**Duty** (or duty all things considered): an act that someone is morally required to perform or to not perform (negative duty: act that person is required to not perform, e.g. killing someone).

**Prima facie duty**: act that would be a duty all things considered except if there is a strong reason against doing it, especially another duty pulling in a contrary direction. For example: there is a prima facie duty to tell the truth when asked; but if SS asks you if you are hiding Jews, and answering truthfully will result in those person’s deaths (and possibly your own), there is no duty all things considered to tell the truth to the SS

**Supererogatory act**: act that is good or admirable to do but not a duty. (Many supererogatory acts are “beyond duty,” e.g. helping someone beyond what is morally required.)

**Jones’s view about rescuing or helping in Holocaust**: (1) some rescue or helping acts that were performed were duties. (2) many people had a duty to help/rescue but did not. (3) some helping/rescue acts were supererogatory.

**Variables affecting how risky or dangerous rescue activities were** (and thus whether persons had a duty to engage in them):
(1) how much control Germans had; differed from country to country (e.g. weak in Italy and France, strong in Poland).
(2) harshness of penalties for rescue (greatest in Poland—death for rescuers).
(3) degree of anti-Semitism in local population (translates into likelihood of rescuer being turned in to Nazis by neighbors) [differs both locally and nationally, e.g. weak in Belgium, Italy, strong in Poland, Germany]

**3 main types of rescue**: helping someone escape; concealing person; giving person false identity that allows them to live in open. Other non-rescue “helping” activities: warning of action against Jews (e.g. Opdyke); taking someone to safe place; giving someone temporary shelter; giving food, water or clothing

**How do we tell if an act of rescue is a duty** (206f):
(1) how much benefit to rescued (e.g. saving her life; conveying regard and solidarity, inclusion in the human community). (Although Jones does not mention this, the number of people potentially saved also seems relevant in this category). (2) value of the act as resistance to Nazism and the Nazi regime (212: not necessarily stopping Nazism but standing up against it and its perverted values). (3) ability/opportunity (213).
(4) degree of risk or danger [Jones does not mention this in his list on 207, but it is required for the distinction that is important to his argument between duty and supererogation. If an act is too risky, he implies, then even if it would save a life or even several lives, it is not a duty. Where the line between “risky but not too risky” and “too risky” is to be drawn cannot be specified with any precision; but the basic idea of that distinction is built into our moral thinking.]

**Jones’s moral typology of non-helpers**:
1) 214: bystanders with obligations that are stronger than their duty to rescue, e.g. family responsibilities [he calls this “justifications for not helping”]
2) 214: bystanders unable to help e.g. because don’t know how to produce or obtain false identity papers [he calls this “bystanders with valid excuses”]
3) 215: bystanders too cowardly or callous so don’t want to help
4) 216: bystanders with “mitigating circumstances”—had duty to help, but some degree of risk, so not fully blameworthy

**Oliners’ psychological profile of rescuers** (comparing to non-rescuers): strong sense of obligation to maintain commitments; empathy for pain and sadness; sense of connection to people ethnically and religiously different; likely to have friends of different classes and religions (but equal contact specifically with Jews, compared to non-rescuers). [rescuers were not more nor less religious than non-rescuers]

4 specific types within this general characterization:
1. strong, cohesive families, generally religious. Saw selves as personally efficacious
2. consistent, close contacts with Jews
3. sense of responsibility for society, stand up for unpopular beliefs
4. strong sense of connection to outgroups. Moved by pain of others.