

**COMPLETE PHILOSOPHICAL AND
THEOLOGICAL TREATISES
of
ANSELM of CANTERBURY**

Translated
by
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MONOLOGION

PREFACE¹

Certain brothers have frequently and earnestly entreated me to write out for them, in the form of a meditation, certain things which I had discussed in non-technical terms with them regarding meditating on the Divine Being and regarding certain other [themes] related to a meditation of this kind. For the writing of this meditation they prescribed—in accordance more with their own wishes than with the ease of the task or with my ability—the following format: that nothing at all in the meditation would be argued on Scriptural authority, but that in unembellished style and by unsophisticated arguments and with uncomplicated disputation rational necessity would tersely prove to be the case, and truth's clarity would openly manifest to be the case, whatever the conclusion resulting from the distinct inquiries would declare. They also desired that I not disdain to refute simple and almost foolish objections which would occur to me.

For a long time I was reluctant to attempt this; and comparing myself with the task, I tried on many grounds to make excuses for myself. For the more readily they wished that what they were seeking should be of practical use to them, the more difficult they were making it for me to accomplish what they sought. But at last, overcome by the modest insistence of their entreaties as well as by the commendable probity of their earnestness, I began [to undertake] what they were entreating, [even though] I was [still] reluctant because of the difficulty of the task and the weakness of my intellectual power. But because of their love I gladly and to the best of my ability finished [it] in accordance with their prescription. I was induced to this [undertaking] by the expectation that whatever I did would be known only to those who made the request [of me] and that after a while they would overwhelm it with contempt, scorning it as a thing of little value. For in this [undertaking], I know, I was not so much able to satisfy those who were entreating [me] as I was able to put an end to the entreaties that were pursuing me. Nevertheless, contrary to my expectation,

¹The *Monologion*, composed at the Monastery of Bec, France, was completed in 1076.

it somehow turned out that not only the aforementioned brothers but also several others were engaged in committing this treatise to posterity by each making a copy for himself.

After frequently re-examining this treatise, I have not been able to find that I said in it anything inconsistent with the writings of the Catholic Fathers—especially with Blessed Augustine's writings. Therefore, if it shall seem to anyone that in this work I have set forth some [doctrine] which either is altogether new or else departs from the truth, then I make the following request: let him not immediately declare me to be one who presumes to new [doctrines] or who teaches falsehood, but let him first look carefully at the books of *On the Trinity* by the aforementioned teacher, viz., Augustine, and then let him judge my work in the light of these books. For in stating that the Supreme Trinity can be called three substances, I have followed the Greeks, who confess [that God is] three substances in one person, by means of the same faith with which we [confess that He is] three persons in one substance. For with respect to God they signify by “substance” what we [signify] by “person.”

Now, whatever I have stated in this treatise I have stated in the role of one who by reflection alone investigates, and disputes with himself about, points which he had previously not considered—just as I knew was desired by those whose request I was endeavoring to oblige.

Now, I entreat and adjure anyone who wants to copy this work to make sure to append this preface at the very front thereof, before the chapter-titles themselves. For if someone knows at the outset with what intent and in what manner the disputation has been conducted, I believe that he will be greatly aided in understanding what he will read in the work itself. I also think that if someone sees this preface first, he will not be quick to pass judgment should he find presented [in the treatise] something counter to his own view.

CHAPTER-TITLES

1. There is something that is the best, the greatest, the highest, of all existing things.
2. The same topic continued.

3. There is a Nature which exists through itself, which is the highest of all existing things, and through which exists whatever is.
4. The same topic continued.
5. Just as this [Nature] exists through itself (*per se*) and [all] other things exist through it, so it exists from itself (*ex se*) and [all] other things exist from it.
6. This Nature was not brought into existence through any assisting cause. Nevertheless, it does not exist through nothing or from nothing. How it can be understood to exist through itself and from itself.
7. How all other things exist through and from this [Nature].
8. How “[This Nature] made all things from nothing” is to be construed.
9. Before their creation those things which have been made from nothing were not nothing with respect to their Maker's reason.
10. This reason is an expression of things, just as a craftsman first tells himself what he is going to make.
11. Nevertheless, in this comparison there is much dissimilarity.
12. The Expression of the Supreme Being is the Supreme Being.
13. Just as all things were made through the Supreme Being, so they are sustained through it.
14. The Supreme Being exists in all things and through all things; and all things exist from it, through it, and in it.
15. What can and what cannot be predicated of the Supreme Being substantively.
16. For the Supreme Being to be *just* is the same as for it to be justice. The case is the same regarding that which can be predicated of it in a way similar [to the way in which “just” is predicated]. None of these [predicates] indicate what kind of thing it is or of what magnitude it is; instead, [they indicate] what it is.
17. [The Supreme Being] is so simple that whatever things can be predicated of its essence are one and the same thing in it. And something can be predicated substantively of the Supreme Being only with respect to what [this Being] is.
18. [The Supreme Being] exists without beginning and without end.
19. How nothing existed before or will exist after the Supreme Being.

20. The Supreme Being exists in every place and at all times.
21. [The Supreme Being] exists in no place at no time.
22. How [the Supreme Being] exists in every place at every time and in no place at no time.
23. How [the Supreme Being] can better be understood to exist everywhere than in every place.
24. How [the Supreme Being] can better be understood to exist always than at every time.
25. [The Supreme Being] is not mutable in virtue of any accidents.
26. In what sense [the Supreme Being] is to be called substance. It is beyond every substance. It is uniquely whatever it is.
27. [The Supreme Being] is not included in the usual classification of substances; nevertheless, it is a substance and an individual spirit.
28. This Spirit exists in an unqualified sense; compared to it created things do not exist.
29. This Spirit's Expression is the very same thing as this Spirit. Nevertheless, there are not two spirits but [only] one.
30. This Expression is not many words but is one word.
31. This Word is not the likeness of created things but is true Existence. Created things are a likeness of this true Existence. Which natures exist more, and are more excellent, than others.
32. The Supreme Spirit speaks of itself by means of a co-eternal Word.
33. By means of one Word [the Supreme Spirit] speaks both of itself and of that which it has made.
34. How [the Supreme Spirit] can be seen to speak of creatures by its own Word.
35. Whatever was made exists as life and truth in the Word and Knowledge of the Supreme Spirit.
36. In what an incomprehensible manner [the Supreme Spirit] speaks of, or knows, the things made by it.
37. Whatever the Supreme Spirit *is* in relation to creatures this Spirit's Word also is. And yet, together they are not [this relation] in a plural way.
38. It cannot be said what two they are, although they must be two.
39. This Word exists from the Supreme Spirit by being begotten.

40. The Supreme Spirit is most truly parent, and the Word is most truly offspring.
41. The Supreme Spirit most truly begets, and the Word is most truly begotten.
42. It is most truly characteristic of the one to be begetter and father, and of the other to be begotten and son.
43. Reconsideration of what is common to both and of what is proper to each.
44. How the one is the essence of the other.
45. The Son can more fittingly be called the essence of the Father than the Father [can be called the essence] of the Son. Similarly, the Son is the strength of the Father, the wisdom of the Father, and the like.
46. How various of the [statements] which are expressed in the foregoing way can also be understood in another way.
47. The Son is Understanding of Understanding, Truth of Truth, etc.
48. The Father is referred to as Memory, just as the Son is referred to as Understanding. How the Son is the Understanding (or Wisdom) of Memory, the Memory of the Father, and the Memory of Memory.
49. The Supreme Spirit loves itself.
50. This love proceeds equally from the Father and the Son.
51. The Father and the Son love themselves and each other in equal degree.
52. This Love is as great as the Supreme Spirit.
53. This Love is the same thing as the Supreme Spirit is; and yet, this Love is one spirit with the Father and the Son.
54. [This Love] proceeds as a whole from the Father and as a whole from the Son. Nevertheless, there is only one love.
55. [This Love] is not the son of the Father and of the Son.
56. Only the Father is begetter and unbegotten. Only the Son is begotten. Only their Love is neither begotten nor unbegotten.
57. This Love is uncreated and creator, even as are the Father and the Son. Nevertheless, they are together one uncreated creator and not three [uncreated creators]. This Love can be called the Spirit of the Father and of the Son.
58. Just as the Son is the essence and wisdom of the Father in the sense that He has the same essence and wisdom as the Fa-

- ther, so their Spirit is the essence, wisdom, and the like, of the Father and of the Son.
59. The Father and the Son and their Spirit exist equally in one another.
 60. No one of them needs the other for remembering, understanding, or loving—because each, distinctly, is Memory, Understanding, Love, and whatever [else] must be present in the Supreme Being.
 61. Nevertheless, there are not three [fathers, or three sons or three spirits] but one father, one son, and one spirit common to them.
 62. How from these [viz., the Father, the Son, and their Spirit] many sons seem to be begotten.
 63. How in the Supreme Spirit there is only one son and one who has a son.
 64. Although inexplicable, this [teaching] must be believed.
 65. How regarding [this] ineffable matter something true was argued.
 66. Through the rational mind one comes nearest to knowing the Supreme Being.
 67. The mind is the mirror and image of the Supreme Being.
 68. The rational creature was made for loving the Supreme Being.
 69. The soul that always loves the Supreme Being lives at some time in true happiness.
 70. The Supreme Being gives itself as a reward to [the soul] which loves it.
 71. [The soul] that despises the Supreme Being will be eternally unhappy.
 72. Every human soul is immortal.
 73. [The soul] is either always unhappy or else at some time truly happy.
 74. No soul is unjustly deprived of the Supreme Good. [The soul] is supposed to strive for the Supreme Good wholeheartedly.
 75. We are to hope for the Supreme Being.
 76. We are to believe in the Supreme Being.
 77. We ought to believe equally in the Father, the Son, and their Spirit—in each distinctly and in all three together.
 78. Which faith is alive and which is dead.
 79. What three the Supreme Being can in some respect be said

to be.

80. The Supreme Being exercises dominion over all things and rules all things and is the only God.

MONOLOGION

CHAPTER ONE

There is something that is the best, the greatest,
the highest, of all existing things.

There may be someone who, as a result of not hearing or of not believing, is ignorant of the one Nature, highest of all existing things, alone sufficient unto itself in its eternal beatitude, through its own omnipotent goodness granting and causing all other things to be something and in some respect to fare well. And he may also be ignorant of the many other things which we necessarily believe about God and His creatures. If so, then I think that in great part he can persuade himself of these matters merely by reason alone—if he is of even average intelligence. Although he can do this in many ways, I shall propose one [way] which I regard as the most accessible for him. For since all men seek to enjoy only those things which they consider to be good, at some time or other he can readily turn his mind's eye to investigating that thing from whence are derived these goods which he seeks only because he judges them to be good. Thus, with reason guiding and with him following, he may then rationally advance to the matters of which he is unreasonably ignorant. Nevertheless, if in this [investigation] I say something that a greater authority does not teach, I want it to be accepted in such way that even if it is a necessary consequence of reasons which will seem [good] to me, it is not thereby said to be absolutely necessary, but is said only to be able to appear necessary for the time being.

It is, then, easy for someone to ask himself the following question: although the good things whose very great variety we perceive by the bodily senses and distinguish by the mind's reason are so numerous, are we to believe that there is one thing through which all good things are good, or are some things good through something else? Indeed, the following is thoroughly certain and is evident to all who are willing to give heed: whatever things are

said to be something in such way that they are said to be [it] either in greater or lesser or equal degree in relation to one another, are said to be [it] through something which is understood to be identical in the different things (rather than through something different in the different things), whether it is considered to be in them in equal or in unequal degree. For example, whatever things are said to be *just* in relation to one another—whether [they are said to be] equally [just] or [whether some are said to be] more just and [others] less just—can be understood to be just only through justice, which is not something different in [these] different things. Therefore, since it is certain that if compared with one another all good things are either equally or unequally good, it is necessary that all [good] things are good through something which is understood to be identical in [these] different goods—although at times, ostensibly, some things are said to be good through something else. For, ostensibly, a horse is said to be good through one thing, because it is strong, and is said to be good through another thing because it is swift. For although, ostensibly, it is said to be good through strength and good through swiftness, nevertheless strength and swiftness are seen not to be the same thing. Now, if a horse is good because it is strong or swift, how is it that a strong and swift robber is evil? Rather, then, just as a strong and swift robber is evil because he is harmful, so a strong and swift horse is good because it is useful. Indeed, ordinarily, nothing is thought to be good except because of a certain usefulness (e.g., health and whatever conduces to health are called good) or because of some kind of excellence (e.g., beauty and what conduces to beauty are considered to be good). But since the reasoning already seen can in no way be faulted, it is necessary that even every useful and every excellent thing—if they are truly goods—be good through that very thing (whatever it be) through which it is necessary that all [good] things be good.

But who could doubt that that through which all [good] things are good is [itself] a great good? Therefore, it is good through itself, since every [good] thing is good through it. So it follows that all other [good] things are good through something other than what they are and that this other alone [is good] through itself. But no good which is [good] through something other [than itself] is equal to or greater than that good which is good through itself.

Hence, only that which alone is good through itself is supremely good; for that is supreme which so excels others that it has neither an equal nor a superior. Now, what is supremely good is also supremely great. Therefore, there is one thing which is supremely good and supremely great—i.e., [which is] the highest of all existing things.

CHAPTER TWO

The same topic continued.

Just as something has been found to be supremely good inasmuch as all good things are good through some one thing which is good through itself, so it follows necessarily that something is supremely great inasmuch as whatever things are great are great through some one thing which is great through itself. I do not mean great in size, as is a material object; but [I mean great in the sense] that the greater [anything is] the better or more excellent it is—as in the case of wisdom. Now, since only what is supremely good can be supremely great, it is necessary that something be the greatest and the best, i.e., the highest, of all existing things.

CHAPTER THREE

There is a Nature which exists through itself, which is the highest of all existing things, and through which exists whatever is.

Indeed, not only are all good things good through the same thing and all great things great through the same thing, but also whatever *is* is seen to exist through some one thing. For whatever is exists either through something or through nothing. But it is not the case that anything exists through nothing. For it cannot even be conceived that there is anything which exists other than through something. Thus, whatever is exists only through something. Accordingly, either there is one thing or there are many things through which all existing things exist. But if there are many things, then either (1) they are traced back to some one thing through which they exist, or (2) each of the many exists through itself, or (3) they exist mutually through one another. (1') But if these many exist through one thing, then it is not, after all, the case that everything exists through the many but is rather the

case that [everything exists] through that one thing through which the many exist. (2') But if each of the many exists through itself, then surely there is some one power-(or nature)-of-existing-through-itself which they have in order to exist through themselves. And there is no doubt that they exist through this one thing through which they have the fact that they exist through themselves. Thus, all things exist through this one thing more truly than through the many things which themselves are not able to exist without this one thing. (3') But [sound] reasoning does not allow that the many exist mutually through one another, for the thought that a thing exists through that to which it gives existence is irrational. For not even relational things exist in this manner through one another. For example, when a master and a servant are referred to relatively to each other, the [two] men referred to do not at all exist through each other, nor do the relations by which they are referred to exist at all through each other (for these relations exist through their subjects).

Therefore, since the truth altogether excludes [the possibility of] there being a plurality through which all things exist, it must be the case that that through which all existing things exist is one thing.

Since, then, all existing things exist through one thing, without doubt this one thing exists through itself. Thus, all existing things other [than this one] exist through something other [than themselves]; and this one alone exists through itself. But whatever exists through something other [than itself] exists less than that which alone exists through itself and through which all other things exist. Accordingly, that which exists through itself exists most greatly of all. Therefore, there is some one thing which alone exists most greatly of all and most highly of all. But what exists most greatly of all and [is that] through which exists whatever is good and great and whatever is anything at all—necessarily, this is supremely good, supremely great, the highest of all existing things. Accordingly, there is something which—whether it is called a being, a substance, or a nature—is the best, the greatest, and the highest, of all existing things.

CHAPTER FOUR

The same topic continued.

Moreover, if anyone considers the natures of things, he cannot help perceiving that they are not all of equal excellence but that some of them differ by an inequality of gradation. For if anyone doubts that a horse is by nature better than a tree and that a man is more excellent than a horse, then surely this [person] ought not to be called a man. So although we cannot deny that some natures are better than others, nonetheless reason persuades us that one of them is so pre-eminent that no other nature is superior to it. For if such a division of gradation were so limitless that for each higher grade a still higher grade could be found, then reason would be led to the conclusion that the number of these natures is boundless. But everyone holds this [conclusion] to be absurd, except someone who himself is utterly irrational. Therefore, necessarily, there is a nature which is so superior to some [other] or some [others] that there is no [nature] to which it is ranked as inferior.

But this nature which is thus superior is singular—or else there is more than one nature of this kind, and they are equal. Assume that they are many and equal. Since they cannot be equal through different things but [only] through the same thing, this one thing through which they are equally so great either is the same thing which they are (i.e., is their essence) or else is something other than what they are. Now, if it is nothing other than their essence, then just as their essences are one rather than many, so too the natures are one rather than many. For here I am taking the nature to be identical with the essence. On the other hand, if that through which these many natures are equally great is something other than what they are, surely they are less than that through which they are great. For whatever is great through something other [than itself] is less than that [other] through which it is great. Therefore, they would not be so great that nothing else is greater than they. Now, if neither through what they are nor through something other [than what they are] it is possible for there to be many equal natures than which nothing else is more excellent, then there cannot at all be a plurality of such natures. Therefore, [the alternative which] remains is: there is only one Nature which is so superior to [all] others that it is inferior to none. Now, that which is such is the greatest, and the best, of all existing things. Thus, there is a Nature which is the highest of all existing things.

But it can be the highest only if through itself it is what it is and only if through *it* all [other] existing things are what they are. For since a few moments ago reason taught that that which exists through itself and through which all other things exist is the highest of all existing things: either, conversely, that which is the highest [of all] exists through itself and all other things exist through it, or else there are many supreme beings. But it is evident that there are not many supreme beings. Hence, there is a Nature, or Substance, or Being (*essentia*) which through itself is good and great and which through itself is what it is; and through this Nature exists whatever truly is good or great or something. And this Nature is the Supreme Good, the Supreme Greatness (*summum magnum*), the Supreme Being (*ens*), or Subsistence (*subsistens*)—i.e., the highest of all existing things.

CHAPTER FIVE

Just as this [Nature] exists through itself (*per se*)
 and [all] other things exist through it,
 so it exists from itself (*ex se*)
 and [all] other things exist from it.

