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SPINOZA'S SHORT TREATISE ON GOD, MAN, & HIS WELL-BEING
STUDIES IN LOGIC
By A. WOLF
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1905

NATURAL REALISM AND PRESENT TENDENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY
By A. WOLF
(IN "PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY"
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ARISTOTLE IN MEDIEVAL JEWISH THOUGHT
By A. WOLF
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ROUTLEDGE AND SONS, 1909
SPINOZA'S SHORT TREATISE
ON
GOD, MAN, & HIS WELL-BEING

TRANSLATED AND EDITED, WITH AN
INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY
AND A
LIFE OF SPINOZA

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ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK
1910
PREFACE

This volume is primarily intended to be an introduction to the philosophy of Spinoza. The Short Treatise, though by no means free from difficulties, is well adapted for the purpose. It contains the essentials of Spinoza's philosophy in a less exacting form than the Ethics with its rigid geometric method. The Short Treatise cannot, of course, take the place of the Ethics, but it prepares the way for a much easier and more profitable study of it than is otherwise possible. The Introduction and the Commentary provide all the help that the reader is likely to require.

At the same time, the Short Treatise has a special interest for more advanced students of Spinoza as the most important aid to the study of the origin and development of his philosophy. And their needs have not been overlooked. Every care has been taken to give a faithful version of the Treatise; notice is taken of all variant readings and notes which are likely to be of any importance; even peculiarities of punctuation and the lavish use of capital letters are for the most part reproduced here from the Dutch manuscripts. And the Introduction and the Commentary, though largely superfluous for the advanced student, will, it is hoped, also be found to contain something that may be interesting and helpful even to him.

The Translation was, in the first instance, based on the Dutch text contained in Van Vloten and Land's second edition of Spinoza's works. Subsequently, however, I spent a very considerable amount of time and trouble in going through the manuscripts themselves, with the result that the present version may, I think, claim to be more complete than any of the published editions or translations.

The Life of Spinoza, which forms the greater part of the Introduction, is based on an independent study of all the available material. This material has been considerably increased in recent years by the researches of the late Prof. Freudenthal, Dr. K. O. Meinsma, and Dr. W. Meyer, so that the older biographies of Spinoza require correction in some respects. I have also utilised to a greater extent than has been done hitherto all that is known of contemporary
Jewish history and Jewish life, and have devoted more attention to Manasseh ben Israel than he has so far received in this connection. It has not been thought necessary to give detailed references to authorities, because the earliest biographies and all the available documents relating to Spinoza have been edited by Prof. Freudenthal in a single volume under the title of Die Lebensgeschichte Spinozas, and the evidence can easily be found there. For the general history of the period I consulted Motley, Blok, and the Cambridge Modern History; and Graetz, for the history of the Jews.

In the second part of the Introduction I confined myself to such a general statement of the history, &c., of the Short Treatise as may be followed without any previous knowledge of the Treatise itself, leaving details for the Commentary, where they are dealt with as occasion arises. By the aid of facsimiles the reader is enabled to judge for himself on various matters which would otherwise have to be taken on trust. In the preparation of this part and of the remainder of the volume I found the writings of Prof. Freudenthal, Dr. W. Meyer, and C. Sigwart very helpful, and I am also indebted more or less to the other writers mentioned on pp. cxxvii/. or in other parts of the volume.

In conclusion, I desire to acknowledge my obligations to all who have helped me in any way. Dr. Byvanck (Librarian of the Royal Library, The Hague) and Mr. Chambers (Librarian of University College, London) have enabled me to consult the MSS. with as little inconvenience as possible. The Royal Society has given me permission to reproduce the facsimile on p. lx. Prof. S. Alexander, of the University of Manchester, has read the Introduction in proof, and made valuable suggestions. I wish to thank them all very cordially, and I hope that the usefulness of the result may in some measure compensate for all the trouble given and taken in the preparation of this volume.

A. WOLF

Harrow, November 1909
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INTRODUCTION

I. THE LIFE OF SPINOZA
II. HISTORY OF THE SHORT TREATISE
"So steht es vor uns, dies Denkerleben, ganz der Wahrheit geweiht, und darin eben beruht die Erhabenheit seiner stillen Größe. Denn zu sterben für die Wahrheit, sagt man, sei schwer—schwerer ist es für sie zu leben."—W. Windelband, Zum Gedächtnis Spinozas.
THE LIFE OF SPINOZA

§ 1. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

Baruch or Benedict * Spinoza was born of Jewish parents, on the 24th of November 1632, at Amsterdam. At that time the Jews of Amsterdam consisted almost entirely of refugees, or the children of refugees, who had escaped from Spain and Portugal, where they had lived as crypto-Jews, in constant dread of the Inquisition.

Spain had been the home of Jews long before the introduction of Christianity. Under non-Christian rule they enjoyed considerable power and prosperity. With the introduction of Christianity, however, came the desire to convert the Jews; and as the Church was not very nice or scrupulous about the methods employed, there commenced a series of intermittent barbarities which stained the annals of medieval Christianity for many centuries. Fortunately for the Jews these persecutions were neither universal nor constant. Bad blood broke out now here, now there, but there were usually also healthy spots, and healthy members, immune from the fell disease. While the fanaticism of the mob was often irritated by envy, the fanaticism of princes was, as a rule, overcome by their personal interests. For the Jews of Spain numbered some of the bravest soldiers, some of the ablest Ministers of State, and, above all, some of the most resourceful financiers. The Kings of Spain and Portugal, accordingly, took the Jews under their protection, though they could not always prevent outbreaks which involved the loss of thousands of Jewish lives. During periods of respite, Jews outvied their neighbours in

* Benedichus is simply the Latin equivalent of the Hebrew Baruch.
their devotion to literature, science, and philosophy. They produced eminent poets, celebrated doctors and astronomers, and most influential philosophers. Indeed the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries have come to be regarded as the golden age in the history of the Jews since the dispersion, and that chiefly through the distinction achieved by the Jews of Spain. But fanaticism neither slumbered nor slept. And the climax was reached in the year 1492, when, under the baneful influence of Torquemada, the Jews were expelled from Spain, in spite of the golden promises made by Ferdinand and Isabella so long as they needed Jewish aid against Moorish foes. Baptism or banishment—such were the alternatives offered to the Jews. And those who preferred the wanderer’s staff to the baptismal font were prohibited from taking away their gold or silver with them. Some two hundred thousand Jews or more paid the penalty for their religious loyalty, and wandered forth from their native land, the home of their fathers and forefathers for centuries; many thousands of them only to meet with an untimely death owing to the hardships of their wanderings. Some fifty thousand, however, chose baptism, and remained in Spain. Many of them remained Jews at heart, fighting the Jesuits with their own weapons, until an opportunity should present itself of making good their escape with what worldly goods they possessed. Some of these crypto-Jews (or Maranos, as they were called), as also many of the original exiles of 1492, found refuge for a time in Portugal. But only for a short time. Soon the hounds of the Inquisition were on the scent for the Jewish blood of the New Christians, in Portugal as well as in Spain. The most frivolous pretext served as sufficient evidence. Countless converts, or descendants

* The etymology of the name Marano is uncertain. But it seems to have been applied to the New Christians in the sense of “the damned,” possibly in allusion to 1 Corinthians, xvi. 22: If any man loveth not the Lord, let him be anathema maranatha.
of converts, were condemned to the dungeon, the rack and
the stake without mercy, while princes and priests shared the
spoils without scruple. No wonder that the eyes of Spanish
and Portuguese Maranos were ever strained in search of
cities of refuge. About a century after the expulsion from
Spain, good tidings came from the revolted Netherlands.

Not content with the wholesale expulsion and slaughter
of Jews and Moors, the Spanish Inquisition turned its
attention to all Christians who were in any way suspected
of the slightest disloyalty to Roman Catholicism. And the
work of this "holy office" was vastly extended in scope
when the religious policy of Ferdinand and Isabella was
adopted by their grandson, the Emperor Charles V., who
desired nothing less than the entire extermination of all
heresies and heretics, so that the world and the fulness
thereof might be reserved for the exclusive enjoyment of
Roman Catholics, with the Emperor at their head. In
accordance with his policy he issued various edicts for the
extirpation of sects and heresies, and introduced the Inqui-
sition into the Netherlands, with which alone we are here
concerned. On the abdication of Charles in 1555, his son,
King Philip II., continued his religious policy, only with far
greater zeal. Within a month of his accession to the throne
he re-enacted his father's edicts against heresy, and four years
later he obtained from Pope Paul IV. a Bull for an ominous
strengthening of the Church in the Netherlands. Instead
of the four Bishoprics then existing, there were to be three
Archbishoprics with fifteen Bishoprics under them, each
Bishop to appoint nine additional prebendaries, who were to
assist him in the matter of the Inquisition, two of these to
be inquisitors themselves. Four thousand Spanish troops
were stationed in the Netherlands, the government was more
or less in the hands of Anthony Perrenot, Archbishop of Mechlin (better known as Cardinal Granvelle), a kind of
Torquemada after Philip's own heart, and his underling the
inquisitor Peter Titelmann, who rushed through the country like a tempest, and snatched away whole families to their destruction, without being called to account by any one. Fortunately for the Netherlands, William of Orange, Stadt-
holder of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht, had learned from King Henry of France the whole extent of Philip's bloody schemes for the extirpation of dissenters. Though at that time a Catholic himself, he revolted from such heartless inhumanity in the guise of religion, and determined to watch and wait. In the meantime, the holy inquisitors had ample opportunity to slake their unholy thirst. Wedged in between France and Germany, the Netherlands were naturally influenced by the Calvinism of the one and the Lutheranism of the other. Under the circumstances, to give unlimited power to the Inquisition meant practically to condemn a whole people to death. The people were furious. Various leagues and confederacies were formed. The position of affairs seemed for a time so threatening that the Regent, Margaret of Parma, a worthy disciple of Loyola, granted an Accord in 1566 in which the Inquisition was abolished. But this was only done to gain time by duping the rather tactless malcontents. The following year, 1567, there appeared on the scene Alva, the most bloodthirsty and unscrupulous villain even of his generation. He brought with him ten thousand veteran troops to purge the Netherlands of heretics. And now commenced the grim struggle for existence which was to last eighty long years (1567-1647). After various fortunes and misfortunes the seven northern provinces, more or less deserted by the ten southern provinces, leagued themselves together by the Union of Utrecht, in 1579, to defend one another "with life, goods, and blood" against the forces of the King of Spain, and they decreed, at the same time, that "every citizen shall remain free in his religion, and that no man shall be molested or questioned on the subject of divine worship." The united provinces managed to hold their own under the leadership of "Father
William," the silent but sleepless guardian of his country's fortunes. Commerce also soon revived, for Dutch sailors were more than a match for the Spaniards, whom the English also helped to cripple, notably by the destruction of the great Armada in 1588.

The Netherland revolt against Spain and the Inquisition was, we may be sure, followed with keen interest by the Spanish and Portuguese Maranos, who had their relatives and agents in all the European centres of commerce. The decree of toleration included in the Union of Utrecht seemed to hold out some promise to them; and the lot of the Maranos was not likely to improve (indeed their needs only became more urgent) when Portugal was conquered by Spain in 1579. About the year 1591 there arrived in Amsterdam a new consul from the King of Morocco. The consul's name was Samuel Pallache, and he was a Jew. He commenced negotiations with the magistrates of Middelburg, in Zeeland, for the settlement of Portuguese Maranos there. The religious temper of the clergy made the negotiations fruitless. But the Portuguese Maranos were in such straits that some of them resolved to seek refuge in Holland without any preliminary arrangements, relying simply on the natural sympathy of the Dutch with all fellow-victims of Philip and the Inquisition. Accordingly, in 1593 there arrived in Amsterdam the first batch of Marano fugitives. They had sailed from Oporto, and had had an adventurous voyage. They were captured by English buccaneers and taken to London. They owed their release chiefly to the bewitching beauty of one of their number, the fair Maria Nunes, who had an audience of Queen Elizabeth, and actually drove with her in an open carriage through the streets of London. An English Duke offered her his hand, but the beautiful Marano declined the honour, being determined to return to the religion of her ancestors. Such was the spirit of these fugitive Maranos who settled in Amsterdam, and secretly returned to Judaism. The secret leaked out in 1596. They
were celebrating the Day of Atonement, at the house of the above-mentioned Pallache, when their mysterious gathering aroused the suspicion of neighbours. Armed men thereupon arrived on the scene, and arrested the surprised worshippers who were suspected of being Papists. But when it was explained that they had fled from the Inquisition, that they had brought considerable wealth with them, and would do their utmost to promote the commercial prosperity of Amsterdam, they were set free and left in peace. Two years later, in 1598, they were allowed to acquire their first place of worship, though it was not till 1619 that formal permission was given to the Jews to hold public worship, nor were they recognised as citizens till 1657. At all events the first Jews settled in Amsterdam in 1593, and others soon followed from Spain, Portugal, France and elsewhere. What interests us here is that among these early arrivals were Abraham Michael d'Espinoza and his son Michael, who was to be the father of our philosopher, Benedict Spinoza.

§ 2. THE HOME OF SPINOZA

The name Spinoza (also written variously as Espinosa, d'Espinoza, Despinoza, and De Spinoza) was most probably derived from Espinosa, a town in Leon. The Spinozas lived originally in Spain. During the persecutions there some of them seem to have outwardly embraced Christianity. (As late as 1721 eight descendants of theirs, living in or near Granada, were condemned to life-long imprisonment as Judaising heretics.) Some fled to Portugal, others to France, but they met again in Amsterdam as soon as it became known that Jews were tolerated there. Benedict's grandfather is twice described in the Synagogue archives as Abraham Espinosa of Nantes, from which it
would appear that he lived there some time. On the other hand, it seems that Michael (his son, and the father of Benedict) stayed at one time in Figueras, near Coimbra, and that his third wife hailed from Lisbon. And as tradition unanimously describes Spinoza as of Portuguese descent, it seems reasonable to suppose that his father and grandfather came from Spain or Portugal, and that their stay in France was only brief.

Very little is known of Spinoza’s father and grandfather. They were merchants, and were evidently held in high esteem. For, already in 1622, we find Abraham Espinosa filling an important honorary office in the Amsterdam Jewish community, of which he seems to have been the recognised head in 1628. His son, Michael Espinosa, held office even more frequently. He was Warden of his Synagogue in 1633, 1637-8, 1642-3, and again in 1649-50, when he was also one of the Wardens of the Amsterdam Jewish School, and presided over the charity for granting loans without interest. If not rich, he was probably well-to-do. In 1641, it is true, we still find him living in the Vloyenburgh, but this was probably not at that time the poor quarter which it became subsequently. Soon afterwards, however, he moved into the Houtgragt (now the Waterlooplein), and the house in which he lived the closing years of his life looks substantial even now. It is numbered 41, and can also be identified by a stone tablet (placed there in 1743) which bears the inscription “t Oprechte Tapijthuis” (the upright tapestry house). But, whatever his worldly fortune may have been, Michael had more than his share of domestic sorrow. His first wife died in 1627. His second wife, Hannah Deborah, the mother of Benedict, died in 1638. He married again in 1641; but his third wife, a Lisbon lady, also predeceased him in 1652. The year before, in 1651, his daughter, Miriam, died at the age of 22, and but a little more than a year after her marriage to
Samuel de Casseres. Michael had also lost three other children, and only two of his six children, namely, Benedict and a daughter, Rebekah (born of the first marriage), survived him when he died shortly afterwards, in 1654.

The childhood of Spinoza was no doubt happy enough. Until he was five he would be entirely under his mother's care, as was the Jewish custom. Then his school-life would begin, with its quaint introductory ceremonial. The ceremony connected with the little boy's entrance into school-life was probably one of the last, and happiest, of the poor mother's experiences. It was performed partly in school and partly in the Synagogue, of which his father was Warden at the time. According to traditional custom, three cakes of fine flour and honey were baked for the boy by a young maiden, and fruit was provided in profusion. One of his father's learned friends would carry him in his arms to the Synagogue, where he would be placed on the reading-dais while the Ten Commandments were read from the Scroll of the Law. Then he would be taken to school to receive his first lesson in Hebrew. Some simple Hebrew verses would be smeared on a slate with honey, and little Baruch would repeat the Hebrew letters, and eat the honey and other dainty things, so that the words of the Law might be sweet to his lips. And then into his mother's arms!

Unfortunately his mother died when Baruch was barely six years old, and, for the next three years or so, he was left to the care of his stepsister, Rebekah, who may not have been more than twelve years of age herself. To judge by subsequent events, there was probably not much love lost between Rebekah and Baruch. For, when their father died in 1654, she did her utmost to prevent Benedict from receiving his share of the inheritance, and he went to law, though he let her keep nearly everything after he had won the lawsuit. At his death also her conduct was not
exemplary; she hastened to the Hague to claim her inheritance, but made off again as soon as she learned that the property left was hardly enough to cover his debts and funeral expenses. All this, however, belonged as yet to the future. In the meantime one may well imagine the pathetic picture of the child standing by his mother's grave and lisping the mourner's prayer in Hebrew, which he had but just commenced to learn. For nearly a whole year afterwards he might be seen twice or three times each day in the neighbouring Synagogue, reciting aloud that same mourner's prayer, with a mysterious feeling of awe and solemnity, yet glad withal to be doing something for his poor mother. Each anniversary of her death would be commemorated by a special light that was kept burning at home for twenty-four hours in memory of a light that had failed, but was believed to be still shedding its rays in another sphere. And the solemn days of the Jewish calendar were only made more solemn for him by tender memories of "the touch of a vanished hand, and the sound of a voice that was still."

We must not, however, exaggerate the sad side of young Spinoza's life—though it certainly had its sad side. When he was in his ninth year he received a stepmother. Being but a recent Marano refugee from Lisbon she may not have been exactly the kind of woman to inspire young Spinoza with any specially warm attachment to Judaism. Like so many Maranos she may have been half Catholic in her training, from the necessity of outward conformity to Roman Catholicism. Still, she was probably kind to the children, and the home would resume its normal tone. The Jewish calendar, moreover, has its joyous Festivals, even its frivolous carnival; and a good Jew like Michael Espinosa was not likely to neglect his religious duty to be and to make merry on these occasions. First, there was the weekly Sabbath and Sabbath eve (Friday evening) so often and so justly celebrated in verse—even by Heine, in his
INTRODUCTION

Princess Sabbath. The spirit in which it was celebrated is perhaps best expressed in the following verses from one of the later Sabbath hymns:

"Thou beautiful Sabbath, thou sanctified day,
That chasest our cares and our sorrows away,
O come with good fortune, with joy and with peace
To the homes of thy pious, their bliss to increase!

"In honour of thee are the tables decked white;
From the clear candelabra shines many a light;
All men in the finest of garments are dressed,
As far as his purse each hath got him the best.

"For as soon as the Sabbath-hat is put on the head,
New feelings are born and old feelings are dead;
Yea, suddenly vanish black care and grim sorrow,
None troubles concerning the things of to-morrow.

"New heavenly powers are given to each;
Of everyday matters now hushed is all speech;
At rest are all hands that have toiled with much pain;
Now peace and tranquillity everywhere reign." *

Then there were the three Pilgrim Festivals, Passover, Pentecost, and Tabernacles, all of them essentially joyous in character. On the first two evenings of Passover especially, children play an important rôle. One can easily imagine the important air with which little Baruch opened the domestic celebrations on these occasions by asking the meaning of such strange dishes as bitter herbs, a yellow-looking mixture of almonds, cinnamon and apples, &c. By way of answer his father would then relate to the assembled household the old, yet ever new story of the bitter lives which the Israelites had lived in Egypt, of the bricks and mortar with which they had to build Pithom and Ramses under cruel taskmasters, until God delivered them from

* Translated by I. Myers (see I. Abrahams: Jewish Life in the Middle Ages, p. 136).
their oppressors. And the familiar story of ancient Egypt and its tyrants would soon lead up to the more recent barbarities in Spain and Portugal. Possibly, nay most probably, there were strangers, guests at table—for hospitality had become, not a luxury, but a necessity among the wandering Jews. Perhaps some recent arrival, fresh from the hell-fires of the Inquisition, would relate the latest story of martyrdom. On such an occasion it may have been that Spinoza heard of the martyrdom of "a certain Judah, called the Faithful, who in the midst of the flames, and when he was already believed to be dead, commenced to chant the psalm To thee, O God, I commit my Soul, and died singing it."* But the ground-notes of the Passover evening celebrations were those of courage, and faith that the Guardian of Israel neither slumbered nor slept.

There were also other celebrations of Israel's deliverance in the past. There was the Feast of Lights, or of the Rededication of the Temple (Chanukah) in memory of the brave Maccabees. A whole week was more or less spent as a half-holiday, and given to games and merriment. The spirit of the holiday is well expressed in a gay table-hymn composed by Ibn Ezra, the poet and commentator of whom Spinoza thought so highly. The following are the opening stanzas:

"Eat dainty foods and fine,
And bread baked well and white,
With pigeons, and red wine,
On this Sabbath Chanukah night.

CHORUS.
"Your chattels and your lands
Go and pledge, go and sell!
Put money in your hands,
To feast Chanukah well!"†

* Epistle 76. The incident took place at Valladolid on the 25th of July 1644.
† See I. Abrahams, op. cit. p. 135.
Then there was the Feast of Lots (Purim) in celebration of Israel's escape from the evil designs of Haman, as told in the Book of Esther. As the life of the Jew would become intolerably solemn if all his persecutors were taken seriously, Haman was treated more like a clown than a villain, and the half-holiday associated with his name was celebrated as a kind of carnival, when it was deemed wrong to be staid, and when wits were readily indulged in parodying even Rabbis and prayers, and had ample licence to make fools of themselves and of others. Above all it was the occasion for plays, Purim plays, as they were called. At that time these were not yet set plays, but informal buffooneries linked to the story of Ahasuerus and Haman, or, by way of variety, turning on the story of the Sale of Joseph, or David's encounter with Goliath, and the like. On one such occasion Spinoza may have witnessed a play written by one of his senior school-fellows, Moses Zacuto, whose L'Inferno Figurato (written in Hebrew) expressed the writer's scorn of the Inquisition. The hero of the story was Abraham, whose steadfastness against Nimrod and legendary escape from the fiery furnace were meant to typify the Jewish fortunes in Spain.

Lastly, mention may also be made of what may roughly be described as a kind of Confirmation ceremony when Spinoza completed his thirteenth year. On that Sabbath he would chant aloud in the Synagogue a portion of the Law, or Pentateuch, and possibly also the portion from the Prophets appointed to be read on that day. After the service in the Synagogue, his father would entertain all his friends at home in honour of the occasion, and young Baruch would, according to custom, make a speech at table. This speech would, of course, have been carefully prepared by him for the occasion, not without the assistance of his teacher; and filial gratitude for the past and lavish promises for the future would begin and end a more
or less learned discourse. One would like to know what he actually did say, and what he thought of it all afterwards!

In the meanwhile his time must have been fully occupied. He was at school from 8 till 11 each morning, and from 2 till 5 in the afternoon on weekdays; and some of the hours when he was not at school were occupied in school preparation, and also in the study of secular subjects under a private teacher or teachers. Most probably he continued to study at the Jewish school or academy until he was eighteen, so as to give him an opportunity to develop that uncommon ability of which he showed unmistakable signs at the age of fifteen in the perplexing questions which he asked of Rabbi Morteira. At eighteen it was high time to think of a means of livelihood. His brother, or half-brother, Isaac died just about that time. His father may have thought of taking him into business. But Spinoza's tastes did not lie in the direction of business. He preferred to seek the means of support in some occupation that would keep him in touch with science and scholarship. This probably determined him to learn the art of polishing lenses, which was taken up by many learned men of his generation. By that time he may already have shown some of his heretical tendencies, and these may have given rise to some little friction at home. Possibly this was the reason why his half-sister Rebekah and his brother-in-law de Casseres tried soon afterwards to exclude him from his share of the property which his father left when he died. Spinoza, however, could scarcely have been so inconsiderate as to cause his father unnecessary pain, and most probably he kept most of his doubts to himself, and remained in his father's house so long as his father lived, that is to say, till March 1654, when he was in his twenty-second year.
§ 3. THE EDUCATION OF SPINOZA

The general features of Spinoza's early education it is not difficult to delineate. The Amsterdam Jewish community had their own boys' school, which was founded about 1638, and which all Jewish boys would attend as a matter of course. The general curriculum of this school is known from contemporary accounts. We also know the names and characters of some of its most important teachers in the time of Spinoza. There were seven classes in the school. In the lowest class little boys were taught to read their prayers in Hebrew. In the second class they learned to read and chant the Pentateuch in Hebrew. In the next class they were taught to translate parts of the Pentateuch from Hebrew into Spanish (which for a long time continued to be the mother-tongue of many Amsterdam Jews, notwithstanding the worse than stepmotherly treatment which had been meted out to them and their fathers in Spain). Here also they commenced to study Rashi's Hebrew Commentary on the Pentateuch—a commentary written in the eleventh century, but sober far beyond its age. The boys in the fourth class studied the Prophets and the Hagiographa. In the remaining higher classes they studied Hebrew Grammar, portions of the Talmud and of the later Hebrew Codes, the works of Ibn Ezra, Maimonides, and others, according to the discretion of the Rabbi who instructed and advised them. The school hours were from 8 till 11 A.M. and from 2 till 5 P.M. (or earlier during the winter months). We are explicitly informed that during the hours that the boys were at home they would receive private tuition in secular subjects, even in verse-making. The school also possessed a good lending library.

Of the teachers under whose influence Spinoza must have come during his school-days, the most important
undoubtedly were Rabbi Saul Morteira and Rabbi Manasseh ben Israel. Saul Morteira was the senior Rabbi of Amsterdam. Born in Venice about 1596 he studied medicine under Montalto, the Marano Court physician of Maria de' Medici. Montalto died suddenly while accompanying Louis XIII. to Tours, in 1616, and it was the desire to bury Montalto in a Jewish cemetery that brought Saul Morteira to Amsterdam, where the Jews had only recently (1614) acquired a cemetery in Ouwerkerk (also called Ouderkerk), not very far from the city. While in Amsterdam, Morteira accepted a call to the Rabbinate of the older of the two Synagogues there (the House of Jacob). A third Synagogue came into existence two years later, but in 1638 the three Synagogues were amalgamated, and Morteira acted as the senior or presiding Rabbi till his death, in 1660. Morteira had had a taste of Court life, and was not altogether wanting in philosophical appreciation; but he was essentially medieval, strait-laced, prosy, and uninspiring. It is related that when Spinoza was but fifteen years old Morteira marvelled at the boy's acumen. By an irony of fate he also presided over the court of Rabbis who issued the ban against Spinoza in 1656.

In Manasseh ben Israel we have a different type of character altogether. He was born in 1604, and had a tragic infancy. His father, Joseph ben Israel, was one of a hundred and fifty Jews whom the Inquisition in Lisbon was about to consign to the flames, in 1605, when Mammon was successfully enlisted against the priests of Moloch. A million gold florins, eight hundred thousand ducats, and five hundred thousand crusados were paid to King Philip III., a hundred thousand crusados to the saintly ecclesiastics, and they became reconciled to spare their victims the flames of hell on earth even if it should entail their loss of heaven hereafter. At the auto-da-fé in January 1605 the unhappy Jews were paraded in penitential garb and
made a formal confession of their secret and most sinful loyalty to the religion of Jesus and of the Prophets. The King graciously obtained papal absolution for their heinous crime, and they were dismissed—alive, it is true, but wrecked in health by torture, and robbed of their possessions by Catholic king and holy priests. Joseph ben Israel naturally fled, at the very first opportunity, with his wife and their infant son Manasseh. They went to Amsterdam, where Manasseh lived nearly all his life. He succeeded his teacher, Rabbi Uzziel, as Rabbi of the second Amsterdam Synagogue (the Habitation of Peace) in 1622, when he was barely eighteen years old; started a Hebrew printing-house about the year 1627; and in 1640 he was about to emigrate to Brazil when he received an important appointment in the senior department of the Amsterdam Jewish School, where Spinoza must have come under his influence. Manasseh was not a great thinker, but he was a great reader, and made up in breadth of outlook for what he lacked in depth of insight. Like so many contemporary theologians he was inclined towards mysticism, it is true, but there was a touch of romance in his character, and, urged by an irresistible yearning to help his suffering brethren, his very mysticism with all its puerilities played a useful part: it prompted him to schemes which may indeed appear quixotic, which certainly brought his life to an untimely end, but which bore fruit nevertheless, and were well adapted to bear fruit in an age in which religion and superstition, the flame and the smoke, were so curiously intermingled. What he conceived to be the mission of his life is indicated in the Biblical verse with which he headed the dedication of his Hope of Israel (1650). The book, it is interesting to observe, was dedicated to Spinoza's father and the other Wardens of the Jewish school. At the head of the dedication is the first verse from Isaiah xli.: To preach good tidings unto the meek; he hath sent me to bind up the broken-hearted.
In 1655 Manasseh came to England on a special mission to Oliver Cromwell for the readmission of the Jews into England. Two years later he returned to the Netherlands, carrying with him the corpse of his eldest son. His great schemes seemed shattered. Poor, prematurely aged, and full of sorrows he died, at Middelburg, in 1657.

Manasseh ben Israel was a prolific writer, and his books show undeniable evidence of very wide reading and extraordinary industry. He cites not only Jewish writers like Ibn Gabril and Maimonides, but also Euripides and Virgil, Plato and Aristotle, Duns Scotus and Albertus Magnus. Poets and legalists, mystics and rationalists—he had an appreciation for all, if not always a very intelligent appreciation. And he rather prided himself on his secular knowledge, and felt flattered when he was described, not simply as a "theologian," but also as a "philosopher" and "Doctor of Physics." On a portrait engraved in 1642 he is described as "Theologicus et Philosphus Hebraeus."* Moreover he had numerous Christian acquaintances and friends, and corresponded with learned men and women in all parts of Europe—even with Queen Christina of Sweden, and Hugo Grotius, the famous statesman, jurist and historian. In various letters to Vossius, Grotius expressed his great and sincere esteem of Manasseh. Gerhard Vossius, "the greatest polyhistor of the Netherlands," was on intimate terms with Manasseh, and visited him often. Nor was Manasseh at all intolerant. He was very friendly with Caspar Barlaeus, the Amsterdam Professor of Philosophy and Rhetoric, who was rather suspected of being a free-thinker. Barlaeus was a noted Latin scholar and poet, and prefixed to one of Manasseh's books (De Creatione) a Latin poem which was

* Over this portrait, it is interesting to note, are also the words Peregrinando Quarimus, which formed the motto or trade-mark of Manasseh's press; in the top left corner there is a small shield with a picture of a pilgrim carrying a staff and lamp, while in the right corner are the Hebrew words for Thy word is a lamp unto my feet (Psalm cxix. 105).
scarcely orthodox. We also hear of Manasseh's presence at a merry gathering in the house of Episcopius in honour of Sobierre, a noted French wit. On occasion, Manasseh would also introduce some of his Jewish friends to his Christian acquaintances. In one of his letters to a Professor at Leyden, Vossius mentions that Manasseh had just paid him a visit, and brought with him a Portuguese Jew, whom he desired to recommend for the medical degree. It does not seem unreasonable to suppose that Manasseh ben Israel exercised a potent personal influence over Spinoza, who must have studied under him for a number of years. Not that Manasseh was competent to make any direct contribution towards the development of Spinoza's philosophy. But his indirect influence must have been considerable. After all, the greatest service which even the best teacher can render does not consist so much in the actual information which he imparts as in the stimulus which he gives, and the love of truth which he inculcates. And Manasseh, we have seen, was a man of wide culture, of broad sympathy, and really devoted to scholarship. What is more likely than that he should use his influence with Spinoza's father so that Baruch might be taught Latin and other secular subjects? And what is more natural than that Manasseh, who encouraged and helped his young Christian friend, a son of Gerhard Vossius, to study and translate Maimonides, should have been even more eager to urge his Jewish students to study their own Hispano-Jewish literature, of which they were justly so proud?

At the house of his Rabbi, Spinoza would occasionally meet Christians who were interested in Judaism, or in the Jewish interpretation of the Old Testament. Here also he may have met Rembrandt, who, between 1640 and 1656, lived in the very heart of the Jewish quarter and was probably on friendly terms with "The Amsterdam Rabbi," as Manasseh was called. For Rembrandt etched a portrait of
Manasseh in 1636, and illustrated one of his books (the *Piedra Gloriosa*, published in 1655). Moreover, in the Hermitage at St. Petersburg, there is a Rembrandt painting of a Rabbi, aged and worn, and believed to be Rabbi Manasseh ben Israel. If so, we must suppose that Rembrandt, hearing of the return and illness of his old friend of twenty years or more, hastened to him to Middelburg, and, deeply impressed by the tragic change which had come over the once handsome but now prematurely aged and broken-down Rabbi, embodied his impression in that portrait. Perhaps it was the art of Rembrandt which stimulated young Spinoza to try his hand at drawing. For we are told that Spinoza was an amateur draughtsman, and his early biographer, Colerus, actually possessed a number of ink and charcoal sketches which Spinoza had made of his friends, also one of Spinoza himself in the costume of Mas Anjellos* (Thomas Aniellos), who in 1647 led the Neapolitan revolt against Spain, and was murdered soon afterwards. In any case, it is known that Spinoza had a number of Christian acquaintances and friends at a very early stage in his career, and that he helped some of them in the study of the Hebrew Bible, and it is not improbable that he was first introduced to some of them by Manasseh ben Israel, the courteous and easily accessible Rabbi, whom they at first consulted when they took up the study of Hebrew. And it is probably more than a mere accident that Spinoza knew and corresponded with Isaac, the son of Gerhard Vossius, and possessed copies of some of the works of both, as also of Grotius, and even of Delmedigo, all of them friends of Manasseh, whose own book, *The Hope of Israel*, Spinoza also possessed.

Last, though by no means least, there was the moral earnestness of Manasseh. He was an earnest disciple of an earnest master. His teacher and predecessor in office, Rabbi Uzziel, was known for his moral courage. It was *

"A fisherman in his shirt with a net over his right shoulder" (Colerus).
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his outspoken condemnation of the moral laxity of a portion of Amsterdam Jewry that led to a schism in the young community, and the formation of a third congregation in 1618. For reasons already explained, some of the members of the community had been Roman Catholics for several generations, and had grown dangerously accustomed to the habit of obtaining priestly absolution for moral delinquencies. Rabbi Uzziel would have none of it. Like the prophets of old he would make no truce with immorality, and denounced it without respect of person. Manasseh ben Israel also had the reputation of being an earnest and eloquent preacher, and probably passed on some of his master's moral earnestness to his pupil Spinoza. No doubt young Spinoza could and did draw from the wells of the living waters; no doubt he could and did draw moral inspiration from the prophetic books themselves. Still, a living example of their moral tone could not fail to intensify his susceptibility to that spirit of the prophets which Spinoza's own writings still breathe.*

The school curriculum, though fairly encyclopaedic in range of subjects, was all in Hebrew. Other languages and the more modern sciences, or the more modern treatment of them, had to be studied outside the school. Spanish and Portuguese he learned from his parents; Dutch, from his environment. Morteira, who was a Venetian by birth, may have taught him some Italian; and Manasseh ben Israel, some French. Latin, we are informed, he learned from a German scholar, possibly a certain Jeremiah Felbinger, a man of rather unorthodox reputation, who may also have taught him German. The study of Latin was not popular among the Jews at that time. It was too intimately associated with Roman Catholicism and the Inquisition. In fact it was usual

* For fuller information about Manasseh ben Israel, see Kayserling's essay in the Miscellany of Hebrew Literature (second series), and L. Wolf's Manasseh ben Israel's Mission to Oliver Cromwell.
among the Jews to speak of Latin as "the priests' language." Hence the knowledge of Latin was not a common accomplishment of Jews then. A certain Mochinger, writing to Manasseh ben Israel in 1632, complained that in Bohemia and Germany he had not come across any Jew who had learnt even the rudiments of Latin; and he goes on to encourage Manasseh to persevere with his Latin and to teach it also to others. Even in Amsterdam, where, as the same writer states, there were a number of Jews who knew Latin well, it was regarded with misgiving as the medium of a worldly wisdom, which, like the "Greek wisdom" of old, was suspected, not without reason, of leading to an estrangement from Judaism. And Spinoza's schoolfellow, Moses Zacuto, to whom reference has already been made above, and who began as a poet and ended as a mystic, actually fasted for forty days by way of penance for his early devotion to Latin. If, therefore, Spinoza studied Latin, it may be taken for granted that he also pursued other secular studies, especially mathematics (which he is reported to have studied under an Italian), and physics, both of which he soon required for optical work, and which may actually have disposed him to learn the art of polishing lenses; probably also the later scholastic philosophy as expounded about that time, in the works of Burgersdijck, Professor of Philosophy at Leyden (died 1632), and by his successor, Heereboord (died 1659). In 1652 Francis van den Enden, an ex-Jesuit, ex-diplomat, ex-bookseller, doctor, and classicist, opened a school in Amsterdam, and Spinoza went there to complete his secular studies. Van den Enden was certainly unorthodox, and was strongly suspected of atheism. Colerus relates that some of the past students of Van den Enden "blessed every day the memory of their parents, who took care in due time to remove them from the school of so pernicious and impious a master." But he was admittedly an able teacher, and Spinoza, no doubt, owed to him his mastery of Latin, also
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what little knowledge he had of Greek, the advancement of his medical and physical knowledge, and most probably also his first introduction to the philosophy of Descartes, whose recent death, in 1650, must have attracted renewed attention to his writings. Van den Enden, as we shall see, was also kind to Spinoza in other ways, and certainly deserved something better than the tragic fate which befell him.

In March 1654 Spinoza's father died. Spinoza had now to provide for his own maintenance. His "schooling" was finished. A new period commenced for him.

§ 4. SPINOZA'S ALIENATION FROM THE SYNAGOGUE—1654-1656

Spinoza had an inborn passion for clear and consistent thinking. And the great intellectual gifts with which fortune had unstintingly endowed him were abundantly exercised and sharpened in the prolonged study of the Hebrew legal and religious codes. These abound in subtle problems and subtler solutions. And whatever Spinoza may have subsequently thought of their intrinsic merits, yet their value as a mental discipline was undeniable. But this power of penetration was slowly but inevitably bringing him into antagonism with the very sources from which it had drawn strength. Moreover, even quite apart from this sharpening of his reasoning powers, his Hebrew studies provided him also with ample material and stimulus for the exercise of his critical acumen. The spirit of rationalism pervades the whole literature of the Jews of the Spanish period,* and the masterpieces of that literature were the pride of the Jewish refugees from the Peninsula, indeed, of all Jews. In the commentary of Abraham Ibn Ezra (1092-1167) he found many bold and suggestive hints. In the Preface,

* See the writer's Aristotle in Medieval Jewish Thought.
Ibn Ezra states that he “will show no partiality in the exposition of the Law,” and although the promise seems bolder than the fulfilment, yet now and again one meets with “a word to the wise” which is just sufficient to direct attention to some inconsistency in Scripture, to the post-Mosaic authorship of certain passages in the so-called Five Books of Moses, or to the different authorship of the first and of the second parts of Isaiah. These hints, obscure as they may seem, justify Ibn Ezra’s claim to be called “the father of the Higher Criticism of the Bible,” and they certainly led to Spinoza’s subsequent important contributions to this kind of Biblical criticism. In the Guide of the Perplexed of Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) his attention was drawn to certain crudities and inconsistencies in Biblical theology, which Maimonides, indeed, tried to explain away, or to reconcile with the requirements of reason, though apparently, in the judgment of Spinoza, with little success. And Maimonides’ treatment of the institution of sacrifices as merely a temporary concession or device to wean Israel from idolatry could not but suggest to Spinoza that other religious customs, too, were only temporary in character and validity. In the writings of Gersonides (1288-1344) he saw rationalism encroaching on miracles and on prophecy, so as to explain away their supposed supernatural character. Maimonides had already boldly asserted that any passage in the Bible which appeared to conflict with reason must be so re-interpreted as to be in harmony with it. This method of “interpreting” Scripture into conformity with reason still seemed to save the priority of the Bible over human reason—though only in appearance. Gersonides went further than that. Frankly admitting the possibility of a real conflict between Reason and Revelation, he openly declared that the Bible “cannot prevent us from holding that to be true which our reason prompts us to believe.” Moreover, the tendency towards free thought was very much in the air.
ever since the Renaissance, and it affected young Jews as it affected others. For example, in 1628 there arrived in Amsterdam a Jewish scholar, Joseph Delmedigo by name, who had studied at the University of Padua. He was well versed in philosophy, medicine, physics, and mathematics, as well as in Hebrew literature, and he had also studied astronomy under Galileo. He seems to have stayed several years in Amsterdam, where Manasseh ben Israel published a selection of his works for him. He was a remarkable product of that age of conflict between the old and the new. Unsettled by the new spirit of the age, yet faithful to the old, his mind inclined now towards scepticism and again towards mysticism, and his nomad life was at once typical and expressive of a restless, vacillating mind seeking in vain to regain its equilibrium. And, to judge from contemporary complaints, Amsterdam Jewry had not a few of such religious malcontents, and the leaders had to cope with the trouble as best they could. Already in 1623 Samuel da Silva, a Jewish physician at Amsterdam, was called upon to write a defence of the immortality of the soul, and the inspiration of the Bible, against the sceptical views aired by Uriel da Costa. In 1632 Manasseh ben Israel published the first part of his Conciliator, wherein he sought to reconcile the apparent inconsistencies of Scripture. The Marano refugees, like others who threw off the yoke of Roman Catholicism, turned back to the Bible, and the difficulties which some of them encountered there may have been one of the causes which prompted Manasseh’s enterprise. Spinoza, no doubt, knew this book. But he probably appreciated the problems which it attacked much more than the solutions which it offered. And if the Bible already presented difficulties, how extravagant and unwarranted must have appeared that elaborate superstructure which the Rabbis had reared upon it “line upon line and precept upon precept”! At all events, Spinoza’s difficul-
ties, in so far as they turned on the narrower problems of the Hebrew Scriptures and Jewish ceremonial, were by no means new. They had been clearly realised, and partly dealt with, by others long before him.

As regards the wider philosophical questions, it is difficult to say what Spinoza’s philosophy was like at that epoch of his life. One can scarcely suppose that his thought was already systematised into a definite philosophic theory. Most likely his views were as yet but loosely connected, and, in the main, negative rather than positive in tendency. And these views also were, in very large measure, if not exclusively, suggested to him by Jewish writers. These more philosophical problems, too, were not altogether new, they had been realised, and grappled with, by other Jews before him. The popular conception of Creation (creatio ex nihilo) had been denied by both Ibn Ezra and Gersonides, who maintained the eternity of matter. Crescas (1340-1410) had maintained that God had extension, and the Jewish Mystics taught that Nature was animated. Maimonides had denied that man was the centre of creation, maintaining that each thing exists for its own sake, and Crescas denied the validity of final causes. Maimonides also had suggested the relativity of good and evil, and Ibn Ezra and Crescas had maintained a thoroughgoing determinism.

Spinoza, however, felt the accumulated burden of all these problems, and he may already have been sufficiently influenced by Cartesian thought to refuse to accept any unproved assertions. Moreover, Spinoza lacked the power (one is almost inclined to call it a gift) which his Jewish predecessors possessed, namely, the power of detaching their theories from their practical everyday life. However advanced or heterodox their views may have been, yet they were conservative in feeling, and conservative in practice, and observed religious customs just like the most orthodox. Such an attitude may easily be accused of duplicity; but
we do not really explain it by calling it bad names. It is often perfectly honest, and it is to be met with in all creeds, at the present no less than in the past. And, after all, the difference is mostly one of degree rather than of kind. Even Spinoza's feeling remained to the end more conservative than his thought. That was why he could not help using the language of religion long after his thought seemed to have emptied it of its religious meaning. At all events he made no secret of his views, and he grew lax in the matter of ceremonial observances, whose theoretic basis no longer appealed to him. The elaborate dietary laws of orthodox Judaism must have been something of an obstacle in his intercourse with Christian friends, and although he, no doubt, observed these laws for a time from sheer force of habit, even when their raison d'être had already lost its hold on him, still he probably got weary of excusing his apparent unsociability on the ground of a custom in which he no longer believed. Moreover, the comparatively liberal religion of his Mennonite and Collegiant * friends, their Quaker-like simplicity, their brotherly equality, their humanitarian repudiation of strife and war, the plain decorum of their prayer-meetings—all this must have tended to make him increasingly dissatisfied with the over-elaborated ceremonial of his own community, and the comparative indecorum of their Synagogue services. On the other hand, his Jewish neighbours were beginning to feel scandalised by this breach of ritual observances, his frequent absence from the Synagogue, and the reports of his attendance at Christian prayer-meetings, especially so, considering that his father and grandfather had held office in the Synagogue, and Baruch himself had been looked upon as a promising "light of the Exile." Mutual distrust developed into mutual antipathy. The conservatives could not understand how any one could, merely on account of personal inconvenience, deliberately ignore divinely ordained

* See p. xli on the character of these sects.
precepts—except from sheer perverseness. They failed to realise that any one who did not accept the divine origin of such customs, and did not see any very obvious moral purpose in them, would simply not think it worth while sacrificing time or anything else on their account. And Spinoza himself was almost equally unsympathetic when he failed to realise that customs which seemed a burden to him were nevertheless felt to be a blessing and a privilege by those who sincerely regarded them as divine ordinances, as opportunities of serving God; while the apparent indecorum of the Synagogue was largely the outcome of Israel's feeling of familiarity with God. Such mutual misunderstandings neither began nor ended in the days of Spinoza. At all events trouble was brewing. After his father's death Spinoza probably became less cautious than before. He did not entirely sever his connection with the Synagogue, for the Synagogue accounts show that he was present in the Synagogue on the Sabbath, the 5th of December 1655, and made an offering. It was the Sabbath of the Feast of Lights, in memory of the Maccabean uprising against Antiochus Epiphanes, and Spinoza had a warm admiration for all enemies of tyranny—did he not actually picture himself in the guise of Aniellos, the Neapolitan rebel against the tyranny of Spain? That Spinoza should have kept up his connection with the Synagogue stands to reason. He could hardly resist the call of filial piety to recite the mourner's prayer for his father, even as, in the days of his childhood, he had done for his mother. The prayer was innocent enough. Though a "mourner's prayer," it was not a prayer for the dead, in fact it contained no reference whatever to the dead. It was a prayer for peace, and its ground-note was that of praise of God, which, coming at the moment of profoundest sorrow, was regarded as the finest expression of resignation and faith. Spinoza could scarcely have taken any serious objection to it, at that time, and on such
an occasion, and he would thus remain attached to the Synagogue during his year of mourning. In the months of September, October, and November fell the anniversaries of the deaths of his sister Miriam, his stepmother, and his mother respectively. He would be expected to attend Synagogue on these occasions, and hardly be disinclined. We need not, therefore, be surprised to find him again in the Synagogue on the 5th of December. In all probability that was not the last occasion either on which he was seen in Synagogue—the anniversary of his father's death, in March 1656, most likely saw him there again. What exactly happened in the interval between March and July 1656 is not certain, though it may not be difficult to conjecture. Possibly some of his young Jewish friends spoke to him on the subject of death—a subject natural enough under the circumstances—and may have been surprised and shocked to hear from him that in his view the Bible did not teach the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and that, in the Bible, "soul" was simply synonymous with "life." This might have led up to the more general question of the existence of disembodied spirits or angels, which Spinoza then described as unreal, and mere phantoms of the imagination. But what about God? would be the natural rejoinder. God, said Spinoza, was also not incorporeal, but extended. At all events, it was these heretical views which were soon afterwards made the ground of his excommunication; but they were not really the whole ground—there were other reasons.

Reference has already been made to the fact that, on the death of their father, Rebekah endeavoured to keep her half-brother from his share in the inheritance. Her idea no doubt was that Spinoza might earn his livelihood, whereas she had nothing wherewith to support herself, and ought therefore to be provided for. Possibly her brother-in-law, de Casseres, a prospective Rabbi, learned in the
Law, and uncommonly shocked by Spinoza's religious lapses, of which Rebekah probably knew much and told him more, advised her that according to strict Jewish law Spinoza's delinquencies disqualified him from inheriting his father's property. Spinoza naturally resented such high-handed methods, and appealed to the law of the land, which of course took no notice of the subtleties of Rabbinic legislation. Spinoza won his lawsuit, but, realising the moral claims of his sister's position, he refrained from taking anything beyond a bedstead, and that very likely as a memento quite as much as an article of value, or of which he had need. This appeal to the secular arm against his sister hardly tended to make him more popular with his people, however little some of them may have sympathised with her peculiar methods. Moreover, the report of his heresies, on which Rebekah had based her exclusive claims, got abroad and was duly magnified as it passed from mouth to mouth.

Meanwhile Spinoza had to earn his bread. He could hardly think of staying with his sister, or with any other relative, after this family quarrel, and he had nothing very definite to fall back upon for his support. Fortunately Van den Enden, realising his pupil's plight, came to his rescue. Spinoza assisted him in his school, and, in return, Van den Enden provided him with a home and all necessaries at his own house. This, of course, entailed a complete breach with the Jewish dietary laws. But this was not all. Van den Enden, as already remarked, had an evil reputation, and his school was strongly suspected of being a centre for the teaching of atheism. Whether Van den Enden really merited his ill repute is by no means certain. That he was not particularly orthodox in his views may be granted; he knew too much to satisfy the requirements of the zealots. On the other hand, it must be remembered that when Dirck Kerckrinck wooed Clara Maria Van den Enden, he had to turn Roman Catholic before her father consented to
the marriage (1671). Be that as it may, the school had a bad name, and Spinoza's reputation did not improve by his more intimate connection with it. Possibly some of the fathers, who subsequently earned the daily blessings of their sons for taking care in due time "to remove them from the school of so pernicious and impious a master" as Van den Enden was reputed to be, were not slow in fastening some of the blame on his Jewish assistant; and Spinoza, who was as yet too inexperienced to appreciate the wisdom of discretion, may have given utterance to many a heterodox thought. If so, the scandalised fathers who repeatedly tried to persuade the city magistrates to close Van den Enden's school, and who actually did succeed in driving him out of Amsterdam eventually, would not keep very quiet about Spinoza, and the Jewish authorities would have good reason to take alarm.

Except by the select few, religious toleration was scarcely understood in those days, even in the Netherlands. That the persecuted turn persecutors has become a truism; it is sad, but it is true. In practice, the cry for religious toleration has all too often amounted to this: you have persecuted me long enough now, let me persecute you for a change. At the very commencement of their long struggle against the tyranny of the Inquisition, the mutual intolerance of the various religious sects in the Netherlands caused infinite trouble to William the Silent, and very nearly wrecked their enterprise. As their fortunes improved and the need of union became somewhat less urgent, intolerance became increasingly manifest. The Calvinists, who were in the majority, regarded their Church more or less as the established Church, to which the Reformed clergy tried their utmost to compel all others to conform. When Philip III. made a twelve years' truce with the United Netherlands in 1609, he did so, it is said, in the sinister hope that mutual religious persecutions among the different religious sects
would bring about that fall of the Netherlands which
the Spanish troops had failed to effect. Sooth to say,
there was considerable justification for that sinister hope. In 1610 the followers of Arminius (Professor of Theology
at Leyden, died 1609) presented to the provincial parliament
of Holland and West Friesland their Remonstrance * against
extreme Calvinism, and the struggle between the Arminians
(or Remonstrants) and the extreme Calvinists (or Contra-
Remonstrants) culminated in 1619, when the Synod of
Dordrecht excommunicated the Arminians, closed their
places of worship, and brought about the expulsion of Re-
monstrant preachers from most of the States. Barneveldt,
the political head of the Remonstrants and reputed to have
been the greatest statesman of the Netherlands, was exe-
cuted; Hugo Grotius, one of their most eminent scholars,
was thrown into prison, and only escaped from it through
the bold ingenuity of his wife. One interesting result of the
banishment of Arminian pastors was the formation of the
Collegiant sect, which simply decided to dispense with
the clerical office altogether, and held more or less informal
gatherings (collegia) for prayers and religious discussions
conducted entirely by laymen. (The Mennonites, with
whom also Spinoza stood in friendly relations, had come
into existence under very similar circumstances during the
sixteenth century). The events of 1619 show clearly enough
the temper of the dominant religious sect in the United
Provinces. Fortunately, enlightened statesmen and magis-
trates generally managed to resist the persecuting zeal of
the Reformed or Calvinist clergy. But not always; nor did
the zealots relax their efforts in spite of repeated dis-
couragement. In 1653 the clerical Synods forced the
States-General to issue a strict edict against the Socinians

* The "five points" of the Remonstrance were (i) conditional election;
(ii) universal redemption through Christ; (iii) salvation by grace; (iv) the
irresistibleness of grace; and (v) the possibility of falling from a state of
grace.
or Unitarians, many of whom consequently went over to the Collegiants.

After all, then, the decree of toleration embodied in the Union of Utrecht did not secure very much in the way of real toleration. Non-Calvinist Christians were allowed to live in the Netherlands without suffering in person or property on account of their nonconformity. For those days even that was a great deal; but the right of public worship was quite another matter. And if the Union of Utrecht did not secure real toleration for all Christian sects, much less did it guarantee anything to the Jews, who had not been contemplated in it at all, who had not even been formally admitted into the Netherlands, but whose presence had been more or less connived at. Even in 1619, when the Jewish question was definitely raised in the Netherlands, it was decided to allow each city to please itself whether it would permit Jews to live there or not. Their position was precarious indeed. They had to take care not to give offence to the religious susceptibilities of their neighbours. And their troubles commenced soon enough.

About the year 1618 there had arrived in Amsterdam a Marano refugee from Portugal whose name was Gabriel da Costa. Both he and his late father had held office in the Catholic Church, but seized by a sudden longing to return to the religion of his ancestors, Gabriel fled to Amsterdam, where he embraced Judaism and changed his name from Gabriel to Uriel. His ideas about Judaism had been derived chiefly from reading the Old Testament, and his contact with actual Rabbinic Judaism somewhat disappointed him. He thereupon commenced to speak contemptuously of the Jews as Pharisees, and aired his views very freely against the belief in the immortality of the soul, and the inspiration of the Bible. These views were, of course, as much opposed to Christianity as to Judaism. The Jewish physician, de Silva, as already stated, tried to controvert these heretical
views in a book published in 1623. Da Costa replied, in 1624, with a treatise which was very confused, and which, while accusing de Silva of slander against the author, actually reiterated those heresies. Partly from fear that an outcry might be raised against the Jews as promulgators of heresy, the Jewish authorities excommunicated Uriel da Costa, and as a kind of official repudiation of all responsibility for him, they communicated the facts to the civil authorities, who thereupon imprisoned him, fined him, and ordered his book to be burned. Shunned by Jews and Christians alike, da Costa found his existence very lonely and intolerable, and in 1633 he made up his mind, as he said, "to become an ape among apes," and made his peace with the Synagogue. But he soon got quite reckless again, and was excommunicated a second time. Again he grew weary of his isolation, and once more he approached the Synagogue authorities for the removal of the ban. Determined not to be duped again, yet reluctant to repel him absolutely, they imposed hard conditions on him. He submitted to the conditions—he recanted his sins publicly in the Synagogue, received thirty-nine lashes, and lay prostrate on the threshold of the Synagogue while the congregation stepped over him as they passed out. It was a cruel degradation. And so heavily did his humiliation weigh on his mind that he committed suicide soon afterwards. This happened in 1640, and Spinoza must have remembered the scandal.

If the Jewish community in Amsterdam felt it necessary to repudiate, in such drastic manner, their responsibility for Uriel da Costa's heresies, so as to avoid giving offence to their Christian neighbours, there was every reason why they should feel even greater discomfort on account of Spinoza's heresies in 1656. It was a critical period in the annals of Jewish history. During the Muscovite and Cossack invasion of Poland (1654–1656) entire Jewish communities were
massacred by the invaders; nor did the Poles behave much better towards the Jews during the war. Naturally, whosoever could tried to escape from the scene of slaughter. There was consequently a considerable influx of Polish Jews into Amsterdam. Now, even in the twentieth century, when countless missionaries are sent to spread the Gospel from China to Peru, Jewish refugees have been shown but scant Christian charity under similar circumstances, so we have every reason to suppose that the condition of the Amsterdam Jewish community did not gain in security through this influx of destitute refugees. Then more than ever was it necessary to be circumspect, and avoid giving offence to the people of the land, especially in the matter of the most delicate of all things—religion.* They did not want another scandal. One da Costa affair was enough, and more than enough. Yet they must not incur the responsibility for Spinoza’s heresies. So at first they tried to bribe Spinoza. They promised him a considerable annuity if he would only keep quiet, and show some amount of outward conformity to his religion. They must have known well enough that silence and partial outward conformity do not alter a man’s views; they were surely shrewd enough to realise that a heretic does not cease to be a heretic by becoming also a hypocrite. If their sole object had been to suppress heresy in their midst, that was not the way to gain their end. Heresy would not languish through becoming profitable. The real motive that prompted them must have been that just indicated—though it is very likely that they did not realise it so explicitly. If they had done so, and if they had urged these points on Spinoza, he would, undoubtedly, have appreciated the need for caution and silence. But they evidently did not understand him, they evidently misconceived his character entirely, and the

* That their apprehensions were not unfounded is clear from the fact that even some twenty years afterwards various Synods of the Reformed Church tried to induce the civil powers to pass strong measures for the forcible conversion of the Jews.
attempt to gag him with a bribe was just the way best calculated to defeat their end. The only person who might have understood him, and whose intervention might have been successful, was Manasseh ben Israel. But he was in England then, on a mission to Cromwell. So threats were tried next; but the threat of excommunication had no effect on Spinoza. They had reached the end of their tether. The only course open to them, as they felt, was to put him under the ban. The feeling against him was, no doubt, so strong that a fanatic might have tried to do him some physical violence. And it may be that such an attack gave rise to the story of an attempt to assassinate Spinoza with a dagger, as he was leaving the Synagogue or the theatre. But there is no evidence of this, and the probability is decidedly against it.

