This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world’s books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that’s often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book’s long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ **Make non-commercial use of the files** We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ **Refrain from automated querying** Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google’s system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ **Maintain attribution** The Google “watermark” you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ **Keep it legal** Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can’t offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book’s appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world’s books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at [http://books.google.com/](http://books.google.com/)
FROM THE LIBRARY OF
ROBERT MARK WENLEY
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY
1896 - 1922
GIFT OF HIS CHILDREN
TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
Series of Modern Philosophers.
Edited by E. Hershey Sneath, Ph.D.

DESCARTES by Prof. H. A. P. Torrey of the University of Vermont.*
SPINOZA by Prof. Geo. S. Fullerton of the University of Pennsylvania.*
LOCKE by Prof. John E. Russell of Williams College.*
HUME by Prof. H. Austin Aikins of Trinity College, N. C.*
REID by E. Hershey Sneath of Yale University.*
KANT by Prof. John Watson of Queen's University, Canada.*
HEGEL by Prof. Josiah Royce of Harvard University.

* Those marked with an asterisk are ready.

Henry Holt & Co., Publishers,
New York.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

AS CONTAINED IN THE FIRST, SECOND, AND FIFTH PARTS OF THE "ETHICS," AND IN EXTRACTS FROM THE THIRD AND FOURTH

TRANSLATED FROM THE LATIN, AND EDITED WITH NOTES

BY

GEORGE STUART FULLERTON

Professor of Philosophy in the University of Pennsylvania

SECOND EDITION, ENLARGED

NEW YORK
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
1894
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

As it is the purpose of this little volume to set forth the philosophical system of Spinoza in the philosopher's own words, and not merely to prepare a book of disconnected extracts from his writings, I have followed a plan which may seem somewhat unusual in works of this kind.

The philosophy of Spinoza is contained in its final form in the "Ethics." By translating in full the first, second, and fifth parts of the "Ethics," giving the author's prefaces to, and summaries of, the third and fourth parts, and supplying in foot-notes passages in the omitted portions to which reference is made, I have found it possible to give a just idea of the doctrine contained in the "Ethics," while reducing the work by about one-half, and bringing it within the limits demanded by this Series. That it is not easy to cut into a work constructed as is this one, anyone may readily satisfy himself by examination. I think, however, I have omitted nothing essential to a comprehension of Spinoza's metaphysical system, and have preserved intact his chain of argument.

Lack of space has made any extended criticism of his reasoning out of the question. A very brief examination of some of the cardinal points in his system I have thought it desirable to insert in the form of notes. These are referred to by number in the text, and will be found in the back of the book.
In making the translation I have used the excellent Latin text of Van Vloten and Land, which appears to be remarkably free from errors of any sort, and have endeavored first of all to be exact and to avoid paraphrases. This has sometimes resulted in a sacrifice of grace, but it is, of course, worth the sacrifice.

I take this opportunity of thanking my colleague and former pupil, Dr. Wm. Romaine Newbold, for a number of suggestions which have materially improved my translation.

GEORGE STUART FULLERTON.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA,

October, 1891.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

This second edition is so different from the first that it may almost be regarded as a new book. The general plan is retained, but the translation has been freely altered throughout, and in Part III. propositions i to xi have been added. Some of the introductory matter is new, and the critical and explanatory notes have been greatly multiplied. I have discussed at length in a prefatory note the nature of Spinoza’s reasoning and the foundations upon which it rests; and I beg the reader to examine this carefully before proceeding to a study of the text. It has been my experience that, even to intelligent students, the argument of the "Ethics" presents serious difficulties. In my notes I have taken great pains to make the author's meaning plain, and have not hesitated, with this end in view, to repeat the same thought in different places, when, in the interests of clearness, it has seemed wise to do so. I have, of course, been somewhat hampered by the necessity of keeping the size of the volume within reasonable limits.

Explanations and excuses are always rather stupid, but it may not be wholly amiss for me to state here that, when the first edition was printed, an uncorrected copy of the translation of Part I. was sent, through a misunderstanding, to the printer. As the
proofs were corrected for me by a friend, while I was suffering from a serious illness, the fact was not discovered until after the publication of the book. It, hence, contains some errors from which the present edition is free.

George Stuart Fullerton.

June, 1894.
CONTENTS.

PAGE

BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................. 1

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH..................................................... 5

SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY..................................... 11

BRIEF EXPOSITION OF SPINOZA'S SYSTEM.—SPINOZA'S
  INFLUENCE UPON SUBSEQUENT THINKING.............................. 13

THE ETHICS:

Part I. Of God............................................................... 25

Part II. Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind...................... 74

Part III. Of the Origin and Nature of the Emotions................ 132

Part IV. Of Human Bondage, or of the Strength of
  the Emotions............................................................ 153

Part V. Of the Power of the Understanding, or of
  Human Freedom.......................................................... 171

CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES................................. 209

Introductory Note: I. Spinoza's Epistemology:

1. Ideas and Things..................................................... 210
2. Parallelism of Ideas and Things.................................. 211
3. The Test of Truth.................................................... 213
4. The Concatenation of Ideas........................................ 214
5. Mind and Body.......................................................... 215
6. Summary................................................................. 216

Introductory Note: II. Spinoza's Realism the Key to
  the Reasonings Contained in the "Ethics":

7. The System of Ideas................................................... 217
8. Spinoza's Realism..................................................... 219
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. The Concept</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Concepts made Causes</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Concepts, though Causes, yet Universals</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. The Word &quot;Involved&quot;</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Essence</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. The Dual Causality of the &quot;Ethics&quot;</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. The Eternity of Essences</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Summary</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes to Part I</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes to Part II</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note on the Mind and its Knowledge</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes to Part III</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes to Part IV</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes to Part V</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEX</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY.

It would not be profitable to attempt, in a work of this sort, anything like a complete bibliography of Spinozistic literature. Such a bibliography would be very extensive, and of little value to most of those who will use this book. I shall, consequently, merely indicate, for the sake of the few who may wish such information, where it may be looked for, and shall then confine myself to mentioning a limited number of books readily obtainable, which the student will find of service in gaining a good knowledge of the life and philosophy of Spinoza. A list of Spinoza's works will be found in the Biographical Sketch following this Bibliography.

In 1871 Dr. A. van der Linde published at The Hague a full and excellent catalogue of the Spinozistic literature, under the title "Benedictus Spinoza : Bibliografie." This brings the bibliography down to 1871. The introductory chapter to Sir Frederick Pollock's volume on Spinoza (to be mentioned later) supplements this, and brings us to 1880. What has appeared since, those interested in the subject will not find it difficult to trace.

The last edition of the complete works of Spinoza, and one which should be on the shelf of every careful student of his philosophy, is that of Van Vloten and Land (2 vols., The Hague, 1882–83). It is attractive in typography, and very free from errors of
any sort. This edition has been used in the translation of these selections.

The German reader will doubtless find it helpful to sometimes compare with the Latin Auerbach's translation ("Spinoza's Sämtliche Werke," 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1871). Auerbach follows the Latin very closely—more closely, indeed, than an English writer would dare to. Where a passage admits of more than one meaning he seems to use excellent judgment in making a selection. Readers of French may use in the same way Saisset's translation of Spinoza's principal works (3 vols., Paris, 1872). It is not, however, as close as Auerbach's.

There is no complete English translation of the works of Spinoza. A translation of his most important works, by R. H. M. Elwes, appeared in 1883–84 (2 vols., London, Bohn's Philos. Lib.). This contains the "Theologico-Political Treatise," the "Political Treatise," the unfinished work on the "Improvement of the Understanding," the "Ethics," and an abridgment of Spinoza's Correspondence. The translation of the "Ethics" I have compared pretty carefully with the original, and have found it careful, generally quite close, and graceful. The translator has used Bruder's text (1843), which is now superseded by the text of Van Vloten and Land. With Elwes's rendering of some passages I do not agree, as is, of course, to be expected; but I can recommend his translation, and the student would do well to secure these volumes. There are several other translations of the"Ethics," the best of which is that by William Hale White (London, 1890, second edition, by Mr. White and Amelia Hutchinson Stirling, 1894). This seems to be accurate, but is not as readable as the translation just men-
tioned. Another translation, which is, however, quite inferior to those by Elwes and White, was made by Professor Henry Smith of Lane Theological Seminary (Cincinnati, 1886). It is preceded by a lengthy criticism of Spinozism, and especially of its significance for theology. An anonymous translation, which appeared before any of these (New York, 1876), is not reliable.

The expository and critical volumes on Spinoza by Sir Frederick Pollock ("Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy," London, 1880), Dr. James Martineau ("A Study of Spinoza," London, 1883), and Dr. John Caird ("Spinoza," Edinburgh, 1888), will be found helpful to a comprehension of his system. They are written from different points of view, and will serve to supplement each other. Pollock lays especial stress on the scientific side of Spinoza's thought, and emphasizes the harmony of some of his doctrines with the conceptions of modern science. His book is full of valuable information communicated in a very clear and straightforward way. His admiration for the philosopher, however, makes him, in my judgment, a little blind to his errors in reasoning, and inclined to pass lightly over that aspect of his philosophy which finds its explanation in his Jewish birth and training. Dr. Martineau gives more attention to Spinoza's metaphysics, and his criticisms will be found acute and suggestive. Dr. Caird writes from what one may call the Neo-Hegelian point of view, and is most in sympathy with what Pollock is inclined to explain away. If one is unable to procure all three of these books, and has to choose a single one, he would better take the volume by Dr. Martineau.

For most of our information concerning the life of
Spinoza we are indebted to Colerus. An old English version of Colerus' account is reprinted by Pollock (*op. cit.*, Appendix A.). It gives a vivid picture of the man and his surroundings. Both Pollock and Martineau (especially the latter) devote a good deal of space to Spinoza’s life. In connection with the above it would be well to read four essays on Spinoza by Land, Kuno Fischer, Van Vloten, and Renan, which have been edited in an English dress by Professor Knight of St. Andrews (London and Edinburgh, 1882). The German reader will enjoy Auerbach’s historical romance ("Spinoza, Ein Denkerleben," Stuttgart, 1880. A translation by Charles T. Brooks, New York, 1882), which is excellent.
BIографical sketch.

Baruch de Spinoza was born at Amsterdam, November 24, 1632. He was the son of Spanish or Portuguese Jews who had taken refuge in the Netherlands from the cruel persecutions directed against their race in the Peninsula. His early education, which was entirely Jewish, was probably largely confined to the study of the Hebrew language and literature, in which, at the age of fifteen, he was regarded as a very promising scholar. Latin he learned from the free-thinking physician Francis van den Ende, from whom also he may have gotten his knowledge of German, his initiation into the sciences, and an introduction to the works of Giordano Bruno and Descartes. He was acquainted with Spanish and Portuguese, as these languages were spoken in the Jewish colony to which he belonged, and one of them was his mother tongue. Italian he learned, probably, from his teacher, the Rabbi Morteira, who was a Venetian. Dutch he never used with fluency, although he spent his life in Holland.

His studies and the reflections to which they gave rise produced in him a gradual separation from the faith of his fathers. In 1656 it was deemed necessary by the rulers of the synagogue at Amsterdam to take steps to remove the scandal occasioned by his heretical opinions and his lax observance of the ceremonial law. He was offered an annuity of 1000 florins on condition of an outward conformity. This being

5
refused, he was excommunicated for thirty days. During this period, as he was one evening leaving the Portuguese synagogue, he was set upon by an unknown man armed with a dagger, who, however, succeeded only in piercing his coat. After this event he removed from Amsterdam to the house of a friend—himself a heretic, as he belonged to the sect of the Collegiants—two or three miles from the city, on the Ouwkerk road. On the 27th of July, 1656, he was formally excommunicated, and cut off from his people. This was the occasion of his substituting for his Hebrew name Baruch, its Latin equivalent Benedict.

Spinoza had learned the art of making lenses for optical instruments, and he now supported himself by it. He acquired a reputation as an optician, and was consulted in this capacity by Leibnitz and Huygens. About the beginning of the year 1661 he moved with his Collegiant friend to Rijnsburg, near Leyden. Three years later he moved again to Voorburg, a suburb of The Hague, where he spent six years. In 1670 he took up his residence in The Hague, and there lived until his death, which occurred on February 21, 1677.

Spinoza lived much alone—in part, probably, from choice, but also in part from necessity. His separation from his kindred was complete after his excommunication. On the death of his father, his two sisters made an effort to deprive him of his share of the inheritance, on the ground that he was a heretic and cut off from Israel. An appeal to the civil power established his right, but he afterward voluntarily resigned to his sisters all that came to him except one bed. As he never joined any Christian sect, his companionship with Christians was necessarily not of the
closest, and his opinions, which he took no great pains to conceal, inspired with horror many who would have been drawn to him by the beauty of his life. Yet he had a limited number of enthusiastic disciples who studied his manuscript works with ardor, and addressed him as master. He acquired the friendship of persons high in position, notably of the De Witt brothers, and of a number of scholars who addressed to him letters on scientific and philosophical subjects. Not the least interesting part of his writings is this correspondence, which throws light on several important points in his philosophy. At the time of the French invasion of the Netherlands in 1672, he was sent for by the Prince of Condé, who wished to make his acquaintance. On his arrival at the camp he found the Prince absent, but was informed that he could probably obtain a pension from Louis XIV. by dedicating some work to that monarch. This offer he refused.

Occupied with his philosophical studies and correspondence, and with his manual labor, Spinoza led a quiet and laborious life, sometimes remaining in his apartments for days together. His simple recreations were smoking an occasional pipe of tobacco and conversing on ordinary matters with the people of the house, watching the habits and quarrels of spiders, working with a microscope, and making sketches of his friends with ink or charcoal, in which last exercise he appears to have had some skill. A book of such sketches was in existence after his death.

The character of Spinoza was singularly pure and beautiful. With a single-minded devotion to truth, and a willingness to suffer martyrdom for his convictions, he combined an earnest desire for a tranquil and quiet life, and a catholicity of sympathy which
manifested itself in a generous tolerance. Though he had suffered for his opinions at the hands of both Jew and Christian, toward neither does he show any trace of bitterness or spite. The material goods valued by the multitude—money, position, reputation—he regarded with the indifference of the Stoic sage. A gift of 2000 florins from Simon de Vries, a disciple and admirer, was refused; and when, later, De Vries wished to make the philosopher his heir, Spinoza dissuaded him from the act, saying that the money ought to pass to the natural heir, a brother of De Vries. The estate was so disposed of, but with the proviso that a pension be paid to Spinoza during his lifetime. The heir having fixed this pension at 500 florins, Spinoza declared the sum excessive, and refused to accept more than 300. When the Elector Palatine Charles Lewis offered him the chair of Philosophy at Heidelberg, it was declined on the ground that the duties attached to it might interfere with philosophical research, that liberty of thought and expression might be restricted, and that he preferred the quiet of private life to the honor of the position tendered him. The picture of this private life left us by Colerus, the Lutheran minister who afterward occupied apartments Spinoza had lived in at The Hague, shows it to have been simple and frugal in the extreme. A number of sensational stories concerning his death-bed were circulated soon after his death. They are all denied by Colerus. For years Spinoza had suffered from consumption, but his death was sudden and unexpected. On the morning of the day in which he died, he came down and conversed with the people of the house. In the afternoon he passed away while alone with his friend and physician Lewis Meyer. There is every
reason to believe that his death was as quiet and peaceful as his life. His estate scarcely more than sufficed to pay his debts and the expenses of his funeral.

The only bit of romance his biographers have connected with his life must be received with hesitation. The story goes that Van den Ende, under whom, as has been said, Spinoza acquired the Latin, was assisted in his teaching by his daughter Clara, a young woman of learning and intelligence. Spinoza became her lover, but was defeated by a more fortunate rival named Kerkering, who was his fellow-pupil, and whose addresses were made irresistible by the gift of a valuable necklace. It is true that Van den Ende's daughter Clara married a man named Kerckrinck, but the marriage took place in 1671, and the bride was then only twenty-seven years old. She could not, consequently, have been more than twelve when Spinoza left Amsterdam. Besides this, the reputed rival was seven years younger than Spinoza, and it is not likely that they both studied under Van den Ende at an age in which rivalry could arise between them. It is, however, possible that Spinoza kept up his visits to the house of his former teacher after he took up his residence out of the city, and we have in this possibility a straw for those to cling to who wish to believe in the story of his love. Yet there is little in the life or writings of the philosopher to indicate that he was susceptible to a romantic passion. He lived in a world of the intellect and not of the emotions.

Only two of Spinoza's works were published during his lifetime. The first was a summary of the first and second parts, and a portion of the third part, of Descartes' "Principles of Philosophy," arranged in
the form of mathematical demonstration. This appeared at Amsterdam in 1663. In 1670 he put forth anonymously the "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus," which is an attempt to prove not only that freedom of thought and speech may be granted without danger to piety and the peace of the commonwealth, but also that such freedom cannot be denied without danger to both. To prove his point he enters into an exhaustive examination of the nature of prophecy, the authority of the Biblical writers, the principles of interpretation, and the relation of theology to philosophy, all of which subjects he handles with the utmost freedom and boldness. His methods are those of the modern school of historical criticism, and it was but natural that both methods and results should give offense. Especially offensive was his Erastian doctrine of the supremacy of the state in matters ecclesiastical. The book was speedily condemned by the Reformed churches and put on the Index of the Church of Rome.

Spinoza had arranged that after his death the desk containing his letters and unpublished manuscripts should be carried to Jan Rieuwertz, a publisher at Amsterdam. This was done, and in the same year (1677) appeared the "Opera Posthuma," which contained the "Ethics," the "Tractatus Politicus," the unfinished "Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione," a selection of the letters written to Spinoza by various scholars, and his answers to them, and a "Compendium of Hebrew Grammar." In 1687 was printed at The Hague Spinoza's brief "Treatise on the Rainbow," which for years was supposed to have perished, but was discovered and reprinted in 1862 by Dr. J. van Vloten in a supplement to an edition of Spinoza's
works. In the same supplement appeared for the first time the early essay entitled, "A Short Treatise on God, and on Man and his Blessedness." A few letters not contained in the collection of the "Opera Posthuma" have since been published.

SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY.

The reader of Spinoza is struck by the fact that one finds in his philosophy, curiously blended with one another, two widely different elements. He is, on the one hand, a mediaeval realist, a mystic, dwelling in a world which seems to the modern thinker strange and unreal. On the other hand he is a scientific thinker who has anticipated with remarkable acuteness some of the most important conceptions of later scientific thought. The mind of a philosopher is not a mere aggregation of independent elements easily separated and traced to different sources; but if we venture to make the distinction between Spinoza the scientific thinker and Spinoza the religious philosopher, we may regard the former as the child of Descartes and the latter as the descendant of the mediaeval Jewish philosophers, who held to an Aristotelianism colored by Neo-Platonic conceptions.

Born a Jew, and early impregnated with the Jewish literature and philosophy, it is scarcely conceivable that Spinoza should have escaped the influence of the semi-Oriental character of the leading scholars of his race. Although but one direct reference to the Kabbala occurs in his writings, and that one is contemptuous in tone, it is sufficiently evident that the Neo-Platonic conceptions at the root of the Jewish philosophy have
contributed much to the form and spirit of his doctrine. That Spinoza was familiar with the works of the Jewish philosophers we know. It is, furthermore, very probable that he was influenced by the writings of Giordano Bruno, the mystic and pantheist. In these facts we have enough to account for the presence of one element in his philosophy; and that an element so important, as the reader will see, that the reasonings of the "Ethics" cannot be made intelligible unless its presence be constantly recognized.

That Spinoza owes much to Descartes, I have just said. He was, perhaps, at no time a Cartesian; but it is easy to find in Descartes' "Meditations" and "Principles of Philosophy" passages which appear to belong more properly to the later system, and which, more fully developed, might have resulted in some of its leading ideas. Nevertheless, the notion that the philosophy of Spinoza is simply the logical outcome of the philosophy of Descartes, and only brings to light what was implicit in the latter, cannot justly be held. It leaves out of view a very important element in the Spinozistic philosophy. The fusion of the two elements and the resulting system of doctrine was, of course, due to the genius of Spinoza himself.
BRIEF EXPOSITION OF SPINOZA'S SYSTEM.
SPINOZA'S INFLUENCE UPON SUBSEQUENT THINKING.

Influenced by the conceptions at the root of the mediæval Jewish philosophy, Spinoza transformed the Cartesian doctrine of two independent substances, mind and matter, into a pantheistic doctrine which recognizes but one substance, God, of which thought and extension are mere manifestations.

Substance is defined as that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself. Only one substance can exist, and this must be infinite, and self-caused. It is the real cause of all that exists, and, indeed, is all that exists, for all things are but manifestations of the one substance, which unfolds itself in manifold forms through an inner necessity of its nature. This substance is God, a being not outside of the world and acting upon it as men exercise their activity upon external things, but an immanent cause, the very being of whatever is.

Attribute is defined as that which the understanding perceives as constituting the essence of substance. Substance consists of an infinite number of infinite attributes, only two of which can be known by us. These two are thought and extension. Each attribute expresses, though in a different way, the essence of the one substance. Hence different attributes, while they are conceived as distinct, are not really different entities, independent substances, but the one thing
viewed under different aspects. God is, therefore, a thinking being in so far as he is contemplated under the attribute of thought, and he is extended in so far as he is contemplated under the attribute of extension. The same may be said in the case of all the other attributes to us unknown. Between different attributes there cannot be any interaction. The spiritual cannot act upon the material, nor the material upon the spiritual. As aspects of the same thing they are absolutely parallel and perfectly correspond, but they can exercise upon each other no influence. Only body can act upon body, and thought upon thought.

Modes are individual things. The modes of the attribute thought are ideas. Those of the attribute extension are material things, or bodies. As it is the one substance that is revealed under the two attributes thought and extension, a body and the idea of that body are one and the same thing expressed in two ways. The order and connection of things is, therefore, identical with the order and connection of ideas. For every mode in the attribute of extension there is a corresponding mode in the attribute of thought, and in each of the other attributes. All the modes in each attribute are causally connected with each other, and form an endless chain of causes and effects.

The human body is a mode in the attribute extension, and the human mind, which is composed of ideas, is the corresponding mode in the attribute thought. Consequently, the mind cannot act upon the body, nor the body upon the mind. All the actions of the body must be explained by material causes, and all changes in ideas by reference to other ideas. Both physical and mental changes follow unvarying laws, and there is no possibility of freedom, in the common
EXPOSITION OF SPINOZA'S SYSTEM.

acceptation of the word. "Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are determined by the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a definite manner." When men, therefore, believe themselves possessed of free will, it is because they are conscious that they will and desire, but are ignorant of the causes which have impelled them to do so.

Every one of man's actions is, hence, to be regarded as a link in an infinite chain of causes and effects. Each idea may be traced back along the ideal series, and each physical fact along the series of physical facts. Neither series has a beginning, and, as perfectly parallel, they can by no possibility come together. Man is, in modern phrase, a physical automaton with parallel mental states.

Man necessarily seeks what he deems to be useful to him, and that alone is useful which preserves and exalts his being. The terms "good" and "evil" indicate nothing really in things regarded as they are in themselves: by "good" we mean what we know to be useful to us, and by evil what we know to be a hindrance to us in the pursuit of any good. Virtue is power, the power of furthering one's being, and self-preservation is the supreme law. As, however, man is but a part of nature, and his power is inferior to that of other things, he cannot indefinitely preserve his being, but must ultimately go to the wall. In so far as he is acted upon by external things, he is in a state of passivity, or is subject to the passions, which are natural phenomena, belonging to the fixed order of nature, and may be studied as one studies the geometrical properties of bodies.

This doctrine of human bondage to the order of natural causes would seem to cut off completely the
possibility of any sort of freedom in human action, and yet it is the teaching of the "Ethics" that man may liberate himself from this dependence upon external causes, cease to be "a part of nature," and become free. Such freedom is the goal that he is to set before him, and in its attainment consists his blessedness. To understand Spinoza's deliverances on the freedom of man, one must examine his conception of the relation of substance to its modes, and his doctrine of essences.

It has been said above that substance is the cause of all things that exist, and that it is, at the same time, their very being. How can these two statements be reconciled? A cause is something numerically distinct from its effect, and how can it be its very being?

The careful reader of the "Ethics" will discover that Spinoza has three distinct conceptions of God or substance, and that he passes from one to another in a very confusing way. I discuss all this at length in my notes, and shall not dwell upon the subject here, but it will suffice to state that sometimes he conceives the relation of substance to its modes as that of cause to effect, sometimes as that of a whole to its parts, and sometimes as that of a universal to the individuals subsumed under it. It is the last conception that it is important for us to consider in this connection.

The problem of the universal and its relation to the individual was the common heritage of Christian, Jew, and Arab in the Middle Ages. It absorbed the attention of speculative minds to a degree that seems to us surprising, unless we bear in mind the conclusions drawn from the solution given it, and their
significance for the whole philosophical system of the thinkers of the time. To the extreme Realist, class names were not mere words, or conveniences for classification. They stood for things—not individual things, but things in a higher sense, things upon which individual things depend, and to which they owe the fact that they are what they are. But class names may indicate broader or narrower classes, and we may arrange them in a series as higher or lower; regarding as the highest that which indicates the broadest class, and as the lower those which, by the addition of differences, come to indicate smaller and smaller classes down to the smallest class possible. If class names indicate things, we have here a series of things, which are yet not individual things, but essences, things of a different order, and which stand to each other in the relation of higher and lower. Now, if the individuals depend upon the species, it is but reasonable to suppose that the species depend in the same way upon the genus which embraces them. If individual men are what they are by virtue of their "manhood," it seems but reasonable to say that "rational animal" and "irrational animal" stand in a like relation to "animal." We have thus a hierarchy of universals, a world of essences, which are things, though not individual things, and which are so related to each other that the lower depend upon the higher, and may be called, in a certain sense, their effects. At the top of the series stands the highest universal, which is ultimate cause, and at the bottom we find individual things, which do not, indeed, belong to the world of essences, but which are related to essences as each lower essence is related to the one above it.
Thus are universals turned by the Realist into things, and these things made real causes. It should be noted, however, that they are causes of a peculiar kind. They are not separate from their effects and beside them, but they are, so to speak, within them. The essence "man," for example, is in each individual man; and if "man" is to be defined as a rational animal, the higher essence "animal" is in the lower essence "man." Essences are, then, immanent causes, and an individual which is determined to any action by its essence is not determined by an external thing, but may be said to determine itself. It is, consequently, free, for freedom means, not absence of determination simply, but absence of determination by an external cause.

Such reasonings did not die with the Middle Ages, and it is thus that Spinoza reasons. He turns universals into things, and makes these things immanent causes of their effects. This makes it possible for him to regard man as determined by two distinct kinds of causes: first, external causes, or real individual things, which are outside of and distinct from their effects; and second, immanent causes, which belong to the world of essences, and are not to be sought outside of their effects. In so far as man is regarded as a mere link in the chain of finite modes, he is subject to natural necessity and is not free, for each such link is absolutely conditioned by what precedes it; in so far as he is determined by his essence to any action he is determined from within. In being so determined he is no longer in a state of bondage, he does only what is in harmony with his nature, is freed from the passions, and enjoys a state of blessedness. The problem of life is to detach one's self from the influence
of external things, and to be more and more determined from within.

But the mind that attains this self-determination is, in just so far, immortal. Essences are related to each other as higher and lower, and the higher may be regarded as causes of the lower, but this peculiar causal relation does not imply that they are related to each other as temporal antecedent and consequent. Time-relations only apply to things regarded as standing in the other causal series, that of individual finite modes. The relation of one essence to another is an eternal one. If, then, anything in man be regarded as belonging to the series of essences or as the result of a descent along this series, this must, like everything else belonging to the series, be eternal. Man's essence is, hence, eternal and imperishable, and if it constitute the greater part of a man's mind he will have small cause to fear death, for the part of him which will perish will be very small compared with that which will remain.

But how is one to attain this freedom and immortality? and what part of the mind is it that is eternal? It is that part which consists of clear and distinct, or adequate, ideas. The mind is, as we have said, composed of ideas. Some of these are clear and distinct, and some are confused. We know a thing confusedly when we know it only in part, and we know only in part when we cannot explain the thing from its causes. Each link in the series of finite modes must be explained by a reference to other modes preceding, these by a reference to still others, and so on without end. Such things cannot be adequately known, for all their causes cannot be known. They are things which have to be explained by a reference to some-
thing beyond themselves. If, however, anything can be explained by a reference to the other series of causes, the series of essences, it carries its explanation, so to speak, within itself, and may be adequately known. Now God or substance is the sole cause of itself and of things, and if we can obtain an idea by a logical deduction along the series of essences from the idea of God, we have completely explained it and know it adequately. And we have explained it without going beyond it to any other idea. Moreover, as we have obtained this idea by a logical deduction from the idea of God, we see that it is contained implicitly in the nature of God, and, hence, we recognize it to be eternal and imperishable. That part of the mind, therefore, that consists of adequate ideas belongs to the world of essences and shares their immortality. Thus the highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and in knowing God man gains freedom and blessedness. It follows that our highest aim in life should be to know God, or, in other words, to replace our confused and fragmentary knowledge by adequate ideas. The ignorant man is in bondage to passion, a perishable thing: in so far as a man is wise, he is free and undisturbed in spirit, he belongs to the world of essences, and possesses immortality and true peace. The path that leads to this goal seems difficult, but it may be found. "All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare."

So much for the doctrine contained in the "Ethics." I shall refer the reader for a fuller exposition and for a criticism to the notes that follow the text. Spinoza's reasonings are often loose and faulty, but his meaning and the general plan of his work should, to the sympathetic student, be sufficiently apparent. Part I.
treats of God or substance; Part II. of the nature of the human mind; in Part III. the mind is treated as a part of nature, a finite mode in the infinite chain of modes, and completely conditioned by its place in that chain; in Part IV. the essence of the mind as a something belonging to the world of essences, and to be distinguished from that which is individual and perishable, makes its appearance. It is a part of the mind, and distinguished from the rest. The last half of Part V. treats of this part of the mind as altogether detached from its place in the world of individual real things, and wholly in the world of essences. If the student will read carefully my somewhat lengthy Introductory Note, he will, I think, be in a position to follow Spinoza as he unfolds his thought.

The properly ethical portions of his work are contained in Part IV. Here Spinoza is still in the world of real things, but is not wholly of it. He has passed from the consideration of the individual as an individual to the consideration of him as containing something universal—as not this man or that, but as man. This leads to the treatment of man as a social being, having rights and duties; and though the reader may criticise the reasoning by which our author passes from an uncompromising egoism to an altruistic utilitarianism, he will have to admit that many of Spinoza’s ethical maxims are excellent, and the spirit of his teachings elevated.

Spinoza never founded a school as did Descartes. For this the intense theological antagonism he has aroused has been partly responsible. He appears to have been very imperfectly understood, and, indeed, except for an occasional unfriendly criticism, almost overlooked by the learned world during the century
succeeding his death. He was brought before the German mind by Lessing and Jacobi in the latter part of the last century, and has deeply influenced it since. Lessing, Goethe, Herder, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel owe him much. Coleridge, who regarded the "Ethics" as one of the three greatest works since the introduction of Christianity, brought him from Germany to England. He has, however, had more influence upon English literature and theology than upon the course of English philosophy. On French soil Spinozism has never flourished. In our own time there has been a revival of interest in Spinoza among Dutch scholars, resulting in a celebration with fitting ceremonies of the two hundredth anniversary of his death, and the erection of the statue of the philosopher at The Hague, where he spent the last years of his life. The widespread interest of men of letters in his thought and personality is revealed by the fact that thirteen nations were represented on the committee charged with the erection of the statue. At the present time this interest is evidently increasing.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA.

The Ethics.

PART I.

OF GOD.

Definitions.

1. By cause of itself I mean that whose essence involves existence; or, in other words, that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing.¹ *

2. A thing is said to be finite in its kind when it can be limited by another of the same nature. For example, a body is called finite because we always conceive another still greater. In the same way one thought is limited by another. But a body cannot be limited by a thought, nor a thought by a body.

3. By substance I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived by means of itself: that is, that the conception of which does not need to be formed from the conception of any other thing.²

4. By attribute I mean that which the understanding perceives as constituting the essence of substance.³

5. By mode I mean the modifications of substance: in other words, that which is in and is conceived by means of something else.⁴

6. By God I mean a being absolutely infinite: that

* These numbers refer to the critical notes, at the end of this volume.—Tr.
is, a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, each one of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence.5

Explanation.—I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its kind; for we can deny an infinity of attributes of anything that is infinite only in its kind. But to the essence of that which is absolutely infinite belongs everything that expresses essence and involves no negation.

7. A thing will be called free that exists by the sole necessity of its nature, and is determined to action by itself alone: that, on the other hand, which is determined by something else to exist and to act in a definite and determinate way will be called necessary, or rather coerced.6

8. By eternity I mean existence itself in so far as it is conceived as following necessarily from the mere definition of an eternal thing.

Explanation.—For such existence, like the essence of a thing, is conceived as an eternal truth; it cannot, therefore, be explained by duration or time, even though duration be conceived as without beginning and without end.7

Axioms.8

1. Everything that is, is either in itself or in something else.

2. That which cannot be conceived by means of something else must be conceived by means of itself.

3. Granted a determinate cause, an effect necessarily follows; conversely, if there be no determinate cause it is impossible for an effect to follow.

4. Knowledge of an effect depends upon and involves knowledge of its cause.
5. Things which have nothing in common cannot be comprehended by means of each other; that is, the conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other.

6. A true idea must agree with its object.

7. If a thing can be conceived as non-existent, its essence does not involve existence.

**Prop. 1.** *Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.*

*Proof.*—This is evident from defs. 3 and 5.

**Prop. 2.** *Two substances with different attributes have nothing in common.*

*Proof.*—This, too, is evident from def. 3. Each must be in itself and be conceived by means of itself; that is, the conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other.

**Prop. 3.** *When things have nothing in common, the one cannot be the cause of the other.*

*Proof.*—If they have nothing in common, then (axiom 5) they cannot be comprehended by means of one another, and, hence (axiom 4), the one cannot be the cause of the other. Q. E. D.

**Prop. 4.** *Two or more distinct things are distinguished from each other either by a difference in the attributes of the substances, or by a difference in their modifications.*

*Proof.*—Everything that is, is either in itself or in something else (axiom 1), that is (defs. 3 and 5), outside of the understanding there is nothing save substances and their modifications. There is, therefore, outside of the understanding, nothing by means of which several things can be distinguished from one another, except substances, or, which is the same
thing (def. 4), their attributes and their modifications. Q. E. D.

Prop. 5. *There cannot be in the universe two or more substances of the same nature, that is, with the same attribute.*

*Proof. — Were there several distinct substances, they would have to be distinguished from one another either by a difference in attributes or by a difference in modifications (by the preceding proposition). If merely by a difference in attributes, it will be admitted there cannot be more than one with the same attribute. If, on the other hand, one is to be distinguished from another by a difference in modifications, then, since a substance is by nature prior to its modifications (1),* when we lay aside its modifications, and consider it in itself, that is (def. 3 and axiom 6), consider it as it is, we cannot conceive it as distinguished from another substance. In other words (by the preceding proposition), there cannot be several substances, but only one.* Q. E. D.

Prop. 6. One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

*Proof. — There cannot be in the universe two substances with the same attribute (by the preceding proposition), that is (2), substances that have something in

*The meaning of the references occurring in the text would seem to be sufficiently plain; but to avoid possible misconception it may be well to state that where reference is made to a proposition, definition, etc., in the same Part, the number of the proposition or definition only is given: where the passage referred to is in another Part, the Part is indicated by Roman numerals. When the reference is to something omitted in this volume, the passage referred to, or its equivalent, is given in a footnote. Most of the references are to propositions, and in such cases the numbers stand alone.—Tr.
common. Therefore (3), the one cannot be the cause of the other, or, in other words, the one cannot be produced by the other. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that a substance cannot be produced by any other thing. For there is nothing in the universe except substances and their modifications, as is evident from axiom 1 and defs. 3 and 5. But a substance cannot be produced by a substance (by the preceding proposition). Hence a substance cannot be produced by any other thing whatever. Q. E. D.

Another Proof.—This is proved even more readily by a reductio ad absurdum. For if a substance could be produced by any other thing, the knowledge of it would have to depend on a knowledge of its cause (axiom 4); hence (def. 3) it would not be a substance.14

Prop. 7. It belongs to the nature of a substance to exist.

Proof.—A substance cannot be produced by any other thing (by the corollary to the preceding proposition); it must, therefore, be its own cause, that is (def. 1), its essence necessarily involves existence, or, in other words, it belongs to its nature to exist.15 Q. E. D.

Prop. 8. Every substance is necessarily infinite.

Proof.—There does not exist more than one substance with a given attribute (5), and it belongs to the nature of that one to exist (7). It must, therefore, belong to its nature to exist either as finite or as infinite. But not as finite. For (def. 2) it would have to be limited by another of the same nature, and this, also, would necessarily have to exist (7). There would, then, be two substances with the same attribute, which is absurd (5). It therefore exists as infinite.16 Q. E. D.
Scholium 1.—Since finitude is in fact a partial negation, and infinitude an absolute affirmation of the existence of any nature, it follows from prop. 7 alone that every substance must be infinite.\textsuperscript{17}

Scholium 2.—No doubt it is difficult for all those who judge of things confusedly and are not accustomed to come to a knowledge of them by means of their first causes, to comprehend the proof of prop. 7; for they make no distinction between the modifications of substances and the substances themselves, nor do they know how things are produced. Hence they ascribe to substances the origin they see proper to natural objects. For those who are ignorant of the true causes of things confuse all things, and without repugnance fancy trees talking as well as men, and that men are formed from stones as well as from seed, and they imagine that any kind of thing can be changed into any other. In the same way those who confuse the divine nature with the human easily ascribe to God human emotions, especially as long as they are further ignorant how the emotions are produced in the mind. But if men would consider attentively the nature of substance, they would never doubt the truth of prop. 7; nay, rather they would all accept this proposition as an axiom and class it among the common notions. For by substance they would mean that which is in itself and is conceived by means of itself; in other words, that the knowledge of which does not presuppose the knowledge of any other thing. By modification, on the other hand, they would mean that which is in something else, and whose conception is formed from the conception of the thing in which it is. For this reason we can have true ideas of non-existent modifications, since, although they do not
actually exist outside of the mind, yet their essence is included in something else in such a way that they can be conceived by means of that. But since substances are conceived by means of themselves, their truth can have no being outside of the mind except in themselves. Hence, should anyone say that he has a clear and distinct, that is, a true idea of a substance, and yet doubts whether such a substance exists, it would be absolutely the same as saying that he has a true idea and yet is not certain that it is not false! This will be plain to anyone who gives the matter enough attention. Or if one maintains that a substance is created, he thereby maintains that a false idea has been made true, than which really nothing more absurd can be conceived. We are, therefore, forced to confess that the existence of a substance is an eternal truth, just as is its essence. Hence we are able to prove in another way that there cannot be more than one substance with a given nature, and I have thought it worth while to set forth the proof here. But to do this in a methodical way, I must note—First, that the true definition of a thing neither involves nor expresses anything except the nature of the thing defined. Whence it follows in the second place, that no definition either involves or expresses a certain definite number of individuals, seeing that it expresses nothing but the nature of the thing defined. For example, the definition of the triangle expresses nothing but just the nature of the triangle, and not a certain definite number of triangles. I must note in the third place that every existing thing necessarily has some definite cause, by reason of which it exists. And finally in the fourth place that this cause, by reason of which anything exists, must either be con-
tained in the very nature and definition of the existing thing (for the reason, of course, that it belongs to the nature of such a thing to exist), or it must be outside of it. Granted these points, it follows that if there exist in the world some definite number of individuals, there must necessarily be a cause why those individuals, and neither more nor less, exist. If, for example, there exist in the universe twenty men (I will suppose, to make the matter clearer, that they exist at the same time, and that no others have ever existed before), it will not be a sufficient explanation of the existence of the twenty men to show the cause of human nature in the abstract; but it will be further necessary to show the cause why twenty exist, and not more nor less; for (by point third) there must necessarily be a cause for the existence of each one. But this cause (by points second and third) cannot be contained in human nature itself, since the true definition of man does not involve the number twenty. Hence (by point fourth) the cause why these twenty men exist, and, consequently, why each one exists, must necessarily be outside of each one. Therefore, the conclusion is unavoidable that everything of such a nature, that several individuals with that nature can exist, must necessarily have an external cause to bring about their existence. Now since it belongs to the nature of a substance to exist (by what I have just shown in this scholium), its definition must involve necessary existence, and hence its existence must be inferred from its mere definition. But from its definition (as has just been proved from points second and third) the existence of several substances cannot be inferred. From it, therefore, it follows necessarily that but one of a given nature exists, as was maintained.
PROP. 9. The more reality or being anything has, the greater the number of its attributes.

Proof.—This is evident from def. 4.20

PROP. 10. Each attribute of a substance must be conceived by means of itself.

Proof.—Attribute is that which the understanding perceives as constituting the essence of substance (def. 4); therefore (def. 3) it must be conceived by means of itself. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—Hence it is evident that although two attributes are conceived as really distinct—that is, the one is conceived without help from the other—yet we cannot thence infer that they constitute two beings, or, in other words, two different substances. For it is of the nature of a substance that each of its attributes is conceived by means of itself; seeing that all the attributes it has have always been in it simultaneously, nor has it been possible for one to be produced by another, but each one expresses the reality, that is, the being of the substance. It is, therefore, far from absurd to ascribe several attributes to one substance; nay, nothing in the world is clearer than that every being must be conceived under some attribute, and that the more reality or being it has, the more attributes has it that express both necessity, that is, eternity, and infinity. Hence nothing can be clearer than that an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined (as in def. 6), as a being consisting of an infinity of attributes, each one of which expresses a definite eternal and infinite essence. Should one here ask, by what mark, then, can we distinguish different substances? let him read the propositions that follow, which show that there exists in the universe but a single substance, and that this is
absolutely infinite. Hence such a mark would be sought in vain.\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{Prop. 11.} God, that is, a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, each one of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.

\textit{Proof.}—If you deny it, conceive if you can that God does not exist. Then (\textit{axiom 7}) his essence does not involve existence. But this (7) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists.\textsuperscript{22} Q. E. D.