Since, then, what has been ascertained commends itself, it is agreeable to investigate whether this Nature and all that is something exist only *from* this Nature, even as they exist only *through* this Nature. Clearly, we can say that what exists from a thing exists also through it and that what exists through a thing exists also from it. For example, what exists from a material and through a craftsman can also be said to exist through a material and from a craftsman. For through both and from both (i.e., by both) it has its existence, even though it exists through a material and from a material in a way other than [the way it exists] through a craftsman and from a craftsman. As a logical consequence, then: just as through the Supreme Nature all existing things are what they are (and, thus, this Nature exists through itself, whereas [all] other things exist through something other [than themselves]), so all existing things exist from the Supreme Nature (and, thus, this Nature exists from itself, whereas [all] other things exist from something other [than themselves]).

CHAPTER SIX

This Nature was not brought into existence through any assisting cause. Nevertheless, it does not exist through nothing or from nothing. How it can be understood to exist through itself and from itself.

Therefore, since “to exist through something” or “to exist from something” does not always retain the same meaning, we must inquire more carefully about how all existing things exist through and from the Supreme Nature. And since what exists through itself does not have the same mode of existing as what exists through something other [than itself], let me separately examine first the Supreme Nature, which exists through itself, and afterwards those things which exist through something other [than themselves].

Therefore, since it is evident that through itself this [Nature] is whatever it is and that through it all other things are what they are, in what manner does this [Nature] exist through itself? For what is said to exist through something seems to exist either through something efficient or through a material or through some other aid, as through an instrument. But whatever exists in any of these three modes exists through something other [than itself] and is later, and somehow less, than this other through which it has its existence. Yet, the Supreme Nature does not at all exist through something other [than itself]; nor is it later or less than either itself or any other thing. Accordingly, the Supreme Nature could not have been [efficiently] caused to exist either by itself or by something other [than itself]; nor was it itself or anything else the material from which it was made; nor did it somehow aid itself (nor did some [other] thing aid it) to become what previously it was not.

What [shall I say] then? For that which does not exist by anything's making or from any material, or that which did not come to exist by any assisting [factors] seems either to be nothing or, if it is something, to exist through nothing (*per nihil*) and from nothing (*ex nihilo*). Although (on the basis of what I have already noticed about the Supreme Substance by the light of reason) I think that these [implications] cannot at all apply to this [Substance], nonetheless I will not neglect constructing a proof of this point.

For since this meditation of mine has led me all of a sudden to a certain important and interesting point, I do not want to pass carelessly over even some simple, almost foolish, objection occurring to me as I am disputing. [My purpose is twofold: viz.,] so that in leaving nothing doubtful in the preceding [arguments], I myself can advance more assuredly to the succeeding ones and so that (if I wish to convince someone of what I observe) by my removing every obstacle, even a small one, anyone who is slow to understand can have easy access to what he has heard.

Therefore, [to say] that this Nature (in the absence of which no nature would exist) is nothing is as false as it would be absurd to say that whatever exists is nothing. Moreover, [this Nature] does not exist *through* nothing, since it is altogether unintelligible that what is something exists through nothing. Yet, if [this Nature] somehow existed *from* nothing, then it would exist from nothing either (1) through itself or (2) through something other [than itself] or (3) through nothing.

(NOT 3) Now, it is evident that something does not at all exist through nothing. So if [this Nature] somehow existed *from* nothing, it would exist from nothing either through itself or through something other [than itself]. (NOT 1) But a thing cannot through itself exist from nothing; for if a thing existed from nothing through something, then that [something] through which it existed would have to be prior [to it]. Therefore, since this Being is not prior to itself, it is not the case that through itself it somehow exists from nothing.

(NOT 2) On the other hand, if [this Nature] is said to have come from nothing through some other nature, then [this Nature] would not be the highest of all things but would be inferior to some [other] thing; moreover, it would not through itself be what it is, but [would be it] through something other [than itself]. Likewise, if this Nature existed from nothing through something [else], then this [something else] through which it existed would have been a great good, since it would have been the cause of such great good. But no good could conceivably [have existed] before the Good without which nothing [at all] would be good. Now, it is clear enough that this Good, without which nothing [at all] would be good, is identical with the Supreme Nature which is under discussion. Hence, it is not even conceivable that this [Nature] was

preceded by some other thing through which it existed from nothing.

Finally, if this Nature were something either *through* nothing or *from* nothing, then without doubt either it would not be through and from itself whatever it is or else it would [have to] be said to be nothing. But it is superfluous to discuss how false each [of these alternatives] is. Therefore, even though the Supreme Substance does not exist through anything efficient or from any material, and was not helped to begin existing by any [instrumental] causes, nevertheless it does not at all exist through nothing or from nothing, because whatever it is it is through and from itself.

How, then, in last analysis, ought this [Nature] to be understood to exist through itself and from itself if it did not [efficiently] cause itself and was not its own material and did not somehow aid itself to become what earlier it was not? Should one perhaps understand *how* by comparison with one's saying that through itself and from itself light shines (or is shining)? For in the way that *light* and *to shine* and *shining* are related to one another, so *being* and *to be* and *be-ing* (i.e., *existing*, or *subsisting*) are related to one another. Thus, *supreme being* and *supremely to be* and *supremely be-ing* (i.e., *supremely existing*, or *supremely subsisting*) are related to one another analogously to *light* and *to shine* and *shining*.

CHAPTER SEVEN

How all other things exist through and from this [Nature].

Now, with regard to all the things which exist through something other [than themselves], there remains to discuss how they exist through the Supreme Substance: [do they exist through it] (A) because it [efficiently] caused them all or (B) because it was the material of them all? There is no need to ask whether or not all these things exist through this Substance only by virtue of its having in some way aided them to exist, while something other than this Substance created them or was the material [out of which they were made. We need not pursue such an inquiry] because were it the case that whatever [all these things] are they are [only] secondarily, and not principally, through this [Substance], then what has already been proved would be contradicted.

So I think that I must first ask whether everything which ex-

ists through something other [than itself] (B) exists from some material. I do not doubt that the world's entire mass, as we see it formed with its parts, consists of earth, water, air, and fire. These four elements somehow can be conceived apart from the forms which we see in formed things, so that the unformed, or even mingled, nature of these elements is seen to be the material of all corporeal objects which exist separately, each having its own form. Although I do not doubt any of these facts, I do ask: whence exists the aforementioned material of the massive world? For if this material exists from some other material, then that other is more truly the material of every corporeal thing. Thus, if all things, whether visible or invisible, exist from some material, then surely they can exist, and be said to exist, only from the material (B.1) of the Supreme Nature or (B.2) of themselves, or (B.3) of some third being. (NOT B.3) But, assuredly, a third being does not exist. Indeed, nothing at all can even be thought to exist except the Supreme Being (which exists through itself) and all [other] things (which exist through the Supreme Being rather than through themselves). Consequently, what in no way is something is not the material of anything. (NOT B.2) Moreover, the universe, which does not exist through itself, cannot exist from out of its own nature. For if it existed from out of its own nature, it *would* in some way exist through itself and [thus] through something other than that through which all things exist, and that through which all things exist would not be singular. But these [consequences] are false. Moreover, everything that is from [any] material is from something other [than itself] and is later than that other. Therefore, since no thing is other than itself or later than itself, it follows that no thing exists materially from itself.

(NOT B.1) But if from the “material” of the Supreme Nature there could be something less than the Supreme Nature, then the Supreme Good could be changed and corrupted—something abominable to say. Thus, since everything other than the Supreme Nature is less than it is, something other [than it] cannot exist materially from it. Furthermore, assuredly, that through which the Supreme Good would be changed or corrupted would itself not at all be good. But if any nature inferior [to the Supreme Nature] existed from the “material” of the Supreme Good, then since whatever exists from anywhere at all exists only through the

Supreme Being, the Supreme Good would be changed and corrupted through the Supreme Being. Thus, the Supreme Being, which is the Supreme Good, would not be a good at all—an inconsistency. Therefore, no nature inferior [to the Supreme Nature] exists materially from the Supreme Nature. Since, then, it is evident that the being of those things which exist through something other [than themselves] does not exist “materially” from the Supreme Being or materially from itself or materially from some third thing, it is obvious that (NOT B) it does not exist from any material at all.

Therefore, since whatever exists exists through the Supreme Being, and since all things other [than the Supreme Being] can exist through it only if it either [efficiently] causes them or else is the material [out of which they are made], necessarily nothing besides it exists except (A) by its [efficient] causing. And since there neither is nor was anything except this Being and the things made by it, [this Being] was not able to make anything at all through anything else (be it [merely] an instrument or an aid) than through itself. Yet, everything that it made it made, without doubt, either (A.1) materially from something, or else (A.2) from nothing. Therefore, since it is most assuredly evident that the being of all existing things (other than the Supreme Being) has been made by the Supreme Being and (NOT A.1) exists from no material, assuredly nothing is more clear than that the Supreme Being through itself and by itself produced (A.2) from nothing (*ex nihilo*) so great a complex of things—so vastly numerous, so beautifully formed, so well-ordered in their variety, so harmonious in their diversity.

CHAPTER EIGHT

How “[This Nature] made all things from nothing”
is to be construed.

But a [problem] occurs about *nothing*. For that from which a thing is made is a cause of the thing made from it; and, necessarily, every cause contributes some assistance to the effect's existence. On the basis of their experience all men accept this [principle]—to such an extent that it can be wrested from no one through debate and removed from scarcely no one through deception. Hence,

if something were made from nothing, nothing was a cause of what was made from it. Yet, how could that which had no existence have aided something [else] to begin to exist? But if no aid comes to something from nothing, who would be persuaded, and how would he be persuaded, that something is made from nothing?

Moreover, either “nothing” signifies something or it does not signify something. But if nothing is something, then whatever is made from nothing is made from something. But if nothing is not something, then from nothing nothing is made; for it is inconceivable that anything be made from nothing at all. (As the truism goes: “From nothing nothing comes.”) Therefore, it seems to follow that whatever is made is made from something. For [a thing] is made either from something or from nothing. Therefore, whether nothing is something or whether it is not something, there seems to follow that whatever is made is made from something. However, if [this conclusion] is posited as true, it opposes all [the conclusions] previously reached. Accordingly, since what was nothing would be something, that which was most greatly something would be nothing. For from the fact that I found a certain Substance which exists most greatly of all, I rationally inferred that all things other [than this Substance] were made by it in such way that they were made from nothing. Therefore, if that from which they were made (which I believed to be nothing) is something, then all that I thought I had concluded about the Supreme Being is nothing.

What, then, must be understood regarding *nothing*? For I have already determined not to neglect in this meditation any objection which I see to be possible—even an almost foolish objection. So if any substance is said to have been made from nothing, [this statement], it seems to me, can be interpreted in three ways; and these [interpretations] suffice to resolve the present difficulty. One way is that by which we want it understood that what is said to have been made from nothing has not at all been made. Similar to this is the case in which one asks about another, who is silent, “Of what is he speaking?” and is given the reply “Of nothing”; that is, [the other] is not speaking. In this way one who asks with regard to the Supreme Being or with regard to something which has not at all existed and does not at all exist, “From what was it made?”, can correctly be answered “From nothing.” That is, it was not

made at all. This sense can be understood of none of the things which have been made. Secondly, there is a signification [of “from nothing”] which can be expressed but yet which cannot be the case. For example, something may be said to have been made from nothing in that it was made from nothing itself (i.e., was made from what does not at all exist), as if nothing itself were an existing thing from which some [other] thing could be made. But since [this statement] is always false, a contradiction ensues as often as [the statement] is asserted. The third interpretation by which something is said to have been made from nothing is when we understand that it has indeed been made but that there is not anything from which it was made. The signification is seen to be similar when of a man who is saddened without reason we say, “He is saddened from nothing.” Therefore, if we construe in this third sense our previous conclusion that except for the Supreme Being all existing things have been made by the Supreme Being from nothing—i.e., not from anything—then just as that conclusion follows consistently from the preceding [considerations], so from that conclusion nothing inconsistent follows.

Nonetheless, we can say suitably and without any inconsistency that those things which have been made by the Creative Substance were made from nothing in the way that a rich man is commonly said by us [to have been made] from a poor man, or that from sickness a man has regained health. That is, he who previously was poor is now rich (something which he was not beforehand); and he who previously was sick is now healthy (something which he was not beforehand). In this [same] manner, then, we can suitably understand the following statements: “The Creative Being made all things from nothing” and “Through the Creative Being all things were made from nothing”—that is, things that once were nothing are now something. Indeed, in saying that the Creative Being *made* or that all other things *were made*, we mean that when the Creative Being made, it made something, and that when the other things were made, they were made only something. Thus, when we observe a man of very meager means who has been elevated by a second man to great wealth or honor, we say “The second man made the first man from nothing,” or “The first man was made from nothing by the second man.” That is, the first man, who formerly was regarded as nothing, is now esteemed as truly

something because of the making of the second man.

CHAPTER NINE

Before their creation those things which have been made
from nothing were not nothing
with respect to their Maker's reason.

But I seem to see a certain [point] which requires [me] to distinguish carefully the respect in which those things which have been made can be said to have been nothing before they were made. For by no means can anything reasonably be made by anyone unless beforehand there is in the maker's reason a certain pattern, as it were, of the thing to be made—or more fittingly put, a form or likeness or rule. Thus, it is evident that before all things were made there was in the Supreme Nature's reason what they were going to be or what kind they were going to be or how they were going to be. Therefore, although it is clear that before they were made, those things which have been made were nothing—with respect to the fact that they were not then what they are now and that there was not anything from which they were made—nevertheless they were not nothing with respect to their Maker's reason, through which and according to which they were made.

CHAPTER TEN

This reason is an expression of things, just as a craftsman first tells himself what he is going to make.

But what is this form of things, which in the Maker's reason preceded the things to be created, other than an expression-of-things in the Maker's reason?—just as when a craftsman who is about to make a work from his craft first speaks of it within himself by a mental conception? Now, by “mental expression” or “rational expression” I do not mean here thinking the words which are significative of things; I mean, rather, viewing mentally, with the acute gaze of thought, the things themselves which already exist or are going to exist. For in ordinary usage we recognize that we can speak of a single object in three ways. For we speak of objects either (1) by perceptibly employing perceptible signs (i.e., [signs] which can be perceived by the bodily senses) or (2) by imperceptibly thinking to ourselves these same signs, which are perceptible

outside us, or (3) neither by perceptibly nor by imperceptibly employing these signs, but by inwardly and mentally speaking of the objects themselves—in accordance with their variety—either through the imagination of material things or through rational discernment. For example, in one way I speak of a man when I signify him by the name “man.” In another way [I speak of him] when I think this name silently. In a third way [I speak of a man] when my mind beholds him either by means of an image of a material thing or by means of reason—by means of an image of a material thing, for instance, when [my mind] imagines his perceptible shape; but by means of reason, for instance, when [my mind] thinks of his universal being, viz., *rational, mortal animal*.

Each of these three kinds of speaking has its corresponding kind of words. Yet, words of that [kind of] speaking which I mentioned third, and last, are natural and are the same for all races, if they are not words for unknown things. And since all other words have been formulated because of these [natural words], wherever *these* are no other word is needed for recognizing an object; and where *they* cannot be, no other [word] is useful for manifesting the object. Moreover, [these natural words] can without absurdity be called truer the more they resemble, and the more expressly they signify, the objects for which they are words. Except for those things which we use as names for themselves in order to signify themselves (e.g., certain sounds such as the vowel *a*)—except for these, I say, no other word seems so similar to the object for which it is a word, and [no other word] so expresses that object, as does that likeness which is expressed in the acute gaze of the mind as it conceives the object itself. Therefore, the natural word is rightly to be called the principal and most proper word for an object. No expression of anything whatsoever approximates an object as closely as does that expression which consists of words of this kind; and in no one's reason can there be anything else which is so similar to an object, whether already existing or going to exist. Consequently, in the case of the Supreme Substance such an Expression of objects can justifiably be seen (1) to have existed before these objects, in order that they might be made through it, and (2) to exist now that they have been made, in order that they may be known through it.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Nevertheless, in this comparison there is much dissimilarity.

It is evident that within itself the Supreme Substance “spoke,” as it were, of all creatures before it created them through and according to its own inmost Expression—just as a craftsman first conceives mentally what he subsequently produces in accordance with his mental conception. Nevertheless, I detect in this comparison much dissimilarity [between the Supreme Substance and an ordinary craftsman]. For the Supreme Substance did not from anywhere borrow anything at all whereby to fashion within itself the form of the creatures which it was going to make, or whereby to make these creatures what they are. By contrast, a craftsman cannot at all conceive in his mind, imaginatively, any material object except one which he has already in some way experienced (either in its entirety all at once or through parts from various objects); moreover, a craftsman cannot produce the work conceived in his mind if he lacks either the materials or any thing without which the preconceived work cannot be accomplished. For example, although a man can form the concept or the image of some kind of animal which nowhere exists, he can do so only by therein putting together parts which he has drawn into his memory from objects previously experienced. Hence, these two inner expressions of their respective works to be made—viz., [the Expression] in the Creative Substance and [the expression] in a craftsman—differ from each other in the following respect: The former was neither borrowed from anywhere nor aided from anywhere; as first and only cause it was able to suffice its Craftsman for accomplishing His work. By contrast, the latter is neither the first cause, the sole cause, nor the sufficient cause for [the craftsman's] commencing his [work]. Therefore, those things which have been created through the Expression [in the Creative Substance] are wholly through this Expression whatever they are, whereas the things made through [the craftsman's] expression would not at all exist unless they were something more than what they are through his expression.

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Expression of the Supreme Being is the Supreme Being.

But it is equally certain, as reason teaches, that (1) whatever the

Supreme Substance made, it made through no other than through itself and that (2) whatever it made, it made through its own inmost Expression (whether by uttering different things with different words or else by uttering all things at once with a single word). Accordingly, what [view] can be seen to be more necessary than that the Expression of the Supreme Being is not other than the Supreme Being? Therefore, I think that examination of this Expression must not be passed over lightly. But before this topic can be developed critically, several properties of the Supreme Substance must be carefully examined, it seems to me.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Just as all things were made through the Supreme Being,
so they are sustained through it.

Therefore, it is evident that whatever is not identical with the Supreme Nature was made through the Supreme Nature. Only an irrational mind can doubt that all created things endure and continue to exist as long as they do because they are sustained by the same one who made [them] from nothing and from whom they have their being what they are. For we can prove that whatever things are sustained [in existence] are sustained by some one thing and, hence, it alone is sustained through itself, whereas [all] other things [are sustained] through something other [than themselves]. We can prove this] by [using] an argument similar in every respect [to the argument] by which we inferred that all existing things exist through some one thing and, hence, it alone exists through itself, whereas [all] other things exist through something other [than themselves]. Since it can only be the case that [all] the things which have been made are sustained through something other [than themselves] and that the thing by which they have been made is sustained through itself, it must be the case that just as nothing was made except through the creative and present Being, so nothing is sustained except through the conserving presence of this same [Being].

