I. Trajectory of research from MC to DP
   A. Political status of science: question of power and knowledge [pouvoir / savoir]
      1) It's too much to ask this question of "hard sciences": physics or chemistry
      2) So F asked it of the human sciences
         a) Psychiatry in MC
         b) Medicine in BC
   B. No one else saw the interest of these questions
      1) Marxist intellectuals wanted to offer new answers to same old questions posed by the liberal university tradition, so they went to the "classic" questions of philosophy of science
      2) "Post-stalinist Stalinism" insisted on repetition of Marxist / 19th C discourse
         a) Post-1968, there was a new discursive regime possible
      3) The PCF directors refused to pose questions to psychiatry bcs of the gulag

II. Discontinuity and structuralist history
   A. F admits that in Order of Things (Les Mots et les Choses) he wasn't as clear as he could have been. [He uses his work in AK to explain]:
   B. In some sciences, change is not smooth and continuous, but somewhat abrupt
      1) A "discontinuity" changes the manner of saying (mots) and seeing (choses)
      2) Change in "rules of formation of statements"
         a) What counts as possibly true or false, as a scientific statement
         b) In other words, a change in the "internal regime of power" of statements
            (1) That is, which statements are admissible and which are excluded
            (2) This issue is what is common to MC and OT, but badly formulated

III. Relation of event and structure
   A. An "event" cannot be pure surd opposed to pure intelligibility of structure
      1) Thus, F says "no one could be more anti-structuralist than me"
      2) We have to see the networks and levels of events, and how they are connected
   B. Thus F adopted the genealogical approach using the war model
      1) Relations of events are relations of power, not of "meaning" [sens]
      2) This doesn't mean they are not intelligible, but genealogy is
         a) Neither dialectic (which evades contingency of history)
         b) Nor semiotics (which evades violence of history)

IV. Relation of discourse and power
   A. Inability of left or right to properly pose question of power's specific mechanisms
      1) Right was tied to sovereignty
      2) Left was tied to the State
   B. The everyday and local struggles of 1968 allowed F to question micro-power

V. Didn't the hegemony of Marxism and structuralism help obscure micro-power?
   A. Yes.

VI. Genealogy and constitution
   A. Rather than simply historicize the subject, we have to get rid of it altogether [as centralizing constitutive power]
   B. Genealogy shows how the subject is itself constituted in a historical framework
VII. Ideology and repression [as ways of analyzing power] vs "positive history" of DP
A. Three problems with ideology
   1) Always in virtual opposition to truth; we have to show "production of effects of truth" interior to a discourse which is neither true nor false
   2) Always refers to a subject
   3) Always derivative of an economic or material determinant
B. Repression is more difficult to get rid of
   1) MC implicitly used a concept of repression
   2) Repression implies a juridical / negative notion of power
      a) But if power always only said "no," how could it ever get us to obey it?
      b) We have to see power as productive of pleasure, knowledge, discourse
C. DP tried to show a great technological "release" [déblocage] of power
   1) Not just the great state apparatuses of army, police, financial administration
   2) But a new "economy" of power

VIII. Repression and sexuality
A. F agrees that dispositif of sexuality looks repressive, but is productive
   1) By putting parents and children on the lookout for masturbation
   2) We saw a great "electrification" of infant bodies, a "sexualization"
B. Why did we see power as juridical-negative vs positive-technical-productive?

IX. Juridical / philosophical theories of power
A. Medieval monarchies posited themselves as impartial arbiters
B. Sovereignty, law, prohibition = "representation of power" transmitted by theories of right [droit]; to understand power, we have to "cut off the head of the king"

X. The modern state
A. Posing question of power in terms of state = sovereignty / law / repression
B. The state is important, but power goes beyond the state
   1) The state doesn't saturate the field of power relations
   2) The state only functions on a base of pre-existing power relations;
      a) It is super-structural re: series of networks of micro-power:
      b) The state is thus a "metapower"

XI. The state and revolution
A. States are "codifications" of multiple power relations
B. Revolutions are re-codifications
   1) There are as many types of revolutions as there are subversions of power
   2) Some revolutions change the state w/o changing power relations

XII. Inverting Clausewitz's formula so that politics is continuation of war
A. Object of F's current research ["Society Must Be Defended"]
B. NB that F does not simply endorse this view, but makes it a problem

XIII. Relation of disciplines and populations
A. Feudal power tended to work by signs and levies [prélèvements]
B. New power tended to work by production and "social service" [prestation]
   1) An "incorporation" of power: training of bodies
   2) A direction of the population
C. Sex is the junction of discipline of bodies and control of populations

XIV. The role of intellectuals
A. Form of struggle
1) Universal intellectual: individual, self-conscious form of the universality the proletariat only embodied darkly and collectively
2) Specific intellectual: concrete and immediate knowledge of struggles
   a) Sometimes these are different from the problems of the proletariat
   b) But sometimes these struggles are another form of the struggles of the proletariat or peasantry or the masses against multinationals, prison-industrial system, housing market speculation, etc.

B. Type of knowledge:
   1) The universal writer opposed himself to specialized competence
   2) But the specific intellectual uses his specialized knowledge
      a) This is why the university is such a political flashpoint
      b) Example of Oppenheimer

C. Historical antecedents and contemporary examples
   1) Antecedents:
      a) Universal intellectual as man of justice: e.g., Voltaire
      b) Specific intellectual as "expert" [savant] intervening in politics:
   2) Contemporary examples:
      a) Biologists and physicists as "absolute experts": strategies of life and death
      b) Need for integration of struggles: lapse into anarchism by prison struggle alienates public, lets them be manipulated by fear

D. Rethink function of specific intellectual re: truth / power nexus
   1) "Truth is a thing of this world"
   2) Five traits of our "political economy of truth"
      a) Centrality of scientific discourse
      b) Economic and political incitement
      c) Object of diffusion and consumption
      d) Non-exclusive, but dominant, control of political / economic apparatuses
      e) Truth is what's at stake in political debate and social struggle
   3) Three aspects of the specific intellectual tied to our regime of truth
      a) Class position
      b) Conditions of life and work
      c) Position within the regime of production of truth
   4) Thus the problem is not to fight for truth but to question its production

E. Four propositions / hypotheses for future work
   1) "Truth" = ensemble of regulated procedures for production of statements
   2) Truth is linked to systems of power
      a) Production of truth
      b) Power effects of truth
   3) The regime of truth is not ideological or super structural
      a) It was a condition of formation and development of capitalism
      b) But it is also that which functions in the socialist countries
   4) The political problem of truth for intellectuals
      a) Is not to disentangle ideology from science
      b) But to see if we can construct a new political regime of truth production
      c) It's not a matter of freeing truth from power (for truth has its own power)
      d) But detaching power of truth from its current hegemonic forms