Some time in June 1656 Spinoza was summoned before the court of Rabbis. Witnesses gave evidence of his heresies. Spinoza did not deny them—he tried to defend them. Thereupon he was excommunicated for a period of thirty days only—in the hope that he might still relent. But he did not. Accordingly, on the 27th July 1656, the final ban was pronounced upon him publicly in the Synagogue at Amsterdam. It was couched in the following terms:

"The members of the council do you to wit that they have long known of the evil opinions and doings of Baruch de Espinoza, and have tried by divers methods and promises to make him turn from his evil ways. As they have not succeeded in effecting his improvement, but, on the contrary, have received every day more information about the horrible heresies which he practised and taught, and other enormities which he has committed, and as they had many trustworthy witnesses of this, who have deposed and testified in the presence of the said Spinoza, and have convicted him; and as all this has been investigated in the presence of the Rabbis, it has been resolved with their consent that the said Espinoza should be anathematised and cut off from the people of Israel, and now he is anathematised with the following anathema:

"'With the judgment of the angels and with that of the saints, with
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the consent of God, Blessed be He, and of all this holy congrega-
tion, before these sacred Scrolls of the Law, and the six hundred
and thirteen precepts which are prescribed therein, we anathematise,
cut off, execrate, and curse Baruch de Espinoza with the anathema
wherewith Joshua anathematised Jericho, with the curse wherewith
Elishah cursed the youths, and with all the curses which are written
in the Law: cursed be he by day, and cursed be he by night; cursed
be he when he lieth down, and cursed be he when he riseth up;
cursed be he when he goeth out, and cursed be he when he cometh
in; the Lord will not pardon him; the wrath and fury of the Lord
will be kindled against this man, and bring down upon him all the
curses which are written in the Book of the Law; and the Lord
will destroy his name from under the heavens; and, to his undoing,
the Lord will cut him off from all the tribes of Israel, with all the
curses of the firmament which are written in the Book of the Law;
but ye that cleave unto the Lord your God live all of you this
day!'

"We ordain that no one may communicate with him verbally or in
writing, nor show him any favour, nor stay under the same roof
with him, nor be within four cubits of him, nor read anything com-
posed or written by him."

This amiable document of the "holy congregation" is
nothing less than a blasphemy. It must be remembered,
however, that the actual anathema was a traditional formula,
and (unlike the preamble and conclusion) was not specially
written for the occasion. No doubt it shows a greater
familiarity with the phraseology of the Bible than with its
best teaching. But the Jews who excommunicated Spinoza
were no worse than their neighbours in this respect. These
awful curses were but the common farewells with which the
churches took leave of their insubordinate friends. Nor
were these the worst forms of leave-taking, by any means.
After all, swearing breaks no bones, and burns none alive,
as did the rack and the stake which were so common
in those days. The Catholic Church excommunicated
only when it could not torture and kill; and then its ana-
themas, though they may have been more polished in diction,
were incomparably more brutal in effect. The ban pronounced upon William the Silent, for instance, contained nothing less than an urgent invitation to cut-throats that they should murder him, in return for which pious deed they would receive absolution for all their crimes, no matter how heinous, and would be raised to noble rank; and that ban actually accomplished its sinister object! It is, therefore, unjust to single out this ban against Spinoza and judge it by present-day standards. Nor should it be forgotten that if Judaism alone had been concerned, more leniency would have been shown, the whole thing might have been ignored. Elisha ben Abuyah, the Faust of the Talmud, was not persecuted by the Jews, in spite of his heresies. The ban against Spinoza was the due paid to Cæsar, rather than to the God of Israel.

As in the case of da Costa, and for the same reasons, the Jewish authorities officially communicated the news of Spinoza's excommunication to the civil authorities, who, in order to appease the wrath of the Jewish Rabbinate and the Calvinist clergy, banished Spinoza from Amsterdam, though only for a short period.

On the whole there is some reason to suppose that the anathema was not a curse, but a blessing in disguise. It freed him entirely from sectarian and tribal considerations; it helped to make him a thinker of no particular sect and of no particular age, but for all men and for all times.

However reprehensible his heretical utterances and unorthodox doings may have been considered by some of his fellow-Jews, yet there can be no doubt that Spinoza did not really desire to sever his connection entirely with them. This is evident from the fact that he did not ignore, as he might have done, the summons to come before the court of Rabbis in order to defend himself against the charge of heresy. It is true that when informed of his final excommunication he is reported to have said: "Very well, this
does not force me to do anything which I would not have done of my own accord, had I not been afraid of a scandal.” But the last words of this expression of his natural resentment only seem to confirm the suggestion about his previous anxiety to avoid a complete rupture, if he could do so honestly. It was partly perhaps also for this reason that even after his excommunication he addressed to the Synagogue authorities an Apology (written in Spanish) in which he probably sought to defend his heretical views by showing that they had the support of some of the most eminent Rabbis, and to condemn the iniquity of fastening on him “horrible practices and other enormities” because of his neglect of mere ceremonial observances. Unfortunately, this document has not yet been recovered, though some of its contents are said to have been subsequently incorporated in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. It would throw a flood of light on Spinoza’s mental history. However, the Apology did not mend matters. Cut off from his community, without kith or kin, he stood alone, but firm and unshaken. Unlike da Costa, he never winced. He seems to have got into touch with Jews again afterwards; but it was they who had to seek him.

§ 5. THE LAST YEARS OF SPINOZA’S STAY IN AND NEAR AMSTERDAM—1656-1660

Banished from Amsterdam, Spinoza went to live in Ouwkerk, a little village to the south of Amsterdam. Possibly he had some Christian friends there who had influence with the civil authorities; and apparently he meant to return to Amsterdam at the earliest opportunity. Maybe also he was not altogether uninfluenced by the thought that the Jewish cemetery was there, and that his mother, his sister, his father,
and others once dear to him, had found their last resting-place in it.

For his support he had to rely on the lenses which he made—an art which he had mastered during the years immediately preceding his exile. He made lenses for spectacles, microscopes, and telescopes, and his friends sold them for him. The work suited his tastes well enough, because it kept him in touch with his scientific studies. And he evidently excelled in it, for later on his fame as an optician attracted the notice of Huygens and Leibniz, among others. But it was an unfortunate occupation otherwise. The fine glass-dust which he inhaled during his work must have been very injurious to his health, especially when we bear in mind that he eventually died of consumption, and that he probably inherited the disease from his mother, who died so young. For the time being, however, it was a congenial occupation, and, with his frugal habits, left him sufficient time to pursue his scientific and philosophic studies.

As already suggested, Spinoza did not stay long in Ouwerkerk, but returned, after a few months, to Amsterdam, where he remained till 1660. Of the events which happened during this period (1656–1660) we possess the most meagre information. Apparently he gave some private lessons in philosophy, and pursued his studies unremittingly. At the end of this period he had already left Descartes behind him, and had thought out the essentials of his own philosophy.

From Spinoza’s subsequent correspondence, we obtain a glimpse of his friends and associates during this period, while the opening pages of his Improvement of the Understanding at once enlighten and mystify us about his life during those last years in Amsterdam.

After leaving Amsterdam in 1660 Spinoza continued a friendly correspondence with several residents in Amsterdam, whom he also visited for a short time in 1663. These
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correspondents must therefore have been known to him during his stay in Amsterdam, and what is known about them helps to throw some light on this obscure period in Spinoza’s life-history. They were Pieter Balling, Jarig Jelles, Dirck Kerckrinck, Lodewijk Meyer, Simon Joosten de Vries, and Jan Rieuwerts.

Pieter Balling had acted for some time as the representative or agent of various Spanish merchants. And it is just possible that Spinoza’s knowledge of Spanish first brought him into touch with him. Balling was a Mennonite, and a pronounced enemy of dogmatism. In 1662 he published a book entitled The Light on the Candlestick, in which he attacked religion based on stereotyped dogmas, and advocated a religion, partly rationalistic, partly mystical, based on the inward light of the soul. The whole spirit of the book might be summed up in the familiar lines of Matthew Arnold:

"These hundred doctors try
To preach thee to their school.
We have the truth, they cry.
And yet their oracle,
Trumpet it as they will, is but the same as thine.

"Once read thy own breast right,
And thou has done with fears.
Man gets no other light,
Search he a thousand years.
Sink in thyself: there ask what ails thee, at that shrine."

In 1664 he translated into Dutch Spinoza’s version of Descartes’ Princípià. In a letter written in the same year, we see Spinoza trying to console Balling on the loss of his child, and dealing tenderly with Balling’s “premonitions” of his impending loss.

Jarig Jelles was at one time a spice-merchant in Amsterdam, but feeling that “knowledge is better than choice gold, that wisdom is better than rubies, and all the things
that may be desired are not to be compared to her," he left his business in the charge of a manager, and devoted himself to study. He wrote a book to show that Cartesianism did not lead to atheism, but was, on the contrary, quite compatible with the Christian religion. Spinoza seems to have helped him in the composition of this book. Jelles was one of the friends who persuaded Spinoza to publish his version of Descartes' *Principia*, and even defrayed the cost of its publication. He also took an active share in the publication of Spinoza's posthumous works, the preface to which is so similar in tone to the book of Jelles that he is regarded as its author by some very competent authorities.

Dirck Kerckrinck was seven years younger than Spinoza, whom he first met at Van den Enden's school (? 1652-6). He studied medicine, and became the author of various medical treatises. Colerus relates some gossip to the effect that Spinoza and Kerckrinck were rivals for the hand of Clara Maria, the gifted daughter of Van den Enden, and that she accepted Kerckrinck because he was rich, while Spinoza was poor. But as Clara Maria was born in 1644, this very natural attempt to introduce a touch of romance into Spinoza's life of single blessedness is an utter failure. Clara Maria was barely sixteen when Spinoza left Amsterdam for good in 1660, and he had ceased to be her father's pupil in 1654 or, at the latest, in 1656. As an inmate in her father's house he may have been fond of her as a mere child, and some expression of endearment uttered in that sense probably gave rise to this pretty tale. It is true, however, that Kerckrinck did marry her in 1671, as already mentioned. Spinoza possessed several of the medical works of Kerckrinck, who had, no doubt, sent them to him as an old friend of his.

Lodewijk Meyer was a medical practitioner in Amsterdam. He was about two years older than Spinoza, and a man of versatile talents. He had studied not only medicine but
also philosophy and theology, made his bid as poet and dramatist, lexicographer and stage-manager, and was the moving spirit in a certain literary society, the name and motto of which was (as we need scarcely be surprised to hear) *Nil volentibus arduum*. It was he who wrote the interesting preface to Spinoza's version of Descartes' *Principia*.

Simon Joosten de Vries was an Amsterdam merchant. He was only about a year younger than Spinoza, though his attitude towards Spinoza was always that of a humble disciple. He studied medicine under the direction of Spinoza, and his attachment to Spinoza is evident from a letter of his written in 1663, after Spinoza had left Amsterdam. “For a long time,” he writes, “I have been longing to be with you; but the weather and the hard winter have not been propitious to me. Sometimes I complain of my lot in being removed from you by a distance which separates us so much. Happy, most happy, is your companion Casearius, who lives with you under the same roof, and who can converse with you on the most excellent topics during dinner, or supper, or on your walks. But although we are so far apart in the body, yet you have constantly been present to my mind, especially when I take your writings in my hand, and apply myself to them.” In the same letter he reports about a philosophical society for the study of Spinoza's philosophy, as communicated to de Vries and others in manuscript form, and asks for further elucidation of some difficult points. The sincerity and extent of his devotion was further shown by his offer of a gift of 2000 florins to Spinoza, which was, however, declined. Later on, Simon de Vries, whose health was even less satisfactory than Spinoza's, feeling that his end was drawing nigh, desired to make Spinoza his heir. Again the philosopher dissuaded him, urging the prior claims of the testator's own kindred. On the death of Simon de Vries his brother
offered to Spinoza an annuity of 500 florins, but Spinoza declined to take more than 300 florins.

Jan Rieuwertsz was a bookseller at Amsterdam, and some fifteen years older than Spinoza. He was a Collegiant, and very liberal in his views. His shop enjoyed the evil reputation of being the seat of scoffers. He published and stocked the works of many authors of unorthodox repute, including those of Descartes, Balling, Jelles, and Spinoza. His son also was a devoted admirer of Spinoza.

Such were some of the men with whom Spinoza stood in friendly relationship during his last years in Amsterdam. Further details are wanting. Possibly he had given private tuition to Simon de Vries (who speaks of him as "master"), Balling, and others; or he may have held some kind of seminar or class for the informal discussion of religious and philosophical questions. If so, the substance of his *Meta-physical Thoughts* (which were subsequently appended to his version of Descartes' *Principia*) and of his *Short Treatise on God, Man and his Well-being* must have been elaborated during these years, and for these purposes. This would also account for the continuation or revival of similar meetings for the discussion of Spinoza's views, as reported in the letter of Simon de Vries.

Little as is known of these years, there can be no doubt that they were years of storm and stress in the mental history of Spinoza. This much may be gathered from the impressive pages with which he opens his *Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding*.

"After experience had taught me [so he writes] that all things which are ordinarily encountered in common life are vain and futile, and when I saw that all things which occasioned me any anxiety or fear had in themselves nothing of good or evil, except in so far as the mind was moved by them; I at length determined to inquire if there were anything which was a true good capable of imparting itself, and by which alone the mind could be affected to the
exclusion of all else; whether, indeed, anything existed by the discovery and acquisition of which I might have continuous and supreme joy to all eternity. I say that I at length determined: for at first sight it seemed unwise to be willing to let go something certain for something that was yet uncertain. I saw, forsooth, the advantages which are derived from honour and riches, and that I should be obliged to abstain from the quest of these if I wished to give serious application to something different and new: and if, perchance, supreme happiness should lie in them, I saw clearly that I should have to do without it; but if, on the other hand, it did not lie in them, and I applied myself only to them, then I should also have to go without the highest happiness. I, therefore, revolved in my mind whether, perchance, it would not be possible to arrive at the new plan of life, or, at least, some certainty about it, without any change in the order and usual plan of my life, a thing which I have often attempted in vain. Now the things which one mostly meets with in life, and which, so far as one may gather from their actions, men esteem as the highest good, are reducible to these three, namely, riches, honour, and pleasure. By these three the mind is so distracted that it can scarcely think of any other good. . . . When, therefore, I saw that all these things stood in the way of my applying myself to any new plan of life; in fact, that they were so opposed to it that one must necessarily abstain either from the one or from the other, I was forced to inquire which would be the more useful to me; for, as I have already said, I seemed to be willing to let go a sure good for something uncertain. But after brooding a little over this subject I found, in the first place, that if I let go those things and devoted myself to the new plan of life I should be letting go a good uncertain by its very nature . . . for one which was uncertain, not in its nature . . . but only as regards its attainment. After unremitting reflection I came to see that, if I could only make up my mind thoroughly, then I should give up sure evils for a sure good. . . . Not without reason did I use the words, if I could only make up my mind thoroughly. For although I saw this so clearly in my mind, yet I could not thus put aside all avarice, sensuous pleasure, and the desire for fame. This one thing I saw, that so long as my mind revolved these thoughts, so long did it turn away from those things, and consider seriously the new plan of life. This was a great comfort.
to me. . . . And although at first these periods were rare and only of very brief duration, yet as the true good gradually became better known to me so these periods grew more frequent and longer."

The above "confession" was written by Spinoza in 1661. The inner struggle between worldly allurements and the beck of the spirit was over then. Indeed already his earlier work, the Short Treatise, which was completed in 1660, bears unmistakable evidence of the peace which crowned that inward conflict. This conflict must therefore be referred to the years immediately preceding 1660. His last years in Amsterdam, when he made his first acquaintance with real life and the struggle for existence, must have brought home to him often enough the desirableness of worldly goods, and the hardships of poverty and obscurity. After all, he was human, and he could scarcely escape the common lot of mortals—the conflict between the two souls which dwell in mortal breast. But Spinoza was not given to speak about himself. He lifts but a corner of the veil, behind which we may well conjecture scenes of storm and stress during the period intervening between his excommunication in 1656 and his departure from Amsterdam in 1660. Early in that year, weary of the whir and the worldliness of that commercial centre, he went to dwell among unworldly folk with old-world virtues in an out-of-the-world village—Rijnsburg. He withdrew from the madding crowd, but not in disgust or misanthropy. He had caught a glimpse of the highest good of man, and he wanted to strengthen his hold thereon under more favourable conditions. He had discovered that the sorrows of man "arise from the love of the transient," while "love for an object eternal and infinite feeds the mind with unmixed joy, free from all sorrow."
§ 6. SPINOZA’S STAY IN RIJNSBURG—1660-1663

Rijnsburg is a village some six or seven miles north-west of Leyden. Its modest cottages, narrow lanes, quiet waterways, and quaint medieval church still present an old-world appearance very much as in the days of Spinoza—except, of course, for the clumsy, though convenient, steam-trams which pass by on their way to and from Leyden and Katwijk—or Noordwijk-aan-Zee. Within easy walking distance from it, on the road to Leyden, is Endgeest, a nice rural little place where Descartes once stayed for a number of years, but now noted chiefly for its lunatic asylum.

During the seventeenth century Rijnsburg was the headquarters of the Collegiants. This sect, whose origin has already been explained above, repudiated infant baptism, and insisted on adult baptism by immersion. And Rijnsburg, on the old Rhein, was their place of baptism. That was the reason why the Collegiants were also commonly called the “Rijnsburgers.” Now Spinoza, as we have seen, numbered several Collegiants among his friends, and it was probably on the suggestion of one of his Collegiant friends that he went to live there. At all events, early in the year 1660 he seems to have taken up his quarters there, probably with a surgeon of the name Hermann Homan, in a newly built little cottage standing in a narrow lane, which has since then come to be known as Spinoza Lane. Some time afterwards, apparently, the landlord’s pious humanitarianism led him to inscribe or to have inscribed on a stone in the cottage wall the well-meant message expressed in the concluding stanza of Kamphuyzen’s May Morning:

“Alas! if all men would be wise,
And would be good as well,
The Earth would be a Paradise,
Now it is mostly Hell.”
And it was by this inscription that, on the authority of an old tradition, the cottage has been identified. It is still in existence, and is still surrounded by open fields rich in garden produce and bulbs. Restored, and equipped with all that diligent search could find and that money could procure in the way of things interesting to students of Spinoza, the cottage is now known as the Spinoza-huis or Spinoza Museum, and serves as a kind of shrine sacred to the memory of the philosopher, and many pilgrims bend their footsteps there to pay homage to a profound mind and lofty character, and feel something of his calm of mind in that haunt of ancient peace.

One reason which prompted Spinoza to seek a quiet retreat was probably the desire to write down his thoughts in some systematic form. Dissatisfied with the Scholastic philosophy still in vogue then, he and his friends had turned eagerly to the writings of Descartes. The opposition of the strict Calvinists to the Cartesian philosophy rather tended to recommend it to the Remonstrants (including the Collegiants), and, indeed, to all who had suffered from, or were opposed to, the religious intolerance of the dominant Reformed Church. The cry for impartiality and an open mind in the interpretation of Scripture was felt to have a certain kinship with the Cartesian method of philosophising, his preliminary doubt of whatever could be reasonably disputed. Hence there was a gradual coalition between liberal religion and Cartesian philosophy. Spinoza's friends were mostly Cartesians, and remained such to the end. Whether Spinoza himself was ever a thoroughgoing Cartesian is not known. That Descartes' writings exercised a very potent influence on Spinoza there is no doubt whatever. By 1660, however, Spinoza had already outgrown the fundamentals of Cartesian Metaphysics, though he still continued to follow Descartes in his Physics. Now we have already remarked that, during his last years in Amsterdam,
Spinoza seems to have acted as teacher or leader of a small philosophical circle. Its members, including Spinoza himself, were primarily interested in religious questions at first. They approached philosophy from the side of religion, and only in so far as religious problems led up to philosophical considerations. God and His attributes, Nature and Creation, Man and his Well-being, the nature of the Human Mind and the Immortality of the Soul—these were the topics which chiefly interested them, and on which, we may assume, Spinoza had accumulated various notes for those informal talks with them. These notes he wanted to elaborate and to systematise. This was the first task which occupied him at Rijnsburg, and it resulted in the Short Treatise on God, Man and his Well-being. But he continued to keep in touch with his Amsterdam friends and sent them the parts of the manuscript as he completed them. Though Cartesian in appearance, and partly also in substance, the Short Treatise, Spinoza's very first philosophical essay, already marks a definite departure from the philosophy of Descartes, in its identification of God with Nature, and its consequent determinism and naturalism. Spinoza himself fully realised the extent of his deviation from Descartes, and the novelty of his views even as compared with the novelties of Cartesianism, which was at that time "the new philosophy" par excellence. So he begged his friends not to be impatient with his novel views, but to consider them carefully, remembering that "a thing does not therefore cease to be true because it is not accepted by many." He also realised that some of these views were liable to prove rather dangerous to minds more eager for novelty than for truth. He was therefore careful about the kind of people to whom he communicated his views, and also begged his trusted friends to be careful likewise. Caution was also necessary on account of the unremitting vigilance of heretic-hunters.
quid autem in novum ibum questionem attinet, quoniam de Scil. non caperint eam, et quae aecuit apertius dependens: de Sacre et etiam de emendatione intuitu integrum opusculum composui, in cujus de scriptura, et emendatione occupaturemun. Sed alioquid non opus esse desitio, quia in omnium ullum certum hanc consilium circa eam editionem, teneo minimam ne theologici nostri temporis offendatur, et quod solutio, in una, quae securius, non esset, Inventem, hanc circa hanc rem consilium spectabo. Et ut scio, quid in uno hoc opera continetur quod concionatoribus et officiis esse possit, dico quod multa attributa quae ab illis et ab omnibus in illi paletam Motivam tribuantur, eae tamen creaturas considerandae et contra alios, propter prejudicium ab eis tamen creaturas considerandae, ego attributa deinde et ab ipso sale intelliga frustra contento, et eam quid sequitur, natura non sita separata, ut omnia quorum apud me est notitia, secernant, tum ut speculando specto, tene re mea ut speculacionem annum aspicio de cuya fide natus est Gabries, et ut sit illum umare pange, qui dum

Annum ex aet

Benedicte a Spinoza

[Conclusion of Spinoza's letter to Oldenburg, October 1661. See p. cxxiii.]
"As the character of the age in which we live [Spinoza adds] is not unknown to you, I would beg of you most earnestly to be very careful about the communication of these things to others. I do not want to say that you should absolutely keep them to yourselves, but only that if ever you wish to communicate them to others, then you shall have no other object in view except only the happiness of your neighbour; being at the same time clearly assured that the reward of your labour will not disappoint you therein."

Having finished the first draft of his *Short Treatise* Spinoza felt that he had attacked all the great problems of religion and of philosophy, without any preliminary account of the requirements of philosophic method, without any adequate justification of his own mode of treatment. To this problem, accordingly, he turned his attention next, and began his *Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding*. In a letter dated October 1661, in reply to some questions of Henry Oldenburg, Spinoza states that he had written a complete little treatise on the origin of things, and their relation to the first cause, and also on the improvement of the understanding, and that he was actually busy just then copying and correcting it. It would appear from this that Spinoza's intention at that time may have been to combine the *Short Treatise* and the *Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding*. What actually happened, however, is not quite certain. The editors of Spinoza's posthumous works only had a fragment of the *Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding*, and apparently nothing of the *Short Treatise*, of which we only possess at present two Dutch versions, discovered about 1860. The editors of the *Opera Posthuma* say that the *Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding* was one of Spinoza's earliest works, and that he had never finished it, but they appear to be uncertain whether it was only want of time or the inherent difficulties of the subject which prevented him from finishing it.
In the meantime Spinoza seems to have acquired some reputation not only with the Rijnsburgers but even among some of the professors at Leyden. This may have been due to his participation in the Collegiant Conferences held at Rijnsburg. These conferences for the discussion of religious questions were open to all who cared to come. And some of the students from the neighbouring University at Leyden made a practice of attending these meetings and taking part in the debates. Some of them very likely came there for fun, though others, no doubt, had worthier motives. It was in this way that Spinoza came into touch with, among others, Johannes Casearius and the brothers Adriaan and Johannes Koerbagh, of whom more will be said anon. And in this way also Spinoza's name and history may have become known to some of the Leyden professors, among them Johannes Coccejus, professor of theology, famous as the author of the first standard Hebrew dictionary, and even more so as the author of the dictum that an interpreter of the Scriptures should approach his task with a mind free from all dogmatic prejudices—the dictum which helped to bring about a kind of alliance between the Remonstrants and the Cartesians, to which reference has already been made. Now Coccejus was a native of Bremen, and when his countryman Henry Oldenburg visited Leyden in 1661, eager as usual to make the acquaintance of everybody who was remarkable in any way, Coccejus may have suggested to him a visit to Spinoza. Possibly Oldenburg had also heard something about Spinoza from Huygens, who was in correspondence with the English scientists among whom Oldenburg had moved, had actually visited London that very year, and may have met Oldenburg at one of the meetings of the "Gresham College," which was soon to blossom into the "Royal Society." At all events, in July 1661 Oldenburg visited Spinoza in Rijnsburg.
Henry Oldenburg, as already remarked, was a native of Bremen, where he was born about 1620. During the war between England and Holland which followed Cromwell's enforcement of the Navigation Act, in 1651, the shipowners of Bremen seem to have suffered. It was therefore decided to send an envoy to make representations to Cromwell concerning the neutrality of Bremen. Accordingly in 1653 Henry Oldenburg was entrusted with this diplomatic mission, which brought him into touch with Milton, who was then Latin Secretary to the Council, and other eminent Englishmen of the time. For some reason he remained in England after the conclusion of his mission, staying in Oxford in 1656, and acting as private tutor to various young gentlemen, including Boyle's nephew, Richard Jones, with whom he travelled in France, Germany, and Italy, during the years 1657-1660, attending the most important academies of science, and becoming acquainted with the great lights of the scientific world. During his stay in Oxford, Oldenburg had been associated with the leading spirits of the "Invisible College," a society for the discussion of scientific problems. There was a similar society in London, the "Gresham College." With the Restoration of Charles II., in 1660, it was decided to apply for a Charter for the formation of a "Royal Society" to carry on the work of these two societies, and an acting secretary was required to undertake the work of organisation, &c. Just then Oldenburg returned from his continental tour, and his wide reading and extensive knowledge of men and matters marked him out as just the man for the post, for which he was accordingly nominated. In the following year, 1661, Oldenburg had occasion to visit his native town, Bremen, and on his return journey via Holland, he visited Leyden (among other places), and thence Rijnsburg, where, as already mentioned, he had a long interview with Spinoza.

The subject discussed on that occasion and the impres-
sion which Spinoza made on Oldenburg may be gathered from the following letter which Oldenburg wrote to Spinoza immediately after his return to London, in August 1661. “It was with such reluctance [he writes] that I tore myself away from your side, when I recently visited you in your retreat at Rijnsburg, that no sooner am I back in England than I already try to join you again, at least as far as this can be effected by means of correspondence. Solid learning combined with kindliness and refinement (wherewith Nature and Study have most richly endowed you) have such an attraction that they win the love of all noble and liberally educated men. Let us, therefore, most excellent sir, give each other the right hand of unfeigned friendship, and cultivate it diligently by every kind of attention and service. Whatever service my humble powers can render, consider as yours. And permit me to claim a part of those intellectual gifts which you possess, if I may do so without detriment to you. Our conversation at Rijnsburg turned on God, infinite Extension and Thought, on the difference and the agreement between these attributes, on the nature of the union of the human soul with the body; and further, on the Principles of the Cartesian and the Baconian Philosophy. But as we then discussed themes of such moment only at a distance, as it were, and cursorily, and as all those things have since then been lying heavily on my mind, I now venture to claim the right of our new friendship to ask you affectionately to explain to me somewhat more fully your views on the above-mentioned subjects, and not to mind enlightening me, more especially on these two points, namely, first, what do you consider to be the true distinction between Extension and Thought; secondly, what defects do you observe in the Philosophy of Descartes and of Bacon, and how, do you think, might they be eliminated, and replaced by something more sound? The more freely you write to me about these and the like, the more closely
will you bind me to yourself, and the greater will be my obligation to render similar services, if at all possible." The letter concludes with a promise to send Spinoza a volume of scientific essays by Robert Boyle, between whom and Spinoza, Oldenburg subsequently acted as a kind of intermediary.

It is not at all clear what kind of an introduction Oldenburg had to Spinoza, or, indeed, whether he had any introduction at all. And Spinoza was neither so loquacious nor so indiscreet as to unburden his whole mind to a stranger. But he had evidently treated Oldenburg ungrudgingly and with his wonted courtesy, and Oldenburg's letter is certainly very remarkable for its tone of generous appreciation—all the more remarkable because he was considerably older than Spinoza, and had been befriended by so many of the intellectual giants of that period, while Spinoza was apparently an obscure outcast.

It is noteworthy that Spinoza's conversation with Oldenburg turned on Bacon and Descartes. This is not surprising, for Spinoza was at that time (1661) very much occupied with the question of philosophical method, and the two alternatives which he must have been carefully weighing against each other were the empirical, inductive method of Bacon, and the deductive, geometric method of Descartes. This was the very problem with which he was then grappling in his Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding, as we gather from his subsequent reply to Oldenburg, which has already been cited above. Spinoza ultimately sided with Descartes, in favour of the geometric method. He felt that the deductive method was the right one in philosophy, and that the best form of exposition was that exemplified in Euclid's geometry. This had already been urged, and, to some extent, also illustrated by Descartes; and Spinoza also now tried a similar experiment by casting one of the chapters of his Short Treatise into geometric form, consti-
tuting what is now its First Appendix. Soon afterwards he was occupied even more with Descartes, and tried a much more extensive experiment in the application of the geometric method.

In 1662, possibly in the winter of 1661-2, Johannes Casearius, a student of Theology at the University of Leyden, came to stay in Rijnsburg, and lived in the same house with Spinoza, who agreed to help him with the study of philosophy. Casearius was only about nineteen then, apparently rather immature and fickle-minded, more devoted to novelty than to truth. He proved to be very trying to Spinoza, and caused him some anxiety. Still, Spinoza had faith in the youth's good qualities, which only required a little time to mature and assert themselves. And the subsequent history of Casearius confirmed Spinoza's anticipations. In the meantime, however, Spinoza had to be cautious in the treatment of his pupil. What Casearius no doubt wanted of Spinoza was, that he should expound to him the newest philosophy. This generally meant Cartesianism then. Spinoza had something newer than that, and Casearius may have got some inkling of this, and came to him for that reason. But Spinoza did not think it good for one of his youth and temper. He therefore decided to teach him the essentials of the scholastic metaphysics as then taught at most of the universities, but to combine with it a good deal of his own criticism, and also to substitute altogether the Cartesian for the older physics. He had probably pursued a very similar course with his previous pupils in Amsterdam. But being convinced by this time that the geometric method was the most persuasive method of imparting knowledge, he turned the Second Part and a portion of the Third Part of Descartes' *Principia* into geometric form.

In the meanwhile, Spinoza had been growing discontented with his *Short Treatise*. For a time he probably tried to
bring it into line with the continuous advance of his thought by means of modifications and additional notes. Finding, however, that he could wield the geometric method of exposition so well, he seems to have decided to start afresh, and to do for his own philosophy what he had already done, in a measure, for the philosophy of Descartes. In short, he commenced his *Ethics*, and early in the following year, 1663, a part, if not the whole, of the First Book of the *Ethics* was already in the hands of his Amsterdam friends.

By that time, however, Spinoza was already preparing to leave Rijnsburg. He had been there about three years then. Most likely they were his happiest years. They were certainly among his most fruitful years. But one of the reasons which had brought him there also drove him away now. He had come there so as to be able to work quietly, undisturbed by friend or foe. And for the first two years or so his hopes were realised. But gradually, as his circle of friends and acquaintances extended, more and more of his time was taken up by them, and taken away from his work. He therefore decided to remove from there to Voorburg, near the Hague. He left Rijnsburg in April 1663, but, before going to Voorburg, he wanted to see his old friends again, and went accordingly to Amsterdam, where he stayed about two months. While on this visit to Amsterdam he showed to his friends his Euclidean version of Descartes' *Principia*, Part II. Jarig Jelles, Lodewijk Meyer, and other Cartesian friends of his thereupon persuaded him to do the same with the first part of the *Principia*. He did so in a fortnight, and consented to their publication, together with his own *Metaphysical Thoughts*, on condition that Meyer revised the whole work, improving its phraseology where necessary, and adding a preface to explain that Spinoza was far from being in entire agreement with the Cartesian philosophy, even as thus moulded in the Euclidean
mould. This was readily done, and the work appeared soon afterwards. It was published by Rieuwertsz; Meyer wrote the Preface; and this was followed by a poem, *Ad Librum*, composed by J[ohannes] B[ouwmeister], M.D., Meyer's "oldest and best friend." It was the only book to appear in Spinoza's lifetime with his name on it. Spinoza (it should be noted at once here) had no delusions about the absolute cogency of the geometric method. For in his very first publication he expounded and defended *more geometrico* a system of philosophy with which he did not agree.

§ 7. SPINOZA'S STAY IN VOORBURG—1663-1670

In June 1663 Spinoza arrived in Voorburg and took up his lodgings in the *Kerklaan*, at the house of a painter whose name was Daniel Tydemann. Though little more than half an hour's walk from the Hague, the village of Voorburg was at that time almost as isolated as Rijnsburg, and there were times when it took Spinoza a week and more to get a letter to or from the Hague. During the next two years or so he was busily at work on his *Ethics*. But he found time also to keep up a fairly extensive correspondence with old friends, to make new friends, and to pay occasional visits to other towns. In the winter of 1663-4 he returned to Rijnsburg for about two months; in the following winter (1664-5) he seems to have visited either the sister or the brother of Simon de Vries, at Schiedam; in the following April (1665) he visited his old friends in Amsterdam; he also made frequent excursions to the Hague, where he was wont to stay with a certain Mesach Tydemann, possibly a brother of his Voorburg landlord.

If Spinoza found Voorburg rather lonely at first, conditions changed soon enough, so that he complained that he was scarcely his own master, so much of his time was taken up
by callers. Of the people with whom he associated more or less during his stay in Voorburg the most interesting were Vossius the philologist, subsequently Canon of Windsor (who probably consulted Spinoza on subjects relating to the Hebrew language and literature, much as his father, Gerhard Vossius, used to consult Manasseh ben Israel), Christian Huygens, Hudde, van Beuningen, and Jan de Witt.

Christian Huygens, the discoverer of Saturn's rings, inventor of the pendulum clock, and originator of the undulatory theory of light, was living within easy walking distance of Spinoza during the years 1664–6, and the two saw a good deal of one another during that period. Both of them were keenly interested in the making and improvement of lenses, and this common interest formed their chief or only bond. In character the two men were very unlike. Spinoza was generous and without reserve in imparting whatever knowledge he possessed and which might be of service to others; Huygens, on the other hand, was stinting and ever on his guard lest his trade secrets should leak out. In his letters to his brothers, Huygens refers to Spinoza as l'Israélite, le Juif de Voorburg, or notre Juif, asks his brother to inform him of Spinoza's doings, but urges him to keep from him a certain optical secret lest Hudde and others should get to hear of it through him. To strangers, no doubt, he spoke with greater respect of Spinoza. To Tschirnhaus, for instance, he remarked some years later (1675) that he had a great regard for Spinoza.

It was probably through Huygens that Spinoza got to know Johan Hudde. Hudde was Burgomaster of Amsterdam, and a member of the States of Holland, in which capacity he had frequent occasion to visit the Hague, which was the seat of government. He was, moreover, a man of a scientific bent of mind, which prompted him to take up the art of grinding lenses, which in those days seems to have been a fashionable hobby, not unlike present-day photo-
This interest in lenses may have led to his seeking and making the acquaintance of Huygens, and, through him, of Spinoza. We have just seen how anxious Christian Huygens was lest Hudde should learn from Spinoza more than Huygens cared that he should know. Hudde, moreover, unlike Huygens, was also keenly interested in problems of religious philosophy, and we still have three letters which Spinoza addressed to him on the subject of God's unity. Hudde very likely introduced Spinoza to some of his friends in the political sphere, and was, no doubt, instrumental in procuring for Spinoza that protection and patronage the desire for which was possibly one of the chief reasons why Spinoza had come to live near the Hague.

When Spinoza gave his consent to the publication of his version of Descartes' *Principia*, he had a special object in view. This object he explained clearly in his letter to Oldenburg, in the latter part of July 1663. "It may be [he writes] that on this occasion some of those who occupy the highest posts in my fatherland may be found desirous of seeing my other writings, which I do acknowledge as expressing my views; they will then enable me to publish them without any risk of violating the civil law. Should this, indeed, occur, then I shall, no doubt, publish something immediately; but if not, then I will rather be silent than obtrude my opinions on men against the wishes of my country, and so incur their hostility." What exactly Spinoza meant to publish immediately is not quite certain—possibly the *Short Treatise*, more likely the first book of his *Ethics*, or the whole of it which he may have hoped to complete in the near future.

At all events it is clear that Spinoza was anxious to enlist the sympathy of some of those who held the reins of government, and Hudde was just the man to help him. He probably introduced him to Coenraad van Beuningen, an ex-Burgomaster of Amsterdam, and sometime diplomatic envoy of the Netherlands at the Courts of France and
Sweden. Van Beuningen was friendly towards the Jews, and when Louis XIV. remarked to him that it was scandalous that the Dutch should tolerate the Jews, he replied: "Is not the fact that God himself has not destroyed them a proof that He wants them to be tolerated in the world? And since all other countries expel them, and yet they must live somewhere, it cannot be ungodly that Amsterdam at least should receive them." But most important of all was Spinoza's introduction to Jan de Witt, the Grand Pensionary of Holland, of whom more will be said presently.

Spinoza was gradually being drawn into the turbulent current of contemporary politics. In the meantime, however, he was making progress with his *Ethics*, receiving calls from old friends and distinguished strangers, and corresponding with all sorts and conditions.

Oldenburg's first letter to Spinoza, which was cited above, was followed by a cordial and regular correspon-dence. The Royal Society, of which Oldenburg was the acting secretary, had (as Spinoza was duly informed) received its royal charter from Charles II. in 1662, and was going full sail on its course of scientific exploration. Its ambition was nothing less than (to use Oldenburg's bold phrase) "to take the whole universe to task," and its versatile cosmopolitan secretary spared no pains to publish its doings to the world, and to gather all the latest scientific news and gossip from the four corners of the earth. Spinoza thus heard from Oldenburg all that was done in England for the advancement of science, also frequent kind messages from Robert Boyle, who, however, never condescended to write himself to the "odd philosopher," though he sent him his writings and invited his criticisms, and replied to them through Oldenburg. Spinoza also sent what news he could, especially about Huygens. Occasionally we hear echoes of contemporary events in other than purely scientific spheres. Oldenburg complains about the Plague which was raging in London.
during 1665, and seriously hindered the work of the Royal Society. He moralises on the inhumanity of warfare, à propos of the war that was being waged between England and Holland in the same year. And he wants to know what Spinoza and also the Jews of Amsterdam think of the "rumour which is on everybody's lips here that the Jews are about to return to Palestine." This had reference to the escapades of the impostor Sabbatai Zevi, who began as a pseudo-Messiah and ended as an apostate, but whose pretences, aided by the incessant sufferings of the Jews, deceived for a time even the Amsterdam Jews, whose opinion Oldenburg was curious to know—prayers being offered up in the Amsterdam Synagogue for "the King Messiah," and some new prayer-books being dated "the year one of the Messiah"! It would be interesting to know what Spinoza thought about this tragi-comedy. But just at this point the correspondence between Spinoza and Oldenburg comes to an abrupt end. The next letter between them, at least of those which are still extant, was written some ten years later. Possibly there were other letters, or it may be that the Great Fire of London in 1666 and the continued war between England and Holland (in which Bremen, Oldenburg's native city, sided with England) made further correspondence impracticable for a time; while in 1667 Oldenburg was actually imprisoned in the Tower of London, charged with "dangerous plans and practices," the vagueness of which suggests that it was simply his vast foreign correspondence that had made him an object of suspicion to a king who was too much of an adept at intrigue not to suspect everybody, and to a government which had no appreciation of a man who had "taken to task the whole universe." Oldenburg was eventually released; but his sad experiences had made him nervous and circumspect, as we shall see.

Among other correspondence, that with William van Blyenbergh is noteworthy at once as a study in cross-pur-
poses, when people argue from totally different standpoints, and also as illustrating the patience of Spinoza. Blyenbergh, a merchant of Dordrecht, had read Spinoza’s version of Descartes’ *Principia* several times with pleasure and profit, as he informed Spinoza. But finding certain difficulties in that book he ventured to ask Spinoza (in a letter dated December 1664) for further explanations, assuring him, at the same time, that his questions were prompted by no other motive than the desire for truth, as he was not dependent on any profession, supporting himself by honest merchandise, and simply devoting his leisure to problems of religious philosophy. Spinoza thought that here was a man after his own heart, and gladly hastened to deal with his difficulties. These difficulties turned chiefly on the problem of evil—God’s responsibility for the existence of evil, and the apparent reduction of good and evil to the same moral level, on the views of Spinoza. In the course of his lengthy and rather garrulous epistles Blyenbergh made it quite clear that he followed both Reason and Revelation, but that whenever these conflicted then the Scriptures had precedence over Reason. From such a standpoint, of course, the correspondence was bound to be futile from the first, but Spinoza dealt most patiently and gently with Blyenbergh, as long as human patience could endure it, and brought the correspondence to a close in June 1665.

In due course Blyenbergh requited Spinoza’s long suffering by writing “refutations” of his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* and his *Ethica*, for the deep thoughts of which he could design no holier origin than Hell!

From one of Spinoza’s letters, written in June 1665, it appears that, by that time, his *Ethics* had advanced as far as the end of what is now the fourth book, and that Spinoza expected to finish it shortly. In a letter, however, which Oldenburg wrote to Spinoza in September of the same year he remarks jestingly: “I see that you are not so much
philosophising as, if one may say so, theologising; since your thoughts are turning to angels, prophecy, and miracles.” Evidently Spinoza had informed him that he was already at work on what was to be the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. And in his reply to Oldenburg’s letter, Spinoza writes (September or October 1665) quite explicitly that he is writing a Treatise on the Scriptures. The *Ethica*, then, must have been put aside suddenly, just as it was nearing completion, and for the next four years or so we find Spinoza hard at work on his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. This certainly seems strange. What was the cause of this sudden change in the direction of his thoughts?

In his letter to Oldenburg, Spinoza states three reasons which prompted him to take up the new Treatise. In the first place, he wanted to deal with the theologians, whose prejudices were the chief obstacle which prevented people from becoming philosophical. Spinoza intended to expose these prejudices, and even hoped to convert some of the more intelligent divines. In the second place, he wanted to refute the charge of atheism which was constantly brought against him. In the third place, he wanted to defend by every means in his power freedom of thought and speech from the tyranny and presumption of the clergy, who were doing their utmost to suppress it. To appreciate these reasons adequately it is necessary to make a brief survey of the historical circumstances which seemed to call for such a book as the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, the need for which must evidently have appeared very urgent to Spinoza to have made him put aside his great work, just as it was nearing completion, in order to attack these mixed problems of theology and politics.

Spinoza, we have seen, was anxious to win the favour of the men who were in power, so that he might publish his philosophy without let or hindrance. Such patronage was indispensable in those days, for the sake of both the thinker
and his thoughts. Descartes, for instance, did not feel safe, notwithstanding his most ceremonious bows to the Church; and even in the Netherlands, where there was neither occasion nor inclination to study the susceptibilities of the holy Roman Church, the Cartesian philosophy met with considerable clerical resistance, and was repeatedly forbidden to be taught at the Universities. Although the civil authorities were generally inclined to be liberal, yet the Calvinist or Reformed Clergy often had sufficient power to cause the confiscation and destruction of books to which they took exception, and the authors of such books were occasionally made to suffer both in purse and in person. Spinoza's desire to win the favour and protection of those in power was therefore natural enough. And he succeeded almost better than he could have expected. For he enlisted the sympathy of no less a personage than the Grand Pensionary himself—Jan de Witt. His very success, however, in a way defeated his primary object, by diverting his attention from purely philosophical problems. How this happened will soon be evident.

Reference has already been made to the struggle between the Remonstrants and the contra-Remonstrants, and the tragic fate of the Remonstrant leader, Barneveldt, in 1619. That conflict was by no means a purely religious conflict. Church and State, Religion and Politics, if not quite so intimately united as elsewhere, were anything but completely divorced even in the Netherlands. Politically that conflict was one between the principle of autonomy of each of the United Provinces, and especially of Holland, and the principle of the predominance of the House of Orange. In that early conflict, Barneveldt stood for the former principle, Maurice, the Stadtholder (or so-called "Lieutenant," but virtual or would-be monarch), for the latter. Though Barneveldt came to an end in 1619, the conflict did not; it only required a suitable opportunity to break out afresh. In 1650, the Stadtholder, William II., chagrined
because of the independent attitude of Amsterdam, arrested its five chief burghers, among them Jacob de Witt. They were released soon afterwards and deprived of their office. But their bitter resentment may be gauged by the fact that, on the death of William II., in 1651, de Witt had a medal struck representing William II. lying dead on the ground, with the motto, *Liberty for ever!* The years which followed were years of great anxiety for the Netherlands. Cromwell, prompted by the Utopian idea of a European Protestant Coalition, proposed to the States-General of the Netherlands that they should suffer themselves to be absorbed by England. When this was declined, he brought the "Navigation Act" into operation with a view to crippling the Dutch shipping trade. War followed. But negotiations were soon reopened, and peace was concluded in 1654. It was during these troubles that Jan de Witt, the brilliant son of Jacob de Witt, got and used his opportunity. In 1653 he had been elected Grand Pensionary of Holland, and it was largely through his skill that the peace negotiations with England came to a successful issue in the following year. Unfortunately for de Witt, Cromwell, in his anxiety to keep Charles II. at a safe distance, stipulated as one of the conditions of peace that the young Prince of Orange (son of William II., and nephew of Charles II.) should be made ineligible for the posts of Stadtholder and Captain-General of the Netherlands forces. And, knowing that most of the United Provinces would strongly resent the very suggestion of such a condition, de Witt had to persuade the Hollanders to bind themselves at least to such a secret "Act of Seclusion." This, of course, was bound to intensify the opposition between the de Witts and the House of Orange, and to lead to a fresh conflict between the Republican and the Monarchist parties in the Netherlands. The House of Orange, largely owing to its early alliance (in the days of Barneveldt) with the orthodox majority, eventu-
ally realised their monarchical ambitions, and the de Witts, whose broad tolerance and republican zeal made them more like William the Silent than were his own descendants, were destined to meet with a tragic end. But all that was still to come. At the time with which we are at present concerned Jan de Witt was still the Grand Pensionary of Holland, and virtually the head of the United Provinces. Still, he had his enemies. His very tolerance gained for him the secret opposition of the Reformed Clergy, who were bent on Calvinising everybody and everything. And the Orange party were assiduous in cultivating the friendship of the Calvinists. The one radical safeguard for the maintenance of the Republic, as de Witt must have seen, lay in widening the outlook of its citizens, so that politics might be purged of religious animosities, and people might live at peace with each other, and co-operate in all national enterprises, without regard to their private views on matters which did not affect their conduct as citizens. In 1665, during the wars with England and Sweden, when the Dutch were so hard pressed that they had to employ French troops, the voice of discontent made itself heard in various quarters, and Calvinist prophets made capital out of these temporary trials by proclaiming them to be visitations sent from heaven in punishment of the godlessness of the country's rulers, and clamoured that the young Prince of Orange should be set in supreme authority to make the country more godly. "Moses and Aaron, the Sword and the Word," they cried, must always go hand in hand.

Already before this, Jan de Witt seems to have urged or encouraged various writers, who shared his views, to use their pen in support of his policy of tolerance, in short, in support of the separation between Church and State. One such book was written by his own nephew and namesake, others were written by Dr. Lodewijk Meyer and other members of the Spinoza circle, and Jan de Witt himself is
said to have written or contributed some chapters to such a political pamphlet. It seems natural enough, therefore, that at such a critical period Spinoza, the "good republican," should lay aside his more speculative *Ethica* in order to play his part in the warfare against bigotry and intolerance. He would expose the prejudices, presumption, and the lust for power of the clerical party. But it was idle simply to add one more political pamphlet to the multitude in which the principle of freedom of thought and speech had already been ably defended on general philosophical and humanitarian grounds. The zealots were deaf and blind to such arguments. To them philosophy meant heresy, and humanism meant atheism. The citadel of the clerics was the Bible. From it they drew all their arguments with which they so often silenced people, even when they failed to convince them. Spinoza resolved to turn his attention to the citadel itself, leaving mere skirmishes to others. He would show that the very Bible on which these presumptuous theologians based their whole case did not bear them out at all, that they were simply ignorant of these very Scriptures, and that they used religion and the Bible merely as a cloak for their own impudent lust for power over others. Such a work required vast and varied learning and insight—but Spinoza (and at that time perhaps he alone) had them in an eminent degree. And it required time—perhaps more than Spinoza anticipated. But Spinoza grudged neither time nor effort, and for the next four years he was deeply engrossed in theological and political studies, which resulted in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*.

Interfused with this wider, grander motive there was yet another, a private or personal motive. He desired to show (as he wrote to Oldenburg in the autumn of 1665) that he was not an atheist, as was commonly supposed. By the time Spinoza finished his treatise he had probably forgotten all about this private aim. If he was really still anxious to convert public opinion about himself, he could scarcely hope
to do so by publishing his treatise anonymously, as he did in 1670. The fact is that although his personal experiences added zest to his enterprise in 1665, they gradually sank into the background as he proceeded with his work. But in any case it is interesting to ask what these personal experiences were. One naturally thinks, at first, of his excom- munication in 1656. But that was an old story already, and Spinoza was at that time hardly concerned much, if at all, about the good opinion of the Amsterdam Jews. It will be better to turn to Voorburg, and to what happened there in 1665, for light on this subject. It was not an important event to which we are referring, but it is interesting as an incident in Spinoza's life, and as typical of the religious temper of the time. The pastorate of the Voorburg Church happened to be vacant in that year. There were two candidates in the field, one liberal, the other orthodox. Spinoza's landlord and others petitioned the authorities on behalf of the more liberal candidate. Thereupon the orthodox party sent a counter-petition accusing the Tydemann party of sheer wickedness, and stating at the same time that the Tydemann petition had been "concocted by a certain Spinoza, an Amsterdam Jew by birth, who is an atheist, scoffs at all religion, and is inflicting harm on the Republic, as many learned persons and ministers can attest." Evidently Spinoza had an evil repute among the champions of orthodoxy in the village, though it is pleasant to think that the more liberal section showed sufficient faith in him to enlist his sympathy and help even in their religious concerns.

In the course of the same year Spinoza had a distinguished visitor in the person of Field-Marshal Charles de St. Denis, Seigneur de St. Evremont, who has left us a pleasant record of his impression. "Spinoza [he wrote] was of medium height and had pleasant features. His knowledge, his modesty, and his unselfishness made all the intellectual people in the Hague esteem him and seek his acquaintance."
Spinoza remained in Voorburg till 1670, but not many details have reached us about him even during this period. He kept in touch with his Amsterdam friends, to whom he sent his manuscript of the *Ethics* for reading and discussion at their philosophical society's gatherings. Some of them, notably Simon de Vries, also visited him at Voorburg. That Spinoza's health was not robust is evident from his letter to one of his medical friends at Amsterdam (A. Koerbagh), to whom he incidentally mentions that he had been suffering repeatedly from tertian ague, and asks him for some conserve of roses. It was about this time apparently that Simon de Vries wanted Spinoza to accept from him a gift of two thousand florins. Simon de Vries died in 1667, and his death must have been felt very deeply by Spinoza. The following year, 1668, brought bad news about another of his friends. Adriaan Koerbagh, whom Spinoza got to know at Rijnsburg, had studied law and medicine at Leyden, and was possessed of considerable mental gifts. Spinoza liked him, and encouraged him in the study of philosophy, and in the above-mentioned letter he actually offered to send him the manuscript of the *Ethics*. But, though clever, Koerbagh seems to have had little or no character. At all events, early in 1668 he published two works, entitled *A Garden of Flowers*, and *Light in Dark Places*, in which he attacked medicine, morals, and religion in a most wanton and shameless manner. He was promptly arrested, and though he expressed regret and recanted, yet (as this was not his first offence) he was fined 6000 florins and condemned to ten years' imprisonment with hard labour, to be followed by exile. It should be mentioned to his honour that he entirely exonerated his brother, who had also been arrested; and when Spinoza's name was mentioned in the course of the trial he took the entire responsibility upon himself, emphatically denying that Spinoza or any one else was in any way responsible for what he had written. However
little there may be to say in Koerbagh’s favour, yet the punishment was certainly savage. And one of the officers of the court had actually urged something much more severe, namely, that his fortune should be confiscated, his right thumb cut off, his tongue bored through with a red-hot iron, and that he should be imprisoned for thirty years! Koerbagh died in prison in the following year. The affair must have made a deep impression on Spinoza, who had expected much from him, and some of whose views Koerbagh had certainly assimilated and spread—though Spinoza was the last man to condone immorality.

In the meantime Spinoza had been busy with his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, and it was published in 1670. He had now been seven years at Voorburg, and he may have needed a change, or his friends at the Hague may have urged him to come and live among them. At all events Spinoza left the village, and went to live in the Hague.

§ 8. SPINOZA’S STAY IN THE HAGUE—1670–1677

Spinoza’s first lodgings in the Hague were situated on the *Stille Veerkade*, a quiet wharf not far from the Great Church of St. James. He lodged and boarded with a widow of the name of Van Velen. A single room on the second floor served him as bedroom, workroom, and study, all in one. Curiously enough, it was in that same room that Colerus subsequently wrote one of the earliest biographies of Spinoza. The house has been identified (it bears the number 32) but it has, no doubt, been very much altered since those days; and the *Stille Veerkade* is no longer a wharf, but an ordinary street, the waterway having been filled up with earth long since.

Probably one of the attractions which the Hague had
for Spinoza was that it brought him into closer touch with Jan de Witt. That he had known him for some time already seems certain. The political views of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* are very like those of the Grand Pensionary, and it was under his protection that this treatise had been published. When the opportunity arose, de Witt's enemies spoke quite openly of the treatise as a wicked instrument "forged in hell by a renegade Jew and the devil, and issued with the knowledge of Mr. Jan de Witt." It was probably also during his stay in Voorburg, and while giving his time and energy to the composition of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, that Spinoza accepted from de Witt an annual pension of 200 florins, which was paid even after de Witt's death. Once in the Hague, Spinoza must have received many a visit from the Grand Pensionary; and local gossip, indeed, still refers to such private visits from him, and his usual entrance by the garden door at the back of the house.

The need of protection from high quarters showed itself soon enough. Already in the June following the publication of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, the Church Council of Amsterdam had condemned it, and the condemnation of other Church Councils followed in rapid succession. The book had made a great stir in the learned world, and ran through five editions within a comparatively short time. But it had stirred a hornet's nest, and, for many years to come, theologians and other respectable folks showed their orthodoxy by incessant denunciations of that godless treatise. The civil authorities were repeatedly approached and worried to exercise the arm of the law. But so long as de Witt was in power the importunate zealots were successfully resisted. Even after de Witt's death there were men, like Burgomaster Hudde, who could, for a time, defeat the efforts of the clerics. But when William III. found it desirable to ingratiate himself with the clergy and the mob,
and to play to the gallery for a crown, the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* was strictly prohibited (1674), and other measures were contemplated also against the known author of the anonymous treatise.

In May 1671 Spinoza found it necessary to change his lodgings. He was in receipt of 300 florins a year from the brother of Simon de Vries, and 200 florins a year from de Witt, that is, about £40 a year, besides what little he may have been still earning by making lenses. He found that he could not afford to continue to pay Mrs. Van Velen's charges for board and lodging, and therefore looked out for rooms where he might provide his own food, and economise that way. He accordingly moved into the adjoining *Paviljoensgragt*, where he rented two small rooms in the house of a painter, Hendrik van der Spyck. This house has also been identified, and may now be recognised by the tablet affixed to the front wall just below the window on the second story, where Spinoza's rooms were. Here also the "gragt," or waterway, has long since made room for an ordinary road. Spinoza lived with the Van der Spycks till the end of his life.

When Spinoza settled in the Hague, after the publication of his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, he turned his attention once more to his neglected *Ethics*, which had already seemed to be near completion in 1665. The comparatively long interval which had elapsed since he had put it aside in order to take up the more urgent work had probably brought with it the need or the desire for not inconsiderable modifications or elaborations of details, and the *Ethics* only attained to its final form in 1675. In the meantime, however, Spinoza must have devoted his attention also to other things besides the *Ethics*. While at work on his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* he had again taken up his Hebrew and Biblical studies, and had mastered a mass of political literature. In that treatise he was chiefly concerned with the
final results of these studies and reflections, and the different departments of thought were necessarily all intermingled. It would naturally occur to him, or some of his friends would suggest to him, that it was desirable to work out each of these subjects independently, and more fully than was possible in the above treatise. Spinoza, while completing and perfecting his Ethics, would accordingly also be preparing for a scientific treatise on the Hebrew language, for a translation of the Old Testament based on such an exposition of the character of Hebrew, and, lastly, for a separate treatise on political theories. By way of a change from theology and politics he would also turn again sometimes to mathematics and physical science, with a view to supplementing his Ethics, some day, by a treatise on natural philosophy. That Spinoza wished to write such a work on natural philosophy, and also to give a new exposition of the principles of algebra, we know; but he did not live to realise these wishes. His other intentions fared rather better. Spinoza did begin a Hebrew Grammar, a Dutch translation of the Bible, and a Political Treatise. But he seems to have been dissatisfied with his translation, and destroyed what he had done. The Hebrew Grammar remained unfinished, so did the Political Treatise, which, however, was much nearer completion. He has also left an essay On the Rainbow and another On the Calculation of Chances. Very likely he did not begin to write all or any of these while he was still occupied with his Ethics. But he must have been preparing for them, and we are told that at times he was so hard at work that he did not leave his room for days, nor go out of the house for three months at a stretch.