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

The Supreme Being exists in all things and through all things;
and all things exist from it, through it, and in it.

But if [the foregoing consideration] is true—or, rather, because it

must be true—it follows that where the Supreme Being does not exist, nothing exists. Therefore, [the Supreme Being] exists everywhere and through all things and in all things. Now, it is absurd [to think] that just as a created thing cannot at all exceed the greatness of the Creating and Sustaining [Being], so the Creating and Sustaining [Being] cannot at all in any way exceed the totality of created things. Consequently, it is clear that this [Being] is what sustains, excels, encompasses, and pervades all other things. Therefore, if these [conclusions] are conjoined with the ones discovered earlier, then [one and] the same [Being] exists in and through all [other] things and is that from which, through which, and in which all [other] things [exist].¹

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

What can and what cannot be predicated
of the Supreme Being substantively.

Now, I am especially and not unjustifiably moved to inquire, as earnestly as I can, into what (from among whatever is predicable of something) can substantively besuit such a marvelous Nature as this. For although I would be surprised if, among the names or words which we apply to things made from nothing, there could be found a [word] that would appropriately be predicated of the Substance which created all [other] things, nevertheless I must try to ascertain to what end reason will direct this investigation. Now, about relational [words]—no one doubts that none of them apply to the substance of the thing of which they are predicated relationally. Therefore, if some [word] is predicated of the Supreme Nature relationally, [this word] does not signify its substance. Thus, although [the Supreme Nature] can be spoken of relationally as *supreme* over, or as *greater* than, all the things that it made (or can be spoken of relationally in some other similar way), [these utterances] do not, it is obvious, designate its natural being. For if there never existed any of the things in relation to which it is called supreme and greater, then it would not be understood to be either supreme or greater. Nevertheless, it would not for that reason be less good or would not at all undergo detriment with respect to its essential greatness. We recognize this plainly from the

¹Romans 11:36.

fact that through no other than through itself is this Being as good as it is or as great as it is. So if the Supreme Nature can so be understood to be not-supreme that it is still [understood to be] no greater or lesser than when it is understood to be supreme over all things, clearly “supreme” does not signify unqualifiedly *that* Being which in every way is greater and better than whatever is not what it is. Now, that which reason teaches regarding “supreme” holds equally true for similar relational [words].

And so, leaving aside those [words] which are predicated relationally (since none of them unqualifiedly exhibit the essence of anything), let me turn my attention to the discussion of other [words]. Surely, if someone carefully examines them one at a time, [he will see that] whatever non-relational [words] there are, [each one] either is such that [what] it [signifies] is in every respect better than [what] its negation [signifies] or else is such that its negation is in some respect better than it. (By “it” and “its negation” I mean here only *true* and *not-true*, *material object* and *not-material-object*, and the like). Indeed, [in some cases] something is in every respect better than its negation—as, for example, wise than not-wise; i.e., wise is better than not-wise. (For although someone who is just without being wise seems better than someone who is wise without being just, nevertheless not-wise is not unqualifiedly better than wise. Indeed, whatever is not-wise is, insofar as it is not wise, unqualifiedly inferior to what is wise; for whatever is not wise would be better if it were wise. Similarly, *true* is in every respect better than not-itself, i.e., than *not-true*; and *just* [is in every respect better] than *not-just*; and *lives* [is in every respect better] than *not-lives*. But [in some cases] the negation is in some respect the better; for example, *not-gold* [is in some respect better] than *gold*. For it is better for a man to be not-gold than to be gold, even though for something [else] it might be better to be gold than not-gold (e.g., for lead). For although neither a man nor a piece of lead is gold, still, the more inferior in nature [a man] would become if he were gold, the better thing a man is than gold; and the more valuable a piece of lead would become if it were gold, the more inferior lead is [to gold].

From the fact that the Supreme Nature can be understood to be not-supreme in such way that (1) [for it to be] supreme is in no respect better than [for it to be] not-supreme and (2) [for it to

be] not-supreme is not in some respect better than [for it to be] supreme, clearly there are many relational [words] which are not at all encompassed by the above classification. I forego inquiring about whether some [relational words] *are* [so] encompassed, because for my purposes what has [already] been learned about them suffices, viz., that none of these [words] designate the simple substance of the Supreme Nature. Since, then, if we look separately at whatever else there is [i.e., at whatever is signified by non-relational words, each is something which] either it is better to be than not to be or else in some respect it is better not to be than to be: just as it is blasphemous to suppose that the substance of the Supreme Nature is something which in some respect it would be better not to be, so this substance must be whatever in every respect it is better to be than not to be. For this substance alone is that than which nothing at all is better; and it alone is better than all things which are not what it is. Hence, it is not a material object or one of the things which the bodily senses detect. (Indeed, there is something better than all these [material objects]—something which is not what they are. For [consider] a rational mind, whose nature, quality, or quantity is perceived by no bodily sense: the more inferior a rational mind would become if it were one of those things which are subject to the bodily senses, the greater it is than any of those things.) For the Supreme Being must in no respect be said to be one of those things to which something that is not what they are is superior. And the Supreme Being (as reason teaches) must unqualifiedly be said to be each of those things to which whatever is not what they are is inferior. Therefore, necessarily, the Supreme Being is living, wise, powerful and all-powerful, true, just, blessed, eternal, and whatever similarly is in every respect better than its negation. Why, then, should I continue to ask what this Supreme Nature is, if whatever it is or is not is evident?

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

For the Supreme Being to be *just* is the same
as for it to be justice. The case is the same regarding
that which can be predicated of it
in a way similar [to the way in which “just” is predicated].
None of these [predicates] indicate what kind of thing it is or of
what magnitude it is; instead, [they indicate] what it is.

But when we call [the Supreme Being] *just* or *great* (or any such thing), perhaps we are indicating not what it is but rather what kind of thing it is or of what magnitude it is. Indeed, each of these [predicates, viz., “just” and “great”] seems to be predicated with respect to quality or to quantity; for whatever is just is just through justice (and likewise for other [predicates] of this kind). Therefore, the Supreme Nature is just only through justice. Hence, it seems that the supremely good Substance is called just by participation in a quality, viz., justice. But if so, [i.e., if the Supreme Substance were just in this way], then [the Supreme Substance] would be just not through itself but through something other [than itself]. But this [view] is contrary to the truth which we have already seen: viz., that—whether good or great or existing—what [the Supreme Nature] is, it is completely through itself and not through something other [than itself]. So if it is just only through justice, and if it can be just only through itself, what is more clear and more necessary than that this Nature *is* justice? And when it is said to be just through justice, is not this the same as [being just] through itself? And when it is said to be just through itself, what else is meant other than [that it is just] through justice? Therefore, if someone asks “What is this Supreme Nature which is being investigated?” is there a truer answer than “justice”? So I must look into how we are to understand the statement that this Nature (which *is* justice) is just.

For since a man cannot be justice but can have justice, a just man is not understood to be a man who is justice but to be a man who *has* justice. So since the Supreme Nature is not properly said to have justice but rather to be justice, then when [this Nature] is said to be just, it is properly understood to be [a Nature] which is justice rather than to be [a Nature] which has justice. Hence, if when we say that it is [a Nature] which is justice we are saying not what kind of thing it is but rather what it is, then (by logical inference) when we say that it is just, we are saying not what kind of thing it is but what it is. Or again, with regard to the Supreme Being: since to say that it is just is the same as saying that it is what is justice, and since to say that it is what is justice is not other than saying that it is justice, it makes no difference, with regard to this Nature, whether we say “It is just” or “It is justice.” Therefore, when someone asks regarding this Nature “What is it?” the

answer “just” is no less appropriate than the answer “justice.”

The intellect is bound to discern rationally that what is seen to have been established in the case of justice also holds true for all the things predicated similarly of the Supreme Nature. Hence, whichever of these is predicated of this Nature, they tell neither what kind of thing this Nature is nor of what magnitude it is but rather what it is. But obviously the Supreme Nature is supremely whatever good thing it is. Therefore, the Supreme Nature is Supreme Being (*summa essentia*), Supreme Life (*summa vita*), Supreme Reason, Supreme Refuge, Supreme Justice, Supreme Wisdom, Supreme Truth, Supreme Goodness, Supreme Greatness, Supreme Beauty, Supreme Immortality, Supreme Incorruptibility, Supreme Immutability, Supreme Beatitude, Supreme Eternity, Supreme Power, Supreme Oneness. And [all] these [descriptions] are the same as [the descriptions] Supremely Being (*summe ens*), Supremely Living (*summe vivens*), and so forth.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

[The Supreme Being] is so simple that whatever things can be predicated of its essence are one and the same thing in it. And something can be predicated substantively of the Supreme Being only with respect to what [this Being] is.

What, then? If the Supreme Nature is so many goods, will it be composed of so many goods, or are they, rather than being many goods, [only] one good signified by so many names? For everything composite needs for its existence the parts of which it is composed; and what it is it owes to its parts. For through them it is whatever it is, whereas what they are they are not through it; and so, it is not at all supreme. Hence, if the Supreme Nature were composed of many goods, then what holds true of everything composite would also have to hold true of it. But the whole necessity of previously established truth destroys and overthrows, by means of clear reasoning, this blasphemous falsity. Therefore, since this Nature is in no respect composite and yet is in every respect those very many goods [listed above], all those goods must be one rather than many. Hence, each one of them is the same as all [the others]—whether they be considered distinctly or all together. For example, when [this Nature] is said to be justice or being, [these

predicates] signify the same thing as do the other [predicates], whether considered distinctly or all together. Thus, even as whatever is predicated essentially of the Supreme Substance is one, so whatever the Supreme Substance is essentially it is in one way, in one respect. For when a man is said to be a body and rational and a man, he is not said to be these three things in a single way, in a single respect. For in one respect he is a body, in another rational; and neither of these constitutes the whole of what a man is. By contrast, it is not at all the case that the Supreme Being is something in such way that in some manner or respect it is not this thing; for whatever [the Supreme Being] in some respect essentially is is the whole of what it is. Therefore, whatever is predicated truly of its essence applies to what it is, not to what kind of thing it is or to of what magnitude it is. For whatever is [subject to] a quality or a quantity is something else with respect to what it is [i.e., with respect to its essence] and, thus, is not simple but is composite.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

[The Supreme Being] exists
without beginning and without end.

From what time, then, did this so simple Nature—Creator and Sustainer of all things—first exist? And when will it cease to exist? Or does [this Nature] exist neither from a beginning point nor to an end point but rather as beginningless and endless? For were it to have a beginning it would have a beginning either (1) from or through itself, (2) from or through something other [than itself], or (3) from or through nothing. But from the truth already seen, clearly [this Nature] does not in any way exist either from something other [than itself] or from nothing, either through something other [than itself] or through nothing. Therefore, it did not at all have a beginning from or through something other [than itself], from or through nothing. Moreover, it could not have had a beginning from or through itself, even though it exists from itself and through itself. For [this Nature] exists from and through itself in such way that there is not at all one being which exists from and through itself and another being through which and from which the first being exists. Now, whatever begins to exist from something or through something is not at all the same thing as

that from which or through which it begins to exist. Therefore, the Supreme Nature did not begin [to exist] through itself or from itself. Thus, since it has no beginning either from or through itself, either from or through something other [than itself], either from or through nothing, it has no beginning at all.

On the other hand, [the Supreme Nature] will also have no end. For if it were going to have an end, it would not be supremely immortal and supremely incorruptible. But it is evident that it is both supremely immortal and supremely incorruptible. Hence, it will not have an end. Furthermore, if it were going to have an end, it would come to an end either willingly or unwillingly. But surely that [Being] by means of whose will the Supreme Good perished would not be a simple good. But the Supreme Nature is a true and simple good. Hence, this Nature, which is assuredly the Supreme Good, would not come to an end willingly. Yet, if it were going to come to an end unwillingly, it would not be supremely powerful or all-powerful. But rational necessity has already declared that it is supremely powerful and all-powerful. Hence, it would not come to an end unwillingly. Consequently, if the Supreme Nature shall not have an end either willingly or unwillingly, it shall not at all have an end.

Moreover, if the Supreme Nature were to have a beginning or an end it would not be true eternity—something which it has already uncontestably been found to be. Or again, let anyone who can, try to conceive of when it began to be true, or was ever not true, that something was going to exist. Or [let him try to conceive of] when it will cease being true and will not be true that something has existed in the past. Now, if neither of these things can be conceived, and if both [statements] can be true only if there is truth, then it is impossible even to think that truth has a beginning or an end. Indeed, suppose that truth had had a beginning, or suppose that it would at some time come to an end: then even before truth had begun to be, it would have been true that there was no truth; and even after truth had come to an end, it would still be true that there would no longer be truth. But it could not be true without truth. Hence, there would have been truth before truth came to be, and there would still be truth after truth had ceased to be. But these [conclusions] are self-contradictory. Therefore, whether truth is said to have a beginning or an end, or

whether it is understood not to have a beginning or an end, truth cannot be confined by any beginning or end. Consequently, the same [conclusion] holds with regard to the Supreme Nature, because the Supreme Nature is the Supreme Truth.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

How nothing existed before or will exist after the Supreme Being.

But, behold, *nothing* once again rises up; and it alleges to be nothing all that reason has thus far discussed and all that truth and necessity have given consistent witness to. For if those things which have been explained

above have been made secure by the fortification of necessary truth, then there was not anything earlier than the Supreme Being nor will there be anything later than the Supreme Being. Hence, nothing was before it, and nothing will be after it. For, necessarily, either something or nothing preceded it and is going to succeed it. But anyone who says that nothing was before it and that nothing will be after it seems to be saying that (1) before the Supreme Being there was a time when nothing existed and that (2) after the Supreme Being there will be a time when nothing will exist. Consequently, when nothing existed, the Supreme Being did not exist; and when nothing will exist, the Supreme Being will not exist. So if when nothing already existed the Supreme Being did not yet exist, and if the Supreme Being will no longer exist when nothing will still exist, how is it that [the Supreme Being] did not begin [to exist] from nothing, or how is it that it will not come to nothing? What, then, did such an array of arguments accomplish if *nothing* so easily destroys their efficacy? For if it be established that the Supreme Being is subsequent to nothing, which precedes it, and ceases prior to nothing, which succeeds it, then all that necessary truth determined above is destroyed through a mere nothing. Or must this *nothing* be opposed, lest so many necessary structures of reason be overthrown by nothing and lest the Supreme Good, which by the light of truth has been sought-after and found, be lost for nothing?

Therefore, if possible, let us deny the proposition “Nothing existed before and will exist after the Supreme Being” rather than,

while giving place to nothing before and after the Supreme Being, to reduce to nothing through nothing this Being, which through itself brought into existence what had been nothing. For the one expression—viz., “Nothing existed before the Supreme Being”—has a twofold meaning. For one meaning of it is that before the Supreme Being existed there was a time when nothing existed; but the other meaning of it is: it is not the case that there was anything before the Supreme Being. Similarly, if I were to say “Nothing taught me to fly” I might construe this [statement] to mean that nothing itself (in the sense of not-something) taught me to fly—[an assertion] which would be false. Or [I might construe it to mean] that it is not the case that anything taught me to fly—[an assertion] which is true. And so, the first construal is that from which there follows the inconsistency discussed above; and [this construal] is rejected as in every respect false. But the second [construal] is perfectly consistent with the earlier [conclusions] and is of necessity true in conjunction with them. Therefore, when it is said that nothing existed before the Supreme Being, the statement must be taken in accordance with the second meaning. It must not be construed to mean that there was a time when nothing existed and the Supreme Being did not exist; rather, [it must be construed] to mean that it is not the case that there was anything before the Supreme Being. The same kind of twofold meaning occurs if we say that nothing will exist after the Supreme Being. Accordingly, if we examine carefully the construal which has been given concerning [the word] “nothing,” then we conclude very truly that neither something nor nothing preceded or will succeed the Supreme Being and that nothing existed before it or will exist after it. And nevertheless, the stability of our previously established conclusions is not at all shaken by a mere nothing.

CHAPTER TWENTY

The Supreme Being exists in every place and at all times.

It was concluded above that this Creative Nature exists everywhere, in all things and through all things; and the fact that it neither began to exist nor will cease to exist entails that it always was, is, and will be. Nonetheless, I detect a murmur of contradiction which requires me to investigate more closely where and when the

Supreme Being exists. Accordingly, the Supreme Being exists either (1) everywhere and always or (2) only in some place and at some time or (3) nowhere and never—in other words, either (1) in every place and at every time or (2) [only] in a delimited way in some place and at some time or (3) in no place and at no time.

But what is more obviously objectionable than [supposing] that what exists supremely and most truly, exists nowhere and never? Therefore, it is false that the Supreme Being exists nowhere and never. Moreover, without this Being there would exist neither any good nor anything at all. Hence, if it existed nowhere or never, there would nowhere or never be anything good and nowhere or never be anything at all. (It is not necessary to discuss how false this [consequence] is.) (NOT 3) So it is false that the Supreme Being nowhere and never exists. Hence, either it exists [only] in a delimited way in some place and at some time or else it exists everywhere and always. Assume that it exists only in a delimited way in some place and at some time. Then, only where and when it existed could anything exist; where and when it did not exist, no being would exist—because without the Supreme Being there would be nothing. Thus, it would follow that there is a place and a time at which there would not exist anything at all. But this [consequence] is false; for that place and that time would be something. (NOT 2) Therefore, the Supreme Nature cannot exist [only] in a delimited way in some place and at some time. Now, if it be said that through itself this Nature exists in a delimited way in some place and at some time but that through its power it exists wherever and whenever something is—[this statement] would not be true. For since, clearly, this Nature's power is nothing other than itself, its power exists in no way apart from itself. (1) Therefore, since [this Nature] does not exist in a delimited way in any place or at any time, it is necessary that it exist everywhere and always, i.e., in every place and at every time.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

[The Supreme Being] exists in no place at no time.

But if [the foregoing conclusion] holds, then either [the Supreme Being] exists as a whole in every place and at every time or else only a part of it [occupies every place and time], with the result

that the rest of it exists beyond every place and time. But if it partly were and partly were not in every place and at every time, then it would have parts—[a consequence] which is false. Hence, it is not the case that only a part of it exists everywhere and always. But how does it exist as a whole everywhere and always? We must understand this either (1) in such way that the whole of it once occupies every place and time through its parts which are present in each place and at each time, or else (2) in such way that it exists as a whole even in each place and at each time. But if through its parts it is present in each place at each time, [this Nature] would not escape composition from parts and division into parts—something which has been found to be totally foreign to the Supreme Nature. Hence, it does not exist as a whole in all places or at all times in such way that through parts it is in each place and at each time. [So] the second alternative remains to be discussed, viz., how the Supreme Nature exists as a whole in each and every place and at each and every time. Now, without doubt, this can occur [i.e., the Supreme Nature can exist in each and every place and at each and every time] only at the same time or else at different times. But since the law of place and the law of time (which hitherto one procedure was able to examine, because these [laws] moved forward together on the same footing) here diverge from each other and seem to “shun” (as it were) disputation by [taking] different routes, let each be examined distinctly in a discussion of its own. So first let it be seen whether the Supreme Nature can exist in each *place* as a whole—either at the same time or at different times. Then, let the same question be posed about [different] *times* [viz., the question whether at each time the Supreme Nature can exist as a whole—either at each time at once or else at each time successively].