\textit{Another Proof.}—A cause or reason must be assigned, whether for the existence or the non-existence of everything. For example, if a triangle exists there must be a reason or cause for its existence; if, on the other hand, it does not exist, there must be a reason or cause which prevents it from existing, one, in other words, which annuls its existence. Now, this reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing, or must be external to it. For instance, the reason for the non-existence of a square circle is given in its very nature—it involves a contradiction. The existence of a substance, on the other hand, also follows from its very nature, for this involves existence (7). But the reason for the existence or non-existence of a circle or of a triangle is not to be found in their nature, but in the order of the material universe, for from this it must follow either that a triangle now necessarily exists, or that it is impossible for it now to exist. This is self-evident. Hence it follows that if there is no reason or cause which prevents a thing from existing, that thing necessarily exists. If, therefore, there can be no reason or cause which prevents God from existing, or which annuls his existence, we must certainly conclude that he necessarily exists. But were there such a reason
or cause it would have to be either in the divine nature itself or external to it, that is, in some other substance of another nature. For were it of the same nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. But a substance of a different nature could have nothing in common with God (2), and hence could neither bring about nor annul his existence. Since, therefore, there cannot be, external to the divine nature, a reason or cause which annuls the divine existence, such a cause, if God does not exist, will have to be found in his very nature, and this would involve a contradiction. To affirm this of a Being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect is absurd. Therefore, neither in God nor external to God is there any cause or reason which annuls his existence, and, hence, God necessarily exists.\textsuperscript{23} Q. E. D.

\textit{Another proof.}—To be able not to exist is lack of power, and, on the other hand, to be able to exist is power \textit{(as is self-evident)}. If, therefore, nothing necessarily exists but finite beings, finite beings are more powerful than the absolutely infinite Being, and this \textit{(as is self-evident)} is absurd. Hence, either nothing exists, or an absolutely infinite Being necessarily exists also. But we exist either in ourselves, or in something else that necessarily exists \textit{(axiom 1 and prop. 7)}. Therefore, an absolutely infinite Being, that is \textit{(def. 6)} God, necessarily exists.\textsuperscript{24} Q. E. D.

\textit{Scholium.}—In this last proof I have, for the sake of clearness, chosen to demonstrate the existence of God \textit{a posteriori}. Not that God's existence does not follow \textit{a priori} from the same premises. For since to be able to exist is power, it follows that, the more reality belongs to the nature of a thing, the greater
the power it has of itself to exist. Hence the absolutely infinite Being, God, has of himself an absolutely infinite power to exist. He, therefore, exists absolutely. Many, perhaps, will find it difficult to see the force of this proof, because they are accustomed to consider only those things which flow from external causes. They see that of such things, those which quickly come into being—that is, which easily exist—easily cease to exist; and, on the other hand, those things which they conceive as having many properties, they consider less easy to bring into being—that is, less ready to exist. But, to free them from these prejudices, I need not here show in what sense the saying "what quickly comes into being, quickly perishes," is true; nor yet discuss whether, from the point of view of nature as a whole, everything is equally easy or not. It is enough to point out that I am not speaking of things which are brought into being by external causes, but of substances alone, which (6) cannot be produced by any external cause. For things which are brought into being by external causes, whether they consist of many parts or of few, owe all their perfection or reality to the virtue of an external cause, and, hence, their existence has its source solely in the perfection of an external cause, and not in their own. A substance, on the other hand, owes what perfection it has to no external cause. Hence, even its existence must follow from its very nature, and, accordingly, is nothing but its essence. Perfection, therefore, does not annul the existence of a thing, but insures it. Imperfection, on the contrary, annuls it. Hence, there is nothing of whose existence we can be more certain than we are of that of the absolutely infinite or perfect Being, that is, God. For the mere fact that his es-
sence excludes all imperfection, and involves absolute perfection, removes every cause for doubting his existence, and establishes it as most certain. This, I think, will be clear to anyone who gives the matter a little attention.25

**Prop. 12.** No attribute of substance can be truly conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided.

*Proof.*—The parts into which substance so conceived would be divided, will either retain the nature of substance, or they will not. If the former, then (8) each part will have to be infinite, and (6) its own cause, and (5) will have to consist of a different attribute. Hence it will be possible to make several substances out of one substance, which (6) is absurd. Furthermore, the parts (2) would have nothing in common with the whole, and the whole (*def. 4 and prop. 10*) could both be and be conceived without its parts, which no one can doubt to be absurd. If, on the other hand, we take the latter alternative, namely, that the parts will not retain the nature of substance; then, were the whole substance divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance, and would cease to be, which (7) is absurd.26

**Prop. 13.** Absolutely infinite substance is indivisible.

*Proof.*—Were it divisible, the parts into which it would be divided will either retain the nature of absolutely infinite substance, or will not. If the former, there will be several substances of the same nature, which (5) is absurd. If the latter, then (*as above*) it will be possible for absolutely infinite substance to cease to be, which (11) is also absurd.

*Corollary.*—Hence it follows that no substance, and
consequently no corporeal substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.

_Scholium._—That substance is indivisible may be more readily apprehended from the mere fact that the nature of substance cannot be conceived except as infinite, and that by a part of substance one can only mean a finite substance, which (8) plainly involves a contradiction. 27

_PROP. 14. Besides God, no substance can be or be conceived._

_Proof._—God is an absolutely infinite being, of whom no attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied (def. 6), and he necessarily exists (11). If, then, there were any substance besides God, it would have to be expressed by means of some attribute of God, and thus there would exist two substances with the same attribute, which (5) is absurd. There cannot, therefore, be any substance besides God, nor can such even be conceived. For if it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to be conceived as existing. But this (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. Therefore, besides God, no substance can either be or be conceived. Q. E. D.

_Corollary 1._—Hence it follows very clearly: _First_, that there is but one God, or, in other words (def. 6), there is in the universe only one substance, and that this is absolutely infinite, as I have intimated above in the scholium to prop. 10.

_Corollary 2._—It follows, _second_, that that which is extended and that which thinks are either attributes of God, or (axiom 1) modifications of God's attributes. 28

PROP. 15. _Whatever is, is in God, and without God nothing can either be or be conceived._
Proof.—Besides God, there is no substance, and none can be conceived (14); that is (def. 3), there is nothing that is in itself and is conceived by means of itself. But (def. 5) modes can neither be nor be conceived without a substance. Hence they can only be in, and be conceived by means of, the divine nature. But, besides substances and modes, there is nothing (axiom 1). Therefore, without God nothing can either be or be conceived. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—There are those who fancy that God, like man, consists of body and mind, and is subject to passions, but how far they are from possessing a true knowledge of God is sufficiently evident from what has been already proved. These I pass by, for all who have to any degree reflected upon the divine nature, deny that God is corporeal. Of this they give an excellent proof in the fact that by body we mean a certain quantity, having length, breadth, and thickness, and bounded by some definite figure, than which nothing more absurd can be asserted of God, a being absolutely infinite. Nevertheless in other arguments, by which they try to establish this truth, they all the while show clearly that they wholly separate corporeal or extended substance from the divine nature, and maintain it to be created by God. By what divine power it could have been created, they are quite ignorant; which shows clearly that they do not understand what they say themselves. I, for my part, have proved, as I think, clearly enough (6, cor., and 8, schol. 2), that no substance can be produced or created by any other thing. Furthermore, I have shown (14) that besides God no substance can either be or be conceived, and hence have inferred extended substance to be one of the infinite attributes of God. Still, for the sake of
a fuller exposition, I will answer the arguments of my opponents, which all amount to this: *First*, they maintain that corporeal substance, as substance, consists of parts, and, therefore, deny that it can be infinite, and, consequently, that it can be predicated of God. This argument they develop in many ways, one or two of which I will quote. If, they say, corporeal substance is infinite, let it be conceived as divided into two parts; each part will be either finite or infinite. If the former, then that which is infinite is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If the latter, then one infinite is twice as great as another, which is also absurd. Again, if an infinite quantity be estimated in parts a foot long, it will have to consist of an infinite number of such parts; as will also be the case if it be estimated in parts an inch in length. Hence one infinite number will be twelve times as great as another. Finally, if from one point of a

![Diagram](attachment:image.png)

certain infinite quantity we conceive as extending to infinity the two lines, A B, A C, which at first are a definite and determined distance apart; it is certain that the distance between B and C will continually increase, and at length from a determinate distance will become indeterminable. Since, as they believe, these absurdities follow from the supposition that quantity is infinite, they infer that corporeal substance must be finite, and, hence, that it does not belong to the essence of God. The *second* argument is also
drawn from God's supreme perfection. God, they say, since he is a supremely perfect being, cannot be passively affected; but corporeal substance, since it is divisible, can be passively affected. It follows that it cannot belong to God's essence. These are the arguments I find writers bringing forward to prove that corporeal substance is unworthy of, and cannot belong to, the divine nature. But anyone who pays proper attention will find that I have already answered these arguments, for they are based wholly on the supposition that corporeal substance is composed of parts, which supposition I have above (12 and 13, cor.) shown to be absurd. In the second place, anyone who will rightly consider the matter will see that all those absurdities (if, indeed, they are all absurdities—a point I am not now discussing), from which they would infer extended substance to be finite, do not in the least result from the supposition that quantity is infinite, but from the supposition that infinite quantity is measurable, and is composed of finite parts. Hence, from the absurdities which result from that supposition, they can draw no other conclusion than that infinite quantity is not measurable, and cannot consist of finite parts. This is exactly what we proved just above (12, etc.). Thus they really turn against themselves the weapon aimed at us. If, therefore, they still choose to infer from this absurdity they plead, that extended substance must be finite, they do just what one does who infers that the circle has no center from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal, and infers it from the false supposition that the circle has the properties of the square. For they conceive corporeal substance, which can only be conceived as infinite, single, and indivisible (8, 5, and 12),
in such a way as to infer that it is finite, composed of finite parts, manifold and divisible. In the same way, others, after pretending that a line is composed of points, are able to find many arguments to prove that a line cannot be divided to infinity. And certainly it is no less absurd to maintain that corporeal substance is composed of bodies or parts, than that a solid is composed of surfaces, surfaces of lines, and lines of points. This must be admitted by all who know that clear reasoning is infallible, and especially by those who deny the existence of a vacuum. For if corporeal substance could be so divided that its parts would be really distinct, why could not one part be annihilated and the rest remain connected with each other as before? And why must all be so fitted together that there exists no vacuum? Surely, of things really distinct from one another, one can exist and abide in its own state without another. Since, therefore, there is no vacuum in nature (of this I shall speak elsewhere), but all the parts must so run together that there be no vacuum; it again follows that they cannot be really distinguished; in other words, that corporeal substance, as substance, cannot be divided. If, nevertheless, one here asks, why we are so prone by nature to divide quantity; I answer, it is because we conceive quantity in two ways; to wit: abstractly, that is, superficially, as when we imagine it, and, second, as substance, in which case we conceive it by means of the understanding alone. If, therefore, we consider quantity as it is in the imagination, a thing we do often and quite easily, we shall find it finite, divisible, and composed of parts. If, on the other hand, we consider it as it is in the understanding, and conceive it as substance—a very difficult task—then, as I have already suffi-
iciently proved, we shall find it infinite, single, and indivisible. This will be plain enough to everyone who knows how to distinguish between the imagination and the understanding, especially if he will also consider that matter is everywhere the same, and that there is in it no distinction of parts except as we conceive it affected in diverse ways, whence its parts are distinguished only modally, not really. For example, we conceive water, in so far as it is water, to be divided, and its parts to be separated from one another; but not in so far as it is corporeal substance, for, in so far as it is that, it is neither separated nor divided. Again, water, in so far as it is water, is generated and destroyed; but in so far as it is substance, it is neither generated nor destroyed. With this I think I have answered the second argument also; seeing that it, too, rests upon the assumption that matter, in so far as it is substance, is divisible and composed of parts. But even if what I have said were untrue, I do not know why matter should be unworthy of the divine nature, since (14) besides God there can be no substance, in relation to which it could be passive. Everything, I say, is in God, and everything that happens, happens solely through the laws of the infinite nature of God and results (as I shall show presently) from the necessity of his essence. Therefore, even if extended substance be supposed to be divisible, yet, provided only it be admitted to be eternal and infinite, there can be no reason for saying that God is passive in relation to something else, or that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature. But of this enough for the present.

PROP. 16. From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow in infinite ways an infinity of things:
that is, everything that can fall within the scope of an infinite intellect.

*Proof.*—The truth of this proposition ought to be evident to everyone who bears in mind that, granted the definition of a thing, the understanding infers from this a number of properties, which necessarily follow from it (in other words, from the very essence of the thing). And it infers the more properties, the more reality the definition of the thing expresses; that is, the more reality the essence of the thing defined involves. But since the divine nature has an absolute infinity of attributes (def. 6), each one of which, further, expresses an essence infinite in its kind, there must necessarily follow from its necessity in infinite ways an infinity of things, that is, everything that can fall within the scope of an infinite intellect. Q. E. D.

*Corollary 1.*—Hence it follows that God is the efficient cause of everything that can fall within the scope of an infinite intellect.

*Corollary 2.*—It follows, in the second place, that God is a cause *per se*, and not *per accidens.*

*Corollary 3.*—It follows, in the third place, that God is absolutely the first cause. 3*

*Prop. 17.* God acts solely from the laws of his own nature and under no constraint.

*Proof.*—We have just shown (16) that from the mere necessity of the divine nature, or, in other words, from the mere laws of that nature, there follows an absolute infinity of things; and we have proved (15) that nothing can either be or be conceived without God, but all things are in God. Wherefore there can be nothing external to him that can determine or constrain him to act, and hence, God acts solely from

*I. e.*, Causality belongs to his very nature.—Tr.
the laws of his own nature, and under no constraint. Q. E. D.

Corollary 1.—Hence it follows, first, that there is no cause, except the perfection of his nature, which, either from without or from within, moves God to act.

Corollary 2.—It follows, in the second place, that God alone is a free cause. For God alone exists from the mere necessity of his nature (11, and 14, cor. 1), and acts from the mere necessity of his nature (by the preceding proposition). Therefore (def. 7), he alone is a free cause. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—Others think that God is a free cause because they suppose him able to prevent those things of which we have spoken as following from his nature—in other words, as in his power—from coming to pass, that is, from being produced by himself. But this is the same as saying that God can prevent it following from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles; that is, can prevent an effect from following its cause, which is absurd. Furthermore, I shall show below, without making use of this proposition, that neither intellect nor will belongs to God's nature. I know, of course, that many think they can prove that the highest intellect and free will belong to his nature, saying they find nothing they can ascribe to God more perfect than what is in us the highest perfection. Again, although they conceive God as actually in the highest degree a knower, yet they do not believe that he can bring into existence all the things he actually knows, for they think this destroys God's power. If, they say, he had created all the things that are in his intellect, he would not, after that, have been able to create any more, and this, they believe, contradicts God's omnipo-
tence. Hence they have preferred to maintain that God is indifferent to all things, and creates only what, by a certain arbitrary fiat, he has decided to create. But I think I have shown clearly enough (16) that from God's supreme power, that is, from his infinite nature, in an infinity of ways an infinity of things—in other words, all things—have streamed forth of necessity, or, rather, always follow by the same necessity; just as, from the nature of the triangle, it follows from eternity to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles. Hence God's omnipotence has from eternity been actual, and to eternity will abide in this actuality. This it seems to me, ascribes to God a much truer omnipotence. Nay, to speak plainly, my opponents appear to deny that God is omnipotent. For they are forced to admit that God knows an infinity of things that can be created, and yet will never be able to create them. Otherwise—that is to say, supposing him to create everything he knows—he would, as they hold, exhaust his omnipotence and render himself imperfect. Hence, in order to hold that God is perfect, they are reduced to the necessity of maintaining at the same time that he cannot do everything that falls within his power. I do not see that anything more absurd than this, or more inconsistent with the omnipotence of God, can be imagined. Again, to say a word here of the intellect and will commonly ascribed to God; if intellect and will do belong to God's eternal essence, each of these attributes must be taken in a sense very different from the common one. For there would have to be a world-wide difference between our intellect and will and the intellect and will constituting God's essence, nor could they agree in anything, except in name;
Prop. 17]  

just as the Dog, a constellation, agrees with dog, an animal that barks. This I will prove as follows: If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it cannot, like our intellect, be by nature posterior to (as many think), or simultaneous with, the things it knows, for God is by his causality prior to all things (16, cor. 1). On the contrary, the truth and the formal * essence of things is what it is, because it exists as such objectively in the intellect of God. Therefore God's intellect, in so far as it is conceived as constituting God's essence, is in reality the cause of things, whether of their essence or of their existence—a truth which appears also to have been remarked by those who have maintained that God's intellect, will, and power are one and the same thing. Since, therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, in other words, is the cause, as we have shown, both of their essence and of their existence, it must necessarily differ from them both with respect to its essence and to its existence. For an effect differs from its cause in just that which it has from its cause. For example, one man is the cause of the existence of another man, but not of his essence, for the latter is an eternal truth. Hence, as regards essence, they can exactly agree; but they must differ in existence. If, therefore, the existence of the one come to an end, it does not follow that that of the other will do so too; but if the essence of the one could be destroyed or made false, the essence of the other would be destroyed also. Wherefore, a thing that is cause both of the essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ from such an

* Formal, i. e., having what we would now call objective existence; objective, i. e., existing in the mind by way of representation.—Tr.
effect as regards both its essence and its existence. But God's intellect is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of our intellect; hence God's intellect, in so far as it is conceived as constituting the divine essence, differs from our intellect as regards both its essence and its existence, nor can it agree with it in anything save in name, as I said before. The same reasoning applies to the will, as one can easily see.32

Prop. 18. God is the immanent, not the transient, cause of all things.

Proof.—Everything that is, is in God, and must be conceived by means of God (15); hence (16, cor. 1), God is the cause of the things that are in himself; which was the first point to be proved. Again, there cannot be external to God any substance (14), that is (def. 3), anything which is in itself external to God; which was the second point. Therefore, God is the immanent, not the transient, cause of all things.33 Q. E. D.

Prop. 19. God is eternal, that is, all God's attributes are eternal.

Proof.—God (def. 6) is a substance, and this (11) necessarily exists, that is (7), it belongs to its nature to exist; in other words, his existence follows from his definition. Hence (def. 8) he is eternal. In the second place, by God's attributes is meant that (def. 4) which expresses the essence of the divine substance, that is, that which belongs to substance. This, I say, must be involved in the attributes themselves. But eternity (as I have already proved from prop. 7) belongs to the nature of substance. Therefore, each of the attributes must involve eternity and, hence, all are eternal. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—The truth of this proposition is also
most clearly evident from the proof I have given (11) of God's existence. This proof, I say, establishes that God's existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth. Moreover (see "The Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy," prop. 19), I have given also another proof of God's eternity, which it is unnecessary to repeat here.34

PROP. 20. God's existence and his essence are one and the same thing.

Proof.—God (by the preceding proposition) and all his attributes are eternal. That is, each of his attributes expresses existence. Therefore, the same attributes of God that (def. 4) express God's eternal essence also express his eternal existence; in other words, just that which constitutes God's essence constitutes at the same time his existence; hence the latter and his essence are one and the same thing. Q. E. D.

Corollary 1.—Hence it follows, first, that God's existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth.

Corollary 2.—It follows, in the second place, that God is unchangeable, or, in other words, that all God's attributes are unchangeable. For were these changed as regards their existence they would also have to be changed (by the preceding proposition) as regards their essence; that is (as is self-evident), they would be changed from true to false, which is absurd.35

PROP. 21. Everything that follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite; that is, by virtue of that attribute it is eternal and infinite.

Proof.—If you deny it, conceive, if you can, as in some attribute of God and following from its absolute
nature, something that is finite and has a determinate existence or duration—for example, the idea of God in thought. Now, thought, since it is, by hypothesis, an attribute of God, is necessarily (11) in its nature infinite. But in so far as it has the idea of God, it is, by hypothesis, finite. Now (def. 2), it cannot be conceived to be finite unless it be limited by thought itself. Not, however, by thought itself in so far as it constitutes the idea of God, for in so far it is, by hypothesis, finite; hence, by thought in so far as it does not constitute the idea of God, which, nevertheless (11), must necessarily exist. There is, therefore, thought which does not constitute the idea of God, and, hence, from its nature, in so far as it is absolute thought, the idea of God does not necessarily follow. (For it is conceived as constituting, and not constituting, the idea of God.) This is contrary to our hypothesis. Therefore, if the idea of God in thought, or anything else (it matters not what is taken, for the proof is a general one) in any attribute of God, follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of that attribute, it must necessarily be infinite. This was the first point.

In the second place, that which follows in this way from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a determinate duration. If you deny it, let us suppose that there is in some attribute of God a thing that follows from the necessity of the nature of that attribute, for example, the idea of God in thought; and let us suppose that this thing at one time has not existed or sometime will not exist. Now, since thought is by hypothesis an attribute of God, it must necessarily exist and be unchangeable (11 and 20, cor. 2). Therefore, beyond the limits of the duration of the
idea of God (for we are supposing that it has at one
time not existed, or sometime will not exist), thought
must exist without the idea of God. But this is con-
trary to our hypothesis, which assumes that when
thought is granted the idea of God necessarily follows.
Therefore, the idea of God in thought, or anything
that necessarily follows from the absolute nature of
some attribute of God, cannot have a determinate
duration, but is, by virtue of that attribute, eternal.
This was the second point. Mark, this is true of
everything that necessarily follows in any one of God's
attributes from the absolute nature of God.36

PROP. 22. Whatever follows from any attribute of
God, in so far as it is modified by a modification that, by
virtue of this attribute, necessarily exists and is infinite,
must also both necessarily exist and be infinite.

Proof.—The proof of this proposition is similar to
that of the preceding one.

PROP. 23. Every mode, which necessarily exists and is
infinite, must necessarily have followed either from the
absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some
attribute modified by a modification which necessarily
exists and is infinite.

Proof.—A mode is in something else, by means of
which it must be conceived (def. 5); that is (15), it is
in God alone, and can be conceived by means of God
alone. If, therefore, a mode is conceived as necessa-
rily existent, and as being infinite, in both cases this
is necessarily inferred or perceived by means of some
attribute of God, in so far as this is conceived as
expressing infinity and necessity of existence, or, in
other words (def. 8), eternity; that is (def. 6 and
prop. 19), in so far as it is considered absolutely. A
mode, therefore, which necessarily exists and is infi-
nature, something that is finite and has a determinate existence or duration—for example, the idea of God in thought. Now, thought, since it is, by hypothesis, an attribute of God, is necessarily (11) in its nature infinite. But in so far as it has the idea of God, it is, by hypothesis, finite. Now (def. 2), it cannot be conceived to be finite unless it be limited by thought itself. Not, however, by thought itself in so far as it constitutes the idea of God, for in so far it is, by hypothesis, finite; hence, by thought in so far as it does not constitute the idea of God, which, nevertheless (11), must necessarily exist. There is, therefore, thought which does not constitute the idea of God, and, hence, from its nature, in so far as it is absolute thought, the idea of God does not necessarily follow. (For it is conceived as constituting, and not constituting, the idea of God.) This is contrary to our hypothesis. Therefore, if the idea of God in thought, or anything else (it matters not what is taken, for the proof is a general one) in any attribute of God, follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of that attribute, it must necessarily be infinite. This was the first point.

In the second place, that which follows in this way from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a determinate duration. If you deny it, let us suppose that there is in some attribute of God a thing that follows from the necessity of the nature of that attribute, for example, the idea of God in thought; and let us suppose that this thing at one time has not existed or sometime will not exist. Now, since thought is by hypothesis an attribute of God, it must necessarily exist and be unchangeable (11 and 20, cor. 2). Therefore, beyond the limits of the duration of the
idea of God (for we are supposing that it has at one time not existed, or sometime will not exist), thought must exist without the idea of God. But this is contrary to our hypothesis, which assumes that when thought is granted the idea of God necessarily follows. Therefore, the idea of God in thought, or anything that necessarily follows from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, cannot have a determinate duration, but is, by virtue of that attribute, eternal. This was the second point. Mark, this is true of everything that necessarily follows in any one of God's attributes from the absolute nature of God.

Prop. 22. Whatever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as it is modified by a modification that, by virtue of this attribute, necessarily exists and is infinite, must also both necessarily exist and be infinite.

Proof.—The proof of this proposition is similar to that of the preceding one.

Prop. 23. Every mode, which necessarily exists and is infinite, must necessarily have followed either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute modified by a modification which necessarily exists and is infinite.

Proof.—A mode is in something else, by means of which it must be conceived (def. 5); that is (15), it is in God alone, and can be conceived by means of God alone. If, therefore, a mode is conceived as necessarily existent, and as being infinite, in both cases this is necessarily inferred or perceived by means of some attribute of God, in so far as this is conceived as expressing infinity and necessity of existence, or, in other words (def. 8), eternity; that is (def. 6 and prop. 19), in so far as it is considered absolutely. A mode, therefore, which necessarily exists and is infi-
nite, must have followed from the absolute nature of some attribute of God; and that either immediately (21), or mediatly through some modification which follows from his absolute nature, that is (by the preceding proposition), which necessarily exists and is infinite. Q. E. D.

Prop. 24. The essence of the things produced by God does not involve existence.

Proof.—This is evident from def. 1. For that whose nature (considered in itself) involves existence, is its own cause, and exists solely from the necessity of its nature.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that God is not merely the cause that brings things into existence, but is also the cause of their continuing in existence; or, to use a scholastic term, God is the cause of the being of things. For whether things exist or do not exist, whenever we consider their essence we find it does not involve either existence or duration; hence their essence cannot be the cause either of their existence or of their duration. Only God, to whose nature alone existence belongs, can be the cause of these (14, cor. 1).

Prop. 25. God is not the efficient cause of the existence of things only, but also of their essence.

Proof.—If you deny it, it follows that God is not the cause of the essence of things. Hence (axiom 4) the essence of things can be conceived without God. But this (15) is absurd. Therefore God is the cause of the essence of things also. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—This proposition follows more clearly from prop. 16. For from that proposition it follows that, given the divine nature, one must necessarily infer from it the essence as well as the existence
of things; and, in a word, that God must be said to be the cause of all things in just the sense in which he is said to be the cause of himself. This will be still more clearly evident from the following corollary.

Corollary.—Particular things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of God; in other words, modes, by which the attributes of God are expressed in a definite and determinate manner. The proof of this is evident from prop. 15 and def. 5.38

Prop. 26. A thing that is determined to any action has necessarily been so determined by God: and a thing that is not determined by God cannot determine itself to action.

Proof.—That through which things are said to be determined to any action is necessarily something positive (as is self-evident). Therefore, God is, from the necessity of his nature, the efficient cause both of its essence and of its existence (25 and 16). This was the first thing to be proved. From this the second part of the proposition very clearly follows. For if a thing which is not determined by God could determine itself, the first part of the proposition would be false, which is absurd, as we have shown.

Prop. 27. A thing that is determined by God to any action cannot render itself undetermined.

Proof.—The truth of this proposition is evident from axiom 3.

Prop. 28. No individual thing, that is, nothing that is finite and has determinate existence, can exist or be determined to action, unless it be determined to existence and action by some cause other than itself, which also is finite and has a determinate existence; again, this cause cannot exist nor be determined to action unless it be
determined to existence and action by still another, which, too, is finite and has a determinate existence; and so to infinity.

Proof.—Whatever is determined to existence and action is so determined by God (26 and 24, cor.). But that which is finite and has a determinate existence cannot have been produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for everything that follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal (21). It must, therefore, have followed from God or from some one of his attributes, in so far as this is considered as modified by some mode, for besides substance and modes nothing exists (axiom 1 and defs. 3 and 5), and modes (25, cor.) are only modifications of the attributes of God. But it cannot have followed from God or from one of his attributes in so far as this is modified by a modification that is eternal and infinite (22). It must therefore have followed from, or have been determined to existence and action by, God or one of his attributes in so far as this is modified by a modification that is finite and has a determinate existence. This was the first point. In the second place, this cause, that is, this mode (by the same reasoning by which the first part of the proposition has just been proved) must also have been determined by another, which, too, is finite and has a determinate existence, and this last, in turn, by another (by the same reasoning), and so on (by the same reasoning) to infinity. 39 Q. E. D.

Scholium.—Since certain things must have been produced by God immediately, namely, those things that necessarily follow from his absolute nature, and through these certain other things, that yet cannot either be or be conceived without God; it follows;
First, that God is absolutely the proximate cause of the things immediately produced by himself; but he is not a cause, as the saying is, after their kind. For God's effects cannot either be or be conceived without their cause (15 and 24, cor.). It follows, in the second place, that God cannot be properly called the remote cause of particular things, unless, perhaps, because we distinguish the latter from the things that he has produced immediately, or, rather, that follow from his absolute nature. For by a remote cause we mean one that is in no way joined with its effect. But everything that is, is in God, and so depends upon God, that without him it can neither be nor be conceived. 40

PROP. 29. There is in the universe nothing contingent; but all things are, from the necessity of the divine nature, determined to existence and action of a definite sort.

Proof.—Whatever is, is in God (15); but God cannot be called a contingent thing, for (11) he exists necessarily and not contingently. In the second place, the modes of the divine nature have followed therefrom necessarily, and not contingently (16), and that whether the divine nature be considered absolutely (21) or as determined to action of a definite sort (27). Moreover, God is not merely the cause of these modes in so far as they simply exist (24, cor.), but also (26) in so far as they are considered as determined to some action. But if they are not determined by God (by the same proposition), it is impossible, not contingent, that they should determine themselves; on the other hand (27), if they are determined by God, it is impossible, not contingent, that they should render themselves undetermined. Therefore, all
things are, from the necessity of the divine nature, determined not only to existence, but also to existence and action of a definite sort, and there is nothing that is contingent. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—Before going further, I will here explain to the reader, or rather remind him of, what we must understand by natura naturans and natura naturata. From what precedes, I think it is now evident that we must mean by natura naturans that which is in itself, and is conceived by means of itself; in other words, those attributes of substance which express an eternal and infinite essence, that is (14, cor. 1, and 17, cor. 2), God, in so far as he is regarded as a free cause. By natura naturata, on the other hand, I mean all that follows from the necessity of God’s nature, or in other words, from the necessity of each of his attributes; that is, all the modes of God’s attributes, in so far as these modes are regarded as things that are in God, and that cannot be or be conceived without God.

Prop. 30. An intellect, actually finite or actually infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God, and nothing else.

Proof.—A true idea must agree with its object (axiom 6), that is (as is self-evident), what is contained objectively in the intellect must necessarily exist in nature. But in nature (14, cor. 1) there is but one substance, which is God; nor are there any modifications (15) but those which are in God, and which (by

*For these expressions we have no exact equivalent. They might be rendered: “nature regarded as active,” and “nature regarded as passive”; but I have preferred to keep the Latin names, which have become common property. A literal translation into English would not be endurable.—Tr.
the same proposition) without God can neither be nor be conceived. Therefore, an intellect, actually finite or actually infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God, and nothing else. Q. E. D.

Prop. 31. Actual intellect, whether it be finite or infinite, as also will, desire, love, etc., must be referred to natura naturata and not to natura naturans.

Proof.—By intellect (as is self-evident) we do not mean absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, which mode differs from others, such as desire, love, etc., and must, hence, be conceived by means of absolute thought; in other words (15 and def. 6), it must be so conceived through some attribute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, that without it it can neither be nor be conceived. Therefore (29, schol.) it must be referred to natura naturata and not to natura naturans, as must also the other modes of thinking. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—My reason for here speaking of actual intellect is not that I admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potency; but, as I wish to avoid all confusion, I have chosen to speak only of a thing we perceive as clearly as possible, namely, of the mere act of knowing, than which we perceive nothing more clearly. For we cannot know anything that does not conduce to a more perfect knowledge of the act of knowing.

Prop. 32. Will cannot be called a free, but only a necessary, cause.

Proof.—Will, like intellect, is only a certain mode of thinking, hence (28) no volition can exist or be determined to action unless it be determined by some
cause other than itself, and this, in turn, by another, and so on to infinity. But if we suppose will to be infinite it must be determined to existence and action by God, not in so far as he is absolutely infinite substance, but in so far as he has an attribute that expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought (23). Therefore, in whatever way we conceive it, whether as finite or as infinite, it calls for a cause to determine it to existence and action; hence (def. 7) it cannot be called a free, but only a necessary or constrained cause. Q. E. D.

Corollary 1.—Hence it follows, first, that God does not act from the freedom of his will.

Corollary 2.—It follows, in the second place, that will and intellect are related to God's nature in the same way as motion and rest, and absolutely all natural things, which (29) must be determined by God to existence and action of a definite sort. For will, like everything else, needs a cause to determine it to existence and action of a definite sort. And although an infinity of things follow when will or intellect are granted, yet God cannot on this account be said to act from the freedom of his will, any more than he can be said to act from the freedom of motion and rest, on account of the things that follow from motion and rest, for an infinity of things follow from these also. Therefore, will no more belongs to God's nature than do the rest of the things in nature, but is related to it in the same way as are motion and rest, and all the other things, which, as we have shown, follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and are by it determined to existence and action of a definite sort. 44

Prop. 33. Things could not have been produced by
God in any other way or in any other order than that in which they have been produced.

Proof.—All things have followed necessarily from the nature of God as given (16), and from the necessity of God's nature have been determined to existence and action of a definite sort (29). If, therefore, things could have been of a different nature, or could have been determined to action of another sort, so that the order of nature would be different, God's nature, too, could be different from what it is; hence (11) that nature, too, would have to exist, and, consequently, there could be two or more Gods, which (14, cor. 1) is absurd. Therefore, things could not have been produced by God in any other way or in any other order than that in which they have been produced. Q. E. D.

Scholium i.—As in what precedes I have made it clearer than noonday that there is in things absolutely nothing to justify one in calling them contingent, I will here explain briefly what is meant by contingent; but, first, what is meant by necessary and impossible. A thing is said to be necessary either by reason of its essence, or by reason of its cause. For the existence of a thing necessarily follows either from the essence and definition of the thing, or from the fact that there is an efficient cause. Again, for similar reasons, a thing is said to be impossible; namely, either because its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because there is no external cause determined to the production of the thing. But a thing is called contingent only in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge. For when we do not know that the essence of a thing involves a contradiction, or do know certainly that it does not involve a contradic-
tion, and yet can make no definite assertion concerning the existence of the thing because we are ignorant of the order of causes, then the thing cannot seem to us either necessary or impossible; and, hence, we call it either contingent or possible.

Scholium 2.—From what precedes it clearly follows that things have been brought into being by God in the highest perfection, seeing that they have followed necessarily from a most perfect nature. Nor does this charge God with any imperfection, for it is his perfection that has compelled us to make this assertion. Nay, from the contrary statement, it would clearly follow (as I have just shown) that God is not supremely perfect; for, if things had been brought into being in some other way, we should have to ascribe to God some other nature different from that which, from a consideration of the most perfect Being, we are compelled to ascribe to him. I have no doubt many will reject this opinion as absurd, and will refuse to apply their mind to a careful consideration of it; and that simply because they are accustomed to ascribe to God a freedom very different from that (def. 7) we ascribe to him—in other words, an absolute will. But I have also no doubt that, if they will consider the matter and duly weigh my chain of proofs, they will wholly reject the sort of freedom they now ascribe to God as not only worthless, but a great obstacle to knowledge. There is no need of my repeating here what I have said in the scholium to prop. 17. Still, for the sake of my opponents, I will further show that, even if will be admitted to belong to God's essence, it nevertheless follows from his perfection that things could not have been created by God in any other way or order. This will be easy to
prove if we consider first the fact, admitted by my opponents, that it depends solely on God's decree and will that everything is what it is—otherwise God would not be the cause of all things. And in the second place, that all God's decrees have been ordained by God himself from all eternity—otherwise he would be charged with imperfection and fickleness. Now, since there is in eternity no \textit{when, before, or after}, it follows, from the mere perfection of God, that God never can decree anything else, and never could have done so; in other words, that God has not existed before his decrees and cannot exist without them. But it is said, even on the supposition that God had made some other universe, or had from eternity ordained other decrees regarding nature and its order, that would not argue any imperfection in God. But those who say this admit thereby that God can change his decrees. For if God had ordained other decrees regarding nature and its order than those he has ordained, that is, had had some other will and thought regarding nature, he would necessarily have had an intellect different from that he actually has and a will different from that he actually has. And if one may ascribe to God a different intellect and a different will without any change in his essence and in his perfection, what is to prevent his changing his decrees regarding created things and nevertheless remaining as perfect as before? For his intellect and his will regarding created things and their order are, in their relation to his essence and perfection, just the same, however we conceive them. Again, all the philosophers I know admit that there is in God no potential, but only actual, intellect; now since, as they also admit, neither his intellect nor his will is to
be distinguished from his essence, it further follows that, if God had actually had a different intellect and a different will, his essence, too, would necessarily be different. Hence (as I inferred at the outset), if things had been brought into being by God other than they actually are, God's intellect and his will, that is (as is admitted) his essence, would have to be different; which is absurd.

Since, therefore, things could not have been brought into being by God in any other way or order, and since the truth of this assertion follows from God's supreme perfection, there is no sound reason that can persuade us to believe that God has chosen not to create, in the same perfection with which he knows them, all the things that are in his intellect. It will be objected that there is in things neither perfection nor imperfection; that that in them which makes them perfect or imperfect, and on account of which they are called good or bad, depends solely on the will of God, and hence, had God chosen, he could have made what is now perfection the greatest imperfection, and vice versa. But what else would this be than the open assertion that God, who necessarily knows what he wills, can by his will make himself know things in some other way than as he knows them, which (as I have just shown) is highly absurd. Hence I can turn this argument against those who bring it forward, thus: All things depend upon God's power. Therefore, for things to be different God's will also would necessarily have to be different; but God's will cannot be other than it is (as I have just shown very plainly from God's perfection). Hence things, too, cannot be other than they are. I confess this doctrine which subjects all things to a certain arbitrary fiat of
God and makes them depend upon his good pleasure, is less wide of the truth than that of those who maintain that God does all things with some good end in view. The latter appear to affirm that there is something external to God and independent of him, upon which, as upon a pattern, God looks when he acts, or at which he aims, as at a definite goal. This is simply subjecting God to fate, and nothing more absurd than this can be maintained concerning God, who is, as we have shown, the first and only free cause as well of the essence of all things as of their existence. It is, therefore, unnecessary to waste time in refuting this nonsense.45

PROP. 34. God's power is his very essence.

Proof.—It follows from the mere necessity of God's essence that God is his own cause (11), and (16 and cor.) the cause of all things. Therefore, God's power, through which he himself and all things are and act, is his very essence. Q. E. D.

PROP. 35. Whatever we conceive to be in God's power, necessarily exists.

Proof.—Whatever is in God's power must (by the preceding proposition) be so comprehended in his essence that it necessarily follows from it; hence it necessarily exists. Q. E. D.

PROP. 36. There exists nothing from whose nature some effect does not follow.

Proof.—Everything that exists expresses in a definite and determinate way God's nature or essence (25, cor.), that is (34), everything that exists expresses in a definite and determinate way God's power, which is the cause of all things. Therefore (16), from everything that exists, some effect must follow. Q. E. D.
APPENDIX.

In the foregoing I have unfolded the nature of God and his properties; as that he exists necessarily; that he alone is; that he exists and acts solely from the necessity of his nature; that he is, and in what way he is, the free cause of all things; that all things are in God, and so depend upon him that without him they can neither be nor be conceived; and, finally, that all things have been fore-ordained by God, not from the freedom of his will or his absolute good-pleasure, but from his absolute nature, or, in other words, his infinite power. Moreover, wherever an opportunity presented itself, I have taken care to remove prejudices which could have prevented the reader from seeing the force of my proofs. As, however, there still remain not a few prejudices which very well could and can prevent men from grasping the connection of things as I have set it forth, I have thought it worth while to here summon these before the bar of reason. Now all the prejudices I here undertake to point out depend on just this one; that men commonly suppose that all things in nature act, as they themselves do, with a view to some end, nay, even assume that God himself directs all things to some definite end, saying that God has made all things for man, and man that he might worship God. I shall, therefore, consider this prejudice first. I shall inquire, in the first place, why most persons assent to it, and all are naturally so prone to embrace it. In the second place, I shall prove that it is false; and, lastly, I shall show how there have sprung from it prejudices concerning good and evil, merit and sin, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, and other things of the sort. This is not the place, however, to
deduce these things from the nature of the human mind. It will here suffice to assume certain facts all must admit, namely, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that all men have, and are conscious of having, an impulse to seek their own advantage. From this it follows, *first*, that men think themselves free for the reason that they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and, being ignorant of the causes by which they are led to will and desire, they do not so much as dream of these. It follows, *second*, that men do everything with some purpose in view; that is, with a view to the advantage they seek. Hence it happens that they always desire to know only the final causes of actions, and, when they have learned these, are satisfied. It is because they have no longer any reason to doubt. But if they cannot learn these from someone else, nothing remains for them to do but to turn to themselves and have recourse to the ends by which they are wont to be determined to similar actions; and thus they necessarily judge another’s character by their own. Again, since they find in themselves and external to themselves many things, which, as means, are of no small assistance in obtaining what is to their advantage, as, for example, the eyes for seeing, the teeth for chewing, plants and animals for food, the sun for giving light, the sea for maintaining fish, and so on—this has led them to regard all the things in nature as means to their advantage. And knowing that these means have been discovered, not provided, by themselves, they have made this a reason for believing that there is someone else who has provided these means for their use. For after they had come to regard things as means they could not believe that things had made
themselves; but from the means which they were wont to provide for themselves they had to infer the existence of some ruler or rulers of nature, endowed with human freedom, who had provided everything for them, and had made all things for their use. Moreover, as they had never had any information concerning the character of such beings, they had to judge of it from their own. Hence they maintained that the gods direct all things with a view to man's advantage, to lay men under obligations to themselves, and to be held by them in the highest honor; whence it has come to pass that each one has thought out for himself, according to his disposition, a different way of worshiping God, that God might love him above others, and direct all nature to the service of his blind desire and insatiable avarice. Thus this prejudice has become a superstition and has taken deep root in men's minds; and this has been the reason why everyone has applied himself with the greatest effort to comprehend and explain the final causes of all things. But while they sought to prove that nature does nothing uselessly (in other words, nothing that is not to man's advantage), they seem to have proved only that nature and gods and men are all equally mad. Just see how far the thing has been carried. Among all the useful things in nature they could not help finding a few harmful things, as tempests, earthquakes, diseases, and so forth. They maintained that these occur because the gods were angry on account of injuries done them by men, or on account of faults committed in their worship. And although experience daily contradicted this, and showed by an infinity of instances that good and evil fall to the lot of the pious and of the impious indifferently, that did not make
them abandon their inveterate prejudice; they found it easier to class these facts with other unknown things of whose use they were ignorant, and thus to retain their present and innate condition of ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning and think out a new one. Hence they assumed that the judgments of the gods very far surpass man's power of comprehension. This in itself would have been sufficient to hide the truth forever from mankind, had not mathematics, which is concerned, not with final causes, but with the essences and properties of figures, shown men a different standard of truth. Besides the mathematics, other causes can be mentioned (I need not here enumerate them) which might have led men to examine these common prejudices, and have brought them to a true knowledge of things.