In the meantime black clouds were gathering in the political atmosphere, and a storm was preparing to burst upon the heads of the de Witts and their friends.

Reference has already been made to the war between England and Holland in 1665. That war was concluded in
1667, when England was induced to come to terms partly by de Ruyter's daring and successful expedition to Chatham (when the sound of Dutch guns was heard in London), but even more so by the intervention of Louis XIV., who took sides with the Netherlands. Soon afterwards, however, Louis XIV. revived his claims to the Spanish Netherlands (Belgium) and led an army there. The Dutch grew alarmed. It was good to have Louis XIV. for a friend, but it was dangerous to have him for a neighbour. Jan de Witt accordingly sought for a means of checking French pretensions, and succeeded in doing so by means of the Triple Alliance between the Netherlands, England and Sweden. This was in 1668. Louis XIV. meant to be revenged on de Witt. First he started a tariff war with the Netherlands, next he bribed Charles II. (by the Secret Treaty of Dover, 1671), and, in 1672, England and France declared war against the Netherlands, and a French army of 120,000 men invaded the totally unprepared United Provinces. For some time past there had been a growing conspiracy in favour of the young Prince of Orange and against Jan de Witt, who had done his utmost to keep him from power, especially by engineering the "Perpetual Edict" of 1667, which decreed that no Captain-General or Admiral-General of the United Provinces could at the same time be Stadtholder of a province. The conspiracy now came to a sudden head. There was a cry for the Prince of Orange to take the field and deliver the country as his father had done. The "Perpetual Edict" was swept aside, and its author was not forgotten on the day of reckoning. With the country unprepared, and the enemy carrying all before them, the populace was easily stirred to uncontrollable fury, which had to find vent on a scapegoat. After vain attempts to procure their judicial murder, the mob broke into the prison, at the Hague, while Jan de Witt was visiting his brother Cornelis there, and murdered the two brothers in
the most brutal fashion. This happened on the 20th of August 1672. More than twenty years of the most devoted and able service to the Republic was forgotten in the moment of wrath, and the Prince of Orange, William III. (the future King of England), was not altogether guiltless of the crime.

When Spinoza heard of the horrible tragedy he was quite beside himself. His usual philosophic calm entirely deserted him. He burst into tears, and, distracted with grief and anger, he wrote on a placard his utter abhorrence of "the very lowest of barbarians" who had committed the iniquitous murder. He wanted to go out and post his denunciation near the scene of the crime. Fortunately, Van der Spyck was more discreet. He locked the door, so that Spinoza could not get out to share the fate of the de Witts.

Some time after these terrible events the heirs of Jan de Witt showed some hesitation about continuing Spinoza's pension. Some of the philosopher's friends, when they heard of it, urged him to enforce his legal claims on the strength of the written promise which he possessed. But Spinoza simply returned that document to de Witt's heirs, without any comment. Impressed by his conduct, they continued his pension without any more ado.

The war between France and Holland proved fatal to yet another friend of Spinoza. His old teacher, Van den Enden, had been compelled to leave Amsterdam some years before these events. For a time he stayed in Antwerp, and then settled in Paris. Here his desire to help his own country at that critical period led him to join in a conspiracy to betray Quillebœuf to the Dutch, and to raise a rebellion in Normandy. All this would, of course, have greatly helped the Netherlands in their struggle with Louis XIV. But the conspiracy was discovered, and Van den Enden was beheaded in front of the Bastille in November 1674. Such was the tragic end of the man who had befriended Spinoza.
in the early days of his struggle, and who had contributed not a little towards the early development of his scientific thinking.

The war with France had yet further consequences in store for Spinoza. In 1673 the French army under Prince Condé was encamping at Utrecht, and among the officers there was a Colonel Stoupe, who was in charge of a Swiss regiment. Stoupe was an ex-parson, well read, but an adventurer. Condé was a man of liberal views, and interested in art, science, and philosophy. And during their enforced idleness at Utrecht, Stoupe suggested that as Spinoza (already famous as the author of the geometric version of Descartes' *Principia*, and much more so as the author of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*) lived quite near, at the Hague, it would be interesting to get to know him. Condé accordingly sent, through Stoupe, an invitation to Spinoza to visit him at Utrecht. What induced Stoupe to seek the acquaintance of Spinoza seems fairly clear. Though a Calvinist, and at one time a minister of his religion, he had brought a regiment of Swiss soldiers to the service of Catholic France against the Calvinist Netherlands. The fact is that he was just an unscrupulous adventurer; at heart (as Bishop Burnet has said of him) he was neither a Protestant nor a Christian, but a man of intrigue and of no virtue. But he was anxious to keep up appearances, and when a countryman of his took him severely to task for helping the Catholics against his own fellow-Calvinists, he tried to defend himself by suggesting that the majority of the Dutch were not Calvinists at all, but heretics of the blackest dye. In a pamphlet which he published about September 1673, he refers to Spinoza as a bad Jew and worse Christian, who had written a treatise with the aim of destroying all religion and establishing atheism. This book (he added) was, nevertheless, openly sold and widely read, and no Dutchman has taken the trouble to refute it, while
its author was, in fact, much sought after by learned men and fashionable ladies, and so on. The object of the invitation to Spinoza, so far as Stoupe was concerned, was therefore simply to get what information he could that might be turned to account for his self-defence. And such were the terms in which he described Spinoza apparently at the very time when he professed the greatest regard for him!

Spinoza, on the other hand, a dreamer by birth, probably saw in this invitation from Prince Condé a possible opening for peace negotiations, and was anxious to do his duty. He seems to have consulted some people in authority, and whatever they may have thought about it privately, they could certainly see no harm in Spinoza's errand. And so, armed with the necessary safe-conducts, Spinoza made his way to Utrecht in May 1673. He was well received by Count Luxemburg, on behalf of Prince Condé, who had in the meantime been called away, and he was invited to stay there and await the Prince's return. Spinoza's intercourse with the Count, with Stoupe and others there, seems to have been of the friendliest kind, and it is known that he made a very good impression. But when, after waiting several weeks, the news arrived that Condé could not return, Spinoza took his departure. He had been offered a pension if he would dedicate a book to Louis XIV.; but Spinoza was not Stoupe—he was not ready to serve any master for hire. He declined the request, and returned to the Hague.

The people at the Hague had, in the meantime, got wind of Spinoza's visit to the enemy's camp. With mob charity they could give but one meaning to this—Spinoza was a spy. When, therefore, he arrived at the Hague, scowls and stones greeted his return, and Van der Spyck was afraid that the mob would break into the house. Spinoza, however, begged him not to be afraid. "I am innocent," he said,
"and some of our leading statesmen know why I went to Utrecht. As soon as the people make any noise, I shall go out to them, even if they should do to me what they did to the good de Witts. I am a good Republican, and my desire is the good of the Republic." Apparently Spinoza's frank and fearless bearing in the moment of danger reassured the suspicious people, and he escaped without harm.

The invitation from Prince Condé was not the only compliment paid to Spinoza that year. A more important invitation had reached him in February. It came from the Elector Palatine, Karl Ludwig, the brother of the Princess Elizabeth, who had befriended Descartes. The Elector offered him the Professorship of Philosophy at the University of Heidelberg. The invitation certainly had considerable attractions, and Spinoza considered it for about six weeks. But, in the first place, he could not make up his mind to become a public teacher after all these years of habitual quietude and retirement. In the second place, he had misgivings about the statement made in the invitation concerning the Prince's confidence that Spinoza would not misuse his freedom in philosophical teaching to disturb the public religion. "I do not know [Spinoza wrote] the limits within which the freedom of my philosophical teaching would be confined, if I am to avoid all appearance of disturbing the publicly established religion. Religious quarrels do not arise so much from ardent zeal for religion as from men's various dispositions, and the love of contradiction which makes them habitually distort and condemn everything. . . . I have experienced these things in my private and secluded life, how much more should I have to fear them after my promotion to this post of honour."

So he acknowledged gracefully the Prince's liberality in offering him the Professorship, and declined it with thanks. There can be no doubt that it was the wisest course, for, besides the reasons stated by Spinoza himself, it must be
remembered that he could scarcely tear himself away from his numerous friends in Holland, and that the course of events in his fatherland (as his political writings show) touched him too closely to permit of his going abroad in that critical period. Moreover, though he may not have anticipated quite such an early end as befell him (he died four years afterwards), yet with his state of consumption he could scarcely expect to grow old.

That Spinoza had a large circle of friends and acquaintances there can be no doubt, though the ascendancy of the orthodox and the evil repute of his views compelled people, from sheer prudence, to keep quiet about their knowledge and admiration of him. One of his most devoted friends at the Hague was a Dr. J. M. Lucas, a medical practitioner, who subsequently wrote the oldest extant biography of Spinoza, which breathes the most ardent attachment to the philosopher. Another of his medical friends was Dr. G. H. Schuller, who practised medicine at Amsterdam, but also devoted much time to alchemy and philosophy. It was Schuller who brought Spinoza into contact with one of the most promising of the younger scientists, Tschirnhaus, and, through him, also with the most eminent philosopher of the next generation—Leibniz. Tschirnhaus was a young German Count who had studied at Leyden. In 1674 he made the acquaintance of Schuller at Amsterdam. Having studied Descartes, he was interested to hear all about Spinoza, with whom he soon started a correspondence, and also came into personal contact towards the end of the same year. In the following summer, 1675, he visited London, where he met Oldenburg and Boyle. He also visited Paris in the same year, and, on the advice of Spinoza, called on Christian Huygens, who had settled in Paris since 1667, and (it is interesting to compare) had continued to enjoy the profitable patronage of Louis XIV. even during the years of disaster which that King had
inflicted on the Netherlands, while Spinoza had declined even to dedicate a book to him for the sake of a pension. The still interesting correspondence between Spinoza and Tschirnhaus lasted about two years. In 1683 Tschirnhaus published his *De Medicina Mentis*, dealing with the same problem as Spinoza’s *Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding*, and borrowing some of its ideas. But prudence prevented him from mentioning Spinoza, to whom he simply referred as *quidam* (somebody).

Incidentally Tschirnhaus’s visit to London led to a resumption of the correspondence between Oldenburg and Spinoza, which seems to have been dropped since 1665. Spinoza had sent a copy of his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* to Oldenburg, who felt rather shocked by its heterodox views, and expressed himself accordingly in a letter which may not have reached Spinoza, but which, in any case, would probably not have brought about a renewal of their correspondence. The account, however, which Tschirnhaus gave of Spinoza and his views seems to have produced a conciliatory effect on Oldenburg, who thereupon wrote another letter to Spinoza, saying that “a closer consideration of the whole subject had convinced him that he (Spinoza) was far from attempting any injury to true religion and sound philosophy.” Spinoza, who had taken no notice of the various “refutations” of his treatise published by various people, was nevertheless anxious to know, and to discuss carefully, the objections which Oldenburg—or, indeed, any reasonable people—had to bring against his views. In the course of his increasingly stiff letters, it turns out that Oldenburg objected to the entire system of Spinoza’s philosophy, and that what he wished Spinoza to do was nothing less than to write a kind of philosophic apologetic of orthodox Christianity! Spinoza may well have wondered whether Oldenburg was guilty of stupidity or of hypocrisy.
In the meantime Spinoza had finished his *Ethics*, and was contemplating its immediate publication. He mentioned this to Oldenburg in a letter written at the end of June 1675. Oldenburg replied that he "will not object to receiving a few copies of the said treatise" to dispose of among his friends, but asked him to send them in such a way that no one may know of it, and begged him "not to insert any passages which may seem to discourage the practice of religion and virtue."

About the end of July 1676 Spinoza went to Amsterdam to arrange for the publication of the *Ethica*. What happened there is best told in Spinoza's own words. "While I was negotiating [he writes to Oldenburg] a rumour gained currency that I had in the press a book concerning God, wherein I endeavoured to show that there is no God. This report was believed by many. Thereupon certain theologians, perhaps the authors of the rumour, took occasion to complain of me before the Prince and the Magistrates. Moreover, the stupid Cartesians, being suspected of favouring me, endeavoured to remove the aspersion by abusing everywhere my opinions and writings, a course which they still pursue. When I became aware of this through trustworthy men, who also assured me that the theologians were everywhere lying in wait for me, I determined to put off publishing till I saw how things were going. . . . But matters seem to get worse and worse, and I am still uncertain what to do."

Oldenburg must have felt intensely relieved by the news that the publication of the *Ethica* had been indefinitely postponed. The poor man had changed indeed. In his early days, hearing of Spinoza's hesitation to publish the equally unorthodox *Short Treatise*, he had begged Spinoza to ignore the "petty theologians" and to publish. "Come, good sir [he then said], cast away all fear of exciting against you the pigmies of our time. Long enough have we sacri-
faced to ignorance and pedantry. Let us spread the sails of true knowledge, and explore the recesses of nature more thoroughly than heretofore.” He had grown nervous, almost stupidly nervous, since then. It must be remembered, however, that he had learned an unpleasant lesson in the Tower of London, in 1667, that he was never really a profound thinker, and that his environment, though scientific, was none too enlightened. Robert Boyle, for instance, regarded his escape from a certain thunderstorm as due to miraculous interposition, and one may well believe that he had strange opinions about the author of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, as Tschirnhaus relates. Perhaps it was this very treatise (coupled with “the shades of doubt which,” as he confessed, “did sometimes cross his mind”) that first suggested to him the idea of founding the Boyle Lectures for the vindication of Christianity. And Oldenburg was sufficiently under the influence of Boyle not only to suspect Spinoza’s philosophy, which was defensible enough, but even to suspect his motives, which was quite indefensible, and which Spinoza certainly resented.

The *Ethica*, then, had to be laid aside, and it was not destined to be published during the author’s lifetime. Spinoza now applied himself to the other writings, which have already been enumerated above. The *Tractatus Politicus* must have engaged most of his attention and interest. From one point of view it was a fine tribute to the memory of that eminent statesman Jan de Witt, whose conduct of affairs received here its fullest philosophical justification. Moreover that liberal régime was rapidly passing away, as Spinoza had good reason to know. The Dutch had arrived at the parting of the ways, and showed a marked tendency to leave the republican highway for the path of monarchy. Like Samuel of old, he was determined solemnly to warn his countrymen. But, above all, he wanted to set before them a vivid exposition of the great principles of all true states-
manship, the supreme ideal of all statecraft. That ideal was the perfection of the individual citizen. This was only attainable where there was security and freedom. And the supreme duty of the State was to secure these two conditions. Democracy was the best form of government. The ideal, however, may also be approached under other forms of government. But whatever the external form may be (and Spinoza must have realised his country's almost irrevocable drift towards monarchy), let not the true ideal be forgotten. The *Political Treatise* was the "Ethical Will and Testament" which Spinoza left for his country; and it was a dying hand that wrote it, too late to finish it.

Four months before his death Spinoza made the personal acquaintance of Leibniz. About eight years before that already Leibniz had read Spinoza's version of Descartes' *Principia*, and in 1671 he had sent him a copy of his "Notice of the Progress of Optics." In return Spinoza sent him a copy of his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. This book was already known to Leibniz, and had been described by him as "an unbearably free-thinking book." But he did not know till then who its author was, nor did his teacher, Professor Thomas, who had written a "refutation" of it. Leibniz wanted to communicate his discovery to his teacher, without, however, disclosing more than his diplomacy dictated. "The author of the book," he wrote, "is Benedict Spinoza, a Jew (my Dutch friends write me word) expelled from the Synagogue for his monstrous opinions, but a man of universal learning, and especially eminent in Optics, and in the construction of very fine telescopes." In 1675 Leibniz was in Paris, and there he met Tschirnhaus, who had read a manuscript copy of Spinoza's *Ethics*, and now communicated some of Spinoza's views to Leibniz. Leibniz grew eager to read the *Ethics* for himself, and Tschirnhaus wrote to Dr. Schuller to obtain Spinoza's permission to show Leibniz a copy of the *Ethics*. But
Spinoza declined. He had no faith in Leibniz, and his distrust was not unfounded. "What [asked Spinoza] takes Leibniz away from Frankfort, and what is he doing in Paris?" Spinoza had reason to suspect that Leibniz was on a mission for the reunion of Protestants and Catholics, which would lead to a joint effort to repress all liberal tendencies, and to suppress freedom of thought and speech, which were so near to his heart. Leibniz's attitude towards these things was certainly unlike Spinoza's, and his subsequent behaviour towards Spinoza rather justified that instinctive distrust with which Spinoza at first met him. But when Leibniz came to the Hague, in the autumn of 1676, Spinoza's distrust and reserve vanished. Leibniz frequently visited Spinoza in his humble lodgings, and there (as he himself has left on record) "conversed with him often and at great length." He also obtained a first-hand knowledge of Spinoza's *Ethics* then. During the years which followed Leibniz devoted close attention to the philosophy of Spinoza, and even assimilated some of his ideas, but there was a remarkable lack of common generosity, not to say common honesty, both in the way in which he generally avoided all reference to Spinoza, and also in the tone of his remarks when on rare occasions he did refer to him.

Spinoza's days were ending fast. Dr. Schuller, writing to Leibniz on the 6th February, 1677, expresses his fear that Spinoza would not remain much longer among them, as his consumption was growing worse from day to day. He was only forty-four years of age, but his constitution was enfeebled through hereditary consumption, aggravated by the glass-dust from the lenses, and the sedentary habits of the student. And he had lived strenuous days. To the very last he was up and doing. On Saturday afternoon the 20th February 1677, he was still downstairs chatting with the Van der Spycks. But he had already sent for Dr. Schuller, and retired early to bed. On the Sunday morning Dr.
Schuller arrived. Spinoza was up, and at midday had some chicken-broth which the doctor had ordered for him. There seemed to be no immediate danger, and the Van der Spycks went to church in the afternoon. On their way home they were informed that Spinoza was no more. He had passed away at three o'clock, in the presence of Dr. Schuller.

Four days later Spinoza was buried in the New Church on the Spuy, which is quite near to the Paviljoensgragt. Six coaches followed the cortège, and many prominent people followed him to his last resting-place, which was close to that of Jan de Witt. Of worldly possessions he left very little behind him, and that chiefly in the way of books. Dr. Schuller took possession of some of the most valuable of these, and even then there still remained about 160 works (some of them quite costly), the list of which has fortunately been preserved; and copies of nearly all of them are now in the Spinoza Museum at Rijnsburg. The proceeds of these, and of some lenses which he also left behind, were just enough to defray all his debts and the cost of burial—though his grave was but a hired grave, and was used again some years after his death.

In accordance with Spinoza's instructions, his desk, containing the manuscripts of his unpublished works, was entrusted to the care of Jan Rieuwertsz, the Amsterdam bookseller. Immediate publication seemed to be dangerous for publisher and editors; and when they had the courage they had not the money to proceed with the printing. For a time they thought of selling the manuscript of the *Ethica* to Leibniz, intending no doubt to apply the proceeds towards the cost of printing it from one of their own copies of that work. Schuller had already communicated with Leibniz about it, but at the last moment some one at the Hague came to the rescue, and as early as November 1677 Spinoza's *Opera Posthuma* appeared in print. It consisted of one quarto volume, and contained the *Ethics*, the *Political Treatise*, the *Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding*, the *Letters*,
STATUE OF SPINOZA AT THE HAGUE
and the Hebrew Grammar. All names and other means of identification had been carefully removed from the correspondence; the editors' names, as also the name of the publisher and the place of publication were not given; and only the initials of Spinoza (B. D. S.) appeared on the title-page. The editors were Jelles (who appears to have written the Preface), Meyer, and Schuller; and the editorial work seems to have been carried on secretly in one of the rooms of the Orphan Asylum, which had just been established in Amsterdam by some of Spinoza's Collegiant friends. It was at this Orphan Asylum (which is still in existence) that some of the originals of Spinoza's letters were subsequently discovered, with editorial pencil-notes on them.

Two hundred years later a remarkable contrast to this secrecy was witnessed, when the whole learned world joined in celebrating the memory of Spinoza. In 1880 his statue was erected in the Hague, within view of both houses where he had lived his last years. And a new, complete edition of his works was published in 1882, containing a portrait especially engraved from the painting in the library at Wolfenbüttel, where Lessing, poet, philosopher, and champion of the ill-used, had, nearly a century before that, taken the first steps towards the due recognition of Spinoza. The tribute paid to his memory was world-wide; and it was well deserved. For there is considerable truth in Heine's witty saying that "all our modern philosophers, though often perhaps unconsciously, see through the glasses which Baruch Spinoza ground."

§9. THE CHARACTER OF SPINOZA

In attempting to form an estimate of the character of Spinoza, one should be guided by what is actually known about him from the direct evidence of those who knew him personally. There is a natural temptation to judge his
personality by deductions from his views as seen through one's own spectacles. But it is not too much to say that, of the two alternative courses, it is far more safe to interpret the philosophy of Spinoza in the light of what is independently known about his life and character than to estimate his character in the light of certain deductions from an independent interpretation of his views. During his lifetime Spinoza was often condemned and vilified on the score of his opinions, and on account of defects which, it was tacitly assumed, these revealed in his character. There is reason to believe that, but for his death, Spinoza's fate might have been very much like that of Koerbagh. After his death, it was considered a crime to say anything good about Spinoza, and for more than a century afterwards his name was anathema maranatha. Even people who were not too sensitive to his criticism of the Bible felt that a man who maintained the relativity of good and evil, and believed in universal necessity, had no incentive to be good, and, therefore, was very likely bad. Such an interpretation and deduction were, to say the least, very one-sided, and, towards the end of the eighteenth century, its absurdity was exposed by the no less one-sided view which, by laying exclusive stress on "the intellectual love of God" and kindred doctrines of Spinoza, transformed him into a "God-intoxicated" saint.

If we turn to the main facts of Spinoza's life, and to the recorded judgments of the people who knew him personally, there can be no doubt that Spinoza, though not a saint in the accepted sense of the expression, was certainly one of the finest characters of which the history of philosophy can boast. The dominant feature in his character was his devotion to the pursuit of truth. For it he was ever ready to make all sacrifices. Neither bribes nor threats could in any way seduce him from that pursuit. And he readily sacrificed his personal comfort in order that he might have money for books, and time for study. To him the pursuit
of truth was no mere pastime or trade—it was the true life of man. One might almost say that it constituted the religion of Spinoza. Yet he was no mere intellectualist. If his devotion to knowledge reminds one of the striking utterances of his great medieval kinsman, Maimonides (whose Guide of the Perplexed Spinoza read and possessed), his moral earnestness re-echoes something of the voice of the Prophets. Nothing offended him more than the suggestion that his views tended to discourage the practice of virtue; nothing outraged him more than the reading of Homo Politicus, a book in which, from apparently Spinozistic principles, maxims were deduced for the most selfish and immoral conduct. Again and again he insisted on absolute purity of motive even in the communication of views which he regarded as absolutely true. When sending his Short Treatise to his Amsterdam friends he begs of them to be sure that nothing but the good of their neighbours will ever induce them to communicate its doctrines to others. And it was out of considerateness for his fellow-men that he tried, as far as possible, not to unsettle their religious beliefs. He assured the Van der Spycks that their religion was quite good, and that they need have no misgivings whatever so long as their conduct was good and upright. Good conduct and pure motives, these were the most essential things, and, devoted as he was to truth, he maintained that Turks and heathens who did their duty and loved their fellow-men were filled with the spirit of Christ, whom Spinoza regarded as the highest type of manhood. Even in the professed polemic of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus he passes by without criticism the less harmful of orthodox doctrines, although he disagreed with them. But there was no duplicity about him; when men of education invited his views on some of these very doctrines (such as the divinity of Christ) he did not mince matters, but expressed his views without any equivocation. His means for active benevo-
lence were not great. Still what little he possessed was at the service of his friends. When informed that a considerable sum of money, which he had lent in this way, was lost, he merely remarked quietly, and with a smile, that he would have to draw in his expenses for the future. Wealth and position had no undue attraction for him. He would not for their sake bind or blind his judgment by accepting the Heidelberg professorship, or even appear to do so by paying a formal compliment to a monarch whose aims and methods he condemned. In this respect he stood head and shoulders above some of his most eminent contemporaries in the world of science. But though of an independent spirit he was neither proud nor cold and reserved. He met half-way, and more, all people who offered him their friendship. He showed wonderful patience with the most mediocre people who turned to him with their difficulties; and he was kindly to the humblest. Amid all the accusations brought against Spinoza, no specific charge was ever made against his moral character. It was always his heretical views, and his character as deduced a priori from these views by the ingenuity of "learned parsons," that were flung at his head. This is remarkable in itself, and is amply confirmed by Colerus, the Lutheran pastor, who, though he considered Spinoza's heresies to be abominable and most outrageous, has nevertheless made it perfectly clear that Spinoza's morals were unassailable. The peasants at Rijnsburg and Voorburg, we are expressly told, agreed that he was "a man whom it was good to know, kind, upright, obliging, and of good morals." People of culture felt a peculiar charm in his presence, and men of his own age, and even older men, looked upon him with the respect of disciples. We have seen already what impression he made on Oldenburg and the Seigneur de St. Evremonde when they came into personal touch with him. The account which we have from Dr. Lucas, who knew Spinoza intimately in the Hague, breathes
a spirit of the utmost veneration. And many who have only read his writings have felt themselves in the presence of an uncommon moral atmosphere of utter unselfishness and disinterestedness, and a boundless faith in human goodness.

Spinoza was not a saint. He did not believe in turning the cheek to the smiter. Nor was he so other-worldly as to despise the world and the flesh. He could say hard things against insolent ignoramuses and heretic-hunters; he never quite forgot the wrong done to him by his kinsmen and his tribe; and, in the heat of conflict, he even forgot to pause for a moment in order to acknowledge some of the merits of the Law and the Prophets. He was human, and was influenced by emotions to a far greater extent than is supposed by those who exaggerate his intellectualism, because they deduce his character from certain aspects of his philosophy. He could be angry with immorality and intolerance, and he felt injured by unmerited suspicion. He laughed to see divines excel the devil by their wiles; and he wept over the tragic fate of the de Witts. He was not even an ascetic. Though extraordinarily abstemious in his mode of life—living on a few pence a day and with a pipe for his only luxury—this was mainly due to his circumstances. His desire for independence and his devotion to books made it impossible for him to earn sufficient to indulge in the ordinary comforts of life, and so abstemiousness gradually became a habit with him. But he had no contempt for the reasonable pleasures or joys of life. "I enjoy life [he wrote] and try to live it, not in sorrow and sighing, but in peace, joy, and cheerfulness." And those who knew him have confirmed the truth of this. He could not understand how any one could find, or imagine that God would find, any virtue in sighs and tears, and the like. "Nothing [he insists] but a gloomy and sad superstition forbids enjoyment." Indeed, what he had, in the first instance, sought in philosophy was guidance in the attainment of
happiness. It was not, as in the case of Descartes, discontent with the then state of knowledge that drove him to philosophy, but discontent with the ordinary pursuits and pleasures of life, because they failed to bring abiding happiness. This is evident from the opening passage of his Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding, already quoted above. He had turned to philosophy for guidance in the pursuit of happiness, and found his happiness in the pursuit of philosophy.

On the other hand, there was certainly something of the higher mysticism about Spinoza. It would be a mistake to empty his religious terminology of all its religious meaning. We are trenched here on a difficult question of interpretation, and we do not wish to dogmatise. Still it should not be forgotten that, though convinced of the truth of his philosophy, Spinoza was far from supposing that it was the whole truth. There were but few things, even in the world of extension and thought, of which he professed to have the highest kind of knowledge; while, besides extension and thought, there were infinite aspects of the universe (or attributes of substance) of which he avowedly had no knowledge whatever. He felt more than he saw. And though he loved to live in the clear, common light of day, and hated the bigotry and superstition that lurk in the shadows of the twilight, yet he felt the glow of the presence that dwells in the setting sun, even if he was not absorbed in visions of a light that never shone on land or sea. It was something of this mystic feeling that prompted his religious language, and gave to his personality that charm which won all who came near him. It also won for him the sympathy of poets like Goethe and Lessing, Coleridge and Wordsworth, just as his calm scientific outlook has made him a favourite with men of science. His moral ardour seems almost aglow with this mystic fire, and, if we may not call him a priest of the most high God, yet he was certainly a prophet of the power which makes for righteousness.
HISTORY OF
THE SHORT TREATISE

§1. THE DISCOVERY OF THE MANUSCRIPTS

The Short Treatise was not published in the lifetime of Spinoza, nor was it included in the Opera Posthuma published in November 1677, shortly after the death of Spinoza. The writer of the Preface to the Opera Posthuma does not even refer to it specifically. He alludes to the essay On the Rainbow, of which he appears to have been unable to obtain a copy, and which he believed to have been burned by Spinoza. But, for the rest, he simply remarks in a general sort of way that “although it is credible that some work of our philosopher [Spinoza] may still be in the possession of somebody or other without his knowledge, it may nevertheless be assumed that nothing will be found therein which is not already given repeatedly in these writings,” that is, in the Ethics, the Political Treatise, the Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding, the Correspondence, and the Hebrew Grammar, which between them constituted the Opera Posthuma. Thus no reference is made to the Short Treatise even as a possibly lost work of Spinoza. On the other hand, it should be remembered that to the editors of the Opera Posthuma, as indeed to Spinoza himself, the Short Treatise appeared to have been superseded by the Ethics. Hence the silence about the Short Treatise may not be so strange after all, and one should not attach too much importance to it. A report dating from 1703, the truth of which there is no reason to doubt, tends to show that J. Rieuwertsz (junior), the publisher of the Opera Posthuma, ciii
actually possessed a manuscript copy of what is now called the Short Treatise, but which was then not unnaturally regarded simply as an early draft of the Ethics.

In 1703, Gottlieb Stolle (1673–1744)—a Silesian who was appointed Professor of Political Science at Jena in 1717—and a Dr. Hallmann travelled through Holland, where they interviewed various people who had known Spinoza. Among others they saw Rieuwertsz at Amsterdam. Rieuwertsz gave them some personal reminiscences of Spinoza, for whom (so they relate) he showed uncommon affection, and, with tears in his eyes, wished that Spinoza were still alive. Rieuwertsz also showed them several manuscripts of Spinoza’s works, and among them was one apparently written in Spinoza’s own handwriting. This (according to Hallmann) was no other than Spinoza’s first, Dutch version of the Ethica; it was quite different from the published Ethica—not worked out in the geometric method, but in the ordinary way, and divided into chapters, like the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus; Rieuwertsz assured them that the printed Ethica was very much better than this manuscript version, though the latter contained some things which were omitted from the former, notably the chapter on the Devil. Several friends of Spinoza, said Rieuwertsz, had copies of that manuscript, which had never been printed because the Latin version, which had been published, was altogether superior and had been well edited. The story is not altogether free from difficulties. But it undoubtedly gives us an explicit reference to the so-called Short Treatise. Stolle and Hallmann’s account of their travels, written in 1704, was not published till 1847,* but Stolle repeated his information about the Short Treatise in his Brief Introduction to the History of Learning, which was published in 1718. The story about the Dutch Ethics and the chapter on the Devil was repeated by

* Extracts from Stolle-Hallmann’s Reisebeschreibung are given in Freudenthal’s Die Lebensgeschichte Spinozas, pp. 221 ff.
J. F. Reimmann (1668–1743) in his *Catalogue of Theological Books*, which was published in 1731, also by J. C. Mylius in his *Library of Anonymous and Pseudonymous Authors*, which was published in 1740. These notices, however, do not seem to have attracted any attention. Spinoza had such an evil reputation among respectable scholars (including Stolle and Reimmann) that there was no anxiety to discover or recover any of his unpublished works, the published ones being considered more than enough. In the latter half of the eighteenth century we observe, indeed, some signs of an active interest in Spinoza remains. C. T. de Murr, of Nürnberg, visited Holland in search of Spinoza relics. He brought back with him a Latin manuscript copy of Spinoza’s notes to the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, and a report that Spinoza’s *Ethica* was originally written in Dutch and contained a chapter on the Devil, that he then translated it into Latin, throwing it at the same time into geometric form, owing to which and other alterations it was retranslated from the Latin into Dutch by Jarig Jelles. For about a century the matter rested there.

In 1851 Edward Boehmer, Professor of Philosophy at Halle, went to Holland, also in search of Spinoza rarities. At Amsterdam he bought from F. Müller, a well-known bookseller there, a copy of the *Life of Spinoza* by Colerus. Section 12 of Colerus’ *Life of Spinoza* treats very briefly of the philosopher’s unpublished writings, and Boehmer’s copy had a manuscript note (in Dutch) to this section, saying that among certain votaries of philosophy there was still extant, in manuscript, a treatise of Spinoza, which treats of the same subjects as the printed *Ethica*, though not in the geometric method, and that its style and general drift show it to be one of the earliest of Spinoza’s writings, in fact the first draft of the *Ethica*, and for some people less obscure than this, just because it is not cast in the geometric form, except to a very small extent in the
Introduction

Appendix to the treatise. And at the end of the same copy of Colerus' *Life of Spinoza* there actually followed a fairly complete analysis of the *Short Treatise*, chapter by chapter, and written in the same hand as the note to section 12. Boehmer published his *Benedicti de Spinoza Tractatus de Deo et Homine ejusque Felicitate Lineamenta* in 1852, and a new impetus was given to the search for the *Short Treatise*. Not long afterwards a manuscript copy of the *Short Treatise* itself came to light. F. Müller, the same bookseller from whom Boehmer had got his copy of the Colerus, bought this manuscript of the *Short Treatise* at an auction. And while Dr. J. van Vloten was preparing to publish it together with some Spinoza letters, which had been discovered at the Collegiant Orphan Asylum in Amsterdam, a second (and older) manuscript of the *Short Treatise* was discovered. The poet, Adrian Bogaers, of Rotterdam, found it among his books. This (the older) manuscript is generally referred to as codex A, the other as codex B. The first edition of the *Short Treatise* was published, in 1862, by Dr. J. van Vloten in his *Ad Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quae Supersunt Omnia Supplementum*. It was based on both the manuscripts, and was accompanied by a Latin translation. A more careful edition of codex A was published in 1869 by Professor C. Schaarschmidt, of Bonn, and also by Van Vloten and Land in their editions of the complete works of Spinoza (1882, 1895.) Both manuscripts are now in the Royal Library at the Hague.

§ 2. THE HISTORY OF THE MANUSCRIPTS

When Codex B was discovered it was found that the handwriting was the same as that of the notes and "outline" in Boehmer's copy of Colerus' *Life of Spinoza*, and
Op het
AFBEELDZEL
van
WILLEM DEURHOF.

To Willem Deurhoff dood; toen! in Manv zienlijk wezen
Schat te Picturts maakt hij hier; zijn Bijnwerk is te Lezen
In Schrijven, loon van Zoon en van de Vader's hand
Gebocht zoodat niet zijn mond. En in zijn ziel beland
Toet boven't Sterre, och: daar zat hy sceuwig vaanheten
Maar van zijn monden pen, en dood op Aarde spraken:
De zyjve lieden Gods en Christus zyvli vree,
Door vreugd, zyv gevez geheel: Hij zijgod Toalblijnt.

Joh. Mourikhoff.
Dr. Antonius van der Linde had already shown that the handwriting in Boehmer's Colerus was precisely the same as that of various manuscripts which were known to have been copied by Johannes Monnikhoff, an Amsterdam doctor who was born in 1707 and died in 1787. Preceding the Short Treatise in codex B is a long introduction in which reference is made to the year 1743, so that this copy could not have been written before then. The same codex also contains, at the end, Notes to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, all of them in the same handwriting. The Introduction seems to be the composition of Monnikhoff, while the Short Treatise and the Notes were evidently copied by him. That the handwriting is that of Monnikhoff is certain from the fact that several manuscripts, at the Hague Library, written in exactly the same hand have introductions which are signed by him. We reproduce from one of these manuscripts a facsimile of some verses signed by Johannes Monnikhoff, for comparison with the facsimiles of several pages from codex B. According to F. Müller, the bookseller who discovered it, codex B of the Short Treatise accompanied a Dutch manuscript translation of Spinoza's version of Descartes' Principia. But of this there is no sign in the parchment-bound quarto volume which contains simply an Introduction on the life and writings of Spinoza, the Short Treatise, and the Notes to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus—no more. On the back of the volume, however, the title is obviously incomplete. It says

Benedictus
Posthumous

and there is evidently missing a second volume having on its back the rest of the whole title, namely:

Benedictus | De Spinoza
Posthumous | Works.
INTRODUCTION

This is highly probable, because in another two-volume manuscript copied also by Monnikhoff the title of the work is similarly spread over the backs of the two volumes. And it is possible that the missing volume may have contained the Principia, or perhaps some other work, since the Principia was already published, in Dutch as well as in Latin. The Introduction in codex B, it is interesting to note, gives also a summary of the Short Treatise which is practically identical with the "Outline" in Boehmer's copy of Colerus.

Codex A is a much thicker quarto volume, and contains the Short Treatise, the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, and the Notes to it, all in Dutch, but the Notes are not in the same handwriting as the rest of the volume. A is evidently older than B, as may be seen from the very handwriting, which belongs to the seventeenth century, and is much more faded. Moreover, even a cursory inspection reveals the fact that the writer who had copied B had also been busy with A, which contains numerous, though mostly unimportant, additions in the same handwriting as B. For instance, at the beginning of the whole volume there is the following title-page in Monnikhoff's writing—

"The Writings of Benedict de Spinoza, comprising

"I. A Treatise on God, Man and his Well-being.
"II. A Theologico-Political Treatise.

"Both of them with the Notes of the Author, and translated from the Latin."

Separate title-pages in the same writing also precede the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and the Notes. Again, following the Table of Contents, there is a portrait of Spinoza apparently inserted there by Monnikhoff, who may have taken it from a copy of the 1677 edition of the Opera Posthuma, and facing it (on the left) are some well-meaning
Daar ungetweteijerd Zijn de den zestiende dageradt, vinden
Zijn meren niet Zeggen der zestiende dageradt, en de
Zestiende dageradt de onregen van de zestiende dageradt, den
macht van Zijne natuur, ononderbroken zijn. Daar Zij
Zestien van Zijn roep te weten, namelijk Zijn de onregen
de onregen niet van, maar de zestiende dageraad
zestien, 20 dae van Zijne natuur, door Zijne natuur en
onderhoud alle gedragen. Door Zij, de ononderbroken natuur.
Zestien dageraad worden gedragen, niet in eenige
week voor Zijne natuur Zijn als elders onderhoud. De
tijd is gevolgd,祖国 worden de van woedende deel de zestiende
dageraad, 20 dae van Zijne natuur, worden, dat, enige
deler, zestiende dageraad, gedragen, en niet door enige
derwijsde deel werden gedragen. En Zij
Zestien dageraad worden, en onderhoud, de van woedende eff onder-
Zestien, off ventu har worden. Gefoverd, met een vo
drefer van de deel der natuur. Dean Zeggen, noet: dat de
deel de van, ghecnel worden, gedragen. En de
Zestien onderhoud, maar niet, de onregen van de zestiende
dageraad. In den midden en meren deel de zestiende.

[PAGE 14 IN A]
Z I D E - L E E R. 23

deelen. 2. Een zaak. Die van ver =

vrijde deelen is t zamen gezet =

moet roodzijng zijn, dat de deelen =
dezelfde in 't bijzonder genomen den =
een zonder den ander dan bevat =
evristaan worden: also bij voor =
beeld, in een lourwerk, dat van =
verschieden Baden en Touwen =
en andere is t zamen gezet; daar kan =
men in een ieder Rold, Rouw, enz.

Wat is er twijfelen uit aangrijpende deel =
een deel? Gij moet =
reggen of eenidel =
of een ander Lichaam =
of dat van de wijd =
gebonden staat, daarn =
is geen verde. Niet =
licht-serst; want =
daar is geen iedel =
at vleug; en geen =
Lichaam is. Niet =
het tweede; want dan =
was er een iedere =
als er niet zijn; want =
al soo de uitgebreid =
hijt als algemeend =
hijt zonder en voor =
alle wieren is. De =
halven dan het =
sterf; en soo is er =
egeneriek deel van d =
uitgebruid; waar =
het en ondeelbaar.
lines on the portrait,* and both the writing and the thought are extremely like those of the other verses signed by Monnikhoff, of which a facsimile has already been given. There are also numerous page-headings, chapter-headings, and cross-references in Monnikhoff’s writing. Occasionally he also inserted a word in the text, or re-copied an illegible note, as may be seen from the accompanying facsimile, where the illegible marginal note in the original handwriting is seen crossed out and rewritten by Monnikhoff as a foot-note. The corresponding passage from B is also reproduced for comparison.

It is clear, therefore, that codex A is older than B, and that the copyist who wrote out B also knew and used A. But when and by whom was A written? The writing, as already remarked, belongs to the seventeenth century. But it was certainly not written out by Spinoza himself. This is obvious already from the title-page, where we are distinctly told (in the same writing as the bulk of the manuscript) that the Short Treatise was originally composed in Latin, and that it was translated for some of Spinoza’s disciples; and the whole tone of this title-page (or preface, as it might be called) is very unlike what we should expect from Spinoza. Moreover, a reference to Spinoza’s autograph † is quite conclusive on this point. It has been suggested that codex A was copied by William Deurhoff (?1650–1717), a Dutch theologian and a Cartesian. This suggestion derived considerable plausibility from the fact that the fairly numerous other manuscripts copied by Monnikhoff were all of them the works of Deurhoff—Monnikhoff’s signed verses, already given above, actually occur in one such manuscript, and face a portrait of Deurhoff. It seems, therefore, not unnatural to suppose that Monnikhoff copied codex B from

* Reproductions of the portrait and the verses are given at the commencement of the Translation (inserted between pp. 10 and 11).
† See p. lx.
A, largely because this was in Deurhoff's handwriting. A comparison with Deurhoff's authentic handwriting is, unfortunately, impossible. The only authentic autograph of Deurhoff that has been discovered so far consists of his signature, written in 1685, and this seems to be insufficient to go upon with certainty. Dr. W. Meyer, who has seen the signature, thinks that it rather tends to disprove the conjecture that A was copied by Deurhoff. And the tone of the Preface on the title-page of A is also unfavourable to it, because Deurhoff had no such admiration for Spinoza. On the other hand, it may be reasonably supposed that codex A was the property of Deurhoff, and that Monnikhoff obtained it from him.

Dr. W. Meyer has made the interesting suggestion that codex A was originally the property of Jarig Jelles—perhaps the very copy of the translations which he himself had obtained of the Short Treatise and the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Jarig Jelles was one of the oldest and warmest friends of Spinoza, and had defrayed the cost of publishing Spinoza's version of Descartes' Principia, both the Latin and the Dutch versions. Jelles, who was a spice merchant, did not know Latin, and it may have been he who persuaded Pieter Balling to translate Spinoza's Principia into Dutch for that reason. It would appear that he also had the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus translated into Dutch, and that he was about to have it published in 1671. For, in a letter addressed to Jelles in that year, Spinoza begs him to prevent the publication of the Dutch translation of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, as it might lead to the prohibition even of the Latin edition. Accordingly, no Dutch translation of this treatise appeared till 1693, and then another followed in 1694. Now the Dutch version of the Theologico-Political Treatise which is contained in codex A is not identical with either of these two other translations, and it is most probably earlier than 1694, because a new translation would hardly
be made after two others had already been published. Codex A, moreover, bears some evidence of intended publication. Dr. W. Meyer, therefore, suggests that the Dutch version which is contained in A is the very same which was about to be published in 1671, but was kept back at Spinoza’s request. And since the Short Treatise is in the same handwriting, and to judge by the preface seems also to have been intended for publication, Dr. Meyer supposes that Jelles had this also translated into Dutch, and that he intended to publish it together with the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. He even conjectures that the translations were made by Dr. Lodewijk Meyer; but there is no real evidence of this.

One is inclined to ask whether codex A may not be identical with the manuscript which Rieuwertsz is reported to have shown to Stolle and Hallmann in 1703. But the terms of the report make it uncertain whether that manuscript purported to be in Spinoza’s own handwriting or in that of the bookseller’s father. And, in any case, the statement, in the preface on the title-page, that the Short Treatise was originally written in Latin, could scarcely have escaped their eyes, and, since they undoubtedly report that the manuscript was in Dutch just as Spinoza had at first composed it, the probability is that it was a different copy which they then saw. There is no doubt, however, that manuscript copies of the Short Treatise were extant, among various friends and readers of Spinoza, at the end of the seventeenth century, and codex A is most likely one of these manuscripts.

Both A and B, however, purport to be only translations, or copies of a translation, from the Latin, and not copies of a Dutch original. This is also confirmed by an examination of the text of the manuscripts, which contains various mistakes that can only be explained on the supposition that they are mistranslations from the Latin. Some of these will be indicated in the notes.
Again, codex A cannot be the original copy even of a translation, because it contains several mistakes which can only be accounted for on the supposition that they are misreadings of Dutch words, writing (for example) alderwijste (wisest) where the context requires alderwrijste (freest). And codex B has far too much in common with A to be regarded, with any plausibility, as giving an independent translation of the Short Treatise. Prima facie the most plausible supposition is that A is itself a copy of an older manuscript, and that B is more or less a copy of A, and this suggestion is in large measure also confirmed by more internal evidence.

§ 3. THE TWO MANUSCRIPTS COMPARED

In the main, both manuscripts give practically the same translation of the Short Treatise, although there are numerous minor differences, most of which are indicated in the present translation. In neatness of appearance and smoothness of expression B is very much superior to A. In A notes and additions to the text are found sometimes all round the page—top and bottom, and to the left and right of the text. Sometimes it is difficult to know which is meant to be text and which is meant to be the note. In B, on the other hand, the arrangement is perfectly clear and neat. Similar differences show themselves in the composition of the two manuscripts. In A the punctuation is sometimes absolutely barbarous—there are whole strings of colons and semi-colons, bringing together ideas which have no real connection, while at other times full-stops disconnect what should have been connected. Occasionally also the trouble of translating technical expressions seems to be shirked, and they are simply given in their Latin form. All or nearly all such barbarisms are absent from
B—the punctuation is quite normal, and it generally translates into Dutch, and does not simply reproduce, such expressions as *a priori, a posteriori, attributum, essentia, idea, &c.* Again, in A the second part of the *Short Treatise* has numerous marginal summaries of the text, in addition to the explanatory notes; B omits nearly all these marginal summaries, and also some of the notes. Apart from these relatively external differences between the two codices, there are also more important differences between them. A often has a sentence or an expression which B omits; on the other hand, there are only a comparatively few cases in which B has any important sentence or expression which A has not. Again, A has numerous mistakes which are not found in B; on the other hand, there are extremely few instances in which a passage is given correctly in A and wrongly in B. Illustrations of all this will be found in the accompanying translation and notes, though the punctuation had to be somewhat improved occasionally. But such, in general terms, is the relation between the two manuscripts of the *Short Treatise*.

What may reasonably be deduced from the above facts? Some (Schaarschmidt, for instance) are inclined to minimise the differences between A and B, and suggest that the improvements on A in B were made more or less arbitrarily by Monnikhoff, who had no other manuscript before him except A, and that he was guided simply by his own common sense or fastidious taste, as the case may be, in making the numerous alterations in his own copy. A great many of the differences between A and B might certainly be accounted for in this way. Sigwart, however, maintains that it is scarcely possible to account for all the differences that way; and he inclines to the belief (rightly, we think) that Monnikhoff had some other manuscript,* besides A, which enabled him to make so many improve-

* This hypothetical third MS. is generally called C.
ments on A. It seems clear, however, that the suggested other manuscript (if Monnikhoff really had another to consult) could not have been the original Latin manuscript or a copy of it, because some of his mistakes would have been impossible in that case. Nor, in all probability, was it even an independent Dutch translation of the original, because in that case B would most likely not have had so very much in common with A as it actually has. That Monnikhoff might have consulted another Dutch manuscript of the *Short Treatise* (besides A) seems likely from the fact that Rieuwertsz, for instance, had such another Dutch manuscript (as Hallmann reports), and there may have been also others in Amsterdam, where Monnikhoff lived. At the same time, it is just possible that Monnikhoff had only codex A before him, and that his own critical insight enabled him to make the various corrections and improvements.

§ 4. THE COMPONENT PARTS OF THE *SHORT TREATISE*

Even a cursory examination of the *Short Treatise* shows that it is not a homogeneous whole, but a complex of parts in which a closer scrutiny reveals different strata of thought representing different stages of development. Comparatively external differences suffice to enable us to distinguish four separate parts in the *Short Treatise*, namely:

(i) the bulk of the text of the treatise (both parts);
(ii) the so-called foot-notes or marginal additions;
(iii) the two dialogues at the end of Part I. chapter ii.; and
(iv) the so-called Appendices at the end of the treatise.

It may be remarked at once that no one seriously doubts that the *Short Treatise* as a whole is the work of
Spinoza. The only portions the authenticity of which may be doubted are some of the notes. Many of the notes to Part II. in A are evidently mere marginal summaries which were not made by Spinoza, and nearly all of them were omitted by Monnikhoff, no doubt for this very reason. They have also been omitted from all the published editions and translations of the Short Treatise. Some of the remaining notes (or additions) are also probably from some other hand than Spinoza's, and so is the preface on the title-page of A. Most of the long notes, however, are certainly Spinoza's own, and Monnikhoff says so expressly on the extra title-page which he wrote in codex A (which has already been cited above), while the "Outline" in Boehmer's Colerus states explicitly that Spinoza had added notes in further explanation and elaboration of his views. And the rest of the Short Treatise is Spinoza's beyond a doubt. The above-mentioned traditions about his Dutch Ethics with a chapter on the Devil, and passages in his letters, to which we shall refer when we try to determine the date of its composition, sufficiently confirm the authorship of Spinoza which is claimed on the title-page of both the manuscripts.

But, though Spinoza wrote the whole of the Short Treatise (excepting the suspicious notes) as we now have it, he evidently did not write it all at the same time. What we have before us is a first draft together with successive attempts to correct, or supplement, or reconcile various parts of it. The bulk of the text represents that first draft. The chapters are strung together more or less loosely; inconsistencies of thought or of expression are not yet removed. Some of the so-called notes or marginal additions are really new versions of the corresponding text, which Spinoza apparently meant to rewrite. They often represent a distinct advance in thought, bridging over the gulf between the text of the Treatise and the Ethics. The Dialogues
elaborate special points, while assuming what has already been explained in other parts of the *Treatise*. Like the first Appendix, they also represent an experiment in the form of exposition. Spinoza evidently realised very quickly that his was not the art of writing Platonic dialogues. The second Appendix is concerned with the elaboration of a special point. The first, as already stated, is an experiment in the geometric form of exposition, and is intimately related to the *Ethics*. The *Treatise* shows us Spinoza in his workshop gradually shaping the material for his great edifice. It is, of course, all the more interesting for that. But it is practically impossible to determine precisely the chronological sequence of its parts. At one time it was supposed that the Dialogues were the oldest parts of the *Treatise*. Freudenthal, however, has shown that they must have been written after the main text of the *Treatise* because they assume a knowledge of various views already explained in other parts of the work. Thus all that may be asserted with confidence is that the notes, the Dialogues, and the Appendices are later than the rest of the *Treatise*. It is also possible to determine which parts of the work were the last additions. Detailed information relating to these questions will be found in the Commentary. But it is important to note immediately that we are dealing with a book which was never properly prepared for publication, Spinoza having finally determined to recast the exposition of his philosophy in the geometric form, as we have it in the *Ethics*. The present arrangement of the *Treatise* is probably due in part to one of his disciples, whose insight was not sufficient to guard him against misplacing some parts, omitting others, and retaining passages which were meant to be discarded. Occasionally also readers' comments seem to have found their way into the text through the copyist's lack of discrimination.
§ 5. THE ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF THE SHORT TREATISE

It is difficult to determine with any precision when the Short Treatise was begun, but it is comparatively easy to determine when it was already completed. About the end of 1661 Spinoza wrote to Oldenburg, saying, "as regards your new question, namely, in what manner things began to exist, and what is the bond of dependence between them and the first cause, on this subject, and also on the improvement of the understanding, I have written a complete little treatise, and am at present engaged in copying and improving it. Sometimes, however, I put the work aside, for I am not yet sure about publishing it. I fear lest the theologians of our day should take offence, and, with their usual rancour, attack me, who have an absolute horror of quarrels." It is clear from this that the Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding was already sufficiently advanced for Spinoza to think of its early publication. But this cannot be the only treatise to which Spinoza here refers, because it contains nothing about the origin of things and their dependence on the first cause, with which this little treatise, to which Spinoza refers, is primarily concerned, nor does it contain anything to warrant Spinoza's evident apprehension that it would provoke the rancour of the theologians. Spinoza can only be referring, in this letter, to our Short Treatise, the style and contents of which prove it to be an earlier work than the Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding. The Short Treatise must have been already finished when Spinoza wrote the above letter to Oldenburg, but owing to his recent occupation with Bacon and the question of philosophic method, which he had also discussed with Oldenburg, he seems to have begun the Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding with the
intention of using it as a general introduction to his whole philosophy as contained for the most part in the *Short Treatise*. The opening passages of the former treatise, already quoted above,* are hardly appropriate as an introduction to a mere theory of knowledge, they refer rather to philosophy as a whole. Spinoza's growing preference for the geometric method, and his successful experiment in applying it to Descartes' *Principia*, also the gradual modification of some of his views, soon led him to begin a new exposition of his philosophy, such as he eventually gave in the *Ethica*. And the *Short Treatise* thus fell into neglect. But there can be no doubt that it was already completed in 1661, possibly already the year before, if we allow for the *Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding*, which, though a fragment now and probably even more fragmentary then, must nevertheless have taken him some time to write.

The main text of the *Short Treatise*, then, must have been written not later than 1661. It seems equally clear that it could not have been finished before 1660—that is to say, before Spinoza's removal to Rijnsburg. The reason for this suggestion is to be found in the concluding paragraph of the Second Part of the *Treatise*.† It is really an epistle addressed to his friends, to whom he is sending the entire manuscript of the *Short Treatise* (before the Appendices were written). And its tone and contents strongly suggest that it was written to friends at a distance. Who these friends were it is not difficult to conjecture. They were Balling, Jelles, Meyer, and the other members of the philosophical coterie to whom Spinoza subsequently also sent the completed portions of the *Ethica* in manuscript. His friends, then, were in Amsterdam. Had Spinoza still been living in or near Amsterdam, it would scarcely have been necessary for him to write that exhor-

* See pp. liii. ff.
† See pp. 149 f.
HISTORY OF THE SHORT TREATISE  cxxv

tation. It must, therefore, have been written when Spinoza had already left Amsterdam and its neighbourhood, and had gone to Rijnsburg. And this happened early in 1660.

We would maintain, accordingly, that the Short Treatise was not finished before 1660. But, as already suggested, it was probably commenced very much earlier than that. Many or most of its chapters very likely contain the substance of the notes which Spinoza dictated to his disciples while teaching at Amsterdam. This seems to be borne out, to some extent, by a marginal summary at the side of the above-mentioned concluding paragraph of the Treatise.*

This note seems to have been put there by a disciple of Spinoza, and speaks of the Treatise as having been dictated, while the text says that it was written. Very likely a good portion of the Treatise had actually been dictated to his friends while Spinoza was at Amsterdam, but the completed Treatise must have been sent to them in manuscript from Rijnsburg.

Avenarius has suggested that the Short Treatise was quite a youthful work; that the Dialogues were written about 1651, and the main text in 1654 or 1655. The suggestion was largely based on the assumption that the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus was finished in 1661 or earlier. But it is known now that Spinoza did not complete it till 1669 or 1670. The comparative immaturity of the Short Treatise as compared with it does not therefore compel us to assume that the Treatise was written long before 1661. And the internal evidence is against such an early date as 1655. The tone of the concluding paragraph of Part II. shows that, when writing it, Spinoza had already acquired a certain authority in a circle of philosophical friends. He could not have written in that strain at the age of 22 or 23. Again, his reference to the "character of the age" seems to

* See the first note on p. 149.
INTRODUCTION

point to his own excommunication as an event in the past. Moreover, the Treatise shows an interest in specific Christian doctrines and their reinterpretation (the son of God, Regeneration, Sin in relation to the Law, and Grace). Spinoza must have been moving for some time in a Christian environment to feel such an interest in problems of Christian theology. The characters he introduces as illustrations bear New Testament names, and he even devotes a chapter to Devils, in whom the Jews took very little interest. All this argues in favour of the supposition that the Short Treatise was not written till some years after Spinoza's severance from the Jewish community (1656). Freudenthal maintains, accordingly, that it must have been composed between 1658 and 1660. With this view we concur, allowing, however, that some of the additions may be later than 1660, while some parts of the Treatise or some of its views may date from before Spinoza's excommunication, because one of the charges already brought against him then was that he had asserted that extension was an attribute of God.

It is interesting to note, in conclusion, that when Spinoza made his literary début he was already a pantheist. His pantheism was not in any sense a development of Cartesianism; he started from it, and at once criticised the Cartesian dualism from that point of view. He probably owed his introduction to pantheistic views partly to Jewish mysticism, with which he must have been made acquainted by Rabbis Morteira and Ben Israel, who were both of them strongly inclined towards mysticism, and partly to Bruno, to whose writings, as already suggested, Van den Enden may have directed his attention. The Short Treatise shows also considerable familiarity with, and indebtedness to, the writings of Descartes, as will be shown in the Commentary. But Spinoza is never merely a follower of the Jewish Mystics, or of Bruno, or of Descartes. From the first he
has his own peculiar outlook. From the first he is, so to say, his own architect, though he obtains his bricks from many different quarters.