If, then, [the Supreme Nature] were to exist as a whole in each *place* at once, these wholes would be distinct in the distinct places. For just as one place is distinct from another (so that they are different places), so what exists as a whole in one place is distinct from what at the same time exists as a whole in another place (so that they are different wholes). For none of what exists as a whole in a given place fails to exist in that place. And if none of a thing fails to exist in a given place, none of it exists at the same time anywhere besides in that place. Therefore, none of what exists

wholly in a given place exists at the same time outside that place. But if none of it exists outside a given place, none of it exists at the same time in some other place. Thus, that which exists as a whole in any place does not at all exist at the same time in another place. Accordingly, with regard to whatever exists as a whole in some place, how would it likewise exist as a whole in another place at the same time—if none of it can exist in another place? Therefore, inasmuch as one whole cannot at the same time exist as a whole in different places, it follows that in the distinct places there would be distinct wholes—if in each place there were something existing as a whole at the same time. Thus, if the Supreme Nature were to exist as a whole in every single place at the same time, there would be as many distinct supreme natures as there can be distinct places—[a conclusion] which it is unreasonable to believe. Therefore, it is not the case that [the Supreme Nature] exists as a whole in each place at the same time.

On the other hand, if [the Supreme Nature] were to exist as a whole in each place at different times, then while it existed in one place no good and no being would be present in other places, because without the Supreme Being not anything at all exists. But these very places, which are something rather than nothing, prove this [alternative] to be absurd. Thus, it is not the case that the Supreme Nature exists as a whole in each place at different times.

But if it does not exist in each place as a whole either at the same time or at different times, clearly it does not at all exist as a whole in every single place.

I must now investigate whether this Supreme Nature exists as a whole at each *time*—either [existing] at each time at once or else [existing] at each time successively. But how would anything exist as a whole at each time at once, if these [different] times are not simultaneous? On the other hand, if [this Nature] were to exist as a whole distinctly and successively at each time (as a man exists as a whole yesterday, today, and tomorrow), then [this Nature] would properly be said to have existed, to exist, and to be going to exist. Therefore, its lifetime—which is nothing other than its eternity—would not exist as a whole at once but would be extended by parts throughout the parts of time. Now, its eternity is nothing other than itself. Hence, the Supreme Being would be divided into parts according to the divisions of time. For if its life-

time were produced throughout the course of time, it would together with time have a past, a present, and a future. But what is its lifetime or its length of existing other than its eternity? Consequently, since its eternity is nothing other than its essence (as unhasty reasoning unassailably proved in the foregoing [discussion]), if its eternity had a past, a present, and a future its essence would also have to have a past, a present, and a future. Now, what is past is not present or future; and what is present is not past or future; and what is future is not past or present. Therefore, if the Supreme Nature were different things at different times and if it had temporally distributed parts, how would there remain firm what was previously shown by clear and rational necessity—viz., that the Supreme Nature is in no way composite but is supremely simple and supremely immutable? Or rather, if those [conclusions] are true [viz., that the Supreme Nature is supremely simple and immutable]—indeed, since they are clear truths—how are these [conclusions] possible [viz., that the Supreme Nature is different things at different times and has temporal parts]? Hence, neither the Creative Being, its lifetime, nor its eternity admits in any way of a past or a future. (But if [this Being] truly [i.e., really] *is*, how would it fail to have a present?) Yet, “it was” signifies a past; and “it will be” signifies a future. Therefore, it never was and never will be. Consequently, it no more exists as a whole at each different time successively than it exists as a whole at each different time at once.

If, then, (as was argued), the Supreme Being does not exist as a whole in every place and at every time (1) in such way that the whole of it once occupies every [place and time] through its parts, which are present in each [place] and at each [time], and [if it does] not [exist in each place and at each time] (2) in such way that it exists as a whole in each [place] and at each [time], then clearly the Supreme Nature does not at all exist as a whole in every place and at every time. And since we have also seen that [the Supreme Nature] does not exist in every place and at every time in such way that part of it occupies every [place and time] while part of it is beyond every place and time, *it is impossible that* [the Supreme Nature] *exist everywhere and always*. For it could not at all be thought to exist everywhere and always except either as a whole or as a part. Now, if it does not at all exist everywhere and always,

it [must] exist either in a delimited way in some place and at some time or else in no [place and] at no [time]. But I have already argued that it cannot exist in a delimited way in some [place] or at some [time]. Therefore, it [must] exist in no place and at no time, i.e., nowhere and never; for it could not exist except either in every [place] and [at every time] or else in some [place] and at some [time].

On the other hand, since it is uncontestably evident not only (1) that [the Supreme Nature] exists through itself without beginning and end but also (2) that if it did not exist nothing would ever exist anywhere, *it is necessary that the Supreme Nature exist everywhere and always.*

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

How [the Supreme Being] exists in every place
at every time and in no place at no time.

How, then, are these [two conclusions] (so contradictory according to their utterance, so necessary according to their proof) consistent with each other? Well, perhaps the Supreme Nature does exist in place and time in a way which does not prevent it from so existing as a whole in each place at once and as a whole at each time at once that, nonetheless, (1) these are not many wholes but are only one whole and (2) its lifetime (which is only its true eternity) is not divided into a past, a present, and a future. For only those things which exist in place or time in such way that they do not transcend spatial extension or temporal duration are bound by the law of place and the law of time. Therefore, just as for things which do not transcend place and time it is said in all truth that one and the same whole cannot exist as a whole in different places at once and cannot exist as a whole at different times at once, so for those things which do transcend place and time the foregoing statement need not hold true. For the following statements are seen to be correct: "A thing has a place only if a place contains the thing's size by delimiting it and delimits the thing's size by containing it"; and "A thing has a time only if a time somehow limits the thing's duration by measuring it and measures the thing's duration by limiting it." Therefore, if something's size or duration has no spatial or temporal limitation, then [that thing] is truly stated to have no place and no time. For since place does not affect it in

the way that place does [affect things], and since time [does not affect it] in the way that time [does affect things], we may reasonably say that no place is its place and that no time is its time. But what is seen to have no place or time is shown assuredly to be not at all subject to the law of place or the law of time. Therefore, no law of place or of time in any way restricts a nature which place and time do not at all confine by any containment.

But which rational reflection does not exclude, in every respect, [the possibility] that some spatial or temporal restriction confines the Creative and Supreme Substance, which must be other than, and free from, the nature and the law of all things which it made from nothing? For, rather, the Supreme Substance's power (which is nothing other than its essence) confines, by containing beneath itself, all the things which it made. How is it not also a mark of shameless ignorance to say that place delimits the greatness (*quantitatem*)—or that time measures the duration—of the Supreme Truth, which does not at all admit of greatness, or smallness, of spatial or temporal extension?

It is, then, a determining condition of place and of time that only whatever is bounded by their limits cannot escape the relatedness of parts—whether the kind of relatedness that its place undergoes with respect to size or the kind of relatedness that its time undergoes with respect to duration. Nor can this thing in any way be contained as a whole by different places at once, nor as a whole by different times at once. (But whatever is not at all bound by the containment of place and of time is not bound by the law of place or the law of time with respect to multiplicity of parts, or is not prevented from being present as a whole at the same time in many places or at many times.) Since this, I say, is a determining condition of place and time, without doubt the Supreme Substance—which is not bound by any containment of place and of time—is not bound by the law of place and the law of time. Therefore, since an inescapable necessity demands that the Supreme Being be present as a whole in every place and at every time, and since no law of place or of time prohibits the Supreme Being from being present as a whole in every place at once or from being present as a whole at every time at once, the Supreme Being must be present as a whole in each and every place at once and present as a whole at each and every time at once. Its being present

at one place or time does not prevent it from being simultaneously and similarly present at another place or time. Nor is it the case that because it was or is or will be, something of its eternity (a) has vanished from the temporal present along with the past, which no longer exists, or (b) fades with the present, which scarcely exists, or (c) is going to come with the future, which does not yet exist. For the law of place and the law of time do not in any way compel to exist or not to exist in any place or at any time (and do not in any way prevent from existing or not existing in any place or at any time) that which does not in any way confine its own existence within place and time. For if the Supreme Being is said to be in place or time, then even though on account of our customary way of speaking [this] one utterance applies both to the Supreme Being and to spatial and temporal natures, nonetheless on account of the dissimilarity of these beings the meaning [of the utterance] is different [in the two cases]. For in the case of spatial and temporal natures the one utterance signifies two things: viz., (1) that they are present in the places and at the times they are said to be present; and (2) that [these natures] are contained by these places and times. By contrast, in the case of the Supreme Being only one thing is understood, viz., that the Supreme Being is present—not, in addition, that it is contained.

Therefore, if our ordinary way of speaking were to permit, [the Supreme Being] would seem more suitably said to be *with* a place or *with* a time than to be *in* a place or *in* or *at* a time. For when something is said to be *in* something else, it is signified to be contained—more than [it is thus signified] when it is said to be *with* something else. Therefore, [the Supreme Being] is not properly said to be *in* any place or time, because [the Supreme Being] is not at all contained by anything else. And yet, in its own way, it can be said to be in every place and time, inasmuch as all other existing things are sustained by its presence in order that they not fall away into nothing. [The Supreme Being] is in every place and time because it is absent from none; and it is in no [place or time] because it has no place or time. It does not receive into itself distinctions of place and time—as, for example, *here*, *there*, and *somewhere*, or *now*, *then*, and *sometime*. Nor does it exist in the fleeting temporal present which we experience, nor did it exist in the past, nor will it exist in the future. For these are distinguishing prop-

erties of delimited and mutable things; but it is neither delimited nor mutable. Nevertheless, these [temporal modes] can in a sense be predicated of the Supreme Being, inasmuch as it is present to all delimited and mutable things just as if it were delimited by the same places [as they are] and were changed during the same times [as they are]. And so, we see clearly (as clearly as is sufficient for resolving what sounded contradictory) how according to the consistent truth of [two] different meanings the Supreme Being exists everywhere and always, nowhere and never—i.e., in every place and time, and in no place or time.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

How [the Supreme Being] can better be understood
to exist everywhere than in every place.

But since it is evident that the Supreme Nature exists in all existing things as well as in all places ([in these things] not as what is contained but as what contains all things by its pervasive presence), why is [this Nature] not said to exist everywhere in the sense that it is understood to exist in all existing things rather than [being understood to exist] merely in all places? For the truth of the matter exhibits this understanding, and the proper meaning of spatial discourse does not at all preclude it. For it is our irrefragable practice often to predicate spatial words of things which neither are places nor are contained by spatial limits. For example, I might say that the intellect is *there* in the soul *where* rationality is. Now, although “there” and “where” are spatial words, nonetheless the soul does not contain something within spatial limits, nor is the intellect or rationality thus contained. Therefore, according to the truth of the matter, the Supreme Nature is more fittingly said to exist everywhere in the sense that it exists in all existing things than merely in the sense that it exists in all places. And it is necessary that the Supreme Nature exist in all existing things in such way that one and the same [Nature] exists as completely whole in each thing at once—since (as the reasons presented earlier teach) [the case] cannot be otherwise.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

How [the Supreme Being] can better be understood
to exist always than to exist at every time.

It is also evident that (1) the Supreme Substance exists without beginning and without end and (2) that it does not have a past, a future, or a temporal (i.e., a fleeting) present such as we experience; for its lifetime, or eternity, which is nothing other than itself, is immutable and without parts. Consequently, if [the word] “always”—which seems to indicate time as a whole—is predicated of the Supreme Being, is not [this word] much more truly understood to signify eternity (which is never unlike itself) than [it is understood to signify] temporal modalities (which in some respect are always unlike one another)? Hence, if [the Supreme Being] is said always to exist, then since for it to exist is the same as for it to live, nothing better is understood [by “always existing”] than eternally existing, or eternally living—i.e., having an unending life which at once is completely whole. For its eternity is seen to be an unending life existing as completely whole at once. It is already sufficiently evident above that the Supreme Substance is nothing other than its own life and its own eternity, in no respect having boundaries, and existing only as completely whole at once. Hence, what else is true eternity, besuiting the Supreme Being alone, other than unending life that exists as completely whole at once? For on the following basis, by itself, we discern clearly that true eternity is present only in the Supreme Substance (which alone was found not to be *made* but to be the Maker): viz., that true eternity is understood to be unlimited by a beginning and an end—something that is shown not to befit any created things, since they have been created from nothing.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE
[The Supreme Being] is not mutable
in virtue of any accidents.

But at some time is not the Supreme Being—which was clearly seen to be in every respect substantially identical with itself—at least accidentally different from itself? Yet, how is it supremely immutable if it can (I will not say *be* but) even be *thought to be* changeable through accidents? On the other hand, how would it fail to participate in an accident since its being greater than all other natures and its being unlike them seem to *happen* to it?

But why would natural immutability be inconsistent with a sus-

ceptibility to certain [traits] which are called accidents—provided that no change in substance follows from the acquisition of these accidents? Indeed, of all the things which are called accidents some (e.g., all colors) are understood to be able to be present or absent only in conjunction with some change in their participating [subject]. Others (e.g., certain relations) are known to cause, by their coming and going, no change at all with regard to that object to which they are ascribed. For example, it is evident that I am not taller than, shorter than, equal to, or similar to a man who will be born after the present year. But after he is born, I will surely be able to have and to lose all of these relations to him—according as he will grow or will change in various of his qualities—without any change in myself. So it is evident that of those [traits] which are called accidents, some bring change to some extent, whereas others do not at all diminish immutability.

Therefore, just as the Supreme Nature never in its simplicity admits of accidents which cause change, so it does not repudiate something's sometimes being predicated in accordance with those things which are not at all incompatible with its supreme immutability. And yet, there does not *happen*, to its being, anything in terms of which the Supreme Nature can be regarded as mutable. Hence, we can also conclude that [this Nature] does not admit of any accident. Indeed, just as those accidents which cause some change by their coming and going are regarded as really happening, by their own effect, to the thing which they change, so those [properties] which do not have any such effect are found to be called accidents improperly. Therefore, just as the [Supreme Being] is always in every respect substantially identical to itself, so it is never in any respect even accidentally different from itself. But whatever may be the correct analysis of the proper meaning of the word “accidents,” it is certainly true that with regard to the supremely immutable Nature nothing can be said on the basis of which [this Nature] can be understood to be mutable.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

In what sense [the Supreme Being] is to be called substance.

It is beyond every substance. It is uniquely whatever it is.

But if what has been discerned about the simplicity of the

Supreme Nature is right, how is it that the Supreme Nature is a substance? For although every substance is capable of having a mixture of differentiae or of undergoing a change of accidents, the immutable integrity of the Supreme Nature does not admit of any kind of mixture or change. How, then, shall one maintain that it is some kind of substance—unless “substance” stands for “being,” and thus [this Nature] is both beyond and above every substance? Now, the Being which through itself is whatever it is and which makes from nothing every other being is different from that being which through another and from nothing is made whatever it is. As different [as this one Being is from the other], so altogether different is the Supreme Substance from those things which are not identical to it. And since of all natures this one alone has from itself, without the aid of another nature, its being whatever it is, how would it fail to be uniquely whatever it is and to have nothing in common with its creature? Hence, if it ever has some name in common with other things, without any doubt a very different signification must be understood [in its case].

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

[The Supreme Being] is not included in the usual classification of substances; nevertheless, it is a substance and an individual spirit.

Therefore, it is evident that this Substance, from which every [other] nature is excluded from having anything essentially in common, is not included in the usual classification of substances. To be sure, every substance is classified either as a universal, which is essentially common to many substances (as to-be-a-man is common to individual men), or else as a particular (*individua*), which has a universal essence in common with other [particulars] (as individual men have in common the fact that they are men). So how would anyone understand the Supreme Nature to be contained in the [same] classification as other substances? For neither is it common to many substances, nor does it have anything essentially in common with any other [substance]. Nevertheless, since it not only most certainly exists but even exists supremely, and since the being of anything is usually called substance, surely if [the Supreme Being] can be acceptably called anything, there is no reason not

to call it a substance. And since no more excellent being is known than spirit or body, and since of these [two] spirit is more excellent than body, surely the Supreme Being must be called spirit, not body. However, since this Spirit has no parts, and since there cannot be more than one such spirit, necessarily [this Spirit] is an altogether individual spirit. For as is evident above, [this Spirit] is not composed of parts, nor can it be understood to be changeable by means of any differentiae or accidents. Therefore, it is impossible for it to be divided in any way.

CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

This Spirit exists in an unqualified sense; compared to it created things do not exist.

Therefore, from the foregoing [considerations] it is seen to follow that this Spirit, which exists in such a marvelously unique and uniquely marvelous way of its own, in a certain sense alone exists—while by comparison to it other things, whatever they are seen to be, do not exist. For if we take a close look, only this Spirit will be seen to exist in an unqualified sense and completely and absolutely; and everything else [will be seen] almost not to exist and scarcely to exist. On account of its immutable eternity this Spirit can be said unqualifiedly to exist; it cannot at all be said, in accordance with some alteration, to have existed or to be going to exist. Nor is it, mutably, anything which at some time it either was not or will not be; nor does it fail to be something which it once was or once will be. Rather, whatever it is it is at one and the same time and endlessly. Since, I say, its being is of this kind, this Spirit is rightly said to exist in an unqualified sense and absolutely and completely.

All other things in some respect and at some time and mutably either were or will be what they now are not, or else they now are what at some time they were not or will not be. Moreover, their past being no longer exists; their future being does not yet exist; and what they are in the fleeting, momentary, and scarcely existing present scarcely exists. Therefore, since they exist so mutably, they are justifiably denied to exist in an unqualified sense and completely and absolutely, and are said almost not to exist and scarcely to exist. Or again, all things other than this Spirit come from not-being into being through something other than through

themselves; and with respect to their own power, they would return from being to not-being unless they were sustained through something other [than themselves]. Therefore, how would it besuit them to exist in an unqualified sense or completely or absolutely instead of scarcely existing or almost not existing?

