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defined as of the mutually supportive sort which he and Aristotle describe. Indeed it is then a truism. But there can be “close personal relationships” which lack such a moral dimension. People often enjoy each other’s company, sometimes quite intimately, without caring very much about each other’s well being. Indeed a central moral predicament of love is when to put the interests of the individuals involved ahead of their mutual interest in the relationship. (This is the theme, for example, of *The Normal Chaos of Love* by U. Beck and E. Beck-Gernsheim, Cambridge: Polity 1995.) Some go for mutual fun every time. This commitment can “establish and maintain” the relationship for quite a long time. Certainly one should not claim that *only* moral people can sustain a close relationship.

A final worry concerns his defence of the thesis that “we should understand persons in terms of embodied activity”, and that persons are “organisms which behave in certain complex ways” (p. 76). Those who love each other, he says, “do not need to *feel* anything” (p. 9). Emotions, according to LaFollette, are habits, “deeply entrenched dispositions” (p. 34). The only feelings he allows are of visceral changes which are the effect of some emotions (pp. 28–9). LaFollette’s argument for denying that emotions involve personal feelings is the old fallacious one: “the very idea that people might hide their emotions would be senseless unless behaviour were constitutive of emotion” (p. 39). False: behaviour could be a symptom of the emotion, not constitutive of it, just as spots are a symptom of a measles infection and not constitutive of it. So the fact that people can hide their emotions does not prove that behaviour is constitutive of them. Normally we think of behaviour expressing an emotion, rather than being constitutive of it.

LaFollette is clearly impatient with love which lacks care, and his analysis of the dispositions which sustain caring love, in the second part of his book, is generally fine. It is only when he tries to spin theoretical conclusions about human nature out of his preferred kind of love, in the first part of the book, that he becomes quite unconvincing.

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Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture, and Philosophy, by Michele M. Moody-Adams. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997. Pp. 254. H/b \$35.00.

Michele Moody-Adams’s *Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture, and Philosophy* is a strikingly original and deeply challenging work in moral philosophy. Moody-Adams brings a more serious engagement with anthropology and historiography (especially the historiography of slavery) to a general philosophical encounter with moral relativism than one is accustomed to

in the more theoretical discussions of relativism. Moody-Adams defends a complex form of culturally-sensitive anti-relativist moral objectivity. In the course of doing so, she has fascinating things to say about an unusual combination of topics—moral inquiry, moral philosophy, the nature of culture, the role of interpretation in morality, the relation of race to culture, multiculturalism, as well as other topics. Beyond that, I will not attempt to characterize the overall argument of this complex book, but will take up a few of its major themes.

Moody-Adams appears to regard (normative) moral relativism, in one of the forms in which she criticizes it, as the view that no outsider to a culture has the moral standing to criticize the practices of that culture. In chapter one, Moody-Adams criticizes a purportedly empirical view she calls “descriptive relativism” or “descriptive cultural relativism” (DCR), a view she plausibly attributes to many anthropologists, that provides support for this normative relativism. DCR is the view that distinct cultures generally differ in their fundamental values.

Part of Moody-Adams’s argument against DCR involves four claims for which Moody-Adams provides compelling arguments. (1) Cultures are not internally integrated wholes but rather contain divergent and sometimes contradictory tendencies. (2) Cultures are not purely self-contained and isolated, but, on the contrary have been and are generally in continual interaction with other cultures; thus boundaries between cultures are not sharp nor fixed. (3) Cultures have histories; they change over time, not only because of the influence of other cultures but as part of their own internal dynamics. And (4) while cultures influence individual belief and behavior, that influence can not be construed deterministically.

Moody-Adams attributes particular importance to (1). For example, a culture may contain certain tendencies supporting genital cutting of young girls, but there will also be aspects of this culture running counter to this practice, or that at least provide moral resources with which those practices can be opposed. Moody-Adams is particularly good about reminding the reader about the perspective of the apparent victims of a given practice. Are *they* part of the alleged cultural consensus supporting the practice?

Moody-Adams links this internal diversity of cultures to outsiders’ warrant in criticizing the cultures in question. If members of the culture themselves are critical of it, she seems to say, then what is to deprive informed outsiders from making criticisms as well? If nothing more, they can simply echo the criticisms being made by a particular group of insiders.

Such internal criticisms, however, do not necessarily yield all of the moral notions an outsider might feel appropriate to evaluating a culture or moral practice. For example de Tocqueville pointed out that serfs often rebelled against treatment by their masters, thus showing a lack of moral consensus on the practice of serfdom; but they almost never challenged the justice of the system of serfdom itself.