§6. LITERATURE ON THE SHORT TREATISE

A. Editions and Translations

W. Meyer: *Korte Verhandeling* (a modern Dutch version; also a new edition of Boehmer’s *Lineamenta*). Amsterdam, 1899.


Spinoza’s *Kurzgefasste Abhandlung* (German translation). Third edition, Leipzig, 1907.

C. Sigwart: *Spinoza’s Kurzer Tractat* (German translation with Introduction and Notes). Freiburg, 1870.


B. Other Works


L. Busse: *Beiträge zur Entwicklungsgeschichte Spinozas*. 1888.
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Various references to the *Short Treatise* occur also in the following more general works on the life or the philosophy of Spinoza:

R. A. Duff: *Spinoza’s Political and Ethical Philosophy*. Glasgow, 1903.


EXPLANATIONS OF SIGNS, &c.

A stands for the older manuscript of the Short Treatise.
B stands for the later manuscript of the Short Treatise.
Where nothing is stated to the contrary the Translation follows A.
* . . .* Words, &c., between asterisks are in B, but not in A.
[ ] Words in square brackets are those of the translator; but
*[*] When there are asterisks outside the brackets, then B has the words in such brackets.
† is used as a reference-mark to notes which are given in A.
‡ is used as a reference-mark to notes indicating different readings, &c.
“ . . . ” Occasionally words are put in inverted commas to draw attention to the fact that they are used in a peculiar sense.
Explanations of difficult words and passages will be found at the end of the volume (p. 165 ff) arranged according to chapter and page.
Beginners may omit, on a first reading, most of the foot-notes in the Translation.
SPINOZA'S SHORT TREATISE ON
GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING
SHORT TREATISE ON GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING

Previously written in the Latin tongue by B.D.S. for the use of his disciples who wanted to devote themselves to the study of Ethics and true Philosophy. And now translated into the Dutch language for the use of the Lovers of Truth and Virtue: so that they who spout so much about it, and put their dirt and filth into the hands of simpletons as though it were ambergris, may just have their mouths stopped, and cease to profane what they do not understand:

God, themselves, and how to help people to have regard for each other's well-being, and how to heal those whose mind is sick, in a spirit of tenderness and tolerance, after the example of the Lord Christ, our best Teacher
Korte Verhandeling

Van

G O D

d e M E N S C H

in des Levens

ZWECK STAND.

Voor regt werd Lodewijck Jansz. bevrucht voor B. D. S.
De richting van hyne Leedingen, in de Zig, werd
dogisch tot de verhouding der Zedekomst
in Waare Waal begrepen.

En als in de Noodt den Upricht onthorigt, Ich
dracht' van de Wijde Beeld van Waarheid eu Beugo.
op de stuk waar den de bod op Gods en hun dochte
Vreugde au de eden ende vacu Voor Ambacht Oogst
maakt Vreugt Vrije, en met de mond gestaat
moge zoodich, directe, ligt worden, hoe haast de Suy
mee Vorslagt: God! inzelve th cat高考nders
wel stand helpen in art neemen. En noorden
in Spreuk: het schoot door die geest de Hage was
de Vorslag, waar zij gedacht, naar Vorslag Van art.

Ker Christus, door echte Leermeester...
ETHICA or MORAL SCIENCE

COMPOSED IN TWO PARTS

WHICH TREAT

I. Of God's Existence, and Attributes

II. Of Man, with reference to the character and origin of his Passions, the use of his reason in this respect, and the means whereby he is educated to his Happiness and supreme freedom

Also an Appendix, containing a brief account of the nature of Substance—as well as that of the human Soul, and its union with the Body

COMPOSED BY

BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZA
ETHICA
ZEDEL-LEER,
Vervat in Twee Deelen, waar in gehandeld word
I. Van Gods bestaan, en Eigenschappen.
II. Van den Mensoch; ten opzichte van den aart en oorsprok, binnen Hartslagen, het bestrijkt haarere zeden daer ontrekt, en welk het middel is waar door zij tot hun Hiel en opereste vrijhijt worden opgelijdt.
Benevens een Inhageel; behevelende een korte ontwerp over de natuur der Zelfstandigheid; als mede de die van de menochine Lihe Ziel, en haar vereniging met het Lihaam.
Zamengesteld voor
BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZA.
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Op het
A.F.B. E. O. L. D. L. E.,
van den
Schrander en vermaarde Wijze Geer
BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZ.

Hier verklaar'd ons de konst in prent Spinoze'w weeren;
En heede's Mans diep gezijn in 't zeedige troni af;
Terwijl de vraag zijne geest, en 't geen't verman't hem gaf,
Best word gehend van hun, die zijne schriften Lezen;

Anders.

Deez Prent toont, net geweldt na 't Leeven,
Spinoze'w goederen en zeedig weeren.

[MONNIKHOFF'S VERSES FACING SPINOZA'S PORTRAIT IN A]
EDICTUS DE
Cm natujra, Deus, rerum cui cognitus ordo
Hoc Spinola statu conspiciendus erat.
Expellere viri faciem, sed pingere mentem
Zeuxidis artifices non valuerent manus.
Illa vigit scriptis: illie sublimia tractat:
Hunc quicunque cupis noscere. Scripta lege.
FIRST PART
ON GOD
De mensch heeft een Dor van God, zoo zelfs zoo dat God

Maar de mensch heeft een Dor van God, En Go.


eerder dan de aarde van de Zo werd de mensch als belangrijk

maar daar is de aarde van God:

om dat de aarde aangeboren is dater. Zo

dit niet onafhankelijk, goddelijk  zo wezen,

Da de hemelijke dinger onafhankelijk zijn

Dat een zorg verstand dat wijszige niet kan begeven

Dat een zorg verstand door zij smallest  zeg het van het van

zogen bepaald wordt, niet en kan verstaan, omdat gelijk

[First page of A]
ZoDE-LEER;  
EERSTE DEEL'S  
Eerste  
HOOFT-DEEL;  
Dat GOD is.

Belangende dit, dat er een God is, zalhoo zeggen wij te kunnen bewezen worden:

I. Van vooren, aldus;

1. Alles wat wij klaar en onder schijden verstaan aan de*na=

    *Verstaan de bepaalde natuur, door welke de zaak e is, en dat van haar in ge-
    neerlij wijze kan afge-
    schieden worden, zom
    den ook met een ge-
    zaak te vernietigen.

    *à priori.

[FIRST PAGE OF B]
CHAPTER I

THAT GOD EXISTS

As regards the first,† namely, whether there is a God, this, we say, can be proved.

*1.* In the first place, *a priori* thus:

1. Whatever we clearly and distinctly know to belong to the nature† of a thing, we can also truly affirm of that thing. Now we can know clearly and distinctly that existence belongs to the nature of God; Therefore ...

Otherwise also thus:‡‡

2. The essence of things are from all eternity, and unto all eternity shall remain immutable; The existence of God is essence; Therefore ...

† Understand the definite nature through which a thing is what it is, and which can by no means be removed from it without at the same time destroying that thing: thus, for instance, it belongs to the essence of a mountain that it should have a valley, or the essence of a mountain is that it has a valley; ‡‡‡ this is truly eternal and immutable, and must always be included in the concept of a mountain, even if it never existed, or did not exist now.

‡ B: this.

‡‡ B omits these three words.

‡‡‡ B simply: to the essence of a mountain belongs a valley.
II. A posteriori, thus:

If man has an idea of God, then God must exist formaliter;
Now, man has an idea of God;
Therefore...

The first we prove thus:

If there is an idea of God, then the cause thereof must exist formaliter, and contain in itself all that the idea has objective;
Now there is an idea of God;
Therefore...

In order to prove the first part of this argument we state the following principles, namely:

1. That the number of knowable things is infinite;
2. That a finite understanding cannot apprehend the infinite;
3. That a finite understanding, unless it is determined by something external, cannot through itself know anything; because, just as it has no power to know all things equally, so little

† From the definition which follows in chapter 2, namely, that God has infinite attributes, we can prove his existence thus: Whatever we clearly and distinctly see to belong to the nature of a thing, that we can also with truth affirm of that thing; now to the nature of a being that has infinite attributes belongs existence, which is an attribute; therefore... To assert that this may well be affirmed of the idea, but not of the thing itself, is false: for the Idea does not really consist of the attribute which belongs to this being, so that that which is affirmed is [affirmed] neither of the thing, nor of that which is affirmed of the thing; so that there is a great difference between the Idea and the Ideatum: therefore what is affirmed of the thing is not affirmed of the Idea, and vice versa. [Text corrupt. See Commentary.]
also has it the power to begin or to commence to know this, for instance, sooner than that, or that sooner than this. Since, then, it can do neither the one nor the other it can know nothing.

The first (or the major premiss) is proved thus:

If the imagination of man were the sole cause of his ideas, then it would be impossible that he should be able to apprehend anything, but he can apprehend something;

Therefore...

The first †† is proved by the first principle, namely, that the knowable things are infinitely numerous. Also, following the second principle, man cannot know all, because the human understanding is finite, and if not determined by external things to know this sooner than that, and that sooner than this, then according to the third principle it should be impossible for it to know anything.†

† B omits "for instance."

†† Instead of this paragraph B has the following: Again, since according to the first principle the knowable things are infinite, and according to the second principle the finite understanding cannot comprehend everything, and according to the third principle it has not the power to know this sooner than that, and that sooner than this, it would be impossible for it to know anything, if it were not determined thereto by external things.

† Further, to say that this idea is a fiction, this also is false: for it is impossible to have this [idea] if it [the ideal] does not exist; this is shown on page 16, and we also add the following:

It is quite true that when an idea has first come to us from a particular thing, and we have generalised it in abstracto, then our understanding may fancy various things about it, and we can add to it many other attributes abstracted from other things. But it is impossible to do this without a prior knowledge of the things themselves from which these abstractions have been made. Once, however, it is assumed that this idea [of God] is a fiction, then all other
From all this the second point is proved, namely, that the cause of a man's ideas is not his imagination but some external cause, which compels him to apprehend one thing sooner than another, and it is no other than this, that the things whose essentia objectiva is in his understanding exist formaliter, and are nearer to him than other things. If, then, man has the idea of God, it is clear that God must exist formaliter, though not eminenter, as there is no other explanation.

If this is so, whence comes it that we find such a great difference among them? For as regards some we see that it is impossible they should exist; e.g., all monsters supposed to be composed of two natures, such as an animal that should be both a bird and a horse, and the like, for which it is impossible to have a place in Nature, which we find differently constituted; other ideas may, but need not, exist; whether, however, they exist or do not exist, their essence is always necessary; such is the idea of a triangle, and that of the love in the soul apart from the body, &c.; so that even if I at first thought that I had imagined these, I am nevertheless compelled afterwards to say that they are, and would be, the same no less even if neither I nor anybody had ever thought about them. They are, consequently, not merely imagined by me, and must also have outside me a subjectum other than myself, without which subjectum they cannot be. In addition to these there is yet a third idea, and it is an only one; this one carries with it necessary existence, and not, like the foregoing, the mere possibility of existence: for, in the case of those, their essence was indeed necessary, but not their existence, while in its case, both its existence and its essence are necessary, and it is nothing without them. I therefore see now that the truth, essence, or existence of anything never depends on me: for, as was shown with reference to the second kind of ideas, they are what they are independently of me, whether as regards their essence alone, or as regards both essence and existence. I find this to be true also, indeed much more so, of this third unique idea that we have must be fictions no less.

† In B the whole of this first part of the note is given in the body of the text, while the rest is given as a note on "other ideas," eight lines above.
THAT GOD EXISTS

nothing more real or more excellent beside or outside him. Now, that man has the idea of God, this is clear, because he knows his attributes,† which attributes cannot be derived from [man] himself, because he is imperfect. And that he knows these attributes is evident from this, namely, that he knows that the infinite cannot be obtained by putting together divers finite parts; that there cannot be two ‡ infinities, but idea; not only does it not depend on me, but, on the contrary, he alone ‡‡ must be the subjectum of that which I affirm of him. Consequently, if he did not exist, I should not be able to assert anything at all about him; although this can be done in the case of other things, even when they do not exist. He must also be, indeed, the subjectum of all other things.

From what has been said so far it is clearly manifest that the idea of infinite attributes in the perfect being is no fiction; we shall, however, still add the following:

According to the foregoing consideration of Nature, we have so far not been able to discover more than two attributes only which belong to this all-perfect being. And these give us nothing adequate to satisfy us that this is all of which this perfect being consists, quite the contrary, we find in us a something which openly tells us not only of more, but of infinite perfect attributes, which must belong to this perfect being before he can be said to be perfect. And whence comes this idea of perfection? This something cannot be the outcome of these two [attributes]: for two can only yield two, and not an infinity. Whence then? From myself, never; else I must be able to give what I did not possess. Whence, then, but from the infinite attributes themselves which tell us that they are, without however telling us, at the same time, what they are: for only of two do we know what they are.

† His attributes; it is better [to say], because he knows what is proper to God; for these things [infinity, perfection, &c.] are no attributes of God. Without these, indeed, God could not be God, but it is not through them [that he is God], since they show nothing substantial, but are only like adjectives which require substantives or their explanation.

‡ B omits "two."

+++ B omits "alone."
only one; that it is perfect and immutable, for we know that nothing seeks, of itself, its own annihilation, and also that it cannot change into anything better,† because it is perfect, which it would not be in that case, or also that such a being cannot be subjected to anything outside it, since it is omnipotent, and so forth.

From all this, then, it follows clearly that we can prove both a priori and a posteriori that God exists. Better, indeed, a priori. For things which are proved in the latter way [a posteriori] must be proved through their external causes, which is a manifest imperfection ‡ in them, inasmuch as they cannot make themselves known ‡‡ through themselves, but only through external causes. God, however, who is the first cause of all things, and also the cause of himself [causa sui], makes himself known through himself. Hence one need not attach much importance to the saying of Thomas Aquinas, namely, that God could not be proved a priori because he, forsooth, has no cause.

† The cause of this change would have to be either outside, or in it. It cannot be outside, because no substance which, like this, exists through itself depends on anything outside it; therefore it is not subject to change through it. Nor can it be in it: because no thing, much less this, desires its own undoing; all undoing comes from outside. *Again, that there can be no finite substance is clear from this, because in that case it would necessarily have to have something which it had from nothing: which is impossible; for whence has it that wherein it differs from God? Certainly not from God; for he has nothing imperfect or finite, &c.: whence, therefore, but from nothing? *

‡ B: an extreme imperfection.
‡‡ B omits "known."
CHAPTER II

WHAT GOD IS

Now that we have proved above that God is, it is time to show what he is. Namely, we say that he is a being of whom all or infinite attributes are predicated, of which attributes every one is infinitely perfect in its kind. Now, in order to express our views clearly, we shall premise the four following propositions:

1. That there is no finite substance, but that every substance must be infinitely perfect in its kind, that is to say, that in the infinite understanding of God no substance can be more perfect than that which already exists in Nature.

† The reason is this, since Nothing can have no attributes, the All must have all attributes; and just as Nothing has no attribute because it is Nothing, so that which is Something has attributes because it is Something. Hence, the more it is Something, the more attributes it must have, and consequently God being the most perfect, and all that is Anything, he must also have infinite, perfect, and all attributes.

‡ Once we can prove that there can be no Finite Substance, then all substance must without limitation belong to the divine being. We do it thus: It must either have limited itself or some other must have limited it. It could not have done so itself, because having been infinite it would have had to change its whole essence. Nor can it be limited by another: for this again must be either finite or infinite; the former is impossible, therefore the latter; therefore it [i.e., the other thing] is God. He must, then, have made it finite because he lacked either the power or the will [to make it infinite]: but the first [supposition] is contrary to his.

† B inserts here 2.
2. That there are not two like substances.
3. That one substance cannot produce another.
4. That in the infinite understanding of God there is no other substance than that which is *formaliter* in Nature.

As regards the first, namely, that there is no finite substance, &c., should any one want to maintain the opposite, we would ask the following question, namely, whether this substance is finite through itself, whether it has made itself thus finite and did not want to make itself less finite; or whether it is thus finite through its cause, which cause omnipotence, the second is contrary to his goodness.‡ 2. That *there can be no finite substance* is clear from this, namely, that, if so, it would necessarily have something which it would have from Nothing, which is impossible. For whence can it derive that wherein it differs from God? Certainly not from God, for he has nothing imperfect or finite, &c. So, whence then but from Nothing? Therefore there is no substance other than infinite. Whence it follows, that *there cannot be two like infinite substances*; for to posit such necessitates limitation. And from this, again, it follows that *one substance cannot produce another*; thus: The cause that we might suppose to produce this substance must have the same attribute ‡‡ as the one produced, and also either just as much perfection ‡‡‡ or more or less. The first supposition is not possible, because there would then be two like [substances]. The second also not, because in that case there would be a finite [substance]. Nor the third, because something cannot come from nothing.—Moreover, if the finite ‡‡‡ came from the infinite, then the infinite ‡‡‡‡ would also be finite, &c. Therefore one substance can not produce another. And from this, again, it follows that *all substance must exist "formaliter,"* for if it did not exist, there would be no possibility for it to come into existence.

‡ B omits here the next five lines, which it has already given at the end of the last note in the first chapter.
+++ B: attributes.
++++ B omits the seven words—"and also . . . perfection."
++++ B: infinite.
+++++ B: the cause.
either could not or would not give more? The first alternative is not true, because it is impossible that a substance should have wanted to make itself finite, especially a substance which had come into existence through itself. Therefore, I say, it is made finite by its cause, which is necessarily God. Further, if it is finite through its cause, this must be so either because its cause could not give more, or because it would not give more. That he should not have been able to give more would contradict his omnipotence;† that he should not have been willing to give more, when he could well do so, savours of ill-will, which is nowise in God, who is all goodness and perfection.

As regards the second, that there are not two like substances, we prove this on the ground that each substance is perfect in its kind; for if there were two alike they would neces-

† To say to this that the nature of the thing required such [limitation] and that it could not therefore be otherwise, that is no reply: for the nature of a thing can require nothing while it does not exist. Should you say that one may, nevertheless, see what belongs to the nature of a thing which does not exist: that is true as regards its existence, but by no means as regards its essence. And herein lies the difference between creating and generating. To create is to posit a thing quo ad essentiam et existentiam simul [i.e., to give a thing both essence and existence]; while in the case of generation a thing comes forth quo ad existentiam solam [i.e., it only receives existence]. And therefore there is now in Nature no creation but only generation. So that when God creates he creates at once the nature of the thing with the thing itself. He would therefore show ill-will if (from lack of will, and not of power) he created the thing in such a way that it should not agree with its cause in essence and existence. However, what we here call creation can really not be said ever to have taken place, and it is only mentioned to indicate what we can say about it, if we distinguish between creating and generating.
GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING

Issarily limit one another, and would consequently not be infinite, as we have already shown before.

As to the third, namely, *that one substance cannot produce another*: should any one again maintain the opposite, we ask whether the cause, which is supposed to produce this substance, has or has not the same attributes as the produced [substance]. The latter is impossible, because something cannot come from nothing; therefore the former. And then we ask whether in the attribute which is presumed to be the cause of this produced [substance], there is just as much perfection as in the produced substance, or less, or more. Less, we say, there cannot be, for the reasons *given* above. More, also not, we say, because in that case this second one would be finite, which is opposed to what has already been proved by us. Just as much, then; they are therefore alike, and are two like substances, which clearly conflicts with our previous demonstration. Further, that which is created is by no means produced from Nothing, but must necessarily have been produced from something existing. But that something should have come forth from this, and that it should none the less have this something even after it has issued from it, that we cannot grasp with our understanding. Lastly, if we would seek the cause of the substance which is the origin of the things which issue from its attribute, then it behoves us to seek also the cause of that cause, and then again the cause of that cause, and so on in infinitum; so that if we must necessarily stop and halt somewhere, as indeed we must, it is necessary to stop at this only substance.

As regards the fourth, *that there is no substance or attribute in the infinite understanding of God other than what exists “formaliter” in Nature*, this can be, and is, proved by us: *(i)* from the infinite power of God, since in him there can

†B: I. ††B has “or,” and omits “are.”
be no cause by which he might have been induced to create one sooner or more than another; (2) from the simplicity of his will; (3) because he cannot omit to do what is good, as we shall show afterwards; (4) because it would be impossible for that which does not now exist to come into existence, since one substance cannot produce another. And, what is more, in that case there would be more infinite substances not in existence than there are in existence, which is absurd.† From all this it follows then: that of Nature all in all is predicated, and that consequently Nature consists of infinite attributes, each of which is perfect in its kind. And this is just equivalent to the definition usually given of God.

Against what we have just said, namely, that there is no thing in the infinite understanding of God but what exists formaliter in Nature, some want to argue in this way: If God has created all, then he can create nothing more; but that he should be able to create nothing more conflicts with his omnipotence; therefore . . .

Concerning the first, we admit that God can create nothing more. And with regard to the second, we say that we own, if God were not able to create all that could be created, then it would conflict with his omnipotence; but that is by no means the case if he cannot create what is self-contradictory; as it is, to say that he has created all, and also that he should be able to create still more. Assuredly it is a far greater perfection in God that he has created all that was in his infinite understanding than if he had not created it, or, as they say, if he had never been able to create it. But why say so much about it? Do they not themselves argue thus, † or must they not argue thus.

† B omits this sentence.

† That is, whenever we make them argue from this admission, namely, that God is omniscient, then they cannot but argue thus.
GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING

* from God's omniscience * : If God is omniscient then he can know nothing more; but that God can know nothing more is incompatible with his perfection; therefore . . . ? But if God has all in his understanding, and, owing to his infinite perfection, can know nothing more, well then, why can we not say that he has also created all that he had in his understanding, and has made it so that it exists or should exist formaliter in Nature?

Since, then, we know that all alike is in the infinite understanding of God, and that there is no cause why he should have created this sooner and more than that, and that he could have produced all things in a moment, so let us see, for once, whether we cannot use against them the same weapons which they take up against us; namely, thus :

If God can never create so much that he cannot create more, then he can never create what he can create; but that he cannot create what he can create is self-contradictory. Therefore . . .

Now the reasons why we said that all these attributes, which are in Nature, are but one single being, and by no means different things (although we can know them clearly and distinctly the one without the other, and the other without another), are these:

1. Because we have found already before that there must be an infinite and perfect being, by which nothing else can be meant than such a being of which all in all must be predicated. Why? [Because] to a being which has any essence attributes must be referred, and the more essence one ascribes to it, the more attributes also must one ascribe to it, and consequently if a being is infinite then its attributes also must be infinite, and this is just what we call a perfect ‡ being.

2. Because of the unity which we see everywhere in ‡ B: an infinite.
Nature. If there were different beings in it † then it would be impossible for them to unite with one another.

3. Because although, as we have already seen, one substance cannot produce another, and if a substance does not exist it is impossible for it to begin to exist, we see, nevertheless, that in no substance (which we none the less know to exist in Nature), when considered separately, is there any necessity to be real, since existence does not pertain to its separate essence. † † So it must necessarily follow that Nature, which results from no causes, and which we nevertheless know to exist, must necessarily be a perfect being to which existence belongs.

From all that we have so far said it is evident, then, that we posit extension as an attribute of God; and this seems not at all appropriate to a perfect being: for since extension is divisible, the perfect being would have to consist of parts, and this is altogether inapplicable to God, because

† That is, if there were different substances which were not connected in one only being, then their union would be impossible, because we see clearly that they have nothing at all in common, it is so with thought and extension of which we nevertheless consist.

† † That is, if no substance can be other than real, and yet existence does not follow from its essence, when it is considered by itself, it follows that it is not something independent, but must be something, that is, an attribute, of another thing, namely, the one, only, and universal being. Or thus: All substance is real, and when a substance is considered by itself its existence does not follow from its essence; therefore, no existing substance can be known through itself, but it must belong to something else. That is, when with our understanding we consider "substantial" Thought and ["substantial"] Extension, then we consider them only in their essence and not as existing, that is [we do not consider] that their existence necessarily pertains to their essence. When, however, we prove [of each] that it is an attribute of God, we thereby prove a priori that it exists, and a posteriori (as regards extension alone) [we prove its existence] from the modes which must necessarily have it for their subjectum.
he is a simple being. Moreover, when extension is divided it is passive, and with God (who is never passive, and cannot be affected by any other being, because he is the first efficient cause of all) this can by no means be the case.

To this we reply: (1) that "part" and "whole" are not true or real entities, but only "things of reason," and consequently there are in Nature neither whole nor parts. (2) A thing composed of different parts must be such that the parts thereof, taken separately, can be conceived and understood one without another. Take, for instance, a clock which is composed of many different wheels, cords, and other things; in it, I say, each wheel, cord, &c., can be

† In Nature, that is, in "substantial" Extension; for if this were divided its nature and being would be at once annihilated, as it exists only as infinite extension, or, which comes to the same, it exists only as a whole.

But should you say: is there, in extension, no part prior to all its modes? I say, certainly not. But you may say, since there is motion in matter, it must be in some part of matter, for it cannot be in the whole, because this is infinite; and whither shall it be moved, when there is nothing outside it? Therefore it must be in a part.‡ My answer is: Motion alone does not exist, but only motion and rest together; and this is in the whole, and must be in it, because there is no part in extension. Should you, however, say that there is, then tell me: if you divide the whole of extension then, as regards any part which you cut off from it in thought, can you also separate it in nature from all [other] parts; and supposing this has been done, I ask, what is there between the part cut off ‡‡ and the rest? You must say, a vacuum, or another body, or something of extension itself; there is no fourth possibility. The first will not do, because there is no vacuum, something positive and yet no body; nor the second, because then there would exist a mode, which cannot be, since ‡‡‡ extension as extension is without and prior to all modes. Therefore the third; and then there is no part but only the whole of extension.‡‡‡

‡ B omits this sentence. ‡‡ B: separated. ‡‡‡ B: therefore. ‡‡‡ B: but extension one and indivisible.
conceived and understood separately, without the composite whole being necessary thereto. Similarly also in the case of water, which consists of straight oblong particles, each part thereof can be conceived and understood, and can exist without the whole; but extension, being a substance, one cannot say of it that it has parts, since it can neither diminish nor increase, and no parts thereof can be understood apart, because by its nature it must be infinite. And that it must be such, follows from this, namely, because if it were not such, but consisted of parts, then it would not be infinite by its nature, as it is said to be; and it is impossible to conceive parts in an infinite nature, since by their nature all parts are finite.‡ Add to this still: if it consisted of different parts then it should be intelligible that supposing some parts thereof to be annihilated, extension might remain all the same, and not be annihilated together with the annihilation of some of its parts; this is clearly contradictory in what is infinite by its own nature and can never be, or be conceived, as limited or finite. Further, as regards the parts in Nature, we maintain that division, as has also been said already before, never takes place in substance, but always and only in the mode of substance. Thus, if I want to divide water, I only divide the mode of substance, and not substance itself. And whether this mode is that of water or something else it is always the same.††

Division, then, or passivity, always takes place in the mode; thus when we say that man passes away or is annihilated, then this is understood to apply to man only in so far as he is such a composite being, and a mode of substance, and not the substance on which he depends.

‡ B: because all the parts would have to be infinite by their nature.
†† B: when, therefore, I divide water I do not divide the substance, but only that mode of the substance, which substance, however variously modified, is always the same.
Moreover, we have already stated, and we shall repeat it later, that outside God there is nothing at all, and that he is an Immanent Cause. Now, passivity, whenever the agent and the patient are different entities, is a palpable imperfection, because the patient must necessarily be dependent on that which has caused the passivity from outside; it has, therefore, no place in God, who is perfect. Furthermore, of such an agent who acts in himself it can never be said that he has the imperfection of a patient, because he is not affected by another; such, for instance, is the case with the understanding, which, as the philosophers also assert, is the cause of its ideas, since, however, it is an immanent cause, what right has one to say that it is imperfect, howsoever frequently it is affected by itself? Lastly, since substance is [the cause] and the origin of all its modes, it may with far greater right be called an agent than a patient. And with these remarks we consider all adequately answered.

It is further objected, that there must necessarily be a first cause which sets body in motion, because when at rest it is impossible for it to set itself in motion. And since it is clearly manifest that rest and motion exist in Nature, these must, they think, necessarily result from an external cause. But it is easy for us to reply to this; for we concede that, if body were a thing existing through itself, and had no other attributes than length, breadth, and depth, then, if it really rested there would be in it no cause whereby to begin to move itself; but we have already stated before that Nature is a being of which all attributes are predicated, and this being so, it can be lacking in nothing wherewith to produce all that there is to be produced.

Having so far discussed what God is, we shall say but a word, as it were, about his attributes: that those which are known to us consist of two only, namely, Thought and

† B: And although the understanding, as the philosophers say, is a cause of its ideas, yet, since it is an immanent cause, &c.
Extension; for here we speak only of attributes which might be called the *proper attributes* of God,‡ through which we come to know him [as he is] in himself, and not [merely] as he acts [towards things] outside himself. All else, then, that men ascribe to God beyond these two attributes, all that (if it otherwise pertains to him) must be either an "extraneous denomination," such as *that he exists through himself*, is *Eternal, One, Immutable, &c.*, or, I say, has reference to his activity, such as that he is a *cause, predestines*, and *rules* all things: all which are properties of God, but give us no information as to what he is. But how and in what manner these attributes can nevertheless have a place in God we shall explain in the following chapters. But, for the better understanding of this ‡‡ and in further exposition thereof,‡‡‡ we have thought it well *and* have decided *to add the following arguments consisting of a [Dialogue.]

‡ B: which may truly be called God's attributes.
‡‡ B: of the foregoing. ‡‡‡ B: of what we mean to say.
I see, Brother, that both my essence and perfection depend on your perfection; and since the perfection of the object which you have conceived is your perfection, while from yours again mine proceeds, so tell me now, I pray you, whether you have conceived such a being as is supremely perfect, not capable of being limited by any other, and in which I also am comprehended.

UNDERSTANDING. I for my part consider Nature only in its totality as infinite, and supremely perfect, but you, if you have any doubts about it, ask Reason, she will tell you.

REASON. To me the truth of the matter is indubitable, for if we would limit Nature then we should, absurdly enough, have to limit it with a mere Nothing;† we avoid this absurdity by stating that it is One Eternal Unity, infinite, omnipotent, &c., that is, that Nature is infinite and that all is contained therein; and the negative of this we call Nothing.

DESIRE. Ah indeed! it is wondrously congruous to suppose that Unity is in keeping with the Difference which I observe everywhere in Nature. But how? I see that thinking substance has nothing in common with extended substance, and that the one limits [not] the other; and if, in addition to these substances, you want to posit yet a third one which is perfect in all respects, then look how you involve

† A and B continue: moreover under the following attributes, namely, that it is One, Eternal, infinite through itself; we avoid . . .
yourself in manifest contradictions; for if this third one is placed outside the first two, then it is wanting in all the attributes which belong to those two, but this can never be the case with a whole outside of which there is nothing. Moreover if this being is omnipotent and perfect, then it must be such because it has made itself, and not because another has made it; that, however, which could produce both itself and yet another besides would be even more omnipotent. And lastly, if you call it omniscient then it is necessary that it should know itself; and, at the same time, you must know that the knowledge of oneself alone is less than the knowledge of oneself together with the knowledge of other substances. All these are manifest contradictions. I would, therefore, have advised Love to rest content with what I show her, and to look about for no other things.

LOVE. What now, O dishonourable one, have you shown me but what would result in my immediate ruin. For, if I had ever united myself with what you have shown me, then from that moment I should have been persecuted by the two archenemies of the human race, namely, Hatred and Remorse, and sometimes also by Oblivion; and therefore I turn again to Reason only to proceed and stop the mouths of these foes.

REASON. What you say, O Desire, that there are different substances, that, I tell you, is false; for I see clearly that there is but One, which exists through itself, and is a support to all other attributes. And if you will refer to the material and the mental as substances, in relation to the modes which are dependent on them, why then, you must also call them modes in relation to the substance in which they depend: for they are not conceived by you as existing through themselves. And in the same way that willing, feeling, understanding, loving, &c., are different modes of that which you call a thinking substance, in which you bring together and

† A: substances; B: substance.
unite all these in one, so I also conclude, from your own proofs, that Both Infinite Extension and Thought together with all other infinite attributes (or, according to your usage, other substances) are only modes of the One, Eternal, Infinite Being, who exists through himself; and from all these we posit, as stated, An Only One or a Unity outside which nothing can be imagined to be.‡

**DESIRE.** Methinks I see a very great confusion in this argument of yours; for, it seems you will have it that the whole must be something outside of or apart from its parts, which is truly absurd. For all philosophers are unanimous in saying that "whole" is a second notion, and that it is nothing in Nature apart from human thought. Moreover, as I gather from your example, you confuse whole with cause: for, as I say, the whole only consists of and [exists] through its parts, and so it comes that you represent the thinking power as a thing on which the Understanding, Love, &c., depend. But you cannot call it a Whole, only a Cause of the Effects just named by you.

**REASON.** I see decidedly how you muster all your friends against me, and that, after the method usually adopted by those who oppose the truth, you are designing to achieve by quibbling what you have not been able to accomplish with your fallacious reasoning. But you will not succeed in winning Love to your side by such means. Your assertion, then, is, that the cause (since it is the Originator of the effects) must therefore be outside these. But you say this because you only know of the transeunt and not of the immanent cause, which by no means produces anything outside itself, as is exemplified by the Understanding, which is the cause of its ideas. And that is why I called the understanding

‡ A: all which you bring to one, and make one from all these; B: to which you bring all and make them into one.

†† B: . . . One, Eternal, self-subsisting Being in which all is one and united, and outside which unity nothing can be imagined to be.
(in so far as, or because, its ideas depend on it †) a cause; and on the other hand, since it consists of its ideas, a whole: so also God is both an Immanent Cause with reference to his works or creatures, and also a whole, considered from the second point of view.

† So in B. A: it depends on its ideas.
SECOND DIALOGUE
BETWEEN
ERASMUS AND THEOPHILUS
RELATING PARTLY TO THE PRECEDING, PARTLY TO THE FOLLOWING SECOND PART

ERASMUS. I have heard you say, Theophilus, that God is a cause of all things, and, at the same time, that he can be no other than an immanent cause. Now, if he is an immanent cause of all things, how then can you call him a remote cause? For, that is impossible in the case of an Immanent cause.

THEOPHILUS. When I said that God is a remote cause, I only said it with reference to the things [which God has produced mediately, and not with reference to those] which God (without any other conditions beyond his mere existence) has produced immediately; but on no account did I mean to call him a remote cause absolutely: as you might also have clearly gathered from my remarks. For, I also said that in some respects we can call him a remote cause.

ERASMUS. I understand now adequately what you want to say; but I note also that you have said, that the effect of the immanent cause remains united with its cause in such a way that together they constitute a whole. Now, if this is so, then, methinks, God cannot be an immanent cause. For, if he and that which is produced by him together form a whole, then you ascribe to God at one time more essence than at another time. I pray you, remove these doubts for me.
Theophilos. If, Erasmus, you want to extricate yourself from this confusion, then mark well what I am going to tell you now. The essence of a thing does not increase through its union with another thing with which it constitutes a whole; on the contrary, the first remains unchanged. I will give you an illustration, so that you may understand me the better. An image-carver has made from wood various forms after the likeness of the parts of the human body; he takes one of these, which has the form of a human breast, joins it to another, which has the form of a human head, and of these two he makes a whole, which represents the upper part of a human body; would you therefore say that the essence of the head has increased because it has been joined to the breast? That would be erroneous, because it is the same that it was before. For the sake of greater clearness let me give you another illustration, namely, an idea that I have of a triangle, and another resulting from an extension of one of the angles, which extended or extending angle is necessarily equal to the two interior opposite angles, and so forth. These, I say, have produced a new idea, namely, that the three angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles. This idea is so connected with the first, that it can neither be, nor be conceived without the same. Mark well now that although the new idea is joined to the preceding one, the essence of the preceding idea does not undergo any change in consequence; on the contrary, it remains without the slightest change. The same you may also observe in every idea which produces love in itself: this love in no way adds to the essence of the idea. But why multiply illustrations? since you can see it clearly in the subject which I have been illustrating and which we are discussing now. I have distinctly stated that all attributes, which depend on no

‡ A continues: And of all ideas which any one has we make a whole, or (which is the same) a thing of reason, which we call Understanding.
other cause, and whose definition requires no genus pertain
to the essence of God; and since the created things are not
competent to establish an attribute, they do not increase the
essence of God, however intimately they become united to
him. Add to this, that "whole" is but a thing of Reason,
and does not differ from the general except in this alone that
the general results from various Disconnected individuals, the
Whole, from various United individuals; also in this, that
the General only comprises parts of the same kind, but the
Whole, parts both the same and different in kind.†

ERASMUS. So far as this is concerned you have satisfied
me. But, in addition to this, you have also said, that the
effect of the ‡‡ inner cause cannot perish so long as its cause
lasts; this, I well see, is certainly true, but ‡‡ if this is so, then
how can God be an inner cause of all things, seeing
that many things perish? After your previous distinction
you will say, that God is really a cause of the effects which he
has produced immediately, without any other conditions except
his attributes alone; and that these cannot perish so long as
their cause endures; but that you do not call God an inner cause
of the effects whose existence does not depend on him imme-
diately, but which have come into being through some other
thing, except in so far as their causes do not operate, and can-
not operate, without God, nor also outside him,‡‡‡‡ and that for
this reason also, since they are not produced immediately
by God, they can perish. But this does not satisfy me.
For I see that you conclude, that the human understanding
is immortal, because it is a product which God has pro-
duced in himself. Now it is impossible that more than the

‡ B: ... the general results from various unconnected indi-
viduals of the same kind; but the whole from various connected
individuals different as well as the same in kind.
‡‡ B: an.
‡‡‡ B: this, I see, is not true, because if...
‡‡‡‡ B: without and outside him.
attributes of God should have been necessary in order to produce such an understanding; for, in order to be a being of such supreme perfection, it must have been created from eternity, just like all other things which depend immediately on God. And I have heard you say so, if I am not mistaken. And this being so, how will you reconcile this without leaving over any difficulties?

Theophilus. It is true, Erasmus, that the things (for the existence of which no other thing is required, except the attributes of God) which have been created immediately by him have been created from eternity. It is to be remarked, however, that although in order that a thing may exist there is required a special modification and a thing beside the attributes of God, for all that, God does not cease to be able to produce a thing immediately. For, of the necessary things which are required to bring things into existence, some are there in order that they should produce the thing, and others in order that the thing should be capable of being produced. For example, I want to have light in a certain room; I kindle a light, and this lights up the room through itself; or I open a window [shutter], now this act of opening does not itself give light, but still it brings it about that the light can enter the room. Likewise in order to set a body in motion another body is required that shall have all the motion that is to pass from it to the other. But in order to produce in us an idea of God there is no need for another special thing that shall have what is to be produced in us, but only such a body in Nature whose idea is necessary in order to represent God immediately. This you explain.

B: of.

B: a thing.

B: I kindle this [light], or I open a window, whereupon the room becomes light; now the act of kindling, or of opening the room does not produce the light, but prepares the way for the light to be able to light up the room, or to enter it.
could also have gathered from my remarks: for I said that God is only known through himself, and not through something else. However, I tell you this, that so long as we have not such a clear idea of God as shall unite us with him in such a way that it will not let us love anything beside him, we cannot truly say that we are united with God, so as to depend immediately on him. If there is still anything that you may have to ask, leave it for another time; just now circumstances require me to attend to other matters. Farewell.

ERASMUS. Nothing at present, but I shall ponder what you have just told me till the next opportunity. God be with you.
CHAPTER III

THAT GOD IS A CAUSE OF ALL THINGS

We shall now begin to consider those attributes [of God] which we called Propria.† And, first of all, how God is a cause of all things.

Now, we have already said above that one substance cannot produce another; and that God is a being of whom all attributes are predicated; whence it clearly follows that all other things can by no means be, or be understood, apart from or outside him. Wherefore we may say with all reason that God is a cause of all things.

As it is usual to divide the efficient cause in eight divisions, let me, then, inquire how and in what sense God is a cause.

First, then, we say that he is an emanative or productive cause of his works; and, in so far as there is activity, an active or operating cause, which we regard as one and the same, because they involve each other.

Secondly, he is an immanent, and not a transeunt cause, since all that he produces is within himself, and not outside him, because there is nothing outside him.

Thirdly, God is a free cause, and not a natural cause, as we shall make clear and manifest when we come to consider whether God can omit to do what he does, and then it will also be explained wherein true freedom consists.

† The [attributes] following are called Propria, because they are only Adjectives, which cannot be understood without their Substantives. That is to say, without them God would indeed be no God, but still it is not they that constitute God; for they reveal nothing of the character of a Substance, through which alone God exists.

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Fourthly, God is a cause through himself, and not by accident; this will become more evident from the discussion on Predestination.

Fifthly, God is a principal cause of his works which he has created immediately, such as movement in matter, &c.; in which there is no place for a subsidiary [instrumental] cause, since this is confined to particular things; as when he dries the sea by means of a strong wind, and so forth in the case of all particular things ‡ in Nature.

The subsidiary provoking cause is not [found] in God, because there is nothing outside him to incite him. The predisposing ‡‡ cause, on the other hand, is his perfection itself; through it he is a cause of himself, and, consequently, of all other things.

Sixthly, God alone is the first or Initial cause, as is evident from our foregoing proof.

Seventhly, God is also a Universal cause, but only in so far as he produces various things; otherwise this can never be predicated of him, as he needs no one in order to produce any results.

Eighthly, God is the proximate cause of the things that are infinite, and immutable, and which we assert to have been created immediately by him, but, in one sense, he is the remote cause of all particular things.

‡ B omits the semi-colon before "as," in the preceding line, and gives the words "as when ... particular things" in a note, instead of in the text.
‡‡ A and B: voorgaande.
CHAPTER IV

ON GOD'S NECESSARY ACTIVITY

We deny that God can omit to do what he does, and we shall also prove it when we treat of Predestination; when we will show that all things necessarily depend on their causes. But, in the second place, this conclusion also follows from the perfection of God; for it is true, beyond a doubt, that God can make everything just as perfect as it is conceived in his Idea; and just as things that are conceived by him cannot be conceived by him more perfectly than he conceives them, so all things can be made by him so perfect that they cannot come from him in a more perfect condition. Again, when we conclude that God could not have omitted to do what he has done, we deduce this from his perfection; because, in God, it would be an imperfection to be able to omit to do what he does; we do not, however, suppose that there is a subsidiary provoking cause in God that might have moved him to action, for then he were no God.

But now, again, there is the controversy whether, namely, of all that is in his Idea, and which he can realise so perfectly, whether, I say, he could omit to realise anything, and whether such an omission would be a perfection in him. Now, we maintain that, since all that happens is done by God, it must therefore necessarily be predetermined by him, otherwise he would be mutable, which would be a great imperfection in him. And as this predetermination by him must be from eternity, in which eternity there is no before or after, it follows irresistibly that God could never have predetermined things in any other way than that in which

† B: but.

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they are determined now, and have been from eternity, and that God could not have been either before or without these determinations. Further, if God should omit to do anything, then he must either have some cause for it, or not; if he has, then it is necessary that he should omit doing it; if he has not, then it is necessary that he should not omit to do it; this is self-evident. Moreover, in a created thing it is a perfection to exist and to have been produced by God, for, of all imperfection, non-existence is the greatest imperfection; and since God desires the welfare and perfection of all things, it would follow that if God desired that a certain thing should not exist, then the welfare and perfection of this thing must be supposed to consist in its non-existence, which is self-contradictory. That is why we deny that God can omit to do what he does. Some regard this as blasphemy, and as a belittling of God; but such an assertion results from a misapprehension of what constitutes true freedom; this is by no means what they think it is, namely, the ability to do or to omit to do something good or evil; but true freedom is only, or no other than [the status of being] the first cause, which is in no way constrained or coerced by anything else, and which through its perfection alone is the cause of all perfection;† consequently, if God could omit to do this, he would not be perfect: for the ability to omit doing some good, or accomplishing some perfection in what he does, can have no place in him, except through defect.‡

That God alone is the only free cause is, therefore, clear not only from what has just been said, but also from this, namely, that there is no external cause outside him to force or constrain him; all this is not the case with created things.

Against this it is argued thus: The good is only good

† B: but true freedom consists in this, that the first cause, constrained or coerced by nothing else, through its perfection alone is the cause of all perfection. ‡‡ B: because it implies defect.
because God wills it, and this being so, he can always bring it about that evil should be good. But such reasoning is about as conclusive as if I said: It is because God wills to be God that he is God; therefore it is in his power not to be God, which is absurdity itself. Furthermore, when people do anything, and they are asked why they do it, their answer is, because it is what justice demands. If the question is then put, why justice, or rather the first cause of all that is just, *makes such a demand,* then the answer must be, because justice wills it so. But, dear me, I think to myself, could Justice really be other than just? By no means, for then it could not be Justice. Those, however, who say that God does all that he does because it is good in itself, these, I say, may possibly think that they do not differ from us. But that is far from being the case, since they suppose that there is something before God ‡ to which he has duties or obligations, namely, a cause [through] which [God] desires that this shall be good, and, again, that that shall be just.‡‡

Then comes the further controversy, namely, whether God, supposing all things had been created by him in some other way from eternity, or had been ordered and predetermined to be otherwise than they now are, whether, I say, he would then be just as perfect *as he is now.* To this it may serve as an answer, that if Nature had, from all eternity, been made different from what it is now, then, from the standpoint of those who ascribe to God will and understanding, it would necessarily follow that God had a different will and a different understanding then, ‡‡‡‡ in consequence of which he would have made it different; and so we should be compelled to think that God ‡‡‡‡ has a different character.

‡ B: Goodness (Goed instead of God).
‡‡ B: . . . obligations, because of a desire that this shall be good, and that, again, just.
‡‡‡ B: "than now" (als nu) instead of "then" (als doen).
‡‡‡‡ B omits the eleven words which follow ("has . . . and ").
now from what he had then, and had a different character then from what he has now; so that, if we assume he is most perfect now, we are compelled to say that he would not have been so had he created all things differently. All these things, involving as they do palpable absurdities, can in no way be attributed to God, who now, in the past, and unto all eternity, is, has been, and will remain immutable. We prove this also from the definition that we have given of a free cause, which is not one that can do or omit to do anything, but is only such as is not dependent on anything else, so that whatever God does is done and carried into effect by him as the freest \$\$ cause. If, therefore, he had formerly made things different from what they are now, it would needs follow that he was at one time imperfect, which is false.\#

For, since God is the first cause of all things, there must be something in him, through which he does what he does, and omits not to do it. Since we say that Freedom does not consist in [having the choice of] doing or not doing something, and since we have also shown that that which makes him [God] do anything can be nothing else than his own perfection, we conclude that, had it not been that his perfection made him do all this, then the things would not exist, and could not come into existence, in order to be what they are now. This is just like saying: if God were imperfect then things would be different from what they are now.\#

So much as regards the first [attribute]; we shall now pass on to the second attribute, which we call a \textit{proprium} of God, and see what we have to say about it, and so on to the end.

\textit{A}: wisest (\textit{aldervijste} instead of \textit{aldervrijste}; corrected in B).

\textit{B} omits this sentence.
CHAPTER V

ON DIVINE PROVIDENCE

The second attribute, which we call a *proprium* [of God] is his Providence, which to us is nothing else than the *striving* which we find in the whole of Nature and in individual things to maintain and preserve their own existence. For it is manifest that no thing could, through its own nature, seek its own annihilation, but, on the contrary, that every thing has in itself a striving to preserve its condition, and to improve itself. Following these definitions of ours we, therefore, posit a *general* and a *special providence*. The *general* [*providence*] is that through which all things are produced and sustained in so far as they are parts of the whole of Nature. The *special providence* is the striving of each thing separately to preserve its existence [each thing, that is to say], considered not as a part of Nature, but as a whole [by itself]. This is explained by the following example: All the limbs of man are provided for, and cared for, in so far as they are parts of man, this is *general* providence; while *special* [*providence*] is the striving of each separate 20 limb (as a whole in itself, and not as a part of man) to preserve and maintain its own well-being.
CHAPTER VI

ON DIVINE PREDESTINATION

The third attribute, we say, is divine predestination.

1. We proved before that God cannot omit to do what he does; that he has, namely, made everything so perfect that it cannot be more perfect.

2. And, at the same time, that without him no thing can be, or be conceived.

It remains to be seen now whether there are in Nature any accidental things, that is to say, whether there are any things which may happen and may also not happen. Secondly, whether there is any thing concerning which we cannot ask why it is.

Now that there are no accidental things we prove thus: That which has no cause to exist cannot possibly exist; that which is accidental has no cause: therefore . . .

The first is beyond all dispute; the second we prove thus: If any thing that is accidental has a definite and certain cause why it should exist, then it must necessarily exist; but that it should be both accidental and necessary at the same time, is self-contradictory; Therefore . . .

Perhaps some one will say, that an accidental thing has indeed no definite and certain cause, but an accidental one. If this should be so, it must be so either in sensu diviso or in sensu composito, that is to say, either the existence of the cause is accidental, and not its being a cause; or it is accidental that a certain thing (which indeed must necessarily exist in Nature) should be the cause of the occurrence of that accidental thing. However, both the one and the other are false.
For, as regards the first, if the accidental something is accidental because [the existence of] its cause is accidental, then that cause must also be accidental, because the cause which has produced it is also accidental, et sic in infinitum.

And since it has already been proved, that all things depend on one single cause, this cause would therefore also have to be accidental: which is manifestly false.

As regards the second: if the cause were no more compelled to produce one thing than another, that is, [if the cause were no more compelled] to produce this something than not to produce it, then it would be impossible at once both that it should produce it and that it should not produce it, which is quite contradictory.

Concerning the second [question raised] above, whether there is no thing in Nature about which one cannot ask why it is, this remark of ours shows that we have to inquire through what cause a thing is real; for if this [cause] did not exist it were impossible that the thing should exist. Now, we must look for this cause either in the thing or outside the thing. If, however, any one should ask for a rule whereby to conduct this inquiry, we say that none whatever seems necessary. For if existence pertains to the nature of a thing, then it is certain that we must not look outside it for its cause; but if such is not the case, then we must always look outside the thing for its cause. Since, however, the first pertains to God alone, it is thereby proved (as we have already also proved before) that God alone is the first cause of all things. From this it is also evident that this or that will of man (since the existence of the will does not pertain to its essence) must also have an external cause, by which it is necessarily caused; that this is so is also evident from all that we have said in this chapter; and it will be still more evident when, in the second part, we come to consider and discuss the freedom of man.

Against all this others object: how is it possible that
God, who is said to be supremely perfect, and the sole cause, disposer, and provider of all, nevertheless permits such confusion to be seen everywhere in Nature? Also, why has he not made man so as not to be able to sin?

Now, in the first place, it cannot be rightly said that there is confusion in Nature, since nobody knows all the causes of things so as to be able to judge accordingly. This objection, however, originates in this kind of ignorance, namely, that they have set up general Ideas, with which, they think, particular things must agree if they are to be perfect. These Ideas, they state, are in the understanding of God, as many of Plato's followers have said, namely, that these general Ideas (such as Rational, Animal, and the like) have been created by God; and although those who follow Aristotle say, indeed, that these things are not real things, only things of Reason, they nevertheless regard them frequently as [real] things, since they have clearly said that his providence does not extend to particular things, but only to kinds; for example, God has never exercised his providence over Bucephalus, &c., but only over the whole genus Horse. They say also that God has no knowledge of particular and transient things, but only of the general, which, in their opinion, are imperishable. We have, however, rightly considered this to be due to their ignorance. For it is precisely the particular things, and they alone, that have a cause, and not the general, because they are nothing.

God then is the cause of, and providence over, particular things only. If particular things had to conform to some other Nature, then they could not conform to their own, and consequently could not be what they truly are. For example, if God had made all human beings like Adam before the fall, then indeed he would only have created Adam, and no Paul nor Peter; but no, it is just perfection

† B: Rational-Animal. ‡‡ B: to consider.
in God, that he gives to all things, from the greatest to the least, their essence, or, to express it better, that he has all things perfectly in himself.

As regards the other [objection], why God has not made mankind so that they should not sin, to this it may serve [as an answer], that whatever is said about sin is only said with reference to us, that is, as when we compare two things with each other, or [consider one thing] from different points of view. For instance, if some one has made a clock precisely in order to strike and to show the hours, and the mechanism quite fulfils the aims of its maker, then we say that it is good, but if it does not do so, then we say that it is bad, notwithstanding that even then it might still be good if only it had been his intention to make it irregular and to strike at wrong times.

We say then, in conclusion, that Peter must, as is necessary, conform to the Idea of Peter, and not to the Idea of Man; good and evil, or sin, these are only modes of thought, and by no means things, or any thing that has reality, as we shall very likely show yet more fully in what follows. For all things and works which are in Nature are perfect.
CHAPTER VII
ON THE ATTRIBUTES WHICH DO NOT PERTAIN TO GOD

Here we shall take up the consideration of those attributes† which are commonly attributed to God, but which, nevertheless, do not pertain to him; as also of those through which it is sought to prove the existence of God, though in vain; and also of the rules of accurate definition.

For this purpose, we shall not trouble ourselves very much about the ideas that people commonly have of God, but we shall only inquire briefly into what the Philosophers can tell us about it. Now these have defined God as a being existing through or of himself, cause of all things, Omniscient, Almighty, eternal, simple, infinite, the highest good, of infinite compassion, &c. But before we approach this inquiry, let us just see what admissions they make to us.

† As regards the attributes of which God consists, they are only infinite substances, each of which must of itself be infinitely perfect. That this must necessarily be so, we are convinced by clear and distinct reasons. It is true, however, that up to the present only two of all these infinites are known to us through their own essence; and these are thought and extension. All else that is commonly ascribed to God is not any attribute of his, but only certain modes which may be attributed to him either in consideration of all, that is, all his attributes, or in consideration of one attribute. In consideration of all [it is said], for instance, that he is eternal, self-subsisting, infinite, cause of all things, immutable. In consideration of one [it is said], for instance, that he is omniscient, wise, &c., which pertains to thought, and, again, that he is omnipresent, fills all, &c., which pertains to extension.
In the first place, they say that it is impossible to give a true or right definition of God, because, according to their opinion, there can be no definition except per genus et differentiam, and as God is not a species of any genus, he cannot be defined rightly, or according to the rules.

In the second place, they say that God cannot be defined, because the definition must describe the thing itself and also positively; while, according to their standpoint, our knowledge of God cannot be of a positive, but only of a negative kind; therefore no proper definition can be given of God.

They also say, besides, that God can never be proved a priori, because he has no cause, but only by way of probability, or from his effects.

Since by these assertions of theirs they admit sufficiently that their knowledge of God is very little and slight, let us now proceed to examine their definition.

In the first place, we do not see that they give us in it any attribute or attributes through which it can be known what the thing (God) is,† but only some propria or properties which do, indeed, belong to a thing, but never explain what the thing is. For although self-subsisting, being the cause of all things, highest good, eternal and immutable, &c., are peculiar to God alone, nevertheless, from those properties we cannot know what that being, to whom these properties pertain, is, and what attributes he has.

It is now also time for us to consider the things which they ascribe to God, and which do not, however, pertain to him,‡ such as omniscient, merciful, wise, and so forth, which things, since they are only certain modes of the thinking thing, and can by no means be, or be understood without

† That is to say, when he is considered as all that he is, or with regard to all his attributes; see on this point page 52 n.
‡ B: through which the thing (namely God) can be known.
the substances † whose modes ‡ they are, can, consequently, also not be attributed to him, who is a Being subsisting without the aid of anything, and solely through himself.

Lastly, they call him the highest good; but if they understand by it something different from what they have already said, namely, that God is immutable, and a cause of all things, then they have become entangled in their own thought, or are unable to understand themselves. This is the outcome of their misconception of good and evil, for they believe that man himself, and not God, is the cause of his sins and wickedness—which, according to what we have already proved, cannot be the case, else we should be compelled to assert that man is also the cause of himself. However, this will appear yet more evident when we come to consider the will of man.

It is necessary that we should now unravel their specious arguments wherewith they seek to excuse their ignorance in Theology.

First of all, then, they say that a correct definition must consist of a "genus" and "differentia." Now, although all the Logicians admit this, I do not know where they get it from. And, to be sure, if this must be true, then we can know nothing whatever. For if it is through a definition consisting of genus and differentia that we can first get to know a thing perfectly, then we can never know perfectly the highest genus, which has no genus above it. Now then: If the highest genus, which is the cause of our knowledge of all other things, is not known, much less, then, can the other things be understood or known which are explained by that genus. However, since we are free, and do not consider ourselves in any way tied to their assertions, we shall, in accordance with true logic, propose other rules

† B: substance.
‡‡ A: essences (wezens); B: modes (wijzen).
of definition, namely, on the lines of our division of Nature.

Now we have already seen that the attributes (or, as others call them, substances) are things, or, to express ourselves better and more aptly, a being which subsists through itself, and therefore makes itself known and reveals itself through itself.

As to the other things, we see that they are but modes of the attributes, without which also they can neither be, nor be understood. Consequently definitions must be of two kinds (or sorts):

1. The first, namely, are those of attributes, which pertain to a self-subsisting being, these need no genus, or anything, through which they might be better understood or explained: for, since they exist as attributes of a self-subsisting being, they also become known through themselves.

2. The second [kind of definitions] are those [of things] which do not exist through themselves, but only through the attributes whose modes they are, and through which, as their genus, they must be understood.

And this is [all that need be said] concerning their statement about definitions. As regards the other [assertion], namely, that God can [not] be known by us adequately, this has been sufficiently answered by D. des Cartes in his answers to the objections relating to these things, page 18.

And the third [assertion], namely, that God cannot be proved a priori, has also already been answered by us. Since God is the cause of himself, it is enough that we prove him through himself, and such a proof is also much more conclusive than the a posteriori proof, which generally rests only on external causes.
CHAPTER VIII

ON NATURA NATURANS

Here, before we proceed to something else, we shall briefly divide the whole of Nature—namely, into Natura naturans and Natura naturata. By Natura naturans we understand a being that we conceive clearly and distinctly through itself, and without needing anything beside itself (like all the attributes which we have so far described), that is, God. The Thomists likewise understand God by it, but their Natura naturans was a being (so they called it) beyond all substances.