The existence of this sole ineffable Spirit can in no way be understood either to have begun from not-being or to be able to undergo any falling away (from that which it is) into not-being; moreover, whatever this Spirit is it is through no other than through itself—i.e., through that which it itself is. Therefore, is not its existence alone justifiably understood to be simple, complete, and absolute? But surely what exists so unqualifiedly and what alone is in every respect complete, simple, and absolute can in a certain respect rightly be said alone to exist. On the other hand, surely whatever through the above reasoning is known not to exist in an unqualified sense and completely and absolutely, but to exist scarcely at all or almost not to exist, is in a certain respect rightly said not to exist. So according to this reasoning the sole Creator-Spirit exists, and all created things do not exist. Nevertheless, created things do not altogether lack existence, since from nothing they have been made something through this Spirit, which alone exists absolutely.

CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

This Spirit's Expression is the very same thing as this Spirit.

Nevertheless, there are not two spirits but [only] one.

But having examined these [topics] which have presently occurred to me (as I am following the guidance of reason) concerning the properties of the Supreme Nature, I [now] think it useful to consider, as best I can, the Supreme Nature's Expression, through which all things were made. For although all the [points] which I was able to notice earlier concerning this Expression possess the inflexible strength of reason, the fact that this Expression is proved to be the same thing that the Supreme Spirit is imposes a special requirement upon me to discuss this Expression the more carefully. For if the Supreme Spirit made all other things only through itself, and if whatever was made by it was made through its Expression, how is this Expression anything other than what the Supreme Spirit itself is? Moreover, assuredly those truths

which have already been discovered declare uncontestedly that nothing at all was ever able or is ever able to exist besides the Creating Spirit and its creatures. Now, it is impossible that the Expression of this Spirit would be in the class of created things. For whatever is created is made through this Expression; but this Expression could not have been made through itself. Indeed, nothing can be made through itself, because whatever is made exists later than that through which it is made, and nothing exists later than itself. Thus, [the other alternative] holds, viz., that the Expression of the Supreme Spirit—since it cannot be a creature—is none other than the Supreme Spirit.

Indeed, this Expression can be understood to be nothing other than the understanding of the Supreme Spirit by which [the Supreme Spirit] understands all things. For what else is it for this Spirit to speak of a thing (in this way of speaking) than for it to understand it? For unlike a man, the Supreme Spirit never fails to express what it understands. Therefore, if the supremely simple Nature is none other than what its understanding is—just as it is the same thing that its wisdom is—then, necessarily, it is also none other than what its Expression is. But since it is already evident that the Supreme Spirit is only singular and is in every respect an individual, necessarily its Expression is so consubstantial with it that there is one Spirit rather than two.

CHAPTER THIRTY

This Expression is not many words but is one Word.

Why, then, should I continue to doubt what I earlier left in doubt, viz., whether this Expression is one word or many words? For if [the Expression of the Supreme Nature] is so consubstantial with it that there is one Spirit rather than two, then surely just as the Supreme Nature is supremely simple, so too is this Expression. Therefore, it is not many words but is one Word, through which all things have been made.

CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE

This Word is not the likeness of created things but is true Existence. Created things are a likeness of this true Existence. Which natures exist more, and are more excellent, than others.

But, lo, a difficult question seems to me to arise—a question not to be left in any ambiguity. For all such words by which we mentally speak of objects (i.e., by which we think them) are likenesses and images of those objects for which they are words. And every likeness and image is true in proportion to the exactness with which it imitates the thing whose likeness it is. What, then, must be believed about the Word by which all things are spoken of and through which all things were made? Will it or will it not be the likeness of those things which were made through it? For (1) if it is a true likeness of [those] mutable things, then it is not consubstantial with the Supreme Immutability—[a consequence] which is false. (2) On the other hand, if it is not in every respect a true likeness of mutable things but is a likeness [only] in some respects, then the Supreme Truth's Word is not altogether true—[a consequence] which is absurd. (3) Or if it has no likeness to mutable things, how were they made according to its form?

But perhaps no ambiguity will remain if [we make use of the following comparison]. The living man is said to be the true man; but the likeness, or image, of a true man is said to be in a portrait [of this man]. By comparison, the Word is understood to be true Existence, for the being of the Word exists so supremely that, in a way, it alone exists; but a kind of likeness of this Supreme Being is understood to be in those things which, in a way, by comparison with it, do not exist—even though they have been made something through it and in accordance with it. Thus, Supreme Truth's Word, which Word is itself the Supreme Truth, will not become something greater or something lesser by virtue of a greater or lesser degree of likeness to creatures. Rather, it must be the case that every created thing both exists and is excellent in proportion to its likeness to what exists supremely and is supremely great. For this reason, perhaps—or, rather, not perhaps but certainly—every intellect judges that natures which are in any way alive excel non-living [natures], and that sentient natures excel non-sentient [natures], and that rational natures excel non-rational [ones]. For since the Supreme Nature in its own unique way not only exists but also lives and perceives and reasons, clearly whatever existing thing in some respect lives is more like the Supreme Nature than what does not at all live. And what in any way (be it even by a bodily sense) recognizes an object [is] more

[like the Supreme Nature] than what does not at all perceive. And what is rational [is] more [like the Supreme Nature] than what has no rational capacity. By a similar consideration it is clear that some natures exist more than others or less than others. For just as that is naturally more excellent which, with respect to its natural being, more closely approximates what is most excellent, so indeed that nature exists more whose being is more like the Supreme Being.

I think that this [same point] can also be readily seen by means of the following [consideration]. From some substance which lives, perceives, and reasons let us mentally remove [first] what is rational, next what is sentient, then what is vital, and finally the remaining bare existence. Now, who would not understand that this substance, thus destroyed step by step, is gradually reduced to less and less existence—and, in the end, to non-existence? Yet, those [characteristics] which when removed one at a time reduce a being to less and less existence increase its existence more and more when added [to it] again in reverse order. Therefore, it is clear that a living substance exists more than does a non-living one, that a sentient substance exists more than does a non-sentient one, and that a rational substance exists more than does a non-rational one. So without doubt every being exists more and is more excellent to the extent that it is more like that Being which exists supremely and is supremely excellent. Thus, it is quite evident that in the Word, through which all things were made, there is no likeness of created things but is, rather, true and simple Existence—whereas in created things there is not simple and absolute existence but a meager imitation of this true Existence. Hence, it must be the case that this Word is not more or less true according to a likeness to created things but, rather, that every created nature has a higher degree of existence and excellence to the extent that it is seen to approximate this Word.

CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO

The Supreme Spirit speaks of itself by means of
a co-eternal Word.

Accordingly, how can what is simple Truth be the Word [or

Image]¹ of those things whose likeness it is not? For every word by which an object is thus mentally spoken of is a likeness of that object. And if [this Word] is not a word [or an image] of these things that were made through itself, then how would it be true that it is a word? Without doubt, every word [or image] is a word [or an image] of some thing; indeed, if there never existed a creature, then there would exist no word [or image] of a creature. What then? Must one conclude that if no creature in any respect existed, then the Word, which is the Supreme Being, in need of nothing [else], would not at all exist? Or [are we to think], perhaps, [that] the Supreme Being, which the Word is, would indeed be an eternal being but would not be a word if nothing were ever made through it? For there can be no word [or image] of that which neither did exist, does exist, nor will exist. But according to this reasoning, if there never existed any being besides the Supreme Spirit, there would not at all be a word in this Spirit. And if there were no word in this Spirit, this Spirit would not speak within itself. And if it did not speak within itself, then it would not understand anything—since for it in this way to speak of something is for it to understand something. And if it understood nothing, then Supreme Wisdom, which is none other than this Spirit, would understand nothing—an utterly absurd [consequence]. What [follows], then? For if the [Supreme Spirit] were to understand nothing, how would it be Supreme Wisdom?

Or again, if there in no way existed anything other than Supreme Wisdom, what would this Wisdom understand? Would it [in that case] fail to understand itself? But how can we even think that Supreme Wisdom ever fails to understand itself, since a rational [human] mind can remember² not only itself but also the Supreme Wisdom, and can understand itself and the Supreme Wisdom? (For if the human mind could not have remembrance

¹The second member of the Trinity is the Word of God, not the Word for God. The bracketed insertion of the phrase “or image” both preserves this idiom and adheres to Anselm’s own thought in *Monologion* 38. See n. 63 and n. 64 of J. Hopkins, *A New, Interpretive Translation of St. Anselm’s Monologion and Proslogion* (1996 reprint).

²Like Augustine, Anselm uses “*memini*” and “*reminisci*” in a broader sense than the English word “remembering.” The Latin verbs encompass *being mindful of*, *being aware of*, *being conscious of*. Cf. Ecclesiastes 12:1: “Remember your Creator in the days of your youth.”

or understanding either of itself or of the Supreme Wisdom, then it would not be able—by disputing silently with itself, just as my mind is now doing—to distinguish itself from irrational creatures and to distinguish the Supreme Wisdom from all its creatures.) Hence, just as the Supreme Spirit is eternal, so it eternally remembers itself and understands itself similarly to the way the rational mind [remembers itself and understands itself]. Or better, [it remembers itself and understands itself] according to no likeness but rather principally; and the rational mind [remembers itself and understands itself] in a way similar to this Spirit's [remembering itself and understanding itself]. But if [the Supreme Spirit] understands itself eternally, it speaks of itself eternally. And if it speaks of itself eternally, its Word is eternally with it. Consequently, whether this Spirit be thought of as not having any creatures or whether it be thought of as having creatures, its co-eternal Word must be with it.

CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE

By means of one Word [the Supreme Spirit] speaks
both of itself and of that which it has made.

But, lo, as I was inquiring just now about the Word by which the Creator speaks of all that it has made, I was confronted with the Word by which the Creator of all things speaks of itself. Does [the Creator], then, speak of itself by means of one word and speak of its creation by means of another? Or does [the Creator] by means of the same Word by which it speaks of itself speak of whatever it makes? For, necessarily, the Word by which [the Creator] speaks of itself is what the Creator is, just as is evident in the case of the Word by which [the Creator] speaks of the things made by it. For since—even if nothing else were ever to exist except the Supreme Spirit—reason would require [the conclusion] that the Word by which [this Spirit] speaks of itself cannot fail to exist, what is more true than that the Word [or Image] of this Spirit is not anything other than what this Spirit is? Hence, if by a Word consubstantial with itself this Spirit speaks of itself and of those things which it makes, then clearly the substance of the Word by which [this Spirit] speaks of itself is one with the substance of the Word by which it speaks of creatures. So if there is [only] one substance, how

would there be two words? On the other hand, perhaps the identity of substance does not require us to admit a oneness of word. For this Spirit, which speaks by means of these words, has the same substance as they do; but nevertheless this Spirit is not a word.

Assuredly, the Word by which Supreme Wisdom speaks of itself can most suitably, according to the foregoing reasoning, be called the Word [or Image] of this Wisdom; for it has a perfect likeness to this Wisdom. For we cannot at all deny that when a rational mind understands itself by thinking of itself, an image of the mind is begotten in the mind's thought—or better, the mind's thought of itself is its own image, formed according to the likeness of the mind and formed, as it were, from an “impression” of the mind. For as best it can the mind tries to express in its thought a likeness of whatever thing it desires to think of truly (whether through imagining a material object or through reason). The more truly it expresses this likeness, the more truly it thinks of the object itself. Indeed, this [fact] is noticed more clearly in cases where [the mind] thinks of something other than itself—especially when it thinks of a material object. For example, when in his absence I think of a man whom I know, the acute gaze of my thought is formed into that kind of image of him which I brought into my memory through the vision of my eyes. This mental image is a word [or likeness] of this man whom I speak of by thinking of him. Therefore, when a rational mind understands itself by thinking of itself, it has with itself an image of itself begotten from itself—i.e., it has a thought of itself, formed after the likeness of itself and formed from its own “impression” of itself, as it were. Yet, only through its reason can a mind distinguish itself from its own image. And this image of the mind is a word [or likeness] of the mind.

So who would deny that in this way Supreme Wisdom begets its own consubstantial likeness, i.e., its Word, when it understands itself by speaking of itself? Although nothing can properly or suitably enough be said of a thing so uniquely excellent, nevertheless the Word can (not unsuitably) be called the image, figure, and form (*character*)—as well as the likeness—of the Supreme Wisdom. Yet, [this] Word, by which [Supreme Wisdom] speaks of creatures, is not at all likewise a word [or an image] of creatures—because this Word is not the likeness of creatures but is rather the principal Existence. Thus, it follows that [Supreme Wisdom] does not

speak of creatures by a word [or an image] of creatures. By what word, then, does it speak of creatures if it does not speak of them by a word [or an image] of creatures? For that of which [Supreme Wisdom] speaks, it speaks of by a word; and a word is a word—i.e., a likeness—of something. But if [Supreme Wisdom] speaks of nothing other than either of itself or of its creatures, then it can speak of something only by the Word [or Image] of itself or else by a word [or an image] of creatures. Therefore, if it does not speak of anything by a word [or an image] of creatures, then whatever it speaks of it speaks of by its own Word. Consequently, by one and the same Word it speaks of itself and of whatever it has made.

CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR

How [the Supreme Spirit] can be seen
to speak of creatures by its own Word.

But how can such different things, viz., the Creating Being and the created being, be spoken of by one word?—especially since this Word is co-eternal with the Speaker, whereas the creation is not co-eternal therewith. Perhaps when the Supreme Spirit speaks of itself it speaks of all created things *because* it itself is the Supreme Wisdom and Supreme Reason, in which all created things exist (just as an object which is made according to some craft exists always—i.e., not only upon being made, but even before being made and after having perished—in the craft itself, as identical with what the craft itself is.) For before [created things] were made and once they have been made and after they have perished or have changed in some manner, they always exist in this Spirit as what this Spirit is, rather than as what they are in themselves. For in themselves they are a mutable being, created according to immutable Reason. But in this Spirit they are the primary Being and the primary true Existence; and the more created things [in themselves] are in any way like this true Existence, the more truly and excellently they exist. And so, in this way one can, not unreasonably, maintain that when the Supreme Spirit speaks of itself, it also speaks, by one and the same Word, of whatever has been made.

CHAPTER THIRTY-FIVE

Whatever was made exists as life and truth
in the Word and Knowledge of the Supreme Spirit.

But since it is evident that the Word [or Image] of the Supreme Spirit is consubstantial with it and perfectly similar to it, necessarily all things existing in this Spirit exist also, in the same way, in its Word. Therefore, whatever was made—whether it lives or does not live, or howsoever it exists in itself—exists as life itself and truth itself in the Supreme Spirit. But since for the Supreme Spirit to know is the same thing as for it to understand or to speak: all the things that it knows, it must know in the same way in which it speaks of them or understands them. Therefore, just as all things exist as life and truth in the Word of this Spirit, so they [also] exist [as life and truth] in this Spirit's Knowledge.

CHAPTER THIRTY-SIX

In what an incomprehensible manner [the Supreme Spirit] speaks of, or knows, the things made by it.

From the foregoing can be most clearly comprehended that human knowledge cannot comprehend how the Supreme Spirit speaks of, or knows, those things which have been made. For no one doubts that created substances exist in themselves quite differently from the way they exist in our knowledge. For in themselves they exist in virtue of their own being; but in our knowledge their likenesses exist, not their own being. It follows, then, that the more truly they exist anywhere by virtue of their own being than by virtue of their likenesses, the more truly they exist in themselves than in our knowledge. Now, it is evident that the more truly the Creating Being exists than does the created being, the more truly every created substance exists in the Word (i.e., in the Understanding) of the Creator than in itself. Therefore, how would the human mind comprehend what that kind of speaking and knowledge is which is so vastly superior to and truer than created substances, if our knowledge is as vastly surpassed by these [created] things as their likenesses are different from their being?

CHAPTER THIRTY-SEVEN

Whatever the Supreme Spirit *is* in relation to creatures this Spirit's Word also is. And yet, together they are not [this relation] in a plural way.

Since, plainly, the foregoing rational considerations teach that the

Supreme Spirit made all things through its own Word, did not its Word also make all [these] same things? For since [the Word] is consubstantial with that of which it is the Word [or Image], the Word must be the Supreme Being. But the Supreme Being is only one [being], which is the sole Creator and only Beginning of all that has been made. For it alone, through no other than through itself, made all things from nothing. Wherefore, whatever things the Supreme Spirit makes, its Word also makes in the same way. And so, whatever the Supreme Spirit is in relation to creatures its Word also is in the same way; and yet, together they are not [this relation] in a plural way, for there are not many creating and supreme beings. Thus, just as this Spirit is the Creator and the Beginning of [all] things, so also is its Word. And yet, they are not two but are one Creator and one Beginning.

CHAPTER THIRTY-EIGHT

It cannot be said what two they are,
although they must be two.

Thus, we must carefully give heed to something which, though very uncommon in the case of created things, is seen to hold true of the Supreme Spirit and its Word. Assuredly, whatever they are essentially and whatever they are in relation to creatures is present to each individually and to both together in such way that it is wholly in each of the two without being more than one. For although this Spirit is itself completely the Supreme Truth and completely the Creator, and although its Word is also itself completely the Supreme Truth and completely the Creator, nevertheless both together are not two truths or two creators. But even though these [observations] are correct, still in a remarkable way it is perfectly clear that the Supreme Spirit, of which there is a Word [or an Image], cannot be its own word; nor can the Word be this Spirit, of which it is the Word [or Image]. Thus, with respect to signifying what [this Spirit and its Word] are substantively and what they are in relation to creatures, they are always an individual oneness. But with respect to the fact that the Supreme Spirit is not of the Word but that the Word is of the Supreme Spirit, they are an ineffable plurality. To be sure, ineffable—because although necessity requires that they be two, what two they are cannot at all

be expressed. For even if in relation to each other they could possibly be called two equals, or some such thing, still if we ask regarding these relational [words] “What is that of which they are predicated?” we cannot answer in the plural—as [we can] when we are talking about two equal lines or two similar men. Indeed, they are not two equal spirits or two equal creators or two of anything which signifies either their essence or their relation to creatures. Nor are they two of anything which designates the distinguishing relation of the one to the other, for there are not two words or two images. For the Word, with respect to the fact that it is a word or an image, is related to the Supreme Spirit, for a word or an image is [the word or image] only of something; and being a word or an image is so proper to the Word that [this same characterization] does not at all fit the Supreme Spirit. For this Spirit, of which there is a Word or an Image, is itself neither word nor image. Therefore, it is evident that there cannot be expressed what two the Supreme Spirit and its Word are, even though it is necessary that they be two because of certain distinguishing properties which each has. For it is the distinguishing property of the one to exist from the other; and it is the distinguishing property of the other that this one exist from it.

CHAPTER THIRTY-NINE

This Word exists from the Supreme Spirit by being begotten.