In what precedes I have sufficiently developed my first point. To show that nature has no predetermined end and that all final causes are only human fancies needs but little argument. For I think this is sufficiently evident, both from the bases and causes, whence, as I have shown, this prejudice has had its origin, and from prop. 16 and the corollaries to prop. 32, as also from all those propositions in which I have proved that everything in nature proceeds by a certain eternal necessity, and in the highest perfection. Still, I will add that this doctrine of final causes simply turns nature upside-down. It regards as effect what is really cause, and vice versa. In the second place, it makes last what is by nature first. Finally, it renders most imperfect what is supreme and most perfect. For (to omit the first two points as self-evident) that effect, as is plain from props. 21, 22, and 23, is the most perfect which is immediately produced by God;
and the more intermediate causes are needed for the production of a thing, the more imperfect it is. But if the things immediately produced by God were made in order that God might attain his end, then necessarily the last things, for the sake of which the first were made, would be the most excellent of all. Again, this doctrine denies God's perfection; for if God acts with an end in view, he necessarily seeks something he lacks. And although theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between the finis indigentiae and the finis assimilationis,* they nevertheless admit that God has done everything for his own sake, and not for that of created things. For, except God himself, they can assign no final cause of God's acting before the creation, and hence are forced to admit that God lacked these things for which he chose to provide means, and desired them, as is self-evident. Nor must I here overlook the fact that the adherents of this doctrine, who have chosen to display their ingenuity in assigning final causes to things, have employed in support of their doctrine a new form of argument, namely, a reduction, not ad impossible, but ad ignorantiam; † which shows that there was no other way to set about proving this doctrine. If, for example, a stone has fallen from a roof upon someone's head, and has killed him, they will prove as follows that the stone fell for the purpose of killing the man: If it did not fall, in accordance with God's will, for this purpose, how could there have been a chance concurrence of so many circumstances (for many cir-

---

* Literally, "the end of need" and "the end of assimilation." The meaning of the terms is sufficiently clear.—Tr.

† That is, they appeal, not to the absurdity of the opposing doctrine, but to the ignorance of their opponent.—Tr.
cumstances often do concur)? Perhaps you will answer, it happened because the wind blew and the man had an errand there. But they will insist, why did the wind blow at that time? and why did that man have an errand that way at just that time? If you answer again, the wind rose at that time, because, on the day before, while the weather was still calm, the sea had begun to be rough; and the man had had an invitation from a friend; they will again insist, since one may ask no end of questions, but why was the sea rough? and why was the man invited at that time? And so they will keep on asking the causes of causes, until you take refuge in the will of God, that asylum of ignorance. So again, when they consider the structure of the human body, they are amazed, and because they are ignorant of the causes which have produced such a work of art, they infer that it has not been fashioned mechanically, but by divine or supernatural skill, and put together in such a way that one part does not injure another. Hence it happens that he, who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and endeavors, like a scholar, to comprehend the things in nature, and not, like a fool, to wonder at them, is everywhere regarded and proclaimed as a heretic and an impious man by those whom the multitude reverence as interpreters of nature and the gods. For these men know that, with the disappearance of ignorance, wonder—their only means of argument and of maintaining their authority—goes too. But this I leave, and pass on to the third point I proposed to treat here.

After men had persuaded themselves that everything that happens, happens for their sake; they had to regard that quality in each thing which was most useful to
them as the most important, and to rate all those things which affected them the most agreeably as the most excellent. Hence, to explain the natures of things, they had to frame the notions good, evil, order, confusion, warm, cold, beauty, and deformity; and from their belief that they are free have arisen the notions of praise and blame, sin and merit. The latter I shall explain below, after discussing the nature of man; the former I will briefly explain here. They have called good, everything that conduces to health and to the worship of God, and bad everything that is unfavorable to these. And as those who do not understand nature make no affirmations about things, but only imagine things, and take imagination for understanding; in their ignorance of things and of their nature they firmly believe that there is order in things. For when things are so arranged that, when they are represented to us through the senses, we can easily imagine them, and hence can easily think them over, we call them orderly; if the opposite be true, we say they are in disorder, or are confused. And since those things we can easily imagine are more pleasing to us than the others, men place order above confusion—as though order had any existence in nature except in relation to our imagination—and they say that God created all things in order, thus unwittingly ascribing imagination to God; unless possibly they mean that God, making provision for the human imagination, arranged all things in the way in which they could be most easily imagined. Nor will it, perhaps, put any check upon them that we find an infinity of things that far transcend our imagination, and very many that, by reason of its weakness, confound it. But of this enough. The other notions, too, are nothing but
modes of imagining, which affect the imagination in various ways: yet they are regarded by the ignorant as the chief attributes of things. This is, as we have just said, because men believe that everything was made for their sake, and call the nature of a thing good or bad, sound or rotten and spoiled, according as it affects them. For example, if the motion communicated to the nerves by objects represented through the eyes is conducive to health, the objects which cause it are called beautiful; those objects, on the other hand, that excite a contrary motion, are called ugly. Again, those that move the sense through the nostrils are called odoriferous or stinking; those that move it through the tongue, sweet or bitter, savory or unsavory, and so on; those that move it through the touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, and so forth. Finally, those that move the ears are said to give forth noise, sound, or harmony; which last has driven men so mad that they believed even God takes delight in harmony. Nor are there wanting philosophers who have persuaded themselves that the motions of the heavenly bodies compose a harmony. All this sufficiently proves that everyone has judged of things according to the condition of his brain, or, rather, has taken the affections of his imagination for things. Hence (to make a passing allusion to this point, too), it is not surprising that so many controversies have arisen among men as we find to be the case, and that from these skepticism has resulted. For although men’s bodies are in many respects alike, yet they have very many points of difference, and, therefore, what seems good to one seems bad to another; what seems orderly to one seems confused to another; what is pleasant to one is unpleasant to
another; and so of the other cases, which I here pass over, not only because this is not the place to deal with them expressly, but also because it is a matter of common experience. The sayings: "Many men, many minds;" "Every man is satisfied with his own opinion;" "Brains differ as much as palates;"—these are in everybody's mouth; and they sufficiently prove that men judge of things according to the condition of their brains, and rather imagine things than comprehend them. For had they comprehended things, all these proofs would, as mathematics bears witness, if not attract, at least convince them.

We see, therefore, that all the fundamental notions upon which the ordinary man is wont to base his explanation of nature, are only modes of imagining, and do not indicate the nature of anything, but only that of the imagination. Since they have names, like entities existing outside of the imagination, I call them entities, not of reason, but of the imagination. Hence all arguments against me drawn from such notions can easily be refuted. Many are accustomed to reason as follows: If everything has followed from the necessity of God's most perfect nature, whence so many imperfections in nature—the stinking rottenness of things, their disgusting ugliness, confusion, evil, sin, and so forth? But, as I have just said, those who reason thus are easily confuted; for the perfection of things is to be determined solely from their nature and power, nor are things more or less perfect because they please or displease man's senses, and are helpful or harmful to man's nature. To those, however, who ask: Why did not God create all men such as to be led solely by the guidance of reason? I answer only, because he had no lack of material
wherewith to create all things, from the very highest to the very lowest degree of perfection; or, to speak more strictly, because the laws of his nature were ample enough to suffice for the production of everything that can be conceived by an infinite intellect, as I have proved in prop. 16. These are the prejudices which I undertook to note here. If any more of this sort remain, anyone can, by a little reflection, correct them for himself.
PART II.

OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND.

I now proceed to set forth those things that necessarily had to follow from the essence of God, a Being eternal and infinite. I shall not, indeed, treat of all of them, for I have shown (I, 16) that there must follow from this essence an infinity of things in infinite ways, but I shall treat only of those which may lead us, as it were, by the hand, to a knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness.47

Definitions.48

1. By body I mean a mode which expresses, in a definite and determinate manner, the essence of God, in so far as he is considered as an extended thing. (See I, 25, cor.)

2. I regard as belonging to the essence of a thing that which, being given, the thing is necessarily given, and which being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken away; in other words, that without which the thing, and, conversely, which without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.

3. By idea I mean a conception of the mind, which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing.

Explanation.—I say rather conception than perception, because the word perception seems to indicate that the mind is acted upon by the object; but conception seems to express an action of the mind.
4. By adequate idea I mean an idea which, in so far as it is considered in itself and without reference to an object, possesses all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.

Explanation.—I say intrinsic, to exclude the extrinsic mark, namely, the agreement of the idea with its object.

5. Duration is indefinite continuance in existence.

Explanation.—I say indefinite, because it can in no wise be limited by the nature itself of the existing thing, nor yet by the efficient cause, which, to be sure, necessarily brings about the existence of the thing, but does not sublate it.

6. By reality and perfection I mean the same thing.

7. By individual things I mean things that are finite and have a determinate existence. If, however, several individuals so unite in one action that all are conjointly the cause of the one effect, I consider all these, in so far, as one individual thing.

Axioms.49

1. Man's essence does not involve necessary existence; in other words, in the order of nature, it equally well may or may not come to pass that this or that man exists.

2. Man thinks.

3. Such modes of thinking as love, desire, or whatever else comes under the head of emotion, do not arise unless there be present in the same individual the idea of the thing loved, desired, etc. But the idea may be present without any other mode of thinking being present.

4. We perceive by sense that a certain body is affected in many ways.
5. We do not feel or perceive any individual things except bodies and modes of thinking.

See the Postulates after Prop. 13.

Prop. 1. Thought is an attribute of God, that is, God is a thinking thing.

Proof.—Individual thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which express in a definite and determinate manner God's nature (I, 25, cor.). God therefore possesses (I, def. 5) the attribute, the conception of which is involved in all individual thoughts, and through which they are conceived. Hence, thought is one of the infinite attributes of God, and it expresses God's eternal and infinite essence (I, def. 6) : that is, God is a thinking thing. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—This proposition may also be proved from the fact that we can conceive an infinite thinking being. For the more thoughts a thinking being is capable of having, the more reality or perfection do we regard it as containing; a being, then, that can think an infinity of things in an infinity of ways is necessarily, by virtue of its thinking, infinite. Since, therefore, we conceive an infinite being by fixing attention upon thought alone, thought is necessarily (I, defs. 4 and 6) one of the infinite attributes of God, as I asserted.50

Prop. 2. Extension is an attribute of God, that is, God is an extended thing.

Proof.—This is proved like the preceding proposition.

Prop. 3. There is necessarily in God an idea, both of his own essence, and of all those things which necessarily follow from his essence.

Proof.—God can (1) think an infinity of things in
an infinity of ways, or (which is the same thing, I, 16) can form an idea of his own essence, and of all those things which necessarily follow from it. But everything that is within God's power necessarily is (I, 35). Therefore such an idea necessarily is, and (I, 15) it is in God and nowhere else. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—By the power of God the multitude understand God's free will, and his authority over all things that are, which consequently are commonly regarded as contingent; for God has, they say, the power to destroy all things and to reduce them to nothing. Again, they very often liken the power of God to that of kings. This I have refuted in I, 32, corollaries 1 and 2, and have shown in I, 16, that God acts by the same necessity as that by which he knows himself; that is, just as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all agree in maintaining) that God knows himself, so from the same necessity it follows that God does an infinity of things in an infinity of ways. Later, in I, 34, I have shown that the power of God is nothing else than the active essence of God; hence it is as impossible for us to conceive that God does not act as to conceive that he does not exist. Moreover, did I care to follow this up further, I could show, too, that the power the multitude attribute to God not only is a human power (in that it shows that God is conceived by the multitude as a man, or as like a man), but even that it involves lack of power. But I do not wish to discourse so often upon the same theme. I merely beg the reader again and again to ponder repeatedly what is said concerning this point in Part I, from prop. 16 to the end. For no one will be able rightly to perceive my meaning unless he very carefully avoids confounding the
power of God with the human power or authority of kings.

Prop. 4. The idea of God, from which an infinity of things follow in an infinity of ways, can be but one.

Proof.—Infinite intellect comprises nothing, save God's attributes and his modifications (I, 30). But God is one (I, 14, cor. 1). Therefore the idea of God, from which an infinity of things follow in an infinity of ways, can be but one. Q. E. D.

Prop. 5. The formal* being of ideas admits of God as its cause, only in so far as he is regarded as a thinking thing, and not in so far as he is manifested in some other attribute. That is, the ideas both of the attributes of God and of individual things do not admit of their objects—perceived things—as their efficient cause, but God himself, in so far as he is a thinking thing.

Proof.—The proof is evident from prop. 3 of this Part. We there concluded that God can form an idea of his own essence, and of all those things which necessarily follow from it, from the mere fact that God is a thinking thing, and not from the fact that he is the object of his own idea. It follows that the formal being of ideas admits of God as cause, in so far as he is a thinking thing.

Another proof of this is as follows: The formal being of ideas is a mode of thinking (as is self-evident), that is (I, 25, cor.), a mode which expresses in a definite manner the nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and thus (I, 10) involves the concept of no other attribute of God, and consequently (I, axiom 4) is the effect of no other attribute than thought. Therefore the formal being of ideas

*Formal is here about equivalent to real or actual.—Tr.
Prop. 7] THE MIND. 79

admits of God as its cause, only in so far as he is regarded as a thinking thing, etc.53 Q. E. D.

Prop. 6. The modes of any attribute have God as their cause, only in so far as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, not in so far as he is considered under any other attribute.

Proof.—Each attribute is conceived through itself independently of anything else (I, 10). The modes, then, of each attribute involve the concept of their own attribute, but of no other; therefore (I, axiom 4), they have as their cause God, only in so far as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not in so far as he is considered under any other attribute. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that the formal being of things, which are not modes of thinking, does not follow from the divine nature because this first knew things; but the objects of ideas follow and are inferred from their attributes in the same manner, and by the same necessity, as we have shown ideas to follow from the attribute of thought.54

Prop. 7. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.

Proof.—The proof is evident from axiom 4, of Part I, for the idea of anything that is caused depends upon a knowledge of the cause whose effect it is.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that God's power of thinking is equal to his realized power of acting. That is, whatever follows formally* from God's infinite nature follows also objectively in God in the same order and with the same connection from the idea of God.

* See note to I, 17, schol.—Tr.
Scholium.—Before going further we should recall to mind this truth, which has been proved above, namely, that whatever can be perceived by infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance belongs exclusively to the one substance, and consequently that thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same substance, apprehended now under this, now under that attribute. So, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways; a truth which certain of the Hebrews* appear to have seen as if through a mist, in that they assert that God, the intellect of God, and the things known by it, are one and the same. For example, a circle existing in nature, and the idea, which also is in God, of this existing circle, are one and the same thing, manifested through different attributes; for this reason, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under that of thought, or under any other attribute whatever, we shall find there follows one and the same order, or one and the same concatenation of causes, that is, the same thing. I have said that God is the cause of an idea; for instance, the idea of a circle, merely in so far as he is a thinking thing, and of the circle, merely in so far as he is an extended thing, just for the reason that the formal being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived through another mode of thinking, as its proximate cause, that one in its turn through another, and so to infinity. Thus, whenever we consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain

*This may have reference to a passage in the work entitled "The Garden of Pomegranates," by Moses Corduero, a Kabbalist of the sixteenth century; or, perhaps, to a passage in the "Guide to the Perplexed," by Maimonides.—Tr.
the whole order of nature, or concatenation of causes, through the attribute of thought alone; and in so far as we consider them as modes of extension, we must likewise explain the whole order of nature solely through the attribute of extension. So also in the case of the other attributes. Hence God, since he consists of an infinity of attributes, is really the cause of things as they are in themselves. I cannot explain this more clearly at present.55

Prop. 8. The ideas of individual things or modes which do not exist must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the formal essences of individual things or modes are contained in the attributes of God.

Proof.—This proposition is evident from the one preceding, but it may be more clearly understood from the preceding scholium.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that so long as individual things do not exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of God, their objective being, that is, their ideas, do not exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when particular things are said to exist, not merely in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they are said to have a being in time, their ideas, too, involve an existence, through which they are said to have a being in time.

Scholium.—If anyone wants an illustration to explain this matter more fully, I can, indeed, give none that will adequately explain the thing of which I speak, for it is unique. I will, however, do what I can to make it clear.

The nature of the circle is such that the rectangles formed by the segments of all the straight
lines which intersect each other in it are equal. It follows that an infinity of rectangles equal to each other are contained in the circle. Still, no one of them can be said to exist, except in so far as the circle exists, nor can the idea of any one of these rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as it is comprehended in the idea of the circle.

Of that infinite number let us now conceive two only, E and D, as existing. Plainly their ideas also now exist, not merely in so far as they are comprehended in the idea of the circle; but also in so far as they involve the existence of those rectangles. And by this they are distinguished from the remaining ideas of the rest of the rectangles.\textsuperscript{56}

Prop. 9. The idea of an individual thing, actually existent, has God for its cause, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing actually existent, of which idea in its turn God is cause, in so far as he is affected by a third idea, and so to infinity.

Proof.—The idea of an individual thing actually existent is an individual mode of thinking, and distinct from all others (8, \textit{cor. and schol.}); therefore (6), it has God, in so far merely as he is a thinking thing, for its cause. Not, however (I, 28), in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, but in so far as he is considered as affected by some other mode of thinking; and of this also God is cause in so far as he is affected by another, and so to infinity. But the order and concatenation of ideas (7) is the same as the order and concatenation of causes; therefore, of any particular idea, another idea, that is, God, in so far as he is con-
Prop. 10] THE MIND. 

sidered as affected by another idea, is the cause; of this one, too, he is the cause in so far as he is affected by another, and so to infinity. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—Whatever takes place in the individual object of any idea, the knowledge of this is in God, in so far only as he has an idea of the said object.

Proof.—The idea of whatever takes place in the object of any idea is in God (3) not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing (by the preceding proposition); but (7) the order and concatenation of ideas is the same as the order and concatenation of things. The knowledge, therefore, of what takes place in any individual object, is in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that object. Q. E. D.

Prop. 10. Substantive being does not belong to the essence of man, that is, substance does not constitute the essence of man.

Proof.—Substantive being involves necessary existence (I, 7). If, then, substantive being belongs to the essence of man, granted substance, man would necessarily be granted (def. 2): hence man would necessarily exist, which (axiom 1) is absurd. Therefore, etc. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—This proposition is proved also by I, 5, which maintains that there are not two substances of the same nature. As, however, a number of men may exist, that which constitutes the essence of man is not substantive being. This proposition is evident, moreover, from the other properties of substance, to wit, that substance is in its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, etc.; as anyone may readily see.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that the essence of man consists of certain modifications of God’s attri-
butes. Substantive being (by the preceding proposition) does not belong to the essence of man. It is, therefore (I, 15), something which is in God, and which without God can neither be nor be conceived, that is (I, 25, cor.), a modification, or mode, which expresses God's nature in a definite and determinate manner.

Scholium.—Surely all must admit that without God nothing can be or be conceived. For it is an accepted fact with all that God is the sole cause of all things, both of their essence and of their existence; that is, God is the cause of things, not merely as regards their coming into existence, but also as regards their being. At the same time most persons say that that belongs to the essence of a thing without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived. Consequently, they either believe that the nature of God belongs to the essence of created things, or that created things can be or be conceived without God, or, as is more probable, they are inconsistent. The cause of this I believe to be that they have not observed the proper order of philosophizing. They have believed the divine nature, which should be contemplated before everything else, since it is prior both in knowledge and in nature, to be last in the order of knowledge, and the things called objects of sense to be first of all. Whence it has come to pass that, while they contemplated the things of nature, they thought of nothing less than they did of the divine nature; and when afterward they brought their mind to the contemplation of the divine nature, there was nothing they could think of less than of their first imaginings, upon which they had based the knowledge of the things of nature, inasmuch as these could not at all help one to a knowledge of the divine nature. Hence it is no
wonder that they sometimes contradicted themselves. But this I pass over. My purpose here was only to give the reason why I did not say that that belongs to the essence of anything without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived. It is, that particular things cannot be or be conceived without God, and yet God does not belong to their essence. For my part, I have said that that necessarily constitutes the essence of anything, which being granted, the thing is granted, and which being taken away, the thing is taken away; or that without which the thing, and, conversely, which without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.58

**Prop. 11.** The first thing that constitutes the actual being of the human mind is nothing else than the idea of some individual thing actually existing.

**Proof.**—Man's essence (by the corollary to the preceding proposition) consists of certain modes of the attributes of God; namely (axiom 2) of modes of thinking, in all of which (axiom 3) an idea is prior by nature, and when this is present the other modes (those, that is, to which the idea is prior by nature) must be present in the same individual (by the same axiom). Thus an idea is the first thing that constitutes the being of the human mind. But it is not the idea of a non-existent thing, for in that case (8, cor.) the idea itself could not be said to exist; it is, then, the idea of a thing actually existing. Not, however, of an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I, 21 and 22) must always necessarily exist; but this is (axiom 1) absurd; therefore the first thing that constitutes the actual being of the human mind is the idea of an individual thing actually existing. Q. E. D.

**Corollary.**—Hence it follows that the human mind
is a part of the infinite intellect of God. When, therefore, we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we say merely that God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is manifested by the nature of the human mind, that is, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea; and when we say that God has this or that idea, not merely in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, but in so far as besides the human mind he has also the idea of another thing, we say the human mind perceives the thing partially or inadequately.

Scholium.—Here, doubtless, my readers will stick, and will contrive to find many objections which will cause delay. For this reason I beg them to proceed with me slowly, and not to pass judgment on these matters until they have read over the whole. 59

Prop. 12. Whatever takes place in the object of the idea that constitutes the human mind must be perceived by the human mind; that is, an idea of that thing is necessarily in the mind. In other words, if the object of the idea that constitutes the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body without being perceived by the mind.

Proof.—Whatever takes place in the object of any idea, the knowledge of it is necessarily in God (9, cor.), in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of that object; that is (11), in so far as he constitutes the mind of anything. Whatever, then, takes place in the object of the idea that constitutes the human mind, the knowledge of it is necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, that is (11, cor.), the knowledge of it is necessarily in the mind, or the mind perceives it. Q. E. D.
Scho
dium.—This proposition is evident also, and
more clearly understood, from 7, schol., which see. 60
Prop. 13. The object of the idea that constitutes the
human mind is the body, that is, a definite mode of exten-
sion actually existing, and nothing else.
Proof.—If the body were not the object of the
human mind, the ideas of the modifications of the
body would not be in God (g, cor.), in so far as he
constituted our mind, but in so far as he constituted
the mind of something else; that is (ii, cor.), the
ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in
our mind. But (axiom 4) we have ideas of the modi-
fications of the body. Therefore the object of the
idea that constitutes the human mind is the body, and
that (ii) is a body actually existing. Again, if, be-
sides the body, there was still another object of the
mind, then, since nothing (I, 36) exists from which
some effect does not follow, there would (ii) neces-
sarily have to be in our mind the idea of some effect
of this object. But (axiom 5) there is no such idea.
Therefore the object of our mind is the existing body
and nothing else. Q. E. D.
Corollary.—Hence it follows that man consists of
mind and body, and that the human body exists, just
as we perceive it.
Scholium.—From this we comprehend, not merely
that the human mind is united to the body, but also
what is meant by the union of mind and body. No
one, however, can comprehend this adequately or dis-
tinctly, unless he first gain an adequate knowledge of
the nature of our body. What I have proved so far
have been very general truths, which do not apply
more to men than to all other individual things, which
are all, though in different degrees, animated. For of
everything there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause, just as there is an idea of the human body; hence, whatever I have said of the idea of the human body must necessarily be said of the idea of everything. Yet we cannot deny that ideas differ among themselves as do their objects, and that one is more excellent than another, and contains more reality, just as the object of the one is more excellent than the object of the other, and contains more reality. Therefore, in order to determine in what the human mind differs from other ideas, and in what it excels the others, we must gain a knowledge, as I have said, of the nature of its object, that is, of the human body. This, however, I cannot here treat of, nor is it necessary for what I wish to prove. I will only make the general statement that, in proportion as any body is more capable than the rest of acting or being acted upon in many ways at the same time, its mind is more capable than the rest of having many perceptions at the same time; and the more the actions of a body depend upon itself alone, and the less other bodies contribute to its action, the more capable is its mind of distinct comprehension. We may thus discern the superiority of one mind over others, and we may see the reason why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body; and many other things which, in what follows, I shall deduce from what has been said. Hence I have thought it worth while to explain and prove these things rather elaborately. To do this, I must make a few preliminary statements concerning the nature of bodies. 6r

Axiom 1.—All bodies are either in motion or at rest.
Axiom 2.—Every body moves sometimes more slowly, sometimes more rapidly.
Lemma 1.—Bodies are distinguished from one another as regards their motion or rest, their swiftness or slowness, and not as regards their substance.

Proof.—The first part of this I assume to be self-evident. That bodies are not distinguished as regards their substance is evident both from I, 5, and I, 8. It is still more evident from what has been said in the scholium to I, 15.

Lemma 2.—All bodies agree in some respects.

Proof.—All bodies agree, in the first place, in that they involve the conception of one and the same attribute (def. 1). In the second place, in that they can move now more slowly, now more swiftly, or simply now move and now remain at rest.

Lemma 3.—A body in motion or at rest must have been determined to motion or rest by another body, which also was determined to motion or rest by another, this again by another, and so to infinity.

Proof.—Bodies (def. 1) are individual things, which (lemma 1) are distinguished from one another as regards their motion and rest; therefore (I, 28) each must necessarily have been determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely (6), by another body which also (axiom 1) is either in motion or at rest. But this, too (by the same reasoning), could not have been in motion or at rest if it had not been determined to motion or rest by another, and this in turn (by the same reasoning) by another, and so to infinity. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that a body in motion remains in motion until it is determined by another body to come to rest; and a body at rest remains, too, at rest until it is determined to motion by another. This is, besides, self-evident. For if I suppose a
body—A, for instance—to be at rest, and do not direct my attention to other moving bodies, I can say nothing of the body A except that it is at rest. But should it afterward happen that the body A is set in motion, that surely could not have been due to the fact that it was before at rest; for from that nothing else could follow than the body A should remain at rest. If, conversely, A be supposed to be in motion, whenever we think only of A, we can make no affirmation concerning it except that it is in motion. But should it afterward happen that A is brought to rest, that truly could never have been due to the motion which it had before; from the motion nothing else could follow than that A should be in motion. It is due, therefore, to something which was not in A, namely, to an external cause, by which it was determined to come to rest.

**Axiom 1.**—All the modes, in which any body is affected by another body, are a consequence both of the nature of the body affected and of the nature of the body affecting it; so that one and the same body is set in motion in divers ways according to the diversity of nature of the bodies setting it in motion; and conversely, different bodies are set in motion in different ways by one and the same body.

**Axiom 2.**—When a body in motion impinges upon another which is at rest, and which it cannot set in motion, it is reflected in such a way that it continues in motion, and the angle made by the line of reflection with the plane of the body at rest, upon which the former body has impinged, is equal to the angle which the line of incidence makes with the same plane.
This is true of the most simple bodies, which are distinguished from one another only by motion or rest, swiftness or slowness; now let us pass on to those that are complex.

Definition.—When several bodies of the same size or of different sizes are so pressed upon by other bodies as to lie against each other, or if they move with the same or with different degrees of rapidity, in such a way as to communicate to each other their motions according to some fixed law, we say that they are united to each other, and that all together compose one body, that is, one individual, which is distinguished from all others by this union of bodies.

Axiom 3.—In proportion as the parts of an individual, or composite body, are in contact with each other by greater or less surfaces, the less or more easily can they be forced to change their place, and, consequently, the more or less easily can that individual be made to take another shape. Hence I shall call hard, bodies the parts of which are in contact by large surfaces; soft, those the parts of which are in contact by small surfaces; and fluid, those, finally, whose parts are in motion among themselves.

Lemma 4.—If, from a body, or individual, composed of many bodies, some bodies are taken away, and at the same time just as many of the same nature take their place, the individual will keep the nature it had before, without any change of its essence.

Proof.—Bodies (lemma 1) are not distinguished as regards their substance; but it is a union of bodies (by the preceding definition) that constitutes the essence of the individual. This (by hypothesis) it retains, even though there be a continual change of bodies. The individual will retain, therefore, as respects both
substance and mode, the nature that it had before. Q. E. D.

Lemma 5.—If the component parts of an individual become greater or less, but in such a way that all preserve the same relative proportion of motion and rest with respect to each other as they did before, the individual will likewise retain the nature it had before, without any change of essence.

Proof.—The proof of this is the same as that of the preceding lemma.

Lemma 6.—If the bodies which compose an individual are made to change the direction of the motion which they have, but in such a way that they may continue their motions, and communicate them to one another in the same proportion as before, the individual will likewise retain its nature, without any change of essence.

Proof.—This is self-evident. For it retains, by hypothesis, all that I have given in its definition as constituting its essence.

Lemma 7.—Moreover, the individual, thus composite, retains its nature, whether as a whole it moves or is at rest, or whether it moves in this or in that direction, so long as each part retains its motion, and communicates it to the rest, as before.

Proof.—This is evident from its definition, which see before lemma 4.

Scholium.—Thus, we see how a composite individual can be affected in many ways, and yet preserve its nature. So far we have conceived an individual, which is composed merely of bodies that are distinguished from one another only by motion or rest, swiftness or slowness, that is, which is composed of the most simple bodies. If now we conceive another composed of many individuals of different natures, we
shall find that it can be affected in many other ways, and yet preserve its nature. For, since each of its parts is composed of many bodies, each part will be able (by the preceding lemma), without any change of its nature, to move now more slowly, now more swiftly, and hence to communicate its motions more swiftly or more slowly to the other parts; and if we further conceive a third class of individuals composed of this second kind, we shall find that it can be affected in many other ways, without any change of its essence. If we go on thus to infinity, we shall easily conceive the whole of nature as one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in an infinity of ways, without any change of the whole individual. Had it been my professed purpose to treat of body, I ought to have explained and proved these things more at length. But I have just said that I have another purpose, and bring these things forward only for the reason that I can easily deduce from them what I have undertaken to prove.

Postulates.

1. The human body is composed of very many individuals of different natures, each one of which is highly composite.
2. Of the individuals which compose the human body, some are fluid, some soft, and some hard.
3. The individuals which compose the human body, and, consequently, the human body itself, are affected in very many ways by external bodies.
4. The human body needs, for its conservation, very many other bodies, by which it is continually, as it were, born anew.
5. When a fluid part of the human body is deter-
mined by an external body to impinge often upon a soft part, it changes the plane of the latter, and imprints upon it certain traces, as it were, of the impelling external body.

6. The human body can move external bodies in very many ways, and arrange them in very many ways.

Prop. 14. The human mind is capable of having very many perceptions, and the more capable, the greater the number of ways in which its body can be disposed.

Proof.—The human body (postulates 3 and 6) is affected in very many ways by external bodies, and is adapted to affect external bodies in very many ways. But (12) the human mind must perceive whatever takes place in the human body. Therefore, the human mind is capable of having very many perceptions, and the more capable, etc. Q. E. D.

Prop. 15. The idea, which constitutes the essential being of the human mind, is not simple, but composed of very many ideas.

Proof.—The idea, which constitutes the essential being of the human mind, is the idea of the body (13), and this (postulate 1) is composed of many highly composite individuals. But there is necessarily in God (8, cor.) an idea of each of the individuals which compose the body. Therefore (7) the idea of the human body is composed of these many ideas of the component parts. Q. E. D.

Prop. 16. The idea of any mode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies, must involve both the nature of the human body and the nature of the external body.

Proof.—All the modes, in which any body is affected, are a consequence both of the nature of the body
affected, and the nature of the body affecting it (axiom 1, after the cor. to lemma 3). Hence their idea (I, axiom 4) necessarily involves the nature of both bodies. Consequently, the idea of any mode, in which the human body is affected by an external body, involves the nature of the human body and of the external body. Q. E. D.

Corollary 1.—Hence it follows, in the first place, that the human mind perceives the nature of very many bodies along with the nature of its own body.

Corollary 2.—And it follows, in the second place, that the ideas which we have of external bodies indicate rather the constitution of our own body than the nature of external bodies; as I have explained with many illustrations in the Appendix to Part I.63

Prop. 17. If the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard this external body as actually existing, or as present to it, until the body is affected with some modification which excludes the existence or presence of this body.

Proof.—This is evident. For as long as the human body is thus affected, the human mind (12) will contemplate this modification of the body; in other words (by the preceding proposition), will have the idea of a mode actually existing, which involves the nature of an external body; that is, an idea that does not exclude the existence or presence of the nature of the external body, but affirms it. *Therefore the mind (cor. 1 to the preceding proposition) will regard an external body as actually existing, or as present, until it is affected, etc. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—The mind can contemplate, as if they were present, external bodies by which the human
body has once been affected, although they do not exist and are not present.

Proof.—When external bodies cause the fluid parts of the human body to impinge often upon the softer parts, they change (postulate 5) the planes of these latter; whence it happens (axiom 2 after the cor. to lemma 3) that the fluid parts are reflected by them in a way different from that in which they were before; and that, after that, when they meet these new planes in their spontaneous motion they are reflected in the same way as they were when impelled by external bodies toward these planes; and consequently, when they continue their motion thus reflected, they affect the human body in the same way. Of this the mind (12) will think again; that is (17), the mind will again regard the external body as present. This it will do as often as the fluid parts of the human body meet in their spontaneous motion the same planes. Hence, even if the external bodies by which the human body was once affected do not exist, the mind will regard them as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—Thus we see how it can be that we regard as present things that do not exist, as often happens. It is possible that this is brought about by other causes, but it is here sufficient that I have shown one by which I can explain the thing as well as if I had explained it by its true cause. Nevertheless I do not think I am far wrong, since all the postulates I have assumed contain scarcely anything not in harmony with experience, and experience we may not doubt, after we have shown that the human body exists just as we perceive it (13, cor.). Besides (from the preceding cor., and 16, cor. 2) we clearly comprehend the difference
between the idea, for instance, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of the mind of Peter, and the idea of the same Peter, which is in another man, say in Paul. The former directly expresses the essence of Peter's body, nor does it involve existence, except so long as Peter exists; the latter, on the other hand, indicates rather the condition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter; and, therefore, while that condition of Paul's body endures, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present, even if he does not exist. Further, to keep to the usual phraseology, we will call the modifications of the human body, the ideas of which represent external bodies as present to us, images of things, although they do not reproduce the shapes of things. When the mind contemplates bodies in this way, we will speak of it as imagining. And here, that I may begin to show what error is, I would have you note that acts of imagination, in themselves considered, contain no error; that is, that the mind does not err from the mere fact that it imagines, but only in so far as it is considered as lacking the idea, which excludes the existence of the things it imagines as present. For if the mind, when imagining things non-existent as present, knew that these things did not really exist, surely it would ascribe this power of imagination to a virtue in its nature, and not to a defect, especially if this faculty of imagining depended solely upon its nature, that is (I, def. 7), if this mental faculty were free.64

**Prop. 18.** If the human body has once been affected simultaneously by two or more bodies, when the mind after that imagines any one of them it will forthwith call to remembrance also the others.

**Proof.**—The cause of the mind's imagining any
body is (by the preceding corollary), that the human body is affected and disposed by the traces of an external body in the same way as it was affected when certain of its parts were impelled by that external body; but (by hypothesis) the body was then so disposed that the mind imagined two bodies at the same time; it will therefore now, also, imagine two at the same time; and when the mind imagines either, it will forthwith recollect the other. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—From this we clearly comprehend what memory is. It is nothing but a certain concatenation of ideas, involving the nature of things outside of the human body, which arises in the mind according to the order and concatenation of the modifications of the human body. I say, in the first place, that it is a concatenation of those ideas only that involve the nature of things outside of the human body, not of the ideas that express the nature of those things; for these ideas are really (16) ideas of the modifications of the human body, which involve both its nature and that of external bodies. I say, in the second place, that this concatenation follows the order and concatenation of the modifications of the human body, to distinguish it from the concatenation of ideas which follows the order of the understanding, whereby the mind perceives things through their first causes, and which is the same in all men. From this, furthermore, we clearly understand why the mind from the thought of one thing immediately passes to the thought of another which bears no resemblance to the former. For example, from the thought of the word pomum (apple) a Roman passes straightway to the thought of the fruit, which bears no resemblance to that articulate sound, and has nothing in common with it, except
that the body of the same man has often been affected by these two; that is, the man has often heard the word _pomum_ while he saw this fruit. Thus each one passes from one thought to another, according as custom has ordered the images of things in his body. A soldier, for instance, who sees in the sand the tracks of a horse, passes at once from the thought of the horse to the thought of its rider, and from that to the thought of war, etc.; while a rustic passes from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plow, a field, etc. Thus each one, according as he has been accustomed to join and connect the images of things in this or that way, passes from a given thought to this thought or to that.

**Prop. 19.** _The human mind does not come to a knowledge of the human body itself, or know that it exists, except through the ideas of the modifications by which the body is affected._

**Proof.**—The human mind is the idea or knowledge of the human body (13), which (9) is in God, in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of another individual thing. Or rather, since (_postulate 4_) the human body needs many bodies, by which it is continually born anew, as it were; and since the order and connection of ideas is (7) the same as the order and connection of causes; this idea is in God, in so far as he is considered as affected by the ideas of many individual things. Therefore God has an idea of the human body, or knows the human body, in so far as he is affected by many other ideas; and not in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (11, _cor._), the human mind does not know the human body. But the ideas of the modifications of the body are in God, in so far as he con-
stitutes the nature of the human mind; that is, the human mind perceives these same modifications (12), and consequently (16) perceives the human body itself, and that (17) as really existing. Therefore, only in so far does the human mind perceive the human body. Q. E. D.

**Prop. 20.** There is in God also an idea or knowledge of the human mind, which follows in God in the same way, and is referred to God in the same way, as the idea or knowledge of the human body.

**Proof.**—Thought is an attribute of God (1); therefore (3) there must necessarily be in God an idea of it and of all its modifications, and consequently (11) of the human mind also. In the second place, it does not follow that this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual thing (9). But the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes (7). Therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind follows in God, and is referred to God, in the same way as the idea or knowledge of the body. Q. E. D.

**Prop. 21.** This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body.

**Proof.**—We have proved that the mind is united to the body, from the fact that the body is the object of the mind (12 and 13); hence, for the same reason, the idea of the mind must be united with its object, that is, with the mind itself, in the same way as the mind is united with the body. Q. E. D.

**Scholium.**—This proposition is much more clearly comprehended from what was said in the scholium to prop. 7 of this Part. I there showed that the idea of the body and the body, that is (13), the mind and the
body, are one and the same individual, conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under that of extension. Hence the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, conceived under one and the same attribute, namely, that of thought. The idea of the mind, I say, and the mind itself follow in God, by the same necessity, from the same power of thinking. For, in truth, the idea of the mind—that is, the idea of an idea—is nothing else than the essence of an idea, in so far as this is considered as a mode of thinking, and without relation to its object. For when anyone knows a thing, from that very fact he knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so to infinity. But of this more hereafter. 67

PROP. 22. The human mind perceives, not merely the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of these modifications.

Proof.—The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God in the same way, and are referred to God in the same way, as the ideas of the modifications. This is proved as is prop. 20. But the ideas of the modifications of the body are in the human mind (12), that is (11, cor.), they are in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind. Hence, the ideas of these ideas are in God, in so far as he has a knowledge, or idea, of the human mind; that is (21), they are in the human mind itself, which, consequently, perceives not merely the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of these. 68 Q. E. D.

PROP. 23. The mind only knows itself in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.

Proof.—The idea or knowledge of the mind (20) follows in God in the same way, and is referred to
God in the same way, as the idea or knowledge of the body. But since (19) the human mind does not know the body itself; that is (11, cor.), since the knowledge of the human body is not referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; neither is the knowledge of the mind referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and hence (11, cor.), in so far the human mind does not know itself. In the second place, the ideas of the modifications which the human body receives involve the nature of the human body itself (16), that is (13), they agree with the nature of the mind; hence the knowledge of these ideas necessarily involves the knowledge of the mind. But (by the preceding proposition) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself. Therefore only in so far does the human mind know itself.69 Q. E. D.

Prop. 24. The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts which compose the human body.

Proof.—The parts which compose the human body do not belong to the essence of the body, except in so far as they communicate to one another their motions according to a certain definite law (see the def. after lemma 3, cor.), and not in so far as they can be regarded as individuals without relation to the human body. For the parts of the human body are (postulate 1) highly composite individuals, the parts of which (lemma 4) can be separated from the human body, while the nature and essence of the latter are preserved intact, and can communicate their motions (axiom 1, after lemma 3) to other bodies according to another law. Therefore (3) the idea or knowledge of any part is in God, and that (9) in so far as he
is regarded as affected by another idea of an individual thing, which individual thing is prior in the order of nature to the part in question (7). This may be said, too, of any part of the individual which forms a part of the human body; hence, the knowledge of any component part of the human body is in God, in so far as he is affected by many ideas of things, and not in so far as he has an idea of the human body merely; that is (13), an idea, which constitutes the nature of the human mind. Therefore (11, cor.) the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts which compose the human body.70 Q. E. D.

Prop. 25. *The idea of any modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of an external body.*

*Proof.*—I have shown (16) that the idea of a modification of the human body involves the nature of an external body in so far as the external body modifies the human body itself in a certain determinate manner. But in so far as the external body is an individual, which is not referred to the human body, the idea or knowledge of it is in God (9), in so far as God is regarded as affected by the idea of another thing, which (7) is prior by nature to the external body itself. Hence the adequate knowledge of an external body is not in God in so far as he has an idea of a modification of the human body; in other words, the idea of a modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of an external body.71 Q. E. D.