The Natura naturata we shall divide into two, a general, and a particular. The general consists of all the modes which depend immediately on God, of which we shall treat in the following chapter; the particular consists of all the particular things which are produced by the general mode. So that the Natura naturata requires some substance‡ in order to be well understood.

‡ A: substances; B: substance.
CHAPTER IX

ON NATURA NATURATA

Now, as regards the general Natura naturata, or the modes, or creations which depend on, or have been created by, God immediately, of these we know no more than two, namely, motion in matter,† and the understanding in the thinking thing. These, then, we say, have been from all eternity, and to all eternity will remain immutable. A work truly as great as becomes the greatness of the workmaster.

All that specially concerns Motion, such as that it has been from all eternity, and to all eternity will remain immutable; that it is infinite in its kind; that it can neither be, nor be understood through itself, but only by means of Extension,—all this, I say, since it [Motion] more properly belongs to a treatise on Natural Science rather than here,‡ we shall not consider in this place, but we shall only say this about it, that it is a Son, Product, or Effect created immediately by God.

As regards the Understanding in the thinking thing, this, like the first, is also a Son, Product, or immediate Creation of God, also created by him from all eternity, and remaining immutable to all eternity. It has but one function,††

† Note.—What is here said about motion in matter is not said seriously. For the Author still intends to discover the cause thereof, as he has already done to some extent a posteriori. But it can stand just as it is, because nothing is based upon it, or dependent thereon. [B omits this note.]
‡ In A and B the words "since it . . . than here" follow immediately after "Motion," at the beginning of the sentence.
¶¶ Literally: This its attribute is but one.
namely, to understand clearly and distinctly all things at all times; which produces invariably an infinite or most perfect satisfaction, which cannot omit to do what it does. Although what we have just said is sufficiently self-evident, still, we shall prove it more clearly afterwards in our account of the Affects of the Soul, and shall therefore say no more about it here.
CHAPTER X
WHAT GOOD AND EVIL ARE

In order to explain briefly what good and evil are in themselves, we shall begin thus:

Some things are in our understanding and not ‡ in Nature, and so they are also only our own creation, and their purpose is to understand things distinctly: among these we include all relations, which have reference to different things, and these we call Entia Rationis [things of reason]. Now the question is, whether good and evil belong to the Entia Rationis or to the Entia Realia [real things]. But since good and evil are only relations, it is beyond doubt that they must be placed among the Entia Rationis; for we never say that something is good except with reference to something else which is not so good, or is not so useful to us as some other thing. Thus we say that a man is bad, only in comparison with one who is better, or also that an apple is bad, in comparison with another which is good or better.

All this could not possibly be said, if that which is better or good, in comparison with which it [the bad] is so called, did not exist.

Therefore, when we say that something is good, we only mean that it conforms well to the general Idea which we have of such things. But,‡‡ as we have already said before, the things must agree with their particular Ideas, whose essence must be a perfect essence, and not with the general *[Ideas]*, since in that case they would not exist.

As to confirming what we have just said, the thing is clear

‡ B: not such.
‡‡ A: “And therefore”; B: “Nevertheless.”
to us; but still, to conclude our remarks, we will add yet the following proofs:

All things which are in Nature, are either things or actions. Now good and evil are neither things nor actions. Therefore good and evil do not exist in Nature.

For, if good and evil are things or actions, then they must have their definitions. But good and evil (as, for example, the goodness of Peter and the wickedness of Judas) have no definitions apart from the essence of Judas or Peter, because this alone exists in Nature, and they cannot be defined without their essence. Therefore, as above—it follows that good and evil are not things or actions which exist in Nature.
SECOND PART
ON MAN
AND WHAT PERTAINS TO HIM
HAVING, in the first part, discoursed on God, and on the universal and infinite things, we shall proceed now, in the second part, to the treatment of particular and finite things; though not of all, since they are innumerable, but we shall only treat of those which concern man; and, in the first place, we shall consider here what man is, in so far as he consists of certain modes (contained in the two attributes which we have remarked in God). I say of certain modes, for I by no means think that man, in so far as he consists of spirit, soul, or body, is a substance. Because, already at the

† 1. Our soul is either a substance or a mode; it is not a substance, because we have already shown that there can be no finite substance; it is therefore a mode.

2. Being a mode, then, it must be such either of "substantial" extension or of "substantial" thought; not of extension, because, &c.; therefore of thought.

3. "Substantial" Thought, since it cannot be finite, is infinitely perfect in its kind, and an attribute of God.

4. Perfect thought must have a Knowledge, Idea, or mode of thought of all and everything that is real, of substances as well as of modes, without exception.

5. We say, that is real, because we are not speaking here of a Knowledge, Idea, &c., which completely knows the nature of all things as involved in their essence, apart from their individual existence, but only of the Knowledge, Idea, &c., of the particular things which are constantly coming into existence.

6. This Knowledge, Idea, &c., of each particular thing which happens to be real is, we say, the soul of this particular thing.

7. All and sundry particular things that are real, have become such through motion and rest, and this is true of all the modes of "substantial" extension which we call bodies.

8. The differences among these result solely from the varying
beginning of this book, we proved (1) that no substance can have a beginning; (2) that one substance cannot produce another; and lastly (3), that there cannot be two like substances.

As man has not been in existence from eternity, is finite, and is like many men, he can be no substance; so that all that he has of thought are only modes of the attribute thought which we have attributed to God. And, again, all that he has of form, motion, and other things, are likewise (modes) of the other attribute which is attributed *by us* to God.

And although from this, [namely,] that the nature of man can neither be, nor be understood without the attributes which we ourselves admit to constitute substance, some try to prove that man is a substance, yet this has no other ground than false suppositions. For, since the nature of proportions of motion and rest, through which this is so, and not so—this is this, and not that.

9. From such proportion of motion and rest comes also the existence of our body; of which, consequently, no less than of all other things, there must be a Knowledge, an Idea, &c., in the thinking thing, and hence at once also our soul.

10. This body of ours, however, had a different proportion of motion and rest when it was an unborn embryo; and in due course, when we are dead, it will have a different proportion again; none the less there was at that time [before our birth], and there will be then [after death] an idea, knowledge, &c., of our body in the thinking thing, just as there is now; but by no means the same [idea, &c.], since it is now differently proportioned as regards motion and rest.

11. To produce, in "substantial" thought, such an idea, knowledge, mode of thought as ours now is, what is required is, not any body you please (then it would have to be known differently from what it is), but just such a body having this proportion of motion and rest, and no other: for as the body is, so is the Soul, Idea, Knowledge, &c.

12. As soon, then, as a body has and retains this proportion [which our body has], say, e.g., of 1 to 3, then that soul and that
matter or body existed before the form of this human body existed, that nature cannot be peculiar to the human body, because it is clear that during the time when man was not, it could never belong to the nature of man.

And what they set up as a fundamental principle, [namely,] that that pertains to the nature of a thing, without which the thing can neither be, nor be understood, we deny. For we have already shown that without God no thing can be or be understood. That is, God must first be and be understood before these particular things can be and be understood. We have also shown that genera do not belong to the nature of definition, but that only such things as cannot exist without others, can also not be understood without these. This being so, what kind of a rule shall we, then, state, whereby it shall be known what belongs to the nature of a thing?

body will be like ours now are, being indeed constantly subject to change, but to none so great that it will exceed the limits of 1 to 3; though as much as it changes, so much also does the soul always change.

13. And this change in us, resulting from other bodies acting upon us, cannot take place without the soul, which always changes correspondingly, becoming aware of the change. And [the consciousness of] this change is really what we call feeling.

14. But when other bodies act so violently upon ours that the proportion of motion [to rest] cannot remain 1 to 3, that means death, and the annihilation of the Soul, since this is only an Idea, Knowledge, &c., of this body having this proportion of motion and rest.

15. Still, since it [the soul] is a mode in the thinking substance it could also know, and love this [substance] as well as that of extension, and by uniting with substances (which remain always the same) it could make itself eternal.

‡ This emendation was suggested by Boehmer.
‡‡ Gevoel [sensitivity ?].
Well, the rule is this: That belongs to the nature of a thing, without which the thing can neither be, nor be understood; not merely so, however, but in such wise that the judgment must be convertible, that is, that the predicate can neither be, nor be understood without the thing. Of these modes, then, of which man consists, we shall begin to treat at the commencement of the following first chapter.
CHAPTER I

ON OPINION, BELIEF, AND KNOWLEDGE

To begin our consideration of the modes of which man consists, we shall state, (1) what they are, (2) their effects, and (3) their cause.

As regards the first, let us begin with those that are first known to us: namely, certain ideas or the consciousness of the knowledge of ourselves, and of the things which are outside us.

Now we get these ideas either merely through belief (which belief arises either from experience, or from hearsay), (2) or, in the second place, we acquire them by way of a true belief, (3) or, thirdly, we have them as the result of clear and distinct conception.

The first is commonly subject to error.

The second and third, however, although they differ from one another, cannot err.

To make all this somewhat clearer and more intelligible, we shall give the following illustration taken from the Rule of Three.

Some one has just heard it said that if, in the Rule of Three, the second number is multiplied by the third, and then divided by the first, a fourth number will then be obtained which has the same relation to the third as the

† The modes of which Man consists are ideas, differentiated as Opinion, true Belief, and clear and distinct Knowledge, produced by objects, each in its own way.

†† These ideas of this Belief are put first on page 69; here and there they are also called opinion, which they really are.

††† This one merely forms an opinion, or, as is commonly said, believes through hearsay only. [B omits this note.]
second has to the first. And notwithstanding the possibility that he who put this before him might have been lying, he still made his calculations accordingly, and he did so without having acquired any more knowledge of the Rule of Three than a blind man has of colour, so that whatever he may have said about it, he simply repeated as a parrot repeats what it has been taught.

Another,† having a more active intelligence, is not so easily satisfied with mere hearsay, but tests it by some actual calculations, and when he finds that they agree with it, then he gives credence to it. But we have rightly said that this one also is subject to error; for how can he possibly be sure that his experience of a few particulars can serve him as a rule for all?

A third,‡ who is not satisfied with hearsay, because it may deceive, nor with experience of a few particulars, because this cannot possibly serve as a rule, examines it in the light of true Reason, which, when properly applied, has never deceived. This then tells him that on account of the nature of the proportion in these numbers it had to be so, and could not happen otherwise.

A fourth,§ however, having the clearest knowledge of all, has no need of hearsay, or experience, or the art of reasoning, because by his penetration he sees the proportion in all such calculations immediately.¶

† This one thinks or believes not simply through hearsay, but from experience: and these are the two kinds of people who have [mere] opinions. [B omits this note.]

‡ This one is certain through true belief, which can never deceive him, and he is properly called a believer.

§ But this last one is never [merely] of opinion, nor a [mere] believer, but sees the things themselves, not through something else, but through the things themselves.

¶ A: "and"; B: "in."

†† B adds here, in the body of the text, the substance of the above two notes on the third and fourth kinds of knowledge.
We come now to the consideration of the effects of the different grades of knowledge, of which we spoke in the preceding chapter, and, in passing as it were, we shall explain what Opinion, Belief, and clear Knowledge are.

The first [kind of knowledge], then, we call Opinion, the second Belief, but the third is what we call clear Knowledge.†

We call it Opinion because it is subject to error, and has no place when we are sure of anything, but only in those cases when we are said to guess and to surmise. The second we call Belief, because the things we apprehend only with our reason are not seen by us, but are only known to us through the conviction of our understanding that it must be so and not otherwise. But we call that clear Knowledge which comes, not from our being convinced by reasons, but from our feeling and enjoying the thing itself, and it surpasses the others by far.

After these preliminary remarks let us now turn to their effects. Of these we say this, namely, that from the first proceed all the “passions” which are opposed to good reason; from the second, the good desires; and from the third, true and sincere Love, with all its offshoots.

We thus maintain that Knowledge is the proximate cause of all the “passions” in the soul. For we consider it once for all impossible that any one, who neither thinks nor knows in any of the preceding ways and modes, should be capable of being incited to Love or Desire or any other mode of Will.

† B omits this sentence.
CHAPTER III

THE ORIGIN OF PASSION. PASSION DUE TO OPINION

Here, then, let us see how, as we have said, the passions derive their origin from opinion. To do this well and intelligently we shall take some special ones, and prove what we say by using these as illustrations.

Let Surprise, then, be the first. This is found in one who knows a thing after the first manner [of Knowledge]; ‡ for, since from a few particulars he draws a conclusion which is general, he stands surprised whenever he sees anything that goes against his conclusion; † like one who, having never seen any sheep except with short tails, is surprised at the sheep from Morocco which have long ones. So it is

‡ A refers to the following note already here; B, at the next semi-colon.

† This should on no account be taken to mean that a formal inference must always precede astonishment; on the contrary, it exists also without that, namely, when we tacitly believe that a thing is [always] so, and not different from what we are accustomed to see it, hear or think about it, &c. For example, Aristotle says, a dog is a barking animal, therefore he concludes, whatever barks is a dog; but when a peasant says a dog, he means tacitly just the same that Aristotle did with his definition. So that when the peasant hears the barking he says, a dog; and so, if they had heard some other kind of animal bark, the peasant, who had drawn no [explicit] inference, would stand just as astonished as Aristotle, who had drawn an inference. Furthermore, when we become aware of something about which we had never thought before, it is not really such the like of which, whether as a whole or in part, we have not known before, only it is not so constituted in all respects, or we have never been affected by it in the same way, &c.
related of a peasant that he had persuaded himself that beyond his fields there were no others, but when he happened to miss a cow, and was compelled to go and look for her far away, he was surprised at the great number of fields that there were beyond his few acres. And, to be sure, this must also be the case with many Philosophers who have persuaded themselves that beyond this field or little globe, on which they are, there are no more [worlds] (because they have seen no others). But surprise is never felt by him who draws true inferences. This is the first.

The second is Love.† Since this arises either from true ideas, or from opinion, or, lastly, from hearsay only, we shall see first how [it arises] from opinion, then how [it arises] from [true] ideas; for the first tends to our ruin, and the second to our supreme happiness; and then [we shall see how it arises] from the last.

† The substance of the next three paragraphs is given in the following simpler order in B:

The second is Love. This arises either, 1, from hearsay, or 2, from opinion, or 3, from true ideas.

As regards the first, we generally observe it in the attitude of children to their father; because their father tells them this or that is good they incline towards it, without knowing anything more about it. We see it also in those who, from Love, give their lives for the Fatherland, and also in those who from hearsay about something fall in love with it.

As regards the second, it is certain that whenever any one sees, or thinks he sees, something good, he is always inclined to unite himself with it, and, for the sake of the good which he discerns therein, he chooses it as the best, outside which he then knows nothing better or more agreeable. Yet if ever it happens (as it mostly does happen in these things) that he gets to know something better than this good at present known to him, then his love changes immediately from the one (first) to the other (second). All this we shall show more clearly when we treat of the freedom of man.

As to love from true ideas, as this is not the place to speak of it, we shall pass it over for the present. [See note † on page 72.]
As regards the first, it is certain that whenever any one sees, or thinks he sees, something good, he is always inclined to unite himself with it, and, for the sake of the good which he discerns therein, he chooses it as the best, outside which he then knows nothing better or more agreeable. Yet if ever it happens (as it mostly does happen in these things) that he gets to know something better than this good at present known to him, then his love changes immediately from the one (first) to the other (second). All this we shall show more clearly when we treat of the freedom of man.

As to love from true ideas, since this is not the place to speak of it, we shall pass it over now, and speak of the third, and last, namely, the Love that comes from hearsay only. This we generally observe in the attitude of children to their father: because their father tells them that this or that is good they incline towards it, without knowing anything more about it. We see it also in those who from Love give their lives for the Fatherland, and also in those who from hearsay about some thing fall in love with it.

Next, Hatred, the exact opposite of love, arises from error which is the outcome of opinion. For when some one has come to the conclusion that a certain thing is good, and another happens to do something to the detriment of the same thing, then there arises in him a hatred against the one who did it, and this, as we shall explain afterwards, could never happen if the true good were known. For, in comparison with the true good, all indeed that is, or is conceived, is naught but wretchedness itself; and is not such a lover of what is wretched much more deserving of pity than of hatred?

Hatred, lastly, comes also from mere hearsay, as we see it in the Turks against Jews and Christians, in the Jews

† Love that comes from true ideas or clear knowledge is not considered here, as it is not the outcome of opinion; see, however, chapter xxii. about it.
against the Turks and Christians, in the Christians against the Jews and Turks, &c. For, among all these, how ignorant is the one multitude of the religion and morals of the others!

Desire. Whether (as some will have it) it consists only in a longing or inclination to obtain what is wanting, or (as others will have it †) to retain the things which we already enjoy, it is certain that it cannot be found to have come upon any one except for an apparent good [sub specie boni]. It is therefore clear that Desire, as also Love which we have already discussed, is the outcome of the first kind of knowledge. For if any one has heard that a certain thing is good, he feels a longing and inclination for the same, as may be seen in the case of an invalid who, through hearing the doctor say that such or such a remedy is good for his ailment, at once longs for the same, * and feels a desire for it. *

Desire arises also from experience, as may be seen in the practice of doctors, who when they have found a certain remedy good several times are wont to regard it ‡ as something unfailing.

All that we have just said of these, the same we can say of all other passions, as is clear to every one. And as, in what follows, we shall begin to inquire which of them are rational, and which of them are irrational, we shall leave the subject now, and say no more about it.

What has now been said of these few though most important [passions] can also be said of all others; ‡‡ and with this we conclude the subject of the Passions which arise from Opinion.

† The first definition is the best, because when the thing is enjoyed the desire ceases; the form [of consciousness] which then prompts us to retain the thing is not desire, but a fear of losing the thing loved.

‡ B: are wont to resort to it.

‡‡ B omits the first half of the concluding sentence ("What . . . others").
CHAPTER IV

WHAT COMES FROM BELIEF; AND ON THE GOOD AND EVIL OF MAN

Since we have shown in the preceding chapter how the Passions arise from the error of Opinion, let us now see here the effects of the two other modes of Knowing. And first of all, [the effect] of what we have called True Belief.†

This shows us, indeed, what a thing ought to be, but not what it really is. And this is the reason why it can never unite us with the object of our belief. I say, then, that it only teaches us what the thing ought to be, and not what it is; between these two there is a great difference. For, as we remarked à propos of the example taken from the rule of three, when any one can, by the aid of proportion, find a fourth number that shall be related to the third as the second is to the first, then (having used division and multiplication) he can say that the four numbers must be proportional;

† Belief is a strong proof based on Reasons, whereby I am convinced in my mind that the thing is really, and just such, outside my understanding, as I am convinced in my mind that it is. I say, a strong proof based on Reasons, in order thereby to distinguish it both from Opinion, which is always doubtful and liable to error, and from Knowledge which does not consist in being convinced by Reasons, but in an immediate union with the thing itself. I say, that the thing is really and just such outside my understanding—really, because reasons cannot deceive me in this, for otherwise they would not be different from opinion. Just such, for it can only tell me what the thing ought to be, and not what it really is, otherwise it would not be different from Knowing. Outside, for it makes us enjoy intellectually not what is in us, but what is outside us.
and although that is so, he speaks of it none the less as of a thing that is beyond him. But when he comes to see the proportion in the way which we have shown in the fourth example, then he says with truth that the thing is so, because then it is in him and not beyond him. *Let* this *suffice* as regards the first [effect].

The second effect of true belief is that it brings us to a clearer understanding, through which we love God, and thus it makes us intellectually aware of the things which are not in us, but outside us.

The third effect is, that it gives us the knowledge of good and evil, and shows us all the passions which should be suppressed. And as we have already said that the passions which come from opinion are liable to great evil, it is worth the pains to see how these also are sifted out by this second kind of knowledge, so that we may see what is good and what is bad in them.

To do so conveniently, let us, using the same method as before, look at them closely, so that we may know through it which of them should be chosen and which rejected. But, before proceeding to this, let us first state briefly what is the good and evil of man.

We have already said before that all things are necessarily what they are, and that in Nature there is *no* good and *no* evil. So that whatever we want man to be *in this respect* must refer to his kind, which is nothing else than a thing of Reason. And when we have conceived in our mind an Idea of a perfect man, it should make us look (when we examine ourselves) to see whether we have any means of attaining to such perfection.

Hence, then, whatever advances us towards perfection, we call good, and, on the contrary, what hinders, or also what does not advance us toward it, bad.

I must therefore, I say, conceive a perfect man, if I want

† A: third; B: fourth.
to assert anything concerning the good and evil of man, because if I were to consider the good and evil of some individual man, say, e.g., of Adam, I should be confusing a real thing (ens reale) with a thing of Reason (ens Rationis), which must be most scrupulously avoided by an upright Philosopher, for reasons which we shall state in the sequel, or on another occasion. Furthermore, since the destiny of Adam, or of any other individual creature, is not known to us except through the result, so it follows that what we can say even of the destiny of man must be based on the idea which our understanding forms of a perfect man, which destiny, since it is a thing of Reason, we may well know; so also, as already remarked, are good and evil, which are only modes of thinking.

To come gradually to the point: We have already pointed out before how the movement, passions, and activities of the soul arise from ideas, and these ideas we have divided into four kinds, namely, [according as they are based on] mere hearsay, experience, belief, clear knowledge. And from what we have now seen of the effects of all these, it is evident that the fourth, namely, clear knowledge, is the most perfect of all. For opinion often leads us into error. True belief is good only because it is the way to true knowledge, and awakens us to things which are really lovable. So that the final end that we seek, and the highest that we know, is true knowledge. But even this true knowledge varies with the objects that come before it: the better the object is with which it happens to unite itself, so much the better also is this knowledge. And, for this reason, he is the most perfect man who is united with God (who is the most perfect being of all), and so enjoys him.

† For from no individual creature can one derive an Idea that is perfect; for the perfection of this object itself, [that is,] whether it is really perfect or not, cannot be deduced except from a general perfect Idea, or Ens Rationis.
Now, in order to find out what is good and bad in the affects or passions, let us, as suggested, take them one by one. And first of all, *Surprise*. This, since it arises either from ignorance or prejudice, is an imperfection in the man who is subject to this perturbance. I say an imperfection, because, through itself, surprise does not lead to any evil.
CHAPTER V

ON LOVE

Love, which is nothing else than the enjoyment of a thing and union therewith, we shall divide according to the qualities of its object; the object, that is, which man seeks to enjoy, and to unite himself with.

Now some objects are in themselves transient; others, indeed, are not transient by virtue of their cause. There is yet a third that is eternal and imperishable through its own power and might.

The transient are all the particular things which did not exist from all time, or have had a beginning.

The others are all those modes which we have stated to be the cause of the particular modes.

But the third is God, or, what we regard as one and the same, Truth.

Love, then, arises from the idea and knowledge that we have of a thing; and according as the thing shows itself greater and more glorious, so also is our love greater.

In two ways it is possible to free ourselves from love: either by getting to know something better, or by discovering that the loved object, which is held by us to be something great and glorious, brings in its train much woe and disaster.

It is also characteristic of love that we never think of emancipating ourselves from it (as from surprise and other passions); and this for the following two reasons: (1) because it is impossible, (2) because it is necessary that we should not be released from the same.

† B: but. ‡‡ B: the general modes.
ON LOVE

It is impossible because it does not depend on us, but only on the good and useful which we discern in the object; it is necessary that these should never have become known to us, if we would not * or should not * love it; and this is not a matter of our free choice, or dependent on us, for if we knew nothing, it is certain that we should also be nothing.

It is necessary that we should not be released from it, because, owing to the weakness of our nature, we could not exist without enjoying something with which we become united, and from which we draw strength.

Now which of these three kinds of objects are we to choose or to reject?

As regards the transient (since, as remarked, we must, owing to the weakness of our nature, necessarily love something and become united with it in order to exist), it is certain that our nature becomes nowise strengthened through our loving, and becoming united with, these, † for they are weak themselves, and the one cripple cannot carry the other. And not only do they not advance us, but they are even harmful to us. For we have said that love is a union with the object which our understanding judges to be good and glorious; and by this we mean such a union whereby both the lover ‡‡ and what is loved become one and the same thing, or together constitute one whole. He, therefore, is indeed always wretched who is united to transient things. For, since these are beyond his power, and subject to many accidents, it is impossible that, when they are affected, he should be free from these affects. And, consequently, we conclude: If those who love transient things that have some measure of reality are so wretched, how wretched must they be who love honour, riches, and pleasures, which have no reality whatever!

† B: with things which are transient.
‡‡ A and B: love.
Let this suffice to show us how Reason teaches us to keep away from things so fleeting. For what we have just said shows us clearly the poison and the evil which lurk concealed in the love of these things. But we see this yet incomparably clearer when we observe from what glorious and excellent a good we are kept away through the enjoyment of this.

We said before that the things which are transient are beyond our power. * But * let us be well understood; we do not mean to say that we are a free cause depending upon nothing else; only when we say that some things are in, others beyond our power, we mean by those that are in our power such as we can produce through the order of or together with Nature, of which we are a part; by those which are not in our power, such as, being outside us, are not liable to suffer any change through us, because they are very far removed from our real essence as thus fashioned by Nature.

To proceed, we come now to the second kind of objects, which though eternal and imperishable, are not such through their own power. † However, if we institute a brief inquiry here, we become immediately aware that these are only mere modes which depend immediately on God. And since the nature of these is such, they cannot be conceived by us unless we, at the same time, have a conception of God. In this, since he is perfect, our Love must necessarily rest. And, to express it in a word, if we use our understanding aright it will be impossible for us not to love God.

The Reasons why, are clear. First of all, because we find that God alone has essence only, and all other things are not essences but modes. And since the modes cannot be rightly understood without the entity on which they immediately depend; and [as] we have already shown before

† B continues: "but are modes which depend immediately on God"—and omits the next sentence.
that if, when loving something, we get to know a better thing than that which we then love, we always prefer it immediately, and forsake the first; it follows, therefore, incontrovertibly that when we get to know God, who has all perfection in himself, we must necessarily love him.

Secondly, if we use our understanding well in acquiring a knowledge of things, then we must know them in [relation to] their causes. Now then, since God is a first cause of all other things, therefore, from the nature of the case (ex rerum natura), the knowledge of God is, and remains, before the knowledge of all other things: because the knowledge of all other things must follow from the knowledge of the first cause. And true love results always from the knowledge that the thing is glorious and good. What else, then, can follow but that it can be lavished upon no one more ardently than upon the Lord our God? For he alone is glorious, and a perfect good.

So we see now, how we can make love strong, and also how it must rest only in God.

What more we had still to say about love, we shall bear in mind to say ‡ it when we consider the last kind of knowledge. In what follows here we shall inquire, as we promised before, as to which of the passions we are to entertain, which we are to reject.

‡ Λ: do.
CHAPTER VI

ON HATRED

HATRED is an inclination to ward off from us that which has caused us some harm.† Now it is to be remarked that we perform our actions in two ways, namely, either with or without passion. With passion, as is commonly seen in the [conduct of] masters towards their servants who have done something amiss. Without passion, as is related of Socrates, who, when he was compelled to chastise his slave for [the latter’s own] good, never did so when he felt that he was enraged against his slave.

Now that we see that our actions are performed by us either with, or without passion, we think that it is clear that those things which hinder or have hindered us can be removed, when necessary, without any perturbation on our part. And so, which is better: that we should flee from the things with aversion and hatred, or that, with the strength of reason, we should (for we think it possible) endure them without loss of temper? First of all, it is certain that when we do what we have to do without passion, then no evil can result therefrom. And, since there is no mean between good and evil, we see that, as it is bad to do anything in a passion, so it must be good to act without it.

But let us examine whether there is any harm in fleeing from things with hatred and aversion.

As regards the hatred which comes from opinion, it is certain that it should have no place in us, because we know that one and the same thing is good for us at one time, bad

† B: let or hindrance.
for us at another time, as is always the case with medicinal herbs.

It therefore depends, in the end, on whether the hatred arises in us only through opinion, and not also through true reasoning. But to ascertain this properly we deem it right to explain distinctly what hatred is, and to distinguish it from aversion.

Now I say that *Hatred* is a perturbation of the soul against some one who has done some ill to us willingly and knowingly. But *aversion* is the perturbation which arises in us against a thing on account of some infirmity or injury which we either know or think is in it by nature. I say, by nature; for when we do not suppose *or think* that it is so, then, even if we have suffered some hindrance or injury from it, we have no aversion for it, because we may, on the contrary, expect something useful from it. Thus, when some one is hurt by a stone or a knife, he does not on that account feel any aversion for the same.

After these observations let us now briefly consider the consequences of both of them. From hatred there ensues sorrow; and when the hatred is great, it produces anger, which not only, like hatred, seeks to flee from what is hated, but also to annihilate it, when that is practicable: from this great hatred comes also envy. But from aversion there comes a certain sorrow, because we consider ourselves to be deprived of something which, since it is real, must always have its essence and perfection.

From what has just been said it may be easily understood that, if we use our Reason aright, we can feel no hatred or aversion for anything, because, if we do, we deprive ourselves of that perfection which is to be found in everything.

† B continues: "while, on the contrary, if we want anything we must contrive to improve whatever we want from nature, whether for our own sake, or for the sake of the thing itself"—and omits the next sentence.
We see likewise with our Reason that we can never reasonably feel any hatred whatever against anybody, because whatsoever exists in Nature, if we entertain any wish about it, then we must always improve it, whether for our sake or for the sake of the thing itself. And since a perfect man is the best thing *for us* that we know of all that we have around us or before our eyes, it is by far the best both for us and for all people individually that we should at all times seek to educate them to this perfect state. For only then can we reap the greatest benefit from them, and they from us. The means thereto is, to give regard to them always in the manner in which we are constantly taught and exhorted to do by our good Conscience; for this never prompts us to our undoing, but always to our happiness *and well-being.*

In conclusion, we say that Hatred and Aversion have in them as many imperfections as Love, on the contrary, has perfections. For this always produces improvement, invigoration, and enlargement, which constitute perfection; while Hatred, on the contrary, always makes for desolation, enervation, and annihilation, which constitute imperfection itself.
CHAPTER VII

ON JOY AND SORROW†

Having seen that Hatred and Surprise‡‡ are such that we may freely say, that they can have no place in those who use their understanding as they should, we shall now proceed in the same manner to speak of the other passions. To begin with, Desire and Joy shall come first. Since these arise from the same causes from which love ensues, we shall only say concerning them that we must remember and call to mind what we then said; and with this we leave the subject.

We turn next to Sorrow, of which we may say that it arises only from opinion and imagination *which follows* therefrom: for it comes from the loss of some good.

Now we have already remarked above, that whatsoever we do should tend towards progress and amelioration. But it is certain that so long as we are sorrowing we render ourselves unfit to act thus; on this account it is necessary that we should free ourselves from it. This we can do by thinking of the means whereby we may recover what we have lost, if it is in our power to do so. If not, [we must reflect] that it is just as necessary to make an end of it,††† lest we fall a prey to all the miseries *and disasters* which sorrow necessarily brings in its train. And either course *must be adopted* with joy; for it is foolish to try to restore and make good a lost good by means of a self-sought and provoked evil.

† B: On Desire and Joy. ‡‡ B: Hatred and Aversion. ††† B: Sorrow.

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Lastly, he who uses his understanding aright must necessarily know God first. Now God, as we have shown, is the highest good and all that is good. Hence it follows incontrovertibly, that one who uses his understanding aright can fall a prey to no sorrow. How should he? since he finds repose in that good which is all that is good, and in which there is the fulness of all joy and contentment.

Sorrow, then, comes from opinion or want of understanding, as explained.

† B abridges the paragraph as follows: Lastly, he who uses his understanding aright must necessarily know that God is the first and the highest; and rest in him as this supreme good: whence it follows that, since he finds therein all joy and full contentment, no sorrow can befall him.

†† B omits the last sentence.
CHAPTER VIII

ON ESTEEM AND CONTEMPT, &c. †

We shall now proceed to speak of Esteem and Contempt, of Self-respect and Humility, of Conceit and Culpable Humility. We shall take them in the above order, and try to distinguish accurately what is good and what is bad in them.

Esteem and Contempt are felt in so far as we know a thing to be something great or small, be this great or little thing in us or outside us.‡‡

Self-respect does not extend [to anything] outside us, and is only attributed to one who knows the real worth of his perfection, dispassionately and without seeking esteem for himself.

Humility is felt when any one knows his own imperfection, without regard to the contempt [of others] for himself; ††† so that Humility does not refer to anything outside the humble man.

Conceit is this, when some one attributes to himself a perfection which is not to be found in him.

Culpable humility is this, when some one attributes to himself an imperfection which he has not. I am not speaking of those hypocrites who, without meaning it,

† B enumerates all the topics in the heading of this and the following chapters.

‡‡ B begins this chapter as follows: In order to distinguish thoroughly the good and evil in these Passions we shall take them up in turn, beginning with Esteem and Contempt, which refer to something known that is in or outside us, the first relating to something great, the last, to something small.

††† B: without any self-contempt.

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humble themselves in order to deceive others;† but only of those who really think they have the imperfections which they attribute to themselves.

From these observations it is sufficiently evident what good and evil there is in each of these passions. For, as regards Self-respect and Humility, these show their excellence through themselves. For we say that the possessor thereof knows his perfection and imperfection for what it is.‡‡ And this, according to what Reason teaches us, is the most important thing for the attainment of our perfection. Because if we know exactly our powers and perfection, we see thereby clearly what it is we have to do in order to attain our good end. And, on the other hand, if we know our fault and frailty, then we know what we have to avoid.

As regards Conceit and Culpable Humility, the definition of them already shows *sufficiently* that they arise from a certain opinion; for we said that it [conceit] is attributed to one who ascribes to himself a certain perfection, although he does not possess it, and culpable humility is the precise opposite.

From what has just been said it is evident, then, that just as Self-respect and True Humility are good and salutary, so, on the contrary, Conceit and Culpable Humility are bad and pernicious. For those [Self-respect and True Humility] not only put their possessor into a very good attitude, but are also, besides, the right ladder by which we may rise to supreme bliss. But these [Conceit and Culpable Humility] not only prevent us from attaining to our perfection, but also lead us to utter ruin. Culpable Humility is what prevents us from doing that which we should otherwise have to do in order to become perfect; we see this, for instance, in the case of the Sceptics, who, just because they deny that

† B: who without really meaning it make a show of humbling themselves simply in order to deceive others.
‡‡ B: for their true worth.
man can attain to any truth, deprive themselves thereof through this very denial. Conceit *on the other hand* is what makes us undertake things which tend straight to our ruin; as is seen in the case of all those who had the conceit, and have the conceit, that they stood, and stand, wondrously well in the opinion of God, and consequently brave fire and water, and thus, avoiding no danger, and facing every risk, they die most miserably.

As regards Esteem and Contempt, there is no more to be said about them, we have only to recall to memory what we said before about Love.
CHAPTER IX

ON HOPE AND FEAR, &c.

We shall now begin to speak of Hope and Fear, of Confidence, Despair, and Vacillation, of Courage, Boldness and Emulation, of Pusillanimity and Timidity, *and lastly of Jealousy,* and, as is our wont, we shall take them one by one, and then indicate which of these can hinder us, and which can profit us. We shall be able to do all this very easily, if only we attend closely to the thoughts that we can have about a thing that is yet to come, be it good, be it bad.

*The ideas which we have about things have reference either
1. To the things themselves; or,
2. To the person who has the ideas.*

The ideas that we have as regards the thing itself are these, either the thing is regarded by us as accidental, that is as something which may come or may not come, or [we think] that it necessarily must come. So much as regards the thing itself.

Next, as regards him who thinks about the thing, the case is this: he must do something either in order to advance the thing, or in order to prevent it. Now from these thoughts all these passions result as follows: when we think that a certain thing which is yet to come is good and that it can happen, the soul assumes, in consequence of this, that form which we call *hope,* which is nothing else than a certain kind of joy, though mingled with some sorrow.

And, on the other hand, if we judge that that which may
be coming is bad, then that form enters into our soul which we call fear.

If, however, the thing is regarded by us as good, and, at the same time, as something that necessarily must come, then there comes into the soul that repose which we call confidence; which is a certain joy not mingled with sorrow, as hope is.

But when we think that the thing is bad, and that it necessarily must come, then despair enters into the soul; which is nothing else than a certain kind of sorrow.

So far we have spoken of the passions considered in this chapter, and given positive definitions of the same, and have thus stated what each of them is; we may now proceed in a converse manner, and define them negatively. We hope that the evil may not come, we fear lest the good should not come, we are confident that the evil will not come, we despair because the good will not come.

Having said this much about the passions in so far as they arise from our thoughts concerning the thing itself, we have now to speak of those which arise from the thoughts relating to him who thinks about the thing; namely:

If something must be done in order to bring the thing about, and we come to no decision concerning it, then the soul receives that form which we call vacillation. But when it makes a manly resolve to produce the thing, and this can be brought about, then that is called courage; and if the thing is difficult to effect, then that is called intrepidity or bravery.

When, however, some one decides to do a thing because another (who had done it first) has met with success, then we call it emulation. *Lastly,*

If any one knows what he must decide to do in order to advance a good thing, and to hinder a bad one, and yet does not do so, then we call it pusillanimit; and when the
same is very great, we call it timidity. Lastly, jealousness or jalousie is the anxiety which we feel that we may have the sole enjoyment and possession of something already acquired.

Since we know now whence these passions originate, it will be very easy for us to show which of them are good, and which are bad.

As regards Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, and Jealousy, it is certain that they arise from a wrong opinion. For, as we have already shown above, all things have their necessary causes, and must necessarily happen just as they do happen. And although Confidence and Despair seem to have a place in the inviolable order and sequence of causes *or to confirm the same,* yet (when the truth of the matter is rightly looked into) that is far from being the case. For Confidence and Despair never arise, unless Hope and Fear (from which they derive their being) have preceded them. For example, if any one thinks that something, for which he still has to wait, is good, then he receives that form in his soul which we call Hope; and when he is confident about *the acquisition of* the supposed good, his soul gains that repose which we call Confidence. What we are now saying about confidence, the same must also be said about Despair. But, according to that which we have said about Love, this also can have no place in a perfect man: because they presuppose things which, owing to the mutability to which they are subject (as remarked in our account of Love), we must not become attached to; nor (as shown in our account of Hatred) may we even have an aversion to them. The man, however, who persists in these passions is at all times subject to such attachment and aversion.

As regards Vacillation, Pusillanimitv, and Timidity, these betray their imperfection through their very character and nature: for whatsoever they do to our advantage comes

‡ A adds here: (because there all is inviolable and unalterable.)
only negatively from the effects of their nature. For example, some one hopes for something which he thinks is good, although it is not good, yet, owing to his vacillation or pusillanimity, he happens to lack the courage necessary for its realisation, and so it comes about that he is negatively or by accident saved from the evil which he thought was good. These *Passions,* therefore, can also have no place whatever in the man who is guided by true Reason.

Lastly, as regards Courage, Boldness, and Emulation, about these there is nothing else to be said than that which we have already said about Love and Hatred.
CHAPTER X

ON REMORSE AND REPENTANCE

On the present occasion we shall speak, though briefly, about remorse and repentance. These never arise except as the result of rashness; because remorse comes only from this, that we do something about which we are then in doubt whether it is good, or whether it is bad; and repentance, from this, that we have done something which is bad.

And since many people (who use their understanding aright) sometimes (because they lack that habitual readiness which is required in order that the understanding may at all times be used aright) go astray, it might perchance be thought that such Remorse and Repentance might soon set them right again, and thence it might be inferred, as the whole world does infer, that they are good. If, however, we will get a proper insight into them, we shall find that they are not only not good, but that they are, on the contrary, pernicious, and that they are consequently bad. For it is obvious that we always succeed better through Reason and the love of truth than through remorse and sorrow. They are, therefore, pernicious and bad, because they are a certain kind of sorrow, which [sorrow] we have already shown above to be injurious, and which, for that reason, we must try to avert as an evil, and consequently we must likewise shun and flee from these also, which are like it.

‡ B continues: but, on the other hand, when we look into the matter thoroughly the case is quite otherwise, for we shall find that they are not only not good . . .
CHAPTER XI

ON DERISION AND JESTING

Derision and jesting rest on a false opinion, and betray an imperfection in him who derides and jests.

The opinion on which they rest is false, because it is supposed that he who is derided is the first cause of the effects which he produces, and that they do not necessarily (like the other things in Nature) depend on God. They betray an imperfection in the Derider; because either that which is derided is such that it is derisible, or it is not such. If it is not such, then it shows bad manners, to deride that which is not to be derided; if it is such, then they [who deride it] show thereby that they recognise some imperfection in that which they deride, which they ought to remedy, not by derision, but much rather by good reasoning.

Laughter does not refer to another, but only to the man who observes some good in himself; and since it is a certain kind of Joy, there is nothing else to be said about it than what has already been said about Joy. I speak of such laughter as is caused by a certain Idea which provokes one to it, and not at all of such laughter as is caused by the movement of the [vital] spirits; as to this (since it has no reference to good or to evil) we had no intention to speak of it here.

As to Envy, Anger, Indignation, we shall say nothing about them here, but only just refer back to what we have already said above concerning hatred.

† B continues thus: the laughther thereto without any reference to good or evil, and not at all of such laughter as is caused in him by the movement of the [vital] spirits; it was not our intention to speak of this. Again, . . .
CHAPTER XII

ON GLORY, SHAME, AND SHAMELESSNESS

We shall now also briefly consider glory, shame, and shamelessness.† The first ‡‡ is a certain kind of Joy which every one feels in himself whenever he becomes aware that his conduct is esteemed and praised by others, without regard to any other advantage or profit which they may have in view.

Shame is a certain * kind of * sorrow which arises in one when he happens to see that his conduct is despised by others, without regard to any other disadvantage or injury that they may have in view.

Shamelessness is nothing else than a want, or shaking off, of shame, not through Reason, but either from innocence of shame, as is the case with children, savage people, &c., or because, having been held in great contempt, one goes now to any length without regard for anything.

Now that we know these passions, we also know, at the same time, the vanity and imperfection which they have in them. For Glory and Shame are not only of no advantage, because of what we have observed in their definitions, but also (inasmuch as they are based on self-love, and on the opinion that man is the first cause of his action, and therefore deserving of praise and blame) they are pernicious and must be rejected.

I will not, however, say that one ought to live among men in the same way that one would live away from them, where Glory and Shame have no place; quite the contrary,
I admit that we are not only free to utilise them, when we apply them in the service of mankind and for their amelioration, but that we may even do so at the price of curtailing our own (otherwise perfect and legitimate) freedom. For example: if any one wears costly clothes in order to be respected, he seeks a Glory which results from his self-love without any consideration for his fellow-men; but when some one observes that his wisdom (wherewith he can be of service to his neighbours) is despised and trampled under foot *simply* because he is dressed in shabby clothes, then he will do well if (from the motive to help them) he provides himself with clothes to which they cannot take exception, thereby becoming like his fellow-man in order that he may win over his fellow-man.

Further, as regards Shamelessness, this shows itself to be such that in order to see its deformity all that we need is merely its definition, and that will be enough for us.
Now follows [the consideration] of favour, gratitude, and ingratitude. As regards the first two, they are the inclinations which the soul has to wish and to do some good to one’s neighbour. I say, to wish, [this happens] when good is returned to one who has done some good; I say, to do, [this is the case] when we ourselves have obtained or received some good.

I am well aware that almost all people consider these affects to be good; but, notwithstanding this, I venture to say that they can have no place in a perfect man. For a perfect man is moved to help his fellow-man by sheer necessity only, and by no other cause, and therefore he feels it all the more to be his duty to help the most godless, seeing that his misery and need are so much greater.

Ingratitude is a disregard * or shaking off * of Gratitude, as Shamelessness is of Shame, and that without any rational ground, but solely as the result either of greed or of immoderate self-love; and that is why it can have no place in a perfect man.
CHAPTER XIV

ON GRIEF

GRIEF shall be the last of which we shall speak in our treatment of the passions, and with it we will conclude. Now grief is a certain kind of sorrow arising from the contemplation of some good which we have lost, and [lost] in such a way that there is no hope of recovering the same. It makes its imperfection so manifest that as soon as we only examine it we think it bad. For we have already shown above that it is bad to bind and link ourselves to things which may easily, or at some time, fail us, and which we cannot have when we want them. And since it is a certain kind of sorrow, we have to shun it, as we have already remarked above, when we were treating of sorrow.

I think, now, that I have already shown and proved sufficiently that it is only True Belief or Reason that leads us to the knowledge of good and evil. And so when we come to prove that Knowledge is the first and principal cause of all these passions, it will be clearly manifest that if we use our understanding and Reason aright, it should be impossible for us ever to fall a prey to one of these passions which we ought to reject. I say our Understanding, because I do not think that Reason alone is competent to free us from all these: as we shall afterwards show in its proper place.

We must, however, note here as an excellent thing about the passions, that we see and find that all the passions which

‡ B omitted "cause," but the word seems to have been inserted recently—perhaps by Van Vloten, as a marginal pencil note suggests.
are good are of such kind and nature that we cannot be or exist without them, and that they belong, as it were, to our essence; such is the case with Love, Desire, and all that pertains to love.

But the case is altogether different with those which are bad and must be rejected by us; seeing that we cannot only exist very well without these, but even that only then, when we have freed ourselves from them, are we really what we ought to be.

To give still greater clearness to all this, it is useful to note that the foundation of all good and evil is Love bestowed on a certain object: for if we do not love that object which (nota bene) alone is worthy of being loved, namely, God, as we have said before, but things which through their very character and nature are transient, then (since the object is liable to so many accidents, ay, even to annihilation) there necessarily results hatred, sorrow, &c., according to the changes in the object loved. Hatred, when any one deprives him of what he loves. Sorrow, when he happens to lose it. Glory, when he leans on self-love. Favour and Gratitude, when he does not love his fellow-man for the sake of God.

But, in contrast with all these, when man comes to love God who always is and remains immutable, then it is impossible for him to fall into this welter of passions. And for this reason we state it as a fixed and immovable principle that God is the first and only cause of all our good and delivers us from all our evil.

Hence it is also to be noted *lastly,* that only Love, &c., are limitless: namely, that as it increases more and more, so also it grows more excellent, because it is bestowed on an object which is infinite, and can therefore always go on increasing, which can happen in the case of no other thing except this alone. And, maybe, this will after-
wards give us the material from which we shall prove 1 the immortality of the soul, and how or in what way this is possible.

Having so far considered all that the third kind of ‡ effect of true belief makes known we shall now proceed to speak, *in what follows,* of the fourth, and last, effect which was not stated by us on page 75.†††

† B: And this will give us the material from which we shall, in the 23rd chapter, make out a case for, and prove, the immortality of the Soul. [A marginal note in A also refers to chapter xxiii.] 10

‡‡ A and B: or.

††† A gives this sentence in a foot-note; B in the body of the text, as above.
CHAPTER XV

ON THE TRUE AND THE FALSE

Let us now examine the true and the false, which indicate to us the fourth, and last, consequence of true belief. Now, in order to do this, we shall first state the definitions of Truth and Falsity. Truth is an affirmation (or a denial) made about a certain thing, which agrees with that same thing; and Falsity is an affirmation (or a denial) about a thing, which does not agree with the thing itself. But this being so, it may appear that there is no difference between the false and the true Idea, or, since the [affirmation or] denial of this or that are mere ‡ modes of thought, and [the true and the false Idea] differ in no other way ‡‡ except that the one agrees with the thing, and the other does not, that they are therefore, not really, but only logically ‡‡‡ different; and if this should be so, one may justly ask, what advantage has the one from his Truth, and what harm does the other incur through his falsity? and how shall the one know that his conception or Idea agrees with the thing more than the other does? lastly, whence does it come that the one errs, and the other does not?

To this it may, in the first place, serve as an answer that the clearest things of all make known both themselves and

‡ Literally "true," but the translator probably mistook merus for verus.

‡‡ In B this sentence begins as follows: "But since the affirmation or denial of this or that are mere ‡ modes of thought, there seems to be no difference between the true and the false idea except that," &c.

‡‡‡ door reeden [through reason.]
also what is false, in such a manner that it would be a great folly to ask how we are to become aware of them: for, since they are said to be the clearest of all, there can never be any other clearness through which they might be made clear; it follows, therefore, that truth at once reveals itself and also what is false, because truth is made clear through truth, that is through itself, and through it also is falsity made clear; but falsity is never revealed and made manifest through itself. So that any one who is in possession of the truth cannot doubt that he possesses it, while one who is sunk in falsity or in error can well suppose that he has got at the truth; just as some one who is dreaming can well think that he is awake, but one who is actually awake can never think that he is dreaming.

These remarks also explain to some extent what we said about God being the Truth, or that the Truth is God himself.

Now the reason why the one is more conscious of his truth than the other is, is because the Idea of [his] affirmation (or denial) entirely agrees with the nature of the thing, and consequently has more essence.‡ It may help some to grasp this better if it be observed that Understanding (although the word does not sound like it) is a mere or pure passivity; that is, that our soul is changed in such a way that it receives other modes of thought, which it did not have before. Now when some one, in consequence of the whole object having acted upon him, receives corresponding forms or modes of thought, then it is clear that he receives a totally different feeling of the form or character of the object than does another who has not had so many causes [acting upon him], and is therefore moved to make an affirmation or denial about that thing by

‡ B: . . . because in the former case the Idea of the affirmation (or denial) which entirely agrees with the nature of the thing has so much more essence.
a different and slighter action (because he becomes aware of it only through a few, or the less important, of its attributes). From this, then, we see the perfection of one who takes his stand upon Truth, as contrasted with one who does not take his stand upon it. Since the one changes easily, while the other does not change easily, it follows therefrom that the one has more stability and essence than the other has: likewise, since the modes of thought which agree with the thing have had more causes [to produce them] they have also more stability and essence in them: and, since they entirely agree with the thing, it is impossible that they should after a time be made different or undergo some change, *all the less so* because we have already seen before that the essence of a thing is unchangeable. Such is not the case with falsity. And with these remarks all the above questions will be sufficiently answered.

† Text imperfect. See Commentary.
CHAPTER XVI

ON THE WILL

Now that we know the nature of Good and Evil, Truth and Falsity, and also wherein the well-being of a perfect man consists, it is time to begin to examine ourselves, and to see whether we attain to such well-being voluntarily or of necessity.

To this end it is necessary to inquire what the Will is, according to those who posit a Will, and wherein it is different from Desire. Desire, we have said, is the inclination which the soul has towards something which it chooses as a good; whence it follows that before our desire inclines towards something outside, we have already inwardly decided that such a thing is good, and this affirmation, or, stated more generally, the power to affirm and to deny, is called the Will.

It thus turns on the question whether our Affirmations are made voluntarily or necessarily, that is, whether we can

‡ B omits the words "according . . . Will."
† Now the Will, regarded as Affirmation or Decision is different from true Belief and from Opinion. It differs from True Belief in this, that it extends also to that which is not truly good; and this is so because it lacks that conviction whereby it is clearly seen that it cannot be otherwise; in the case of true belief there is, and must be, this conviction, because from it none but good desires emanate.

But it also differs from Opinion in this, that it can sometimes be quite infallible and certain; this is not the case with Opinion, which consists in guessing and supposing.

So that we can call it Belief in so far as it can proceed with certainty, and Opinion in so far as it is subject to error.
make any affirmation or denial about a thing without some external cause compelling us to do so. Now we have already shown that a thing which is not explained through itself, or whose existence does not pertain to its essence, must necessarily have an external cause; and that a cause which is to produce something must produce it necessarily; it must therefore also follow that each separate act of willing this or that, each separate act of affirming or denying this or that of a thing, these, I say, must also result from some external cause: so also the definition which we have given of a cause is, that it cannot be free.

Possibly this will not satisfy some who are accustomed to keep their understanding busy with things of Reason more

\[ B \]: which does not exist.

\[ A \]: It is certain that each separate volition must have an external cause through which it comes into being; for, seeing that existence does not pertain to its essence, its existence must necessarily be due to the existence of something else.

As to the view that the efficient cause thereof is not an Idea but the human Will itself, and that the Understanding is a cause without which the will can do nothing, so that the Will in its undetermined form, and also the Understanding, are not things of Reason, but real entities—so far as I am concerned, whenever I consider them attentively they appear to be universals, and I can attribute no reality to them. Even if it be so, however, still it must be admitted that Willing is a modification of the Will, and that the Ideas are a mode of the Understanding; the Understanding and the Will are therefore necessarily distinct, and really distinct substances, because [only] substance is modified, and not the mode itself. As the soul is said to direct these two substances, it must be a third substance. All these things are so confused that it is impossible to have a clear and distinct conception about them. For, since the Idea is not in the Will, but in the Understanding, and in consequence of the rule that the mode of one substance cannot pass over into the other substance, love cannot arise in the

\[ A \]: the idea of the efficient cause.
than with Particular things which really exist in Nature; and, through doing so, they come to regard a thing of Reason not as such, but as a real thing. For, because man has now this, now that volition, he forms in his soul a general mode which he calls Will, just as from this man and that man he also forms the Idea of man; and because he does not adequately distinguish the real things from the things of Reason, he comes to regard the things of Reason as things which really exist in Nature, and so he regards himself as a cause of some things. This happens not infrequently in the treatment of the subject about which we are speaking. For if any one is asked why people want this or that, the answer usually given is, because they have a will. But, since the Will, as we have said, is only will: because to will something when there is no idea of that thing in the willing power involves self-contradiction. If you say that the Will, owing to its union with the Understanding, also becomes aware of that which the Understanding understands, and thus also loves it, one may retort to this: but since awareness is also an apprehension, it is therefore also a mode of understanding; following the above, however, this cannot be in the Will, even if its union [with the Will] were like that of the soul and body. For suppose that the body is united with the soul, as the philosophers generally maintain, even so the body never feels, nor does the soul become extended. When they say that the Soul directs both the Understanding and the Will, this is not only inconceivable, but even self-contradictory, because by saying so they seem to deny that the will is free, which is opposed to their

† B: no more.

‡: B continues: and thus regard themselves as the cause of some things; as happens not infrequently in the matter about which we are at present speaking.

+++ B continues: if then the question is asked, why people want this or that, they answer...

+++ A: an apprehension [or "conception"] and a confused idea.

++++ A continues: For then a Chimera, in which we conceive two substances, might become one; this is false.
an Idea of our willing this or that, and therefore only a mode of thought, a thing of Reason, and not a real thing, nothing can be caused by it; for out of nothing, nothing comes. And so, as we have shown that the will is not a thing in Nature, but only in fancy, I also think it unnecessary to ask whether the will is free or not free.

I say this not [only] of will in general, which we have shown to be a mode of thought, but also of the particular act of willing this or that, which act of willing some have identified with affirmation and denial. Now this should be clearly evident to every one who only attends to what we have already said. For we have said† that the under-view. But, to conclude, I have no inclination to adduce all my objections against positing a created finite substance. I shall only show briefly that the Freedom of the Will does not in any way accord with such an enduring creation; namely, that the same activity ‡‡ is required of God in order to maintain *a thing* in existence as to create it, and that otherwise the thing could not last for a moment; as this is so, nothing can be attributed to it.§§

But we must say that God has created it just as it is; for as it has no power to maintain itself in existence while it exists, much less, then, can it produce something by itself. If, therefore, any one should say that the soul produces the volition from itself, then I ask, by what power? Not by that which has been, for it is no more; also not by that which it has now, for it has none at all whereby it might exist or last for a single moment, because it is continuously created anew. Thus, then, as there is no thing that has any power to maintain itself, or to produce anything, there remains nothing but to conclude that God alone, therefore, is and must be the efficient cause of all things, and that all acts of Volition are determined by him *alone.*

† In B this paragraph begins thus: "Now in order to understand whether we are really free, or not free in any particular act of willing, that is of affirming or denying this or that, we must recall to our memory what we have already said, namely, . . . ."

‡‡ B: . . . such an enduring creation [as they admit]; for, if one and the same activity . . .

§§ B: . . . as this is so, no causality can be attributed to the thing.
standing is purely passive; it is an awareness, in the soul, of the essence and existence of things; so that it is never we who affirm or deny something of a thing, but it is the thing itself that affirms or denies, in us, something of itself.

Possibly some will not admit this, because it seems to them that they are well able to affirm or to deny of the thing something different from what they know about the thing. But this is only because they have no idea of the conception which the soul has of the thing apart from or without the words [in which it is expressed]. It is quite true that (when there are reasons which prompt us to do so) we can, in words or by some other means, represent the thing to others differently from what we know it to be; but we can never bring it so far, either by words or by any other means, that we should feel about the things differently from what we feel about them; that is impossible, and clearly so to all who have for once attended to their understanding itself apart from the use of words or other significant signs.

Against this, however, some perchance may say: If it is not we, but the thing itself, that makes the affirmation and denial about itself in us, then nothing can be affirmed or denied except what is in agreement with the thing; and consequently there is no falsity. For we have said that falsity consists in affirming (or denying) aught of a thing which does not accord with that thing; that is, what the thing does not affirm or deny about itself. I think, however, that if only we consider well what we have already said about Truth and Falsity, then we shall see at once that these objections have already been sufficiently answered. For we have said that the object is the cause of what is affirmed or denied

† B: . . . because they make no distinction between the idea which the soul has of a thing, and the words in which the same is expressed.
thereof,† be it true or false: *falsity arising thus,* namely, because, when we happen to know something *or a part* of an object, we imagine ‡‡ that the object (although we only know very little of it) nevertheless affirms or denies that of itself as a whole; this takes place mostly in feeble souls, which receive very easily a mode or ‡‡‡ an idea through a slight action of the object, and make no further affirmation or denial apart from this.