There surely seems to be no more ready way to put this matter than to say that it is the distinguishing property of the one to be *begotten* from the other, and is the property of the other that this one be begotten from it. For it is already certain that the Word of the Supreme Spirit does not exist from the Supreme Spirit in the same way as do the things made by the Supreme Spirit. Rather, it exists as Creator from Creator, as the Supreme from the Supreme. Or, to sum up the full likeness in a few words: the same thing exists altogether from the same thing—and in such way that it does not at all exist except from this thing. Therefore, since it is clear that (1) the Word of the Supreme Spirit exists from it alone, in such way as to possess its perfect likeness—as of offspring to parent—and since (2) the Word does not exist from the Supreme Spirit as something made by it, surely in no way can [the

Word] more suitably be thought to exist from the Supreme Spirit than by being begotten. Indeed, countless items are said, without qualm, to be begotten from those things to which they owe their existence. [We speak this way even in cases] where things do not at all, analogously to an offspring and its parent, resemble that from which they are said to be begotten. For example, we say that hair is begotten from a head and fruit from a tree, even though hair does not resemble a head nor fruit a tree. If, then, many such things are not absurdly said to be begotten, then the more perfectly [the Word of the Supreme Spirit] resembles the Supreme Spirit, like offspring to parent, by existing from it, the more appropriately the Word of the Supreme Spirit can be said to exist from it by being begotten.

CHAPTER FORTY

The Supreme Spirit is most truly parent,
and the Word is most truly offspring.

But if [the Word] is most suitably said to be begotten, and if it is so like the Supreme Spirit from whom it is begotten, then why would we think that [the Word is] *like* an offspring to its parent? Why would we not rather maintain that the more the Supreme Spirit alone suffices for effecting this begottenness and the more what is begotten expresses the Supreme Spirit's likeness, the truer parent the Supreme Spirit is and the truer offspring the Word is? For with regard to other things which assuredly are related as parent and offspring, none begets in such way that it alone needs no one else but is completely sufficient by itself to beget offspring; and none is begotten in such way that, having no dissimilarity admixed, it resembles its parent in every respect. Therefore, if the Word of the Supreme Spirit exists so entirely from this Spirit's essence alone, and resembles this Spirit so uniquely, that no offspring exists as completely only from the essence of its parent or resembles its parent as much, surely the relationship of offspring to parent is seen to befit nothing as suitably as [it befits] the Supreme Spirit and its Word. Hence, the Supreme Spirit has the distinguishing property of being the most true parent, and the Word has the distinguishing property of being the most true offspring.

CHAPTER FORTY-ONE

The Supreme Spirit most truly begets,
and the Word is most truly begotten.

But this [conclusion above] will not be able to stand unless, likewise, (1) the Supreme Spirit most truly begets and (2) the Word is most truly begotten. Therefore, just as the first is clearly true, so must the second be completely certain. Hence, it is the distinguishing property of the Supreme Spirit most truly to beget and the distinguishing property of the Word most truly to be begotten.

CHAPTER FORTY-TWO

It is most truly characteristic of the one to be begetter
and father, and of the other to be begotten and son.

I would now like to infer, if I can, that the Supreme Spirit most truly is father and that the Word most truly is son. Yet, I think I ought not to by-pass [the following question]: is the appellation “father and son” or the appellation “mother and daughter” more befitting for them?, for there is no sexual distinction in the Supreme Spirit and the Word. For if the Supreme Spirit is suitably [called] father and its offspring suitably [called] son because each is spirit, then why is it not suitable, by parity of reasoning, for the one to be [called] mother and the other to be [called] daughter because each is truth and wisdom?¹ Is it [preferable to call them father and son] because among those natures which have a difference of sex it is characteristic of the better sex to be father or son and of the inferior sex to be mother or daughter? Now, although this is by nature the case for many [beings], for others the reverse holds true. For example, in some species of birds the female sex is always larger and stronger, the male sex smaller and weaker.

But, surely, the Supreme Spirit is more suitably called father than mother because the first and principal cause of offspring is always in the father. For if the paternal [cause] always in some way precedes the maternal cause, then it is exceedingly inappropriate for the name “mother” to be applied to that parent whom no other cause either joins or precedes for the begetting of offspring. Therefore, it is most true that the Supreme Spirit is father of its

¹“Spirit” is in Latin a masculine noun (“*spiritus*”); “truth” and “wisdom” are feminine nouns (“*veritas*,” “*sapientia*”).

own offspring. But if a son is always more like a father than is a daughter, and if no one thing is more like another than this offspring is like the Supreme Father, it is most true that this offspring is a son, not a daughter. Therefore, just as this Spirit has the distinguishing property of most truly begetting and this offspring of most truly being begotten, so the former has the distinguishing property of being the most true begetting one and the latter of being the most true begotten one. And just as the one is the most true parent and the other the most true offspring, so the one is the most true father and the other the most true son.

CHAPTER FORTY-THREE

Reconsideration of what is common to both
and of what is proper to each.

Having now discovered so many, and such important, properties of each—[properties] by which a certain remarkable plurality, as ineffable as it is necessary, is proved to exist in supreme oneness—I find it especially delightful to reflect more frequently upon such an impenetrable mystery. For, lo, it is so impossible for the one who begets and the one who is begotten to be the same, and so impossible for the parent and the offspring to be the same, that it is necessary for the Begetter to be other than the Begotten and for the Father to be other than the Son. And yet, it is so necessary for the one who begets and the one who is begotten to be the same, and so necessary for the parent and the offspring to be the same, that it is impossible for the Begetter to be other than what the Begotten is or for the Father to be other than what the Son is. Although both exist distinctly in such way that the fact of their being two is perfectly clear, nonetheless what each of them is is so one and the same [as what the other is] that what two they are is thoroughly hidden. For the Father and the Son are so distinct that when I speak of both I see that I have spoken of two; yet, what the Father and the Son are is so identical that I do not understand what I have called two. For although the Father, considered distinctly, is completely the Supreme Spirit and although the Son, considered distinctly, is completely the Supreme Spirit, nevertheless the Spirit who is Father and the Spirit who is Son are so one and the same that the Father and the Son are not two spir-

its but one. Thus, just as the properties which are unique to each do not admit of plurality because they do not belong to both, so what is common to both constitutes an individual oneness even though the whole of it belongs to each. For just as there are not two fathers or two sons but [only] one father and one son since the distinguishing properties of the Father are distinct from the distinguishing properties of the Son, so there are not two spirits but [only] one even though it is true of both Father and Son that each is completely spirit. [The Father and the Son] are so opposite in relation that the one never sustains the distinguishing property of the other; and they are so concordant in nature that the one always has the essence of the other. For with respect to the fact that the one is the Father and the other is the Son they are so different that the Father is never called the Son nor the Son called the Father; and with respect to their substance they are so identical that the essence of the Son is always in the Father and the essence of the Father is always in the Son. For their essence is the same rather than different, one rather than many.

CHAPTER FORTY-FOUR

How the one is the essence of the other.

So also, if the one were said to be the essence of the other, there would be no departure from truth; rather, the supreme oneness and supreme simplicity of a common nature would be commended. For it is not the case that just as we understand a man's wisdom, through which a man is wise, who cannot be wise through himself, so we can understand (if the Father is said to be the essence of the Son, and the Son to be the essence of the Father) that, similarly, the Son is existent through the Father, and the Father through the Son—as if the one could not be existent except through the other, even as a man cannot be wise except through wisdom. For just as Supreme Wisdom is always wise through itself, so the Supreme Being always exists through itself. But the Father is completely the Supreme Being, and the Son is completely the Supreme Being. Therefore, the complete Father exists through Himself, and likewise the complete Son exists through Himself—even as each is wise through Himself. For it is not the case that the Son is less perfect existence (*essentia*) or wisdom because He is ex-

istence begotten from the existence of the Father and wisdom [begotten] from the wisdom [of the Father]. (But [the Son] *would* be less perfect existence or wisdom if He did not exist through Himself or were not wise through Himself.) For there is no inconsistency at all involved in the Son's existing through Himself and His having existence (*esse*) from the Father. For the Father has existence, wisdom, and life in Himself, so that He exists through His own being, is wise through His own wisdom, and lives through His own life (rather than through another's being, wisdom, or life). Similarly, by begetting [the Son] he bestows on Him the having of existence, wisdom, and life in Himself [i.e., in the Son Himself], so that the Son exists through His own being, is wise through His own wisdom, and lives through His own life (rather than through someone else's being, wisdom, or life). Otherwise, the existence (*esse*) of the Father and of the Son would not be identical, nor would the Son be equal to the Father. But we have already seen most clearly how false [this consequence] is.

So, then, the fact that the Son exists from the Father is not inconsistent with the fact that the Son exists through Himself. For it is necessary that He have from the Father the very ability to exist through Himself. If some wise man were to teach me his wisdom which previously I lacked, surely his wisdom would not inappropriately be said to do this [i.e., to cause my wisdom]. But although my wisdom would owe its existence and its being-wise to his wisdom, nevertheless once my wisdom existed it would exist only by its own being and would be wise only by itself. Therefore, it is all the more true that the eternal Father's co-eternal Son—who has existence from the Father in such way that they are not two beings—exists, is wise, and lives through Himself. Therefore, “the Father is the essence of the Son” or “the Son is the essence of the Father” cannot be understood as if the one were [able to exist] through the other but not able to exist through Himself. Rather, in order to signify their commonness of supremely simple and supremely singular essence, it can be appropriately said and understood that the one so is the very same thing as the other that the one has the essence of the other. And so, on the basis of the fact that, for either of them, to have an essence is not other than to be an essence: just as the one has the essence of the other, so the one is the essence of the other—i.e., the one has the same being (*esse*) as the other.

CHAPTER FORTY-FIVE

The Son can more fittingly be called the essence of the Father than the Father [can be called the essence] of the Son. Similarly the Son is the strength of the Father, the wisdom of the Father, and the like.

Although according to the unforeseen reasoning this [last conclusion] is true, nevertheless for the Son to be called the essence of the Father is much more appropriate than for the Father [to be called] the essence of the Son. For since the Father has His essence from no one except Himself, He is not very fittingly said to have anyone's essence except His own. But because the Son has His essence from the Father and because He has the same [essence] as the Father has, the Son can very fittingly be said to have the Father's essence. Therefore, since neither [the Father nor the Son] has an essence otherwise than by being an essence: just as the Son is much more fittingly understood to have the Father's essence than the Father [to have] the Son's [essence], so the Son can more suitably be said to be the essence of the Father than the Father [can be said to be the essence] of the Son. For when this one utterance is made, it indicates sufficiently, by its terseness, that the Son not only has the same essence as the Father but also that He has this [essence] from the Father. Thus, to say that the Son is the essence of the Father is to say that the Son is not a different essence from the essence of the Father—or better, [is not different] from the Father-essence. Similarly, therefore, the Son is the Father's strength, wisdom, truth, justice, and whatever else besuits the essence of the Supreme Spirit.

CHAPTER FORTY-SIX

How various of the [statements] which are expressed in the foregoing way can also be understood in another way.

Nevertheless, various of the [statements] which can be expressed and understood in the foregoing way are seen to admit also of another meaning which is not inconsistent with the present construal. For, clearly, the Son is the true Word—i.e., the perfect Understanding, Cognition, Knowledge, and Wisdom—of the whole paternal substance. That is, the Son understands, cognizes, knows, and comprehends the essence of the Father. Therefore, if the Son

is called the Understanding, Wisdom, Knowledge, and Cognition, or Conception, of the Father in the sense that He understands, comprehends, knows, and cognizes the Father, there is no departure at all from the truth. Moreover, the Son can very fittingly be called the truth of the Father—not only in the sense that the truth of the Son is identical with [the truth] of the Father (as we have already seen), but also in the sense that in the Son there is understood to be (not an imperfect image of the paternal substance but) the whole truth of the paternal substance, for the Son is the same as what the Father is [i.e., the same essence].

CHAPTER FORTY-SEVEN

The Son is Understanding of Understanding,
Truth of Truth, etc.

But if the substance of the Father is understanding, knowledge, wisdom, and truth, it follows that as the Son is the Understanding, Knowledge, Wisdom, and Truth of the paternal substance, so He is Understanding of Understanding, Knowledge of Knowledge, Wisdom of Wisdom, Truth of Truth.

CHAPTER FORTY-EIGHT

The Father is referred to as Memory, just as the Son
is referred to as Understanding. How the Son is
the Understanding (or Wisdom) of Memory, the Memory
of the Father, and the Memory of Memory.

But what are we to believe about memory? Ought the Son to be thought to be the Understanding of Memory, or the Memory of the Father, or the Memory of Memory? Indeed, since we cannot deny that Supreme Wisdom remembers itself, nothing is more fitting than that just as the Son is referred to as the Word, so the Father is referred to as Memory—for the word seems to be born from memory, as we observe more clearly in regard to our own minds. For since the human mind does not always think of itself (as it does always remember itself), it is clear that when it thinks of itself the word [or image] of itself is begotten from memory. Apparently, then, if [the mind] were always to think of itself, the word [or image] of itself would always be born from memory. For to think of a thing which we remember is to speak of this thing men-

tally; but this thought formed from memory and formed in the thing's likeness is the word [or image] of the thing. Herefrom, then, we can see clearly—regarding the Supreme Wisdom, which always speaks of itself as well as always remembering itself—that the co-eternal Word is begotten from the Eternal Memory. Therefore, as the Word is appropriately understood to be an offspring, so Memory is very fittingly called a parent. Hence, if an offspring begotten completely from the Supreme Spirit alone is an offspring of this Spirit's memory, nothing [follows] more consistently than that the Supreme Spirit is its own memory. Indeed, with respect to [the Supreme Spirit's] remembering itself, the Supreme Spirit is not in its own memory as one thing is in another—as is the case with those [remembrances] which exist in the human mind's memory in such way that they are not our memory itself. Rather, this Spirit remembers itself in such way that it is its memory of itself. Hence, it follows that as the Son is the Understanding and Wisdom of the Father, so He is [the Understanding and Wisdom] of the paternal memory. Now, whatever the Son comprehends or understands, He likewise remembers. Therefore, the Son is the Memory of the Father and the Memory of Memory (i.e., Memory remembering the Father, who is Memory), even as He is the Wisdom of the Father and the Wisdom of Wisdom (i.e., Wisdom comprehending the Father, who is Wisdom). And, indeed, the Son [is] Memory begotten from Memory—just as [He is] Wisdom begotten from Wisdom. But the Father [is] Memory and Wisdom begotten from no [other].

CHAPTER FORTY-NINE

The Supreme Spirit loves itself.

But, lo, as I am contemplating with delight the distinguishing properties of the Father and the Son, together with what they have in common, I find in the Father and the Son nothing more delightful to reflect upon than the affection of mutual love. For how absurd it would be to deny that the Supreme Spirit loves itself as well as remembering and understanding itself—since even a rational [human] mind, from the fact that it can remember and understand both itself and this Spirit, is proved to be able to love both itself and this Spirit. For the remembrance and understand-

ing of any thing whatsoever is in vain, and is altogether useless, unless this thing be loved or condemned to the extent that reason requires. Therefore, the Supreme Spirit loves itself, even as it remembers and understands itself.

CHAPTER FIFTY

This love proceeds equally from the Father and the Son.

To one who is rational it is surely clear that the Supreme Spirit does not remember itself and understand itself because it loves itself but rather loves itself because it remembers itself and understands itself. [Clearly,] moreover, this Spirit cannot love itself unless it remembers itself or understands itself. For nothing is loved without being remembered or understood, whereas many things are remembered and understood without being loved. So, clearly, the Supreme Spirit's love proceeds from its remembering itself and understanding itself. But if the Father is referred to as the Memory of the Supreme Spirit, and if the Son [is referred to] as the Understanding [of the Supreme Spirit], then it is evident that the love of the Supreme Spirit proceeds equally from the Father and the Son.

CHAPTER FIFTY-ONE

The Father and the Son love themselves and each other in equal degree.

But if the Supreme Spirit loves itself, then without doubt the Father loves Himself, the Son loves Himself, and the Father and the Son love each other. For the Father, considered distinctly, is the Supreme Spirit; and the Son, considered distinctly, is the Supreme Spirit; and both together are one spirit. Moreover, [they love themselves and each other] because each remembers and understands both Himself and the other in equal degree. And since what loves and is loved is wholly the same for the Father and for the Son, it is necessarily the case that each loves Himself and the other in equal degree.

CHAPTER FIFTY-TWO

This Love is as great as the Supreme Spirit.

How great, then, is the Supreme Spirit's love—[a love] so mutual to the Father and the Son? If the Supreme Spirit loves itself to

the extent that it remembers and understands itself, and if it remembers and understands itself in proportion to its essence—as cannot fail to be the case—then surely the Supreme Spirit's love is as great as this Spirit itself.

CHAPTER FIFTY-THREE

This Love is the same thing that the Supreme Spirit is; and yet, this Love is one spirit with the Father and the Son.

But what can be equal to the Supreme Spirit except the Supreme Spirit? Hence, this Love is the Supreme Spirit. Indeed, if there never had been a creature—i.e., if nothing had ever existed other than the Supreme Spirit, who is Father and Son—nonetheless, the Father and the Son would still have loved themselves and each other. Hence, it follows that this Love is identical with what the Father and the Son are, viz., the Supreme Being. Now, since there cannot be many supreme beings, what is more necessary than that the Father, the Son, and their Love be one Supreme Being? Therefore, this Love is the Supreme Wisdom, the Supreme Truth, the Supreme Good, and whatever [else] can be predicated of the substance of the Supreme Spirit.

CHAPTER FIFTY-FOUR

[This Love] proceeds as a whole from the Father and as a whole from the Son. Nevertheless, there is only one love.

We must consider closely whether there are (1) two loves—one proceeding from the Father and the other [proceeding] from the Son—or (2) one [love] proceeding not as a whole from [either] one but [proceeding] partly from the Father and partly from the Son or (3) neither two [loves] nor one [love] which proceeds partly from the Father and partly from the Son but, rather, one and the same [love proceeding] as a whole from each distinctly and as a whole from both together. Now, the solution to this question is unquestionably recognized from the following [consideration: the Supreme Spirit's Love] does not proceed [from the Father and the Son] with respect to the fact that they are two but with respect to the fact that they are one. For the Father and the Son equally send forth such a great good not from their relations, which are plural (the one relation is that of father, the other that of son),

but from their essence, which does not admit of plurality. Therefore, just as the Father, considered distinctly, is the Supreme Spirit and just as the Son, considered distinctly, is the Supreme Spirit, and yet the Father and the Son together are not two spirits but are one Spirit, so the Supreme Spirit's Love proceeds as a whole from the Father, considered distinctly, and as a whole from the Son, considered distinctly, and as one and the same whole (not as two wholes) from the Father and the Son together.