Prop. 26. *The human mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the modifications of its own body.*

*Proof.*—If the human body is in no way affected by
an external body, neither is (7) the idea of the human body, that is (13), the human mind, affected in any way by the idea of the existence of that body, or, in other words, it in no way perceives the existence of that external body. But in so far as the human body is in some way affected by an external body, the mind (16 and cor.) perceives an external body. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—In so far as the human mind imagines an external body, it does not have an adequate knowledge of it.

Proof.—When the human mind contemplates external bodies through the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it is imagining (17, schol.); nor can the mind by any other method (by the preceding proposition) imagine external bodies as really existing. Therefore (25), in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it does not have an adequate knowledge of them. Q. E. D.

Prop. 27. The idea of any modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.

Proof.—Any idea of any modification of the human body involves the nature of the human body just in so far as the human body is regarded as affected in a certain determinate manner (16). But in so far as the human body is an individual, which can be affected in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, etc. (See proof of prop. 25.)

Prop. 28. The ideas of the modifications of the human body in so far as they are referred to the human mind alone, are not clear and distinct, but confused.

Proof.—The ideas of the modifications of the human body involve the nature both of external bodies and
of the human body itself (16); and they must involve the nature, not only of the human body, but also of its parts; for the modifications are modes (postulate 3) which affect the parts of the human body, and consequently the whole body. But (24 and 25) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as well as of the parts which compose the human body, is not in God in so far as he is considered as affected by the human mind, but in so far as he is considered as affected by other ideas. These ideas of modifications are therefore, in so far as they are referred to the human mind merely, like conclusions without premises; that is (as is self-evident) they are confused ideas. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—It may be proved in the same way that the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind is not, considered in itself alone, clear and distinct. This applies also to the idea of the human mind, and to the ideas of the ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred to the mind alone, as anyone may readily see.73

Prop. 29. The idea of the idea of any modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind.

Proof.—The idea of a modification of the human body does not (27) involve an adequate knowledge of the body itself, that is, does not adequately express its nature, or, in other words (13), does not adequately agree with the nature of the mind. Therefore (I, axiom 6) the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human mind; that is, does not involve an adequate knowledge of it. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that the human mind, when in the ordinary course of nature it perceives things, has not an adequate but merely a confused and
fragmentary knowledge, whether of itself, of its body, or of external bodies. For the mind has no knowledge of itself, except in so far as it perceives ideas of the modifications of the body (23). Its own body, however, it does not perceive (19), except through those very ideas of the modifications through which alone (26) it perceives external bodies. Therefore, in so far as it has these, it has not an adequate, but merely (28 and schol.) a mutilated and confused knowledge of itself (29), of its body (27), and of external bodies (25). Q. E. D.

Scholium.—I say expressly that the mind has not an adequate but merely a confused knowledge of itself, of its body, and of external bodies, when in the ordinary course of nature it perceives things; that is, when, by chance contact with things, it is determined from without to the contemplation of this thing or that; not when, from the fact that it is contemplating several things simultaneously, it is determined from within to a perception of their harmonies, differences, and oppositions. For when it is determined from within in this way or that, things are contemplated clearly and distinctly, as I shall show later.

Prop. 30. We can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body.

Proof.—The duration of our body does not depend upon its essence (axiom 1), nor yet upon the absolute nature of God (I, 21). It is (I, 28) determined to existence and action by causes, which are also determined by others to existence and action of a definite and determinate sort, and these again by others, and so to infinity. Hence the duration of our body depends upon the common course of nature and the constitution of things. But what the constitution of
things is, of this an adequate knowledge is in God, in so far as he has ideas of all things, and not merely in so far as he has the idea of the human body (9, cor.). Hence there is in God a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body, in so far as he is considered merely as constituting the nature of the human mind. That is (11, cor.), this knowledge is in our mind very inadequate. Q. E. D.

Prop. 31. We can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of individual things which are external to us.

Proof.—Every individual thing, like the human body, must be determined to existence and action of a definite and determinate sort by some other individual thing; this in turn by another, and so to infinity (I, 28). But since I have proved in the preceding proposition, from this common property of individual things, that we have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body, the same inference is to be drawn concerning the duration of individual things, to wit, that we can have of it but a very inadequate knowledge. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that all individual things are contingent and perishable. For we can have no adequate knowledge of their duration (by the preceding proposition), and this is what we mean (I, 33, schol. 1) by the contingency of things and the possibility of decay. Except in this sense (I, 29) nothing is contingent.

Prop. 32. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true.

Proof.—All ideas, that are in God, absolutely agree with their objects (7, cor.), therefore (I, axiom 6) all are true. Q. E. D.
Prop. 33. There is in ideas no positive element, on account of which they are called false.

Proof.—If you deny this, conceive, if you can, the positive mode of thinking which constitutes the essence of error or falsity. This mode of thinking cannot be in God (by the preceding proposition); and yet out of God it cannot either be or be conceived (I, 15). Therefore, there can be in ideas no positive element, on account of which they are called false. Q. E. D.

Prop. 34. Every idea which is in us absolute, that is, adequate and perfect, is true.

Proof.—When we say that there is in us an adequate and perfect idea, we say merely (11, cor.) that there is in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of our mind, an adequate and perfect idea. Consequently (32) we say, merely, that such an idea is true. Q. E. D.

Prop. 35. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge that is involved in inadequate or mutilated and confused ideas.

Proof.—There is in ideas no positive element to constitute the essence of falsity (33). But falsity cannot consist in absolute privation (for minds, not bodies, are spoken of as going astray and being deceived); nor yet in absolute ignorance, for ignorance and error are different things. Hence it consists in that privation of knowledge which is involved in an inadequate knowledge of things, that is, in inadequate and confused ideas. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—In the scholium to prop. 17 I have explained in what sense error consists in a privation of knowledge, but for the fuller explication of this I will give an example. Men are, for instance, deceived in thinking themselves free, a belief which
rests upon this alone, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes which determine them. This, then, is their idea of freedom, that they know no cause of their actions. Their statement that human actions are due to will is a collection of words, for which they have no idea. For all are ignorant of what will is, and how it moves the body. Those who boast that they know, and imagine seats and habitations for the soul, usually provoke either laughter or disgust. Thus, when we look upon the sun, we imagine it about two hundred feet away from us; an error which does not consist merely in the act of imagination, but in the fact that, while we thus imagine it, we are ignorant of its true distance, and of the cause of this act of the imagination. And, although we afterward learn that it is above six hundred diameters of the earth away from us, nevertheless we imagine it as near; for we do not imagine the sun to be so near because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as the body itself is affected by that object.\textsuperscript{78}

PROP. 36. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct, ideas.

\textit{Proof.}—All ideas are in God (I, 15); and, in so far as they are referred to God, are true (32) and (7, cor.) adequate. Hence none are inadequate, or confused, except in so far as they are referred to some individual mind (24 and 28). Hence all, both adequate and inadequate, follow by the same necessity (6, cor). Q. E. D.

PROP. 37. That which is common to all things (see lemma 2, above), and is equally in the part and in the whole, constitutes the essence of no individual thing.
Proof.—If you deny this, conceive, if you can, that it constitutes the essence of some individual thing, namely, the essence of B. Then (def. 2) it cannot be nor be conceived without B. But this is contrary to the hypothesis. Hence it does not belong to the essence of B, nor constitute the essence of any other individual thing. Q. E. D.

Prop. 38. That which is common to all things, and is equally in the part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except adequately.

Proof.—Let A be something that is common to all bodies, and that is equally in the part and in the whole of each body. I say that A cannot be conceived except adequately. For the idea of it (7, cor.) is necessarily adequate in God, both in so far as he has the idea of the human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of its modifications, which (16, 25, and 27) involve to some degree both the nature of the human body and that of external bodies. That is (12 and 13), this idea is necessarily adequate in God, in so far as he constitutes the human mind, or in so far as he has ideas, which are in the human mind. The mind, therefore (11, cor.), necessarily perceives A adequately, and that in so far as it perceives itself, its own body, or any external body; nor can A be conceived in any other way. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that certain ideas or notions are common to all men. All bodies (lemma 2) agree in some things, and these (by the preceding proposition) must be perceived adequately, or clearly and distinctly, by all. 80

Prop. 39. That which is common to and a property of the human body and those external bodies by which the human body is wont to be affected, and which is equally in
the part and in the whole of each of them—of this also there is an adequate idea in the mind.

Proof.—Let A be something, which is common to and a property of the human body and certain external bodies, which is equally in the human body and in these external bodies, and which, finally, is equally in the part and in the whole of each external body. Of this A there will be in God an adequate idea (7, cor.), both in so far as he has an idea of the human body, and in so far as he has ideas of the said external bodies. Now, let the human body be affected by an external body, through that which they have in common, that is, through A. The idea of this modification will involve the property A (16); and hence (7, cor.) the idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property A, will be adequate in God, in so far as he is affected by the idea of the human body; that is (13), in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind. Therefore (11, cor.) this idea is adequate in the human mind also. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that the more properties the body has in common with other bodies, the more things is the mind capable of adequately perceiving.81

Prop. 40. All ideas in the mind, that follow from ideas which are in it adequate, are themselves adequate.

Proof.—This is evident. When we say that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are in the mind adequate, we merely say (11, cor.) that there is, in the divine mind itself, an idea of which God is the cause, not in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by the ideas of many individual things, but in so far merely as he constitutes the essence of the human mind.
Scholium 1.—In the above I have set forth the cause of the notions that are called common, and that are the foundation of all our reasoning. But of certain axioms or notions there are other causes, which it would be a digression to unfold here by my method. From these it would appear, which notions are the most useful, and which are of scarcely any value; and again, which are common notions, and which are clear and distinct to those only who are without prejudices; and, finally, which are unfounded. Moreover, it would appear whence the notions called secondary, and hence the axioms based upon them, have had their origin; and there would be set forth other reflections which I have made at various times touching this subject. But since I have reserved these things for another treatise, and for fear that I may arouse aversion by my excessive prolixity, I have decided to pass over this matter here. Nevertheless that I may omit nothing that it is necessary to know, I will briefly mention the causes in which the terms known as transcendental have had their origin, as, for example, Being, Thing, Something. These terms arise from the fact that the human body, since it is limited, is only capable of forming in itself distinctly a certain number of images at one time (I have explained what an image is in the scholium to prop. 17). If this number be exceeded, the images begin to run together; and if the number of images that the body is able to form in itself distinctly at one time be greatly exceeded, they are all entirely confused with each other. Since this is so, it is evident from the corollary to prop. 17, and from prop. 18, that the human mind can imagine distinctly at one time as many bodies as there are images that can be
formed at one time in the body corresponding to it. But when the images in the body are wholly confused with each other, the mind, too, will imagine all the bodies confusedly, and without distinguishing them at all. It will grasp them under one attribute, as it were, namely, under the attribute of Being, of Thing, etc. This can also be deduced from the fact that images are not always equally lively; and from other causes analogous to these, which it is not necessary to unfold here, for it is sufficient to the object I have in view to consider a single one. They all amount to this, that these terms stand for ideas in the highest degree confused. Again, from like causes have sprung the notions called *universals*, as Man, Horse, Dog, etc. There are formed in the human body at the one time so many images—for instance, of man—that they overcome the faculty of imagination; not, indeed, wholly, but to such a degree that the mind is unable to imagine the little differences in the individuals (as the color, the size, etc., of each) and their exact number. It distinctly imagines only that in which all, in so far as they affect the body, agree. By this element, especially, the body was affected in the case of each individual; it is this that the mind expresses by the word *man*; and this that it predicates of an infinity of individuals. As I have said, it cannot imagine the exact number of individuals. But bear in mind that these notions are not formed by everyone in the same way, but differently by each according to the nature of the object by which the body has been the more often affected, and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For example, those who have more often regarded with admiration the stature of men will understand by the word *man* an animal erect in stature,
Those, on the other hand, who have been accustomed to notice something else, will form another common image, as that man is a laughing animal, a featherless biped, a rational animal, and so on. Each one will form universal images of things according to the character of his body. Hence it is not strange that among philosophers, who have endeavored to explain nature through the mere images of things, there have arisen so many controversies.82

Scholium 2.—From all that has been said above it is clearly evident that we have many perceptions, and that we form universal notions: First, from individuals, represented to our understanding through the senses fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order (29, cor.); hence I have been accustomed to call such notions knowledge from vague experience. Second, from signs; for example, when we hear or read certain words, we think of things, and form certain resembling ideas of them, through which we imagine them (18, schol.). Both these ways of viewing things I shall hereafter call Knowledge of the First Kind, Opinion, or Imagination. Third: From the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things (38, cor., 39 and cor., and 40). I shall call this Reason, or Knowledge of the Second Kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge there is, as I shall show in what follows, still a third, which I shall call Intuitive Knowledge. This kind of knowledge proceeds from the adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I will make all this clear by a single example. Three numbers are given to find a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is to the first. Without hesitation mer-
chants multiply the second and the third, and divide their product by the first. They do this, either because they have not forgotten the rule they received without proof from their teacher, or because they have often tested it with very simple numbers; or by virtue of the proof of prop. 19 of the seventh book of Euclid, namely, from the common property of proportionals. But with very simple numbers none of these is necessary. For example, given the numbers 1, 2, 3—everyone sees that the fourth proportional number is 6, and we see this much the more clearly in that we infer it to be the fourth from the ratio that we see at a glance the first bears to the second.83

Prop. 41. Knowledge of the first kind is the sole cause of falsity, while that of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.

Proof.—I have said in the preceding scholium that to knowledge of the first kind belong all those ideas that are inadequate and confused. Hence (35) this knowledge is the sole cause of falsity. I have said, in the second place, that to knowledge of the second and third kinds belong all those that are adequate. Therefore (34) it is necessarily true. Q. E. D.

Prop. 42. Knowledge, not of the first, but of the second and third kinds, teaches us to distinguish between the true and the false.

Proof.—This proposition is self-evident. He who knows how to distinguish between the true and the false must have an adequate idea of the true and the false; that is (40, schol. 2), must apprehend the true and the false by knowledge of the second or third kind.

Prop. 43. He who has a true idea, at the same time knows that he has a true idea, nor can he doubt of the truth of the thing known.
Proof.—An idea that is true in us is one which is adequate in God, in so far as he is manifested by the nature of the human mind (II, cor.). Let us grant, therefore, that there is in God, in so far as he is manifested by the nature of the human mind, an adequate idea A. There must necessarily be also in God an idea of this idea, and this is referred to God in the same way as the idea A (by 20, the proof of which is general). But the idea A is, by hypothesis, referred to God in so far as he is expressed by the nature of the human mind. Therefore the idea of the idea A must also be referred to God in the same way. That is (II, cor.), this adequate idea of the idea A is in the mind that has the adequate idea A. Hence, he who has an adequate idea, or (34) truly knows something, must at the same time have an adequate idea of his knowledge, or, in other words, have true knowledge of it; that is (as is self-evident), he must at the same time be certain. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—In the scholium to prop. 21 I have explained what the idea of an idea is, but one should note that the preceding proposition is sufficiently evident of itself. No one who has a true idea is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest certainty; for to have a true idea means nothing else than to know something perfectly or in the best possible way. No one can doubt this, unless he thinks an idea is something passive like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of thinking, to wit, the act of understanding itself. Who, I ask, can know that he perceives anything, without first perceiving the thing? That is, who can know that he is certain of anything, without first being certain of that thing? Again, what norm of truth can there be more clear and cer-
tain than a true idea? Just as light reveals both itself and darkness, so truth is the norm both of itself and of what is false. In the foregoing I think I have given an answer to the following disputed points: First, if a true idea be distinguished from a false one only in that it is said to agree with its object, the true idea has no more reality or perfection than the false (since they are distinguished merely through an external relation), nor, consequently, has the man who has true ideas any more than the man who has only false ideas. Second, how does it happen that men have false ideas? And, third, how can one know certainly that one has ideas which agree with their objects? I think, I say, that I have now answered these disputed points. As regards the difference between a true idea and a false, it appears from prop. 35 that the one is related to the other as being to not being. The causes of falsity I have very clearly shown from prop. 19 to prop. 35 with its scholium. From these it is clear what the difference is between the man who has true ideas and the man who has only false. As to the last point, namely, how a man can know he has an idea that agrees with its object; this I have, just above, sufficiently and more than sufficiently shown to spring from the mere fact that he has an idea that agrees with its object—in other words, from the fact that truth is its own norm. Add to this that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is a part of the infinite intellect of God (11, cor.). Therefore it is as necessary that the clear and distinct ideas of the mind must be true as that the ideas of God must be true.84

Prop. 44. It is of the nature of reason to regard things, not as contingent, but as necessary.

Proof.—It is of the nature of reason to perceive
things truly (41), namely (I, *axiom* 6), as they are in themselves; that is (I, 29), not as contingent, but as necessary. Q. E. D.

**Corollary 1.**—Hence it follows that it is due only to imagination that we regard things, whether with respect to the past or to the future, as contingent.

**Scholium.**—How this happens I will briefly explain. I have shown above (17 and cor.) that the mind, even when things do not exist, always imagines them as present, unless there present themselves causes that exclude their present existence. Again, I have shown (18) that, if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies simultaneously, the mind, whenever, after that, it imagines either one of them, will forthwith recall also the other, that is, will regard both as present to it, unless there present themselves causes that exclude their present existence. Further, no one doubts that we imagine time because we imagine some bodies moving more slowly or more swiftly than, or equally fast with, others. Let us suppose, then, a boy, who has yesterday for the first time seen Peter in the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening, and to-day again sees Peter in the morning. It is evident from prop. 18 that as soon as he sees the morning light he will imagine the sun passing over the same part of the sky he saw it pass over on the day before, that is, he will imagine the entire day; and with the morning he will imagine Peter, with the noon Paul, and with the evening Simon. In other words, he will imagine the existence of Paul and of Simon in relation to future time. If, on the contrary, he sees Simon in the evening, he will refer Paul and Peter to past time, imagining them, that is, simultaneously with past time. This he will do the
more uniformly, the oftener he has seen them in this order. But if he ever happens to see, on some other evening, James instead of Simon, he will on the following morning imagine with the evening now Simon and now James, and not both together. For, by hypothesis, he has seen only the one or the other, not both together, simultaneously with the evening. His imagination will therefore waver, and with future evening time he will imagine now this one and now that. In other words, he will regard neither as certainly, but each as contingently, future. And there will be this same wavering of the imagination, if we imagine things that we conceive in the same way with relation to time past or present. Hence we will conceive as contingent things related as well to present time as to time past or future.

Corollary 2.—It is of the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity.

Proof.—It is of the nature of reason to regard things as necessary, and not as contingent (by the preceding proposition). Moreover, it perceives this necessity of things truly (41), that is (1, axiom 6), as it is in itself. But (I, 16) this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God. Therefore it is of the nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity. Add to this that the foundations of reason are the notions (38) which represent the properties common to all things, but do not represent (37) the essence of any particular thing; and which, therefore, must be conceived without any relation to time, under a certain form of eternity.86 Q. E. D.

Prop. 45. Every idea of a body, or of an individual thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.
Proof.—The idea of an individual thing, actually existing, necessarily involves both the essence and the existence of that thing (8, cor.). But individual things (I, 15) cannot be conceived without God; and since (6) they have for their cause God, in so far as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, the ideas of them (I, axiom 4) must necessarily involve the conception of their attribute, that is (I, def. 6), must involve the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—By existence I do not here mean duration, that is, existence in so far as it is abstractly conceived, and, as it were, a certain kind of quantity; I am speaking of existence in its very nature, which is attributed to individual things, because an infinity of things follow in infinite ways from the eternal necessity of God’s nature (I, 16); I am speaking, I say, of the very existence of individual things, in so far as they are in God. For, although each individual thing is determined by some other to a particular mode of existence, the force by which each persists in existing follows from the eternal necessity of the nature of God. On this point see I, 24, cor. 87

Prop. 46. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God, which is involved in every idea, is adequate and perfect.

Proof.—The proof of the preceding proposition is general, and, whether a thing be regarded as part or as whole, the idea of it, whether it be the idea of a part or of a whole, involves (by the preceding proposition) the eternal and infinite essence of God. Therefore, that which gives a knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God is common to all things, and is equally in the part and in the whole.
Hence (38) this knowledge must be adequate. 88

Q. E. D.

Prop. 47. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Proof.—The human mind has ideas (22) through which (23) it perceives, as actually existing, itself, its body (19), and (16, cor. 1, and 17) external bodies. Therefore (45 and 46) it has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—From this we see that God's infinite essence and his eternity are known to all. Moreover, since all things are in God and are conceived through God, it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge many truths that we may adequately know; and thus develop that third kind of knowledge of which I have spoken in 40, schol. 2, and of the excellence and utility of which I shall have occasion to speak in Part V. That men have not as clear a knowledge of God as of common notions arises from the fact that they cannot imagine God as they do bodies, and that they have connected the word God with images of the things that they are accustomed to see—a thing men can scarce avoid doing, as they are continually affected by external bodies. Many errors, indeed, consist in just this, that we apply the wrong names to things. For when one says that the lines which are drawn from the center of a circle to its circumference are unequal, one plainly means by a circle something else—for the time being, at least—than do mathematicians. Thus, when men make mistakes in reckoning, they have one set of figures in mind and another on the paper. Hence, if you consider their thought, they do not make mistakes; yet they seem to do so, because we think they have in mind the same figures as are on
the paper. If this were not so, we would not believe they made any mistake; just as I did not believe one mistaken, whom I heard lately proclaiming that his hall had flown into a neighbor's hen. His thought appeared to me sufficiently evident. Many controversies arise from the fact that men do not rightly express their meaning, or that they misconstrue the meaning of someone else. For in truth, while they flatly contradict each other, they are either thinking the same thing, or thinking of different things, so that the errors and absurdities they suppose in another have no existence.

Prop. 48. There is in the mind no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to this or that volition by a cause, which has itself been determined by another cause, this again by another, and so to infinity.

Proof.—The mind is a definite and determinate mode of thinking (11), therefore (I, 17, cor. 2) it cannot be a free cause of its own actions, that is, it cannot have an absolute power to will or not to will. It must be determined to this or that volition (I, 28) by a cause, which has itself been determined by another cause, this again by another, etc. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—In the same way it is proved that there is in the mind no absolute power of knowing, desiring, loving, etc. Whence it follows, these and similar faculties are either absolutely fictitious, or only metaphysical entities—universals—that we are accustomed to form from individuals. Thus, understanding and will are related to this or that idea and to this or that volition, as lapidity is related to this or that stone, or man to Peter or Paul. Why men think themselves free I have explained in the Appendix to Part I. Before I go further, it should be noted that I mean by
Prop. 49] THE MIND. 123

will, not desire, but the faculty of affirming and denying; I mean, I say, the faculty by which the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, and not the desire through which the mind seeks or avoids things. But having proved these faculties to be universal notions, which are not distinguished from the individuals of which we form them, it remains to inquire whether the volitions themselves are anything but just the ideas of things. It remains, I say, to inquire whether there is in the mind any other affirmation or negation than that involved in an idea, in that it is an idea. On this point see the following proposition, and, to avoid confounding ideas with pictures, see, also, def. 3 of this Part. For by ideas I do not mean such images as are formed at the back of the eye, or, if you please, in the middle of the brain, but the conceptions of thought.

Prop. 49. There is in the mind no volition, that is, no affirmation or negation, except that involved in an idea in that it is an idea.

Proof.—There is in the mind (by the preceding proposition) no absolute power to will or not to will, but only particular volitions, namely, this or that affirmation, and this or that negation. Let us conceive, therefore, some particular volition—for instance, the mode of thinking by which the mind affirms the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. This affirmation involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, it cannot be conceived without the idea of a triangle; for it is the same thing whether I say, A must involve the conception B, or A cannot be conceived without B. In the second place, this affirmation (axiom 3), without the idea of a triangle, cannot be. Therefore this affirma-
tion cannot, without the idea of a triangle, either be or be conceived. Moreover, this idea of a triangle must involve this same affirmation of the equality of its three angles to two right angles. Therefore, conversely, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation. Hence (def. 2) this affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing but that idea. What I have said of this volition is (since I took it at random) to be said also of every volition, namely, that it is nothing else than an idea. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—Will and understanding are one and the same thing.

Proof.—Will and understanding are nothing but particular volitions and ideas (48 and schol.). But a particular volition and a particular idea are (by the preceding proposition) one and the same thing. Therefore will and understanding are one and the same thing. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—In the foregoing I have set aside the cause commonly assigned to error. I have shown above, moreover, that falsity consists merely in the privation involved in mutilated and confused ideas. Hence a false idea, in so far as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we say, therefore, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and has no doubt of it, we do not say that he is certain, but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false, because no causes are present to make his imagination waver. On this point see 44, schol. Consequently, no matter how tenaciously we suppose a man to cling to what is false, we never speak of him as being certain. By certainty we mean something positive (43 and schol.) not merely the privation of doubt. By
the privation of certainty, on the other hand, we mean falsity. But for the fuller explication of the preceding proposition it remains: first, to give warning of certain dangers; second, to answer the objections that can be made to this my doctrine; and, third, I have thought it worth while to indicate certain useful results of this doctrine, that I may remove every scruple. I say certain of them; for the most important ones will be better understood from what I shall say in Part V.

I begin then with the first point, and I warn my readers to distinguish carefully between an idea—that is, a conception of the mind—and the images of things we imagine. It is necessary, in the second place, to distinguish between ideas and the words by which we indicate things. For these three, images, words, and ideas, are by many either wholly confounded, not distinguished with sufficient precision, or not distinguished with sufficient care. Hence they are wholly ignorant of this doctrine of the will, a doctrine the acceptance of which is truly necessary, as well for speculation as for the wise ordering of life. Of course, those who think that ideas consist in images formed in us on meeting bodies persuade themselves that the ideas of things of which we can form no resembling image are not ideas, but mere figments, which we frame by an exercise of free will. They look upon ideas, then, as passive pictures upon a panel; and, possessed by this prejudice, they do not see that an idea, in that it is an idea, involves affirmation or negation. Again, those who confound the words with the idea, or even with the affirmation involved in the idea, think that they can will something contrary to what they perceive, when they affirm or deny in words only something contrary to what
they perceive. He, however, will be able easily to shake off these prejudices, who fixes attention upon the nature of thought, in which the conception of extension is not involved in the least; and who, therefore, clearly understands that an idea (since it is a mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of a thing, nor in words. For the essence of words and of images is composed of bodily motions solely, and these do not involve at all the conception of thought.

These few words of admonition will suffice, so I pass to the aforesaid objections. The first of them is—and they think this undisputed—that the will extends farther than the understanding, and therefore is different from it. And the reason why they think the will extends farther than the understanding is, that they say they have found by experience that they do not need a greater power of assenting—affirming—or denying, in order to assent to an infinity of other things, which we do not perceive, than we now have; but that they do need a greater power of understanding. The will is therefore distinguished from the understanding in that the latter is made finite, and the former infinite. Second, the objection can be raised that experience seems to teach nothing more clearly than that we can suspend judgment and not assent to what we perceive. This is also confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived in so far as he perceives something, but only in so far as he assents or dissents. For example, he who imagines a winged horse does not, on that account, admit that there is a winged horse; that is, he does not, on that account, make a mistake, unless he at the same time admit there is a winged horse. Experience, therefore, seems to teach nothing more clearly than this, that the will, or
the power of giving assent, is free, and different from
the power of understanding. Third, the objection
can be made that one affirmation does not seem to
contain more reality than another; that is, we do not
seem to need a greater power for affirming to be true
what is true, than for affirming to be true something
that is false; but we do perceive that one idea has more
reality or perfection than another, for some ideas are
as much more perfect than others as are their objects
more excellent than the objects of those others.
This, too, seems to establish a difference between will
and understanding. Fourth, the objection can be
made: If a man does not act from free will, what will
happen if he be in equilibrium, like Buridan’s ass?
will he die of hunger and thirst? If I admit this,
I would seem to be thinking of an ass or the statue
of a man, and not of a man. If, on the other hand,
I deny it, I make him self-determining, and, conse-
quently, possessed of the power of going and doing
whatever he wants. Perhaps other objections than
these can be made, but as I am not obliged to crowd
in everything anyone can dream of, I shall set myself
to answer these objections only, and that as briefly as
I can.

In answer to the first, I say that I admit the will
extends farther than the understanding, if by the
understanding be meant clear and distinct ideas only;
but I deny that the will extends farther than the per-
ceptions, that is, the faculty of conceiving. Nor,
indeed, do I see why the faculty of willing should be
said to be infinite rather than the faculty of perceiving.
Just as by the faculty of willing we can affirm an
infinity of things (one after another, however, for we
cannot affirm an infinity of things simultaneously), so,
by the faculty of perceiving, we can perceive by sense or become aware of an infinity of bodies (of course, one after another). If it be said, there are an infinity of things that we cannot perceive, I retort, we cannot attain to these same things by any thought, nor, consequently, by any power of willing. It is objected, if God chose to make us perceive these things also, he would indeed have to give us a greater power of perceiving, but not a greater power of willing, than he has given us. This is the same as saying that if God should choose to make us comprehend an infinity of other beings, it would, indeed, be necessary for him to give us a greater understanding than he has given us, but not a more general idea of being with which to embrace this infinity of beings. For we have shown the will to be a universal, that is, an idea by which we explain all particular volitions, or, rather, what is common to them all. When, therefore, persons believe that this idea common to all volitions—this universal idea—is a faculty, no wonder they say this faculty extends infinitely beyond the limits of the understanding. A universal is predicated equally of one, of several, or of an infinity of individuals.

The second objection I answer by denying that we have a free power of suspending judgment. When we say that one is suspending judgment, we say only that he sees he does not adequately perceive a thing. Hence suspending judgment is really perception and not free will. To understand this clearly, let us conceive a boy imagining a horse, and not perceiving anything else. Since this image involves the existence of the horse (17, cor.), and the boy does not perceive anything that denies the existence of the horse, he will necessarily regard the horse as present, nor will
ne be able to doubt its existence, although he is not certain of it. This we daily experience in dreams, but I do not believe there is anyone who thinks that he, while he is dreaming, has a free power of suspending judgment on the things he is dreaming, and of bringing it about that he should not dream he sees the things he is dreaming he sees. Nevertheless, it happens that even in dreams we suspend judgment, as when we dream that we are dreaming. Furthermore, I admit that no one makes a mistake in so far as he perceives; that is, I admit that the imaginations of the mind, in themselves considered, involve no error (17, schol.); but I deny that a man, in so far as he perceives, makes no affirmation. What is it to perceive a winged horse, if not to affirm that a horse has wings? For if the mind perceived nothing but the winged horse, it would regard it as present; and it would have no cause to doubt of its existence, nor any power of dissenting, unless the image of the winged horse were connected with an idea that denied the existence of said horse, or unless it perceived its idea of a winged horse to be inadequate, in which case it would either necessarily deny the existence of said horse or necessarily doubt it.

With this I think I have answered the third objection also; namely, in showing that will is a universal, predicated of all ideas, and that it signifies only what is common to all ideas, that is, an affirmation. Of this, consequently, the adequate essence, in so far as it is thus abstractly conceived, must be in every idea, and for this reason must be the same in all. But this is not true of it in so far as it is considered as constituting the essence of an idea, for in so far particular affirmations differ from each other as much as do ideas
themselves. For example, the affirmation involved in the idea of a circle differs as much from that involved in the idea of a triangle as the idea of a circle does from the idea of a triangle. Again, I deny absolutely that we need an equal power of thinking to affirm that to be true which is true, and to affirm that to be true which is false. These two affirmations, from the point of view of the mind, are related to each other as being to not-being, for there is in ideas nothing positive that constitutes the essence of falsity (35 and schol., and 47, schol.). One must note, therefore, especially, how easily we make mistakes when we confound universals with particulars, and entities of the reason and abstractions with real things.

Finally, as concerns the fourth objection, I say that I quite admit that a man in such a state of equilibrium (one, namely, who perceives nothing but hunger and thirst, and such food and drink placed at equal distances from him) will perish of hunger and thirst. If I be asked, is not such a man to be regarded as rather an ass than a man? I say, I do not know; just as I do not know how one should regard a man that hangs himself, or how one should regard children, fools, those of unsound mind, etc.

It remains to indicate how much the knowledge of this doctrine contributes to the service of life, and this we shall easily comprehend from the following: First, it is of value in that it teaches us that we act solely according to God's decree, and are participants in the divine nature; and this the more, the more perfect the actions we perform, and the better and better we comprehend God. Hence this doctrine not only sets the soul completely at rest, but also teaches us in what our highest felicity or blessedness
consists, to wit, only in the knowledge of God, which leads us to do only those things that love and piety recommend. Thus we see clearly how far from a true estimate of virtue are those who expect God to honor them with the highest rewards for their virtue and good actions, as though for the extremest slavery—as if virtue and the service of God were not felicity itself and the completest freedom. Second, it is of value in that it teaches us how to behave with regard to those things which depend upon fortune, and which are not within our power, that is, with regard to those things that do not follow from our nature. It teaches us, namely, to look forward to and to endure either aspect of fortune with equanimity, just because all things follow from the eternal decree of God, by the same necessity with which it follows from the essence of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles. Third, this doctrine is of service to social life, in that it teaches to hate no one, to despise, to ridicule, to be angry at no one, to envy no one. It is of service, further, in that it teaches each one to be content with what he has, and to aid his neighbor, not from womanish pity, partiality, or superstition, but solely under the guidance of reason, according to the demands of the time and the case. This I shall show in Part III. Fourth, this doctrine is of no little advantage to the state, in that it shows how citizens ought to be governed and led; namely, not so as to act like slaves, but so as to do freely what is best.

With this I have fulfilled the task I set myself in this scholium, and here I bring to a close this my second Part. In it I think I have explained the nature of the human mind and its properties suffi-
ciently at length, and, so far as the difficulty of the subject admits of it, with clearness. And I have set forth truths from which can be inferred, as will in part appear from what follows, much that is very excellent and exceedingly useful, and that it is necessary to know.
PART III.

OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS.

Most of those who have written on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating not of natural things that obey the general laws of nature, but of things that lie outside of nature. Indeed, they appear to conceive of man in nature as a realm within a realm. For they regard man as rather disturbing than following the order of nature, as having absolute power over his actions, and as being determined solely by himself. Furthermore, human infirmity and inconstancy they attribute, not to the general power of nature, but to I know not what defect in human nature, which, accordingly, they bewail, deride, despise, or, more commonly, denounce; and he who has learned to carp the most eloquently or the most ingeniously at the infirmity of the human mind is regarded as a prophet. There have not been lacking, it is true, distinguished men (to whose labor and industry I confess I owe much), who have written many excellent things concerning the right conduct of life, and have given to mortals counsels full of wisdom; but yet no one, so far as I know, has determined the nature and strength of the emotions, and what the mind can do toward keeping them within bounds. I know, indeed, that the illustrious Descartes, although he believed the mind to have absolute power over its
actions, yet endeavor to explain human emotions by their first* causes, and to show how the mind can gain absolute control over the emotions; but in my opinion he shows nothing but the acuteness of his own great mind, as I shall prove in the proper place, for I wish to return to those who would rather denounce or deride human emotions and actions than comprehend them. To these it will no doubt seem strange that I undertake to treat of human defects and follies by the geometrical method, and wish to prove by rigid reasoning what they proclaim to be inconsistent with reason, unmeaning, absurd, and dreadful. But my reason is this: nothing happens in nature that can be attributed to a defect in it; for nature is always the same, and its virtue or power of acting is everywhere one and the same; that is, the laws and rules of nature, according to which all things come to pass and undergo their changes of form, are everywhere and always the same; consequently there should be also one and the same method of comprehending the nature of things of whatever kind, namely, through the general laws and rules of nature. Therefore the emotions of hate, anger, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and power of nature as do all other particular things; and hence own to definite causes, through which they are comprehended, and have definite properties as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing in the mere contemplation of which we take delight. I shall treat, there-

*Descartes distinguished between the proximate cause of the passions—the movement of the pineal gland by the animal spirits—and their first causes, by which he meant the objects which act upon the senses and thus give rise to passions ("Les Passions de l’Ame," Art. 51).
fore, of the nature and force of the emotions, and of
the power which the mind has over them, by the same
method as, in what precedes, I have treated of God
and of the mind; and I shall consider human actions
and appetites just as though I were dealing with lines,
surfaces, or solids.

Definitions.91

1. I call a cause adequate, when through it its effect
can be clearly and distinctly perceived. On the other
hand, I call inadequate or partial, one whose effect
cannot be comprehended through it alone.

2. When there takes place anything in us or outside
of us, of which we are the adequate cause, that is (by
the preceding definition), when there follows from our
nature anything in us or outside of us which can
be clearly and distinctly comprehended through our
nature alone, I say that we are active. But when, on
the other hand, there takes place anything in us, or
when anything follows from our nature, of which we are
only the partial cause, I say that we are passive.

3. By emotion I mean modifications of the body, by
which the body's power of acting is increased or
diminished, assisted or restrained, and also the ideas
of these modifications.

If, therefore, we can be the adequate cause of any one
of these modifications, by emotion I mean an action; oth-
otherwise I mean a passion.

Postulates.

1. The human body can be affected in many ways
by which its power of acting is increased or dimin-
ished, and in still other ways which render its power
of acting neither greater nor less,
This postulate or axiom rests upon postulate 1 and lemmas 5 and 7, q. v. after II, 13.

2. The human body can undergo many changes, and nevertheless retain the impressions or traces of objects (II, postulate 5), and, consequently, the same images of things. For the definition of these, see II, 17, schol.

Prop. 1. Our mind is in some respects active and in some respects passive: in so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive.

Proof.—Some of the ideas in every human mind are adequate, while others are fragmentary and confused (II, 40, schol.). Now the ideas that are adequate in any mind are adequate in God in so far as he constitutes the essence of that mind (II, 11, cor.); and those that are inadequate in a mind are adequate in God (by the same corollary), not in so far as he contains within himself merely the essence of that mind, but in so far as he at the same time contains within himself the minds of other things. Again, granted any idea, some effect must necessarily follow (I, 36), and of this effect God is the adequate cause (def. 1), not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by the aforesaid idea (II, 9).

But of an effect, of which God is the cause in so far as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in a given mind, that mind is the adequate cause (II, 11, cor.). Hence our mind (def. 2), in so far as it has adequate ideas, is necessarily active. This was the first point. In the second place, a man's mind is not the adequate, but a partial, cause of anything that necessarily follows from an idea that is adequate in God, not in so far as he contains merely the mind of
that man, but in so far as he contains together with it also the minds of other things (II, 11, cor.). Hence (def. 2), in so far as the mind has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive. This was the second point. Therefore our mind, etc. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that, the more inadequate ideas the mind has, the greater the number of passions to which it is subject; and, on the other hand, the greater the number of its adequate ideas, the greater the number of its activities.

Prop. 2. The body cannot determine the mind to think, nor can the mind determine the body to motion or rest, or any other state, if there be any other.

Proof.—Every mode of thinking has God for its cause in so far as he is a thinking thing, and not in so far as he is expressed by some other attribute (II, 6). Hence whatever determines the mind to think is a mode of thought and not a mode of extension; that is (II, def. 1) it is not a body. This was the first point. In the second place, the motion or rest of one body must be due to another body, which in turn was determined to motion or rest by another, and absolutely everything that takes place in a body must have had its source in God in so far as he is considered as affected by some mode of extension, and not by some mode of thought (II, 6); in other words, it cannot have its source in the mind, which (II, 11) is a mode of thought. This was the second point. Therefore, the body cannot determine the mind to think, etc. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—This may be more clearly comprehended from what I have said in II, 7, schol., to wit, that the mind and the body are one and the same thing, conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under
that of extension. Whence it happens that the order or concatenation of things is the same, whether we conceive nature under this attribute or that; and that, consequently, the order of the things done and suffered by our body is by nature the same as the order of the actions and passions of the mind. This is also evident from the proof I have given of prop. 12, Part II.

These arguments leave no room for doubt, but nevertheless I scarcely think I can induce men to weigh them with an unprejudiced mind, unless I support the doctrine by an appeal to experience, so firmly are men persuaded that the body is set in motion and is brought to rest solely at the mind's good pleasure, and performs a multitude of actions which depend only on the mind's choice and ability to think. For as yet no one has determined of what the body is capable; in other words, experience has as yet taught no one what the body can do according to the laws of nature, considered merely as corporeal nature, and what it cannot do unless it be determined by the mind. For no one has as yet a sufficiently accurate knowledge of the structure of the body to be able to explain all its functions; to say nothing of the fact that we observe in brutes many actions that far surpass human sagacity, and that somnambulists do a great many things while asleep that they would not dare to do when awake; which sufficiently proves that the body, in accordance with the laws of its own nature solely, can do much that its mind wonders at.

Again, no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the body, nor how many degrees of motion it can impart to the body, and how swiftly it can move it. Hence it follows that when men say
that this or that action of the body has its source in the mind, which controls the body, they do not know what they are saying, and merely confess in high-sounding words that they are ignorant of the true cause of that action and do not wonder at it.

They will object that, whether they do or do not know by what means the mind moves the body, yet they know by experience that if the human mind were not capable of thinking, the body would be motionless. Furthermore, that they know by experience that it is within the power of the mind alone to speak or to remain silent, and to do many other things which, consequently, they believe to depend upon the mind's decree.