Lastly, it might also be objected that there are many things which we *sometimes* want and [sometimes also] do not want, ‡‡‡‡ as, for example, to assert something about a thing or not to assert it, to speak the truth, and not to speak it, and so forth. But this results from the fact that Desire is not adequately distinguished from Will. ‡‡‡‡‡ For the Will, according to those who maintain that there is a Will, is only the activity of the understanding whereby we affirm or deny something about a thing, with regard to good or evil. Desire, however, is the disposition of the soul to obtain or to do something for the sake of the good or evil that is discerned therein; so that even after we have made an affirmation or denial about the thing, Desire still remains, namely, when we have ascertained or affirmed that the thing

‡ A: ... the cause of that about which something is affirmed or denied; B: the cause of our affirmation or denial thereof, ... ‡‡ B continues: that the whole is such; this takes place .... ‡‡‡ B omits "a mode or."
‡‡‡ B continues: or about which we [sometimes] assert something, and [sometimes] do not assert it .... ‡‡‡‡ B continues as follows: For, although they are both of them an affirmation or denial of a thing, they nevertheless differ in this that the last occurs without regard, and the first with reference, to the good or evil which is discerned in the thing: so that, even after we have made the affirmation or denial about the thing, the Desire itself remains, namely, to obtain or to do what we have ascertained or affirmed to be good, so that the Will may well exist without the Desire, but not the Desire without the Will.
is good; such is the Will, according to their statements, while desire is the inclination, which we only subsequently feel, to advance it—so that, even according to their own statements, the Will may well exist without the Desire, but not the Desire without the Will, which must have preceded it.

All the activities, therefore, which we have discussed above (since they are carried out through Reason under the appearance of good, or are hindered by Reason under the appearance of evil) can only be subsumed under that inclination which is called Desire, and by no means under the designation of Will, which is altogether inappropriate.
CHAPTER XVII
ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WILL AND DESIRE

Now that it is known that we have no *free* will to make an affirmation or a denial, let us just see what is the correct and true distinction between will and desire, or what may the Will be which was called by the Latins voluntas.‡

According to Aristotle's definition, Desire appears to be a genus containing two species. For he says that the Will is the longing or inclination which one feels towards that which *is* or *seems* good. Whence it appears to me that by Desire (or cupiditas) he means any inclination, be it towards good, be it towards evil; but when the inclination is only towards what is *or* appears to be *good*, or when the man who has such inclination, has it under the appearance of good, then he calls it voluntas or good will; while, if it is bad, that is, when we observe in another an inclination towards something which is bad, ‡‡ he calls that voluptas or bad will. So that the inclination of the soul is not something whereby affirmations or denials are made, but only an inclination to obtain something which appears to be good, and ‡‡‡ to flee from what appears to be bad.

It, therefore, remains to inquire now whether the Desire is free or not free. In addition to what we have already said, namely, that Desire depends on the idea of its objects, and that this understanding must have an external cause, and in addition also to what we have said about the will, it still

‡ B adds: or good will.
‡‡ B: and if, on the contrary, it is bad, or towards evil . . .
‡‡‡ B: or.
remains to prove that Desire is not free. Many people, although they see quite well that the knowledge which man has of various things is a medium through which his longing or inclination passes over from one thing to another, yet fail to observe what that may be which thus lures the inclination from the one to the other.

However, to show that this inclination of ours is not of our own free will (and in order to present vividly before our eyes what it is to pass over, and to be drawn, from one thing to another), we shall imagine a child becoming aware of something for the first time. For example, I hold before him a little Bell, which produces a pleasant sound for his ears, so that he conceives a longing for it; consider now whether he could really help feeling this longing or desire. If you say, Yes, then I ask, how, through what cause is this to happen? Certainly not through something which he knows to be better, because this is all that he knows; nor, again, through its appearing to be bad to him, for he knows nothing else, and this pleasure is the very best that has ever come to him. But perchance he has the freedom to banish from him the longing which he feels; whence it would follow that this longing may well arise in us without our free will, but that all the same we have in us the freedom to banish it from us. This freedom, however, will not bear examination; for what, indeed, might it be that shall be able to annihilate the longing? The longing itself? Surely no, for there is nothing that through its own nature seeks its own undoing. What then might it ultimately be that shall be able to wean him from his longing? Nothing else, forsooth, except that in the natural order and course of things he is affected by something which he finds more pleasant than the first. And, therefore, just as, when we were considering the Will, we said that the human Will is nothing

‡ B: I say that this freedom will not stand the slightest test. This will be clearly evident; for what, . . .
but *this and that* Volition, so also man has no other than *this and that* Desire which is caused by this and that idea; *‡* Desire [in the abstract] is not anything actually existing in Nature, but is only an abstraction from the particular acts of desiring this or that. *Desire*, then, as it is not really anything, can also not really cause anything. So that when we say that *Desire* is free, it is just as much as if we said that *this or that* Desire is its own cause—that is, that before it existed it had already arranged that it should exist; which is absurdity itself, and cannot be.

*‡* B concludes this chapter as follows: If then we say that Desire is free, it is just as if we had said that this or that Desire is the cause of itself, and, already before it existed, had brought it about that it should exist: which is absurdity itself and is impossible. And Desire, regarded as a universal, being nothing but an abstraction from the particular acts of desiring this or that, and, beyond this, not actually existing in Nature, can, as such, also cause nothing.
CHAPTER XVIII

ON THE USES OF THE FOREGOING

Thus we see now that man, being a part of the whole of Nature, on which he depends, and by which also he is governed, cannot of himself do anything for his happiness and well-being; let us, then, just see what Uses we can derive from these propositions of ours. And this [is] all the more [necessary] because we have no doubt that they will appear not a little offensive to some.

In the first place, it follows therefrom that we are truly servants, aye, slaves, of God, and that it is our greatest perfection to be such necessarily. For, if we were thrown back upon ourselves, and thus not dependent on God, we should be able to accomplish very little, or nothing, and that would justly give us cause to lament our lot; especially so in contrast with what we now see, namely, that we are dependent on that which is the most perfect of all, in such a way that we exist also as a part of the whole, that is, of him; and we contribute, so to say, also our share to the realisation of so many skilfully ordered and perfect works, which depend on him.

Secondly, this knowledge brings it about that we do not grow proud when we have accomplished something excellent (which pride causes us to come to a standstill, because

‡ B: In the first place, because we depend on that which is the most perfect of all, in such a way that, being also a part of the whole, that is, of him, we also contribute our share to the realisation of so many skilfully ordered and perfect works, which depend on him, it follows therefore that we are God’s servants, and that it is our greatest perfection to be such necessarily.
we think that we are already great, and that we need do nothing further; thereby militating precisely against our own perfection, which consists in this—that we must at all times endeavour to advance further and further); but that, on the contrary, we attribute all that we do to God, who is the first and only cause of all that we accomplish and succeed in effecting.

Thirdly, in addition to the fact that this knowledge inspires us with a real love of our neighbour, it shapes us so that we never hate him, nor are we angry with him, but love to help him, and to improve his condition. All these are the actions of such men as have great perfection or essence.

Fourthly, this knowledge also serves to promote the greatest Common Good, because through it a judge can never side with one party more than with the other, and when compelled to punish the one, and to reward the other, he will do it with a view to help and to improve the one as much as the other.

Fifthly, this knowledge frees us from Sorrow, from Despair, from Envy, from Terror, and other evil passions, which, as we shall presently say, constitute the real hell itself.

Sixthly, this knowledge brings us so far that we cease to stand in awe of God, as others do of the Devil (whom they imagine), lest he should do them harm. For why indeed should we fear God, who is the highest good itself, through whom all things are what they are, and also we who live in him?

*Seventhly,* this knowledge also brings us so far that we attribute all to God, love him alone because he is the most glorious and the most perfect, and thus offer ourselves up entirely to him; for these really constitute both the true service of God and our own eternal happiness and bliss.

‡ A adds: and lastly.
For the sole perfection and the final end of a slave and of a tool is this, that they duly fulfil the task imposed on them. For example, if a carpenter, while doing some work, finds his Hatchet of excellent service, then this Hatchet has thereby attained its end and perfection; but if he should think: this Hatchet has rendered me such good service now, therefore I shall let it rest, and exact no further service from it, then precisely this Hatchet would fail of its end, and be a Hatchet no more. Thus also is it with man, so long as he is a part of Nature he must follow the laws of Nature, and this is divine service; and so long as he does this, it is well with him. But if God should (so to say) will that man should serve him no more, that would be equivalent to depriving him of his well-being and annihilating him; because all that he is consists in this, that he serves God.
CHAPTER XIX

ON OUR HAPPINESS

Now that we have seen the advantages of this True Belief, we shall endeavour to fulfil the promise we have made, namely, to inquire whether through the knowledge which we already have (as to what is good, what is evil, what truth is, and what falsity is, and what, in general, the uses of all these are), whether, I say, we can thereby attain to our well-being, namely, the Love of God (which we have remarked to be our supreme happiness), and also in what way we can free ourselves from the passions which we have judged to be bad.

To begin with the consideration of the last, namely, of the liberation from the passions,† I say that, if we suppose that they have no other causes than those which we have assigned to them, then, provided only we use our understanding aright, as we can do very easily †† (now that we have a

† All passions which come in conflict with good Reason (as is shown above) arise from Opinion. All that is good or bad in them, is shown to us by True Belief; these, however—both, or either of the two—are not able to free us from them. It is only the third kind, namely, True Knowledge, that emancipates from them. And without this it is impossible that we should ever be set free from them, as will be shown subsequently (page 133). Might not this well be that about which, though under different designations, others say and write so much? For who does not see how conveniently we can interpret opinion as sin; belief, as the law which makes sin known; and true knowledge, as grace which redeems us from sin?

†† Can do very easily; that is to say, when we have a thorough knowledge of good and evil: for then it is impossible to be subject to that from which the passions arise: because when we know and enjoy what is best, that which is worst has no power over us.
ON OUR HAPPINESS

criterion of truth and falsity), we shall never fall into them.

But what we have now to prove is that they have no other causes; for this, methinks, it is required that we should study ourselves in our entirety, having regard to the body as well as to the spirit.

And first [we have] to show that in Nature there is a body through whose form and activities we are affected, and thus become aware of it. And the reason why we do this is, because when we get an insight into the activities of the body and the effects which they produce, then we shall also discover the first and foremost cause of all those passions; and, at the same time, also that through which all those passions might be annihilated. From this we shall then also be able to see whether it is possible to do such a thing by the aid of Reason. And then we shall also proceed to speak about our Love of God.

Now to prove that there is a body in Nature, can be no difficult task for us, now that we already know that God is, and what God is; whom we have defined as a being of infinite attributes, each of which is infinite and perfect. And since extension is an attribute which we have shown to be infinite in its kind, it must therefore also necessarily be an attribute of that infinite being. And as we have also already demonstrated that this infinite being exists, it follows at once that this attribute also exists.

Moreover, since we have also proved that outside Nature, which is infinite, there is, and can be, no being, it is clearly manifest that this effect of body through which we become aware [of it] can proceed from nothing else than from extension itself, and by no means from something else which (as some will have it) has extension in an eminent degree [eminenter] †: for (as we have already shown in the first chapter) there is no such thing.

† B: which is more excellent than extension.
We have to remark, therefore, that all the effects which are seen to depend necessarily on extension must be attributed to this attribute; such as Motion and Rest. For if the power to produce these did not exist in Nature, then (even though it [Nature] might have many other attributes) it would be impossible that these should exist. For if a thing is to produce something then there must be that in it through which it, rather than another, can produce that something.

What we have just said here about extension, the same we also wish to be regarded as though it had been said about thought, and *further* about all that is.

It is to be observed further, that there is nothing whatever in us, but we have the power to become aware of it: so that if we find that there is nothing else in us except the effects of the thinking thing and those of extension, then we may say with certainty that there is nothing else in us.

In order that the workings of both these may be clearly understood, we shall take them up first each by itself only, and afterwards both together; as also the effects of both the one and the other.

Now when we consider extension alone, then we become aware of nothing else in it except Motion and Rest, from which we then discover all the effects that result therefrom. And these two† modes of body are such that it is impossible for any other thing to change them, except only themselves. Thus, for example, when a stone lies still, then it is impossible that it should be moved by the power of thought or anything else, but [it may] well [be moved] by motion, ‡ as when another stone, having greater motion than this has rest, makes it move. Likewise also the moving stone will not be made to rest except through something else which has less motion. It follows, accordingly, that no mode of thought can bring motion or rest into a body.

† Two modes: because Rest is not Nothing.
‡ B: by the motion of something else.
accordance, however, with what we observe in ourselves, it may well happen that a body which is moving now in one direction may nevertheless turn aside in another direction; as when I stretch out my arm and thereby bring it about that the [vital] spirits which were already moving in a different direction,† nevertheless move now in this direction, though not always, but according to the disposition of the [vital] spirits, as will be stated presently.

The cause of this can be none other than that the soul, being an Idea of this body, is united with it in such a way that it and this body, thus constituted, together form a whole.

The most important effect of the other *or thinking* attribute is an Idea of things, which is such that, according to the manner in which it apprehends them, there arises either Love or Hatred, &c. This effect, then, as it implies no extension, can also not be attributed to the same, but only to thought; so that, whatever the changes which happen to arise in this mode, their cause must on no account be sought for in extension, but only in the thinking thing.

We can see this, for instance, in the case of Love, which, whether it is to be suppressed or whether it is to be awakened, can only be thus affected through the idea itself, and this happens, as we have already remarked, either because something bad is perceived to be in the object, or because something better comes to be known.‡‡ Now whenever these attributes happen to act the one on the other, there results a passivity which one suffers from the other; namely [in the case of extension], through the determination of movements which we have the power to direct in whatever direction we please. The process, then, whereby the one comes to be passively affected by the other, is this:

† B: which were already moving, though not in this direction.
‡‡ B: either because something good is perceived in the loved object, or because something bad is perceived in the hated object.
namely, the soul in the body, as has already been remarked, can well bring it about that the [vital] spirits, which would otherwise move in the one direction, should nevertheless move in the other direction; and since these [vital] spirits can also be made to move, and therefore directed, by the body, it may frequently happen that, when the body directs their movements towards one place, while the soul directs them towards another place, they bring about and occasion in us those peculiar fits of depression which we sometimes feel without knowing the reasons why we have them. For otherwise the reasons are generally well known to us.

Furthermore, the power which the soul has to move the [vital] spirits may well be hindered also either because the motion of the [vital] spirits is much diminished, or because it is much increased. Diminished, as when, having run much, we bring it about that the [vital] spirits, owing to this running, impart to the body much more than the usual amount of motion, and by losing this [motion] they are necessarily that much weakened; this may also happen through taking all too little food. Increased, as when, by drinking too much wine or other strong drink, we thereby become either merry or drunk, and bring it about that the soul has no power to control the body.

Having said thus much about the influences which the soul exercises on the body, let us now consider the influences of the body on the soul. The most important of these, we maintain, is that it causes the soul to become aware of it, and through it also of other bodies. This is effected by Motion and Rest conjointly, and by nothing else: for the body has nothing else than these wherewith to operate; so that whatever else comes to the soul, besides this awareness, cannot be caused through the body. And as the first

† A and B: the soul and the body.
‡‡ B continues thus: in which they had a strong in—and through—flow which weakened them.
thing which the soul gets to know is the body, the result is that the soul loves it so, and becomes united with it. But since, as we have already said before, the cause of Love, Hatred, and Sorrow must not be sought for in the body but only in the soul (because all the activities of the body must proceed from motion and rest), and since we see clearly and distinctly that one love comes to an end as soon as we come to know something else that is better, it follows clearly from all this that, If once we get to know God, at least with a knowledge as clear as that with which we also know our body, then we must become united with him even more closely than we are with our body, and be, as it were, released from the body. I say more closely, because we have already proved before that without him we can neither be, nor be known; and this is so because we know and must know him, not through something else, as is the case with all other things, but only through himself, as we have already said before. Indeed, we know him better even than we know ourselves, because without him we could not know ourselves at all.

From what we have said so far it is easily gathered which are the chief causes of the passions. For, as regards the Body with its effects, Motion and Rest,† these cannot affect the soul otherwise except so as to make themselves known to it as objects; and according to the appearances which they present to it, that is according as they appear good or bad,† so also is the soul affected by them, and that

† B adds: or their effects.
† But *if it be asked * whence comes it that we know that the one is good, the other bad? Answer: Since it is the objects which cause us to become aware of them, we are affected by the one differently, in proportion than by the other.‡‡ Now these by which we are affected most harmoniously (as regards the proportion of motion and rest, of which they consist) are most agreeable to us,‡‡‡ and as they depart more and more from this [harmonious propor-

‡‡ These six words are crossed out in A.
‡‡‡ B omits the rest of this sentence.
[happens] not inasmuch as it is a body (for then the body would be the principal cause of the passions), but inasmuch as it is an object like all other things, which would also act in the same way if they happened to reveal themselves to the soul in the same way. (By this, however, I do not mean to say that the Love, Hatred, and Sorrow which proceed from the contemplation of incorporeal things produce the same effects as those which arise from the contemplation of corporeal things; for, as we shall presently say, these have yet other effects according to the nature of the thing through the apprehension of which Love, Hatred, and Sorrow, &c., are awakened in the soul which contemplates the incorporeal things.) So that, to return to our previous subject, if something else should appear to the soul to be more glorious than the body really is, it is certain that the body would then have no power to produce such effects as it certainly does now. Whence it follows, not alone that the body is not the principal cause of the passions, but also that even if there were in us something else besides what we have just stated to be capable, in our opinion, of producing the passions, such a thing, even if there were such, could likewise affect the soul neither more nor differently than the body does in fact now. For it could never be anything else than such an object as would

A continues thus: not that the body alone is the principal cause of the passions . . .; B: that the body alone is not the principal cause of the passions . . .
once for all be different from the soul, and would consequently show itself to be such and no other, as we have likewise stated also of the body. So that we may, with truth, conclude that Love, Hatred, Sorrow, and other passions are produced in the soul in various forms according to the kind of knowledge which, from time to time, it happens to have of the thing; and consequently, if once it can come to know the most glorious of all, it should be impossible for any of these passions to succeed in causing it the least perturbation.
Now, as regards what we have said in the preceding chapter, the following difficulties might be raised by way of objection.‡

First, if motion is not the cause of the passions then why is it possible, nevertheless, to banish sorrow by the aid of certain ‡‡ means, as is often done by means of wine? To this it serves [as an answer] that a distinction must be made between the soul's awareness, when it first becomes aware of the body, and the judgment which it presently comes to form as to whether it is good or bad for it.†

Now the soul, being such as just ‡‡‡ stated, has, as we have already shown before, the power to move the [vital] spirits wtherssoever it pleases; but this power may, nevertheless, be taken away from it, as when, owing to other causes [arising out] of the body generally, their form, constituted by certain proportions [of motion and rest], disappears or is changed; and when it becomes aware of this [change] in it, there arises sorrow, which varies with the

† B inserts here a preliminary statement of the three objections which follow, and then repeats them each in its place, as in the text.

‡‡ A has geene [no] but this was crossed out by Monnikhoff and replaced by eenige [some, or certain].

† That is, between understanding considered generally, and understanding having special regard to the good or evil of the thing.

‡‡‡ A: nu mediate, possibly a slip for immediate, that is, “immediately [above].” B: nu onmiddelijk [immediately].
change which the [vital] spirits undergo. This sorrow results from its love for, and union with, the body.†

That this is so may be easily deduced from the fact that this sorrow can be alleviated in one of these two ways; either by restoring the [vital] spirits to their original form that is by relieving him of the pain, or by being persuaded by good reasons to make no ado about this body. The first is temporary, and [the sorrow] is liable to return; but the second is eternal, permanent, and unchangeable.

The second objection may be this: as we see that the soul, although it has nothing in common with the body, can yet bring it about that the [vital] spirits, although they were about to move in one direction, nevertheless move now in the other direction, why should it not also be able to effect that a body which is perfectly still and at rest should begin to move itself? †† Likewise, why should it not also be able to move in whatever direction it pleases all other bodies which are already in motion?

† Man's sorrow is caused by the thought that some evil is befalling him, namely, through the loss of some good; when such a thought is entertained, the result is, that the [vital] spirits gather about the heart, and, with the help of other parts, press it together and enclose it, just the reverse of what happens in the case of joy. Then the soul becomes aware of this pressure, and is pained. Now what is it that medicines or wine effect? This, namely, that by their action they drive away the [vital] spirits from the heart, and make room again, and when the soul becomes aware of this, it receives new animation, which consists in this, that the thought of evil is diverted by the change in the proportion of motion and rest, which the wine has caused, and it turns to something else in which the understanding finds more satisfaction. But this cannot be the immediate effect of the wine on the soul, but only of the wine on the [vital] spirits.

†† Now, there is no difficulty here as to how the one mode, which is infinitely different from the other, yet acts on the other: for it is a part of the whole, since the soul never existed without the body,
But if we recall what we have already said before concerning the thinking thing, it can remove this difficulty for us quite easily. Namely, we then said that although Nature has various attributes, it is, all the same, but one only Being, of which all these attributes are predicated. Besides this we have also said that the thinking thing, too, was but one only thing in Nature, and is expressed in infinite Ideas, in accordance with the infinite things which exist in Nature; for if the body receives such a mode as,

nor the body without the soul.‡ We arrive at this [conclusion] as follows:

1. There is a perfect being, page —.†† 2. There cannot be two substances, page —. 3. No substance can have a beginning, page —. 4. Each is infinite in its kind, page —. 5. There must also be an attribute of thought, page —. 6. There is no thing in Nature, but there is an Idea of it in the thinking thing, resulting from its essence and existence in conjunction, page —. 7. Consequently, now: 8. Since their essence, without their existence, is implied in the designations of things, therefore the Idea of the essence cannot be regarded as something separate; this can only be done when there is both existence and essence, because then there is an object, which before was not. For example, when the whole wall is white, there is no this or that in, &c. 9. Now, this Idea, considered by itself, and apart from all other Ideas, can be no more than a mere Idea of such a thing, and it cannot be that it has an Idea of such a thing; [add] moreover, that such an Idea, thus regarded, since it is only a part, can have no very clear and very distinct conception of itself and its object, but only the thinking thing, which is the whole of Nature, can have this; for, a part considered without its whole, cannot, &c. 10. Between the Idea and the object there must necessarily be a union, because the one cannot exist without the other: for there is no thing whose Idea is not in the thinking thing, and no Idea can exist unless the thing also exists. Furthermore the object cannot change without the Idea

‡ B omits the rest of this note, but adds here the next note: *For,* it is clear . . .

††† The number of the page (in notes 1-6) is not given in the MSS. See Commentary.
for example, the body of Peter, and again another such as is the body of Paul, the result of this is that there are in the thinking thing two different Ideas: namely, one idea of the body of Peter, which constitutes the Soul of Peter, and another of [the body of] Paul, which constitutes the Soul of Paul. Now the thinking thing can well move the body of Peter by means of the Idea of the body of Peter, but not by means of the Idea of the body of Paul; so that the soul of Paul can well move its own body, but by no means that of another, such as that of Peter.† And for this reason changing also, and vice versa, so that there is here no need for a third thing that should bring about the union of soul and body. It is to be remarked, however, that we are speaking here of such Ideas which necessarily arise from the existence of the things together with their essence in God; but not of the Ideas which the things now actually present to us, [or] produce in us. There is a great difference between these: for the Ideas in God do not arise as they do in us by way of one or more of the senses, which are therefore almost always only imperfectly affected by them; but from their existence and their essence, just as they are. My idea, however, is not yours, although one and the same thing produces them in us.

† It is clear that in man, because he had a beginning, there is to be found no other attribute than such as existed in Nature already before.—And since he consists of such a body of which there must necessarily be an Idea in the thinking thing, and the Idea must necessarily be united with the body, therefore we assert without fear that his Soul is nothing else than this Idea of his body in the thinking thing. And as this body has a ‡ motion and rest (which has its proportion determined, and ‡‡ is usually altered, through external objects), and as no alteration can take place in the object without occurring also immediately in the Idea, the result is that people feel (idea reflexiva).‡‡‡ Now I say, as it has *a certain measure or* proportion of motion and rest, because no process can take place in the body without these two concurring.

† B: has a certain measure of . . .
‡‡ B omits these five words.
‡‡‡ B: that people have "reflexive" ideas.
also it cannot move a stone which rests or lies still: because the stone, again, makes another Idea in the Soul. Hence also it is no less clear that it is impossible that a stone, which is perfectly at rest and still, should be made to move by any mode of thought, for the same reasons as above.

The third objection may be this: We seem to be able to see clearly that we can, nevertheless, produce a certain stillness in the body. For, after we have kept moving our [vital] spirits for a long time, we find that we are tired; which, assuredly, is nothing else than a certain stillness in the [vital] spirits brought about by ourselves. We answer, however, that it is quite true that the soul is a cause of this stillness, but only indirectly; for it puts a stop to the movement not directly, but only through other bodies which it has moved, and which must then necessarily have lost as much as they had imparted to the [vital] spirits.‡ It is therefore clear on all sides that in Nature there is *only* one and the same kind of motion.

‡ B: The Answer is that, although it may be true that the Soul is a cause of this rest, still it does not bring it about immediately, but only through other bodies, which necessarily impart to the moving [vital] spirits just as much rest as they receive motion from them.
CHAPTER XXI

ON REASON

At present we have to inquire why it happens that sometimes, although we see that a certain thing is good or bad, we nevertheless do not find in us the power either to do the good or to abstain from the bad, and sometimes, however, we do indeed [find this power in us]. This we can easily understand if we consider the causes that we assigned to opinions, which we stated to be the causes of all affects. These, we then said, [arise] either from hearsay, or from experience. And since all that we find in ourselves has greater power over us than that which comes to us from outside, it certainly follows that Reason can be the cause of the extinction of opinions † which we have got from hearsay only (and this is so because reason has not *like these*

† It is all the same whether we use here the word opinion or passion; and so it is clear why we cannot conquer by means of Reason those that have come to us through experience; for these are nothing else than an enjoyment of, or immediate union with, something that we judge to be good, and Reason, though it teaches us what is better, does not make us enjoy it. Now that which we enjoy in us cannot be conquered by that which we do not enjoy, and is outside us, as that is which Reason suggests. But if these are to be overcome then there must be something that is more powerful; in this way there will be an enjoyment or immediate union with something that is better known and enjoyed than this first; and when this exists victory is always assured; or, indeed, *this victory comes* also through tasting an evil which is recognised to be greater than the good that was enjoyed, and upon which it follows immediately. Still, experience teaches us that this evil does not necessarily always follow thus, for, &c. See pages 78, 118.
come to us from outside), but by no means of those which we have got from experience. For the power which the thing itself gives us is always greater than that which we obtain by way of consequence through a second thing; we noted this difference when speaking of reasoning and of clear understanding, page 67, and we did so with the rule of three as an illustration. For more power comes to us from the understanding of proportion‡ itself, than from the understanding of the rule of proportion. And it is for this reason that we have said so often that one love may be extinguished by another which is greater, because in saying this we did not, by any means, intend to refer to desire which *does not, like love, come from true knowledge, but* comes from reasoning.

‡ A and B: the rule.
ON TRUE KNOWLEDGE, REGENERATION, &c.

Since, then, Reason has no power to lead us to the attainment of our well-being, it remains for us to inquire whether we can attain it through the fourth, and last, kind of knowledge. Now we have said that this kind of knowledge does not result from something else, but from a direct revelation of the object itself to the understanding. And if that object is glorious and good, then the soul becomes necessarily united with it, as we have also remarked with reference to our body. Hence it follows incontrovertibly that it is this knowledge which evokes love. So that when we get to know God after this manner then (as he cannot reveal himself, nor become known to us otherwise than as the most glorious and best of all) we must necessarily become united with him. And only in this *union,* as we have already remarked, does our blessedness consist.

I do not say that we must know him just as he is, *or adequately,* for it is sufficient for us to know him to some extent, in order to be united with him. For even the knowledge that we have of the body is not such that we know it just as it is, or perfectly; and yet, what a union! what a love!

That this fourth [kind of] knowledge, which is the knowledge of God, is not the consequence of something else, but immediate, is evident from what we have proved before, [namely,] that he is the cause of all knowledge that is acquired through itself alone, and through no other thing; moreover, also from this, that we are so united with him by nature that without him we can neither be, nor be...
known. And for this reason, since there is such a close union between God and us, it is evident that we cannot know him except directly.

We shall endeavour to explain, next, this union of ours with him through nature and love.

We said before that in Nature there can be nothing of which there should not be an Idea in the soul of that same thing.‡ And according as the thing is either more or less perfect, so also is the union and the influence of the Idea with the thing, or with God himself, less or more perfect. For as the whole of Nature is but one only substance, and one whose essence is infinite, all things are united through Nature, and they are united into one [being], namely, God. And now, as the body is the very first thing of which our soul becomes aware (because as already remarked, no thing can exist in Nature, the Idea of which is not in the thinking thing, this Idea being the soul of that thing) so that thing must necessarily be the first cause of the Idea.††

But, as this Idea can by no means find rest in the knowledge of the body without passing on to the knowledge of that without which the body and Idea could neither be, nor be understood, so (after knowing it first) it becomes united with it immediately through love. This union is better understood, and one may gather what it must be like, from its action with the body, in which we see how through

† This also explains what we said in the first part, namely, that the infinite understanding must exist in Nature from all eternity, and why we called it the son of God. For, as God existed from eternity, his Idea must also be in the thinking thing, that is, in himself *from eternity*, objective this Idea coincides with himself; see page 57.

†† That is ‡ our soul being an Idea of the body derives its first being from the body, but ‡‡ it is only a representation of the body, both as a whole and in its parts, in the thinking thing.
knowledge of, and feelings towards corporeal things, there arise in us all the effects which we are constantly becoming aware of in the body, through the movements of the [vital] spirits; and therefore (if once our knowledge and love come to embrace that without which we can neither be, nor be understood, and which is in no way corporeal) how incomparably greater and more glorious will and must be the kind of effects resulting from this union; for these must necessarily be commensurate with the thing with which it is united. And when we become aware of these *excellent* effects, then we may say with truth, *that we have been born again.* For our first birth took place when we were united with the body, through which the activities and movements of the [vital] spirits have arisen; but this our other or second birth will take place when we become aware in us of entirely different effects of love, commensurate with the knowledge of this incorporeal object, and as different from the first as the corporeal is different from the incorporeal, spirit from flesh. And this may, therefore, all the more justly and truly be called Regeneration, inasmuch as only from this love and union does Eternal and unchangeable existence ensue, as we shall prove.
CHAPTER XXIII

ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

If only we consider attentively what the Soul is, and whence its change and duration originate, then we shall easily see whether it is mortal or immortal.

Now we have said that the Soul is an Idea which is in the thinking thing, arising from the reality of a thing which exists in Nature. Whence it follows that according to the duration and change of the thing, so must also be the duration and change of the Soul. We remarked, at the same time, that the Soul can become united either \textit{with the body} of which it is the Idea, or \textit{with God}, without whom it can neither be, nor be known.

From this, then, it can easily be seen, (1) that, if it is united with the body alone, and that body happens to perish, then it must perish also; for when it is deprived of the body, which is the foundation of its love, it must perish with it. But (2) if it becomes united with some other thing which is and remains unchangeable, then, on the contrary, it must also remain unchangeable *and lasting.*

For, in that case, through what shall it be possible for it to perish? ¶ Not through itself; for as little as it could begin to exist through itself when it did not yet exist, so

¶ B concludes this chapter as follows: For that which alone is the cause of the existence of a thing, must also, when it is about to pass away, be the cause of its non-existence, simply because itself is changing or passing away; or that whereof it is the cause must be able to annihilate itself; but as little as a thing can begin to exist through itself when it does not yet exist, so little also can it change or perish through itself, now that it does exist.
little also can it change or perish *through itself,* now that it does exist.

Consequently, that thing which alone is the cause of its existence, must also (when it is about to perish) be the cause of its non-existence, because it happens to change itself or to perish.
CHAPTER XXIV
ON GOD'S LOVE OF MAN

Thus far we have shown sufficiently, we think, what our love of God is, also its consequences, namely, our eternal duration. So we do not think it necessary here to say anything about other things, such as joy in God, peace of mind, &c., as from what has been said it may easily be seen what there is to or should be said about them. Thus (as we have, so far, only considered our love of God) it still remains to be seen whether there is also a divine love of us, that is, whether God also loves mankind, namely, when they love him. Now, in the first place, we have said that to God no modes of thought can be ascribed except those which are in his creatures; therefore, it cannot be said that God loves mankind, much less [can it be said] that he should love them because they love him, or hate them because they hate him. For in that case we should have to suppose that people do so of their own free will, and that they do not depend on a first cause; which we have already before proved to be false. Besides, this would necessarily involve nothing less than a great mutability on the part of God, who, though he neither loved nor hated before, would now have to begin to love and to hate, and would be * induced or * made to do so by something supposed to be outside him; but this is absurdity itself.

Still, when we say that God does not love man, this must not be taken to mean that he (so to say) leaves man to pursue his course all alone, but only that be-
a way, ‡ and God consists of all these in such a way, therefore, properly speaking, there can be in him no love for something else: since all form only one thing, which is God himself.

From this it follows also that God gives no laws to mankind so as to reward them when they fulfil them * [and to punish them when they transgress them,] † or, to state it more clearly, that God's laws are not of such a nature that they could be transgressed. For the regulations imposed by God on Nature, according to which all things come into existence and continue to exist, these, if we will call them laws, are such that they can never be transgressed; such, for instance, is [the law] that the weakest must yield to the strongest, ‡‡ that no cause can produce more than it contains in itself, and the like, which are of such a kind that they never change, and never had a beginning, but all things are subjected and subordinated to them. And, to say briefly something about them: all laws that cannot be transgressed, are divine laws; the reason [is this], because whatsoever happens, is not contrary to, but in accordance with, his own decision. All laws that can be transgressed are human laws; the reason [is this], because all that people decide upon for their own well-being does not necessarily, on that account, tend also to the well-being of the whole of Nature, but may, on the contrary, tend to the annihilation of many other things.

When the laws of Nature are stronger, the laws of men are made null; the divine laws are the final end for the sake of which they exist, and not subordinate; human [laws] are not. ‡‡‡ Still, ‡‡‡‡ notwithstanding the fact that

‡ B continues as follows: that God thus consists of them only, therefore, it must be so conceived that, properly speaking . . .

‡‡ B: the weaker must yield to the stronger.
‡‡‡ B: The Divine Laws are the final end for which they exist, and are not subordinate: but not so the Human Laws; for when the Laws of Nature are stronger than these they are annihilated.
‡‡‡‡ A: For; B: Still.
men make laws for their own well-being, and have no other end in view except to promote their own well-being by them, this end of theirs may yet (in so far as it is subordinate to other ends which another has in view, who is above them, and lets them act thus as parts of Nature) serve that end [which] coincides with the eternal \( \dagger \) laws established by God from eternity, and so, together with all others, help to accomplish everything. For example, although the Bees, in all their work and the orderly discipline which they maintain among themselves, have no other end in view than to make certain provisions \( \ast \) for themselves \( \ast \) for the winter, still, man who is above them, has an entirely different end in view when he maintains and tends them, namely, to obtain honey for himself. So also [is it with] man, in so far as he is an individual thing and looks no further than his finite character can reach; but, in so far as he is also a part and tool of the whole of Nature, this end of man cannot be the final end of Nature, because she is infinite, and must make use of him, together also with all other things, as an instrument.

Thus far [we have been speaking] of the law imposed by God; it is now to be remarked also that man is aware of two kinds of law even in himself; \( \ddagger \) I mean such a man who uses his understanding aright, and attains to the knowledge of God; and these [two kinds of law] result from his fellowship with God, and from his fellowship with the modes of Nature. Of these the one is necessary, and the other is not. For, as regards the law which results from his fellowship with God, since he can never be otherwise but must always necessarily be united with him, therefore

\( \dagger \) B: beginningless.

\( \ddagger \) B continues: 1. In him who uses his understanding aright and attains to the knowledge of God; these result from his fellowship with God. 2. Those which result from his fellowship with the modes of Nature.
he has, and always must have before his eyes the laws by which he must live for and with God. But as regards the law which results from his fellowship with the modes, since he can separate himself from men, this is not so necessary.

Now, since we posit such a fellowship between God and men, it might justly be asked, how God can make himself known to men, and whether this happens, or could have happened, by means of spoken words, or directly *through himself,* without using any other thing to do it with.

We answer,† not by means of words, in any case; for in that case man must have known the signification of the words before they were spoken to him. For example, if God had said to the Israelites, *I am Jehovah your God,* then they would have had to know first, apart from these words, that God existed,‡‡ before they could be assured *thereby* that it was he *[who was speaking to them).* For they already knew quite well then that the voice, thunder and lightning were not God, although the voice proclaimed that it was God. And the same that we say here about words, we also mean to hold good of all external signs.

We consider it, therefore, impossible that God should make himself known to men by means of external signs.¶¶¶

And we consider it to be unnecessary that it should happen through any other thing than the mere essence of

† B: To this we answer that such [a thing] can never happen by means of words; for, in that case, man would have had to know the signification of the words before the outward communication was made to him through them. When, for example, God said to the Israelites, . . .  

‡‡ A: *dat hy God was* [that he was God]; B: *dat God was* [that God existed].

¶¶¶ B continues: this self-revelation must therefore take place solely through the essence of God and the understanding of man; for . . .
God and the understanding of man; for, as the Understanding is that in us which must know God, and as it stands in such immediate union with him that it can neither be, nor be understood without him, it is incontrovertibly evident from this that no thing can ever come into such close touch with the Understanding as God himself can. It is also impossible to get to know God through something else. 1. Because, in that case, such a thing would have to be better known to us than God himself, which is in open conflict with all that we have hitherto clearly shown, namely, that God is a cause both of our knowledge and of all essence, and that without him all individual things not only cannot exist, but cannot even be understood. 2. Because we can never attain to the knowledge of God through any other thing, the nature of which is necessarily finite, even if it were far better known to us; for how is it possible that we should infer an infinite and limitless thing from a finite and limited thing? For even if we did observe some effects or work in Nature the cause of which was unknown to us, still it would be impossible for us to conclude from this that there must be in Nature an infinite and limitless thing in order to produce this result. For how can we know whether many causes have concurred in order to produce this, or whether there was only one? Who is to tell us?

We therefore conclude, finally, that, in order to make himself known to men, God can and need use neither words, nor miracles, nor any other created thing, but only himself.
CHAPTER XXV
ON DEVILS

We shall now briefly say something about devils, whether they exist or do not exist, and it is this:

If the Devil is a thing that is once for all opposed to God, and has absolutely nothing from God, then he is precisely identical with Nothing, which we have already discussed before.

If, with some, we represent him as a thinking thing that absolutely neither wills nor does any good, and so sets himself, once for all, in opposition to God, then surely he is very wretched, and, if prayers could help, then one ought to pray for his conversion.

But let us just see whether such a wretched thing could even exist for a single moment. And, if we do so, we shall immediately find out that it cannot; for whatever duration a thing has results entirely from the perfection of the thing, and the more essence and godliness things possess, the more lasting are they: therefore, as the Devil has not the least perfection in him, how should he then, I think to myself, be able to exist? Add to this, that the persistence or duration of a mode of the thinking thing only results from the union in which such a mode is, through love, joined to God. As the precise opposite of this union is supposed in the case of the Devils, they cannot possibly exist.‡

As, however, there is no necessity whatever why we should posit the existence of Devils, why then should they be posited? For we need not, like others, posit Devils in order to find [in them] the cause of Hatred, Envy, Wrath, and such-like passions, since we have found this sufficiently, without such fictions.

‡ A: not exist.
CHAPTER XXVI
ON TRUE FREEDOM

By the assertion of what precedes we not only wanted to make known that there are no Devils, but also, indeed, that the causes (or, to express it better, what we call Sins) which hinder us in the attainment of our perfection are in ourselves. We have also shown already, in what precedes, how and in what manner, through reason as also through the fourth kind of knowledge, we must attain to our blessedness, and how the passions which are bad and should be banished must be done away with: not as is commonly urged, namely, that these [passions] must first be subdued before we can attain to the knowledge, and consequently to the love, of God. That would be just like insisting that some one who is ignorant must first forsake his ignorance before he can attain to knowledge. But [the truth is] this, that only knowledge can cause the disappearance thereof—as is evident from all that we have said. Similarly, it may also be clearly gathered from the above that without Virtue, or (to express it better) without the guidance of the Understanding, all tends to ruin, so that we can enjoy no rest, and we live, as it were, outside our element. So that even if from the power of knowledge and divine love there accrued to the understanding not an eternal rest, such as we have shown, but only a temporary one, it is our duty to

† B: of the preceding chapter.
‡‡ B omits these four words.
+++ B continues thus: but just as knowledge alone can cause the annihilation of this (as is evident from all that we have said) so it may likewise be clearly gathered from the above . . .
seek even this, since this also is such that if once we taste it we would exchange it for nothing else in the world.

This being so, we may, with reason, regard as a great absurdity what many, who are otherwise esteemed as great theologians, assert, namely, that if no eternal life resulted from the love of God, then they would seek what is best for themselves: as though they could discover anything better than God! This is just as silly as if a fish (for which, of course, it is impossible to live out of the water) were to say: if no eternal life is to follow this life in the water, then I will leave the water for the land; what else, indeed, can they say to us who do not know God?

Thus we see, therefore, that in order to arrive at the truth of what we assert for sure concerning our happiness and repose, we require no other principles except only this, namely, to take to heart our own interest, which is very natural in all things. And since we find that, when we pursue sensuousness, pleasures, and worldly things, we do not find our happiness in them, but, on the contrary, our ruin, we therefore choose the guidance of our understanding. As, however, this can make no progress, unless it has first attained to the knowledge and love of God, therefore it was highly necessary to seek this (God); and as (after the foregoing reflections and considerations) we have discovered that he is the best good of all that is good, we are compelled to stop and to rest here. For we have seen that, outside him, there is nothing that can give us any happiness. And it is a true freedom to be, and to remain, bound with the loving chains of his love.

Lastly, we see also that reasoning is not the principal thing in us, but only like a staircase by which we can climb

† B continues thus: people would seek and consider pleasures of sense, merriment, and worldly enjoyments: as though ...

‡‡ B continues: so it is also with the foregoing; for, what else, ...

‡‡‡ B omits this sentence.
up to the desired place, or like a good genius which, without any falsity or deception, brings us tidings of the highest good in order thereby to stimulate us to pursue it, and to become united with it; which union is our supreme happiness and bliss.

So, to bring this work to a conclusion, it remains to indicate briefly what human freedom is, and wherein it consists. For this purpose I shall make use of these following propositions, as things which are certain and demonstrated.

1. The more essence a thing has, so much more has it also of activity, and so much less of passivity. For it is certain that what is active acts through what it has, and that the thing which is passive is affected through what it has not.

2. All passivity that passes from non-being to being, or from being to non-being, must result from some external agent, and not from an inner one: because no thing, considered by itself, contains in itself the conditions that will enable it to annihilate itself when it exists, or to create itself when it does not exist.

3. Whatever is not produced by external causes can have nothing in common with them, and can, consequently, be neither changed nor transformed by them.

And from these last two [propositions] I infer the following fourth proposition:

4. The effect of an immanent or inner cause (which is all one to me) cannot possibly pass away or change so long as this cause of it remains. For such an effect, just as it is not produced by external causes, so also it cannot be changed [by them]; following the third proposition. And since no thing whatever can come to naught except through external causes, it is not possible that this effect should be liable to perish so long as its cause endures; following the second proposition.
5. The freest cause of all, and that which is most appropriate to God, is the immanent: for the effect of this cause depends on it in such a way that it can neither be, nor be understood without it, nor is it subjected to any other cause; it is, moreover, united with it in such a way that together they form one whole.

Now let us just see what we must conclude from the above propositions. In the first place, then,

1. Since the essence of God is infinite, therefore it has an infinite activity, and an infinite negation of passivity, following the first proposition; and, in consequence of this, the more that, through their greater essence, things are united with God, so much the more also do they have of activity, and the less of passivity: and so much the more also *are they* free from change and corruption.

2. The true Understanding can never perish; for in itself it can have no cause to destroy itself, following the second proposition. And as it did not emanate from external causes, but from God, so it is not susceptible to any change through them, following the third proposition. And since God has produced it immediately and he is only *an inner cause*, it follows necessarily that it cannot perish so long as this cause of it remains, following the fourth proposition. Now this cause of it is eternal, therefore it is too.

3. All the effects of the *true* understanding, which are united with it, are the most excellent, and must be valued above all the others; for as they are inner effects, they must be the most excellent; following the fifth proposition; and, besides this, they are also necessarily eternal, because their cause is such.

4. All the effects which we produce outside ourselves are the more perfect, the more they are capable of becoming united with us, so as to constitute one and the same nature with us; for in this way they come nearest to inner

‡ A: is not only.
effects. For example, if I teach my neighbours to love pleasure, glory, avarice, then whether I myself also love these or do not love them, whatever the case may be, I deserve to be punished, this is clear. Not so, however, when the only end that I endeavour to attain is, to be able to taste of union with God, and to bring forth true ideas, and to make these things known also to my neighbours; for we can all participate equally in this happiness, as happens when it creates in them the same desire that I have, thus causing their will and mine to be one and the same, constituting one and the same nature, agreeing always in all things.

From all that has been said it may now be very easily conceived what is human freedom,† which I define to be this: it is, namely, a firm reality which our understanding can neither pass away, nor change so long as this cause thereof endures; it follows that the true understanding, since it is produced by no external cause, but immediately by God, is, through this cause, eternal and immutable, can neither perish nor change, but, with it, necessarily remains eternal and lasting.

3. Since the inner effects of an immanent cause (according to Proposition V.) are the most excellent of all, all the effects of the true understanding which are united therewith, must also be valued above all others, and [must] necessarily be eternal with their cause. Whence it follows that

4. The more perfect the effects are which we produce outside us, the more capable are they of becoming united with us so as to constitute one and the same nature with us. It is thus when,
acquires through direct union with God, so that it can bring forth ideas in itself, and effects outside itself, in complete harmony with its nature; without, however, its effects being subjected to any external causes, so as to be capable of being changed or transformed by them. Thus it is, at the same time, evident from what has been said, what things there are that are in our power, and are not subjected to any external causes; we have likewise also proved here, and that in a different way from before, the eternal and lasting duration of our understanding; and, lastly, which effects it is that we have to value above all others.

So, to make an end of all this, it only remains for me still to say to my friends to whom I write this: Be not astonished at these novelties; for it is very well known to you that a thing does not therefore cease to be true because it is not accepted by many. And also, as the character of the age in which we live is not unknown to you, I would beg of you most earnestly to be very careful about the communication of these things to others. I do not want to say that you should absolutely keep them to yourselves, but only that if ever you begin to communicate them to anybody, through my union with God, I conceive true ideas, and make them known to my neighbours, so that they may likewise participate with me in this happiness, and so that there arises in them a desire like mine, making their will one and the same with mine, so that we thus constitute one and the same nature, agreeing in all things.

† In the margin of this paragraph A has the following note: the author's entreaty to those for whom, at their request, he had dictated this treatise, and therewith the conclusion of all.

‡‡ B continues: that they should not be astonished at the novelties (which they might find here); since a thing does not therefore cease to be true when it is not accepted by many.

‡‡‡ B continues: wish to communicate them to others, then you shall have no other object in view except only the Happiness of your neighbour; being at the same time clearly assured that the reward of your labour will not disappoint you therein.
then let no other aim prompt you except only the happiness of your neighbour, being at the same time clearly assured by him that the reward will not disappoint your labour. Lastly, if, on reading this through, you should meet with some difficulty about what I state as certain, I beseech you that you should not therefore hasten at once to refute it, before you have pondered it long enough and thoughtfully enough, and if you do this I feel sure that you will attain to the enjoyment of the fruits of this tree which you promise yourselves.

† B concludes: desired END.
AXIOMS

1. Substance is, by its nature, prior to all its modifications.

2. Things which are different are distinguished either realiter or modaliter.

3. Things which are distinguished realiter either have different attributes, such as Thought and Extension, or are referred to different attributes, as in the case of Understanding and Motion; one of which belongs to Thought, and the other to Extension.

4. Things which have different attributes, as also the things which belong to different attributes, do not have anything the one of the other.

5. That which has not in itself something of another thing, can also not be a cause of the existence of such another thing.

6. It is impossible that that which is a cause of itself should have limited itself.

7. That by which the things are sustained is by its nature prior to such things.

PROPOSITION I

To no substance that exists can one and the same attribute be ascribed that is ascribed to another substance; or (which is the same) in Nature there cannot be two substances, unless they are distinguished realiter.††

† A: the first (prior) in; B: prior to.
†† B: . . . in Nature there cannot be posited two substances of one and the same nature.
If there are two substances, then they are distinct; and consequently (Axiom 2) they are distinguished either realiter or modaliter; not modaliter, for in that case the modes would by their nature be prior to the substance, which is contrary to the first axiom; therefore, realiter; and consequently, what is predicated of the one cannot be predicated of the other, which is what we intended to prove.

PROPOSITION II

One substance cannot be the cause of the existence of another substance.

PROOF

Such a cause cannot contain in itself anything of such an effect (Prop. 1); because the difference between them is real, and therefore it cannot (Axiom 5) produce it.

PROPOSITION III

Every attribute or substance is by nature infinite, and supremely perfect in its kind.

PROOF

No substance is produced by another (Prop. 2) and consequently, if it exists, it is either an attribute of God, or it has been its own cause outside God. If the first, then it is necessarily infinite, and supremely perfect in its kind, such

† A gives the references to Axioms and Propositions in the margin; B, in the text.

‡‡ A adds: (existence); B: . . . and therefore the one cannot produce the other.

+++ A: all attributes or substance; B: all substance or its attributes.
as are all other attributes of God. If the second, then it is also necessarily such because (Axiom 6) it could not have limited itself.

**PROPOSITION IV**

To such an extent does existence pertain by nature to the essence of every substance,† that it is impossible to posit in an infinite understanding the Idea of the essence of a substance that does not exist in Nature.

**Proof**

The true essence of an object ‡ is something which is realiter different from the Idea of the same object; and this something exists (Axiom 3) either realiter, or is contained in some other thing which exists realiter; from which other thing this essence cannot be distinguished realiter, but only modaliter; such are all the essences of the things ‡‡ which we see, which before they yet existed were already contained in extension, motion, and rest, and when they do exist are not distinguished from extension realiter, but only modaliter. Moreover, it would involve self-contradiction to suppose that the essence of a substance ‡‡‡ is contained thus in some other thing; because in that case it could not be distinguished from this realiter, contrary to the first proposition; also, it could in that case be produced by the subject which contains it, contrary to the second proposition; and lastly, it could not by its nature be infinite and supremely perfect in its kind, contrary to the third proposition.

† A: to every essence of substance; B: to the essence of a substance.
‡ ‡ B: . . . of the object of an idea.
‡‡‡ B: essences or things.
‡‡‡‡ A: that an essence of the substance; B: that an essence of substance.
Therefore, as its essence is not contained in any other thing, it must be a thing that exists through itself.

**Corollary**

Nature is known through itself, and not through any other thing. It consists of infinite attributes every one of them infinite and perfect in its kind; to its essence pertains existence, so that outside it there is no other essence or existence, and it thus coincides exactly with the essence of God who alone is glorious and blessed.
As man is a created finite thing, &c., it necessarily follows that what he has of Thought, and what we call the Soul, is a mode of the attribute which we call Thought, and that nothing else except this mode belongs to his essence: so much so that when this mode comes to naught, the soul perishes also, although the above attribute remains unchanged. Similarly as regards what he has of Extension; what we call Body is nothing else than a mode of the other attribute which we call Extension; when this is destroyed, the human body also ceases to be, although the attribute Extension remains unchanged.

Now in order to understand what this mode is, which we call Soul, and how it derives its origin from the body, and also how its change (only) depends on the body (which to me constitutes the union of soul and body), it must be observed:

1. That the most immediate mode of the attribute which we call thought contains objective the formal essence of all things; so much so, that if one could posit a real thing whose essence was not objective in the above-named attribute, then this would not be infinite, nor supremely perfect in its kind; contrary to what has already been proved in the third proposition. And since, as a matter of fact, Nature or God is one being of which infinite attributes are predicated, and which contains in itself all the essences of created things, it necessarily follows that of all this there is produced

‡ A: an attribute; B: a mode.
¶¶ B omits "as regards," and inserts "and" after "Extension."
in Thought an infinite Idea, which comprehends *objective* the whole of Nature just as it is *realiter*.

2. It is to be observed that all the remaining modes, such as Love, Desire, Joy, *&c.* derive their origin from this first immediate mode; and that, too, in such wise, that if it did not precede, then there could be no love, desire, *nor joy,* &c. Whence it clearly follows that the natural love which prompts everything to preserve its body (I mean the mode) ‡ cannot have any other origin than in the Idea or the "*objective*" essence of such body which is in the thinking attribute. Further, since for the real existence of an Idea (or "*objective*" essence) no other thing is required than the thinking attribute and the object (or "*formal*" essence), it is certain, as we have said, that the Idea, or the "*objective*" essence, is the most immediate † mode of the *thinking* attribute. And, consequently, there can be in the thinking attribute no other mode, that should belong to the essence of the soul of every ‡‡‡ thing, except only the Idea, which must be in the thinking attribute when its object exists: for such an idea brings with it the remaining modes of Love, Desire, *Joy,* &c. Now as the Idea comes from the existence of the object, therefore according as the object changes or perishes, so its Idea must change or perish, and such being the case, it is that which is united with the object. ‡‡‡

† I call that mode the most immediate mode, which, in order to exist, requires no other mode in the same attribute.
‡ A : it necessarily follows that of all that *which* is produced in Thought there is an infinite Idea . . . ; B: . . . that there is produced in thought an infinite idea thereof . . .
‡‡ B omits the words in brackets.
‡‡‡ A : *gelijken* [like]; B : *i gelijk’n* [every].
‡‡‡‡ B : . . . so this idea of it must change or perish in the same degree or measure of change or annihilation, because it is thus united with the object.
Lastly, if we should want to proceed and ascribe to the essence of the soul that through which it can be real, we shall be able to find nothing else than the attribute [Thought] and the object of which we have just been speaking; and neither of these can belong to the essence of the Soul, as the object has nothing of Thought, and is realiter different from the Soul. † And with regard to the attribute, we have also proved already that it cannot pertain to the above-mentioned essence, as appears even more clearly from what we said subsequently; ‡‡ for the attribute as attribute ‡‡‡ is not united with the object, since it neither changes nor perishes, although the object changes or perishes.

Therefore the essence of the soul consists in this alone, namely, in the existence of an Idea or "objective" essence in the thinking attribute, arising from the essence of an object which in fact exists in Nature. I say, of an object which in fact exists, &c., without more particulars, so as to include under this not only the modes of extension, but also the modes of all the infinite attributes, which have also each its soul, just as in the case of extension. And in order that this definition may be somewhat more fully understood, it should be borne in mind what I have already said when speaking about the attributes, which, I said, are not different as regards their existence, ‡‡‡‡ for they are themselves the "subjects" of their essences; also that the essence of every one of the modes is contained in the above-named attributes, * and, lastly, that all the attributes are attributes * of One infinite Being. Wherefore also, in the ninth chapter of the First Part, I called this Idea a creation created immediately by God; since it contains objective the "formal" essence of all

† B: as the object of Thought has nothing thereof, but is realiter different from it.
‡‡ B: as will be seen from what we shall say later.
‡‡‡ B omits "as attribute."
‡‡‡‡ B omits the nine words that follow.
things, without omission or addition. And this is necessarily but one, considering that all the essences of the attributes, and the essences of the modes comprehended in these attributes, are the essence of one only infinite being. But it has still to be remarked that these modes, now under consideration, [even when] none of them exists, are nevertheless equally comprehended in their attributes; and as there is no inequality whatever in the attributes, nor yet in the essences of the modes, there can be no particularity in the idea when there is none in Nature. But as soon as ever some of these modes take on their particular existence, and thereby become in some way different from their attributes (because then their particular existence, which they have in the attribute, is the "subject" of their essence), then there shows itself a particularity in the essences of the modes, and consequently in the "objective” essences of these which are necessarily comprehended in the Idea. And this is the reason why we said, in the definition, that the Idea arises from an object, which really exists in Nature. And with this we think we have sufficiently explained what kind of a thing the soul is in general, understanding by this expression not only the Ideas which arise from the existence of corporeal modes, but also those which arise from the existence of every mode of the remaining attributes.

I called the thinking attribute, or the understanding in the thinking thing, a son, product, or creation created immediately by God, since it contains the “objective” essence of all things . . .

I omits this sentence, and continues: For it has to be remarked . . .

B: in the Thinking Attribute.
B: the soul, the idea, or objective essence in the thinking attribute (which is all one to me) arises . . .
B: from the essence of an object . . .
But, since we have no such knowledge of the remaining attributes as we have of extension, let us just see whether, having regard to the modes of extension, we can discover a more special definition, and one that shall be more appropriate to express the essence of our souls, for this is the real task before us. Now we shall presuppose here, as something already demonstrated, that extension contains no other modes than motion and rest, and that every particular material thing is nothing else than a certain proportion of motion and rest, so much so indeed that, even if extension contained nothing else except motion only or rest only, then no particular thing could be shown or exist in the whole of extension; the human body, therefore, is nothing else than a certain proportion of motion and rest. Now the "objective essence" of this actual ratio of motion and rest which is in the thinking attribute, this (we say) is the soul of the body; so that whenever one of these two modes changes into more or less (motion or rest) the Idea or the soul also changes accordingly. For example, when the [amount of] rest happens to increase, while the [quantity of] motion is diminished, then there is produced thereby that pain or sorrow which we call cold; but if, on the contrary, this [increase] takes place in the [amount of] motion, then there is produced thereby that pain which we call heat. And so when it happens that the degrees of motion and rest are not equal in all the parts of our body, but that some have more motion and rest than others, there

† B: whenever one of these two modes, be it motion or rest, changes into more or less . . .