Moody-Adams attempts to plug up this gap with the idea that there are no genuinely new fundamental moral ideas, only differences in interpretation and application of them. This “no new ideas” view resonates with other of Moody-Adams’s claims. In general she wishes to reduce the sense of difference or differentness that readers of her book—and perhaps the general category of Western intellectuals—may feel both from previous historical eras, and cultures lacking advanced industrial economies, republican democracies, protections of individual rights, and the like. She wishes to challenge the sense of “otherness” that many discussions of different cultures and historical eras imply. So, she suggests, ideas that we may claim to find alien, such as the existence of certain “natural” hierarchies, may often find their counterparts in our own societies. On the other side, ideas that we use to criticize past and present societies are present, in some form, in those societies themselves. So she resists those who would mitigate or deny criticism of ancient Greeks for practicing slavery.

Moody-Adams recognizes that the claim that there are essentially no fundamentally new moral ideas seems at odds with what appear to be new moral sensibilities appearing on the historical horizon. Consider her discussion (one of several, all very interesting) of slavery. Why was the suffering of slaves recognized for thousands of years before a distinct opposition to the entire institution of slavery arose in the 18th century and 19th century?

Moody-Adams replies, “[O]ne must ask whether there was really a new sensibility, or whether this was just a case of a familiar tendency to recognize a moral imperative and nonetheless fail to act on it” (p. 98). But this hardly constitutes the sort of historical explanation required to explain why a morally bad institution began to be attacked. One still needs to know why people failed to act on their convictions in one historical era but not another.

In her discussion of anti-slavery sentiment, Moody-Adams also takes a view entirely opposite to this morally centered one. She says, “[I]t is quite possible that most of the significant changes in human history have had less to do with “moral progress” or any spontaneous outburst of new humanitarian sentiments, or even a stimulation of moral debate, than with considerations of social expediency and enlightened self-interest” (p. 96). This *a priori* materialist view of history seems to come from nowhere in Moody-Adams’s argument. Moreover, it runs counter to one of her purposes in supporting moral objectivity, which is to lend credence to the moral confidence necessary to bring about a better world. In any case, the extent to which either moral ideas and sentiments or self-interest actually played a causal role in any given historical change, especially one with distinctly moral import, is an empirical matter.

The “no new ideas view” is, in any case, implausible in its own right. In chapter five, Moody-Adams notes that indigenous peoples have often appropriated the idea of “rights” to give voice to their grievances. One might think this a new moral idea. But Moody-Adams implies that “rights” articulates a

part of the users' moral experience that was already present but had not, as it were, found its true expression. But is it not equally plausible to say that indigenous peoples have simply adopted a moral idea not present in, and even alien to, their way of thinking, because they recognize that this idea is most likely to achieve their legitimate aims for autonomy? Or even that the indigenous people have now incorporated not only the language but the substance of the idea of rights into their actual thinking; but that this idea is still a genuinely new one for them? That every society recognizes moral claims of *some* sort does not mean that a particular type of such claim—such as a “right”—does not constitute a new moral idea.

The possibility of rationally resolving actual moral disagreement is a further theme in Moody-Adams's book, and her discussions of this issue in chapters one, three, and five are rich, challenging, and often original. Chapter one argues in favor of the following proposition (actually stated in chapter three): “The persistence of serious and unresolved moral disagreement simply does not license the conclusion that some moral disagreements are intrinsically irresolvable” (p. 108). She challenges pluralists or relativists like David Wong and Isaiah Berlin who believe that irresolvable moral disagreement is an ineradicable fact of human experience.

Part of Moody-Adams's point is simply that people often do not try hard enough actually to attempt to resolve their moral disagreements. A kind of intellectual laziness, which can itself be enhanced by a prior commitment to relativism, can get in the way of doing so, as can an unwillingness to appreciate that the final resolution of some moral disagreement might be an especially complex position. While an excellent point and a valuable contribution to the nature of the dispute between objectivists and relativists, this pragmatic defense of moral objectivity—that it will discourage premature jettisoning of the search for resolution of moral disagreement—should recognize an entirely different consequence of believing in moral objectivity—believing that one's own view is “the correct” view, and therefore writing other views off without engaging with them.

One reason Moody-Adams seems to wish to hold out for the possibility of transcultural and transhistorical moral judgment concerns her important and interesting notion of “moral confidence”. Moral confidence, she says “involves, first, a conviction of the worth of making judgments that purport to transcend historical and cultural boundaries, and, second, a conviction that it is sometimes possible to justify such judgments (across various boundaries) without resort to threats or coercion, etc.” (p. 197). Belief in moral objectivity is required for having moral confidence. People are not going to risk death, serious injury or imprisonment for values they regard as merely relative. She cites the Freedom Riders in the American South in the early 1960's and Chinese students in Tienanmen Square as paradigms of those operating with moral confidence. (In general, Moody-Adams's book is greatly enhanced by

its frequent use of real, historical examples, a product of her salutary interdisciplinary sensibility.)