But, as regards the first point, I ask those who urge this objection whether experience does not also show that if the body remains motionless, the mind is incapable of thinking? For when the body comes to rest in sleep, the mind slumbers with it, and has not the power of thinking it has when awake. Again, I think everyone knows by experience that the mind is not always equally capable of thinking about the same object; but, according as the body is the better adapted to having the image of this or that object excited in it, the mind is the more capable of contemplating this or that object. It will be objected that one cannot, from the laws of nature, when nature is regarded merely as corporeal, deduce the causes of buildings, paintings, and things of this sort, which are due solely to human skill, nor could the human body, unless it were determined and guided by the mind, build a temple. But I have already shown that those who reason thus do not know what the body can do, or what can be deduced from a mere contemplation of
its nature, and that they do know by experience that a
great many things take place merely according to the
laws of nature, that they never would have believed
could take place except under the direction of the
mind. Such are the acts performed by somnambulists
during sleep—acts which they themselves wonder at
when awake. I would, moreover, call attention to
the structure of the human body, which vastly sur-
passes in ingenuity anything constructed by human
skill, to say nothing of the truth, proved above, that
an infinity of things must follow from nature con-
sidered under any attribute whatever.
And as regards the second point, surely the condi-
tion of human affairs would be much more satisfactory
if it were as much within man's power to be silent as
to speak. But experience gives sufficient and more
than sufficient proof of the fact that there is nothing
less under a man's control than his tongue, nor is there
anything of which a man is less capable than of restrain-
ing his impulses. This is the reason most persons
believe that we are free only in doing those things to
which we are impelled by slight desires, for the im-
pulse to do such things can be easily checked by the
memory of some other thing of which we often think;
but that we are by no means free in doing those things
to which we are impelled by strong emotion, which
cannot be checked by the memory of some other
thing. But, had they not had experience of the
fact that we do many things which we afterward
regret, and that we often, when we are harassed by
conflicting emotions, see the better and follow the
worse, nothing would prevent them from believing
that we are always free in our actions. Thus the
infant believes it desires milk of its own free will; the
angry child that it is free in seeking revenge, and the timid that it is free in taking to flight. Again, a drunken man believes that he says of his own free will things he afterward, when sober, wishes he had left unsaid; so also an insane man, a garrulous woman, a child, and very many others of the sort, believe they speak of their own free will, while, nevertheless, they are unable to control their impulse to talk. Thus experience itself shows, no less clearly than reason, that men think themselves free only because they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes which determine them. It shows, moreover, that the mind's decisions are nothing but its impulses which vary with the varying condition of the body. For everyone regulates his actions as his emotions dictate; and those who are harassed by conflicting emotions do not know what they want; while those who are not controlled by any emotion are driven hither and thither by the slightest motive. All this certainly shows clearly that the mind's decision, as well as its impulse and the determining of the body, all are by nature simultaneous, or rather all are one and the same thing, which, when it is considered under and expressed by the attribute of thought, we call a decision, and when it is considered under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the laws of motion and rest, we call a determining. This will be still clearer from what I shall say later. But the point I would have you especially note here is that we cannot do anything by a decision of the mind unless we remember it. We cannot, for example, speak a word unless we remember that word. Moreover, it is not within the free power of the mind to remember a thing or to forget it. Hence it is believed that this
alone is within the power of the mind: we can by the mere decision of the mind hold our peace concerning a thing we remember, or speak of it. But when we dream that we are speaking, we think we are speaking because our mind has freely decided to speak, and yet we are not speaking, or if we are speaking, it is due to a spontaneous motion of the body. Again, we dream that we are concealing things from men, and that by the same decision of the mind as that by which, when we are awake, we choose to hold our peace concerning the things we know. Finally we dream that, by the decision of our mind, we are doing things we do not dare to do when awake.

In view of all this I should very much like to know whether there are in the mind two sorts of decisions, the one imaginary and the other free? If such an absurdity is out of the question one must necessarily admit that this decision of the mind, which is thought to be free, is not distinguishable from imagination or memory, and is nothing but the affirmation necessarily involved in an idea, in that it is an idea (II, 49). Hence these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity as the ideas of things actually existing. Those, therefore, who think that they speak, or hold their peace, or do anything whatever, by the free decision of the mind, are dreaming with open eyes.93

PROP. 3. The acts of the mind spring solely from adequate ideas; its passions depend wholly upon those that are inadequate.

Proof.—The first thing that constitutes the essence of the mind is nothing but the idea of the actually existent body (II, 11 and 13), and this idea (II, 15) is composed of many others, some of which (II, 38,
cor.) are adequate, and some inadequate (II, 29, cor.). Hence everything that follows from the nature of the mind, and of which the mind is the proximate cause, through which it must be comprehended, must necessarily follow from an idea either adequate or inadequate. But in so far as the mind has inadequate ideas it is necessarily passive (1). Therefore the acts of the mind follow solely from adequate ideas, and the mind is passive only in that it has inadequate ideas. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—Thus we see that passions cannot be attributed to the mind except in so far as it contains something that involves negation; that is, except in so far as it is considered as a part of nature, which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived by itself, and independently of other parts. By similar reasoning I might show that passions are to be attributed to all individual things in the same way as to the mind, and that they cannot be perceived in any other way, but it is my purpose to treat only of the human mind.94

Prop. 4. Nothing can be destroyed save by an external cause.

Proof.—This proposition is self-evident, for the definition of a thing affirms the essence of that thing, but does not deny it; in other words, it posits the essence of the thing, but does not remove it. As long, therefore, as we give our attention merely to the thing itself, and not to external causes, we shall be able to find in it nothing that can destroy it.95

Q. E. D.

Prop. 5. Things have contrary natures, that is, they cannot exist in the same object, in so far as the one can destroy the other.
Proof.—If they could mutually agree, or could exist together in the same object, there could be in the said object something that could destroy it, which (by the preceding proposition) is absurd. Therefore, etc. Q. E. D.

Prop. 6. Each thing, in so far as in it lies, strives to persevere in its being.

Proof.—Particular things are modes, by which God's attributes are expressed in a definite and determinate manner (I, 25, cor.); that is (I, 34), things which express in a definite and determinate way God's power—that by which he is and acts. A thing, furthermore, has not in itself anything by which it can be destroyed, or which can annul its existence (4); on the contrary it is (by the preceding proposition) opposed to everything that can annul its existence. Therefore, in so far as it can, and in so far as in it lies, it strives to persevere in its being. Q. E. D.

Prop. 7. The endeavor with which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself.

Proof.—Granted the essence of anything, certain things necessarily follow (I, 36), nor are things able to do anything but what necessarily follows from their nature as determined (I, 29). Hence the power or endeavor of each thing, that by which the thing either alone or with others does or strives to do something, in other words (6) the power or endeavor by which it strives to persevere in its being, is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself. Q. E. D.

Prop. 8. The endeavor with which each thing strives to persevere in its being does not involve any finite time, but indefinite time.

Proof.—If it involved a limited time that deter-
mined the duration of the thing, then from the very power by which the thing exists it would follow that the thing, after that limited time, could not exist, but would have to be destroyed. But this (4) is absurd. Hence the endeavor by which a thing exists does not involve any definite time; but on the contrary, since (4) if no external cause destroy it the thing will always continue to exist through the same power through which it now exists, this endeavor involves indefinite time. Q. E. D.

Prop. 9. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas, strives to persevere indefinitely in its being, and is conscious of this its endeavor.

Proof.—The essence of the mind is composed of adequate and inadequate ideas (3), and hence (7) both in so far as it has the former and in so far as it has the latter it strives to persist in its being, and that (8) indefinitely. But since the mind (II, 23) is necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the modifications of the body, it is (7) conscious of its endeavor. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—This endeavor, when it is referred to the mind alone, is called will, but when it is referred to the mind and the body both, it is called impulse. It is, therefore, nothing but the very essence of man, from whose nature necessarily follow those actions that subserve his preservation. Hence man is conditioned to the performance of these actions. Again, there is no difference between impulse and desire, except that we usually speak of men as having desires when they are conscious of their impulses, and consequently desire may be defined as impulse accompanied by a consciousness of the
same. Thus it is evident from all these considerations that we do not endeavor after, choose, strive for, or desire anything because we judge it to be good; but, on the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because we endeavor after, choose, strive for, or desire it.

PROP. 10. There cannot be in our mind an idea which excludes the existence of our body, but such an idea is contrary to it.

Proof.—Anything that can destroy our body cannot exist in it (5), and hence the idea of that thing cannot be in God in so far as he has an idea of our body (II, 9, cor.); in other words (II, 11 and 13) the idea of that thing cannot be in our mind; but, on the contrary, since (II, 11 and 13), the first thing that constitutes the essence of the mind is the idea of a body actually existing, it is the first and the chief endeavor of our mind (7) to affirm the existence of our body. Therefore an idea that denies the existence of our body is contrary to our mind, etc.98 Q. E. D.

PROP. 11. Whatever increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our body's power of acting, the idea of that thing increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our mind's power of thinking.

Proof.—This proposition is evident from II, 7, or from II, 14.

Scholium.—Thus we see that the mind can undergo great changes, passing now to a greater now to a lesser degree of perfection, and these passions explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain. By pleasure, therefore, I shall mean in what follows a passion in which the mind passes to a greater degree of perfection. By pain I shall mean a passion in which it passes to a lesser degree of perfection. Again, I call the emotion of pleasure, as referred to both mind and body, titillation or liveliness;
pain so considered I call suffering or melancholy. But it should be noted that titillation and suffering are predicated of a man when one part of him is more affected than the rest; and liveliness and melancholy when all parts are affected alike. What desire is I have explained in the scholium to prop. 9 of this Part. I recognize no primary emotion save these three, and shall show in what follows that the other emotions spring from these three. But before going further permit me here to give a fuller explanation of prop. 10, that it may be clearly understood how an idea may be contrary to an idea.

In the scholium to prop. 17 of Part II, I have shown that the idea which constitutes the essence of the mind involves the existence of the body as long as the body itself exists. In the second place, from what I have proved in the corollary to prop. 8 of Part II, and in its scholium, it follows that the present existence of our mind depends solely upon this, to wit, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Finally, I have shown (II, 17, and 18 with its schol.) that the power of the mind, by which it imagines and remembers things, also depends upon this, namely, that it involves the actual existence of the body. Hence it follows that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are done away with, just as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body. But the cause of the mind's ceasing to affirm this existence of the body cannot be the mind itself (4), nor can it be the body's ceasing to exist. For (II, 6) the cause of the mind's affirming the existence of the body is not the body's having begun to exist; and, therefore, by the same reasoning, it does not cease to affirm the existence
of the body because the body ceases to exist; but (II, 17) that it does this is due to another idea which excludes the present existence of our body, and, consequently, of our mind, and which is, therefore, contrary to the idea that constitutes the essence of our mind.99

Definitions of the Emotions.100

1. Desire is the very essence of man, in so far as this is conceived as determined to some action by any one of his modifications.

2. Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection.

3. Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection.

4. Wonder is the conception of a thing, in which the mind remains fixed, because this particular conception has no connection with its other conceptions.

5. Contempt is the conception of a thing which impresses the mind so little that the mind is moved by the presence of the thing rather to the conceiving of what is not in the thing, than of what is in it.

6. Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

7. Hate is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

8. Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of something which is per accidens* the cause of the pleasure.

9. Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which is per accidens the cause of the pain.

* I. e., the thing in question happens under given circumstances to be the cause of the pleasure.
10. Devotion is love toward one whom we admire.

11. Derision is pleasure, which has its source in the fact that we conceive something we despise to be in the thing we hate.

12. Hope is inconstant pleasure arising from the idea of something future or past, of the event of which we have some doubt.

13. Fear is inconstant pain arising from the idea of something future or past, of the event of which we have some doubt.

14. Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of a thing future or past, regarding which cause for doubt has been removed.

15. Despair is pain arising from the idea of a thing future or past, regarding which cause for doubt has been removed.

16. Joy is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of something past that has turned out contrary to expectation.

17. Disappointment is pain, accompanied by the idea of a thing past which has turned out contrary to expectation.*

18. Commiseration is pain, accompanied by the idea of misfortune which has happened to another, whom we conceive to be like ourselves.

19. Approbation is love toward one who has benefited another.

20. Indignation is hate toward one who has harmed another.

21. Over-estimation is thinking too highly of one, by reason of our love for him.

* I take Mr. Pollock's rendering of the words conscientia morsus.
22. *Under-estimation* is thinking too little of one because we hate him.

23. *Envy* is hate, in so far as it leads a man to be pained by another’s good fortune, and to take pleasure in another’s misfortune.

24. *Sympathy* is love, in so far as it leads a man to take pleasure in another’s good fortune, and to be pained by another’s misfortune.

25. *Self-satisfaction* is pleasure arising from a man’s contemplation of himself and his power of acting.

26. *Humility* is pain arising from a man’s contemplation of his own impotence or feebleness.

27. *Repentance* is pain, accompanied by the idea of some deed that we think we have done by the free decree of our mind.

28. *Pride* is thinking too highly of one’s self, by reason of self-love.

29. *Self-abasement* is thinking too little of one’s self because of pain.

30. *Glorying* is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of some one of our actions which we conceive others as praising.

31. *Shame* is pain, accompanied by the idea of some one of our actions which we conceive others as blaming.

32. *Longing* is desire or appetite for the possession of something, fostered by the memory of the thing, and at the same time restrained by the memories of other things which exclude the existence of the thing longed for.

33. *Emulation* is the desire for something, produced in us by the fact that we conceive others to have the same desire.

34. *Thankfulness* or *Gratitude* is the desire, or zeal
of love, with which we endeavor to benefit him who, from a like emotion of love, has conferred a benefit upon us.

35. *Benevolence* is the desire of benefiting him whom we pity.

36. *Anger* is the desire with which we are incited, from hate, to injure him whom we hate.

37. *Revenge* is the desire with which, from a reciprocal hate, we are incited to harm him who, from a like emotion, has done us an injury.

38. *Cruelty* or *Barbarity* is the desire with which anyone is inclined to harm him whom we love or whom we pity.

39. *Timidity* is the desire to escape a greater evil, which we fear, by means of a less.

40. *Boldness* is the desire with which one is incited to some undertaking which involves peril that his equals fear to undergo.

41. *Cowardice* is attributed to him whose desire is restrained by fear of a peril that his equals dare to meet.

42. *Consternation* is attributed to him whose desire to escape evil is restrained by astonishment at the evil he fears.

43. *Courtesy* or *Modesty* is the desire of doing what pleases men, and of avoiding what displeases them.

44. *Ambition* is the immoderate desire of fame.

45. *Luxury* is the immoderate desire or love of feasting.

46. *Drunkenness* is the immoderate desire and love of drinking.

47. *Avarice* is the immoderate desire and love of riches.

48. *Lust* is the desire and love of sexual intercourse.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA.

General Definition of the Emotions.

An emotion, which is called a passion (pathema) of the soul, is a confused idea, through which the mind affirms the energy of existence possessed by its body, or any part of it, to be greater or less than it was before; and through the presence of which the mind itself is determined to this thought rather than to that.
PART IV.

OF HUMAN BONDAGE, OR OF THE STRENGTH OF THE EMOTIONS.

PREFACE.

Man's inability to moderate and restrain the emotions I call Bondage; for a man who is subject to the emotions is not his own master, but is ruled by fortune, and is so in her power that he is often forced, although he sees what is better for him, to follow that which is worse. The cause of this, and, furthermore, what is good or evil in the emotions, I propose to show in this Part. But before I begin I wish to say a few words, by way of preface, concerning perfection and imperfection, and concerning good and evil.

One who has undertaken to make something and has brought it to completion will call the thing perfect; and not he alone, but everyone who rightly knows, or thinks he knows, the purpose of the author of this work and its object. For example, if one sees some work (which I suppose to be not yet completed), and knows that it is the object of the author of this work to build a house, he will call the house imperfect, and, on the other hand, he will call it perfect, as soon as he sees the work carried through to the conclusion which its author determined to give it. But if one sees some work, the like of which he never saw, and does not know the purpose of the maker, he surely cannot know whether that work be perfect or
imperfect. This appears to have been the first meaning of these words.* But after men began to form general ideas, and to devise patterns of houses, buildings, towers, etc., and to prefer some patterns of things to others, it came to pass that everyone called that perfect which he saw to be in harmony with the general idea he had formed of a thing of that kind; and, on the other hand, called imperfect what he saw not to be in harmony with the pattern he had conceived, although it had been completed quite according to the intention of the maker. This appears to be the reason why even the things of nature, which have not been made by human hands, are commonly called perfect or imperfect. For men are wont to form general ideas of natural things as well as of artificial, and these they hold as patterns of things, as it were, and believe that nature (which they regard as doing nothing without some purpose) looks upon them, and sets them before itself as patterns. When, therefore, they see something take place in nature which is not in harmony with the pattern they had conceived of a thing of that kind, they think that nature itself has failed or has blundered, and has left that thing imperfect. We see, then, that men have accustomed themselves to call the things of nature perfect or imperfect rather from prejudice than from a true knowledge of them. I have shown in the Appendix to Part I. that nature does not act with any purpose in view; for that eternal and infinite Being that we call God or Nature acts by the same necessity by which he exists. I have shown (I, 16) that he acts from the same neces-

*The force of this is lost in translating. Perfectum is the participle of perfricere, which means (1) to accomplish; (2) to bring to completion, and thus to make perfect.—Tr.
sity of nature as that from which he exists. The reason, therefore, or cause, why God or Nature acts, and why he exists, is one and the same. As, therefore, there is no final cause of his existing, there is also no final cause of his acting; but, as of his existing, so also of his acting, there is no efficient cause, and no end. Moreover, what is called the final cause is nothing but human impulse itself, in so far as it is considered as the efficient or determining cause of something. For example, when we say that the living in it was the final cause of this or that house, we mean only that a man, because he formed a conception of the pleasures of domestic life, had an impulse to build a house. Hence, the living in it, in so far as it is considered as final cause, is nothing but this particular impulse, which, in truth, is the efficient cause; and it is regarded as the first, because men are commonly ignorant of the causes of their impulses. For they are, as I have already often said, conscious, indeed, of their actions and impulses, but ignorant of the causes through which they are determined to any particular impulse. As for the common opinion that nature sometimes fails or blunders, and produces imperfect things, I class this with the fictions of which I have treated in the Appendix to Part I. Perfection and imperfection, therefore, are really mere modes of thinking; that is, notions, which we are accustomed to frame because we compare with one another individuals of the same species or genus. For this reason I have said above (II, def. 6) that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing. For we are accustomed to refer all the individual things in nature to one genus, which we call the highest genus; that is, to the notion of being, which pertains to all without exception of
the individual things in nature. In so far, therefore, as we refer the individual things in nature to this genus, and compare them with one another, and ascertain that some have more being or reality than others, in so far do we say that some are more perfect than others; and in so far as we attribute to them anything that involves negation, as limit, end, impotence, etc., in so far do we call them imperfect, because they do not impress our minds as much as those we call perfect, and not because they lack something that belongs to them, or because nature has blundered. For nothing belongs to the nature of anything, except what follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause; and whatever follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause necessarily comes to pass.

As for good and evil, these terms indicate no positive element in things, considered, that is to say, in themselves. They are only modes of thinking, or notions, which we form because we compare things with one another. For one and the same thing can be at the same time good, bad, and indifferent. For example, music is good for the melancholy man, and bad for him who mourns; while for the deaf man it is neither good nor bad. But, although this is so, we should, nevertheless, retain these terms. For since we desire to form an idea of man—a pattern, as it were, of human nature, upon which we may gaze—it will be of service to us to retain these terms in the sense in which I have spoken. Therefore, I shall hereafter mean by "good" what we certainly know to be a means by the aid of which we may come to resemble more and more the pattern of human nature that we have set before us. By "evil," on the other
hand, I shall mean what we certainly know hinders
us from reflecting that pattern. Furthermore, I shall
say that men are more perfect or less perfect, in
proportion as they resemble more or less closely this
pattern. For it should specially be noted that when I
speak of a man as passing from a less to a greater
perfection, and conversely, I do not mean that he is
changed from one essence or form to another (a horse,
for example, is as much destroyed by being changed
into a man, as by being changed into an insect); but
I mean that we conceive his power of acting, in so far
as we comprehend this through his own nature, to
be increased or diminished. Finally, by perfection,
taken generally, I shall mean reality, as I have said;
that is, the essence of anything, in so far as it exists
and operates in a definite manner, without regard to
its duration. For no particular thing can be said to
be more perfect from the fact that it has continued
longer in existence. Indeed, the duration of things
cannot be determined from their essence, seeing that
the essence of things involves no definite and deter-
minate time of existence. But each thing, whether it
be more perfect or less, will always be able to con-
tinue to exist with the same force with which it
begins to exist; so that all things are, in this respect,
equal. 101

Definitions.

1. By good I mean what we certainly know to be
useful to us.

2. By evil I mean what we certainly know hinders
us from obtaining possession of some good.

(Concerning these, see the preceding preface, near
the end.)

3. Individual things I call contingent, in so far as, so
long as we pay attention merely to their essence, we
discover nothing that necessarily affirms their exist-
ence or that necessarily excludes it.

4. These individual things I call possible, in so far
as, while we pay attention to the causes by which they
must be produced, we do not know whether these
causes are determined to their production.

(In I, 33, schol. 1, I made no distinction between
possible and contingent, because there was no need
there to distinguish them so carefully.)

5. By contrary emotions I shall mean in what follows
those that draw man in different directions, even
though they belong to the same genus, as luxury and
avarice, which are species of love. These are con-
trary, not in their nature but per accidens.*

6. What I mean by emotion toward a thing future,
present, or past, I have explained in III, 18, schols. 1
and 2, q. v. †

(But one must here note that, as in the case of
space, so also in the case of time, we cannot distinctly
conceive distance save up to a certain definite limit.
That is, just as we are accustomed to conceive as
equally distant from us, and, hence, as though they
were in the same plane, all those objects which are
more than two hundred feet away from us, or the dis-
tance of which from the place in which we are is
greater than that we distinctly conceive; so also we

*See note to definitions of the emotions, 8.
† In schol. 1, a thing past or future is defined as one by which
"we have been or shall be affected." The image of such a thing
is said to affect the body as if the thing itself were present; though
the emotions arising from such images are declared to be inconstant
so long as one is not certain of the issue of the thing. In schol. 2
are given definitions of Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and
Disappointment. See definitions of the emotions, 12 to 17.—Tr.
conceive as equally far from the present all objects whose time of existing is distant from the present by a greater interval than that we are accustomed distinctly to conceive, and we refer them, as it were, to the same moment of time.)

7. By the end, for the sake of which we do anything, I mean the impulse.

8. By virtue and power I mean the same thing; that is (III, 7), virtue, in so far as it relates to man, is the very essence or nature of man, in so far as he has the power of effecting certain things that can be comprehended solely through the laws of his own nature.102

Axiom.

There is in nature no individual thing which is not exceeded in power and strength by some other thing. Than each thing there is always another thing more powerful, by which it can be destroyed.

APPENDIX.103

What I have said in this part concerning the right method of living has not been so arranged that it can be seen at a glance, but I have proved what I have advanced piecemeal, as I was best able to deduce one thing from another. Accordingly, I will here gather up my remarks and reduce them to the form of a summary.

I.

All our strivings, or desires, follow in such a way from the necessity of our nature that they can be comprehended either through it alone, as through their proximate cause, or through our being a part of
nature, which cannot be adequately conceived by itself without other individuals.

II.

The desires, which follow from our nature in such a way that they can be comprehended through it alone, are such as are referred to the mind, in so far as it is conceived as consisting of adequate ideas. The other desires, however, are not referred to the mind, except in so far as it conceives things inadequately, and their strength and growth must be defined, not as human power, but as that of the things which are outside of us. Hence, the former are properly called actions, the latter passions; for the former always indicate our power; the latter, on the contrary, our impotence and fragmentary knowledge.

III.

Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined as due to man's power, or to reason, are always good, but the others may be good or bad.

IV.

Hence it is of the utmost service in life to perfect the understanding or reason, as far as we can; and in this one thing consists man's highest felicity or blessedness. Indeed, blessedness is nothing but that very satisfaction of the soul which arises from an intuitive knowledge of God. But to perfect the understanding is only to comprehend God, his attributes, and the actions that follow from the necessity of his nature. Wherefore the ultimate aim of the man who is controlled by reason, that is, the highest desire, with which he strives to restrain all the others, is that which impels
him to conceive adequately himself and everything that can fall within the scope of his understanding.

V.

There is, therefore, no rational life without intelligence; and things are good only in so far as they help man to enjoy the life of the mind, which is defined as intelligence. On the other hand, those things that hinder man from being able to perfect his reason and enjoy a rational life, these alone do we call bad.

VI.

But since all those things of which man is the efficient cause are necessarily good, no evil can happen to man except from external causes; that is to say, no evil can happen to him except in so far as he is a part of the whole of nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to which it is forced to adjust itself in almost an infinity of ways.

VII.

It is impossible for man not to be a part of nature, and not to follow its general order; but if he be placed among such individual things as harmonize with the nature of man itself, that will, in itself, aid and increase man's power of acting. If, on the contrary, he be placed among such as do not harmonize with his nature, he will scarcely be able, without greatly changing, to adjust himself to them.

VIII.

Everything in nature that we judge to be evil—in other words, to hinder us from being able to exist and enjoy a rational life—we may remove from us in the way that appears safest; everything, on the other
hand, that we judge to be good—in other words, serviceable for the preservation of our being and the enjoyment of a rational life—we may turn to our profit, and use as we please; and by the highest law of nature each one may do that, without restriction, which he thinks contributes to his profit.

IX.

Nothing can be more in harmony with the nature of anything than the other individuals of the same species. Hence (VII) there is nothing of more service to man for the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of a rational life than the man who is controlled by reason. Again, since among individual things we know nothing more excellent than the man who is controlled by reason, in nothing can one better show how much skill and ability he possesses than in so educating men that at last they live strictly under the dominion of reason.

X.

In so far as men are influenced by envy or by any emotion of hate toward one another, in so far are they mutually opposed; and, hence, they are the more to be feared, as they have more power than the other individual things in nature.

XI.

Souls, however, are not conquered by force of arms, but by love and magnanimity.

XII.

It is of the utmost service to men to enter into social intercourse, and to bind themselves with those
bonds that are best fitted to make them all a unit, and to do just those things that serve to strengthen friendship.

XIII.

But for this skill and vigilance are required. Men differ (for they are rare who live according to the dictates of reason), and yet most men are envious, and inclined rather to revenge than to pity. It needs, therefore, special strength of mind for one to follow one's own bent and restrain one's self from copying their emotions. But those, on the other hand, who know how to carp at men, and rather to upbraid them with vices than to teach them virtues—not to strengthen men's minds, but to crush them—these are a burden to themselves and everyone else. Wherefore, many, through an excessive impatience of mind and a false zeal of religion, have preferred living among brutes to living among men; as boys or youths who cannot bear with equanimity the chiding of their parents fly to military service, and prefer the hardships of war and the authority of a despotic power to domestic pleasures and paternal admonitions, and suffer any burden to be laid upon them in order to be revenged on their parents.

XIV.

Therefore, although men regulate nearly everything according to their lusts, nevertheless there results from their common fellowship much more good than harm. Hence it is better to bear their injustices with equanimity, and to do zealously what serves to establish harmony and friendship.
XV.

The things that engender harmony are those that are referred to justice, equity, and honor. For men bear with reluctance not only what is unjust and unfair, but also what is considered disgraceful; that is, one’s despising the accepted morals of a state. But for winning love those things are especially necessary that regard religion and piety. On these points see: IV, 37, schols. 1 and 2, 46, schol., and 73, schol.*

XVI.

Harmony is commonly the result of fear, but it is then not to be depended upon. Add to this, that fear springs from weakness of the soul, and does not, therefore, belong to the use of reason; nor does pity, although it seems to present the appearance of piety.

XVII.

Men are also won by liberality, especially those who have not the means of purchasing the necessaries of life. But to give aid to everyone who has need far surpasses the power and the profit of a private man. The wealth of a private man is far from able to meet such demands. Moreover the ability of a single man is too limited to permit him to join all men to himself

* In which it is argued that the man of mere impulse tries to force men to live in the way which happens to please him, and becomes hateful to them; while he who strives to lead men by reason always acts courteously, kindly, and consistently. Religion is defined as those acts of which we are the cause, in so far as we have a knowledge of God; piety, as a life according to reason; honor, as the desire of a man, living according to reason, to associate others with him in friendship. The mutual helpfulness of good men is dwelt upon.—Tr.
in friendship; hence the care of the poor is incumbent upon society as a whole, and concerns only the common good.

XVIII.

In receiving favors and returning thanks, our duty is quite different, concerning which see IV, 70, schol., and 71, schol.*

XIX.

The love of a harlot—that is, lust of generation, which springs from beauty, and in general all love that owns to any other cause than freedom of the soul—easily passes over into hate; unless, which is worse, it be a species of madness, and then it promotes discord rather than concord. See III, 31, cor.†

XX.

As regards marriage, it is certain that this is in harmony with reason, if the desire for sexual intercourse be not engendered by beauty alone, but also by the desire of begetting children and educating them wisely; and if, further, the love of both—that is, of the man and of the woman—has for its cause not mere beauty, but chiefly freedom of soul.

*Wherein it is stated that one should, as far as possible, avoid receiving favors, yet should in this exercise caution and avoid giving offense; that one should repay in kind favors received: that ingratitude is base, as indicating that a man is affected by hatred, anger, pride, avarice, etc.—Tr.

†...everyone strives, as far as he can, to have everyone love what he loves and hate what he hates: as the poet says:

Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;
Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat.

(Ovid, Amores, II, xix. 4, 5.—Tr.)
XXI.

Furthermore, flattery engenders harmony, but through the disgraceful crime of slavishness or perfidy; indeed, none are more taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to be first and are not.

XXII.

Self-abasement has a false appearance of piety and religion. And although self-abasement is the opposite of pride, nevertheless he who abases himself is nearest to the proud. See IV, 57, schol.*

XXIII.

Shame contributes to harmony only in those things that cannot be concealed. Further, since shame itself is a species of pain, it has no relation to the use of reason.

XXIV.

The other emotions of pain that have men for their object are directly opposed to justice, equity, honor, piety, and religion; and although indignation seems to resemble equity, yet men live lawlessly where anyone may pass judgment upon another's deeds and vindicate his own right or that of another.

XXV.

Modesty, that is, the desire of pleasing men, that is determined by reason, is (as I have said in IV, 37, schol. 1 †) referred to piety. But if it springs from

* In which it is argued that his pain comes from the comparison of his own weakness with the power of others, and thus the discovery of faults in others will give him pleasure, as raising him in the scale. Pride is defined as pleasure arising from a sense of superiority over others.—Tr.
† See note to XV.—Tr.
emotion, it is ambition, that is, a desire by which men, under the false appearance of piety, commonly excite discord and seditions. For he who desires to aid others by counsel or deed, that all together may enjoy the highest good, will first of all endeavor to win their love for himself; he will not strive to lead them to admire him, that a doctrine may bear his name, and he will try not to give them any ground whatever for envy. Further, in conversation he will avoid referring to men's faults, and will take care to speak only sparingly of human infirmity, but more at length of human virtue or power and how it can be perfected; that thus men may strive to live, as far as they can, according to the dictates of reason, not from fear or aversion, but influenced merely by the emotion of pleasure.

XXVI.

Except men, we know no individual thing in nature, in the mind of which we can take delight, and which we can join with us in friendship or any kind of companionship. Hence a regard for our interest does not require us to preserve anything that exists in nature except men, but teaches us, according to its various uses, to preserve it, to destroy it, or to adapt it to our use in any way whatever.

XXVII.

The advantage we derive from things external to us is, besides the experience and knowledge we gain by observing them and by changing them from one form to another, chiefly the preservation of the body; and in this respect those things are especially useful that can so sustain and nourish the body that all its parts can rightly perform their functions. For the more
capable the body is of being affected in many ways, and of affecting external bodies in many ways, the more capable the mind is of thinking (IV, 38 and 39).* But very few things in nature appear to be of this kind; wherefore, to nourish the body properly, it is necessary to use many aliments of different sorts. The human body, indeed, is composed of very many parts of different natures, which need constant and varied nutriment, that the whole body may be equally capable of all those actions that may follow from its nature, and, hence, that the mind also may be equally capable of framing many conceptions.

XXVIII.

But the strength of each man would scarcely suffice to procure this, did not men mutually aid each other. Now money has furnished us a representative for everything, whence it has happened that its image is wont to greatly occupy the mind of the masses; for they can scarcely imagine any kind of pleasure unaccompanied by the idea of money as its cause.

XXIX.

But this is a vice only in those who seek money, not from need, nor on account of their necessities, but because they have learned the arts of gain, with which they carry themselves ostentatiously. For the rest, they nourish their body from force of habit, but sparingly, believing that they lose as much of their substance as they spend on the preservation of their body. But those who know the true value of money, and regulate the measure of their wealth solely according to their need, live content with little.

* See II, 14.
Since, therefore, those things are good that help the parts of the body to perform their functions, and pleasure consists in this, that the power of man, in so far as he is composed of mind and body, is aided and increased—all those things that give pleasure are good. Nevertheless, since, on the other hand, things do not act with the purpose of giving us pleasure, and their power of acting is not adjusted to suit our advantage, and since, finally, pleasure is very often referred chiefly to one part of the body, emotions of pleasure (unless one exercise reason and vigilance), and hence also the desires engendered by them, are often excessive. Besides, an emotion leads us to put that first which is agreeable at the present time, nor are we able to regard what is future with an equal emotion of the soul. (IV, 44, schol., and 60, schol.*)

Superstition, however, appears to maintain that to be good which gives pain, and, on the other hand, that bad which gives pleasure. But, as I have already said (IV, 45, schol.†), no one but the envious takes pleasure in my infirmity and misfortune. For the greater the pleasure with which we are affected, the

* The former argues that emotions referred to one part of the body are excessive, in that they so hold the mind to the thought of one object that it is unable to pass to others. Excessive absorption in a single object is madness.

The latter refers back to IV, 9, which reads: "An emotion, the cause of which we conceive to be with us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive the cause to be with us." This is proved from II, 17.—Tr.

† Simply says at greater length what is said above.—Tr.
greater the perfection to which we pass, and consequently the greater our participation in the divine nature; and a pleasure which is regulated by a true regard for our advantage can never be evil. But he who is ruled by fear, and does good to avoid evil, is not ruled by reason.

XXXII.

But human power is very limited, and is infinitely exceeded by the power of external causes; hence we have not absolute power to turn to our advantage the things that are external to us. Nevertheless, we will bear with equanimity those things that happen to us contrary to what a regard for our profit demands, if we are conscious that we have done our duty, and that the power we have could not have reached so far as to enable us to avoid them; and that we are a part of the whole of nature, whose order we follow. If we clearly and distinctly comprehend this, that part of us which is defined as intelligence—that is, the best part of us—will be entirely satisfied with this, and will strive to persevere in this satisfaction. For in so far as we have understanding, we can desire only what is necessary, and we can have perfect satisfaction only in the truth; in so far, therefore, as we rightly comprehend this, in so far does the endeavor of the better part of us harmonize with the order of nature as a whole.
PART V.

OF THE POWER OF THE UNDERSTANDING, OR OF HUMAN FREEDOM.

PREFACE.

I pass now to another Part of the "Ethics," and this is concerned with the method or way that leads to Freedom. I shall here, accordingly, treat of the power of reason, and shall show, first, what influence reason itself can have upon the emotions, and, second, what the freedom or blessedness of the mind is. From this we shall see how much more power the wise man has than the ignorant. The further inquiries, however, how and in what way the understanding should be brought to perfection, and in what manner the body should be cared for, that it may be able properly to perform its functions—these do not belong here. The latter concerns medicine, the former logic. Here, therefore, I shall, as I have said, treat only of the power of the mind or of reason, and I shall show first of all, how great and of what sort is the control it has over the emotions in compelling or restraining them. That we have not absolute control over them I have just demonstrated. Yet the Stoics thought them absolutely dependent on our will, and that we can control them absolutely. Nevertheless, they were compelled by the protest of experience, and not indeed by their own principles, to admit that it requires no little practice and exertion to control and to restrain...
them. This someone has attempted to show by the illustration of the two dogs (if I remember rightly), the one a house-dog, and the other a hunting-dog. For it has been possible, by training, to accustom the house-dog to hunt; the hunting-dog, on the contrary, to give over chasing hares. To this opinion Descartes was strongly inclined. For he maintained that the soul or mind is united chiefly with a certain part of the brain called the pineal gland, by means of which the mind perceives all the motions that are excited in the body and external bodies, and which the mind can move in diverse ways by merely willing to do so. He held that this little gland is so suspended in the middle of the brain that it can be moved by the least motion of the animal spirits. He held, furthermore, that this gland may be suspended in the middle of the brain in as many different ways as there are different ways in which the animal spirits impinge upon it; and that, further, there may be as many different traces imprinted upon it as there are different external objects that propel the animal spirits toward it. Whence it happens that if, afterward, by the volition of the soul moving it in various ways, the gland be suspended in this or that way in which it was once before suspended by the spirits driven in this or that way, the said gland will propel and determine the said animal spirits in the same way as they were before driven by a similar suspension of the little gland. He held, moreover, that each volition of the mind is united by nature to a certain definite motion of the gland. For example, if one will to look upon a distant object, this volition causes a dilatation of the pupil; but if one think only of dilating the pupil, it is of no use to have the will to do this, for nature
has not joined with the will to dilate or contract the pupil, that motion of the gland that serves to impel the spirits toward the optic nerve in the proper way for dilating or contracting the pupil, but has joined this only with the will to look upon distant or near objects. Finally he held that, although each motion of this little gland seems to have been joined by nature with a single one of our thoughts from the beginning of our life, yet these motions can be joined with other thoughts as a result of habit. This he tried to prove in Art. 50, Part I, of the "Passions of the Soul." From these considerations he infers there is no soul so feeble that it cannot, when well directed, acquire an absolute power over its passions. These are, as he has defined them, perceptions, or sensations, or agitations of the soul, referred to it especially, and produced, kept up, and intensified by some motion of the spirits (see Art. 27, Part I, of the "Passions of the Soul"). But seeing that we are able to join with any volition any motion of the gland, and consequently of the spirits, and that the determination of the will is wholly in our own power, it follows that, if we determine our volition by definite and steadfast decisions, according to which we wish to direct the actions of our life, and join to these decisions the motions of the passions we wish to have, we shall acquire an absolute control over our passions. This (so far as I can gather it from his words) is the doctrine of that illustrious man—a doctrine I should scarce have believed put forward by such a man had it been less acute. Indeed, I cannot sufficiently wonder that a philosopher, who had firmly determined to infer nothing except from self-evident principles, and to affirm nothing but what he clearly and distinctly perceived, and who so often blamed
the scholastics for wishing to explain obscure things by occult qualities, should assume a hypothesis more occult than any occult quality. What, I ask, does he mean by the union of mind and body? What clear and distinct conception has he, I say, of thought most closely united to a certain small portion of extension (quantitas)? Would that he had explained this union by its proximate cause. But he had conceived the mind as to such a degree distinct from the body that he was unable to assign any particular cause either of this union or of the mind itself, but was compelled to fall back upon the cause of the universe as a whole, that is, upon God. Again, I should vastly like to know how many degrees of motion the mind can communicate to that little pineal gland, and with what degree of force it can hold it suspended. For I do not know whether this gland is driven about by the mind more slowly or more swiftly than by the animal spirits, nor whether the motions belonging to the passions, which we have firmly joined to steadfast decisions, may not be detached from them in turn by corporeal causes. In this case it would follow that, although the mind has formed a firm purpose of going to meet dangers, and has joined to this decision the motions appropriate to courage, nevertheless, at sight of the danger the gland may be so suspended that the mind can think of nothing but flight. Surely, since there is no comparing volition and motion, there is also no comparing the power or force of the mind and of the body. Consequently the force of the latter cannot possibly be determined by that of the former. Add to these considerations that this gland is not found to be so situated in the middle of the brain that it can be driven about so easily and in so many
ways, and further, that some of the nerves do not extend as far as the cavities of the brain. Finally, I omit all that this writer asserts concerning the will and its freedom, as I have given sufficient and more than sufficient proof that it is false. Since, therefore, the power of the mind is, as I have shown above, limited solely to understanding, we shall determine, solely from the mind's knowledge, the remedies for the emotions—remedies of which I think all men have experience, but which they do not carefully observe, nor distinctly see—and from this same knowledge we shall deduce all that concerns the mind's blessedness.

Axioms.

1. If two contrary actions are excited in the same subject, either both of them or one of them must necessarily undergo change until they cease to be contrary.

2. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause.

(This axiom is evident from III, 7.)

Prop. 1. Just as the thoughts, and the ideas of things, are arranged and connected in the mind, so, precisely, are the modifications of the body, or the images of things, arranged and connected in the body.

Proof.—The order and connection of ideas is the same (II, 7) as the order and connection of things, and conversely, the order and connection of things is the same (II, 6, cor., and 7) as the order and connection of ideas. Therefore, just as the order and concatenation of the modifications of the body (II, 18), so, conversely (III, 2), the order and connection of
the modifications of the body follow the order and concatenation in the mind of thoughts and the ideas of things. Q. E. D.

Prop. 2. If we separate an agitation of the mind, that is, an emotion, from the thought of its external cause, and join it to other thoughts, both the love or hate toward the external cause, and the agitations of the soul that arise from these emotions, will be destroyed.

Proof.—That which constitutes the essence of love or hate is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause (defs. of the emotions, 6 and 7). Therefore, when this last is taken away, the essence of love or hate is taken away, and, consequently, these emotions, and those that spring from them, are destroyed. Q. E. D.

Prop. 3. An emotion that is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.

Proof.—An emotion that is a passion is a confused idea (general def. of the emotions). If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of this emotion, this idea will be only logically distinct from the emotion itself, in so far as it is referred to the mind alone (II, 21, and schol.). Hence (III, 3) the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—An emotion is, therefore, the more in our power, and the mind is the less passive with respect to it, the better it is known to us. Q. E. D.

Prop. 4. There is no modification of the body of which we cannot form a clear and distinct conception.

Proof.—That which is common to all things can only be conceived adequately (II, 38). Therefore (II, 12, and 13, schol., lem. 2), there is no modification of the body of which we cannot form a clear and distinct conception. Q. E. D.
Corollary.—Hence it follows that there is no emotion of which we cannot form a clear and distinct conception. For the emotion is the idea of the modification of the body (general def. of the emotions), which, consequently (by the preceding proposition), must involve a clear and distinct conception.

Scholium.—Since there is nothing from which some effect does not follow (I, 36), and since we comprehend clearly and distinctly everything that follows from an idea that is in us adequate (II, 40), it follows that everyone has the power of knowing himself and his emotions clearly and distinctly, if not wholly, at least in part; and, consequently, has the power of making himself less subject to these emotions. This, then, should be the chief object of our efforts, to know each emotion, so far as is possible, clearly and distinctly; so that the mind may thus be determined by the emotion to the thought of that which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and in which it wholly acquiesces, and to the end that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of its external cause and joined to true thoughts. From this it will result, not only that love, hate, etc., will be destroyed (2), but also that the appetites or desires which are wont to spring from such emotions cannot be excessive (IV, 61).* For it is especially to be noted that it is one and the same appetite on account of which a man is said to be now active and now passive. For example, we have shown that human nature is so constituted that each one desires to have the rest live according to his way

*The desire that springs from reason cannot be excessive. (Proved from defs. of the emotions, I, and III, 3. As this desire is the very essence of man, and as this essence cannot exceed itself, the desire cannot be excessive.—Tr.)
of thinking (III, 31, schol.)*; this appetite is in the man who is not led by reason, a passion, which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ from pride; in the man, on the other hand, who lives in obedience to the precept of reason, it is an activity or a virtue, which is called piety (IV, 37, schol. 1, and the second proof of the same proposition).† Thus all the appetites or desires are passions only in so far as they spring from inadequate ideas, and are reckoned as virtues when they are excited by or spring from adequate ideas. For all the desires by which we are determined to any action can arise as well from adequate ideas as from inadequate (IV, 59).‡ Than this remedy for the emotions (to return to the point from which I started), consisting as it does in the true knowledge of them, none more excellent, that is within our power, can be devised; seeing that the mind has no other power than that of thinking and

* In which the desire to have our own likings and aversions approved is called ambition, and reference made to III, 29, schol., where ambition is defined as an endeavor to do things or leave them undone solely with a view to pleasing men, especially the vulgar.—Tr.