†† B continues as follows: But if the proportion of motion and rest is not the same in all the parts of our body, but some of them are provided with more motion or rest than the others, there arises thence a difference of feeling: such as we experience when we are struck with a cane in the eyes or on the hands. Moreover, when the external causes happen to be different, and have not all the
arises therefrom a difference of feeling (and thence arises the different kind of pain which we feel when we are struck in the eyes or on the hands with a cane). And when it happens that the external causes, which bring about these changes, are different from one another, and have not all the same effect, then there results from this a difference of feeling in one and the same part (and from this results the difference of feeling according as one and the same hand is struck with a piece of wood or of iron). And, again, if the change which occurs in a part restores it to its first proportion of motion and rest, there arises from this that joy which we call repose, pleasurable activity, and cheerfulness. Lastly, now that we have explained what feeling is, we can easily see how this gives rise to an *Idea reflexiva*, or the knowledge of oneself, Experience and Reasoning. And from all this (as also because our soul is united with God, and is a part of the infinite Idea, arising immediately from God) there can also be clearly seen the origin of clear knowledge, and the immortality of the soul. But, for the present, what we have said must be enough.

same effect, there results therefrom a difference of feeling in one and the same part: such as we experience when the same hand is struck with a piece of wood or of iron. But when the change which occurs in some part restores it to its previous proportion of motion and rest, there arises . . .

† A: the.

‡‡ A gives the words in brackets immediately after "happens."
Several of the conceptions which are either tacitly taken up or expressly defined by Spinoza are no longer familiar to us, and have to be learned like the vocabulary of a foreign tongue; with the additional disadvantage that our common English supplies no corresponding terms, the very moulds having been broken and cast away in which the thoughts were shaped.”—Martineau.
COMMENTARY

[The numbers in large type refer to the pages of the translation those in smaller type to the lines.]

TITLE-PAGES, ETC.

4. The Preface on the title-page of A must have been written by an ardent follower of Spinoza, not by Spinoza himself. Hence Monnikhoff felt justified in substituting a new title-page (6), not offensive to the theologians. The engraved Portrait in A (which is reproduced here) is the same as that found in some copies of the Opera Posthuma, and was probably inserted in A by Monnikhoff, who also wrote the verses facing it. It is uncertain whether the portrait was engraved during the life-time of Spinoza. According to Rieuwertsz, as reported by Dr. Hallmann in 1704 (see Introduction, p. civ.), it was engraved some three or four years after the death of Spinoza, probably from the Wolfenbüttel portrait (see p. xcvii.).

The verses facing the portrait have been rendered by Dr. Willis as follows:

“Here Art presents us with Spinoza’s face,
Wherein deep lines of sober thought we trace;
Yet is the mental likeness better shown
To those who read and make his works their own.”

FIRST PART

The First Part is devoted to the consideration of God, His existence, attributes, &c. The same ground was sub-
sequently covered in the First Part of the *Ethics (De Deo)*. This and other resemblances to the *Ethics* naturally suggested that the *Short Treatise* was an early draft of the *Ethics*. Monnikhoff actually put *Ethica* on the title-page of B, and the *Short Treatise* is sometimes referred to as the "small *Ethics*.”

**Chapter I**

15. The opening is remarkably abrupt. The expression "as regards the first" suggests a preceding enumeration of topics about to be discussed, but no such enumeration is given, unless it be on the title-page of the *Treatise*, namely, *God, Man*, &c. Monnikhoff tried to avoid this crudity by substituting "this" for "the first." But the abruptness remains, and is the more striking because so many of the other chapters begin with an enumeration of the topics to be discussed. Freudenthal has suggested that the original opening may have been as follows: “Man has an idea of God as a Being consisting of infinite attributes, each of which is infinitely perfect in its kind. First, we will show that such a Being exists, and then we shall give our views as to what He is. As regards the first…” This conjecture is based partly on the second sentence in chapter ii., which seems to have been misplaced.

It is noteworthy that Spinoza begins with proofs that God is, and only then proceeds to determine what He is. The reason may have been this. He was teaching people who were already fairly familiar with the fundamentals of the Cartesian philosophy. He therefore commenced with the Cartesian proofs of God’s existence, and gradually led up to his own comparatively strange conception of God. This kind of pedagogic method is not uncommon in the history of philosophy. Kant, e.g., started from the then current psychology and gradually led up to very different, almost startling results.
The proofs themselves are mainly (though not altogether) Cartesian. (See Meditations, III. and V., and the Appendix in the translation of Descartes' Method, &c., by John Veitch). Unlike Descartes, however, Spinoza attaches the greatest weight to the *a priori* arguments.

15, 5. *A priori.* An argument is said to be *a priori* when it proceeds from the character of a thing to its implications, from conditions to consequences, or from causes to effects. It is said to be *a posteriori* when it proceeds from consequences to conditions, or from effects to causes. These terms also have other meanings, but not in Spinoza.

15, 6ff. The underlying thought is expressed in Spinoza's *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae*, I. Def. ix. "When we say that something is contained in the nature or concept of a certain thing, that is the same as saying that it is true of that thing, or that it can be truly affirmed of that thing."

15, 7. The word "nature" here means "character" or "essence." More commonly it means the material world, or (in Spinoza and Bruno, e.g.) even the entire universe. Note † was intended to guard against this ambiguity.

15, 13. "Essence" is one of the most difficult terms in Spinoza's vocabulary. In the *Cogitata Metaphysica* it is said to be "nothing else than that mode by which created objects are comprehended in the attributes of God." Briefly, the essence of a thing is its share of, or participation in, ultimate reality. In the case of God, essence and existence coincide. In the case of other things their existence as relatively independent entities is distinct from their essence.

"Eternity," in its stricter sense, does not mean "incessant duration in time," but reality independently of time or beyond it.

15, 16. "The existence of God is essence." Compare Maimonides' *Guide of the Perplexed*, I. lvii.—"It is known that existence is an accident [= quality] appertaining to all
things, and therefore an element superadded to their essence. This must evidently be the case as regards everything the existence of which is due to some cause; its existence is an element superadded to its essence. But as regards a being whose existence is not due to any cause—God alone is that being, for His existence, as we have said, is absolute—existence and essence are perfectly identical. He is not a substance to which existence is joined as an accident, as an additional element. His existence is always absolute, and has never been a new element or an accident in Him” (Friedländer’s translation, 2nd ed., p. 80).

15, 21 f. Such merely verbal alternations show that the Treatise was never properly edited. Cf. 25, 31.

The illustration is the same as in Descartes’ fifth Meditation.

16, 2. The reference-mark † is apparently misplaced, because the note referred to really follows up the preceding a priori arguments, and therefore belongs to 15, 17.

16, 3. Formaliter = actually or objectively (in the modern sense). The identification of formalis and actualis in medieval philosophy was due to the influence of Aristotelianism. According to Aristotle, individual things are compounds of Matter and Form, and Form is the more important of the two. Matter is the as yet imperfect or the merely potential, which requires Form to make it actual. Hence during the supremacy of Aristotelian philosophy in the Middle Ages, Matter was identified with Potentiality, and Form with Actuality, so that formalis = actualis.

16, 9. “Objective” = in thought, or subjectively (in the modern sense). The present use of the terms “subjective” and “objective” is the reverse of former usage. By “subject” (subjectum = συνήθεια) used to be meant the substrate or concrete reality supporting or “underlying” its properties, and hence also the subject of predication, because in predication these properties or qualities are
generally predicated of their "subject." (For an illustration of the older use of the term "subject," see, e.g., 18, 23). By "object" \( (\text{objectum} = \nu \tau i \kappa i \mu \upsilon \nu \omega \nu) \), on the other hand, was meant something which consisted in "lying opposite" or before the mind \( (\text{quatenus objicitur intellectui}) \), so that "objective" referred only to the sphere of thought. This usage is already met with in the writings of Duns Scotus (died 1308), and continued, with some modifications, right into the eighteenth century—Berkeley, e.g., still used "real" as an antithesis to "objective." The noun "object" \( (\text{objectum}) \) acquired its present meaning long before the adjective did. Already Descartes used to term "objects" for "things" \( (\text{"in objectis, hoc est in rebus."}) \) —Principia Phil.). The transition to the present meaning of "subjective" was probably brought about by the application of the term \text{subjectum} to the soul as distinguished from (or as the bearer of) its "objective" ideas. (Leibniz, e.g., used the expression: "\text{subjectum ou l'âme même.}") Hence "subjective" came to indicate whatever had reference to the soul.

16, 29 ff. The text is obscure and most probably corrupt. "Want de Idea en bestaat niet materialiter van de eigenschap die tot dit weezen behoort, alzo dat het geen 't welk bevestigd wordt, en is noch van de zaak noch van dat geen 't welk van de zaak bevestigd word; . . ." Sigwart translates as though "van de eigenschap" followed immediately after "Idea"—"the Idea of the attribute which belongs to this being does not exist materialiter. . . ." Freudenthal has suggested the insertion of "van de Idea" between "het geen 't welk" and "bevestigt"—"so that that which is affirmed [of the Idea] is . . ." But the note remains obscure. Perhaps the meaning intended was this. The ontological argument maintains that the essence of God involves His existence, or (expressed more generally) that the essential attributes of a certain \text{Ideatum} \( [=\text{the object represented by an idea}] \) imply the presence of yet
another attribute (existence, in this case). The objection to this is that the implied additional attribute may be true of the Idea, but not of the Ideatum. And this is met by the argument that the new attribute is inferred from the other (essential) attributes, and if it is to be predicated at all can only be predicated of that which has those other (essential) attributes. Now the Idea is not actually composed (materialiter) of those attributes or qualities; these really pertain to the Ideatum. If, therefore, the new attribute (existence) follows at all from the others it must be predicated of the Ideatum, not of the Idea, which is materialiter so unlike the Ideatum that the same attributes cannot be affirmed of both. This argument does not prove the accuracy of the ontological proof; but it seems to have been directed only against the half-hearted acceptance of it as valid in so far as the Idea of God was concerned.

17, 33 f. In opposition to Descartes, Spinoza maintains that man could not of himself produce any idea whatever. The elementary constituent ideas even of fictions must have been called forth in man by external causes. Descartes only insisted that man could not produce the idea of God; Spinoza extends the denial to all ideas. Compare 16, 18 ff.

18, 5. Essentia objectiva or "objective" essence = the essence of a thing as represented in thought. The correspondence between an idea and its ideatum, or object, is described in the language of scholastic philosophy as a kind of two-fold existence of the "essence" of that object. The essence exists formaliter (actually) in the individual concrete thing; it exists objective, or has "objective" essence, in thought (as an idea).

18, 8. Formaliter—eminenter. This scholastic antithesis has reference to the relation of a cause to its effect. If the cause contained more reality or greater perfection than its effect, then it was said to be an eminent cause, or to produce its effect eminenter or modo eminentiori. In this way,
e.g., God (according to Descartes) is the "eminent" cause of the human mind. But if, on the other hand, the cause contained only as much (it cannot, of course, contain less) perfection as its cause, it was said to have produced it \textit{formaliter} or \textit{secundum eandem formam}. Thus, e.g., the pressure of a foot was said to cause a footprint \textit{formaliter}. This use of \textit{formaliter} is different from that explained in the preceding note.

The words "though not \textit{eminenter} . . . outside him" seem to be both irrelevant and inaccurate. Possibly they are only a reader's comment. It is not clear why God's supreme excellence should prevent His being the \textit{eminent} cause of our idea of Him. The opposite view would seem more reasonable. Probably it is implied that the \textit{idea of God} contains as much perfection \textit{objective} as God has \textit{formaliter}; its cause, therefore, can only be \textit{formal}, not \textit{eminent}, because nothing (not even God Himself) is \textit{more} perfect \textit{formaliter} than it (the idea of God) is \textit{objective}.

18, 13. Pegasus, for instance. \textit{Cf.} Descartes, \textit{Med.} V.

18, 23. \textit{Subjectum}—see note to 16, 9.

19, 3. \textit{Attributes}. The expression is here used in its more usual meaning, not in the stricter sense in which it is generally employed in Spinoza's writings. Hence note †. In the stricter sense of the term "attribute" only two attributes of God or Nature are known to us, namely, Extension and Thought. Each of these is a \textit{sumnum genus}, and is not derived from anything else. "Properties" (\textit{propria} or \textit{proprietaes}) are derivative, they follow from the attributes. The "attributes" referred to in the text are, as note † explains, only "properties," because they are not \textit{summa genera}, they are not "substantial" or self-dependent, but imply the "attributes" which constitute "substance" or the self-dependent reality (God or Nature).

20, 15. \textit{Causa sui} = the self-existent. The expression is awkward and misleading. Spinoza did not invent it; it was
part of the philosophical vocabulary of his time, and had been in use for many centuries before that. It was probably suggested originally by the Platonic expression $kau\v{\nu}o\nu\nu$. Strictly speaking, that which is $causa\ sui$, or "its own cause," really has no cause at all. Spinoza himself has pointed out the absurd implication of the phrase $causa\ sui$. It seems to imply that something which did not exist could yet operate in such a way as to bring itself into existence (see 114, 6 ff., and 146, 18 ff.).

20, 17. Thomas Aquinas (?1225-1274), called Doctor angelicus, brought about the most intimate fusion between Aristotelianism and Catholicism. His favourite argument for the existence of God was the Aristotelian $a\ posteriori$ argument that the existence of Motion implied the existence of an original unmoved Mover. The passage referred to is probably Summa Theologica, I. ii. 2.

20, 24 ff. The rest of this note seems to be quite irrelevant here. A gives it in its proper context, 22, 12 ff.

Chapter II

21, 4 ff. This chapter begins immediately with a definition of God, but without any indication as to the way in which the definition has been arrived at. Note †, however, makes it clear that Spinoza really started with the traditional conception of God as $Ens\ perfectissimum$, or "the most perfect Being" (see lines 18 f.), and developed his conception from it.

It is noteworthy that the definition of God given here does not describe Him as "Substance," as does the later definition in the Ethics. Here the definition of God is followed up by an independent treatment of the notion "Substance" (lines 9 ff.), and it is then made apparent that the two notions "God" and "Substance" converge.

21, 9. Spinoza begins his account of "substance" without defining what he means by that term. He evidently
starts from the Cartesian doctrine of two ultimate kinds of substances, namely, Extension and Thought, and then suddenly shows that there can only be one Substance. To begin with he tacitly assumes the possibility of the existence of a multiplicity of substances all grounded in the perfection of God. When he has shown that there is only one Substance he identifies it with God by identifying both with Nature. Descartes had defined "substance" as "a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence." "In truth" (he added) "there can be conceived but one Substance which is absolutely independent, and that is God." He applied, however, the term "substance" (or "created substance") to minds and bodies, because, except God, nothing else is required for their existence; and, pointing out that Thought and Extension were the "principal attributes" constituting the essence of minds and bodies respectively, he spoke of Extension and Thought as the ultimate and distinct kinds of substances. These substances acquired such a measure of independence that it was beyond Descartes to reunite them again, except in an external kind of way.

Spinoza approached the subject with the conviction that Nature was One and perfect, in the fullest sense of these expressions. He consequently took "Substance" quite seriously. The only really independent or self-dependent being was the complete system of Reality, or Nature. Hence, beginning with a somewhat looser (Cartesian) conception of "Substance," he gradually led up to the conclusion that there was only one substance, of which all other so-called substances were either attributes or modifications.

21, 21 ff. Note †† presents in a different form the argument of the text as far as 25, 13.

23, 23 ff. This distinction between "creating" and "generating" occurs also in the Cogitata Metaphysica, II. x., where, however, he seems to vindicate the possibility of creation,
only confining it to substances (in the Cartesian sense) or attributes. "A created object" (he says there) "is one which presupposes for its existence nothing except God." Modes and accidents presuppose also the attributes or substances Extension and Thought. They are consequently not "created," but "generated." Only that has been created "whose essence is clearly conceived even without existence, and is conceived, moreover, *per se*"—Extension is given as an instance. As soon as Spinoza identified Extension, Thought, and all other (unknown) attributes with God, there was no room for this notion of "creation," except, perhaps, in that inane sense in which it is still implied in the expression *causa sui*. Hence the denial of "creation" in the present treatise. And the "essences" of things, though described in the *Cogitata Metaphysica* as having been "created," must here be regarded simply as eternal. Traces of the earlier belief in "creation" are, however, still observable in the *Treatise*, pp. 24, 57.

24, 24 ff. Cf. Maimonides' *Guide* (II. xx. p. 190): "The series of causes ends with the First Cause, from which everything derives its existence, since it is impossible that the series should continue *in infinitum*". Here, then, Spinoza agrees with Maimonides, and with the Aristotelians generally, that the causal series cannot continue *in infinitum*. But his views changed subsequently, and in his 12th Letter we find Spinoza praising Rabbi Hasdai Crescas for furnishing an argument for the existence of God, independently of the supposed impossibility of such an infinite causal regression.

24, 30. "This only substance." Spinoza does not say what substance he means, but he evidently identifies it with God.

24, 31. "Substance or attribute." The expression is noteworthy. When writing the *Short Treatise* Spinoza was still very much under the influence of Cartesian nomenclature.
He was still inclined to speak of Extension and Thought as *substances*. It seemed to him a matter of indifference whether these were described as "substances" or as "attributes"; he used either term, and sometimes both in conjunction, as here (*see*, e.g., 28, 13; 29, 5; 34, 2 ff.; 154, 18). At this stage, in fact, he defined "attribute" in the same terms as he subsequently defined "substance." In his 2nd Letter (1661) he defined "attribute" as "whatever is conceived through itself and in itself, so that the conception thereof does not involve the conception of anything else." He illustrated his meaning by comparing Extension with motion. Extension can be conceived through itself and in itself, and is therefore an attribute; motion, on the other hand, cannot be conceived without Extension; it is therefore not an attribute, but only a mode (or modification) of an attribute (Extension). In his 9th Letter (1663) Spinoza defined "substance" in the same terms as the preceding definition of "attribute," and explicitly identified the two. "By *substance* I mean that which exists in itself, and is conceived through itself; that is, the conception whereof does not involve the conception of anything else. I mean the same by *attribute*, except that it is called *attribute* with respect to the intellect which ascribes a certain character to substance." This, Spinoza added, will explain what he meant by using the expression, "*substance or attribute*." Briefly, "substance" simply consists of its "attributes," but of *all* of them; while each "attribute" is only one (ultimate and real) aspect or feature of "substance." The totality of attributes is therefore identical with substance, and Spinoza accordingly felt at liberty to speak sometimes as though he ignored the difference between "substance" and "attribute." This, however, occasioned some difficulty among his disciples and friends. He therefore eventually adopted the stricter distinction found in the *Ethics*. But even the *Ethics* still retains traces of the earlier and laxer usage; in
Ethics, I. xv. Schol., he speaks of “extended substance” as “one of the infinite attributes of God.”

25, 2f. What Spinoza meant by the argument “from the simplicity of God’s will” may be explained by the following passage in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed (II. xiv.): “An agent is active at one time and inactive at another, according as the circumstances are favourable or unfavourable. . . . As, however, God is not subject to accidents which could bring about a change in His will, and is not affected by obstacles and hindrances that might appear or disappear, it is impossible, they [i.e., those who maintain the eternity of the world] argue, to imagine that God is active at one time and inactive at another. He is, on the contrary, always active in the same manner as He is always in actual existence” (p. 175).

25, 7f. This is a difficult sentence. “En dat meer is, zo doende zouden er oneyndelijke zelfstandigheeden meer niet zijn als er zijn, het welke ongerijmt is.” Quite literally it means, “. . . there would be no more infinite substances than there are . . .” By taking “meer” as though it preceded “oneyndelijke,” we get “. . . there would be more infinite substances not in existence than there are in existence.” This seems less unintelligible, but its relevancy is not obvious. Perhaps it was only some reader’s marginal comment. B omits it.

25, 9–13. The identification of Nature with God does not appear to be a plausible conclusion from what precedes. Freudenthal has suggested that this sentence is in the wrong place, and should follow immediately after line 12 on p. 23.

25, 14ff. The consideration of objections which begins here is regarded by Avenarius and Sigwart as a later interpolation. The main argument, they say, is continued on the following page, line 20, the intervening paragraphs being obviously a digression. But whether it is a later
insertion or not, the passage does not seem to me to be really a digression. Its purpose is to confirm by a different line of argument the identification of God with Nature, which is the burden of the preceding paragraph. The usual conception of Nature as created by, and different from, God, tacitly assumes that there is a difference between the ideas or plans of God, and His realisation or actualisation of these ideal possibilities. By attacking this distinction between the ideal and the real, between the possible and the actual, Spinoza evidently helps to confirm his identification of God and Nature, both of which are real, and the totality of all that is real. Viewed in this way, the passage forms an important part of Spinoza's argument, and we find it repeated in the Ethics, I. xvii. Schol.

25, 24 ff. Spinoza's view that God "cannot create what is self-contradictory" is also found in Maimonides, and is opposed to the view of Descartes. Descartes put no limitations whatever to God's omnipotence (except apparently in Med. VI.); even contradictory propositions might be true together if God willed it so. Maimonides, on the other hand, maintained that even God could not endow a thing with contradictory qualities (Guide, III. xv. p. 279).

25, 25. "As it is . . ." = for it is self-contradictory, or it is like expecting God to do what is self-contradictory, when we say, &c.


26, 1 ff. The subtle conundrum, whether God can know more than He does know, was actually discussed by Peter Lombard, Bishop of Paris (died 1134).

26, 22 ff. "Although . . ." Spinoza is here alluding to Descartes' assumption (Princ. Phil. I. lx.) that "it is sufficient to assure us that two substances are really mutually distinct if only we are able clearly and distinctly to conceive the one of them without the other."

26, 32. "Infinite," that is, in number as well as in extent.
27, 3 ff. It has not yet been shown that it is impossible for substances to begin to exist; nor is it shown in this Treatise as we now have it. Something seems, therefore, to be missing.

27, 6 ff. "Substance" is not used here in the stricter sense, but instead of "attribute." The "essence" of the one "substance" (in the stricter meaning) does involve "existence," but when either Thought or Extension is "considered separately," then we can conceive it clearly without assuming its existence (cf. Cog. Metaph. I. ii.). Note †† corrects the loose employment of the word "substance" in the text.

28, 1 ff. Descartes, e.g., argued that "God cannot be body," because extension involves divisibility, and this again passivity, which is an imperfection, because it implies dependence on something else (Princ. Phil. I. xxiii.).

28, 5. The account of Nature which follows in the text contains many thoughts which are also found in the writings of Giordano Bruno. See the notes to the first Dialogue (p. 183 ff.).

28, 6. "Things of reason" = mere modes of thought. In the Cog. Metaph. (I. i. and iii.) Spinoza distinguishes as follows between a real thing (ens reale), a chimera, a thing of reason (ens rationis), and a fiction (ens fictum): A chimera is only a verbal expression denoting something which can neither be, nor be conceived, because it involves a self-contradiction (e.g., a square circle); a thing of reason (or a merely logical entity) is a mode of thought which does not exist outside the thinking mind, though it may be an important means of representing extra-mental realities (e.g., genera and species, time, number, and measure); a fiction is "a thing of reason," in so far as it is only a mode of thought (or of imagination) and has no corresponding reality outside the mind; but not all "things of reason" are fictions, only those which involve arbitrary or accidental imaginary
combinations. The Scholastics did not as a rule distinguish between *res fictae* and *entia rationis*. Burgersdijck describes both as "*entia quorum esse nihil aliud est quam intelligi*," that is, as mere modes of thought.

28, 7. "Nature" is here used in the narrower and more usual sense, namely, as equivalent to "the physical world." In the wider sense peculiar to Spinoza and Bruno, "Nature" = Substance = the entire Universe. In "Nature" thus regarded, "things of reason" have reality as modes of thought. Hence the note (line 13), "In Nature, that is, in substantial extension" = in the so-called Substance Extension, or in "Substance" regarded solely under the "attribute" Extension.

29, 3. The view that water "consists of straight oblong particles" is Cartesian (*Meteorologia*, I. 3).

29, 24. The "substance" referred to is that of Extension ("substance" here = "attribute"—cf. note to 24, 31), of which water is a "mode" or modification. Extension, it is here maintained, is a *continuum*.

30, 1 f. What is here said to have been "already stated" is first considered in the Dialogues which follow, and in chapter iii. Apparently something is missing from the preceding part of the *Treatise*.

30, 3. An "immanent" or "inner" cause is a cause whose effects are confined within itself, as distinguished from a "transseunt" or "transitive" cause which operates on things outside itself. God, according to Spinoza, is an "immanent" cause for the same reason that he is *causa sui*, namely, because "outside God there is nothing at all," whether to affect Him or to be affected by Him. This conception involves, of course, the view that God is not outside or above the world, but in it. In other words, Spinoza's God is not a *transcendent* but an *immanent* God. And since the time of Spinoza the doctrine of divine immanence has become a commonplace among theologians of all
the chief religions, instead of being more or less confined to the more pronounced mystics, as it was till then.

30, 10 ff. This illustration of an immanent cause (which is also repeated on p. 34, line 30) seems unfortunate, because Spinoza says distinctly (106, 20 ff.; cf. also p. 37, note) that the "Understanding" is only an abstraction; it cannot, therefore, cause anything. Had Spinoza revised the Treatise for publication this and similar inconsistencies would have been removed.

30, 24. "If body," &c.—that is, if matter were really substance, or if substance were merely matter, and had no other attributes, &c.

31, 2 ff. In the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (xiii.) there is a similar distinction between God's "absolute attributes," which unfold the "absolute essence of God," and other "attributes" (aspects or properties) which indicate His relation to "created things."

31, 7. "An extraneous denomination" (denominatio extrinsica or externa) or "external designation" is contrasted with an "intrinsic denomination" (denominatio interna or intrinsica). The latter unfolds the essential attributes of a thing; the former only the non-essential properties, accidents, &c. The term is used somewhat loosely here. Usually Spinoza means by "denominatio extrinsica" a term that indicates the relation of one thing to another—or what one thing is or does to another, as distinguished from what it is in itself. In this more usual sense self-existence, eternity, unity, and immutability could hardly be described as "extraneous denominations." Possibly there is a slight confusion in the text; or the division which Spinoza intended may have been as follows. Whatever is predicated of God denotes either (a) what is essential in Him, or (b) what is not essential; if non-essential (b), then it indicates either (i) a "property" of God other than, though deducible from, His "essential attributes," but still representing what God
is in Himself, or (ii) some relationship in which God stands to others. So long as Spinoza did not employ the term "attribute" in the strict sense in which he here distinguishes it from "properties," anything coming under (a) or (b i) would be designated as *denominatio intrinsica*, while (b ii) alone would be described as *denominatio extrinsica*. But owing to his stricter usage he had no suitable name for (b i) as distinguished from both (a) and (b ii). He seems, therefore, to have grouped (b i) and (b ii) together as "extraneous denominations" in a wider sense. If so, the word "either" has got misplaced somehow.

31, 11. "What he is"—that is, *essentially*.

31, 12. "Attributes" = properties (not "attributes" in the strict sense).

**THE DIALOGUES**

32. The *Outline* of the *Short Treatise* which was discovered and published by Boehmer does not mention the Dialogues, although it refers to the Notes and the Appendices. This seems disquieting at first. Yet no one has seriously questioned the authenticity of the Dialogues. Their contents are as intimately connected with the line of thought expounded in the rest of the *Short Treatise* as the contents of the *Treatise* itself are with the trend of thought in Spinoza's *Ethics*. But although their genuineness cannot be disputed it may be questioned whether they originally formed part of the *Treatise*, or were only subsequently added either by Spinoza or some one else. The tendency is to regard them as more or less independent essays, which were only inserted afterwards in their present place by a disciple or copyist. If their insertion was an afterthought, then it is quite conceivable that some of the manuscripts of the *Short Treatise* may not have contained the Dialogues;
and if Boehmer's Outline was based on such a manuscript the omission of all reference to the Dialogues would thus be accounted for. The fact that they are given in both codices, A and B, of which A may have been copied already during the lifetime of Spinoza, is certainly in their favour.

With remarkable agreement most critics have treated the Dialogues as the oldest of Spinoza's known writings. The arguments for this view mostly turn on their supposed immaturity, fragmentariness, and crudeness. Freudenthal, however, has shown (Spinozstudien, II.) that this view is untenable, because the Dialogues are really unintelligible unless they are read in the light of various ideas explained in different parts of the Short Treatise. He maintains (rightly, we think) that the Dialogues were written after the the bulk of the Short Treatise, as separate and fuller elucidations of certain problems already briefly dealt with in the Treatise, a familiarity with which they assumed. It is this tacit reliance on the exposition of various views already given in the Treatise that gives to the Dialogues an appearance of fragmentariness and crudeness. In reality they are no more immature than the rest of the Short Treatise, while their very assumption of the various doctrines explained in the Treatise shows that they must have been written later.

To some extent Sigwart anticipated Freudenthal's view by showing that the second Dialogue might very well have been written after the rest of the Treatise. But he insisted that the first Dialogue must have been written some years before the Treatise. The two Dialogues, however, can hardly be separated. The second one really takes up the theme with which the first concludes, and the closing remarks of the second Dialogue seem to revert deliberately to the opening words of the first.
The insertion of this Dialogue here was no doubt suggested by the references to Nature in the preceding (second) chapter (pp. 24–27). For this Dialogue gives a further exposition of Spinoza’s conception of Nature. The view of Nature as animated and as coinciding with the Universe in all its entirety and eternity is also found in the writings of Giordano Bruno, especially in the Dialogues *De la Causa*, &c. Avenarius and Sigwart have cited numerous passages from Bruno which are similar in intent to this and other parts of the *Short Treatise*. They even regard this Dialogue as representing an early stage in the history of Spinoza when he was under the more or less dominant influence of Bruno. But no conclusive evidence has been adduced so far to show that Spinoza was even acquainted with Bruno’s writings. And even Sigwart did not feel sure on this matter. Martineau thought that most of the resemblances between Bruno and Spinoza were superficial and illusory. Neoplatonic views similar to those of Bruno were very much in the intellectual atmosphere of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and Spinoza may have become familiar with them through Jewish and other sources. In any case, the resemblance between Spinoza and Bruno is by no means fundamental. Spinoza went far beyond Bruno. Notwithstanding all his rhapsodies on the infinity of Nature Bruno never quite relinquished the idea of a God who was somehow above and beyond Nature—his God was still *transcendent*; Spinoza, on the other hand, never wavered, he took his conception of the infinity of Nature very strictly, and following up its apparently logical implication he boldly identified Nature with God, and conceived God as absolutely *immanent* in Nature. Avenarius and others, basing their views on the supposed early date of this Dialogue, have distinguished three phases of Spinoza’s Pantheism. In all of them
Spinoza identified the three terms, *God, Nature, Substance*, by showing that the same predicates apply to each of them. But at different stages, they say, Spinoza started with a different term for his *datum*. In the first Dialogue, under the supposed influence of Bruno, he set out from the term *Nature*; this was the first phase. The *Short Treatise* was supposed to represent the second phase, when, under the influence of Descartes, he took his start from the term *God* (see chapter i.). Lastly, the *Ethics* was said to represent the third phase, when, having attained to complete independence and maturity, Spinoza commenced with the term *Substance*. But this whole conception of the development of Spinoza's philosophy is untenable. The supposed influence of Bruno is problematic. The first Dialogue already shows a knowledge of Descartes. And Spinoza's attitude towards Cartesianism is fundamentally antagonistic both in the *Short Treatise* and in the Dialogues. No Cartesian could think of identifying God with Nature. So far as his writings show, Spinoza identified God, Nature, and Substance from the first, and seems to have attached no peculiar significance to any of them as a starting-point. It is true, of course, as Martineau and others have pointed out, that the three terms, "though identical in their application, differ somewhat in their meaning; under *Nature* we are expected to think of the continuous *Source of birth*; under *God*, of the *universal cause* of things; under *Substance*, of the permanent reality behind phenomena." But that is another matter.

32, 11, 15. "Understanding"—"Reason." *Understanding* is hardly the right word for what is meant here by the Dutch *Verstand* = *Intellectus*. "Spirit" or "spiritual insight" might be better in some respects. It represents the highest form of knowledge, namely, knowledge by way of immediate intuition. *Reason*, on the other hand, represents the lower grade of knowledge by way of discursive
inference. It will be observed that "Understanding" does not argue, but just delivers its "immediate apprehension" (aanschouw), and takes no further part in the debate. The distinction between Understanding and Reason is explained in Book II. chapters xxi., xxii., xxvi., and a knowledge of this distinction is evidently assumed in this Dialogue. In the opening chapters of Book II. the same distinction is drawn between Belief and Clear Knowledge. But the nomenclature in this Dialogue agrees with that in the later chapters.

32, 17. In omitting from the text the words given in the foot-note (p. 32) we have adopted a suggestion of Freudenthal, which makes the meaning quite clear. All the words (except "namely") which we have relegated to the foot-note, also the words "we avoid this absurdity by stating that" (lines 17 f.), are written in the margin in A. All these marginal additions make the text unintelligible. Apparently the words given in the foot-note represent some reader's attempt to surmount the obscurity caused by the accidental omission of the words "we avoid this absurdity by stating that"; but when this omission was rectified the other additions were still retained because their origin and significance were unknown to the copyist.

32, 21 ff. "Desire" here means "evil desire" = concupiscentia, not cupiditas. Freudenthal has pointed out that the expression usually employed in the Short Treatise for "Desire" is Begeerte, while here we have Begeerlijkheid. Moreover, Spinoza's conception of the function of "desire" (cupiditas) as such is very different from the sinister rôle which Begeerlijkheid plays in this Dialogue.

"Desire" voices here the dualistic view of Descartes that there are two kinds of substances (extended and thinking substances) which have nothing in common. Spinoza combats this view in favour of his own monistic theory.
32, 25. The insertion of “not” was suggested by Freudenthal, who rightly pointed out that in Ethics, I., Definition ii., and in Letter IV., Spinoza says distinctly that “body is not limited by thought, nor thought by body.” Cf. p. 237, Def. iii.

33, 3 ff. The words “but this . . . nothing” are quite inappropriate here. Freudenthal has suggested that they must be some reader’s marginal comment.

33, 16 ff. This outburst of indignation against “Desire” is only intelligible in the light of Book II. chapter xiv. (p. 100), an acquaintance with which is assumed.

33, 24 ff. It is noteworthy that the later objections raised by “Desire” (lines 1–13) seem to be ignored by “Reason.” But they are considered in chapter ii. (pp. 25 ff.). Possibly the lines 1–13 were not originally in the Dialogue. A reader may have added in the margin these objections which he copied from chapter ii., and an uncritical copyist may have transferred the marginal note into the text.

33, 26 ff. The relation of substance to its attributes is here described as a causal relationship; the attributes are supported by substance; they depend on it not logically only, but causally.

33, 29 ff. The attributes are not actually called “modes” here; their relation to substance is simply compared (for argument’s sake) with that of modes to attributes.

34, 12. A “second notion” (notio secunda) is contrasted with a “first notion” (notio prima). The latter represents what things really are, while the former is some mode of conceiving things. The same antithesis was also expressed by another pair of scholastic terms, namely, intentio prima and intentio secunda. What the mind “intends” or apprehends in the first instance is some concrete reality (say, a particular tree), and this constitutes the “first intention”; but as the result of reflecting on and comparing such “first intentions or notions” (as, e.g., when we compare various trees, and mentally classify them into genera and species,
according to their resemblances and differences) we obtain "second notions or intentions," which do not directly represent real things, but are so many ways of thinking about them. Of course, even "second notions" are not altogether "mere ideas," for they are grounded in the real character of things.

34, 16. "The thinking power." The attribute Thought is also described by Spinoza as a "power" in Letter XXXII. (statuo dari in Natura potentiam infinitam cogitandi) and in the Ethics, II. i. Schol., and II. xxi. Schol. On p. 120 (line 4) the attribute Extension is similarly described as a "power." The attributes thus seem to be conceived here as so many "lines of force" in which God manifests or reveals Himself.

SECOND DIALOGUE

36. In Dr. W. Meyer's modern Dutch version of the Short Treatise the second Dialogue is appended to the next chapter. His reason will be considered in the first note to that chapter. It is noteworthy that the concluding words of chapter ii. (31, 16) do not refer to a second Dialogue—they only refer to a Dialogue (one, not two). This, however, may only mean that the insertion of the second Dialogue in this place was an afterthought. But it can hardly be separated from the first Dialogue. It is the reference to the distinction between immanent and transeunt causality at the end of the first Dialogue that furnishes the theme of the second; and the concluding remarks of the second seem to refer deliberately to the opening remarks of the first.

36, 3. "Theophilus." This name (in the Italian forms Teofilo and Filoteo) occurs also in Bruno's Dialogues De la Causa, &c.; and in Bruno's Dialogues, as in this, the author's own views are put into the mouth of "Theophilus." This may be a mere coincidence, as the name would naturally occur to a writer whose moral ideal was "the love of God."
36, 6–8. The reference is to 35, 3, and 41, 19.
36, 9. "A remote cause" is contrasted with a proximate cause. The latter produces its effect immediately, without the intervention of anything else, while the former produces its (remote) effect by means of an intervening proximate cause or a chain of proximate causes. The terms proximate and remote are relative to a given effect; every cause might be both proximate and remote, but not in relation to the same effect. A remote cause was supposed to be separated from, not in contact with, its effect. Hence the difficulty raised in the text as to how an immanent cause could also be a remote cause.
36, 12–16. The text is corrupt. B seems to have substituted "prior" for "remote" on account of the difficulties presented by the text. The words which we have added in square brackets are intended to suggest the real meaning of the original text, in accordance with 42, 4 ff., and Ethics, I. xxviii. Schol.
36, 22 ff. See 147, 1–6.
37, 32 ff. See 55, 12 ff.
38, 12 ff. See 146, 27 ff.
38, 27 ff. See 147, 16–24.
39, 8 ff. In his Cogitata Metaphysica, II.x., Spinoza maintains that nothing which has been created by God can be eternal.
40, 3–7. How this union with God is to be brought about has already been indicated in the beginning of the first Dialogue (32, 4 ff.), where it is stated that the perfection of Love depends on that of the Understanding. Indeed the sentence now under consideration may be regarded as the
final reply to the question raised there. This conception of the Understanding (or Intellect) as the supreme bond of union between Man and God is essentially Aristotelian, and was adopted by the leading Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages, notably by Maimonides (see the writer's Aristotle in Medieval Jewish Thought). In his Guide (III. li.) Maimonides says expressly that "Man's love of God is identical with his knowledge of Him"; he also uses the expression "intellectual worship of God," which is so like Spinoza's "intellectual love of God."

Chapter III

41. The way in which this chapter is copied in codex A is apt to rouse suspicion. The second Dialogue ends near the bottom of the page, leaving just about as much space as is left at the bottom of most pages in that manuscript. The last line of the Dialogue contains the last two words only. Then in the middle of the same line we have "Cap. III.," and four lines of very small writing follow to the very bottom of the page. The next page shows the same small handwriting, which, however, gets larger towards the end of that page, where the usual space is left. On the following page there are only five lines of big scrawl, more than half the page being left blank. The concluding five lines of chapter iii. are written on the next page, and are immediately followed, on the same page, by "Cap. IV." The numeral IV. has also been tampered with, so have the numbers at the heads of several subsequent chapters. And since chapter iii. treats of divine causality generally, while the second Dialogue is devoted more particularly to God's immanent causality, Dr. W. Meyer holds that the second Dialogue was misplaced by the copyist, and should really follow chapter iii. But with due deference to Dr. Meyer, it seems doubtful whether the facts really necessitate this
construction. It seems obvious that chapter iii. was copied into A after chapter iv. (possibly also some of the rest of the Treatise) had already been copied. But the copyist had evidently left a space for chapter iii., though he miscalculated the amount of space required. It is known that Spinoza's manuscripts circulated among his friends in parts, just as they were completed. Most likely the copyist of A had the MS. of chapter iv. before he had that of chapter iii., so he left some blank pages for the latter and copied it when he got it afterwards. Chapter iii. is in the same handwriting as the rest of the Treatise in A. And as regards the alterations in the numerals it appears certain to me that the Arabic numerals have simply been changed into Roman ones—the change being probably made by the fastidious Monnikhoff. Lastly, as regards the contents of chapter iii. and the second Dialogue, Spinoza is not at all particular in this Treatise about repeating himself, and the second Dialogue, as already shown, has a point of contact with the first. If we had very scrupulous regard to connection of content several of the chapters of the Treatise would have to be transposed, as, indeed, Dr. Meyer himself has pointed out. 41, 12 ff. The elaborate classification of causes to which Spinoza refers in this chapter is to be found in Franco Burgersdijck's Institutionum Logicarum Libri Duo. Burgersdijck, as already stated, was Professor of Philosophy at Leyden in the early decades of the seventeenth century, and his book on logic, to judge by the numerous editions still extant, must have been a most popular manual. Several editions of the book were edited by Burgersdijck's successor, Heereboord, to whom Spinoza refers in his Metaphysical Thoughts, II. xii. It was this reference to Heereboord that Trendelenburg used as a clue to unravel this complicated and somewhat obscure classification of causes.

Though complex, the classification was really not so fanciful as may first appear. Substitute "conditions" for
"causes," and the classification still contains much that is true and valuable. If by "cause" we mean "the totality of conditions," then there is no room for any such elaborate classification of causes. But for all practical purposes we are satisfied to apply the term "cause" to something very far short of "the totality of conditions," and Mill has shown how arbitrary popular usage is in singling out now this, now that condition as "the cause," when, as a matter of fact, all the conditions are equally necessary, if not equally striking or interesting on different occasions of the same kind of occurrence. It was according to this wider and looser use of the term that "causes" were classified in such an elaborate way. The accompanying table (see next page) is taken from Burgersdijck's Logic (p. 282 of the London edition of 1651).

In the accompanying table we see the then usual Aristotelian division of Causes into Material, Formal, Efficient, and Final, each of these being again subdivided in various ways. It would take up too much space to deal with all of them here. We are only concerned with the eightfold division of Efficient causes, which Spinoza has in view in the present chapter. It will be observed that Spinoza enumerates them in precisely the same order as they are given in the following table from Burgersdijck's Logic. The following definitions are also taken from the same book.

41, 15. An emanative cause is one which produces its effect by its sheer existence, while an active (or acting) cause is one which produces its effect through the medium of some activity which it exercises. Fire, for instance, is the emanative cause of its own heat, but an active cause of the heat which it imparts to other things. Spinoza practically does away with this distinction in the case of God. "Emanative" here has nothing to do with the "Emanation" theory of Neoplatonism or Mysticism. Spinoza did not use the expression in the Ethics, possibly in order to avoid this suggestion of "emanation."
BURGERSDIJCK'S CLASSIFICATION OF CAUSES

| In genere (In species, eaque vel) | I. | Prima, Secunda. |
| Materia; eaque vel | II. | Rerum Naturalium, Artificialium. |
| | III. | Generationis, Compositionis. |
| Forma; eaque vel | I. | Materialis, Inmaterialis. |
| | II. | Substantialis, Accidentalis. |
| | III. | Naturalis, Artificialis. |
| | IV. | Principalis, Disponens. |
| | V. | Activa, Emanativa. |
| | | Immanens, Transiens. |
| | | Libera, Necessaria. |
| | | Per se, Per accident. |
| | | Principalis, Minus principalis |
| Efficiens; eaque vel | Procataretica, Proegumen. |
| | Progrument. |
| | VI. | Prima, Secunda. |
| | VII. | Universalis, Particularis. |
| | VIII. | Proxima, Remota. |

| Cui; isque vel | I. | Cui, Cuius. |
| II. | Principalis, Secundarius. |
| III. | Subordinatus, Ultimus. |
41, 19. The distinction between an *immanent* and a *transcendent* cause has already been explained in the note to 30, 3.

41, 22. A *free* cause (according to Burgersdijck) is one which acts from deliberate choice; a *natural* (or *necessary*) cause is one which acts from necessity (*causa libera est, qua consulto—id est, ex judicio rationis—causat. Necessaria, qua non consulto, sed necessitate naturæ causat*). This distinction, however, did not commend itself to Spinoza. He employed these antithetic terms somewhat differently. By a *free* cause (as will be seen in the next chapter) he meant one which acts without any *external* compulsion, or externally imposed necessity. In this sense a cause might be *free* although acting from necessity, namely, when the necessity was inherent in its own character, and not due to outside forces.

42, 1. A cause *through himself*, or *causa per se*, is one whose effects are due to his or its own natural character; a cause *per accidens* is one which produces a certain effect not as the result of its own character, but owing to some unusual circumstances. Heereboord gives the following illustration. When an animal gives birth to one of its own kind it is a *causa per se*, but when it gives birth to a monstrosity then it is *causa per accidens*. Burgersdijck remarks, with quiet humour, *Ad causam per accidens revocatur fortuna et casus*.

42, 4–14. A *principal* cause is one which produces an effect by virtue of its own powers alone, without the aid of anything else. A subsidiary cause (*causa minus principalis*) is merely one condition or factor which is necessary but not adequate to produce a certain effect. Three kinds of subsidiary causes were recognised. Spinoza refers to them all, but somewhat obscurely. In lines 7–9 he illustrates not the subsidiary cause in general, but one special form of it, namely, the *instrumental* cause (*instrumentum*). Almost any means employed in the production of an effect was called an instrumental cause. A second species of subsidiary cause is the *provoking* or *inciting* cause (*causa procatarctica vel causa...*)
incipiens aut inchoans)—that is, any external thing or condition which incites the principal cause to action. The third, and last, kind of subsidiary cause is the predisposing cause (causa proegumenae), or some internal condition which predisposes a thing towards a certain kind of action or process. For instance, if a man with a weak chest becomes very ill in consequence of a cold caught while in a draughty place, then the draught would be described as the provoking (or inciting) cause, while his weak chest or feeble constitution would be the predisposing cause. (Bain made a somewhat similar distinction, though of wider applicability, when he analysed a cause into a “moving power” and a “collocation of circumstances.”)

Spinoza’s departure from Burgersdijck’s division of the causa minus principalis is, I think, explicable by the fluctuating views of the text-books on this point. Clauberg (a copy of whose Logica Vetus et Nova Spinoza is known to have possessed) divided the efficient causes into causa principalis and causa instrumentalis. No doubt this is the division which Spinoza had in view in lines 4–9. On the other hand, Keckermann (a copy of whose Systema Logicae was also among Spinoza’s books) divided as follows:

\[
\text{Causa efficiens} = \begin{cases} 
\text{principalis}, \\
\text{minus principalis}, \\
\text{impulsiva}, \\
\text{proegumenae}, \\
\text{procatactica}, \\
\text{instrumentalis}.
\end{cases}
\]

This also gives the four subdivisions practically in the same order as Spinoza refers to them.

42, 15. A first cause is one which is not dependent on (or not the effect of) any other cause; a causa secunda is dependent on a first cause.

42, 17. A universal cause was contrasted with a particular one as follows. The latter can only produce one kind of effect; the former can produce different kinds of effects by co-operating with various other causes. God, according
to Spinoza, may be described as a universal cause in so far as He is not restricted to any one kind of effect, but not in the sense that He can co-operate with causes outside Himself.

42, 21. For the distinction between a proximate and a remote cause see the note to 36, 9.

Chapter IV

43. The theme of this chapter is also discussed by Spinoza in the Ethics, I. xvi. xvii. xxxiii., and in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, vi.

43, 23 ff. Compare the following passage from the Cogitata Metaphysica (I. iii.): “Since nothing exists except by divine power alone, it is easy to see that those things which come into existence do so by virtue of the decree and will of God. But since there is neither inconstancy nor change in God, He must have decreed from eternity that He would produce those things which He produces now; and as in order that a thing may exist nothing more is required than God's decree that it should exist, it follows that all created things have been under an eternal necessity to be in existence. Nor can we say that they are contingent because God could have decreed otherwise; for, since in eternity there is no when, or before, or after, or any other change of time, it follows that God did not exist before those things were decreed, to be able at all to decree otherwise.” On the other hand, in Cogit. Metaph. II. vii. Spinoza says that “if God willed it so, created things would have a different essence.”

46, 8. "This" = that God could not have made things different from what they are (see p. 45, 19 ff.).

46, 12–15. This sentence, and also the last in the same paragraph, appear to be quite irrelevant. B omits them. Most probably they are only the marginal comments of some reader, and not a part of the original text.

Chapter V

47. Joel has drawn attention to similar views on Providence in the writings of Hasdai Crescas (The Light of the Lord, II. ii. 1); also to the fact that Crescas, while treating of Providence, employs the same illustration which Spinoza gives on p. 42, line 8.

47, 4–6. This striving is described, in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (cap. xvi.), as the highest law of Nature (Lex summa Naturae est, ut unaqueque res in suo statu, quantum in se est, conetur perseverare), and (ibid. cap. vi.) Providence is identified with the ordo Naturae. For Spinoza's (later) explanation of this striving, see Ethics, III. iv. vi. vii.

Chapter VI


48, 3. "Attribute" is here used in the wider sense = proprietas.

48, 10. "Accidental" = that which is neither necessary nor impossible. In the passages referred to above, Spinoza distinguishes between the "contingent" and the "possible," which may be regarded as the two species of the "accidental." The main point is that according to him nothing really is "accidental," only some things are regarded as accidental on account of our ignorance of the causes or their operation.

48, 24 ff. A modal proposition (e.g., "S is an accidental cause") was said to be in sensu diviso or in sensu composito according as the qualifying expression ("accidental")
referred to the copula ("is") or to one of the terms ("S" or "cause"). See, e.g., Duns Scotus, Qu. super Anal. pr. I. 25.

49, 8–11. The meaning is clear, though awkwardly expressed. "If the cause were no more compelled to produce this or that than not to produce it, then . . . ."

49, 27. The original wording in A seems to have been "that God is the only cause, the cause of all things." But this was subsequently altered by the copyist, arbitrarily, it would seem, as the changes are anything but an improvement.


49, 35 ff. This objection, as Joel has pointed out, was mentioned and dealt with by Maimonides and Crescas. Maimonides (Guide, III. xvi.) ascribed the objection to Alexander Aphrodisiensis (circa 200), the author of a treatise On Providence.

50, 14 ff. Cf. Maimonides (Guide, III. xviii.): "It is an established fact that species have no existence except in our own minds. Species and other classes are merely ideas formed in our minds, while everything in real existence is an individual object, or an aggregate of individual objects. . . . It is wrong to say that divine providence extends only to the species, and not to individual beings, as some of the philosophers teach. For only individual beings have real existence."

50, 21–27. Compare Cogitata Metaphysica (II. vii.): "What, indeed, is more absurd than to exclude from God's knowledge individual things, which could not exist for a moment without the concurrence of God? And then they maintain that God is ignorant of actually existing things, while they ascribe to God a knowledge of universals, which do not exist and have no essence apart from that of the individual things. We, on the contrary, attribute to God the knowledge of individual things, and not of universals, except in so far as He knows human minds."

51, 9 ff. The same illustration occurs in Descartes, Med. VI.
Chapter VII

52. Spinoza seems to refer to this chapter in his Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione (Van Vloten and Land’s edition, 1895, vol. i. p. 24, note 1).

53, 1-6. This view is found, for instance, in Heereboord (Disput. ex Philosophia, vol. i. p. 147, quoted by Sigwart).

53, 9-11. Owing partly to the desire to maintain the absolute Unity of God (with which a multiplicity of attributes was thought to be inconsistent), and partly from the anxiety to avoid comparing God with man, there arose in Arabic and Jewish medieval philosophy a tendency to explain away the attributes usually ascribed to God (especially in the Bible and the Koran). These attributes were accordingly treated as having solely a negative import, that is, as predicking what God is not rather than what He is, or as denying some imperfection rather than affirming any (human or quasi-human) characteristic of Him. (Maimonides, e.g., sums up his inquiry into God’s attributes as follows: “It has thus been shown that every attribute predicated of God either denotes the quality of an action, or—when this attribute is intended to convey some idea of the Divine Being Himself, and not of His actions—the negation of the opposite.” Thus “we use One in reference to God to express that there is nothing similar to Him, but we do not mean to say that an attribute Unity is added to His essence.”—Guide, I. lvii. lviii.) A similar tendency appeared also in Christian Scholasticism. This kind of “negative theology” seems to have been started first by Philo Judæus, of Alexandria, the founder of Neoplatonism.

53, 13 f. Spinoza is referring to Thomas Aquinas. See 20, 16 ff.

53, 19 ff. Compare 30, 31 ff. and the notes thereto.

54, 5 ff. Cf. Cogitata Metaphysica, I. vi., where Spinoza says that “good” and “evil” only indicate a certain rela-
tion of one thing to another. "A thing considered by itself is called neither good nor bad; it is so only in relation to another thing, according as it helps it to obtain what it requires, or not." Spinoza, however, allows the application of "supremely good" to God on the ground that all things only exist through Him.


55, 15 ff. Adopting the emendation suggested by Sigwart, we should read here: "Since, as attributes of a self-sustaining being, they exist through themselves, they also become known through themselves"—nam quia ut attributa entis per se existentis [per se] existunt, etiam per se coniipi-untur. This makes the meaning clearer.

55, 20 ff. Although the term genus is here applied to attribute (because the attribute here takes the place of the genus in the old rule of definition) it must not be forgotten that the attribute, according to Spinoza, is not generic, but singular.

In the Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding Spinoza says that the definition of a created thing "should include the proximate cause," which he there identifies with the infinite modes Motion and Understanding, according as the finite mode to be explained is a mode of Extension or of Thought (vol. i. p. 31 in ed. 1895).

55, 26. The reference is to the Answers to the first, second, and third objections (appended to Descartes' Meditations), where Descartes maintains, against Sassendi, that, although we cannot have a completely adequate knowledge of God, we can have a clear and distinct knowledge of some of His attributes.

Chapter VIII

56. The distinction between Natura naturans and Natura naturata may be traced back to Aristotle's distinction between
the Unmoved (Mover) and the Moved. In the writings of Augustine (354-430) the Aristotelian division is developed into a threefold distinction, namely, (1) a Creator who was not created, (2) the created which also creates, and (3) that which has been created but does not create. Scotus Erigena added a fourth distinction (so as to complete the dichotomous scheme), namely, (4) that which neither creates nor has been created (= nothing). Scotus Erigena (ninth century) already maintained that God and the Universe are identical; Nature regarded as a creating totality being the same as God, while Nature regarded as a multiplicity of created things is what is called the world. This mode of thought was developed more fully by Averroes (1126-1198), the chief of the Arabian Aristotelians.


56, 12 ff. Cf. Ethics, I. xxviii. Schol., where the division of Natura naturata into "general" and "particular" is replaced by that into things produced by God "immediately" and "mediately."

Chapter IX

57, 2-8. Probably for the reasons stated in lines 7, 8, Understanding and Motion are referred to in the Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding as res fixae et aeternae. They are also commonly referred to as the "infinite modes." Cf. Letter LXIV.

57, 18, 20. It seems strange that Motion should be described as a "Son of God." But its correspondence or parallelism with Understanding, in Spinoza's scheme, compelled him to predicate of Motion whatever he affirmed of the Understanding by way of epithets indicating position in the scheme. And to describe Understanding as the "Son of God" was, of course, Biblical—1 Cor. i. 24: Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God. It was, no doubt, with reference to this Scriptural passage that Spinoza wrote in
Letter LXXIII.: "I do not think it at all necessary for one’s salvation to know Christ according to the flesh; but as regards the eternal Son of God, that is, God’s eternal wisdom, which has manifested itself in all things, especially in the human mind, and most of all in Christ Jesus, one must think otherwise. For without this no one can attain to a state of bliss, because it alone shows what is true or false, good or evil."

57, 21. The expression "created . . . from all eternity" amounts to a denial of "creation" in its usual sense. Spinoza makes this quite clear in Cogitata Metaphysica, II. x.: "Neither was the Son of God created, He was eternal like the Father. When, therefore, we say that the Father had begotten the Son from eternity, we only mean that the Father has always shared His eternity with the Son."

57, 23–27. It is not certain whether this note was written by Spinoza, to whom it refers in the third person as "the author"—quite a unique form in Spinoza’s writings. The information conveyed is accurate in so far as Spinoza did occupy himself with, and intended to write on, the most general problems of Physics. We gather this from Letters LIX., LX., LXXXIII. But the note seems quite irrelevant. Apparently it refers to some remark in the text which was subsequently struck out.

58, 6. "Affects." The Dutch is Aandoeneningen, which may be a too literal translation of Affectus. The usual expression is passien or tochten.

Chapter X

59. Entia Rationis and Entia Realia. See note to 28, 6.

59, 11 ff. Spinoza’s criticism of the terms "good" and "evil" is different in different parts of this Treatise. On p. 51 (lines 4–15)—also in Cog. Metaph. (I. vi.), in the Tract. de Intel. Emend., and in the Ethics (Appendix to Part I.)—the
criticism turns on the implication of purpose. On the same page (lines 16 ff.)—also in Letter XIX.—the criticism turns on the implied comparison of individual things with general ideas. In the passage now under consideration—also in Ethics, IV. lxv.—the criticism turns on the relative or relational character of the terms “good” and “evil.”

59, 28 ff. The concluding paragraph of the chapter looks suspicious. The force of the additional argument is not obvious. Nor is there anything like its trend of ideas elsewhere in Spinoza. Sigwart is accordingly inclined to regard it as an interpolation by a disciple of Spinoza.

SECOND PART

PREFACE

63. Cf. Ethics, II., the opening sentences, and propositions x. and xi.

63, 12 ff. This long addition was most probably not meant to be a “note” at all, and seems to be misplaced. See the comment on chapter i. The different parts of this long note may be compared with Spinoza’s other utterances as follows: 1. Cf. Ethics, II. x.; 3. cf. Ethics, II. i.; 4. cf. Ethics, I. xxx., II. iii. iv.; 6–8. cf. Ethics, II. xiii. (to the end of Lemma i.); 9. cf. Ethics, II. xi.; 10–12. cf. Ethics, II. Lemma iii.–vii.; 13. cf. Ethics, II. xii. xiv.; 14. cf. Ethics, IV. xxxix. 15. This part of the note is not really essential, and is in any case inaccurate. The contrast required is that between union with substances and union with modes; that given is between union with thought and union with extension, both of which are substances in the looser sense—that is, “attributes of substance.” Probably this part of the note was not written by Spinoza in its present form.