CHAPTER FIFTY-FIVE

[This Love] is not the son of the Father and of the Son.

What then? Since this Love has its existence equally from the Father and the Son, and since it is so like them that it is in no respect unlike them but is in every respect the same thing that they are, must it be regarded as their son or their offspring? Now, as soon as contemplated, the Word evidences most clearly, by manifesting the clear image of its parent, that it is the offspring of the one from whom it exists. By comparison, [the Supreme Spirit's] Love clearly denies that it is an offspring, because when it is understood to proceed from the Father and the Son, it does not immediately exhibit, to one contemplating it, as clear a likeness of the one from whom it exists—even though reflective reason teaches that this Love is in every respect the very thing that the Father and the Son are. Indeed, if [this Love] were the offspring of the Father and the Son, one of the two would be the father of this Love and the other would be the mother, or else both would be its father or both would be its mother—all [three of] which [alternatives] are seen to be counter to the truth. On the one hand, since [this Love] does not proceed at all differently from the Father than from the Son, it is inadmissible to refer to the Father and the Son differently in relation to this Love; thus, it is not the case that the one is its father and the other its mother. On the other hand, there is no precedent in nature for supposing that there are two things each of which has, equally, a perfect and an exactly similar relation of father or mother to some one thing. Thus, it is not the case that both the Father and the Son are father or mother of this Love which proceeds from them. Therefore, that the Love [of the Father and the Son] is their son or their off-

spring is seen not to agree in any respect with the truth.

CHAPTER FIFTY-SIX

Only the Father is begetter and unbegotten.
Only the Son is begotten. Only their Love is neither
begotten nor unbegotten.

But in accordance with our practice in ordinary discourse, this Love (it seems) cannot at all be called unbegotten; nor [can it be called] begotten, as properly as can the Word. For we are accustomed frequently to say that a thing is begotten from that from which it exists—as when we say that heat or brightness is begotten from fire or that an effect [is begotten] from its cause. According to this reasoning, then, the Love which proceeds from the Supreme Spirit cannot at all be called unbegotten; on the other hand, it cannot as properly be called begotten as can the Word. For clearly the Word is the most true offspring and the most true son; but clearly this Love is not at all a son or an offspring. Thus, only He of whom the Word [or Image] is, can be called—or, rather, ought to be called—begetter and unbegotten; for He alone is father and parent and in no way exists from another. And only the Word [should be called] begotten, since it alone is son and offspring. And only the Father and the Son's Love [should be called] neither begotten nor unbegotten, since (1) it is neither son nor offspring and (2) it does not altogether escape existing from someone [else].

CHAPTER FIFTY-SEVEN

This Love is uncreated and creator, even as are the Father and the Son. Nevertheless, they are together one uncreated creator and not three [uncreated creators]. This Love can be called the Spirit of the Father and of the Son.

This Love, considered distinctly, is the Supreme Being, even as are the Father and the Son; and yet, the Father and the Son and their Love, taken together, are not many, but are one Supreme Being, which alone is not made by anyone [else] but which made all [else] only through itself. Therefore, we must infer that just as the Father, considered distinctly, is uncreated and creator, and just as the Son, considered distinctly, is uncreated and creator, so their Love, considered distinctly, is uncreated and creator. Nevertheless, all

three together are one uncreated creator and not three [uncreated creators]. Thus, no one makes or creates or begets the Father. And only the Father begets (but does not create) the Son. And the Father and the Son neither create nor beget their Love; but in some way—if it can be thus expressed—they equally breathe out their Love. For although the supremely immutable Being does not breathe in the manner that we do, still perhaps it cannot at all more fittingly be said to send from itself its own Love (which proceeds ineffably from it by existing from it rather than by parting from it) than by breathing.

Furthermore (if we may speak this way), just as the Word of the Supreme Being is its son, so the Love of the Supreme Being can quite suitably be called its spirit. Thus, although this Love is essentially spirit, even as the Father and the Son [are essentially spirit], nevertheless the Father and the Son are not thought to be anyone's spirit—because the Father is not from anyone else, nor is the Son begotten from the Father's breathing [Him] out, as it were. Rather, this Love may be thought to be the spirit of the Father and of the Son because it marvelously proceeds from both, who breathe [it] out in a certain unique and ineffable way. Moreover, because this Love is common to the Father and the Son, it is reasonably regarded as able to take as its own a name which is common to the Father and the Son, if there is pressing need of a proper name. But, indeed, should it happen that this Love is referred to by the proper name “Spirit”—[a name] which signifies the substance of the Father and of the Son equally—then [this name] will also usefully serve to indicate through itself that [this Love] is what the Father and the Son are, even though it has its own existence from them.

CHAPTER FIFTY-EIGHT

Just as the Son is the essence and wisdom of the Father
in the sense that He has the same essence and wisdom as
the Father, so their Spirit is the essence, wisdom,
and the like, of the Father and of the Son.

Just as the Son is the substance, wisdom, and strength of the Father in the sense that He has the same essence, wisdom, and strength as the Father, so their Spirit can also be understood to be the essence, wisdom, and strength of the Father and of the Son

in that He has exactly the same [essence, wisdom, and strength] as they do.

CHAPTER FIFTY-NINE

The Father and the Son and their Spirit
exist equally in one another.

It is pleasing to contemplate with regard to the Father, the Son, and their Spirit how they exist in one another with such great equality that no one of them excels the other. For aside from the fact that each of them is so perfectly the Supreme Being that all three together are only one Supreme Being which cannot be separate from itself or beyond itself or greater-or-lesser than itself, this very same [fact] can equally well be proved with respect to each, considered distinctly. For the Father as a whole exists in the Son and in the Spirit common [to Him and the Son]; and the Son as a whole exists in the Father and in this same Spirit; and this same Spirit as a whole exists in the Father and in the Son. For the Supreme Being's Memory as a whole exists in its Understanding and in its Love; and its Understanding [as a whole exists] in its Memory and in its Love; and its Love [as a whole exists] in its Memory and in its Understanding. Indeed, the Supreme Spirit understands and loves the whole of its Memory; and it remembers and loves the whole of its Understanding; and it remembers and understands the whole of its Love. But the Father is referred to as Memory, the Son as Understanding, and their Spirit as Love. Therefore, the Father, the Son, and their Spirit so equally encompass one another and so equally exist in one another that no one of them can excel the other or exist without Him.

CHAPTER SIXTY

No one of them needs the other for remembering,
understanding, or loving—because each, distinctly,
is Memory, Understanding, Love, and whatever [else]
must be present in the Supreme Being.

But in regard to these [three] I think that what occurs to me as I investigate must be carefully kept in mind. The Father must be understood as Memory, the Son as Understanding, and the Spirit as Love in such way that the Father does not need either the Son or

the Spirit common [to them], the Son [does] not [need] the Father or this same Spirit, and this Spirit [does] not [need] the Father or the Son. We must not suppose that (1) the Father can only remember through Himself, while being able to understand only through the Son and to love only through His and the Son's Spirit, or (2) that the Son can only understand through Himself, while remembering through the Father and loving through His own Spirit, or (3) that this same Spirit can only love through Himself, while the Father remembers for Him and the Son understands for Him. For with regard to these three each, distinctly, is the Supreme Being and Supreme Wisdom so perfectly that this Being and Wisdom remembers, understands, and loves through itself. Consequently, none of these three could possibly need one of the others in order to remember or understand or love. For each, distinctly, is essentially memory, understanding, love, and whatever [else] must be present in the Supreme Being.

CHAPTER SIXTY-ONE

Nevertheless, there are not three [fathers or three sons
or three spirits] but one father, one son,
and one spirit common to them.

I notice that at this point a question arises. For if the Father is understanding and love as well as Memory, and if the Son is memory and love as well as Understanding, and if their Spirit is memory and understanding as well as Love (indeed, such was the manner in which we understood that the Father is Memory, the Son Understanding, and their Spirit Love), then how does the Father avoid being a son and someone's spirit? And why is the Son not a father and someone's spirit? And why is their Spirit not someone's father and someone's son? Now, these questions are not difficult to answer provided we reflect upon the [conclusions] already discovered by reason. Although the Father is understanding and love, He is not a son or anyone's spirit, because He is not understanding as begotten from someone [else] or love as proceeding from someone [else]. Whatever He is He is only as one who begets and as one from whom someone else proceeds. Moreover, although the Son by Himself remembers and loves, He is not a father or anyone's spirit, because He is not memory which begets

or love which proceeds from someone else in the way that His Spirit does. Whatever He is is only begotten and is that from which a spirit proceeds. Moreover, the fact that the Spirit is comprised of memory or understanding does not require that He be also a father or a son, because [the Spirit] is not memory which begets or understanding which is begotten. Rather, whatever He is only proceeds. Therefore, what prevents us from concluding that there is only one Father, one Son, and one Spirit in the Supreme Being—not three fathers or three sons or three spirits?

CHAPTER SIXTY-TWO

How from these [viz., the Father, the Son, and their Spirit] many sons seem to be begotten.

But let what I now see not perchance contradict this assertion [above]. For there ought to be no doubt that the Father and the Son and their Spirit each speaks of Himself and of the other two (just as each [also] understands Himself and the other two). But if so, how is it that in the Supreme Being there are not as many words as there are ones speaking and ones being spoken of? For if several men utter one thing mentally, there seem to be as many words [or images] of this thing as there are thinkers, because a word [or an image] of this thing is in each one's thought. Likewise, if one man thinks of several things, there are as many words in his mind as there are things thought of. But in a man's thought when he thinks of something which is outside his mind, the word [or image] of the object thought of is not begotten from the object itself, since the object itself is not present in the mental vision. Rather, [the word is begotten in his thought] from a likeness or an image of the object—either [an image] which is in the memory of the one thinking, or else possibly [an image] which, during the time that the person is thinking, is conducted from the object which is present, into the mind by means of the bodily senses. Yet, in the Supreme Being the Father and the Son and their Spirit are always so present to one another (for, as already noted, each of them exists no less in the others than in Himself) that when they speak of one another, the one who is spoken of seems to beget His own word, just as when He speaks of Himself. Therefore, if each one of them begets His own word when He speaks of Himself or

is spoken of by one of the others, how is it that the Son, or how is it that the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, fails to beget anything? Moreover, according to the above reasoning the Supreme Substance must beget as many sons and send forth as many spirits as there are words which can be proved to be begotten from it. Consequently, by this reasoning, there seem to be in the Supreme Being not only many fathers and sons and proceeding [spirits] but also other relations.

CHAPTER SIXTY-THREE

How in the Supreme Spirit there is only one son and one who has a son.¹

On the other hand, surely the Father and the Son and their Spirit (all of whom, it is already most certain, really exist) are not three speakings—even though each, considered distinctly, speaks. Nor is more than one thing spoken of when each speaks of Himself and of the other two. For just as it belongs to the Supreme Wisdom to know and to understand, so it is surely the nature of eternal and immutable Knowledge and Understanding always to behold as present that which it knows and understands. Yet, for the Supreme Spirit to speak in such way is simply for it mentally to see, as it were—even as our own mental speaking is nothing other than a mental seeing. Now, reasons already considered have made it most certain that whatever belongs to the Supreme Nature essentially, perfectly besuits the Father, considered distinctly, the Son, considered distinctly, and their Spirit, considered distinctly; and yet, that very [characteristic] does not admit of plurality if it is predicated of the three together. Now, it is evident that just as knowledge and understanding pertain to the essence of the Supreme Spirit, so the Supreme Spirit's knowing and understanding are the same as its speaking (i.e., the same as its always beholding as present) what it knows and understands. Consequently, it is necessary that just as the Father, considered distinctly, the Son, considered distinctly, and their Spirit, considered distinctly, know and understand, and nevertheless these three together are not several knowings or understandings but one knowing and understanding, so each [of them], considered distinctly,

¹Literally: "How there there is only one of one."

speaks, and nevertheless all of them together are not three speakings but one speaking. Hence, we can also recognize clearly that when these three [viz., the Father, the Son, and their Spirit] are spoken of—whether each speaks of Himself or whether they speak of one another—there are not many [beings] which are spoken of. For what is spoken of *there* except their essence? Hence, if this essence is only singular, then what is spoken of is only singular. Thus, if what speaks is one in them, and if what is spoken of is one (indeed, what speaks in them is one wisdom, and what is spoken of is one substance), necessarily there are not many words in the Supreme Spirit but [there is only] one word. Consequently, although each [speaks of] Himself and all speak of one another, still in the Supreme Being there cannot be any other word than the Word which (I have proved) is so begotten from the one whose word it is that it can be called this one's true image and is truly His son.

In this [fact] I see something marvelous and inexplicable. For, lo, although it is clear that (1) the Father, the Son, and the Spirit of the Father and of the Son each speaks equally of Himself and of the other two, and that (2) there is only one word in the Supreme Spirit, nevertheless this Word cannot in any way, it seems, be called the word of all three but [can be called the word] only of one of them. For it is evident that the Word is the image and the son of the one whose word it is; and, clearly, [the Word] cannot appropriately be called the image or the son either of itself or of the spirit proceeding from it. For [the Word] is not begotten from itself and is not begotten from [the spirit] which proceeds from it; nor does [the Word] through existing imitate either itself or the one proceeding from it. Indeed, [the Word] does not imitate itself or contract from itself the likeness of existing, because there is no imitation and no similarity with regard to a single thing alone but [only] with regard to more than one thing [viz., the imitating and the imitated]. On the other hand, [the Word] does not imitate the proceeding Spirit, nor [does the Word] exist in His likeness—because the Son does not exist from the proceeding Spirit but, rather, the Spirit exists from the Son. Therefore, [the alternative] remains that this Word alone is [the word] only of Him from whom it has its existence by being begotten and in whose complete likeness it exists. Therefore, in the Supreme

Being there is one father, one son, and one proceeding spirit—rather than more than one father, son, or proceeding spirit. And these are so three that the Father is never the Son or the proceeding Spirit; nor is the Son ever the Father or the proceeding Spirit; nor is the Spirit of the Father and of the Son ever the Father or the Son. Moreover, each [of these three], considered distinctly, is so complete that He needs no [other]. Nonetheless, what [the three] are is so one that just as it cannot be predicated plurally of each, considered distinctly, so [it can] not [be predicated plurally] of the three together. And although in equal measure each of them [speaks of] Himself and all speak of one another, nevertheless in the Supreme Being there are not many words but [there is only] one [word]. And this Word is [the word] not of each distinctly or of all together but of one [of them] alone.

CHAPTER SIXTY-FOUR

Although inexplicable, this [teaching] must be believed.

The hiddenness of so sublime a matter seems to me to surpass the entire acute gaze of the human intellect; and so, I think that I ought to refrain from attempting to explain how this doctrine is true. For I think that anyone who is investigating an incomprehensible doctrine should be content if by rational inference he comes to recognize that this doctrine is most certainly true—even if he is unable to comprehend how it could be true. And [I think that] to these [doctrines] which are asserted [to be true] on the basis of compelling proofs (with no other rational consideration opposing) the certitude of faith ought no less to be assigned if because of [the doctrines'] naturally deep incomprehensibility they cannot be explained. But what is so incomprehensible, so ineffable, as that which is higher than all [other] things? Therefore, if the claims hitherto made about the Supreme Being have been asserted on the basis of compelling reasons, then the firm certainty of these [statements] is not at all shaken, even though they cannot be comprehended to the point that they can be explained in words. For if my previous reflection rationally comprehends that it is incomprehensible how the Supreme Wisdom knows the things it made (about which things it is necessary that we know so much), who could explain how [this Wisdom] knows itself or speaks of it-

self (about which [Wisdom] either nothing or nearly nothing is possible to be known by man)? Therefore, if by virtue of [Supreme Wisdom's] speaking of itself the Father generates and the Son is generated, “who shall explain His generation?”¹

CHAPTER SIXTY-FIVE

How regarding [this] ineffable matter something true was argued.

But on the other hand, if such is the manner of the Supreme Wisdom's ineffability—or rather, *because* it is such—how will there hold true what was argued about the Supreme Wisdom in regard to the relation of Father and of Son and of proceeding [Spirit]? For if that [which was argued] was explained by sound reasoning, then how is the Supreme Wisdom ineffable? Or if [the Supreme Being] is ineffable, how is [the matter] such as it was argued to be? [Is not the case as follows?]: to some extent an explanation regarding Supreme Wisdom was able to be given; and so, nothing precludes the truth of what was argued; but because [this Wisdom] was not at all able to be comprehended, it is ineffable. But what can be said about that which was established in the preceding disputation? viz., that the Supreme Being is so above and beyond every other nature that whenever something is predicated of it in words which are also applied to other natures, the meaning [of these words] is not at all the same in the two cases. For in all those words which I thought, did I understand any meaning except the customary and ordinary meaning? So if the ordinary meaning of [these] words does not apply to the Supreme Being, none of my previous inferences apply to it. Therefore, how is it true that something was discovered about the Supreme Being if what was discovered is far different from the Supreme Being?

What then? [Could it be that] in one respect something was discovered about an incomprehensible thing, whereas in another respect nothing was discerned about it? For we often speak of many things which we do not express properly, as they are. Instead, we signify obliquely (*per aliud*) that which we either cannot, or else do not want to, express properly (e.g., when we speak symbolically). And often we see a thing, though not properly (i.e., not as the

¹Isaiah 53:8.

object itself is) but rather by means of a likeness or an image (e.g., when we see someone's face in a mirror). Thus, we do and do not speak of one and the same thing; we do and do not see one and the same object. We speak of and see obliquely; we do not speak of and do not see in accordance with the respective reality. So in this manner, if the Supreme Nature is not at all assumed to be expressed in accordance with the reality of its essence but [is assumed to be] somehow or other designated obliquely, then nothing precludes the truth of all that was hitherto argued about the Supreme Nature, and yet nothing prevents this Nature from remaining as ineffable as ever. For whatever words seem to be predicable of this Nature do not so much reveal it to me in its reality as hint at [it] through a likeness. For when I think the significations of these words, I more readily conceive of what I observe in created things than of that [Being] which I understand to transcend all human understanding. For by their respective significations [these words] form in my mind something much less than—indeed, something far different from—that toward which my mind, by means of these inadequate meanings, tries to advance in order to understand. For example, not even the word “wisdom” suffices for disclosing to me this [Being] through which all things were made from nothing and are kept from [falling away into] nothing. Nor can the word “being” express to me that [Reality] which is far above all things by virtue of its unique loftiness and which is far removed from all things by virtue of its own nature. So, then, this Nature is ineffable, because words cannot at all express it as it is; and yet, if under the instruction of reason we can obliquely, as in a dark manner,¹ think something regarding it, [this thought] is not false.