† See IV, App. XV, note. In this second proof it is argued that the good a man desires and loves he will love the more, the more he sees others love it. Hence he will endeavor to bring them to love it as he does. See the 5th note to prop. 20.—Tr.

‡ To all the actions to which we are determined by an emotion which is a passion, we may, without this, be determined by reason. [To act rationally is to do those things that follow solely from the necessity of our nature (III, def. 2, and III, 3). But whatever is bad diminishes our power of action (IV, preface, at end). Hence a passion, which is a confused idea (general def. of the emotions), and in so far inferior to reason, cannot determine us to any action to which we may not be determined by reason.—Tr.]
forming adequate ideas, as I have (III, 3) already shown.106

Prop. 5. The emotion with which we regard a thing that we conceive simply, and not as necessary or possible or contingent, is, other things being equal, the greatest of all.

Proof.—The emotion with which we regard a thing that we conceive to be free is greater than that with which we regard what we conceive to be necessary (III, 49).* and consequently still greater than that with which we regard what we conceive of as possible or contingent (IV, 11).† But to say that we conceive a thing as free, can only mean that we conceive it simply because we are ignorant of the causes that have determined it to act (by what I have shown in II, 35, schol.). Therefore the emotion with which we regard a thing that we conceive simply is, other things being equal, greater than that with which we regard a thing that we conceive as necessary, as possible, or as contingent. Consequently it is the greatest. Q. E. D.

Prop. 6. In so far as the mind comprehends all things as necessary, in so far has it a greater power over the emotions, and is less subject to them.

Proof.—The mind comprehends that all things are necessary (I, 29), and that they are determined to

*The author argues that, if we conceive a thing as free, we conceive it through itself, without anything else. If, then, we conceive it as causing pleasure or pain, our love or hate toward it will be extreme, for we will regard it as the sole cause of the pleasure or pain.—Tr.

†An emotion toward a thing which we conceive as necessary is, other things being equal, more intense than an emotion toward a thing that is possible or contingent, that is, not necessary. (For in so far as we conceive it necessary, we conceive it as existent.—Tr.)
exist and to operate by an infinite nexus of causes (I, 28). Hence (by the preceding proposition) it in so far brings it about that it is less subject to the emotions which arise from them, and (III, 48)* regards with less emotion the things themselves. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—The more this knowledge that things are necessary is brought to bear upon individual things, which we imagine more distinctly and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the emotions. To this fact experience itself bears witness. We see sorrow at the loss of some good thing mitigated, as soon as the man who has lost it perceives that he could not have preserved it in any possible way. Thus we see, also, that no one pities an infant because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, and because, in a word, it lives so many years, as it were, without the consciousness of self. But if most persons were born as adults, and only one here and there as an infant, then everyone would pity infants, for then we should regard infancy itself, not as a natural and necessary thing, but as a defect or fault of nature. I might note many other instances of the same kind. 107.

Prop. 7. Emotions which arise out of or are produced by reason are, if we take time into account, more powerful than those that are referred to particular things which we conceive as absent.

Proof.—We do not regard a thing as absent on account of the emotion with which we conceive it, but on account of the fact that the body is affected by

*Love or hate, for example, toward Peter, is destroyed, if the pain involved in the latter, or the pleasure involved in the former be connected with the idea of another cause; and it is diminished in so far as we conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause. (See defs. of the emotions, 6 and 7.—Tr.)
Prop. 8] HUMAN FREEDOM. 181

another emotion that excludes the existence of the thing (II, 17). Hence it is not in the nature of an emotion that is referred to a thing we conceive as absent, to dominate the other activities and the power of a man (on which point see IV, 6),* but, on the contrary, it is in harmony with its nature, that it can be to some degree brought into subjection by those emotions that exclude the existence of its external cause (IV, 9).† But an emotion that springs from reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things (see the definition of reason, II, 40, schol. 2), and these we always conceive as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their present existence), and always represent to ourselves in the same way (II, 38). Therefore such an emotion always remains the same; and, consequently (axiom 1), the emotions that are contrary to it, and that are not supported by their external causes, must accommodate themselves to it more and more, until they are no longer contrary. In so far the emotion that springs from reason is the more powerful.108 Q. E. D.

Prop. 8. The greater the number of concurrent causes by which an emotion is aroused, the greater the emotion.

Proof.—A large number of causes acting simultaneously have more effect than if there were fewer (III, 7). Therefore (IV, 5)‡ the greater the number

*The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the remaining activities or power of a man, so that the emotion persistently cleaves to the man. (See note to prop. 8, and IV, axiom.—Tr.)

†See IV, App. XXX, note.—Tr.

‡The force and growth of any passion, and its persevering in existence, are not defined by the power with which we endeavor to persevere in existence, but by the power of an external cause as compared with ours. (See III, defs. 1 and 2, and II, 16.—Tr.)
of simultaneous causes by which an emotion is aroused, the stronger is the emotion. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—This proposition is evident also from axiom 2 of this Part.

Prop. 9. An emotion referred to many different causes, which the mind conceives simultaneously with the emotion, is less harmful than another emotion equally great referred to a single cause or to fewer causes: moreover, we are less dominated by it, and regard with less emotion any one cause.

Proof.—An emotion is evil or harmful only in so far as it makes the mind less capable of thinking (IV, 26 and 27).* Hence an emotion which leads the mind to conceive many objects simultaneously is less harmful than another emotion equally great, that so holds the mind to the contemplation of a single object or of a few objects that it cannot think of others. This was the first point. In the second place, since the essence of the mind—that is (III, 7), its power—consists in thought alone (II, 11), the mind is less dominated by an emotion that leads it to contemplate many things simultaneously than by an emotion equally great that holds it absorbed in the contemplation of but one object or of a smaller number of objects. This was the second point. In the last place, this emotion (III, 48), † inasmuch as it is referred to many external causes, is less with respect to each one of them.

Q. E. D.

* All that we endeavor to do in obedience to reason is to comprehend; nor does the mind, in so far as it exercises reason, judge anything to be of advantage to it, except what assists its comprehension.

We certainly know nothing to be good or evil except what truly assists our comprehension or may hinder us from comprehending.

† See 6, note.—Tr.
Prop. 10. As long as we are not harassed by emotions that are contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order.

Proof.—Emotions that are contrary to our nature—that is (IV, 30),* that are evil—are only evil in so far as they interfere with the mind's comprehension (IV, 27).† So long, therefore, as we are not harassed by emotions that are contrary to our nature, the power of the mind, by which it strives to comprehend things (IV, 26),† is not hampered, and hence it has the power of forming clear and distinct ideas, and of deducing some from others (II, 40, schol. 2, and 47, schol.); consequently (1), so long have we the power of arranging and concatenating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order.109 Q. E. D.

Scholium.—Through this power of rightly arranging and concatenating the modifications of the body, we can keep ourselves from being easily affected by evil emotions. For (7) it requires a greater force to control emotions arranged and concatenated according to the intellectual order than to control indefinite and vague emotions. The best thing, therefore, that we can do, as long as we have not a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to frame a right method of living, or definite rules of life, to commit them to memory, and to continually apply them to the individual cases often met with in life, so that our imagination may be deeply affected by them, and we may

* A thing cannot be bad through that which it has in common with our nature; but in so far as it is bad for us, it is contrary to our nature. (See IV, preface ad fin., and Note 103.—Tr.)
† See 9, note.—Tr.
always have them at hand. For example, I have placed it among the rules of life (IV, 46, and schol.)* that hate must be conquered by love or magnanimity, and not repaid by a return of hate. But that we may have this precept of reason always at hand, where it will be of use, we should think upon and often meditate the injustices men commonly practice, and to what extent and in what way they may best be averted by magnanimity. Thus shall we join the image of the injustice to the thought of this principle, and (II, 18) we shall always have it at hand when we are treated with injustice. But if we also have at hand the consideration of what is truly useful to us, and of the good that results from mutual friendliness and common fellowship, being mindful, moreover, of the fact that the highest satisfaction of the soul springs from the right method of living (IV, 52),† and that men, like other things, act from natural necessity; then an injustice—that is to say, the hate that is wont to spring from it—will occupy a very small part of the imagination, and will easily be overcome. Or if the anger that is wont to spring from the greatest injustices be not so easily overcome, still it will be overcome, though not without agitation of the soul, in a much shorter time than if we had not thus reflected upon these things beforehand. This is evident from props. 6, 7, and 8 of this Part. In the same way one

* He who lives under the control of reason endeavors, as far as he can, to repay the hate, anger, contempt, etc., of others with love or magnanimity. See III, definitions of the emotions, 6. The schol. argues that he who avenges wrongs with hate is miserable. See III, definitions of the emotions, 7 and 36.—Tr.

† Self-satisfaction may arise from reason, and only that which arises from reason is the highest possible. (See III, defs. of the emotions, 25, and III, 3.—Tr.)
must think concerning the courage that lays fear aside; to wit, one must enumerate and often imagine the common perils of life, and reflect how by presence of mind and fortitude they can best be avoided or overcome. But it should be noted that, in arranging our thoughts and images, we should always pay attention (IV, 63, cor., and III, 59) * to what is good in each thing, so that we may always be determined in our action by the emotion of pleasure. If, for example, one sees that he is too eager in the pursuit of fame, let him think of its proper value, to what end it should be sought, and by what means it can be attained; but let him not think of its misuse, of its emptiness, of the fickleness of men, or of other things of the sort, of which no one thinks except through morbidness. For with such reflections do the most ambitious give themselves the most distress, when they despair of attaining the honor that they strive for; and, while they are vomiting forth their wrath, they wish to appear wise. Therefore it is certain that they are the most desirous of fame who complain the loudest of its misuse and of the emptiness of the world. Nor is this peculiar to the ambitious, but it is common to all who suffer from adverse fortune and are weak in character. The covetous poor man keeps talking of the misuse of money and the vices of the rich, whereby he only succeeds in afflicting himself, and in showing others that he is discontented not only with his own poverty but also with the riches of others. So, also, those who have been badly received by their mistress think of nothing save the inconstancy and deceitful character of women, and the rest of their much-harped-upon faults, all of which they immediately

* See III, defs. of the emotions, 2 and 3.—Tr.
commit to oblivion as soon as they are again received by their mistress. Hence the man who is zealous to moderate his emotions and appetites, from the mere love of freedom, will strive, as far as possible, to gain a knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to fill his soul with the joy that springs from a true knowledge of them; but by no means to reflect upon men's vices, to disparage men, and to rejoice in a false show of freedom. He who will diligently observe these precepts (for they are not difficult), and will practice them—he, verily, will be able in a short time to regulate his actions for the most part according to the dictates of reason. 110

Prop. 11. The greater the number of things to which an image is referred, the more frequent is it, or the oftener does it recur, and the more does it occupy the mind.

Proof.—The greater the number of things to which an image or emotion is referred, the greater is the number of causes by which it can be aroused and maintained, and all of these (by hypothesis) the mind considers simultaneously through the said emotion. Therefore is the emotion the more frequent, or the more often recurrent, and (8) it occupies the mind more. Q. E. D.

Prop. 12. The images of things are more easily joined to those images that are referred to the things we clearly and distinctly comprehend than to others.

Proof.—The things we clearly and distinctly comprehend are either the common properties of things or what is inferred from these (see the definition of reason, II, 40, schol. 2), and consequently their images are (by the preceding proposition) the more frequently aroused in us. Therefore it is easier for us to consider other
things simultaneously with these than with other images, and, hence (II, 18), it is easier to join their images with these than with others.\textsuperscript{111} Q. E. D.

**Prop. 13.** *The greater the number of other images to which an image is joined, the oftener does it recur.*

*Proof.*—The greater the number of other things to which an image is joined, the greater is the number of causes (II, 18) by which it can be aroused. Q. E. D.

**Prop. 14.** *The mind can bring it to pass that all the modifications of the body, or the images of things, are referred to the idea of God.*

*Proof.*—There is no modification of the body of which the mind cannot form a clear and distinct conception (4). Hence the mind can bring it to pass (I, 15) that all are referred to the idea of God.\textsuperscript{112} Q. E. D.

**Prop. 15.** *He who clearly and distinctly comprehends himself and his emotions, loves God, and this the more, the better he comprehends himself and his emotions.*

*Proof.*—He who clearly and distinctly comprehends himself and his emotions has pleasure (III, 53),\textsuperscript{*} and this is accompanied by the idea of God (by the preceding proposition). Therefore (defs. of the emotions, 6) he loves God, and (by the same reasoning) this the more, the better he comprehends himself and his emotions.\textsuperscript{113} Q. E. D.

**Prop. 16.** *This love toward God must occupy the mind in the highest degree.*

*Proof.*—This love is joined to all the modifications

\*When the mind contemplates itself and its power of acting it has pleasure; and this the more, the more distinctly it conceives itself and its power of acting. (See III, defs. of the emotions, 2.—Tr.)
of the body (14) and is fostered by them all (15); hence (11) it must occupy the mind in the highest degree. Q. E. D.

Prop. 17. God is without passions, and is not affected with any emotion of pleasure or pain.

Proof.—All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true (II, 32), that is (II, def. 4), they are adequate. Therefore (general defs. of the emotions) God is without passions. In the second place, God cannot pass to a greater or a less degree of perfection (I, 20, cor. 2). Therefore (defs. of the emotions, 2 and 3) he is not affected with any emotion of pleasure or pain. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—Properly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For God is not (by the preceding proposition) affected with any emotion of pleasure or pain. Consequently (defs. of the emotions, 6 and 7) he does not love or hate anyone.114

Prop. 18. No one can hate God.

Proof.—The idea of God that is in us is adequate and perfect (II, 46 and 47). Therefore, in so far as we contemplate God we are active (III, 3); and hence (III, 59)* there can be no pain accompanied by the idea of God, that is (defs. of the emotions, 7), no one can hate God. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—Love toward God cannot turn to hate.

Scholium.—The objection may be made that, in the very act of comprehending God as the cause of all things, we regard him as the cause of pain. To this I answer that, in so far as we comprehend the causes of pain, in so far (3) it ceases to be a passion; that is (III, 59),† in so far it ceases to be pain. Therefore,

* See III, defs. of the emotions, 2 and 3.—Tr.
† See III, 1, and 11, schol.—Tr.
in so far as we comprehend God as the cause of pain, we feel pleasure.\textsuperscript{115}

Prop. 19. He who loves God cannot endeavor to have God love him in return.

Proof.—If a man did this, he would (17, cor.) wish God whom he loves were not God; and hence (III, 19)\textsuperscript{*} he would wish to have pain, which (III, 28)\textsuperscript{†} is absurd. Therefore, he who loves God, etc.\textsuperscript{116} Q. E. D.

Prop. 20. This love toward God cannot be stained either with the emotion of envy or that of jealousy, but it is the more intensified the greater the number of men we conceive bound to God by this same bond of love.

Proof.—This love toward God is the highest good that we can strive for according to the dictate of reason (IV, 28),\textsuperscript{‡} and it is common to all men (IV, 36),\textsuperscript{§} and we desire all to rejoice in it (IV, 37).\textsuperscript{¶} Therefore (defs. of the emotions, 23) it cannot be stained with the emotion of envy, nor (18, and the def. of jealousy,

\textsuperscript{*} He who conceives what he loves to be destroyed will feel pain; but if he conceives it to be preserved, he will feel pleasure. (See defs. of the emotions, 6.—Tr.)

\textsuperscript{†} Whatever we conceive as giving pleasure, we strive to bring about; but what we conceive as opposed to this, or as conducive to pain, we strive to remove or destroy.

\textsuperscript{‡} The highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the highest virtue of the mind is to know God. (Spinoza refers to I, def. 6, and I, 15, to prove that the mind can conceive nothing higher than God, and infers that the mind's highest good is knowledge of God. As it is the mind's nature to know, it furthers its being in knowing, i. e., it does what is useful to it. See IV, pref., ad fn., and defs. 1 and 8.—Tr.)

\textsuperscript{§} The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and all may enjoy it equally. (See the note just preceding, and II, 47, schol.—Tr.)

\textsuperscript{¶} See 103.—Tr.
g. v. III, 35, schol.)* with the emotion of jealousy; but on the contrary (III, 31)† it must be the more intensified, the greater the number of men we conceive to enjoy it. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—We can show in the same way that there is no emotion directly opposed to this love capable of destroying it. Hence we may conclude that this love toward God is the most unchangeable of all the emotions, and cannot, in so far as it is referred to the body, be destroyed except with the body itself. What its nature is, in so far as it is referred to the mind alone, we shall see hereafter.

In what precedes I have included all the remedies against the emotions, that is, all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do to overcome the emotions. From this it appears that the power of the mind over the emotions consists: First, in the knowledge of the emotions itself (4, schol.). Second, in the separation of the emotion from the thought of its external cause, which we conceive confusedly (2 and 4, schol.). Third, in the superiority, in the point of view of time, possessed by the emotions that are referred to the things we comprehend over those referred to

*Jealousy is defined as "an agitation of the soul arising from combined love and hate, accompanied by the idea of someone else who is envied."—Tr.

†If we conceive anyone to love, desire, or hate anything that we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall love, etc., the thing more deeply. If, however, we conceive him as having in aversion what we love, or the converse of this, we shall suffer agitation of mind. (Proved by a reference to III, 27, where it is argued that, if we think of anyone like ourselves as having an emotion, this thought will be accompanied by a modification of the body similar to that which is present when we have the same emotion. See II, 17, cor. and schol.—Tr.)
the things we conceive confusedly or fragmentarily (7). Fourth, in the multitude of causes by which the modifications that are referred to the common properties of things or to God are fostered (9 and 11). Fifth, and last, in the order in which the mind can arrange and link together its emotions (10, schol., and 12, 13, and 14).

But in order to understand more clearly this power of the mind over the emotions, one should specially note that we call the emotions great when we compare the emotion of one man with the emotion of another, and see that the one is harassed more than the other by the same emotion; or when we compare with each other the emotions of one and the same man, and find that he is more affected or moved by one emotion than by another. For (IV, 5)* the force of any emotion is measured by the power of its external cause as compared with our power. But the power of the mind is measured by knowledge alone, and its weakness or passion merely by the privation of knowledge; that is, it is measured by that on account of which ideas are called inadequate. From this it follows that that mind is the most passive of which inadequate ideas constitute the greatest part, so that it is distinguished rather by what it endures than by what it does; and, on the other hand, that is the most active of which adequate ideas constitute the greatest part, so that, although it contains as many inadequate ideas as the former, it is distinguished rather by those ideas that are attributed to human virtue than by those that indicate human infirmity. Again, one should note that grieves and misfortunes have their chief source in an excessive love of that which is subject to many varia-

* See prop. 8, note.—Tr.
tions, and of which we can never have control. No one is solicitous or anxious about anything unless he love it; nor do injustices, suspicions, enmities, etc., arise, except from the love of things of which no one can really have control. Thus we easily conceive what power clear and distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge (II, 47, schol.), the foundation of which is the knowledge of God and nothing else, has over the emotions; if it does not, in so far as they are passions, absolutely remove them (3, and 4, schol.), at all events it brings it about that they constitute the least part of the mind (14). Furthermore, it begets love toward that which is immutable and eternal (15), and which we really have within our power (II, 45); a love which, consequently, is not stained with any of the defects inherent in common love, but can always become greater and greater (15), and take possession of the greatest part of the mind (16), and affect it everywhere.

This completes all I have to say as regards this present life. The truth of what I said at the beginning of this scholium, to wit, that I had briefly set forth in it all the remedies for the emotions, anyone can easily see who will give attention to what I have said in this scholium, and also to the definitions of the mind and its emotions, and finally, to props. 1 and 3 of Part III. Therefore it is now time to pass to the things that pertain to the duration of the mind without relation to the body. 117

Prop. 21. The mind cannot imagine anything, or remember things past, unless while the body endures.

Proof.—The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor conceive the modifications of
the body as actual, except while the body endures (II, 8, cor.) ; hence (II, 26) it does not conceive any body as actually existing, except while its body endures. Therefore, it cannot imagine anything (see the def. of Imagination in II, 17, schol.), or remember things past, except while the body endures (see the def. of Memory in II, 18, schol.)

Q. E. D.

Prop. 22. Nevertheless, there is necessarily in God an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity.

Proof.—God is not only the cause of the existence of this or that human body, but also of its essence (I, 25) ; which must, therefore, necessarily be conceived through the essence of God and nothing else (I, axiom 4), and that by certain eternal necessity (I, 16). This conception must necessarily be in God (II, 3).

Q. E. D.

Prop. 23. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains, which is eternal.

Proof.—There is necessarily in God a conception or idea, which expresses the essence of the human body (by the preceding proposition), and which, consequently, is necessarily something that belongs to the essence of the human mind (II, 13). But we do not ascribe to the mind any duration that can be defined in terms of time, except in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained by duration and can be defined in terms of time ; that is (II, 8, cor.), we do not ascribe to it duration, except while the body endures. But since there is, nevertheless, something that is conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the essence of God and nothing else (by the preceding proposition), this something that
belongs to the essence of the mind is necessarily eternal. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—This idea that expresses the essence of the body under the form of eternity, is, as I have said, a definite mode of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and which is necessarily eternal. Yet we cannot be made to remember having existed before the body, since there can be no traces of it in the body, and since eternity cannot be defined in terms of time, and cannot have any relation to time. Nevertheless we feel and know that we are eternal. The mind perceives those things that it conceives by an act of the understanding no less than those that it has in the memory. The eyes of the mind, with which it sees and observes things, are themselves proofs. Hence, although we do not remember having existed before the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the body under the form of eternity, is eternal, and that this its existence cannot be defined in terms of time or described as duration. Our mind, consequently, can be said to endure, and its existence can be measured by a definite time, only in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body; and only in so far has it the power of measuring in time the existence of things, and of conceiving them as having duration.\textsuperscript{120}

Prop. 24. The better we comprehend particular things, the better do we comprehend God.

Proof.—This is evident from the corollary to proposition 25, Part I.\textsuperscript{121}

Prop. 25. It is the highest endeavor of the mind and its highest virtue to know things by the third kind of knowledge.

Proof.—The third kind of knowledge proceeds
from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things (see its def., II, 40, schol.); and the better we comprehend things in this way, the better (by the preceding proposition) do we comprehend God. Hence (IV, 28)* it is the highest virtue of the mind, that is (IV, def. 8), the power or nature of the mind, or (III, 7) its highest endeavor, to know things by the third kind of knowledge.\textsuperscript{122} Q. E. D.

**Prop. 26.** The more capable the mind is of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge, the more it desires to know things by this kind of knowledge.

**Proof.**—This is evident. In so far as we conceive the mind to be capable of knowing things by this kind of knowledge, we conceive it as determined to a knowledge of things by this kind of knowledge; and, consequently (defs. of the emotions, 1), the more capable the mind is of this, the more it desires it. Q. E. D.

**Prop. 27.** From this third kind of knowledge springs the highest possible satisfaction of the mind.

**Proof.**—It is the highest virtue of the mind to know God (IV, 28),† that is, to know things by the third kind of knowledge (25); and this virtue is the greater, the better the mind knows things by this kind of knowledge (24). Therefore he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the highest degree of human perfection, and consequently (defs. of the emotions, 2), is affected with the highest pleasure, and that (II, 43) with the accompanying idea of himself and of his virtue. Hence (defs. of

* See prop. 20, note.—Tr.
† See prop. 20, note.—Tr.
the emotions, 25) from this kind of knowledge springs the highest possible satisfaction. Q. E. D.

Prop. 28. The endeavor, or desire, to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot spring from the first, but from the second kind of knowledge.

Proof.—This proposition is self-evident. For whatever we clearly and distinctly comprehend, we comprehend either through itself, or through that which is conceived through itself. That is, ideas that are clear and distinct in us—in other words, which are referred to the third kind of knowledge (II, 40, schol. 2)—cannot follow from fragmentary and confused ideas, which (by the same schol.) are referred to the first kind of knowledge, but from adequate ideas, that is (by the same schol.), from the second and third kinds of knowledge. Hence (defs. of the emotions, 1) the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot spring from the first, but from the second kind. 123 Q. E. D.

Prop. 29. Whatever the mind comprehends under the form of eternity, it does not comprehend through conceiving the present actual existence of the body, but through conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity.

Proof.—In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, it conceives duration, which can be measured by time, and in so far only has it the power of conceiving things with relation to time (21, and II, 26). But eternity cannot be expressed by duration (I, def. 8, and its explanation). Hence the mind in so far has not the power of perceiving things under the form of eternity. But since it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of eternity (II, 44, cor. 2), and it also belongs to the
nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (23), and besides these two nothing else belongs to the essence of the mind (II, 13); it follows that this power of conceiving things under the form of eternity does not belong to the mind, except in so far as it conceives the essence of the body under the form of eternity. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—We conceive things as actual in two ways: either in that we conceive them as existing with relation to a definite time and place, or in that we conceive them as contained in God, and as following from the necessity of the divine nature. Those things, however, that we conceive as true or real in this second way, we conceive under the form of eternity, and the ideas of them involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as I have shown in II, 45. See also the scholium to this proposition.124

Prop. 30. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity, necessarily has a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is conceived through God.

Proof.—Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this involves necessary existence (I, def. 8). Hence, to conceive things under the form of eternity is to conceive things in so far as they are conceived as real beings through the essence of God, that is, in so far as they involve existence through the essence of God. Therefore, our mind, in so far as it conceives itself and the body under the form of eternity, necessarily has a knowledge of God, and knows, etc.125 Q. E. D.

Prop. 31. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.
Proof.—The mind conceives nothing under the form of eternity except in so far as it conceives the essence of its own body under the form of eternity (29), that is (21 and 23), except in so far as it is eternal. Therefore (by the preceding proposition), in so far as it is eternal, it has a knowledge of God, which knowledge is necessarily adequate (II, 46). Hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing all those things that can follow when this knowledge of God is granted (II, 40); that is, it is capable of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge (see the def. of this, II, 40, schol. 2), of which, consequently, the mind (III, def. 1), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause.

Q. E. D.

Scholium.—Therefore, the more of this kind of knowledge anyone possesses, the clearer is his consciousness of himself and of God; that is, the more perfect and blessed is he, as will appear still more clearly from what follows. But here it should be noted that, although we are now certain that the mind is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of eternity, nevertheless, in order that the things I wish to prove may be the more easily explained and the better understood, we will consider it, as we have done hitherto, as though it were just beginning to be, and were just beginning to know things under the form of eternity. This we may do without any danger of error, provided we are careful to draw no conclusions except from premises that are clearly evident.126

Prop. 32. Whatever we know by the third kind of knowledge, we take pleasure in and that with the accompanying idea of God as cause,
Proof.—From this kind of knowledge springs the highest possible satisfaction of the mind, that is (defs. of the emotions, 25), the highest possible pleasure, and that with the accompanying idea of the mind itself (27), and, consequently (30), also with the accompanying idea of God as cause. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—From the third kind of knowledge necessarily springs the intellectual love of God. For from this kind of knowledge springs (by the preceding proposition) pleasure, accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is (defs. of the emotions, 6), a love of God, not in so far as we imagine him as present (29), but in so far as we comprehend God to be eternal. It is this that I call the intellectual love of God.127

Prop. 33. The intellectual love of God, which springs from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.

Proof.—The third kind of knowledge (31, and I, axiom 3) is eternal; therefore (by the same axiom), the love that springs from it is also necessarily eternal. Q. E. D.

Scholiwm.—Although this love toward God has not had a beginning (by the preceding proposition), nevertheless it has all the perfections of love, just as if it had had a beginning, as we have chosen to assume in the corollary to the preceding proposition. Nor is there here any difference, except that the mind has eternally had these same perfections that we have just conceived of as added to it, and that with the accompanying idea of God as eternal cause. But if pleasure consists in the transition to a greater perfection, blessedness must surely consist in this, that the mind is endowed with perfection itself.128

Prop. 34. The mind is not subject to those emotions,
which are classed as passions, except while the body endures.

Proof.—A mental image (imaginatio) is an idea through which the mind contemplates something as present (see the def. of it, II, 17, schol.), but which indicates rather the present constitution of the human body than the nature of the external thing (II, 16, cor. 2). An emotion is therefore (by the general def. of the emotions) a mental image, in so far as it indicates the present constitution of the body; and, consequently (21), the mind is not subject to those emotions which are classed as passions except while the body endures. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that no love except the intellectual love is eternal.

Scholium.—If we turn our attention to the commonly received opinion, we shall see that men are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but confound it with duration, and ascribe it to the imagination or memory, which they think remains after death.\textsuperscript{129}

Prop. 35. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.

Proof.—God is absolutely infinite (I, def. 6), in other words (II, def. 6), God's nature rejoices in infinite perfection, and that (II, 3) with the accompanying idea of himself, that is (I, 11, and def. 1), the idea of its cause. It is this that in the corollary to prop. 32 of this Part I have called the intellectual love.

Prop. 36. The intellectual love of the mind toward God is the very love of God with which God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be expressed by the essence of the human mind, considered under the form of eternity. That is, the intel-
lectual love of the mind toward God is a part of the infinite love with which God loves himself.

Proof.—This love of the mind must be classed among the acts of the mind (32, cor., and III, 3). It is, therefore, an act in which the mind contemplates itself, with the accompanying idea of God as cause (32, and cor.), that is (I, 25, cor., and II, 11, cor.), an act, in which God, in so far as he can be expressed by the human mind, contemplates himself, with the accompanying idea of himself. Therefore (by the preceding proposition) this love of the mind is a part of the infinite love with which God loves himself. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves himself, loves men, and consequently that the love of God toward men and the intellectual love of the mind toward God are one and the same.

Scholium.—From this we clearly comprehend in what our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom consists; to wit, in an unchangeable and eternal love toward God, that is, in the love of God toward men. This love or blessedness is in the sacred Scriptures called glory, and not without justice. For whether this love be referred to God, or to the mind, it may justly be called a satisfaction of the mind, which, in truth, is not distinguishable from glory (defs. of the emotions, 25 and 30). In so far as it is referred to God, it is (35) pleasure—let me still use this word—with the accompanying idea of himself; and it is the same thing in so far as it is referred to the mind (27). Again, from the fact that the essence of our mind consists in knowledge alone, of which the source and foundation is God (I, 15, and II, 47, schol.), it becomes clear to us how and in what way our mind follows, as regards its essence and existence, from the
divine nature, and continually depends on God. I have thought it worth while to note this here, that I might show by this illustration of how much worth is that knowledge of individual things, that I have called intuitive or of the third kind (II, 40, schol. 2), and how preferable to general knowledge, which, I have said, is of the second kind. For although, in Part I, I showed by a general argument that all things (including, consequently, the human mind) depend upon God as regards their essence and existence; nevertheless that demonstration, while it is legitimate and placed beyond risk of doubt, yet does not so impress our mind as when the same conclusion is drawn from the very essence of some individual thing which we say depends upon God.\textsuperscript{130}

Prop. 37. \textit{There is nothing in nature that is opposed to this intellectual love, that is, that can destroy it.}

\textit{Proof.}—This intellectual love necessarily follows from the nature of the mind, in so far as this is considered as an eternal truth through the nature of God (33 and 29). If, then, there were anything that were opposed to this love, it would be opposed to the truth: and, consequently, that which could destroy this love would bring it to pass that what is true would be false; which (as is self-evident) is absurd. Therefore, there is nothing in nature, etc.\textsuperscript{131} Q. E. D.

\textit{Scholium.}—The axiom of Part IV. has to do with individual things, in so far as they are considered with relation to a definite time and place. No one, I think, doubts this.

Prop. 38. \textit{The greater the number of things the mind knows by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the less is it subject to hurtful emotions, and the less does it fear death.}
Prop. 39. He whose body is capable of the greatest number of activities has a mind, the greatest part of which is eternal.

Proof.—He whose body is capable of the greatest number of activities is the least harassed by hurtful emotions (IV, 38),† that is (IV, 30),‡ by emotions

* See note to prop. 10.—Tr.
† See IV, App. XXVII, and note.—Tr.
‡ See note to prop. 10.—Tr.
which are contrary to our nature. Therefore (10) he has the power of arranging and concatenating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order, and consequently of bringing it about (14) that all the modifications of the body are referred to the idea of God. Whence it happens (15) that he is affected with love toward God, which (16) must occupy or constitute the greatest part of the mind; and hence (33) he has a mind, the greatest part of which is eternal. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—Since human bodies are capable of very many activities, there is no doubt but that they can be of such a nature as to be related to minds that have a great knowledge of themselves and of God, and of which the greatest or the chief part is eternal—of such a nature, consequently, as scarcely to fear death. That this may be the more clearly comprehended, one should here consider that we live in continual change, and according as we change for the better or for the worse, we are said to be fortunate or unfortunate. He who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a corpse, is said to be unfortunate, and, on the other hand, it is regarded as good fortune to have been able to pass the whole span of life with a healthy mind in a healthy body. And in truth, he who, like an infant or a child, has a body capable of very few activities, and very dependent on external causes, has a mind that, in itself considered, is scarcely conscious of itself, of God, or of things; on the other hand, he who has a body capable of very many activities has a mind that, in itself considered, has a vivid consciousness of itself, of God, and of things. In this life, therefore, it is our chief endeavor to change the body of the infant, as far as its nature
permits, and as far as is profitable for it, into another body capable of very many activities, and related to a mind conscious of itself, of God, and of very many things; so that all that is referred to its memory or imagination will be, in comparison with the understanding, of scarcely any importance, as I have just said in the scholium to the preceding proposition.133

Prop. 40. *The more perfection each thing has, the more active is it, and the less passive; and, conversely, the more active it is, the more perfect is it.*

*Proof.*—The more perfect each thing is, the more reality has it (II, def. 6), and consequently (III, 3, and schol.), the more active is it and the less passive. This demonstration proceeds in the same way in inverse order; whence it follows that, conversely, a thing is the more perfect, the more active it is. Q. E. D.

*Corollary.*—Hence it follows that the part of the mind which abides, whatever its amount, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind (23 and 29) is the understanding, and it is on account of this alone that we are said to be active (III, 3); but the part that we have shown perishes is just the imagination (21), and it is on account of this alone that we are said to be passive (III, 3, and general def. of the emotions). Therefore (by the preceding proposition), the former, whatever its amount, is more perfect than the latter. Q. E. D.

*Scholium.*—These are the things I set out to prove with regard to the mind, in so far as it is considered without relation to the existence of the body. From these, and at the same time from I, 21, and other propositions, it appears that our mind, in so far as it knows, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is de-
terminated by another eternal mode of thinking, this again by another, and so to infinity; so that they all together constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God. 134

Prop. 41. Even if we did not know our mind to be eternal, we should nevertheless regard as of the highest importance piety and religion, and all without restriction of those things that, as I have shown in Part IV, are referred to courage and magnanimity.

Proof.—The first and only foundation of virtue or of a right method of living (IV, 22, cor., and IV, 24)* is to seek one's own advantage. But in the determination of what reason pronounces to be of advantage, we have taken no account of the eternity of the mind, which we have come to a knowledge of only in this Fifth Part. Hence, although at that time we were ignorant that the mind is eternal, we regarded as of the highest importance those things that, as I have shown, are referred to courage and magnanimity. Therefore, were we even now ignorant of that fact, we should nevertheless regard as of the highest importance these precepts of reason. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—The belief of the multitude appears to be otherwise. Most men seem to think that they are free just in so far as they are permitted to gratify desire, and that they give up their independence just in so far as they are obliged to live according to the precept of the divine law. Piety, then, and religion, and all things, without restriction, that are referred to greatness of soul, they regard as burdens; and they hope after death to lay these down and to receive the reward of their bondage, that is, of piety and religion. And not by this hope alone, but also and chiefly by

* See IV, def. 8; IV, App. IV, and Note 103.—Tr.
fear—the fear of being punished after death with dire torments—are they induced to live according to the precept of the divine law so far as their poverty and feebleness of soul permit. If men had not this hope and fear, but if, on the contrary, they thought that minds perished with the body, and that for the wretched, worn out with the burden of piety, there was no continuation of existence, they would return to their inclination, and decide to regulate everything according to their lusts, and to be governed by chance rather than by themselves. This seems to me no less absurd than it would seem if someone, because he does not believe he can nourish his body with good food to eternity, should choose to stuff himself with what is poisonous and deadly; or, because he sees that his mind is not eternal or immortal, should choose on that account to be mad, and to live without reason. These things are so absurd as scarcely to be worth mentioning.

Prop. 42. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; nor do we rejoice in it because we restrain the desires, but on the contrary, because we rejoice in it we are able to restrain the desires.

Proof.—Blessedness consists in love toward God (36, and schol.), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (32, cor.). Therefore this love (III, 59,* and III, 3) must be referred to the mind in so far as it is active, and hence (IV, def. 8) it is virtue itself. This was the first point. In the second place, the more the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, the more it knows (32); that is (3, cor.), the greater the power it has over the emotions, and (38) the less it is subject to emotions that are hurtful. Therefore, from the fact that the mind rejoices in this

* See III, 1.—Tr.
208 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA.

divine love or blessedness, it has the power of restraining the desires. And since the power of man to restrain the emotions consists in understanding alone, no one rejoices in blessedness because he has restrained the emotions, but, on the contrary, the power of restraining the desires springs from blessedness itself. Q. E. D.

Scholium.—With this I have completed all that I intended to show regarding the power of the mind over the emotions, and the freedom of the mind. From what I have said it is evident how much stronger and better the wise man is than the ignorant man, who is led by mere desire. For the ignorant man, besides being agitated in many ways by external causes, and never attaining true satisfaction of soul, lives as it were without consciousness of himself, of God, and of things, and just as soon as he ceases to be acted upon, ceases to be. While, on the contrary, the wise man, in so far as he is considered as such, is little disturbed in mind, but, conscious by a certain eternal necessity of himself, of God, and of things, he never ceases to be, but is always possessed of true satisfaction of soul. If, indeed, the path that I have shown to lead to this appears very difficult, still it may be found. And surely it must be difficult, since it is so rarely found. For if salvation were easily attained, and could be found without great labor, how could it be neglected by nearly everyone? But all excellent things are as difficult as they are rare.136
CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

Since the limits of this volume do not permit of my printing extended extracts from certain of Spinoza's writings which cast a light upon his theory of knowledge, and are of no small assistance in explaining the reasoning contained in the "Ethics," and since those reasonings are, both on account of their unfortunate mathematical dress and on account of the peculiar character of the writer's thought, difficult of comprehension even to students who have had a good training in the interpretation of philosophical systems, I have thought it desirable in this edition to give rather copious notes, and to preface them with a brief exposition of our author's theory of knowledge and an examination of the general structure of his thought. In this preface I do not examine in detail all of Spinoza's conceptions, but refer the student for such an examination to the notes that follow. Here I am concerned only with certain things which the reader may well bear in mind from the outset, and which will make intelligible to him some of the intricacies and obscurities of Spinoza's reasoning. One cannot do justice to an author's thought until one sees how, under the circumstances, the writer might naturally have written as he did. It is my desire to put the student, as far as possible, in such a position with regard to Spinoza.
I. SPINOZA'S EPISTEMOLOGY.

1. Ideas and Things.—Spinoza draws a sharp distinction between ideas and the objects which they represent. An idea is one thing and its object another, and the two are not even alike. The idea of a circle, for example, is not the circle, and does not resemble the circle, for it has no center and no circumference as a circle has.* Yet in some sense it truly represents the circle, or, in the language of that day, the same thing that exists "formally" or "actually," i.e., as a real, external thing, out there beyond the mind, also exists "objectively" or by way of representative image in the mind.† This way of speaking, which makes the one thing or "essence" or "nature" exist in two ways, the one "formal" or real, the other "objective" or representative, seems to bridge the gulf between the idea and its object, even when they are clearly seen to be two distinct things, as, for example, by Descartes,‡ and gives rise to confusion. It makes it easy for one whose theory of knowledge has wholly cut off the world of mind from a supposed real world beyond it, to recover that real world surreptitiously, and without a clear consciousness of his inconsisteny.§ If I say that it is an eternal world that exists "objectively" in my thought, then in my thought I appear to myself to be grasping, not merely ideas, but an external world. One cannot, of course, obtain real knowledge by thus juggling with words, and for the moment regarding as one two things defined to be distinctly two. When the matter

* De Intellectus Emendatione," p. 11, ed. Van Vloten and Land.
† Ibid.
‡ "Meditations," III.
§ "De Intellectus Emendatione," p. 11, et seq.
is narrowly examined it is easy to see that a pure assumption has been made, and the fact partly hidden under a phrase. If the idea is one thing, and its object, as we express it, a something beyond it and distinct from it, and if, further, the mind is shut up to its ideas, how can I know that my idea is representative of something beyond itself? How can I know that it is in any sense a copy? Evidently I am simply assuming without proof of any sort the "formal" existence of the object and then concealing from myself the fact that I have made such an assumption by declaring that this external thing exists "objectively" in my thought. It is easy to forget one's own hypothesis—the doctrine that the mind is shut up to the circle of its own ideas—and to fall back into the notion that we have direct experience of things, and can correct our ideas of things by an immediate reference to the things themselves. One finds this inconsistency everywhere in the history of philosophy,* and one does not have to look far for instances of it in contemporary writings. Such an inconsistency appears a little less glaring when cloaked by the scholastic phrase I have been discussing.