64, 1. See pp. 21 ff.
66, 1-5. According to the reservation here made, God or Substance is no part of the nature of man, because although man could not be, or be conceived without God, yet God could well be, and be conceived without man. Cf. Ethics, II., Definition ii., and prop. x.

CHAPTER I

67. The opening words of this chapter, also the opening and concluding remarks of the Preface (p. 63, lines 6 ff., and p. 66, lines 5 ff.), lead one to expect an exposition of "the modes of which man consists." What is actually considered in this chapter is the three kinds of knowledge, while "the modes of which man consists" are discussed in the long note to the Preface (pp. 63 ff.) Freudenthal has therefore suggested the following explanation. Originally chapter i. did treat of "the modes of which man consists." But, dissatisfied with that first account, Spinoza wrote a new exposition to replace or to supplement it. Owing, however, to some misunderstanding of reference signs the copyist or translator treated the new exposition as a note to the Preface, omitting at the same time the older account, which Spinoza had probably crossed through, or marked in some way as unsatisfactory. Note † seems to be a feeble attempt on the part of a reader or copyist to reconcile the opening words with the actual contents of the chapter.

67, 7 f. The meaning is clear, namely, the modes to be considered first are the modes of thought, because these are known or experienced more immediately than the modes of extension (i.e., material objects, including human bodies), our knowledge of all modes of extension being, of course, included among the modes of cognition. The language, however, is rather obscure. What is "the consciousness of the knowledge of ourselves"? It has been suggested by Freudenthal that the original Latin may have been, "Incipiamus ab iis qui primi nobis cogniti sunt, scilicet a quibusdam
ideis vel a cognitione nostri et deinde agamus de rebus quae extra nos sunt," and that "cognitione nostri" was (like so many other expressions in the Treatise) translated twice over by "medegeweten" (translated "consciousness") and "kennisse," and the whole misconstrued. In accordance with this plausible emendation we should read here: "... certain ideas or our knowledge, and then we shall treat of the things which are outside us."

67, 10 ff. Here we have a threefold classification of the different kinds of knowledge, which is developed into a fourfold scheme by subdividing the first kind of knowledge. In chapter ii. the distinction between the two subdivisions of the first kind of knowledge is passed over, while it is emphasised in chapter iv. (76 ff.). In the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione (pp. 7 ff.) we find the fourfold scheme, while in the Ethics, II. xl. Schol. 2, Spinoza returns to the threefold scheme. The special stress laid on the fourfold scheme in the Tr. de Int. Em. (as Gebhardt has suggested) was probably due to the influence of Bacon. Indeed, the name of the second kind of knowledge (or of the second subdivision of what is here the first kind), namely, perceptio ab experientia vaga, occurs in Bacon's Novum Organum, I. c. In a note in the Tr. de Int. Em. (p. 9) Spinoza promises a fuller account of "experience," and of the methods of "recent empirical philosophers." The reference is most probably to Bacon, from whose estimate of experience Spinoza differed, maintaining (as against Bacon) that "it is something altogether uncertain, ... by means of it the accidents only of natural things are apprehended, and they are never clearly understood without a previous knowledge of their essences" (ibid.).

67, 11. The first kind of knowledge (in the threefold scheme) is here called "belief," but in chapters ii. and iv. (and elsewhere) "opinion." The Latin was probably the same in all cases, namely, opinio. In English also "belief"
is sometimes used for "opinion"; e.g., "I am not sure, but that is my belief" (or "I believe so").

67, 13. The second kind of knowledge, here called "true belief" (on p. 69, line 14, simply "Belief"), is described on p. 74, line 19, as "a strong proof based on reasons." The distinction between "Opinion" and "True Belief" therefore recalls the Platonic (or even pre-Platonic) distinction between ἀφικαὶ and ἐπιστὴν.

"Belief" (or "true belief") seems a strange designation for reasoned or discursive knowledge. Spinoza himself substituted "Reason" afterwards (see, e.g., p. 99, line 16—"True Belief or Reason"). Joel, however, has pointed out that Crescas employed the term "Belief" in the same sense. The expression "true belief" may have been suggested by the following passage from Maimonides' Guide (I. 1.):

"Belief . . . is the conviction that what is apprehended exists outside the mind exactly as it is conceived in the mind. If in addition we are convinced that the thing cannot be different in any way from what we believe it to be . . . then the belief is true."

67, 14. Sigwart has pointed out that the distinction between what is here called "clear and distinct conception" (or immediate intuition) and "true belief" (or discursive reasoning) is also found in Descartes (especially in the Regulae ad directionem ingenii, which, however, was only published in 1701, and was therefore unknown to Spinoza). But Descartes laid no such stress on the distinction, and also conceived it rather differently. Descartes' "immediate intuition" was mathematical in character and referred to the apprehension of the truth of certain propositions, especially the cogito ergo sum; Spinoza's "clear and distinct knowledge" is mystical in character, and referred to the apprehension of objects, especially of God.


67, 25 ff. See the first comment on this chapter.
The three foot-notes on this page, and the first three foot-notes on p. 68, are most probably marginal notes or summaries made by some reader of the MS. from which A was copied.

CHAPTER II

69, 22 ff. Cf. Ethics, IV. Appendix, § iii.: "Our actions, that is to say, those desires which are determined by man's power or reason, are always good; the others may be good or evil." Cf. also Ethics, III. iii.

"Passion" (πάθος = passio, affectus, or perturbatio) was used in the time of Spinoza, and even later, in a much wider sense than at present. It denoted not the violent emotions only, but all feelings, sentiments, and desires, as so many ways in which the mind "suffers" or "is affected" by external things.

69, 26 ff. Cf. Ethics, II. Axiom iii.: "Such modes of thought as love, desire ... do not arise unless there is also, in the same individual, an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c. But the idea may be there even when no other mode of thought is present."

The view that "knowledge is the proximate cause of all the passions" is opposed to the Cartesian view, according to which the passions "are produced, sustained, and strengthened by some movement of the animal spirits" (De Passionibus Animae, I. 27). Spinoza assigns a purely mental origin to the passions, while Descartes ascribed them in large measure to physiological causes.

CHAPTER III

70. In his treatment of the passions in this and the following chapters Spinoza follows closely Descartes' order of exposition in his De Passionibus Animae, Parts II. and III. (This was already noticed by Boehmer when he published the Outline of the Short Treatise.) The following tables (see opposite) (taken, with slight changes, from Sigwart) will make this clear.
DECLINTHES' DE PASSIONIBUS ANIMÆ

PART II.

§§ 69-148. Admiratio
Amor
Odium
Cupiditas
Laetitia
Morch

PART III.

§§ 149-152. Exsimiantio et Despectus

,, 153-156. Generositas et Humilitas

,, 157-161. Superbia et Humilitas vitiosa

,, 161-164. Veneratio et Dedigilatio

,, 165. Spes et Metus
,, 166. Securitas et Desperatio
,, 167-169. Zelotyphia
,, 170. Animi fluctuatio
,, 171. Animositas et Audacia
,, 172. AEmulatio
,, 174-176. Pusillanimitas et Consternatio

,, 177. Conscientia morsus
,, 178-181. Irrissio et Jocus
,, 182-184. Invidia
,, 186-189. Commiseratio
,, 190. Acquiescencia in se ipso

,, 191. Pænilentia
,, 192. Favor
,, 193, 194. Gratitudo et Ingratitudo

,, 195-203. Indignatio et Ira
,, 204-206. Gloria et Pudor
,, 207. Impudentia
,, 209. Desiderium

SPINOZA'S SHORT TREATISE

PART II.

Ch. iii. Admiratio
,, v. Amor
,, vi. Odium (Aversio)
,, vii. Cupiditas
,,,, Laetitia
,,,, Tristitia
,, viii. Exsimiantio et Contemptus
,, ,, Generositas (?), Humilitas
,, ,, Superbia, Abjectio
,, ix. Spes et Metus
,, ,, Securitas, Desperatio
,, ,, Animi fluctuatio
,, ,, Intrepidditas et Audacia
,, ,, AEmulatio
,, ,, Pusillanimitas, Zelotyphia
,, x. Conscientia morsus
,, xi. Irrissio et Jocus
,, ,, Invidia
,, ,, xiv. Desiderium
,, ,, Pænilentia
,, xiii. Favor
,, ,, Gratitudo et Ingratitudo
,, ,, Ira, Indignatio
,, xii. Honor et Pudor
,, ,, Impudentia
As regards details, there are numerous important differences between Spinoza's and Descartes' views on the passions.

70, 8 ff. Spinoza's account of "surprise" is original. Descartes simply described it as evoked by "things rare and extraordinary," but he did not explain it.

70, 28 ff. The concluding part of the note seems to be directed against the view that Surprise is evoked chiefly by what is absolutely new. But the thought is expressed imperfectly.

72, 20 ff. Spinoza's account of Hatred is very different from that of Descartes (op. cit. II. 79).

73, 4 ff. The account here given of Desire is reversed in Ethics, III. ix. Schol., where it is maintained that we do not "desire anything because we think it is good, but, on the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because we . . . desire it."

CHAPTER IV

74, 9 ff. In geometry, e.g., we reason that such and such a figure must have such and such properties; but we do not prove thereby that such a figure actually exists.

74, 19 ff. The meaning of "Belief" here (as already remarked) is peculiar. Equally peculiar is the use here made of the term "Knowledge" (=spiritual intuition), and the way in which "Belief" and "Knowledge" are contrasted. Joel has drawn attention to parallel passages in the writings of Crescas, two of which may be given here. In words very like lines 19-21 Crescas says that "Belief is only the conviction resulting from the necessity of the case that the thing outside the soul is such as it is represented to be in the soul." In contrast to Belief, clear Knowledge is described by Spinoza (in lines 25, 30 ff. and elsewhere) as an "immediate union" with and "intellectual enjoyment" of what is thus known. Crescas distinguishes between
Belief and another form of knowledge as follows: "We accept some views from a feeling of (logical) necessity, others with a feeling of joy and gladness. Our Bliss depends, not on Belief, but on the joy which accompanies Knowledge. For . . . only joy can unite us with God" (The Light of the Lord, II. v. 5, quoted by Joel).

75, 13 ff. The assertion referred to is not found in the Treatise. Apparently some part containing such a statement has been lost.

75, 23 ff. Cf. the comments on I. x. (p. 201 f.). Cf. Ethics, IV., Preface, Def. i. and ii., and Appendix, § v.

76, 6 ff. Spinoza may be referring to the first chapter of his Cogitata Metaphysica, which is entitled De Ente Reali, Ficto, et Rationis, which was probably written already, though the whole work of which it forms a part was not completed and published till 1663.

76, 26 ff. The new point of view is noteworthy. So far the passions were judged by the kind of knowledge which produced them; we now observe a new criterion, namely, the character of the objects which are loved, &c.

77, 3 ff. This brief and somewhat peculiar treatment of "surprise" almost prepares one for its subsequent exclusion from the class of "affects" (or passions) in Ethics, III. (Def. iv. of the Affects). It is possible, however, that originally this chapter was followed by one on "Surprise."

Chapter V

78. Love, it should be noted, is here distinguished according to the character of its objects, not according to the kind of cognition from which it results, which was the mode of procedure suggested at the beginning of chapter iii. (p. 70). Descartes, it may be remarked, rather disparaged any such distinctions based on the character of the objects loved (De Pass. An. II. 82).
78, 15 f. "God, or . . . Truth." Cf. p. 103, line 16—God is Truth, Truth is God. Because by "Truth" Spinoza means "the real essence of things as thought" (Martineau).

78, 17 f. According to this, love is always "intellectual." Descartes had distinguished between *amor intellectualis* and *amor sensitivus*, the latter of which was supposed to be due entirely to physiological causes.

78, 20 ff. In the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, cap. xvi., Spinoza speaks of it as "a universal law of human nature" that we can only relinquish what we think good in one of the two ways stated here.

79, 8 ff. This explanation of love appears to be original; it is not in Descartes.

80, 30–32. One would expect "... God alone is a substance . . ." The Dutch is *weezen* (essence), *weezens* (essences), *wezen* (entity).

81, 15 ff. On the "intellectual love of God" (*Amor Dei intellectualis*) see *Ethics*, V. xxxii. f.

CHAPTER VI

82, 3 f. This definition of Hatred is restricted on the next page (lines 8 ff.) so as to exclude the inanimate and the irresponsible from its objects. On p. 72 (lines 20 f.) we had yet another account, from a different point of view. In *Ethics*, III. (xiii. Schol., also Def. vii. at the end of the Book) Hatred is defined even more widely than here, namely, as "sorrow with the accompanying idea of its external cause"; while in IV. xlv. Schol. it is restricted again so as to exclude all but human beings from its objects.

83, 16 ff. Here things which are the "accidental" causes of injury are excluded from among the objects of "aversion"; in *Ethics*, III. Def. ix. of the Affects, aversion is defined as "sorrow with the accompanying idea of some object as the accidental cause of the sorrow."

83, 20 ff. Here "sorrow" is described as an *effect* of hatred, &c.; in the above definitions (from the *Ethics*)
hatred and aversion are described as *species* of sorrow. We thus seem to have here an identification of *causa proxima* with *genus proximum*. Cf. p. 199.

83, 21. Anger is accordingly defined in *Ethics*, III. Def. xxxvi., as "the desire by which we are impelled, through hatred, to injure those whom we hate."

83, 24. Envy is defined in *Ethics*, III. Def. xxiii., as "hatred in so far as it affects a man so that he is sad at the good fortune of another person, and is glad when some evil befalls him."


**CHAPTER VII**

85. "Joy and Sorrow" are used in a very wide sense, almost as the equivalents of "Pleasure and Pain." They play a more important rôle in the *Ethics* than they do here.

85, 8. "The same causes"—that is, the idea that a certain thing is good.

85, 12 f. The definition here given of Sorrow is the same as that of Grief, on p. 99, lines 5 f. In the *Ethics* (III. Def. iii. of the Affects) Sorrow (*Tristitia*) is defined as "man's transition from greater to lesser perfection." Descartes had defined it as the effect of a present evil.

85, 17 ff. Cf. *Ethics*, IV. xli., where Spinoza says that Joy is in itself good, and Sorrow evil, because Joy increases the body's power of action, while Sorrow diminishes it.

86, 2 f. Cf. *Tract. de Int. Em.* (p. 5), where Spinoza says that strife, hatred, sorrow, jealousy, and other evil passions arise from the love of the transient only, "but love for an object eternal and infinite feeds the mind with unmixed joy." Cf. *Ethics*, V. xx.

86, 7. Reminiscent of *Psalm* xvi. 11:

*In thy presence is fulness of joy,*

*In thy right hand there are pleasures for evermore.*
CHAPTER VIII

87, 7–9. In the *Ethics* (III. Def. Aff. xxi. xxii.) *Existimatio* and *Despectus* are conceived so as to contain an element of bias. *Existimatio* (over-esteem) "consists in thinking too highly of some one in consequence of our love for him; *Despectus* "consists in thinking too little of some one in consequence of our hatred against him."

87, 10. "Self-respect." The Dutch is *Edelmoedigheid*, which generally means "noble bearing" or "generosity." *Generositas*, however, is defined in *Ethics*, III. lix. Schol., as "the desire by which from the dictates of reason alone each person endeavours to help other people and to join them to himself in friendship." This is very unlike what is described here.


87, 20. "Culpable humility" (*strafbare nedrigheid*) = *Abjectio*, which is defined in *Ethics*, III. Aff. Def. xxix., as "thinking too little of oneself, through sorrow."

88, 6 ff. In the *Ethics* (IV. liii.) Spinoza says that "Humility is not a virtue," because the rational man should think of what he *can* do, not of what he *cannot* do. Moreover, Humility is a species of sorrow, and sorrow is always bad. Apparently the good side of "true humility" has been joined to "self-respect" to constitute *acquiescentia in se ipso*, the contentment resulting from a just estimate of one's powers.

88, 32. Scepticism had a certain vogue in the time of Spinoza, and rationalist philosophies were often confounded with it. Hence philosophers like Bacon, Descartes, and Spinoza felt it necessary to break a lance with Scepticism so as to make it clear that they were no Sceptics. In the *Tract. de Ænt. Em.* (p. 14) Spinoza remarks of the Sceptics: "They
say that they know nothing; and they say that even this, namely, that they know nothing, they also do not know; nor can they say even that much absolutely: for they are afraid to admit that they exist, seeing that they know nothing; they should really be dumb, lest perchance they suggest something that may savour of truth. . . . They must consequently be regarded as automata, altogether devoid of mind.” Further on (p. 24) he dismisses such Scepticism as “belonging to an inquiry on obstinacy” rather than to an inquiry on Method.

89. 10 ff. Namely, that God is the highest and worthiest object of our esteem, as of our love (p. 81, line 13 ff.).

Chapter IX

90, 12 ff. The way in which Spinoza here divides the passions appears to be original.

90, 27. In Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xii., Hope is defined as “an inconstant joy arising from the idea of something future or past about the issue of which we have some doubt.” Cf. also Ethics, III. xviii. Schol. 2.

91, 2. Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xiii.: “Fear [metus, not timor] is a wavering sorrow arising from the idea of something future or past about the issue of which we have some doubt.” Cf. III. xviii. Schol. 2.

91, 3 ff. Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xiv.: “Confidence is joy arising from the idea of something future or past concerning which all cause for doubt has been removed.”

91, 8 ff. Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xv.: “Despair is sorrow arising from the idea of something future or past concerning which all cause for doubt has been removed.”

91, 23 ff. “Vacillation of mind” is treated from a different point of view in the Ethics (III. xvii. Schol., xxxi.), where it is described as the result of loving and hating the same thing at once, or (Aff. Def. xlii.) from a choice of evils.
91, 27 ff. Ethics, III. li. Schol.: "I will call that man brave (intrepidum) who despises an evil which I usually fear."

Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xl.: "Boldness (Audacia) is a desire by which one is incited to do something perilous which his fellows fear to attempt." The Dutch terms are moed (line 27), kloekmoedigheid (line 28), and dapperheid (line 29).

91, 30 ff. Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xxxiii.: "Emulation consists in feeling a desire for something because we imagine that others have the same desire."

91, 33 ff. Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xli.: "Pusillanimity [or Cowardice] is attributed to one whose desire [to do something] is checked by the fear (timor) of a danger which his fellows are not afraid to face."

92, 1. Ethics, III. li. Schol.; "The man who fears an evil which I usually despise will appear timid" (timidus).

92, 2. "Jalousie" is given in the MSS. as the (French) equivalent for "Belgzucht"; apparently the translator was not sure how to translate zelotypia. According to Ethics, III. xiii. Schol., Jealousy is "a vacillation of mind arising from a feeling of both love and hatred [for a certain object], accompanied by the idea of another person who is hated [because he has supplant us]."

92, 8 ff. On Hope, Fear, and their effects, see Ethics, IV. xliii. lxiii. ; on Confidence and Despair, Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xv.

93, 10. "Boldness." The Dutch is "Stoutheid."

CHAPTER X

94, 5 ff. Remorse (Knaging) is conceived somewhat differently in the Ethics (III. Aff. Def. xvii.), where it (Conscientiae morsus) is defined as "sorrow accompanied by the idea of something past which happened unexpectedly" (? contrary to expectations). This is Disappointment rather than Remorse. Verrassing (rashness, line 5) usually means surprise.
94, 7 f. Repentance (Berouw). In Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xxvii., Pcenitentia is defined as "sorrow accompanied by the idea of something done, which we believe that we did by a free decision of the mind."

94, 18 ff. The definitions of "Remorse" and "Repentance" given here (in the Short Treatise) are the same as those given by Descartes (De Pass. An. III. 177, 191). But Spinoza's estimate of them is altogether opposed to that of Descartes, who considers remorse "useful" as tending to make people more cautious in future, and repentance as "most useful" because leading to an improvement in conduct. In Ethics, IV. liv. Schol., Spinoza makes a noteworthy concession. "If men impotent in mind... were ashamed of nothing, and feared nothing, how could they be united or restrained? The mob inspires fear when it feels none. No wonder, therefore, that the Prophets, who were concerned about the welfare, not of the few, but of the community, commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence so greatly. And indeed those who are subject to these feelings can be led much more easily than others, so as to live eventually by the guidance of Reason, that is, to be free, and live the life of the blessed."

Chapter XI

95. Cf. Ethics, III. liii. Schol.: "Derision (Irrisio) springs from our contempt for a thing which we hate or fear, Scorn (Dedignatio), from the contempt of folly."

95, 5 ff. Cf. Ethics, IV. 1. Schol.: "He who knows rightly that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass according to the eternal laws and rules of Nature, will forsooth find nothing deserving of Hatred, Laughter, or Contempt." (Cf. George Eliot: "To understand everything would be to pardon everything.")

95, 15. This was probably directed against the view of
Descartes (De Pass. An. III. 180) that a judicious use of derision might diminish vice by making it appear ridiculous. 95, 18 f. Cf. Ethics, IV. liii. Schol.: “I see a great difference between Derision (which . . . I stated to be bad) and laughter. For laughter, and jesting (jocus) likewise, is sheer Joy; and is therefore good in itself, provided it be not excessive. Nothing, surely, but a gloomy and sad superstition forbids enjoyment.” 95, 22. “Spirits.” The allusion is to the spiritus animales, the vital or animal spirits. The doctrine of spiritus animales is found already in the writings of the ancient Stoics and the medieval Scholastics, but was developed more fully by Descartes. Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of the blood encouraged Descartes in the working out of his conception of the automatic character of animal organisms. His dualism—that is, his view that mind and body were entirely different substances which could not directly influence each other—made it necessary for him to explain all physiological processes by the principles of mechanics. The human body was accordingly regarded by him as a cleverly contrived machine, all the parts of which (heart, lungs, brain, nerves, muscles, &c.) co-operated, or acted on each other, through the mediation of the blood which circulated all over the body. Now in passing through the heart the blood (it was said) becomes heated, its finest particles thereupon separate from the coarser ones, and rise to the brain, while the rest of the blood, which is too thick for the arteries leading to the brain, circulates through the other parts of the body. It was this very fine part of the blood, which alone had access to the brain, that Descartes called “spirits” (spiritus or esprits animaux = spiritus animales). Moreover, he regarded the “pineal gland” in the brain to be the “seat” of the Soul, and (deviating from the requirements of his dualistic philosophy) he maintained that the soul could influence the body, not indeed by setting in
motion, but by directing the motion of the "vital spirits," in the same way, say, as a horseman directs the movements of his horse, which is not thereby carried by him, but actually carries him.* Descartes endeavoured to minimise this infringement against his dualism by attenuating the material aspect of his "spirits" as much as possible. In the *Discourse on Method*, v., he says that "the animal spirits are like a very subtle wind, or rather a very pure and vivid flame." They play a very important rôle in his explanation of the passions. Spinoza was opposed to this causal mingling of the mental with the physical, which he criticised severely in his *Ethics* (Preface to Part V.). And this same difference of attitude constitutes a fundamental difference between Spinoza's and Descartes' account of the "passions."

95, 22 f. Because such laughter is only a physiological process, not a mental process or feeling.

95, 25. "Indignation is hatred towards those who have injured others" (*Ethics*, III. Aff. Def. xx.), and "is necessarily evil" (IV. li. Schol.).

**Chapter XII**

96. "Glory." The Dutch *Eere* generally means "honour," and this will do if understood in the sense of "feeling honoured"; but "honour" is too ambiguous to stand alone. The definition given of it here agrees with that of *Gloria* in *Ethics*, III. Aff. Def. xxx., and although "Glory" is not a very satisfactory rendering, it has the merit of suggesting the Latin original.

96, 20 ff. Spinoza opposes the view of Descartes (*De Pass. An.* III. 206) that Glory and Shame tend to encourage virtue, the one through fear, the other through hope. In the *Ethics* (IV. lviii.) Spinoza allows that "Glory [as distinguished from

* This view has been ascribed by L. Robinson (*Archiv f. Gesch. d. Phil.* xix.), not to Descartes, but to the Cartesian Regius. The illustration is, of course, inaccurate, if pressed closely.
“vainglory” is not opposed to reason, and may even spring from it; and (IV. Appendix, § xxiii.) that “Shame also helps towards concord, though only as regards such things as cannot be concealed.”

97. 11 ff. When Descartes refers to the good side of Glory and Shame he means “good for the person who has these feelings.” Spinoza here makes a very different suggestion, namely, how such a person may thus be enabled to do good to others, who might otherwise not come under his influence.

It is interesting to compare Spinoza’s “philosophy of clothes” with what his biographers relate of him. Lucas (the earliest biographer of Spinoza) says that Spinoza himself was always careful to be dressed neatly when he went out, and strongly condemned deliberate negligence, saying, “It is not a dirty and negligent appearance that makes one learned.” Colerus, on the other hand, relates that Spinoza was dressed no better than one of the meanest citizens; that a certain eminent Councillor of State while visiting Spinoza one day found him in a slovenly morning-gown, and when blamed for it Spinoza replied that “a man is not made better by having a finer gown,” and that “it is unreasonable to wrap up things of little or no value in a precious cover” (see Pollock’s Spinoza, 2nd ed. p. 394). The two accounts are not necessarily incompatible.

Chapter XIII

98. Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xix.: “Favour is love towards one who has done good to another”; xxxiv.: “Gratitude (Gratia or Gratitudo) is the desire or endeavour of love with which we try to do good to one who from a similar feeling of love has conferred some benefit on us.”

Spinoza here opposes the view of Descartes, who (De Pass. An. III. 194) considered gratitude “always virtuous as one
of the chief bonds of human society.” In the *Ethics* (IV. li.) Spinoza says that “Favour is not opposed to reason, but may agree with it, and arise from it”; and (IV. lxxi.) that “only those who are free are most grateful to one another.”

**Chapter XIV**

99. *Ethics*, III. Aff. Def. xxxii.: “Grief (*Desiderium*) is the desire or longing to possess something, which [desire] is fostered by the memory of the thing, and at the same time restrained by the memory of other things which exclude the existence of the thing longed for.”

99, 15 ff. This was most probably meant to be a new chapter, dealing with the feelings generally from Spinoza’s own peculiar point of view.

99, 16. Note the equivalence of “True Belief” and “Reason.” *Cf.* p. 74, note.

99, 18 ff. Spinoza here repeats his protest against the Cartesian view that the passions are determined by the movements of the “vital spirits.” *Cf.* p. 69, line 26 ff.

99, 20 ff. This is also in opposition to Descartes, who denied that the soul had any direct control over the passions (*De Pass. An.* I. 45). *Cf.* *Ethics*, V. xx. Schol.: “The power of the mind is determined solely by knowledge, while its impotence or passion is measured solely by the privation of knowledge”; and the knowledge of God (Spinoza adds) enables us to reduce the passions to a minimum, if not to destroy them.

100, 5 ff. According to Descartes (*ibid.* III. 211), “all passions are by nature good”; it is only their abuse that is bad.

100, 11 ff. *Cf. Tract. de Intel. Emend.* (p. 5): “All happiness or unhappiness depends on this alone, namely, on the kind of object to which we are attached by love. For on account of that which is not loved no strife will ever arise, there will
be no sorrow if it perishes, no jealousy if it is possessed by another, no fear, no hatred, and, in a word, no mental commotion; all which arise, indeed, when we love what is perishable. . . . But love for an object eternal and infinite feeds the mind with unmixed joy."

100, 29 ff. Cf. Ethics, V. xx. Schol.: "Love towards an object immutable and eternal" "can always become greater and greater, and occupy the greatest part of the mind, and affect it through and through."

Chapter XV

102, 6 ff. Truth and Falsity are similarly defined in Cog. Metaph. I. vi., and in Ethics, I. Ax. 6. In the Tract. de Intel. Emend. (p. 11 f.), however, a different view of Truth appears, in which no reference is made to "agreement" or "correspondence" with things. To have a true idea is to have objective the essentia formalis of the thing thought about (the ideatum). This view is developed also in Ethics, II. xxxiv., &c., where "true" ideas are identified with "adequate" ideas, "false" ideas with "inadequate" ones. Cf. Ethics, II. xliii.

102, 10 ff. Cf. Descartes, Med. III. (Veitch, p. 118): "With respect to ideas, if these are considered only in themselves, and are not referred to any object beyond them, they cannot, properly speaking, be false; for, whether I imagine a goat or a chimera, it is not less true that I imagine the one than the other."

102, 15. Descartes (Princ. Phil. I. lx.-lxii.—Veitch, pp. 219 ff.) speaks of three kinds of Distinctions, namely, real, modal, and logical. A real distinction is that between two substances; a modal distinction is "that between the mode properly so called and the substance of which it is a mode, or that between two modes of the same substance"; while a logical distinction, or a distinction of reason, "is that
between a substance and some one of its attributes... or between two such attributes of a common substance, the one of which we essay to think without the other”—"for example, duration is distinct from substance only in thought (ratione), because a substance which ceases to endure ceases also to exist.” Similarly Spinoza—see p. 237.

102, 20 f. This question, it may be noted at once, is not answered in this chapter, but in the next (p. 110, lines 1-5). Most probably the passage containing the answer was intended to come at the end of this chapter.

102, 23 f. Cf. Ethics, II. xliii. Schol.: “Just as light reveals both itself and the darkness, so truth is the standard of itself and of the false” (sicul lux seípsam et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est). Compare also Tr. de Intel. Em. (p. 11) : “To be sure of a truth no sign is necessary, only just the possession of the true idea: for, as we have shown, in order that I may know, it is not necessary for me to know that I know.”

103, 12 ff. The same thought recurs in the Tr. de Intel. Em. (p. 15), where it is even more evident that Spinoza is thinking of Descartes, who (Med. III.—Veitch, p. 99) made the occurrence of dreams a ground for his preliminary scepticism.

103, 16. See the note to 78, 15 (p. 210).

103, 18-21. The falsity of an idea, according to Spinoza, is not due to any positive element, but to the “inadequacy” or fragmentariness of the idea; the true or “adequate” idea is therefore richer, or has more essence, than the false one.

103, 23. The word verstaaan, or the verb intelligere, is active, not passive.

103, 24. The expression “passivity” must not be taken too literally here. The explanation which follows immediately seems to suggest that what Spinoza meant was simply that the sequence of our ideas is not due to any arbitrary volition
on our part, but is necessary. It is true that the sentence beginning line 26 appears to suggest a kind of sensationalist view, namely, that the things outside us produce the ideas in us; and there are similar passages in chapters xvi. and xix. (see p. 109, lines 2 ff., and p. 123, lines 29 ff.). On the other hand, the explanation of error in chapter xvi. (p. 110, lines 1 ff.) shows a very different view of human knowledge, a view more like that explained in the Ethics, where he insists on the spontaneity of ideation, in opposition to the view that ideas are "dumb pictures on a tablet" (II. xlix. Schol.). Possibly Spinoza may have been thinking of the immanent necessity in the sequence of our ideas or judgments. And in the case of immanent causality the usual distinction between activity and passivity disappears. See what he actually says on p. 30, lines 8-14. It is, of course, quite easy to suppose that Spinoza's theory of knowledge went through a complete change—that he began by conceiving knowledge to be merely passive, and ended by regarding it as eminently active. But the easier interpretation is not always the more accurate one. What Spinoza really intended to oppose was, I think, the Cartesian conception of judgment as an arbitrary act of volition (Med. IV.). On p. 109, lines 6 ff., Spinoza seems to be dealing expressly with this view of Descartes. (For a discussion of this problem see Trendelenburg, Freudenthal's Spinozastudien, and Gebhardt.)

104, 1 ff. The sentence in brackets presents some difficulty. The Dutch is "(als door weinige of minder toevoeginge in [B: toevoegingen van dien] 't zelve gewaar wordende)." The word "toevoeginge" seems hardly appropriate in any case. Sigwart translates it "Affectionen," Schaarschmidt "Anregungen." This is quite plausible, inasmuch as "toevoegen" is used for "addressing some one," and it may accordingly be rendered by "stimuli." This translation, however, makes the word in in A wrong, while the sentence in brackets is a mere repetition of what precedes. But as
“toevoegen” literally means “to add,” it seems quite possible that “toevoeginge” may have been a rather clumsy translation of *attributa* or *accidentia* in the wider sense of “qualities.” If so, the passage can be rendered thus: “(as becoming aware of it only through a few or the less important of the attributes in it [or “of its attributes”]).” Dr. W. Meyer has paraphrased this passage in the same way, taking *toevoeging* as = *toeigening*, or attribute.

**Chapter XVI**

105. According to Freudenthal this chapter is misplaced. The substance of one part of it—namely, p. 109, line 21, to p. 110, line 8—should have been given at the end of chapter xv., as containing the answer to the question raised on p. 102, lines 20f. But the rest of the present chapter, and also chapters xvii. and xviii., should follow chapter xx. For chapter xix. deals with the question “wherein the well-being of a perfect man consists,” and chapter xvi. (p. 105, line 4) assumes that the question has already been dealt with. *Per contra*, chapter xix. seems to assume an immediately preceding discussion on the advantages of “true belief,” and such a discussion is found in chapter xv. As chapters xix. and xx. obviously go together, they should both follow chapter xv.; and be followed by chapters xvi.-xviii. So rearranged, the connection of ideas would be as follows: the discussion of truth and falsity (or, briefly, of knowledge) serves as an introduction to chapters xix. and xx., where it is shown that knowledge is the cause of the passions, but that these may be mastered by a knowledge of God. This raises the question discussed in chapters xvi. and xvii., namely, whether such a self-emancipation from the passions is the effect of voluntary effort, or the necessary result of inevitable causes. And chapter xviii. (which, according to Freudenthal, originally concluded the whole Treatise) rounds off the whole discussion
with a consideration of the moral value of the highest knowledge.

105, 10. Desire: see p. 73, lines 4 ff. In Ethics, III. ix. Schol., Desire is defined as "appetitus cum ejusdem conscientia," and appetitus as "ipsa hominis essentia, ex cujus natura ea, qua ipsis conservationi inserviunt, necessario sequuntur"; in short (III. Aff. Def. i.), Desire denotes "all the strivings, impulses, appetites, and volitions of man."

107, 3 ff. Cf. Ethics, II. xlvi. and xlix.

108, 1. "Idea"—that is, a general idea or abstraction derived from particular acts of volition.

108, 7. "This" = "that it is unnecessary to ask whether the will is free." The opening of this paragraph in A is somewhat obscure. B is much clearer (see lines 32 ff.).

108, 16 ff. This was a common doctrine among medieval philosophers; it is found in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, Peter Lombard, and others. Scaliger, e.g., says: "Conservatio est quaedam veluti perpetua generatio" (Exerc. 31, quoted by Freudenthal in Sp. u. d. Schol.). The same thought is also found in Crescas. Cf. Descartes, Med. III.

109, 6 ff. Spinoza is probably referring here to the Cartesian view that to have an idea is one thing, to make an affirmation or denial about it is another and depends on our free will. Spinoza identifies volition with affirmation and denial, but denies that it is free. The ideas necessitate certain affirmations or denials. Thinking is thus identified with judging. Cf. Ethics, II. xlix. Schol.


109, 21 ff. See note to p. 102, line 20 (p. 221).

Chapter XVII

112, 8 ff. Spinoza's reference to the Aristotelian distinction between βούλησις (voluntas), and ἐπιθυμία (voluptas)
is most probably based on Scholastic accounts. In *De Anima*, III. ix., Aristotle distinguishes within the conative faculty (τὸ ἀρετεύκτικόν = Spinoza’s *cupiditas*, line 12) rational desire (βοῦλησι) from irrational desire (ἐπιθυμία), and this distinction recurs also in III. x. and in the *Rhetoric*, l. x.

112, 19 ff. Spinoza’s attitude towards the Aristotelian view is not expressed clearly. Since Spinoza identifies volition with affirmation and negation and Aristotle with desire, they really mean different things, although they use the same term (will). This seems to be the meaning of the sentence in question.

**Chapter XVIII**


Trendelenburg has pointed out that in Plato’s *Euthyphron* man is similarly described as the slave of God. There is a vast difference, however. In Plato’s dialogue it is only “the ministration called *holiness*” (that is, sacrificing and praying to the Gods, as distinguished from Justice, which is service to men) that is described as “of the same nature as that which slaves render to their master.” Spinoza is not thinking at all of such restricted “divine service,” but of the whole life and conduct of man.

116, 26 ff. Probably an allusion to 1 *John*, iv. 13: “Hereby know we that we dwell in Him, and He in us, because He hath given us of His spirit.” This verse was subsequently put by Spinoza on the title-page of his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*.

117, 12 ff. Cf. Browning's Last Ride Together; or Tennyson's Wages:

"Glory of Virtue, to fight, to struggle, to right the wrong—
Nay, but she aimed not at glory, no lover of glory she:
Give her the glory of going on, and still to be.

She desires no isles of the blest, no quiet seats of the just,
To rest in a golden grove, or to bask in a summer sky:
Give her the wages of going on, and not to die."

Chapter XIX

118. According to Freudenthal this chapter, and the next, should have been placed immediately after chapter xv. See the first note to chapter xvi. (p. 223).

118, 26 ff. Allusion to Romans iii. 20 ff. : "By the works of the law shall no man be justified in His sight: for through the law cometh the knowledge of sin. But now apart from the law a righteousness of God hath been manifested . . . even the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ unto all them that believe; . . . being justified freely by His grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." See Introduction, p. cxxvi.

118, 30 ff. "Know and enjoy." Probably a reminiscence of Biblical language, as in Psalm xxxiv. 8 : "O taste and see that the Lord is good."

119, 18 ff. It was on account of Descartes' initial scepticism that Spinoza felt it necessary to prove the existence of material bodies. "A body" = Extension, or Matter.

119, 27 ff. This paragraph appears, at first sight, to be directed against Occasionalism—the view, namely, that our perception of a body is produced in our mind by the direct
action of God on the "occasion" of the presence of such a body. But there is no other evidence of Spinoza's acquaintance with Occasionalism. It may be that Spinoza was only thinking of the "omnipotent demon" who, as Descartes suggested (*Med. I*), might be deluding us with fancies of apparently material bodies. The context, dealing as it does with Descartes' scepticism, seems to me to confirm this.

119, 34. The reference to the "first chapter" seems to be inaccurate. The passage to which reference is made is supposed to show that there is nothing outside God (and that, therefore, no such demon can exist). This is done, not in the first chapter, but in the first Dialogue (also in chapter ii. Book I.).

120, ff. In various parts of the *Short Treatise*, but especially in this chapter and the next, Spinoza deals with the relation between mind and body. Only indirectly, however, or incidentally—for his main inquiry is ethical, not psychological, in character. It is regrettable that he did not discuss the problem for its own sake, because in that case he would have expressed his views more clearly and consistently than he has done in these incidental discussions which originated on different occasions, and had different aims. As it is, we seem to have here several different views on the relation between mind and body. And as we have no independent knowledge of the chronological orders, or of the geological formation (so to say) of the parts of the *Treatise*, it is impossible to speak with absolute confidence of the actual order or sequence among these views. It seems reasonable, however, to suppose that their logical order is also more or less representative of their chronological sequence. His final view, we take it, was what has since become familiar as that of psycho-physical parallelism. This view is the one adopted in the *Ethics*, though with occasional lapses. The other views may be regarded as leading up to this one.
Now, in the first place, do body and mind interact? In some passages the view expressed or implied is that they do. Body acts on mind (p. 103, lines 26 ff.; 112, 26; 119, 7 ff.; 122, 26 ff.; 129, 15 ff., &c.); and mind acts on body, or, at all events, the soul can move its own body (129, 6 ff.), and through it also other bodies (130, 12 ff.). In other passages, however, this view, apparently, of direct interaction is considerably modified, if not denied. The mind, we are told, cannot affect even its own body, except through the mediation of the "vital spirits," whose movements it cannot initiate or terminate, but only control or direct (121, 2 ff., 28 ff.; 127, 10 ff.); nor can body act directly on mind without the intervention of "vital spirits" (122, 4 ff.). And this, of course, is the Cartesian view (see note to 95, 22—p. 216).

Spinoza, however, was not satisfied with this solution. After all, the "vital spirits" were physical, and one might just as well suppose that mind can interact with body as with them. We find, accordingly, a new solution of the problem. Mind and body can affect each other, because they are mere modes of one and the same whole, or substance (127, 34 ff.; 121, 9 ff.). This answer may have suggested yet another point of view from which the problem itself disappeared.

So far the reality of interaction of some sort was assumed, the problem being to explain it. And Spinoza tried to do so, first by invoking "spirits," and then by his conception of a "whole," in which mind and body were most intimately united. The ultimate "whole," according to Spinoza, is Substance, of which Extension and Thought are co-attributes. These stand in no causal relationship to each other; they are, so to say, collateral expressions of the same reality; the one does not cause the other, but simply is the other—that is, another or parallel aspect of the same reality. Similarly, mind and body are really one whole, merely a double-faced mode of substance; mind does not affect body, nor body mind; the one simply is the other—that is,
a parallel aspect of the same reality. So there is really no interaction—and no problem. This view is expressed, though not adequately, in the passage now under consideration (pp. 120, 121; cf. Ethics, II. vii. and III. ii.).

The theory of psycho-physical parallelism, first enunciated by Spinoza, did not receive the attention which it merited until some two centuries afterwards, but has held its ground since then as the favourite working-hypothesis among psychologists. (For a fuller account see Freudenthal, *Ueber die Entwicklung der Lehre vom psychophysischen Parallelismus bei Spinoza.*)

120, 4. "Power"—cf. the note to 34, 16 (p. 187).
120, 12 ff. Cf. Ethics, II. xiii.
120, 21 ff. Cf. Ethics, II. Lemma iii., and III. ii.
120, 22. "Rest" (ἡσύγωνον) was regarded by Aristotle (*De Caelo*, II.), not as the mere absence of motion, but as its positive contrary; that is to say (in more modern language), not as the mere absence of energy of motion, but as the presence of energy of position. This positive conception of "rest" is also found in Descartes' *Principia*, II.; in *Med.*, III., however, Descartes speaks as though "rest" were the mere absence of motion, as darkness is of light. Note † (p. 120) may have been directed against this suggestion.

121, 12 ff. Cf. p. 69, lines 26 ff., and p. 158, lines 2 ff.
121, 23. See p. 78, lines 20 ff.
124, 3. "Object" = object of thought. The sentence is awkwardly expressed, but the meaning is clear.

**Chapter XX**

126, 18. "Their form . . ." The Dutch is haár, which generally means "their," but is used by Spinoza also for the singular. If translated by "its," the reference would be to the body. But cf. p. 127, line 5.
127, 34 ff. This long note, as Sigwart has shown, contains various suggestions which Spinoza subsequently elaborated in the *Ethics* (II. xi.-xxxii.).

128, 6-9. "We have also said . . ." Not in this *Treatise* as we now have it. The part referred to must have been lost.

128, 12-17. "Page —." The numbers of the pages referred to are not given in the MS. Nor is it easy to find suitable passages for most of them. The third proposition is not proved in this *Treatise* at all. The references are probably either to lost parts, or to parts which Spinoza intended to write, but did not.

128, 25 ff. "Has an idea"—that is, an adequate idea, as explained immediately afterwards.

129, 9 ff. "Paul" and "Peter" should probably change places.

129, 20 ff. This sentence seems irrelevant. Perhaps the difference in our ideas of the same object was intended as a proof of their imperfection, of which the preceding sentence speaks.

129, 33. The words *idea reflexiva* seem to be quite irrelevant here, and the version which they suggested to Monnikhoff is wrong. Sigwart has suggested that the error may be due to the fact that on p. 162, lines 13 ff., Spinoza passes at once from the explanation of "feeling" to the *idea reflexiva* (self-consciousness), and this transition may have been misunderstood by the copyist, or by a reader.


**Chapter XXI**

131. According to Freudenthal, this and the following five chapters are later additions to the *Short Treatise*, which originally concluded with what is now chapter xviii. *See* the first note to chapter xvi. (p. 223). The addition of these
last six chapters, Freudenthal thinks, was necessitated by Spinoza's (later) distinction between Reason and Understanding (or Intuition, which is the highest kind of knowledge).

The views found in the present chapter are developed much more fully in *Ethics*, IV. ix.-xvii.


*Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor,*

and takes *Ecclesiastes*, i. 18 ("He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow") to refer to such cases.

131, 31. What does "for, &c.," refer to? Possibly to the next sentence in the text (p. 132, lines 2 ff.). So, at all events, Monnikhoff seems to have understood it, for instead of "See pages . . .," B has "See above." But the passages referred to by A are not irrelevant to the note as a whole, and were most probably not meant to refer only to the last sentence of the note.

**Chapter XXII**

133. The "fourth kind of knowledge"—see pp. 67-69, and the notes on them. Sigwart cites several passages from Heereboord's *Logic* which appear at first to express a view very like Spinoza's on knowledge as a bond of union between man and God. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the two views. The knowledge to which Heereboord refers is discursive knowledge, or what Spinoza calls "Reason," while Spinoza refers to "intuitive" knowledge, which is almost mystical in character. The view of Heereboord, it may be remarked, is already found in Maimonides and other medieval Aristotelians.

134, 7 f. "That same thing" = Nature (line 6) or God (see line 10), or possibly the "thinking thing"—*i.e.*, the
attribute Thought (see lines 15 ff. and p. 64, lines 20 f.). The meaning is ultimately the same in any case. It may be that the sentence is imperfect, and (as suggested by Dr. W. Meyer) the following words should be inserted after "in" (line 7): "the thinking thing, which idea is . . . ."

134, 18. The expression "cause" is not quite accurate here. What is meant (as the context shows) is that, corresponding to that mode in the Attribute Extension called our body, there is a mode in the Attribute Thought called our soul; but it is not the body that "produces" the soul (the Attribute Thought does that), it is only in a certain sense the "occasion" of its existence. Note †† was obviously intended to correct the false suggestion of the word "cause." Possibly the note was made, not by Spinoza, but by some reader.

Chapter XXIII

136. Cf. p. 65, lines 31 ff.; also Ethics, V. xxi.-xxiii., xxxiii. f., xxxviii. f. (In the Cogitata Metaphysica, II. xii., the soul is said to be immortal because it is a substance, and a substance cannot destroy itself, nor be destroyed by any other created substance. But this reasoning was obviously not intended to represent Spinoza's own views.)

Joel has rightly drawn attention to a certain similarity in the views of Spinoza and Maimonides on Immortality. According to both Maimonides and Spinoza, Immortality (in the higher sense) is not something which is the common right of all, independently of the lives they actually live, but rather a gift that has to be acquired by leading a life not only of moral uprightness, but also of strenuous effort after the highest kind of knowledge. Very similar to their view on Immortality is also their view on Providence. (See the note to 140, 21 ff.).
Chapter XXIV

138, 8. "What there is . . ." The Dutch is *wat daar af is en te zeggen zoude zijn* [B: *wat daar af is, en van het zelfde zou te zeggen zijn*]. The construction seems to be confused; but the meaning is clear.

138, 13 ff. Cf. Ethics, V. xvii. (*Deus expers est passionum, nec ullo Latitiae aut Tristitiae affectu afficitur*) and xix. (*Qui Deum amat, conari non potest, ut Deus ipsum contra amet*).

138, 27 ff. Cf. Ethics, V. xxxvi. and xl. Schol.: "... Our mind, in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of Thought, which is determined by another mode of Thought, and this again by another, *et sic in infinitum*; so that all taken together constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God."

139, 4 ff. Cf. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, chapters iv., xvi., and xix.

140, 21 ff. The following passage from Maimonides (*Guide*, III. liv. p. 395) throws some light on this paragraph (and also on parts of chapter xxiii.): "Even this [moral perfection] is only a preparation for another perfection, and is not sought for its own sake. For all moral principles concern the relation of man to his neighbour. ... Imagine a person being all alone, and ... all his good moral principles ... are not required. ... These principles are only necessary and useful when man comes in contact with others. The fourth kind of perfection is the true perfection of man; the possession of the highest intellectual faculties; the possession of ... true metaphysical notions concerning God. With this perfection man attains to his final end; ... it gives him immortality; and makes him what is (properly) called Man."

141, 5 ff. Cf. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, i. vi. xiii.
CHAPTER XXV

143. Cf. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, ii.

As already stated in the Introduction, this chapter on Devils played an important rôle in the recovery of the Short Treatise. Kindness shown even to the devil is not wasted. Devils and spirits of all sorts and conditions were very real things in those days; Spinoza's quiet humour is much in advance of his time. In an earlier draft of the Treatise this chapter may have had a different place, for it is referred to as chapter xxi. by Hallmann.

143, 15 ff. In Ethics, II. xxx., Spinoza says, on the contrary, that "the duration of our body does not depend upon its essence . . . but . . . upon the common order of nature and the constitution of things."

CHAPTER XXVI

144, 8. B omits the words "through reason . . ." probably because the copyist (Monnikhoff) noticed that it had not been shown how "our blessedness" is attained "through reason." See note to 128, 12–17 (p. 230).

144, 18 ff. Cf. Ethics, V. xlii.: "Blessedness is not virtue's reward, but virtue itself. . . . The more a mind delights in the love of God . . . the more does it understand, that is, the greater power has it over its feelings, and the less does it suffer from evil passions."

144, 22 ff. Cf. Ethics, V. xli.: "Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal we should still hold Piety and Religion to be of first importance. . . . The creed of the multitude appears to be different. For most people seem to believe that they are free only in so far as they are permitted to indulge in lustfulness. . . . Piety and Religion . . . they believe to be burdens. . . ." It is only the hope of reward and the fear of punishment after death that induce them to
submit to the divine law. If they believed that minds perish with the body they would follow their own sweet will, and obey chance desires rather than themselves. But "this seems to be no less absurd than the conduct of a man who, because he does not believe that he can feed his body with good food to all eternity, decides to stuff himself with poisonous and deadly drugs; or because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, therefore prefers to be mad and live without reason."

145, 8 ff. The parable of the fish (as Joel has pointed out) was probably suggested to Spinoza by the following Talmudical legend (Babylonian Talmud, Berachot, 61b—quoted by Joel). In the reign of Hadrian the Romans prohibited the Jews to study the Law. Rabbi Akiba, however, persisted in studying and teaching it. And when a certain Pappos warned him of the danger that threatened him, he replied with the following parable: A fox on the banks of a river saw many fishes hurrying away from a certain spot. Asking them why they fled, he was told that they were afraid of the nets which had just been spread for them. "Come, then," suggested the fox, "come out, and let us live together on land, even as our forefathers did." "What!" exclaimed the fishes, "if even in our own element we can only live in fear and dread, what shall we do on land, which to us spells death?" Even so, said Rabbi Akiba, is it with the Jews. The Law is our element, for it is written, "It is thy life and the length of thy days." If danger lurks in the study of the Law, a yet greater danger lurks in the neglect thereof.

145, 28 ff. Cf. Hosea, xi. 4: "I drew them . . . with bands of love."

In the Ethics, V. xxxvi. Schol., Spinoza says that human Salvation, or Blessedness or Freedom, consists in "a constant and eternal love towards God."

146, 11 ff. Cf. Ethics, V. xl. : "The more perfect a thing is
the more reality it possesses, and consequently acts more and suffers less."

147, 1 ff. Cf. p. 36, lines 21 ff.
147, 5 ff. "Whole," however, is only an ens rationis, and does not adequately express the actual relationship of God to finite beings.

147, 9 ff. Cf. Ethics, V. xxxviii. xl. Here it is maintained that the greater our union with God is, the greater is our activity; in the Ethics we see the converse of this, namely, the more active we are (or the more we understand) the more are we united with God.

147, 16 ff. Cf. Ethics, V. xxix.—xxxii.
147, 31 ff. Cf. Ethics, IV. xxxii.—xxxvii.
148, 3 f. The Dutch is not very clear: hoe 't zij, of niet zij, ik ben gehouwen of geslaagen, dit 's klaar.
148, 35 ff. This note is apparently just a marginal summary.


APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

153. This gives a "geometric" version of the first half of chapter ii. Part I. It is remarkable that no Definitions are given, although they are really essential features of the "geometric method." Spinoza, however, made good the omission not only in the Ethics, but already in a brief essay (very similar to this Appendix) which he sent to Oldenburg, whose first letter to Spinoza and the latter's reply thereto have already been referred to in the Introduction (pp. lxiv. f., cxxiii.). In the course of his reply Spinoza remarks that
he thought it best to state his explanations also separately in the geometric form, and that he was enclosing it for Oldenburg's perusal and criticism. Unfortunately the enclosed essay has been lost. The correspondence (Letters II.-IV.), however, leaves little doubt about the contents of that essay, which Sigwart has reconstructed as follows:

I. Definitiones

1. Deum definio esse Ens constans infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque est infinitum sive summe perfectum in suo genere.

2. Per attributum intelligo omne id quod concipiatur per se et in se, adeo ut ipsius conceptus non involvat conceptum alterius rei. Ut ex. gr. extensio per se et in se concipiatur; at motus non item. Nam concipiatur in alio, et ipsius conceptus involvit extensionem.

3. Ea res dicitur in suo genere infinita, quae alia ejusdem naturae non terminatur. Sic corpus non terminatur cogitatione, nec cogitatio corpore.

4. Per substantiam intelligo id, quod per se et in se concipiatur, hoc est cujus conceptus non involvit conceptum alterius rei.

5. Per modificationem sive per accidens intelligo id, quod in alio est et per id, in quo est, concipiatur.

II. Axiomata

1. Substantia est prior natura suis accidentibus.

2. Præter substantias et accidentia nil datur realiter, sive extra intellectum.

3. Res quæ diversa habent attributa, nihil habent inter se commune.

4. Rerum quæ nihil habent inter se commune, una alterius causa esse non potest.
III. Propositiones

1. *In rerum natura non possunt existere duæ substantiae ejusdem attributi.*

2. *Substantia non potest produci [neque ab alia quacumque substantia], sed de ipsius essentia est existere.*

3. *Omnis substantia debet esse infinita sive summe perfecta in suo genere.*

There was also a *Scholium* like Schol. 2 in *Ethics*, I. viii., but it is difficult to restore the text of it.

The first Appendix was probably a first draft of the above essay (1661), in which Definitions were added, while the rest was abridged.

153, 6 f. In the *Cagitata Metaphysica* (II. v.) Spinoza enumerates three kinds of "distinctions." *Rerum distinctio triplex, Realis, Modalis, Rationis.* The explanations which he adds are the same as those given by Descartes. *See* note to 102, 15 (pp. 220 f.).

153, 19 f. Axiom 7 looks suspicious. It is really only a repetition of Axiom 1. Possibly it was only a reader’s note on Axiom 1, but was incorporated in the text by an uncritical copyist. The suspicion is confirmed by the fact that no use is made of it in what follows.

APPENDIX II


On p. 24 (lines 31 ff.) it was maintained that whatever is in the infinite understanding of God must actually exist; here (lines 18 ff.) we have the converse assertion, namely, that whatever is real must have its idea in the attribute Thought.
The subject of paragraph i is really continued on p. 159, 28-p. 160, 5, and Freudenthal held that these lines have got misplaced somehow, as they would fit in very well if placed immediately after p. 158, 2, while they are irrelevant in their actual context.

157, 24 ff. In *Ethics*, II. vii. Schol., Spinoza says: “The [so-called] thinking substance and the [so-called] extended substance are really one and the same substance, which is comprehended now under this, now under that attribute. Similarly, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, only expressed in two ways; a truth which certain Hebrews appear to have seen as if through a cloud, for they state, namely, that God, the intellect of God, and the things which are apprehended by that intellect are one and the same thing.”

158, 4 ff. Cf. pp. 69 (lines 26 ff.), 121 ff.

158, 7 ff. Cf. p. 79 (lines 8 ff.), and *Ethics*, III. vi. f.


159, 6. *Realiter* is not quite accurate here; it is used in a wider sense or from a Cartesian point of view, according to which “things” and “souls” are substances, which are therefore different *realiter*.

159, 9. “Essence”—that is, of the soul.

159, 16 f. That is, he does not say “which exists as a material (or extended) thing.”

159, 24. “As regards their existence.” Dutch, na haar *wezentlijkheyt*. The Latin was most probably *realiter*. Attributes do not differ *realiter*, because a *distinctio realis* is only between different *substances*. The attributes, however, though distinct, are not distinct substances, nor are they supported by distinct substances; they are their own “subjects” or substrates (that is to say, they need no other “subjects” for their support), and together they constitute the one and only “Substance.”

159, 28 ff. See note to 157, 14 ff. (top of this page).
160, 20. "Which really exists in Nature." The stress laid on this clause will only be understood after a careful reading of the whole paragraph, omitting p. 159, 28–p. 160, 5. So long as Extension and the other Attributes do not evolve particular modes having duration in time (existence), so long also there is only the Attribute Thought as an Attribute, and there are no individual "Ideas" or "Souls." "Souls" are only evolved out of the Attribute Thought in so far as particular "modes" (bodies, &c.) of the other Attributes come into existence.

160, 26 ff. Spinoza generally distinguishes between the attribute Thought and its infinite mode or Idea, Understanding. B must be wrong here.

161, 6 ff. Cf. notes 7–14 on pp. 63 ff. These notes show a further development of the ideas in the present paragraph, and are most probably later additions.

162, 13 ff. The concluding sentences really contain a very brief synopsis of the plan which Spinoza followed in the second part of the Ethics, where (as Sigwart has pointed out) propositions xi.–xix. are devoted to the consideration of the idea corporis and idea affectionum corporis, xx.–xxiii. to the idea idea (= idea reflexiva), xxiv.–xxxii. to sense-experience, xxxii.–xxxvi. to adequate and inadequate ideas, xxxviii. ff. to reasoned knowledge, &c. The conclusion of the Short Treatise thus directs our attention to the Ethics.
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