This claim seems especially implausible with regard to the actional component in moral confidence. Action often takes place in a very localized context. Values on which it is based may generally require a belief in *some* sort of general validity—and in that sense “objectivity”—beyond the conscience of the participants. But the nature of that objectivity is still perfectly compatible with less than universal moral commitments. For example, surely many Freedom Riders may have held to a kind of “national relativism”—that other societies may have their own ideals and principles, but here in the United States we are supposed to be committed to freedom and equality, so racial segregation is wrong.

Moody-Adams does not seem to have resolved her view of the significance of moral disagreement and the possibilities for claiming that in principle every disagreement is resolvable. In chapter three, she makes the valuable point that a rational response to disagreement is not always to seek agreement, but to find a way to live with others, and learn from them, in light of disagreements. This view departs from the spirit of the earlier account, emphasizing the possibility of agreement, but is not strictly inconsistent with it, since there *could* be agreement even when it would not be rational to seek it.

However, in chapter five, “Morality and Culture Through Thick and Thin”, she appears to advocate the view, which she here calls “critical pluralism”, that she criticizes earlier in the book: “It is reasonable to posit that when everyone has had experience and her “say”, the whole truth about morality will come down to some kind of pluralism about evaluative practices and standards” (p. 202). This form of pluralism allows that some ways of life and practices are morally unacceptable.

Such a view is not very different from that of Berlin, and indeed of David Wong either. Moody-Adams recognizes this, and distinguishes her view from Berlin’s by its leaving room for persons who do not recognize the truth of that pluralism, while Berlin says that it is morally immature to shield one’s convictions from the contingency attendant upon an embrace of pluralism.

Perhaps the view of chapters one to three and that of chapter five can be reconciled. The rejection of ultimate moral disagreement could be seen not as a final truth but as a guideline—a principle that should guide our moral inquiries and moral interactions. We should, according to this guideline, never remain content with a disagreement but always seek to deepen our conversation, inquiry, and interchange so as to seek a way to resolve it. At some point the practical requirements of life, including the desire to preserve one’s relations with others (extending to different nations’ and cultures’ needs to preserve their relations with others) may dictate an end to the actual moral dialogue; but even so, the moral individual should not regard that “agreeing to disagree” as signaling a limitation of reason’s ability to resolve the dis-

agreement, and perhaps the individual should still seek to explore that disagreement, seeking its rational resolution.

Interpreting Moody-Adams's view in this way is supported by an important insight she proffers in several places throughout the book—which is that, in point of fact, the existence of moral disagreement is frequently a vital impetus to moral inquiry and moral growth. Moody-Adams also suggests, in the same spirit, that it is our own limitations as human beings that might prevent us from being able to see “the whole truth about morality”; these limitations make moral disagreement both inevitable and also valuable and constructive as correctives to moral dogmatism, simplistic thinking, and smugness.

Thus when Moody-Adams talks in the final chapter about the “whole truth about morality” this could be construed as a kind of noumenal truth—one that is accessible only as a matter of pure theory, but not to actual moral inquirers. It should thus not be taken as a guideline for thinking about morality. To do so would inevitably lead to premature cutting off of rational moral inquiry. Nevertheless, the view is valuable as a corrective to what Moody-Adams regards as totalistic or monolithic moral theories that try to reduce all of moral life to a few simple principles or procedures.

I have pointed to some unclariities or weaknesses in Moody-Adams's account of the significance of moral disagreement, and of her defense of moral objectivism. Nevertheless, it is refreshing to read such a spirited, original, and well-informed account and defense of such a position in moral philosophy, and how sensitivity to cultural differences can be reconciled with objectivism. Moody-Adams is to be commended for showing, what is often lacking in more purely theoretical accounts of either relativism or objectivism, that it really *matters* whether one is an objectivist or not. *Fieldwork in Familiar Places* is a superior and important work in moral philosophy.

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Music, Value and the Passions, by Aaron Ridley. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995. Pp. xi + 199. H/b. £21.95.

This is unarguably a first-rate contribution to philosophical aesthetics, and to musical aesthetics in particular, first-rate despite its cognitive density and due to depth of argument and also the wide range of issues addressed. In particular, Ridley's book is a must-read for all concerned with arousalist accounts of musical expressiveness. A large part of this critical notice takes issue with Ridley's “weak” or moderate arousalism, but first a summation of some of the main claims in the book.

Ridley begins by classifying different kinds of responses to music, and in particular he is concerned with two sorts: what he calls sympathetic responses