2. Parallelism of Ideas and Things.—Now Spinoza distinguishes, as I have said, between the idea and the object. He declares them to be wholly unlike each other.† Indeed, he pushes so far the Cartesian antithesis between matter and mind as to deny all interaction between ideas and things.‡ Nevertheless he assumes, as above stated, that the idea truly represents

† "De Intellectus Emendatione," loc. cit.
‡ "Ethics," II, 6.
its object, and that the world of thought as a whole mirrors with exactitude the world of things. The two worlds of thought and extension he makes completely independent, but absolutely parallel to each other, the one containing "objectively" what exists "formally" in the other. In short, he regards them as one thing viewed under two aspects.* How two things so different as are, in his conception, thought and extension, can be parallel and stand in the relation of original and representative—how an idea, which is denied a center and circumference, can represent a circle, of which these constitute the very essence—Spinoza never attempts to make clear. He leaves the problem where it is left by modern writers who hold to a doctrine of representative perception, declare ideas to be distinct from things and wholly without extension, and yet regard them as in some occult sense truly representative of extended things. It is easy to see how Spinoza, given the doctrine of the "objective" existence of real things, which he inherited from the past, and given also the Cartesian antithesis between mind and matter as wholly different in nature, might naturally hit upon the idea of an absolute independence and yet a complete parallelism between the two worlds. It will save the student some trouble if he will bear in mind that Spinoza never offers proof of such a parallelism, but simply assumes it; that in some passages he presents doctrines inconsistent with it; and that, as a matter of fact, he rests upon an appeal to experience in justification of his position.† Such an appeal to experience

* "Ethics," II, 7.
† "De Intellectus Emendatione," p. 8; "Ethics," II, axioms 4 and 5.
is, of course, an abandonment of the position assumed at the outset.

3. The Test of Truth.—Having thus separated thought from things and denied all interaction between them, Spinoza naturally raises the question: What is the test of truth? how can a true idea be distinguished from a false? Since he has cut off ideas from things, he cannot consistently make the test to lie in an observed correspondence of the idea with its object. Ideas are independent of their objects and not to be accounted for by a reference to the objects. He is, hence, quite consistent in seeking for the test of truth in the idea itself.* He falls back upon his notion of "formal essences" and their corresponding "objective essences" or mental representatives, and makes certitude to consist in the possession of the "objective essence" of a thing, or a true idea.† In other words, in having a true idea we possess the truth and may know we possess the truth, for truth shines by its own light, and we need not go beyond the idea to know that it is true. Error arises merely from confusion, from our affirming of the "objective essences" of things what does not properly belong to them.‡ We may, therefore, guard against error by avoiding confusion, by attaining clear ideas; and, as very simple ideas cannot be confused, error with regard to them is impossible.§ Spinoza's endeavor in all this is sufficiently reasonable. He is trying to find a criterion of truth which will not compel him to pass beyond the circle of ideas to a something wholly outside of

† "De Intellectus Emendatione," pp. 12, 23.
‡ Ibid., p. 24.
§ Ibid., pp. 21, 22.
them and, by hypothesis, wholly cut off from the mind. The problem is a living one, and very irrational solutions of it are offered still. If we have only copies of things, representations, and never the things themselves, it may well "gravel a philosopher," as Bishop Berkeley hath it, to discover any means of proving that they are mere representations or copies, or to pick out those that are true copies from those that are not. In declaring that the idea is an "objective essence" Spinoza makes precisely the assumption made by the adherents of the doctrine of representative perception now, and he cuts the knot in precisely the same way. Of course, the assumption that all clear ideas are true, in so far as this means that they correspond to real things or "formal essences," is a mere assumption, and adopted without proof. Here again we have a mode of procedure closely analogous to what we meet every day. Indeed, it is most interesting to the student of the history of philosophy to see how ancient and how modern is this bit of loose reasoning. It turns up everywhere. Had Spinoza cut loose from the hypothetical "external" thing altogether, and become an idealist, and had he, instead of seeking the criterion of truth in the idea itself, sought it rather in the relations of the idea in question with other ideas; in short, had he sought some such criterion of truth as characterizes Berkeley's "ideas of sense,"* he would have had a much more hopeful outlook, and could have avoided the inconsistencies and assumptions which burden his argument.

4. *The Concatenation of Ideas.*—Since the world of thought mirrors with exactitude the external, real world, the relations between ideas, according to

* "Principles," §§ 29–33.
Spinoza, correspond exactly to the relations between things. In other words, the logical deduction of ideas from each other corresponds to the physical relation of effect and cause. If a real thing in nature is caused by another thing and could not have existed without it, then its idea "involves" the idea of that other thing and cannot be conceived without it.* Hence in order to reproduce faithfully in our thought all nature, it is only necessary to begin with the idea which represents the origin and source of nature and to completely develop it, deducing all our ideas from it. Could we do this satisfactorily we would possess all truth. The being from the idea of which all truth may thus be evolved is Spinoza's God, or Substance. It is needless to say that Spinoza did not succeed in thus evolving all ideas from the idea of God, and the student will look in vain for such a deduction. I mention this in passing, as I reserve the subject for fuller discussion a little later. I wish simply to remark here that the student will find this parallel between logical deduction and physical causation one of the most puzzling things in the "Ethics." It cannot be carried out consistently, and it introduces much obscurity into Spinoza's reasoning. The origin of the idea is sufficiently clear. It is a corollary to the general parallelism between ideas and things, which I have discussed above.

5. Mind and Body.—As every object has its corresponding idea, one may say that all things are animated, and as the difference between two ideas corresponds to the difference between their objects, some ideas are more complex than and superior to others.†

* "De Intellectus Emendatione," pp. 13, 14.
† "Ethics," II, 13, schol.
The human body is highly complex; the idea corresponding to it is the human mind; and, since thought and extension are wholly independent of each other, the mind cannot act upon the body nor the body upon the mind.* This would seem to teach that the human mind can know only the human body, its object, but this is not Spinoza's teaching. He uses the word idea in two distinct senses, in one of which it signifies that in the world of thought, which corresponds to some given object in the world of reality, is, so to speak, its soul, and in the other a representative image, which need not be the idea of the object known in the former of the two senses. Spinoza himself distinguishes† between the two senses of the word, but he does not make the distinction clear, nor does he keep the two meanings separate. A part of his reasoning is based on a confusion of the two. This treatment of ideas the student will find one of the troublesome parts of the "Ethics." I shall discuss it more fully in a note later. It is evident from certain passages that Spinoza fell back upon experience for his evidence that the mind is connected with the body, and forgot that he had wholly cut them off from each other.‡

6. Summary.—To summarize briefly: one should bear in mind that Spinoza distinguishes between ideas and their objects, and makes them numerically distinct; that he makes them wholly different in nature, and denies all interaction between them; that he, nevertheless, makes them absolutely parallel, and regards ideas as representative of things; that, as a conse-

quence, he believes he can reproduce all nature by logical deduction from the idea of the Being which is the source of nature; and that he regards the relation of mind and body as a special instance of the general parallelism between thought and things, calling the mind the "idea" of the body. These doctrines underlie the reasonings in the "Ethics." They will furnish an explanation of much that seems very arbitrary. One may complain, much that is arbitrary, since the doctrines themselves rest upon unproved assumptions, and do not shine by their own light. To this I answer, it is easy to see how Spinoza might have been led to make such assumptions, which, moreover, are not widely different from those made by philosophers of our day. One may admire the boldness and ingenuity of his thought, while recognizing that its foundations are themselves without foundation. And it ill behooves philosophers of the nineteenth century, whose books bristle with "intuitions" and "necessary truths," to criticise severely a philosopher of the seventeenth for a few natural assumptions of a similar nature. It is a great saving of labor to assume things as self-evident.

II. SPINOZA'S REALISM THE KEY TO THE REASONINGS CONTAINED IN THE "ETHICS."

7. The System of Ideas.—Spinoza insists that the idea from which all other ideas are to be deduced must not be an abstraction, but the idea of "a particular affirmative essence," of a real Being. This Being is God or substance. From this idea must stream forth all our other ideas, as from God stream forth all things.* Had he rigorously and consistently carried

* "De Intellectus Emendatione," pp. 32, 33.
out this thought he would have had to deduce from substance the attributes thought and extension, which "the intellect perceives as constituting its essence"; from them, in turn, the two eternal modes, motion and "absolutely infinite intellect"; and from these one or more other eternal modes: after that, "essences" of various orders; and, finally, finite particular modes, or the individual things in nature, which close the series. These last, however, on account of their number and their complicated relations to each other, as well as on account of the fact that their existence has no connection with their "essence," he declares it beyond the power of the human intellect to obtain by deduction.* He therefore distinguishes between their "essence" or nature and their existence, and allows us the power of deducing the former only from the series of "fixed and eternal things."† For information regarding the existence of individual things we must look elsewhere. We must turn to experience and the order of causes.‡

The student will seek in vain in the "Ethics" for the deductions here indicated. The attributes are not deduced from the idea of substance at all; the infinite modes are not deduced from the attributes; nor are the essences of finite modes deduced from the infinite modes. As to particular finite modes or individual things, with their "accidents" as well as their essences, there is not even an indication of the way in which these are to be traced back to the idea of God or substance. The "existence" of finite things, which is

* Ibid.
† I. c., the essences of various orders which constitute the steps in this deduction, beginning with God or substance,
‡ "Ethics," I, 7, schol. 2., and 11, proof 2,
distinct from their essence and to be accounted for separately, is left unaccounted for, in fact, being merely referred in a general way to God, the source of all.* It is true that Spinoza seems to indicate in the passage referred to above, that our inability to deduce individual things from the idea of God is due rather to the weakness of our understanding than to the nature of the problem itself, but, as I shall point out later, he treats finite existences as different in their nature from essences, and not susceptible of the same kind of an explanation.

8. Spinoza's Realism.—It was natural that Spinoza should pass lightly over these deductions, for in the nature of the case they cannot be made. The existence of these different orders of being has to be assumed—taken up as furnished by experience—and then the things, in accordance with a general principle, are referred to God as source and cause. Our author, though he warns us against abstractions, is really dealing with abstractions, universals, not concrete things, and one cannot deduce a world of concrete realities from an abstraction, even if that abstraction be, after the fashion of the realists, inconsistently treated as a real thing. The question of the nature of the “fixed and eternal things,” beginning with God or substance, is a very important one to the student of Spinoza; and without solving it he cannot find the key to the peculiar reasonings contained in the “Ethics.” When he has solved it he can readily see why Spinoza undertook this deduction and why he was doomed to failure. He must realize that “fixed and eternal things” are treated as both abstract and concrete, as universals and real entities. As universals

they form a chain, are related to each other as lower and higher, and seem to make possible a passage from one to the other; as real entities they appear to justify the derivation of a concrete from that which is really less concrete. Nowhere in the "Ethics" must one lose sight of the fact that they are endowed with this double nature. Spinoza's reasonings are the reasonings of a realist, and he falls into their traditional error. This I shall try to show in what follows.

We hear a good deal of Spinoza's nominalism, and we have seen that he insists upon an avoidance of abstractions, upon a deduction of all our ideas from an idea in the strictest sense concrete, that of a "particular affirmative essence." His nominalism was, however, only skin-deep, and he was at heart as thorough a realist as any philosopher of the Middle Ages. No one, it is true, has more clearly indicated the way in which we arrive at certain general notions or universals. Note the following: "Nevertheless, that I may omit nothing that it is necessary to know, I will briefly mention the causes in which the terms known as transcendental have had their origin, as, for example, Being, Thing, Something. These terms arise from the fact that the human body, since it is limited, is only capable of forming in itself distinctly a certain number of images at the one time. If this number be exceeded, the images begin to run together; and if the number of images that the body is able to form in itself distinctly at one time be greatly exceeded, they are all entirely confused with each other. Since this is so, it is evident from the corollary to prop. 17, and from prop. 18, that the human mind can imagine distinctly at one time as many bodies as there are images that can be formed at one time in the body corresponding
to it. But when the images in the body are wholly confused with each other, the mind, too, will imagine all the bodies confusedly and without distinguishing them at all. It will grasp them under one attribute, as it were, namely, under the attribute of Being, of Thing, etc. This can also be deduced from the fact that images are not always equally lively; and from other causes analogous to these, which it is not necessary to unfold here, for it is sufficient to the object I have in view to consider a single one. They all amount to this, that these terms stand for ideas in the highest degree confused. Again, from like causes have sprung the notions called *universals*, as Man, Horse, Dog, etc. There are formed in the human body at the one time so many images—for instance of man—that they overcome the faculty of imagination; not, indeed, wholly, but to such a degree that the mind is unable to imagine the little differences in the individuals (as the color, the size, etc., of each) and their exact number. It distinctly imagines only that in which all, in so far as they affect the body, agree. By this element, especially, the body was affected in the case of each individual; it is this that the mind expresses by the word *man*; and this that it predicates of an infinity of individuals. As I have said, it cannot imagine the exact number of individuals. But bear in mind that these notions are not formed by everyone in the same way, but differently by each according to the nature of the object by which the body has been the more often affected, and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For example, those who have more often regarded with admiration the stature of men will understand by the word *man* an animal erect in stature. Those, on the other hand, who
have been accustomed to notice something else, will form another common image, as that man is a laughing animal, a featherless biped, a rational animal, and so on. Each one will form universal images of things according to the character of his body." *

Leaving out the "images" formed in the body, we have here something quite modern, and Spinoza applies his doctrine more boldly than many of the moderns. To quote from the "Ethics" a little further on: "In the same way it is proved that there is in the mind no absolute power of knowing, desiring, loving, etc. Whence it follows, these and similar faculties are either absolutely fictitious, or only metaphysical entities—universals—that we are accustomed to form from individuals. Thus, understanding and will are related to this or that idea and to this or that volition, as lapidity is related to this or that stone, or man to Peter or Paul." †

This appears to be a nominalism, or at least conceptualism, sufficiently thorough-going, but it is, as I have said, merely on the surface. Spinoza is at heart a realist, and his reasonings can only be explained after admitting the fact. Had he consistently carried out the thought of the citation just given, he would have recognized that in the several stages of this deduction of things from the idea of God or substance he was handling mere abstractions and not things at all. He would have seen that the attribute thought cannot be regarded as a real thing distinct from the sum total of ideas or modes in which the attribute is expressed; and that his substance, so far from being a "particular affirmative essence," is

* "Ethics," II, 40, schol. 1.
† II, 48, schol.
either that ultimate abstraction "being," or simply a name for the sum total of particular concrete beings. As a matter of fact, Spinoza vibrates between these two conceptions. Usually he makes the higher orders of being, from which concrete things are to be deduced, abstractions, or, perhaps I should say, treats them as somewhat inconsistent abstractions, while calling them something else. But sometimes he clearly comes back to the other conception and makes the lower orders of being parts of the higher. For example, in his treatise "On the Improvement of the Understanding," after stating that the first principle of nature cannot be conceived as a universal—as an abstraction—he says that what we are in search of is "a being single and infinite, in other words, the sum total of being, beyond which there is no being." * Again, in speaking of the relation of the finite mind to God, he expresses the same thought. Our ideas are inadequate when we know only in part, and inadequate ideas arise in us only because we are parts of a thinking being, whose thoughts, some in their entirety and some as fragments, constitute our mind.† The "Ethics" is, if possible, more explicit: "These are the things I set out to prove with regard to the mind, in so far as it is considered without relation to the existence of the body. From these, and at the same time from I, 21, and other propositions, it appears that our mind, in so far as it knows, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, this again by another, and so to infinity; so that they all together constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God." ‡ Here a por-

* P. 26. 
† P. 25. 
tion of the human mind is made part of an infinite mode, and not subsumed under it as an individual under its universal or class notion.

On the other hand these higher orders of being are not usually treated as wholes having the lower as their parts, but rather as universals. The fact that they are universals is not, it is true, very clearly brought out, for the reasoning is vitiated by that unfortunate parallel between physical causation and logical deduction. But it seems to me sufficiently clear that Spinoza treated them rather as universals than as aggregates. That he did not think of them simply as aggregates is plain from a multitude of passages. The idea of God is called the cause of all our ideas as God is the cause of all things.* All our ideas are to be deduced from this one, not found in it as the part in the whole. Substance (or God) is by nature prior to its modifications; † is active while all its modifications are passive; ‡ and is indivisible, while modes, as modes, can be divided.§ In short, on the supposition that Spinoza uses the word substance merely as another name for the universe regarded as an aggregate, much of his reasoning is wholly inexplicable.

That these "fixed and eternal things" from which the essences of concrete individuals are to be deduced are really treated by Spinoza as universals, should be clear, I think, to every careful reader of his works. In one passage in his treatise "On the Improvement of the Understanding" he explicitly admits that they resemble universals, and attributes to them a property which must be denied to every single individual thing

* "De Intellectus Emendatione," p. 32.
† "Ethics," I, i.
of whatever kind. He writes: "Hence these fixed and eternal things, although they are individuals, must, on account of their presence and power everywhere, be to us as universals, that is, as genera of definitions of individual mutable things, and the proximate causes of all things." * It is only a universal that can, in any strict sense of the word, be "present" † everywhere. An individual can be present in different places at the one time only as an aggregate of parts. In many other passages one may see that Spinoza thought of these "eternal things" as universals, and that this thought has given birth to much of his reasoning.

9. The Concept.—The great importance of this question to the Spinozistic philosophy will justify me in indulging in what some may regard as a digression on the subject of the concept or general notion, the much-mooted universal. For a fuller discussion of some aspects of this subject I must refer the reader to a monograph I printed a few years since, entitled "On Sameness and Identity," ‡ and having for object the making clear the different senses in which we may, in accordance with common usage, call a thing or things the same. It deals at some length with the question of universals. I shall return later to the "eternal things" of Spinoza.

When two or more things resemble each other in any way, or, as we say, have anything in common, we may make a distinction between the quality or qualities they have in common and those in which

---

* P. 33.
† I explain later in what sense a universal may be said to be "present" anywhere.
‡ University of Pennsylvania Press, 1890.
they differ from each other, and we may regard the objects as forming a class, giving them a class name. This class name indicates just what they have in common, and abstracts from the other qualities possessed by the objects. When, for example, I compare several men, I may recognize that they are all alike in certain respects, and may, for convenience, regard them as a class, giving them the general name "man." This general name "man" stands, or should stand, only for those qualities possessed by every member of the class. In the same way I may form other class notions of higher and higher degrees of generality, after the fashion of the handbooks on logic, and may obtain a series of general terms related to each other as lower and higher in the same series, such as man, animal, living being, body, being. Whether the concept be of a low or of a high degree of generality, the procedure is just the same. That which a number of individuals have in common is distinguished from that in which they differ, and is, for the time being, made the object of special attention.

It was but natural that, at an early period of the history of thought, reflection should occupy itself with this general notion, marked by the class name, and strive to fathom its significance. We apply the name "man" to a great many different individuals, and recognize that, in so far as each is a man, they are in some sense the same. When a man dies and disappears "man" does not disappear, for here is "man" in another individual. What more natural than to assume that "man" (the universal) must have a reality independent of all individual men, eternal, immutable and apart, unaffected by all the changes in individual things? What more natural than to as-
sume that the "man" in each individual man must be strictly identical with that in each other, and that, although present in all, it must be in some sense an individual real thing? This is just what Plato does. Distinguishing between the universal and the individual, between "man" and men, he thought it necessary, according to Aristotle, who does not, I think, do him injustice, to assume an object for the universal outside of and apart from all the individuals forming a class. This, the object of the general term, is the Platonic Idea. It is a real thing, the real thing, in which the individuals participate, or of which they are copies; but it is not itself to be found in any or all of them except, so to speak, in a figurative or metaphorical way. Aristotle, seeing no reason to assume a new individual, for so he regarded the Platonic Idea, placed the universal in the objects composing the class. Certain of the schoolmen, emphasizing the difference between real things and mental representations, maintained that only individuals have real existence, and asserted either that universals exist merely as peculiar combinations of mental elements which serve to think the objects forming a class, or that the only thing that can properly be called universal is the word, which may be applied indifferently to many individuals of the one kind. In these views we have the universalia ante rem, the universalia in re, and the universalia post rem; or Extreme Realism, Moderate Realism,* and Nominalism in its two forms.

Now the great snare and stumbling-block of all those who busy themselves with universals is the tendency to make abstractions concrete things—to add what

* When in this volume I use the word "realism" without qualification, I do not mean to include this doctrine.
the very nature of the case demands should be absent. When we give a name to a class of objects as a class, or, rather, when we give a name to what a number of objects have in common, we should remember that we are abstracting from everything in which the objects differ. We are trying to indicate that each possesses certain elements which, taken by themselves, render impossible any distinction between different objects. We distinguish two objects as two through some difference, even if it be only local or temporal. Redness combined with \( a \) and redness combined with \( b \) are recognized as two occurrences of redness, but this only account of \( a \) and \( b \). Redness perceived to-day and redness perceived yesterday are two occurrences of redness, marked as such by the "to-day" and the "yesterday." Redness considered simply contains nothing which will allow of such distinctions. This does not imply at all that redness considered simply is an occurrence of redness—that since we have not two or more occurrences of the quality we have a single occurrence of it, an individual. We have not, if we have really abstracted from all save the redness, any "occurrence" or "occurrences" at all, for these imply just the elements of difference which we are endeavoring to eliminate. An "occurrence" of redness means redness with a difference which will mark it out from other redness, from another "occurrence."

When, therefore, one gives to twenty individuals a common name to indicate that they resemble each other, he should keep clearly in mind just what this means. It means that along with various differing elements each contains the element \( x \). And when he proposes to separate the \( x \) from the other elements, and consider it separately, he should be most careful to see
that he is really taking it separately, and not allowing
shreds of foreign matter to hang to it and give rise
to inconsistencies and perplexities. He should make
sure that he is keeping his abstraction abstract, and
not turning it into a concrete thing in any sense what-
ever. For instance, he should not overlook the fact
that there is a fallacy in the very question, Whether
the \( x \) in any one individual is strictly identical with the
\( x \) in any other? If these two \( x's \) are distinguishable
as in two individuals, one is not considering \( x \) merely,
but \( x \) with other elements. The separation of the \( x \)
element from the other elements in the objects is here
not complete, or one would be considering not "an \( x \)"
or "\( x's \)" but \( x \). The abstract \( x \) cannot, strictly speak-
ing, be \( in \) any of the individuals while remaining an
abstraction. When it is in an individual it is "an \( x \)"
—or \( x \) with a difference. So when Spinoza makes
his "fixed and eternal things" individuals, and yet
declares them to be present everywhere, he is in the
same sentence making them abstract and concrete.
A universal may be present in many places only in the
sense that the \( x \)—common, as we say, to a number of
individuals—is found now combined with these
elements and now with those. As combined with them it
becomes this \( x \) or that, and is no longer universal.
Every individual \( x \), as an individual, is, of course, a
different thing from every other, and is not strictly
identical with it.

Now when Plato looked for the object of the gen-
eral name, what did he do? He created a new object
distinct from and apart from all the others. He is
very vague in his statements, and he was probably quite
as vague in his thought; but I cannot see how any-
one familiar with the "Phædrus," the "Republic," the
"Timæus," the "Symposium," and the "Parmenides," and familiar with Plato's concrete way of thinking in images, can avoid coming to the conclusion that the idea was to him predominantly an object, an individual—a vague and inconsistent object, if you please, but still an object. But an $x$ is in no sense a universal. It is the same with other $x$'s only in being like them. The $x$ that they have in common must be $x$ considered simply, not $x$ considered as here or there, in this place or that. All such differences must be completely eliminated if one is to get not an individual, but a universal. If the idea may be considered as apart from objects, it is an object in so far not essentially differing from the others, and it matters little whether it be put in heaven or on the earth or in the waters that are under the earth. Wherever and whatever it may be, it is an individual and must act like an individual, that is, it can only be in the one place at the one time. Plato did not recognize this fact. Although he makes his idea an object, he does not put it on the same plane with other objects. They suffer change, while it is immutable; they are perceivable by the senses, and it is not; they are fettered by space and time conditions, while it is in some sense present in many individuals and is in its nature eternal. The trouble has arisen out of his difficulty in keeping an abstraction abstract; he has turned it into a concrete, and, finding in the world of sense no place for this concrete, this new individual, he has given it a world of its own, where it lives an amphibious life peculiar to itself, and becomes a perennial source of difficulties to succeeding generations of philosophers.

Aristotle, seeing very clearly some of the objections
II, 9] CRITICAL NOTES. 231

to this mode of procedure, placed the idea in the objects forming the class. It may be objected that putting \( x \) in a place individualizes it as much as putting it out of a place. This is quite true if the “in” be taken locally—taken as it is when we speak of a man as being in one room rather than in another. The \( x \) in one object is not identically the \( x \) in another object. We do not get the universal, \( x \) in the abstract, until we lose the distinctions “in the one object” and “in the other object.” If, however, by the statement that the universal is in the objects, one mean merely that the universal is that element \( x \), which, combined with certain elements, forms a total which is known as this object, and combined with certain others forms a total which is known as that, but taken by itself contains no distinction of this and that; if this be all that is meant by the “in,” there is no objection to the use of the statement, and it is strictly true. The \( x \) element is a part of each of the objects, but, until some addition is made to it, it is not “the \( x \) in this object” or “the \( x \) in that object”; it is what they have in common. The “in common” means just this.

The nominalistic doctrine has, as has been said, two forms. The extreme nominalistic position, that the only true universal is the name, is highly unreasonable. If the objects to be classed really have something in common, then that which they have in common is a universal element. If, on the other hand, they have nothing in common, why put them in one class and give them a common name? As for the more moderate nominalism, or the doctrine of the conceptualists—that appears to do justice to ideas, but hardly to things. In so far as it holds that the
mind can form a concept, which shall consist of the element or elements several objects have in common, we have no quarrel with it. Here we find a true universal, obtained by discarding differences which distinguish objects from one another. We obtain by this that mental core common to several similar mental objects, in other words, to several ideas. If, however, we distinguish between mental objects and "real" things corresponding to them, we have evidently two distinct fields to consider. Do our ideas truly correspond to external objects? Then, if the ideas have something in common, are enough alike to furnish a concept, must not their corresponding objects also be alike? must they not, too, have something in common? a universal element? It does not in the least explain the universal element in "real" things to point out that in the mind there exists a concept or general notion. The concept can be no true representative of what is outside unless it truly correspond to a universal element outside. This sounds a little like extreme realism, but it differs from it as widely as the poles. It is only necessary to bear in mind that, just as the concept, to remain a universal, must be kept abstract, so this hypothetical external universal must be kept abstract, and not turned into a thing.

On the whole, the most reasonable doctrine is the Aristotelian, the moderate realism. It is necessary, however, to understand it carefully, and to avoid all tendency to individualize abstractions. That this is by no means easy to do, the history of philosophy clearly shows; and it shows, too, into what serious perplexities one falls when one neglects to observe this precaution. The Anselmic view of genera and
species as universal substances * is an instance of this error. The doctrine attributed to William of Champ- peaux by Abelard, that universals are essentially and wholly present in each of their individuals, in which latter there is no diversity of essence, but only variety through accidents, † is tenable or not, according to the sense in which the words are taken. The word "wholly" is an awkward one, and would seem to indicate that William regarded the universal as a thing, a concrete, which may be in this place or that. Whatever he may have intended to say, there can be no mistake as to the meaning of the following sentence from Robert Pulleyn: "The species is the whole substance of individuals, and the whole species is the same in each individual: therefore the species is one substance, but its individuals many persons, and these many persons are that one substance." ‡ The man who could pen such a sentence must have seen his universals through the thickest of fogs, and must have been capable of all sorts of logical enormities. We find nearly everywhere in the Middle Ages this tendency to turn abstractions into things, and we see the same tendency later. The procedure has a peculiar charm for the mystic, and one which he finds it hard to resist. It would not be difficult to cite contemporary instances of the blunder. §

10. Concepts Made Causes.—When one has turned universals—abstractions—into things, it is easy to ascribe to them causal functions which can only be

† "Historia Calamitatum," quoted by Hauréau, I, p. 324.
‡ Quoted by Hauréau, I, p. 328.
§ In the foregoing pages I have made use of my above mentioned treatise,
exercised by individual real things, having existence as well as "essence." As has been pointed out, concepts may be more or less general, and may stand in a relation of lower and higher. Plato, who had turned the Socratic concept into the concrete Idea, conceives of the Ideas as real things arranged in such a series, and makes the highest member of the series the Idea of the Good. He regards the Ideas as causes of things,* and the highest of them as the ultimate cause of all reality and all knowledge.† John Scotus Erigena well illustrates this same way of thinking. He taught that God is the supreme unity, and that, by a process of evolution from the general to the particular, individual things are produced by him. First come forth the highest genera, then the lower, and finally individuals. He conceived universals as real things, which, by a process of unfolding, give birth to that which represents a lesser degree of generality.‡

As we have seen, the philosophers who have thus made their universals concrete have not made them completely and consistently concrete. They have given them an existence apart from the individuals subsumed under them, but not an existence wholly separate. To have done this would have been to entirely abandon the problem of the universal. Plato, for instance, describes the relation of individuals to their ideas as a "participation" in, an "imitation" of, the idea. The idea is the "pattern" and individual objects "images." The idea has a "community" with objects, it is in some sense "present" in them. And John Scotus declares that God alone truly is;

* "Phaedo," 96 et seq.
† "Republic," VI, 508.
‡ Ueberweg's "Hist. of Philos.," Vol. I, § 90. See also Hauréau, I, p. 150 et seq.
that he is the essence of all things; that they do not exist outside of him, but he is their very substance. This of course is not in harmony with the notion of a causal relation, for in any intelligible sense of the word cause, a cause must be something distinct from its effect and cannot be contained in it. The words "immanent cause," when they are so used as to convey any distinct meaning at all, signify something so different from the causal relation as commonly understood that it would be much better to use some other term to express the idea. Cause and effect are two distinct things, and must remain two distinct things to remain cause and effect. I shall speak of this again when I discuss in the notes Spinoza’s doctrine of the *causa sui*. The attempt to make universals causes, and yet keep them universals, has been the source of much vague and loose reasoning. It is simply the attempt to make them concrete and abstract at the same time.

II. *Concepts, though Causes, yet Universals.*—Much of the reasoning of the “Ethics” will become sufficiently intelligible to one who will bear in mind that Spinoza’s “fixed and eternal things” are universals—abstractions—but universals treated as though they were in some sense concrete things, real causes. He falls into the snare always set for the realist, or, perhaps I should say, into the snare into which one must have fallen to be a realist at all, as Plato and John Scotus are realists. As evidence that his “eternal things” are really universals I shall refer to a few passages in the “Ethics.” The proof that there cannot be in the universe two or more substances of the same nature, or with the same attribute, reads as follows: “Were there several distinct substances, they would have to be distinguished from one another either by a difference in attributes
or by a difference in modifications. If merely by a difference in attributes, it will be admitted there cannot be more than one with the same attribute. If, on the other hand, one is to be distinguished from another by a difference in modifications, then, since a substance is by nature prior to its modifications, when we lay aside its modifications and consider it in itself, that is, consider it as it is, we cannot conceive it as distinguished from another substance. In other words, there cannot be several substances, but only one."**

Here the substance is evidently what remains after stripping off differences, just as the genus is what remains when we overlook the differences which distinguish the species. If we leave out of view the different classes of men, the "modifications" of "man," and consider "man" simply, of course we cannot get more than one "man"—for that matter we cannot get one "man," for what we really get is not an individual but an abstraction. Spinoza, however, reasons as though the substance reached by this process were an individual, though elsewhere he indicates that it cannot be properly called one.† In his argument to prove that substance absolutely infinite is indivisible he reasons as follows: "Were it divisible, the parts into which it would be divided will either retain the nature of absolutely infinite substance, or will not. If the former, there will be several substances of the same nature, which is absurd. If the latter, then it will be possible for absolutely infinite substance to cease to be, which is also absurd."‡ Here substance is evidently treated as that which several things have in common, and upon this depends the absurdity of the first alternative. If substance is an abstraction, a

universal, it is of course absurd to speak of several substances. We cannot keep things separate from each other when we have left them nothing but their common core.

In speaking of extension, or, as he calls it, quantity, Spinoza says: "If, nevertheless, one here asks why we are so prone by nature to divide quantity, I answer, it is because we conceive quantity in two ways; to wit, abstractly, that is, superficially, as when we imagine it, and, second, as substance, in which case we conceive it by means of the understanding alone. If, therefore, we consider quantity as it is in the imagination, a thing we do often and quite easily, we shall find it finite, divisible, and composed of parts. If, on the other hand, we consider it as it is in the understanding, and conceive it as substance—a very difficult task—then, as I have already sufficiently proved, we shall find it infinite, single, and indivisible. This will be plain enough to everyone who knows how to distinguish between the imagination and the understanding, especially if he will also consider that matter is everywhere the same, and that there is in it no distinction of parts except as we conceive it affected in divers ways, whence its parts are distinguished only modally, not really. For example, we conceive water, in so far as it is water, to be divided and its parts to be separated from one another; but not in so far as it is corporeal substance, for, in so far as it is that, it is neither separated nor divided. Again, water, in so far as it is water, is generated and destroyed; but in so far as it is substance, it is neither generated nor destroyed."*

It is, of course, true that if we turn our attention

* "Ethics, I, 15, schol.
from matter in so far as it is "affected in divers ways," and fix it simply on matter as matter, i.e., on matter in the abstract, we cannot divide matter. All physical division implies that we distinguish between the parts of the thing divided as this part and that, here and there, and in so doing we add the differences that Spinoza calls modifications. His "quantity" conceived as substance is simply the extension in the abstract which is found in all extended things.

The same thought is expressed in the language he uses in dealing with modes elsewhere: "Modes are only modifications of the attributes of God;" * "It cannot have followed from God or from one of his attributes, in so far as this is modified by a modification which is infinite or eternal;" † the "essence of man consists of certain modifications of God's attributes;" ‡ "a modification or mode which expresses God's nature in a definite and determinate manner." § Mode is defined as "the modifications of substance, in other words, that which is in, and is conceived by means of, something else;" ¶ body is "a mode which expresses in a definite and determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is considered as an extended thing." ¶ This mode or modification is the concrete corresponding to a universal, and the "definite and determinate manner" in which extension is expressed is an individualization through accidents. Note again: "Such modes of thinking as love, desire, or whatever else comes under the head of emotion, do not arise unless there be present in the same individual the idea of the thing loved, desired, etc." **

† Ibid.
‡ "Ethics," II, 10, cor.
§ Ibid.
¶ "Ethics," I, def. 5.
¶ ¶ "Ethics," II, def. 1.
** "Ethics," II, axiom 3.
The "thinking" is here the class notion. Still clearer is the following proof that thought is an attribute of God, that is, that God is a thinking thing: "Individual thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which express in a definite and determinate manner God's nature. God, therefore, possesses the attribute, the conception of which is involved in all individual thoughts, and through which they are conceived. Hence thought is one of the infinite attributes of God, and it expresses God's eternal and infinite essence; that is, God is a thinking thing."* Evidently the attribute, the conception of which is involved in all individual thoughts, is simply the universal, the abstraction which remains after abstracting from differences. And the infinite attributes of God are the ultimate abstractions at which one arrives by a process of extracting the core common to many individuals.

12. The Word "Involuted."—The somewhat vague phrase, "involved in all individual thoughts," deserves some attention. In the passage quoted "involved in" is equivalent to "contained in," as the universal is contained in (I must warn the reader to bear in mind what I have said on the subject of this "in") the individuals subsumed under it. The word involved (involvere) is constantly used by Spinoza, and he has explained with some clearness what he means by it. He writes: "Let us conceive, therefore, some particular volition—for instance, the mode of thinking by which the mind affirms the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. This affirmation involves the conception or idea of a

triangle, that is, it cannot be conceived without the idea of a triangle; for it is the same thing, whether I say A must involve the conception B, or A cannot be conceived without B. In the second place, this affirmation, without the idea of a triangle, cannot be. Therefore this affirmation cannot, without the idea of a triangle, either be or be conceived. Moreover, this idea of a triangle must involve this same affirmation of the equality of its three angles to two right angles. Therefore, conversely, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation. Hence this affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing but that idea.* Manifestly, in this illustration, to "involve" means to contain something, or to be identical with something, according as we take more or less literally the last clause.† Again: "Things which have nothing in common cannot be comprehended by means of each other; that is, the conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other."‡ Here the one involves the other in virtue of the fact that they have something in common, and it is plain from what Spinoza says a little later§ that he was thinking of the two things in question as higher class and lower, or as universal and individual. That the idea of any mode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies, must involve both the nature of the human body and the nature of the external body, Spinoza proves as follows: "All the modes, in which any body is affected, are a consequence both of the nature of the body affected and the nature of the body affecting it. Hence their idea

necessarily involves the nature of both bodies. Consequently, the idea of any mode, in which the human body is affected by an external body, involves the nature of the human body and of the external body."* From this he infers, in the first place, that the human mind perceives the nature of very many bodies along with the nature of its own body; and, in the second place, that the ideas which we have of external bodies indicate rather the constitution of our own body than the nature of external bodies. † The phrase "involves the nature of both bodies," as here used, means that these essences are (at least in part) "objectively" present in the idea. In other words, it includes them. That this is what is meant is evident from Spinoza's use of this proposition later: "Let A be something, which is common to and a property of the human body and certain external bodies, which is equally in the human body and in these external bodies, and which, finally, is equally in the part and in the whole of each external body. Of this A there will be in God an adequate idea, both in so far as he has an idea of the human body, and in so far as he has ideas of the said external bodies. Now, let the human body be affected by an external body, through that which they have in common, that is, through A. The idea of this modification will involve the property A; and, hence, the idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property A, will be adequate in God, in so far as he is affected by the idea of the human body; that is, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind. Therefore this idea is adequate in the human mind also." ‡ When an idea

is, not partially, but wholly in the human mind, it is, according to Spinoza, adequate in the human mind, or adequately known by the human mind. Since the idea of the modification in question "involves" the property A, and since said idea is in the human mind, the idea of A, which it contains within it, is in the human mind too. Many more instances of this use of the word "involve" might be given, but these will suffice. In general, one thing involves another when it contains it, and, in particular, the word is employed to indicate the relation of the individual to its universal, or of the species to its genus.

Spinoza does not, however, use the word consistently in this sense. Indeed, he could not do so, since he does not keep his universals abstract, but turns them into concrete things, causes. The word "involve" suffers a corresponding change in signification, and is sometimes used to indicate a relation between effect and cause. For example, we find it accepted as an axiom that "knowledge of an effect depends upon and involves knowledge of its cause." * We find the same idea very definitely expressed in one of the arguments offered in support of the thesis: "The formal being of ideas admits of God as its cause only in so far as he is regarded as a thinking thing, and not in so far as he is manifested in some other attribute. That is, the ideas both of the attributes of God and of individual things do not admit of their objects—perceived things—as their efficient cause, but God himself, in so far as he is a thinking thing." The argument is: "The formal being of ideas is a mode of thinking, that is a mode which expresses in a definite manner the nature of God in so far as he is a thinking thing, and thus

involves the concept of no other attribute of God, and consequently is the effect of no other attribute than thought. Therefore the formal being of ideas admits of God as its cause only in so far as he is regarded as a thinking thing.” * Again: “The modes of any attribute have God as their cause only in so far as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, not in so far as he is considered under any other attribute.” This is proved in the same way: “Each attribute is conceived through itself independently of anything else. The modes, then, of each attribute involve the concept of their own attribute, but of no other; therefore they have as their cause God, only in so far as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not in so far as he is considered under any other attribute.” † That Spinoza uses the word cause in a sense approaching its usual acceptation seems to me sufficiently evident from the tenor of the passages cited. He denies that external things cause our ideas, but says they are caused by God “in so far as he is regarded as a thinking thing,” or, in other words, in so far as he is expressed in the attribute thought. Moreover he calls this cause the efficient cause, as if to make his meaning unmistakable. Just afterward he uses the axiom above mentioned to prove that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things, arguing that since the idea of an effect depends upon a knowledge of its cause, the order of ideas must correspond exactly to the nexus of causes and effects in the physical world. ‡ By this order of causes and effects he did not merely mean the order of “fixed and eternal things” which might be claimed to

be "immanent" causes. He includes all separate, individual, existing things, the causes and effects recognized by science.* Such causes and effects are external to and distinct from each other. When, therefore, Spinoza makes his universals causes, he in so far takes them out of the individuals in which they are found (remember this "in") and makes them concrete things outside of their effects. In the passages given above the word "involve" marks such a relation to an illicitly obtained concrete. As, however, Spinoza's "fixed and eternal things" are, like Plato's Ideas, really universals, though treated as in some sense concrete, one finds sometimes in the same passage a double sense in the word "involve."

13. Essence.—So much for the "fixed and eternal things," as universals. Of these same things as concretes, as causes, I have already spoken briefly in the paragraph just preceding. As, however, this aspect of them comes out very clearly in Spinoza's doctrine of "essence," and as that doctrine plays an important part in his philosophy, I shall discuss it rather fully here. Just where Spinoza got this doctrine, or rather where he drew the original inspiration which led him to formulate it as he did, I do not pretend to say. He has left us but scanty information regarding the sources of his philosophy. His fundamental ideas are, however, not new, but had become common property in the Middle Ages. They appear in various forms in the writings of the Jewish philosophers with which he was familiar, and they may be traced back ultimately to the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies.

When one has arranged a number of things in

*"Ethics," II, 9, and cor.; cf. I, 8, schol. 2, and II, 10, cor. schol.; also III, 1.
a class, and, abstracting from the differences of individuals, has marked by a class name that which they have in common, it is, as I have shown at length above, easy to forget just what one has gotten by the process, and how one has gotten it. It is easy to give the result a significance which does not properly belong to it, and to regard it as something higher in nature than the individuals in which it is found—something fixed and unchangeable. Of course, things may be classed by means of any one of their properties, and the process is in all cases identical; but some classifications are more important than others, and it is natural to consider apart the class names which mark these, as expressing the true "nature" or "essence" of things. Aristotle, for example, does not, with Plato, separate his universals from individuals, but he appears to lose sight of the origin of all universals in distinguishing, as he does, between those which express the essential attributes of their objects and those which do not, and treating the former as of higher rank. There is, it is true, no objection to making such a distinction, provided one bear in mind that the difference is one of utility only and that such universals do not differ in their nature from any others. It is, however, difficult to bear this always in mind, and to the words "nature" and "essence" are to be attributed a multitude of philosophical errors.