CHAPTER SIXTY-SIX

Through the rational mind one comes nearest
to knowing the Supreme Being.

Therefore, since it is evident that something about this Nature can be perceived not with respect to its reality but [only] obliquely (*per aliud*), it is certain that one more closely approaches a knowledge of it through that which more closely approximates it in likeness. For among created things whatever is shown to be more similar to

¹I Corinthians 13:12.

the Supreme Nature must be more excellent by nature. Therefore, by virtue of its greater likeness this [created thing] more greatly aids the inquiring mind to approach the Supreme Truth, and by virtue of its more excellent created being it more fully teaches what the mind ought to think regarding the Creator. Hence, without doubt, the more the Creative Being is investigated by reference to a creature more near to itself, the more thoroughly this Being is known. For the argument considered earlier leaves no doubt that every being in the degree to which it exists is in that degree similar to the Supreme Being. Clearly, then, just as the rational mind alone of all creatures is able to mount an investigation of the Supreme Being, so equally the rational mind alone is that through which the rational mind itself is most able to advance toward finding the Supreme Being. For we already know that the rational mind most nearly approximates the Supreme Nature through a likeness of natural being. Therefore, what is clearer than that (1) the more earnestly the rational mind attends to knowing itself, the more effectively it ascends to knowledge of the Supreme Being, and (2) the more it neglects inspecting itself, the more it wanes from contemplating the Supreme Being?

CHAPTER SIXTY-SEVEN

The mind is the mirror and image of the Supreme Being.

The mind, then, can very fittingly be called its own mirror, as it were, in which it beholds, so to speak, the image of this Being which it cannot see face to face. For if of all created things the mind alone can remember itself, understand, and love, then I do not see why we should deny that there is in it the true image of this Being, which exists as an ineffable trinity of self-remembrance, understanding, and love. Indeed, by the fact that [the mind] can remember, understand, and love the Supreme Being it proves the more truly that it is the image of the Supreme Being. For the greater [the mind] is and the more similar it is to the Supreme Being, the truer image of the Supreme Being it is known to be. Yet, there cannot at all be thought to be naturally bestowed upon the rational creature anything as excellent and as similar to the Supreme Wisdom as is the ability to remember, to understand, and to love that which is the greatest and best of all. Therefore, on no creature is there bestowed

anything else which so displays the image of the Creator.

CHAPTER SIXTY-EIGHT

The rational creature was made
for loving the Supreme Being.

And so, it seems to follow that the rational creature ought earnestly to desire nothing as much as to express, as a voluntary effect, this image impressed on it as a natural ability. For aside from the rational creature's owing what he is to his Creator: from the fact that he is known to be able [to do] nothing as excellent as remembering, understanding, and loving the Supreme Good, he is proved without doubt to be under obligation to will nothing as principally [as the Supreme Good]. For who would deny that the better things over which we have power ought more to be willed?

Indeed, for a rational nature to be rational is nothing other than for it to be able to discriminate what is just from what is not just, what is true from what is not true, what is good from what is not good, what is more good from what is less good. But the ability [to make these discriminations] is thoroughly useless and superfluous to rational nature unless what it distinguishes it [also] loves or disapproves in accordance with the dictates of correct discrimination. Herefrom, then, we see quite clearly that every rational [being] exists for the following purpose: viz., that even as by rational discrimination he judges a thing to be more or less good, or else to be no good at all, so he might love that thing in proportionately greater or lesser degree, or else reject it. Therefore, nothing is clearer than that the rational creature was made for this end: viz., to love above all [other] goods the Supreme Being, inasmuch as it is the Supreme Good. Or better, [he was made] so that he might love nothing except the Supreme Being or on account of the Supreme Being—since the Supreme Being is good through itself and nothing else is good except through it. Yet, [the rational creature] cannot love the Supreme Being without striving to remember it and to understand it. Clearly, then, the rational creature ought to devote his entire ability and his entire will to [the end of] remembering, understanding, and loving the Supreme Good—to which end he knows that he has his existence.

CHAPTER SIXTY-NINE

The soul that always loves the Supreme Being
lives at some time in true happiness.

But without doubt the human soul is a rational creature. Hence, it must have been made for the purpose of loving the Supreme Being. Necessarily, then, it was made either so that it might love [this Being] endlessly or else so that it might at some time lose this love either freely or by force. But it is blasphemous to think that Supreme Wisdom created the soul so that the soul might sometime despise such a great good or else might lose it by force, while willing to keep it. Thus, [the alternative] remains that the soul was created for loving the Supreme Being endlessly. However, the soul cannot do this [viz., love endlessly,] unless it always lives. So, then, it was created so that it might always live—provided it would always will to do that for which it was made. Moreover, it would be altogether unbesuited to the omnipotent, supremely good, and supremely wise Creator to cause not to exist, while it was truly loving [Him], a thing which He made to exist for the purpose of loving Him. And [it would be altogether unbesuited to Him] to remove or to permit to be removed from a being which loved [Him] the gift which He freely gave to this being when it did not love [Him] so that it might always love [Him]—a removal which would necessitate this being's not loving [Him. This possibility seems] all the more [unsuitable] since we ought in no way to doubt that the Creator loves every nature which truly loves Him. Therefore, it is evident that the human soul's life will never be removed from it—provided it always earnestly desire to love the Supreme Life.

What kind of life, then, will the soul have? For of what value is a long life unless it is truly free from distressful intrusions? For whoever during his lifetime is subject to distress either because of fear or of suffering, or whoever is deceived because of a false security—how does he live except unhappily? By contrast, if someone lives free of these [conditions], he lives happily. But it is thoroughly absurd that a nature would, while always loving Him who is both omnipotent and supremely good, always live unhappily. Clearly, then, the human soul is such that if it keeps that end for which it exists, it will at some time live happily—truly free from death itself and every other form of distress.

CHAPTER SEVENTY

The Supreme Being gives itself as a reward
to [the soul] which loves it.

Indeed, we cannot at all regard as true [the supposition] that the most just and most powerful [Being] gives no reward to [a soul] loving it perseveringly—[a soul] to which, not loving [it], it gave existence so that this soul could love [it]. For were [this Being] to give no reward to [a soul] loving it, Supreme Justice would not be distinguishing between [a soul] that loves what ought to be loved supremely and [a soul] that despises what ought to be loved supremely. Moreover, either Supreme Justice would not be loving [a soul] which was loving it, or else to be loved by Supreme Justice would be of no advantage. But these [consequences] are all incompatible with Supreme Justice. Therefore, it rewards every [soul] that perseveres in loving it.

But what does [Supreme Justice] give as a reward? If to what was nothing it gave a rational being, so that [this being] would love [it], what will it give to [a soul] which loves [it] without ceasing to love [it]? If the [initial] assistance to love is so great, how great is the recompense to love? And if such is the supporting of love, what will be the nature of love's gain? For if the rational creature, which without this love is useless to itself, is so eminent among all creatures, surely nothing can be this love's reward except what is pre-eminent among all natures. For the Supreme Good, which thus demands to be loved, requires equally that it be desired by [the soul] loving it. For who could love justice, truth, happiness, and incorruptibility in such way as not to desire to enjoy them? Therefore, with what shall Supreme Goodness reward [the soul] which loves and desires it if not with itself? For whatever else it bestows it does not bestow as a reward, because [any other bestowal] would neither compensate the love nor console the loving [soul] nor satisfy its desires.

On the other hand, if [Supreme Goodness] willed to be loved and desired in order to give some other reward, then Supreme Goodness would will to be loved and desired not for its own sake but for the sake of something else. And so, it would not will that it itself be loved but would will that this other thing [be loved]—something blasphemous to think. Therefore, nothing is truer than

that every rational soul at some time shall receive the Supreme Beatitude to enjoy—provided [the soul] strive as it should to desire Supreme Beatitude out of love for it. As a result, what [the soul] now sees as if through a glass, darkly, it shall then see face to face.¹ But to question whether or not [the rational soul] will enjoy Supreme Beatitude endlessly would be very foolish. For while enjoying this Beatitude [the soul] cannot be tormented by fear or deceived by a false security. Nor having experienced the need of this Beatitude can [the soul] keep from loving it. Nor will Supreme Beatitude forsake [a soul] which loves it. Nor will there be anything more powerful which will separate it and the soul against their wills. Therefore, any soul which once begins to enjoy Supreme Beatitude will be eternally happy.

CHAPTER SEVENTY-ONE

[The soul] that despises the Supreme Being
will be eternally unhappy.

Assuredly, from these [conclusions] we can consistently infer that the soul which despises loving the Supreme Good will incur eternal unhappiness. Now, if someone were to say, “For such contempt [the soul] would be more justly punished by losing its existence, or life, since [the soul] does not use itself for that end for which it was made,” then reason would not at all allow [the supposition] that [the soul], after such great guilt, should be punished by becoming what it was before any guilt. Indeed, before [the soul] existed it was not able to have guilt or to be aware of punishment. Therefore, if after despising the end for which it was made the soul were to die in such way that it did not experience anything or in such way that it were absolutely nothing, its condition would be the same in the case of greatest guilt as in the case of no guilt; moreover, supremely wise Justice would not be discriminating between (1) what can [do] no good and will no evil, and (2) what can [do] the greatest good but wills the greatest evil. But how unsuitable this [consequence] is is quite plain. So, then, nothing can be seen [to follow] more consistently, and nothing ought to be believed more assuredly, than that man's soul was made in such way that if it despises loving the Supreme Being it will suffer eternal

¹I Corinthians 13:12.

unhappiness. Consequently, just as the loving [soul] will rejoice in an eternal reward, so the despising [soul] will grieve in eternal punishment. And as the former will experience immutable sufficiency, so the latter will experience inconsolable need.

CHAPTER SEVENTY-TWO
Every human soul is immortal.

But if [the soul] were mortal: then, necessarily, the soul which loves [the Supreme Being] would not be eternally happy; and [the soul] which despises [the Supreme Being] would not [be eternally] unhappy. Thus, whether [the soul] loves or despises that which it was created to love, necessarily the soul is immortal. Now, if there are any rational souls which must be deemed to be neither loving nor despising—as the souls of infants seem to be—what must be believed about them? Are they mortal or immortal? Well, without doubt, all human souls are of the same nature. Therefore, since it is evident that some [of them] are immortal, it is necessary that every human soul be immortal.

CHAPTER SEVENTY-THREE
[The soul] is either always unhappy or else
at some time truly happy.

But since any living thing either is never, or else is at some time, truly free from all distress, it is no less necessary that every human soul either be always unhappy or else be at some time truly happy.

CHAPTER SEVENTY-FOUR
No soul is unjustly deprived of the Supreme Good. [The soul]
is supposed to strive for the Supreme Good wholeheartedly.

I think that it is certainly either very difficult or else impossible for any mortal man to be able to ascertain by disputing (1) which souls are unhesitatingly to be deemed as so loving the end which they were created to love that they deserve at some time to enjoy this end, (2) which [souls] so despise this end that they deserve always to be in need of it, and (3) in what manner or by what merit the souls which apparently can be called neither loving nor despising are assigned to eternal happiness or eternal unhappiness. Nevertheless, we must most certainly maintain that the

supremely just and supremely good Creator of things does not unjustly deprive any [soul] of that good for which it was made; moreover, every man is supposed to strive for this same good by loving and desiring it with all his heart, all his soul, and all his mind.¹

CHAPTER SEVENTY-FIVE

We are to hope for the Supreme Being.

But the human soul would not at all be able to engage in this endeavor if it despaired of being able to attain what it was striving for. Therefore, the hope-of-attaining is as much necessary to the human soul as the desire to strive-for is useful.

CHAPTER SEVENTY-SIX

We are to believe in the Supreme Being.

But that which does not believe cannot love or hope. Therefore, it is advantageous for the human soul to believe the Supreme Being and the things without which the Supreme Being cannot be loved, so that the soul by believing may strive unto the Supreme Being. Yet, I think that this same [idea] can be conveyed fittingly and more tersely if instead of saying “by believing, to strive unto the Supreme Being” we say [simply] “to believe in the Supreme Being.” For if someone declares that he believes in the Supreme Being, he seems sufficiently enough to indicate [thereby] that (1) he strives for the Supreme Being through the faith which he is professing and that (2) he believes those things which pertain to this endeavor. For someone who believes what does not pertain to striving unto the Supreme Being or who does not strive for the Supreme Being through what he believes does not seem to believe in the Supreme Being.

Presumably, it makes no difference whether we say “to believe *in* the Supreme Being” or “to believe *on* the Supreme Being”—just as we can accept as the same the expressions “by believing, to strive *unto* the Supreme Being” and “by believing, to strive *for* it.”² Yet, whoever by striving for it will arrive, will remain within

¹Matthew 22:37. ²The Latin idiom is difficult to capture in English. The following renderings have been used: *tendere in (illam)* - to strive unto; *tendere ad (illam)* - to strive for; *credere in (illam)* - to believe in; *credere ad (illam)* - to believe on.

it rather than remaining outside it; and this [idea] is more explicitly and more readily indicated by saying that [the soul] ought to “strive unto the Supreme Being” than by saying that [the soul] ought to “strive for the Supreme Being.” And so, for this reason I think that “[The soul] ought to believe *in* the Supreme Being” can be said more appropriately than “[The soul] ought to believe *on* the Supreme Being.”

CHAPTER SEVENTY-SEVEN

We ought to believe equally in the Father, the Son, and their Spirit—in each distinctly and in all three together.

Therefore, we ought to believe equally in the Father, the Son, and their Spirit—in each distinctly and in all three together. For the Father, considered distinctly, is the Supreme Being; the Son, considered distinctly, is the Supreme Being; and their Spirit, considered distinctly, is the Supreme Being. And the Father and the Son, together with their Spirit, are together one and the same Supreme Being in which alone every man ought to believe, since this is the singular end which [each man] out of love ought to strive unto in every thought and deed. Hence, it is evident that just as a man can strive unto the Supreme Being only if he believes [in] this Being, so believing [in] this Being is of no avail to anyone unless he strives thereunto.

CHAPTER SEVENTY-EIGHT

Which faith is alive and which is dead.

Therefore, with whatever degree of certainty so important a matter is believed, [this] faith will be useless and as something dead unless it is made alive and strong by love. Indeed, this faith, which its corresponding love accompanies, is not at all idle—provided the opportunity to use [it] arises. Rather, [this faith] exercises itself in a great number of works—something which it could not do in the absence of love. [These claims] can be proved by the solitary fact that what loves Supreme Justice can neither despise anything just nor admit of anything unjust. Therefore, since that which accomplishes something shows [thereby] that it possesses the vital force without which it could not accomplish [what it did], we may without absurdity say [the following]: (1) working faith is

alive because it has the vital force of love, in whose absence it would not accomplish [what it does], and that (2) idle faith is not alive because it lacks the vital force of love, in whose presence it would not be idle. Thus, if we call *blind* not only someone who has lost his sight but also someone who does not have sight when he ought to have it, why can we not likewise call faith without love *dead*—not because it has lost its vital force (i.e., its love) but because it does not have [the vital force] which it ought always to have?¹ Therefore, just as faith which works through love² is recognized to be living faith, so faith which is idle through contemptuousness is shown to be dead. Thus, living faith can quite suitably be said to believe *in* what ought to be believed in, whereas dead faith [can be said] merely to believe what ought to be believed.

CHAPTER SEVENTY-NINE

What three the Supreme Being can
in some respect be said to be.

Lo, it is clearly advantageous for every man to believe in an ineffable Oneness which is trine and Trinity which is one. Indeed, [this Being is] one and a oneness by virtue of one essence; but I do not know by virtue of what three it is trine and a trinity. For although I can speak of a trinity because of the Father, the Son, and their Spirit, who are three, nevertheless I cannot in a single word name that by virtue of which they are three (as if I were to say “[a trinity] by virtue of three *persons*,” as I might say “a oneness by virtue of one *substance*”). For they must not be thought to be three persons, because in cases where there are more persons than one, they all exist so independently of one another that there must be as many substances as there are persons—something which we recognize in the case of a plurality of men, who are as many individual substances as they are persons. Therefore, just as there are not many substances in the Supreme Being, so there are not many persons.

Thus, if someone wanted to speak to someone [else] about the Trinity, what three would he say that the Father, the Son, and their Spirit are?—unless perhaps, compelled by the lack of a properly

¹James 2:20 & 26. ²Galatians 5:6.

suitable word, he were to choose a word from among those which cannot be predicated plurally of the Supreme Being [and were to use this word] for signifying what cannot be said by an appropriate word. For instance, he might say that this wonderful Trinity is one being or nature and three *persons* or *substances*. For these last two words are quite fittingly selected for signifying a plurality in the Supreme Being, since “person” is predicated only of an *individual* rational nature and “substance” is predicated mainly of *individual* things, which, especially, are a plurality. For individuals, especially, support accidents—i.e., are subject to accidents; and so, individuals are quite properly called substances. (Accordingly, we have already seen that the Supreme Being, which is subject to no accidents, cannot *properly* be called a substance—except where “substance” is a substitute for “being.”) Therefore, on the basis of this necessity, the Supreme Trinity which is one, or Supreme Oneness which is trine, can irreproachably be called one being and three *persons* or three *substances*.

CHAPTER EIGHTY

The Supreme Being exercises dominion over all things and rules all things and is the only God.

Therefore, it seems—or rather, it is unhesitatingly affirmed—that this [Being] which we call God is not nothing and that the name “God” is properly assigned to this Supreme Being alone. Indeed, everyone who affirms that a God exists (whether one God or more than one) understands [thereby] nothing other than a Substance which he believes to be above every nature that is not God—[a Substance which] men are to worship because of its excellent worthiness and which they are to entreat against lurking misfortune. What, though, is so to be worshiped because of its worthiness and implored in regard to any matter whatsoever as is the supremely good and supremely powerful Spirit, which exercises dominion over all things and rules all things? For just as it is evident that all things were made through, and are sustained by, this Spirit's supremely good and supremely wise omnipotence, so it would be altogether unsuitable to think that (1) this Spirit does not have dominion over the things made by it or that (2) the things made by it are governed by some other less powerful, less good, or less

wise being—or (3) governed by no rational principle at all but only by a random changing, due to chance occurrences. For this Spirit alone is the one through whom anything fares well and without whom not anything fares well—and from whom, through whom, and in whom all things exist. Therefore, since this Spirit alone is not only the good Creator but also both the most powerful Lord and the wisest Ruler of all, it alone (we see most clearly) is the one whom every other nature to its full ability ought to worship lovingly and love worshipfully. [And, most clearly, this Spirit is the one] from whom alone good fortune is to be hoped for, to whom alone flight from adversity is to be taken, and of whom alone supplication is to be made for anything whatsoever. Truly, then, this Spirit not only is God but is the only God—ineffably three and one.