

BARRY's criticisms of *multiculturalism* (in this context, multiculturalism is the view that government should support the existence and continuation of distinct ethnocultural groups through state action and policy)

1. the equality criticism (63-64): extreme economic inequality is a much more serious problem than cultural recognition; concern with the latter has diverted attention from the former.

2. collective goals criticism (64-68): It is not appropriate for a democratic liberal state to grant rights or recognition to group goals, including cultural maintenance, protection, or expression. Only individuals can have rights and individuals should have the exact same rights independent of their group identities. Cultures do not have rights. [NOTE: by "liberalism," Barry means what Taylor calls the "American" rather than the "Canadian" version of liberalism {see handout on Taylor for this distinction}]

3. (68-71) At the same time, it is not correct to portray liberalism as hostile to group difference and group identities, as Taylor sometimes implies. Giving rights solely to individuals does not mean groups cannot maintain themselves. Liberalism simply provides a common framework for groups to coexist under common laws; it just will not use the state to support those groups pro-actively. [this is not a criticism of MCism but a defense of non-multiculturalist liberalism.]

4. The assimilation criticisms:

a. (72-76): Multiculturalism assumes that assimilation (one group giving up its culture and its identity) is a bad thing; but it is not a bad thing in its own right. It is only bad under certain conditions, e.g. if forced upon the assimilating group. Barry also points out that "assimilation" requires the receiving country to accept the group as "part of them." If the new, immigrating group *tries* to assimilate by adopting the new country's culture, but the group is not accepted in doing so by the new country, this is not assimilation, but only "acculturation." At the same time, he also points out that a group can become assimilated without *trying* to do so; it can just happen "naturally" (75). [Barry's stance on the assimilation question is similar to Callan's, in "The Ethics of Assimilation."]

b. (77-81) Independent of this point, civic nationalism (Barry's favored type of national identity, explained by Frederickson) does not require assimilation but is consistent with cultural plurality (which he misleadingly calls "additive assimilation," where the group adds a new national identity onto its original cultural identity {this is what Du Bois was calling for for African Americans})(81). Civic nationalism involves loyalty of all citizens to common institutions, political ideals, and a sense of the common good that transcends the good of one's ethnic group, as well as a degree of economic equality also. But it allows cultural groups to retain their original cultural identities, and so not to be assimilated.

WALDRON

Waldron's critique of multiculturalism is somewhat indirect. He begins by distinguishing two models of the relation between *individual identity* and *culture*. These are not models of what *should be*, but of what *is*.

1. *One Person. One Culture*

Each person has only one primary culture, which provides both a community for that person, and a meaning system in which the person fashions her life.

2. *One Person. Many Fragments*

Each person in a multicultural society (i.e. almost every society in today's world) constructs her individual identity through picking and choosing from the plurality of cultural materials ("fragments") that are available to her. People do not need, nor typically have, a unified, single culture (or community) on which to base their identity. (104: "People need culture, but they don't need cultural integrity.")

Waldron implies that the Many Fragments model better represents the identities of most people in culturally pluralistic societies (i.e. virtually everyone) than the One Culture model does. He seems to provide 2 somewhat different arguments for this:

A. people are affected by many cultures, not just one, in the constitution of their identity.

B. cultures themselves are hybrids. There are almost no pure cultures in culturally pluralistic societies, and so hardly any cultures to play the role attributed to them in the One Culture model.

The two models have distinct normative implications for interpersonal and social relationships in multicultural societies, and for multicultural education. The One Culture model implies that in order to respect someone, you have to respect her primary culture; and that the wider society should ensure the protection and continuance of the community that bears the culture, and the culture itself. (This argument is attributed to Kymlicka in the article, but it is essentially the same argument made by Taylor. Although Taylor and Kymlicka differ in certain respects—Taylor criticizes Kymlicka in his

essay—they agree on the One Culture model.) With respect to multicultural education, the One Culture model implies that the appropriate objects of respectful study are whole cultures in their distinctness and difference from other cultures.

The Many Fragments model implies that the focus of respect is not a culture but what each individual person has constructed for herself from her own cultural fragments, and perhaps the capacity for identity-construction itself. What are the implications for multicultural education? See p. 114, where Taylor's view is rejected, but what exactly is put in its place?