Now, Spinoza distinguishes between the essence of things and their existence, and not making this simply a difference between the universal and the particular, he treats the essence as different from the other properties of a class of objects; as independent of the individual and not derived from it in the manner
indicated. He writes: "Hence we are able to prove in another way that there cannot be more than one substance with a given nature, and I have thought it worth while to set forth the proof here. But to do this in a methodical way I must note: First, that the true definition of a thing neither involves nor expresses anything except the nature of the thing defined. Whence it follows, in the second place, that no definition either involves or expresses a certain definite number of individuals, seeing that it expresses nothing but the nature of the thing defined. For example, the definition of the triangle expresses nothing but just the nature of the triangle, and not a certain definite number of triangles. I must note, in the third place, that every existing thing necessarily has some definite cause, by reason of which it exists. And finally, in the fourth place, that this cause, by reason of which anything exists, must either be contained in the very nature and definition of the existing thing (for the reason, of course, that it belongs to the nature of such a thing to exist), or it must be outside of it. Granted these points, it follows that if there exist in the world some definite number of individuals, there must necessarily be a cause why those individuals, and neither more nor less, exist. If, for example, there exist in the universe twenty men (I will suppose, to make the matter clearer, that they exist at the same time, and that no others have ever existed before), it will not be a sufficient explanation of the existence of the twenty men to show the cause of human nature in the abstract; but it will be further necessary to show the cause why twenty exist, and not more nor less; for (by point third) there must necessarily be a cause for the existence of each one.
But this cause (by points second and third) cannot be contained in human nature itself, since the true definition of man does not involve the number twenty. Hence (by point fourth), the cause why these twenty men exist, and, consequently, why each one exists, must necessarily be outside of each one. Therefore the conclusion is unavoidable, that everything of such a nature that several individuals with that nature can exist, must necessarily have an external cause to bring about their existence. Now, since it belongs to the nature of a substance to exist, its definition must involve necessary existence, and hence its existence may be inferred from its mere definition. But from its definition (as has just been proved from points second and third) the existence of several substances cannot be inferred. From it, therefore, it follows necessarily, that but one of a given nature exists, as was maintained."*

The only part of this extract which concerns us here is the distinction between essence and existence, universal and individual. Spinoza separates them from each other very sharply, but so far from looking to individuals for the essence, the only question he raises is whether the individual can be deduced from the essence. The essence he puts among the "fixed and eternal things" to be deduced from the idea of God or substance, in the manner already described.† Not everything common to several individuals may be regarded as an essence. He distinguishes between the properties constituting the essence and other properties, as follows: "To be called perfect, a definition must set forth the inmost essence of a thing, and we

* "Ethics," I, 8, schol. 2; cf. I, 11, proof 2.
† "De Intellectus Emendatione," pp. 32–33.
must be careful not to substitute for this some of its properties. To make this clear I shall give an illustration, and passing over other examples, for fear I may appear to be desirous of exposing other people's errors, I shall only take the case of an abstract thing, the exact definition of which is unimportant; I shall take, namely, a circle. If this be defined as a figure of such a sort that all lines drawn from its center to its circumference are equal, it is plain to everyone that such a definition does not in the least set forth the essence of the circle, but only one of its properties. And although, as I have said, this is of little moment in the case of figures and other abstractions, yet it is of great importance when one has to do with physical and real entities; for the properties of things are not understood, as long as one is ignorant of their essence. If we overlook these essences, we necessarily subvert the natural order of ideas, which should reflect the order of nature, and we wholly miss our aim."*

From the above as well as from many other passages, it is clear that Spinoza did not regard his "essences" as mere universals, but rather as real things independent of individuals, while retaining certain characteristics of universality. They are "fixed and eternal things," in no sense arbitrary creations, but existing somewhat after the fashion of Plato's Ideas. Spinoza does not, however, always use the words "nature" and "essence" in this sense. He defines desire as "the very essence of man, in so far as this is conceived as determined to some action by any one of his modifications," † and he proves the thesis "any emotion of one individual differs from the

*"De Intellectus Emendatione," p. 31.
†"Ethics," III, defs. of the emotions, 1.
emotion of another, only in so far as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other," by the argument that emotion varies as does desire, and that a difference in desires means a difference in nature or essence.* This would make the essence different in each individual man. Again, he writes: "Since the essence of the mind consists in its affirming the actual existence of its body, and since by perfection I mean the very essence of a thing; it follows that the mind passes to a greater or less perfection, when it happens to affirm of its body, or of any part of it, something involving more or less reality than before."† Here the essence of the mind is made a variable quantity. Very striking is the preface to Part IV. of the "Ethics," where the meaning of the word "perfection" is discussed. Spinoza argues that we form general ideas of classes of things by comparing individuals with each other, and thus obtain patterns or ideals by which we afterward judge individuals. He continues: "Perfection and imperfection, therefore, are really mere modes of thinking; that is, notions, which we are accustomed to frame because we compare with one another individuals of the same species or genus. For this reason I have said above that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing. For we are accustomed to refer all the individual things in nature to one genus, which we call the highest genus; that is, to the notion of being, which pertains to all, without exception, of the individual things in nature. In so far, therefore, as we refer the individual things in nature to this genus, and compare them with one another, and ascertain that some have more being or reality than

* "Ethics," III, 57; cf. IV, 33.
† Gen. def. of the emotions, Explanation.
others, in so far do we say that some are more perfect than others; and in so far as we attribute to them anything that involves negation, as limit, end, impotence, etc., in so far do we call them imperfect, because they do not impress our mind as much as those we call perfect, and not because they lack something that belongs to them, or because nature has blundered. For nothing belongs to the nature of anything, except what follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause; and whatever follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause necessarily comes to pass.” The terms good and evil likewise are mere notions, formed by comparing things with one another, but such terms should be retained as a matter of convenience: “For since we desire to form an idea of man, a pattern, as it were, of human nature, upon which we may gaze, it will be of service to us to retain these terms in the sense of which I have spoken. Therefore, I shall hereafter mean by ‘good,’ what we certainly know to be a means by the aid of which we may come to resemble more and more the pattern of human nature that we have set before us. By ‘evil,’ on the other hand, I shall mean what we certainly know hinders us from reflecting that pattern. Furthermore, I shall say that men are more perfect or less perfect in proportion as they resemble more or less closely this pattern. For it should specially be noted that when I speak of a man as passing from a less to a greater perfection, and conversely, I do not mean that he is changed from one essence or form to another (a horse, for example, is as much destroyed by being changed into a man, as by being changed into an insect); but I mean that we conceive his power of acting, in
so far as we comprehend this through his own nature, to be increased or diminished. Finally, by ‘perfection,’ taken generally, I shall mean reality, as I have said; that is, the essence of anything, in so far as it exists and operates in a definite manner, without regard to its duration."

In the above Spinoza contrasts what really belongs to the nature of a thing—and this means everything that belongs to the thing—with what we regard as belonging to its nature when we have formed an ideal of that kind of a thing and refer to this ideal as a pattern. The “essence” of man, as he uses the word in the passages quoted further back, evidently is such a pattern. It is formed by comparing individuals, and is fixed and changeless only in the sense that the individuals really contain the elements thus taken, and that we form our pattern by choosing these individuals rather than others. In this argument Spinoza expresses forcibly the truth that the essences of things are not independent of individuals, but are abstractions, and formed through comparison.* Oddly enough he comes back at the close to the other notion and limits the reality of each thing by its essence, as though this essence were something really existent in nature, and not a product owing its existence as an abstraction to its convenience, and found, in so far as it may be said to really exist at all, only in the individuals which have it as their common core. It is strange that he should not have seen that the essence of man is only a pattern formed by comparing different men, and the essence of horse one formed by comparing different horses; that they are entia rationis

* Compare the striking passage in his letter to Blyenbergh, Letter 21.
as much as "white man" or "black horse." This, however, he did not see. Although, as we have seen, he uses the words essence and nature inconsistently, his fundamental thought, and one essential to his philosophical system, is that essences are not the result of an abstraction from the differences of individuals, but entities of a different class, eternal, unchangeable, independent of individuals; not mere abstractions, but real causes; in other words, they are Platonized abstractions.*

14. Deduction of Ideas from the Idea of God.—We are now in a position to see why Spinoza passes lightly over the deduction of all our ideas from the idea of God or substance. Such a deduction of the concrete from the abstract is an impossibility, and Spinoza's "fixed and eternal things" really are at bottom abstractions. From the concrete one may get the abstract by fixing attention upon certain elements and disregarding others, but from a single abstraction one can never get a concrete, for elements have to be added which are not contained in the former. For example, from "white man" I can get "man," but from man alone I cannot possibly get "white man." This difficulty Spinoza met face to face in one of the extracts I have given above. He could not help seeing that he could not get twenty concrete individual men out of "man" in the abstract, for "the definition of man does not involve the number twenty." He was therefore forced to conclude that the essence—man in the abstract—could not be the cause of the existence of twenty individuals. The deduction of all our ideas from the idea of the origin and source of nature, must then,

* The definition of essence in Part II. of the "Ethics" (def. 2) is criticised later. See Note 48.
perforce, stop at essences, and is not prevented from going on to individuals merely by the complexity of the problem and the limitations imposed by human weakness, as seems indicated elsewhere.* And, although Spinoza has not recognized the fact, the difficulty does not end here. It logically repeats itself at each stage of the deduction. If I cannot get twenty men from man, how can I get man and other essences from something higher which will stand to them in a similar relation? And how deduce from the attributes, at the outset, the infinite modes immediately caused by God?† The intellect "perceives certain things, or forms certain ideas, absolutely; some ideas it forms from others. The idea of extension it forms absolutely, and without considering other thoughts. The idea of motion, however, it cannot form without reference to the idea of extension." ‡ That is, extension can be conceived without thinking of motion, but motion cannot be conceived without thinking of extension. Just so, man can be conceived without thinking of twenty men, but twenty men cannot be conceived without thinking the group of qualities represented by the word man. Whether one be concerned with the relation of individuals to their essence, or of essences to something more abstract, one meets the same difficulty. It is, consequently, not surprising that we do not find in the "Ethics" attributes deduced from substance, infinite modes from attributes, essences of a lower order from infinite modes, or individuals from their essences. Things are not obtained by

* "De Intellectus Emendatione," p. 33. But even here Spinoza denies any connection between existence and essence.
† "Ethics," I, 28, schol.; and Letters 64 and 83.
‡ "De Intellectus Emendatione," p. 35.
deduction, but taken up as given in experience, and
then referred in a general way to God as their cause.*

15. The Dual Causality of the "Ethics."—This
explains, too, the puzzling dual causality one finds
everywhere in Spinoza's writings. As we have just
seen, he recognized the impossibility of extracting
individuals from essences, and denied that the essence
could be the cause of the existence of the individuals.
This forced him to look elsewhere for the cause, and
he accounted for the existence of individuals—finite
particular modes—by a reference to other individuals,
the unconditional antecedents recognized as causes in
the sciences. This chain of finite causes he conceived
of as stretching back to infinity. It is true that God
is declared to be the sole cause of things, of their
existence as well as of their essence; † but this chain
of finite causes nowhere shows any tendency to
approach substance. In declaring that essences can-
not cause the existence of individuals, Spinoza has
wholly cut them off from each other. We are left
with the hierarchy of "fixed and eternal things" on
the one side, and concrete individuals on the other;
between them is a great gulf fixed, and the reader
will do well to simply accept this state of affairs as he
finds it, and save himself the trouble of looking for
a bridge where none is forthcoming. ‡

There are thus two distinct aspects to the philoso-

* As the reader must see, Spinoza's difficulties arise out of a
misconception of the true significance and use of universals in
deductive reasoning.
† "Ethics," I, 25.
‡ In an early work ("Short Treatise on God, Man and His
to bridge the gulf by an illustration. He does not succeed.
phy of Spinoza, the one having to do with the chain of finite existences or real things, and the other with the fixed and eternal things, the abstractions which he hypostasizes and regards as causes. The former we may call its scientific aspect, and the latter its metaphysico-theological. Each is sufficiently uncompromising, and, in forming an estimate of Spinozism, neither should be overlooked or explained away. That the theological form given to his reasoning is not merely a dress borrowed by Spinoza for the purpose of making his scientific notions more welcome to his contemporaries should, I think, be clear to any unprejudiced reader of his works. The religious instinct was evidently the fundamental one in his character and furnished the impulse to his philosophy.* Moreover, the whole structure of the "Ethics" demands that we yield recognition to this mediaeval realistic side of his thinking. With that abstracted his reasonings become incomprehensible. It is this religious instinct, too, that forced him into inconsistencies. To feed it satisfactorily through universals it is absolutely necessary to make them something more, to make them concretes. God or substance should logically be to Spinoza simply the highest abstraction, the element contained in every idea of whatever sort.† If, however, these words were clearly recognized as meaning nothing more, the religious element would evaporate out of the Spinozistic philosophy and leave it sufficiently flat.

16. The Eternity of Essences.—In closing this introductory note, which I have already made much longer than I intended, I shall treat very briefly one more

* "De Intellectus Emendatione," opening sentences.
† "Ethics," II, 45–47.
topic, that of the "eternity" of essences of whatever sort. This plays a rôle of no small importance in Part V. of the "Ethics."

I have said, in discussing the formation of the concept, that, to have a true universal, it is necessary to keep the element or elements it represents really abstract, that is, wholly separate from others. This \(x\) and that \(x\), for example, are distinguished as two by the "this" and the "that," by qualities or marks of some sort, even if they be only spatial or temporal differences. That which they have in common—\(x\) in the abstract—must, to remain abstract, be stripped of all such individualizing elements. Hence, \(x\) in the abstract is conceived apart from all time-relations. It cannot change, of course, for change implies two conditions or states related in time. It cannot cease to be, for if these words mean anything they imply existence in time and a negation of existence in time. One cannot abstract from the notion of time, and then use such expressions. On the other hand, \(x\) in the abstract cannot remain unchanged, for it takes time to remain unchanged as well as to change; and it cannot continue to exist, for continuance out of time is an absurdity. It will not do to deny certain time-relations of universals, and then use words which imply certain others. The essence "man," for example, cannot cease to exist, but it is equally true that it cannot go on existing, does not exist now, and never has existed. To remain a genuine essence, a universal, it must not touch the stream of time at any point. It must be kept wholly abstract.

Now Spinoza follows an ancient custom in applying to essences the word eternal to indicate that they are independent of time-relations. I cannot but regard
this use of the word as unfortunate, for when we use
the word eternal we commonly mean to indicate an
existence through endless time. This, of course, it
cannot mean when applied to universals, to essences
of any sort; yet it is very evident that those who em-
ploy the word draw from this source the consolation
they find in thinking of essences as eternal. Spinoza
expressly denies that the word as he uses it has any
reference to continuance in time,* but it is clear to a
careful reader that he did not really abstract from the
idea of time at all. This I shall point out in the notes
to follow. We cannot limit one's right to use words
as one chooses, and everyone is free to employ the
word eternal after his own fashion, but in the interests
of clear thinking I may be excused for protesting that
it is of great importance to bear clearly in mind the
true connotation of the word and to keep to the one
connotation throughout. One should remember that,
as applied to universals, the word should mean simply
that one has abstracted from all time-relations. Uni-
versals of all sorts are, therefore, equally eternal.
"Redness" is as eternal as "man," and "sourness" as
eternal as "substance."† If one chooses, then, to
prove man's immortality by pointing to the fact that
"man" in the abstract is eternal, he should remember
that this is a cheap immortality shared by "man"
with the object of every class name, and that it does
not imply that "man" exists now or ever will exist.
Such an immortality should surely never be confounded
with immortality as commonly understood. It is par-
ticularly important to think of this when reading
Part V. of the "Ethics."

That essences of all sorts are eternal and in what

* "Ethics," I, def. 8. † Compare Plato, "Parmen.," 130.
sense they are eternal, should also be borne well in mind when one reads the earlier parts of the "Ethics." In following Spinoza's account of the procession from God or substance to nature as a diversified aggregate of parts—the creation of things, as he calls it*—we seem to have before us a historical progress marked by a fixed order in time. The impression one thus gains is, however, delusive, and is due to the fact that Spinoza employs words indicating time-relations when, by hypothesis, all time-relations must be abstracted from. The fixed and eternal things "are all by nature simultaneous"†—which unfortunate phrase must, for the sake of consistency, be understood as simply denying temporal succession, and not as affirming co-existence in time. Thus natura naturans, or God considered as a free cause, does not precede in time natura naturata,‡ created things, but is merely to be regarded as a logical prius. The things immediately created by God do not precede in time those created through the instrumentality of these former things. We have in the whole series not a description of what takes place or has taken place, but simply a logical arrangement of abstract conceptions as higher and lower. The only historical process is to be found in the series of particular finite modes, or real things; and, as has been pointed out, there is no indication of any manner in which these may be referred to God or inferred from God.

17. Summary.—In what precedes I have occupied myself almost exclusively with the theologico-metaphysical aspect of the Spinozistic philosophy, for this is

* "Ethics," I, 33, schol. 2.
† "De Intellectus Emendatione," p. 34.
‡ "Ethics," I, 29, schol.
the aspect that the modern reader finds unintelligible. When Spinoza writes as a mediæval realist he employs conceptions which seem to most persons in our day strange and unfamiliar. When, however, he touches the conceptions of modern science he is easily understood, and references in the notes will suffice to bring out this side of his doctrine. Such references I shall give from time to time.

Again to summarize briefly: Spinoza sets out to deduce from the idea of God, or substance, all our other ideas, and believes it possible to thus produce a priori the order of the whole of nature. He conceives of the gap between substance and the individual finite things found in nature as filled by a chain or series of entities, a hierarchy of essences, or fixed and eternal things, which stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect, and which must furnish the steps in the above-mentioned deduction. These essences are really abstractions, universals of a greater or less degree of generality, but they are hypostatized by Spinoza, who was a realist, and treated by him as things, yet as things possessed of properties which belong only to universals. Sometimes, though not usually, they are spoken of as aggregates or wholes, of which finite individual things are parts.

The series of essences here indicated is nowhere given, nor is the deduction carried out in any of its parts. Such a deduction of the concrete from the abstract is an impossibility, and rests upon a misconception of the significance of universals and their employment in deductive reasoning. This difficulty forced itself upon Spinoza's attention at one point, and compelled him to regard the chain which should connect substance with finite individual things as
broken at its last link—he declares it impossible to deduce real existing things from their essences. He is consequently compelled to accord to essences alone a place in his proposed deduction, and to account for real existing things by a reference to other things of the same kind, the causes recognized in the sciences. Both the existence and the essence of individual things are, it is true, referred to God as sole cause, but no indication is given of any way of connecting existences with God. They are wholly unprovided for in Spinoza's general scheme.

Essences are declared to be eternal, and by eternity Spinoza is careful to explain that he does not mean existence through endless time. He means that essences are to be regarded as wholly apart from time-relations of any sort. It is true that the universal, in so far as it is really kept universal, must be kept clear from all such individualizing elements. If this be all that is meant by the word eternal, then, of course, universals are eternal—not merely the universals which Spinoza calls essences, but universals of all sorts. "Man," for example, is not more eternal than "hat," or "substance" than "accident." Such eternity does not imply that the universal in question really exists, ever has existed, or ever will exist, for such language introduces the time-relations supposed absent. This should be remembered in reading Part V. of the "Ethics."

Since, finally, essences are thus eternal, the series of fixed and eternal things must not be conceived as coming into existence successively; its parts do not mark a historical progress. We are not to regard God as prior in time to the things he has created, nor the things immediately created by him as prior in
time to those created through their instrumentality. The story of the Creation as given by Spinoza is not a description of what has taken place. Its chapters are not successive. The series of fixed and eternal things is simply a logical arrangement of abstract conceptions as lower and higher. This should be kept carefully in mind throughout, for the language of the "Ethics" is misleading.
NOTES TO PART I.

1. (def. 1) The notion of a *causa sui* is not original with Spinoza, but dates from a much earlier time (see Martineau's note, "A Study of Spinoza," Part II, ch. 1, § 2). Spinoza sometimes appears to recognize that the phrase cannot be taken literally, but rather as indicating that the being in question has no cause (*De Int. Emendat.*, pp. 23, 30, 32).

This, however, is not in harmony with his language in other places, where the idea of causality is unmistakably present (see I, 8, schol. 2; 11, proof 2, proof 3, and schol.; 16 and cors.; 18; 25, schol.; etc.); and a very positive significance was given to the phrase by his master Descartes. The latter maintains ("Answers to the First Objections to the Meditations") that when we call God the cause of himself we may, indeed, use the words negatively, as indicating that he has no cause; but when we ask why he is or continues to exist, and consider the incomprehensible power contained in the idea of him, we recognize that this is the true and only cause of his existence. To escape verbal disputes, says Descartes, we may avoid the term efficient cause; but we are justified in believing that his relation to himself is analogous to that of the efficient cause to its effect, and, consequently, that he is the cause of himself in a positive sense.

Spinoza cannot use the phrase in a merely negative sense, for his philosophy demands an *a priori* proof of the existence of God. He denies that essences
can be obtained from individual things given in experience. They must be deduced from the series of fixed and eternal things (De Int. Emendat., p. 33; Letter 10. See my Introductory Note, II, 13). Since the idea of God cannot be taken from experience, and since all others are to be deduced from it, some way must be discovered of getting it at the outset. This way is found in declaring God's existence to be included in his essence, and then inferring it from his essence. This is not a passing thought with Spinoza; he evidently regarded it as of the utmost importance, and he returns to it constantly in his different works.

A little later (prop. 11) I shall have occasion to discuss the arguments for the existence of God or substance. Here I wish only to consider what is implied in including existence in an essence. To one who has read carefully the second part of my Introductory Note the reasoning will be sufficiently clear.

Essences are not individual things, but universals, such as "man." A universal is such only in virtue of the fact that it represents what several individual things have in common, and does not contain any of the elements which mark them as individuals. It does not exist in this time or that, or in this space or that. It does not, indeed, exist at all, as a real thing; for it exists only in the individuals subsumed under it (remember what is signified by this use of the word in), and the "man" in any particular individual man is not "man" in the abstract, but an occurrence of the qualities connoted by the word man, at a particular time and place.

Now, if I take up existence among the other qualities composing an essence, then, no matter what I
may mean by the word existence, I must universalize it, I must understand it as existence in general, the mere idea of existence, that which all existing things have in common. I cannot possibly regard it as any particular existence, and insist that, because existence in the abstract has been added to other abstract qualities, I have now no abstraction, but a concrete existing thing. If I have such a concrete individual, it is not an essence, for an essence is not individual, but universal. If I have an essence, then, whether existence be one of the qualities attributed to it or not, I have not an existing thing. Unless one wholly change the meaning of the word essence, one cannot escape from self-contradiction in speaking of the real existence of an essence. As we have seen, Spinoza turned his essences into concrete things, and thus found it easy to ascribe to them real existence.

The use of the phrase *causa sui* in a positive sense it seems hardly necessary to criticise. The word cause implies a relation between two things. A thing cannot be said to be related to itself. It can no more be its own cause than it can be its own neighbor.

2. (def. 3) This definition becomes sufficiently intelligible when one remembers (1) the parallelism of thought and things held by Spinoza (*Introductory Note*, I, 2), and (2) his notion of the existence of a series of eternal entities corresponding to the logical arrangement of concepts as lower and higher (*Introductory Note*, II, 7). He regards each lower essence (species) as in the one above it (genus), and the highest of all as in none. This he expresses by saying that it is in itself. Since the mental order reflects the external, each lower concept is conceived by means of the one above it, and the highest, of course, cannot be con-
ceived through any other. Hence it is conceived through itself.

The highest abstraction would not logically be the notion of substance, and Spinoza has simply substituted for it this latter, which seems to give us a concrete thing and not an abstraction. He was by no means the first to do this, the Realists before him having regarded universals as substances (see the sentence quoted from Robert Pulley, Introductory Note, II, 9; or the doctrine of John Scotus, Ueberweg's "Hist. of Philos.;" vol. I, § 90).

3. (def. 4) Since the attributes constitute the essence of substance, one would naturally infer that Spinoza regarded substance as simply a name for the sum of the attributes. The reader of the "Ethics" will see that there is much to be said in support of this view. Substance is said to consist of attributes (def. 6, and props. 11 and 12); they are declared identical in such a phrase as the following: "God is eternal; that is, all God's attributes are eternal" (prop. 19; see also 29, schol.); attribute is, like substance, defined as that which must be conceived through itself (prop. 10 and Letter 2); it is stated that nothing exists save substance and its modes (prop. 4; 6, cor.; 15; 28); and the things immediately created by God are made modes, not attributes, though one of Spinoza's correspondents, in discussing this point, suggests that by these things the author must mean attributes (prop. 28, schol., and Letter 64).

On the other hand such an interpretation is not in harmony with the general structure of Spinoza's thought. The attributes of substance are infinite in number, and should find their unity in some universal which stands above them, if the hierarchy of essences
is to be complete and end in an ultimate unity. Such a unity Spinoza gives them in substance, and much of his language becomes unintelligible if one assume that he was clearly conscious that by substance he meant only the sum of the attributes (see prop. 10, schol.; props. 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9; II, 7, schol., etc.).

Spinoza never distinguishes clearly between attributes and substance, and never deduces the former from the latter. In tracing individual things, finite modes, to God, he only goes back to the attribute under which they are to be subsumed, and appears to regard his task as finished. This favors the first view of the meaning of the word substance. And yet Spinoza regarded the universe as a unit; he was in search of a Being, single and infinite, and a multitude of distinct attributes would not satisfy him so long as he recognized them as distinct and independent. The word substance, I think, besides its other suggestions, represented to him the universe as a cosmos, a connected whole; it binds together (very vaguely, it is true) the otherwise independent attributes. Indefinite as is this Spinozistic substance, it is not more indefinite than the notion of substance or substratum still generally accepted.

The expression, "which the understanding perceives as constituting," appears to distinguish between things as they are and things as they appear to us, and seems to play into the hands of the idealist. As, however, Spinoza postulated an exact parallelism of thought and things, the idealist can only take the words as an involuntary betrayal of the untenability of his position.

4. (def. 5) For an explanation of this language see Note 2. Modes are the more concrete things subsumed under a universal.
5. (def. 6) In the opening propositions in the "Ethics," where Spinoza is developing the general idea of substance, he does not call substance God. After proving that there is but one substance, he uses the terms as interchangeable (prop. 11). In the explanation appended to the definition, the words "everything that expresses essence," etc., mean everything real and unlimited.

6. (def. 7) See Note 1.

7. (def. 8) See my Introductory Note, II, 16, and Note 1. In defining eternity as existence itself, Spinoza evidently does not stand by the eternity of essences as I have explained it. The word should only mean that the essence in question is a true universal and freed from all individualizing elements. Consequently, as a universal, it does not really exist. Its only real existence is in its individuals (please remember this in), and regarded as in an individual it is individualized and no longer universal. It is "an occurrence" of certain qualities, not the qualities in the abstract.

8. (axioms) In explanation of these axioms, see my Introductory Note, I. The language of axioms 1 and 2 is explained in Note 2. Axiom 5 depends on the same thought. Things which have nothing in common cannot be conceived by means of each other because they cannot be related as genus and species are related. For axiom 7, see Note 1. Anything can be conceived as non-existent, unless we start with the hypothesis that it exists and that the thought of its existence must not be divorced from it, in which case, of course, we contradict ourselves in denying its existence. I can conceive any house as non-existent. I cannot conceive an existing house as non-existent, without ceasing to think of it as an existing house.
If I insist that it shall remain an existing house, it is futile to attempt to conceive of it as non-existent. This is really what Spinoza does in including existence in essence, and then assuming the inconceivability of the non-existence of this essence.

9. (prop. 1) This does not mean prior in time, but logically prior (see Introductory Note, II, 16).

10. (prop. 2) See Note 8, where axiom 5 is referred to.

11. (prop. 3) See Introductory Note, I, 4. The order of causes is assumed to correspond exactly to the order of conceptions.

12. (prop. 4) The puzzling words "outside of the understanding" seem to be inserted without good reason, as Spinoza makes the understanding a modification of substance. Note that substance in this proof appears to be made identical with its attributes.

13. (prop. 5) Naturally, if we mean by substance the ultimate abstraction obtained by laying aside all the differences of things, there cannot be more than one substance. So much for the latter part of the argument. As to distinguishing substances by their attributes, if by attribute we mean all that we can conceive as constituting the substance, then to speak of two substances with but the one attribute is, of course, absurd. We have in mind one attribute and that is all, and from that we can get no duality of any sort. We must add something to pure "x" to get "this x" and "that x." But if each of two substances has a group of attributes, then (even if substance be but a name for the attributes) they may be distinguished as two in spite of a common attribute, for they may also possess attributes that differ. Spinoza's argument is good only for substances with but one attribute.
14. (prop. 6) Such expressions as "produced by" are misleading, and the reader must be on his guard against them all through the "Ethics." The causality with which Spinoza is here concerned is the timeless causality of fixed and eternal things, corresponding to the logical order of conceptions (Introductory Note, II, 15). In the corollary it is assumed as self-evident that a substance cannot be produced by modifications.

15. (prop. 7) See Note 1. The argument is not above reproach as a bit of logic. If everything that exists must have a cause, if substance exists, and if substance cannot have anything else as its cause, then we must infer that it is its own cause. Of these three "ifs" Spinoza furnishes only the third.

16. (prop. 8) In assuming that every finite substance must be limited by another of the same nature, Spinoza has of course assumed that something is infinite. This infinite something is not, however, the substance with which the argument sets out. If we conceive of a finite substance extending to a certain point and then being continued by another of the same kind, we are not merely considering an attribute, but also bringing in a mode. The thing that stops here and the thing that begins there are clearly recognizable as two things. The thing that is infinite is, consequently, not the substance with which we started, and which ends at a given point. If it be said, we may overlook the mode and consider only the attribute; I answer, then we should not start with the mode, the supposition of a given finite substance. The argument consists in making a distinction and then overlooking it.

17. (prop. 8, schol. 1) It will be remembered that prop. 7 was not proved. Note also that finitude is not necessarily a negation. I may think of the thing
discussed in the last note positively as being just what it is; I may also think of it as not going on, but stopping here. So I may think of the infinite as going on; or I may think of it as not stopping.

18. (prop. 8, schol. 2) The argument is as follows: All clear ideas are true (Introductory Note, I, 3). Some true ideas may represent things not actually existent. Their truth consists in the fact that they are true deductions from something else that is true—their essence is included in it. Since substance cannot be thus carried back to something else, the only truth it can have must consist in actual existence. We have a clear, or true, idea of substance, and thus should never doubt its existence. Nor can substance ever have been non-existent, for then the idea of it would have been a false idea (as having no reality corresponding to it), and after the creation of the substance it would be a true idea, and thus a false idea would become true, which is absurd.

19. (prop. 8, schol. 2) I have discussed this question of the essence and the individuals to be subsumed under it in the Introductory Note (II, r3). We have here a striking illustration of the dual causality assumed by Spinoza. Mark that this process of separating the essence from individuals, and considering the former alone, does not justify us in inferring the existence of one substance any more than of several substances. We do not get a single individual thing, but a mere abstraction (Introductory Note, II, r1).

20. (prop. 9) As we commonly use the word reality, a small thing has as much reality as a great one, provided both exist. In other words, both are equally real. In this proposition, as is evident, amount of reality means simply amount of being. If by attribute
be meant that which constitutes the being of substance, the reference to def. 4 is to the point.

21. (prop. 10) See Note 3.

22. (prop. 11) See Note 1.

23. (prop. 11. proof 2) This proof may be condemned merely on the ground that it rests on the general statement that a thing must exist if there be no cause which prevents its existence. Even if we admit the positive statement that everything that exists must have some cause, we are not bound to admit the negative statement that there must be a cause for the non-existence of whatever does not exist. Strictly speaking, one cannot say that there must be a cause for the non-existence of things, for this has no real being, and cannot be an effect, *i.e.*, cannot stand in a certain relation to another thing. When we say, as we sometimes do, that a thing does not exist *because* the system of things is what it is, we only mean that there does not exist a suitable cause for the production of the thing in question. We cannot mean to causally relate the non-existence of the thing to a part or the whole of the system of things. The doctrine that there must be a cause for the non-existence of everything that does not exist would have strange consequences. Let us suppose nothing at all to exist (a conception possible enough): would it then follow that there must exist causes of all this non-existence of things?

Spinoza's reasoning in this proof contains other errors, which I shall not discuss in detail, as they will be recognized as such by the student who has read the notes preceding. I shall merely point out, as touching the notion of the *causa sui*, the fallacy which lurks in the words "the reason for the non-existence of a square circle is given in its very nature." As the
words "square circle" are said to involve a contradiction, they must be, as thus taken together, wholly meaningless. There is, therefore, no "nature" to appeal to—one cannot conceive it as either existent or non-existent, for one cannot conceive it at all. If we choose to say the nature of a square circle precludes its existence, we can only mean that, since we cannot frame any idea at all corresponding to the words, we cannot conceive of a thing, corresponding to the idea, as existing.

24. (prop. 11, proof 3) The premises upon which this proof rests should not have been assumed as self-evident. The statement that to be able not to exist is lack of power, is, interpreted in the sense made necessary by the argument built upon it, evidently false. If a thing does not exist, one cannot say that it has the power not to exist, or has anything else. The proof compares the power of an existing finite being with that of a non-existent infinite being, and declares that, in so far as the infinite being is non-existent, it is less powerful. Now it is possible to compare the properties of an existent thing with those of a non-existent if we abstract from the existence and non-existence. In such a comparison we say, in effect, that, did both of the things exist, one would stand in such and such relations to the other. But if the existence and non-existence enter into the comparison and cannot be abstracted from, the matter is very different. A thing cannot be less powerful than another in that it is non-existent, for in that it is non-existent it cannot enter into any comparison at all. A non-existent thing cannot be infinite, or strong, or weak, or anything else, for it is nothing. The argument, therefore, falls.
25. (prop. 11, schol.) See the preceding note. Even if ability to exist may properly be called a power, it can certainly not be possessed or exercised by something that does not exist, and the whole question is whether the being to which we are attributing a given nature does exist or not, and hence whether it can have any power whatever. If the being does not exist, none of the attributes we allot to it can exist, nor can the number of these non-existent attributes be any indication of a real power to exist on the part of the being in question.

The error which underlies and gives support to all these arguments for the existence of God or substance is the separation of existence and essence, and the attribution to essences of a sort of real being independent of existence. See the discussion of essences in the second part of my Introductory Note.

26. (prop. 12) See the notes to the propositions referred to in support of this argument.

27. (prop. 13) See the notes to the propositions referred to in the text. All this becomes clear when one bears in mind that substance is treated as an abstraction obtained by eliminating differences, a universal (see props. 5 and 8. See also prop. 15, following).

28. (prop. 14) In this proposition God or substance appears to be simply a name for the sum total of possible attributes (see Note 3). If the one substance be a something constituted by all possible attributes, and if there cannot be two attributes of the same kind (i.e., if in comparing attributes we must overlook all modal distinctions, see Note 13), then, of course, there must be but the one substance. Having included in God all that is, it is a simple matter to prove there is nothing else in existence.
29. (prop. 15) Here Spinoza comes back to the notion of substance as *summum genus* (see Notes 2 and 3).

30. (prop. 15, schol.) In this scholium we meet with those perennial bugbears, the mathematical antinomies. I cannot here discuss them at length, but must refer the reader for a fuller discussion of the whole subject to my little volume, "The Conception of the Infinite" (J. B. Lippincott Co., Phila., 1887). Spinoza really touches the true solution of these puzzles in his remark that they arise from "the supposition that infinite quantity is measurable." He does not, however, apply correctly this principle, and hence does not solve the problems.

The conception of the infinite is not quantitative. We cannot say that one infinite is greater or less than, or equal to, another, for these words imply measurement, and measurement of a thing means marking the distance between the limits of the thing. That which has no limits cannot be measured, nor can its extent as a whole be compared with the extent of something else. It is not a whole, for, when we use this word, we mean to include all that lies within the limits of an object. It is not a quantity or amount.

When we cut an infinite line, we may, if we choose, call the two lines resulting from this section infinite. By infinite we here mean limited at but one point, and one point is not enough to determine the extent of a line. The resulting lines cannot be declared equal to each other, or less or greater than each other. They cannot be compared in extent with the original line.

The argument that an infinite line divided into feet will be twelve times as long as one divided into inches,
since each contains an infinite number of divisions, evidently assumes that the number of divisions is in each case the same, i.e., that it is a finite number, and may be compared with other numbers.

Again, in considering the two lines drawn from the point A, we may criticise the statement that "the distance between B and C will continually increase, and at length from a determinate distance will become indeterminable." This "at length" supposes the end reached, when, by hypothesis, there is no end.

As to a line's being composed of points, etc., I must refer the reader to the little volume mentioned above, or to my monograph, "On Sameness and Identity," § 36. It would take too much space to discuss the matter here, and it does not greatly concern us. Spinoza's way out of the difficulty is the assumption that a line does not really consist of parts at all. He regarded space or extension as a real thing, which, diversely modified, constitutes the world of extended objects. Hence he could not admit of the possibility of a vacuum. When he denies that one part of corporeal substance could be annihilated, he says, in effect, that it is impossible to conceive of one part of space as annihilated. From this he infers that the parts are not really distinct. If this be true, we may infer that all corporeal substance (or space) is one and the same.

But, whether Spinoza is right in assuming that we cannot think of any part of space as annihilated or not, and no matter how we regard space, this argument does not prove that space is not really composed of parts. The parts of a thing may be conceived as indestructible, but that does not prevent their being true parts, and, as such, distinct from one another.
The notion of space simply disappears if we abstract all idea of part out of part. Lines are no longer lines, surfaces are no longer surfaces, nor are solids solids.

In denying that the parts of corporeal substance are distinct from each other, in conceiving it "as it is in the understanding," Spinoza simply abstracts from the differences which distinguish this part as here and that part as there. He overlooks the modes and falls back on the attribute, and his attribute is not something concrete, composed of concrete parts, but an abstraction. He is considering extension in the abstract, which, of course, implies some notion of part out of part, but leaves out of view the marks of any concrete individual parts. The difference between extension as it is in the imagination and extension as it is in the understanding, is the difference between concrete and general knowledge, between the individual and the universal. This escape to the concept in no way solves the problems forced on us by the conception of the infinite. We cannot lay the ghosts of those infinite lines by denying that they are really infinite lines, and composed of parts. As well deny that a yard is composed of feet, or a foot of inches, or refuse to believe that anything is really extended, and may contain a smaller thing or be contained in a greater.

31. (prop. 16) See the Introductory Note I, 4, and II, 10. In corollary 1 God is called the efficient cause. It should be remembered that the word cause has a double sense in the "Ethics." The "fixed and eternal things" are "immanent" causes. Finite individuals are transient causes of other individuals. The word efficient cause should only apply to causes in
the latter sense. The causality attributed to essences and to individual things is discussed in the Introductory Note, II, 15.

Corollaries 2 and 3 are, of course, inferred from the fact that nothing can be attributed to any cause outside of the divine nature.

32. (prop. 17) Spinoza conceives all ideas as following by logical deduction from the idea of God, and, by a parallel process, all things following from God. This leaves no room for arbitrary choice, the physical necessity keeping step with the logical. Remember that neither this logical deduction of ideas, nor the corresponding physical progression, describes a historical process, for the "fixed and eternal things" are "all by nature simultaneous" (see Introductory Note, II, 16). The deductions from the nature of the triangle should not have been made parallel with the relation of cause and effect, where, when the words are properly used, the effect is not in the cause and simply brought out of it by analysis.

The difficulty about God's creating all he knows and being unable to create any more is easily overcome. It arises from the fact that one employs the words "all he knows" to signify a definite amount, a finite quantity. If "all he knows" be infinite, one cannot use the word greater in speaking of it, for no comparison is possible (see Note 30).

The words "God's omnipotence has from eternity been actual, and to eternity will abide in this actuality," mean simply that the whole system of "fixed and eternal things"—the hierarchy of abstractions discussed in Introductory Note, II—really exists, has always existed, and will always exist. Of course Spinoza introduces here, as in many other places, the
notion of time, and inconsistently makes eternity to consist in endless time.

In the argument to prove God's intellect and will different from ours there are several difficulties. Making God's intellect the cause of things contradicts II, 6, cor. The statement that our intellect and will agree only in name with God's intellect and will appears to contradict what is explicitly stated elsewhere, e.g., V, 40, schol. (on this point see Note 59). The doctrine of causality here taught contradicts I, 3, which latter is more in harmony with Spinoza's general doctrine of the causality of essences.

33. (prop. 18) See the Introductory Note (II, 10) and Notes 1, 2, and 3. A universal may in some sense be said to be immanent in the individuals subsumed under it, and Spinoza here returns to the notion of God as the ultimate universal. I have criticised in the Introductory Note his ascribing causality to these abstractions. The words "immanent cause" are unfortunate. If the cause cannot be regarded as a distinct thing from the effect, we simply come back to the notion of a causae sui, which I criticised in Note 1.

34. (prop. 19) This proposition appears to make substance only a name for the sum of the attributes (see Note 3). As to God's eternal existence, see Notes 1 and 15. There is evidently a leap in the argument. Existence is included among a number of other attributes as belonging to an essence. It is thus treated as distinct from each. Then it is concluded that each attribute is eternal—that is, that the existence included among the other attributes as one of a number is not a distinct property, but is fused with each other attribute as they are not fused with each other. It is
spread over all the rest. It is thus not treated as an element included with others in an essence.

The argument in the "Principles" to which Spinoza refers is as follows: If we do not attribute to God an unlimited existence, we must admit that he, an omniscient and a most perfect being, would know the limits set to his existence. He would thus know that he, a most perfect being, does not exist beyond those limits, which is absurd. Hence God has not a limited but an infinite existence, and this we call eternity.

35. (prop. 20) See the criticism of the treatment of existence in the preceding note. Prop. 20 completes the confusion by declaring existence absolutely identical with all the other elements in the essence.

36. (prop. 21) This reasoning becomes plain if we bear in mind that here the attribute thought is not treated as a mere universal, an abstraction, but as a thing, infinite in extent and made up of finite thoughts (see the Introductory Note, II, 8). The idea of God is conceived of as one of these finite thoughts, limited by thought beyond itself. It is inferred that, as there may be thought beyond the limits of the idea of God, the idea of God does not follow from the very nature of thought. If it did, we could not have thought without it. The second argument is like the first, except that duration is substituted for extent.

37. (prop. 24) See prop. 8, schol. 2, and Note 19. As I have shown at length in the Introductory Note, Spinoza gives no hint of the way in which individual things, existences, are to be derived from God. The preceding propositions have been concerned to prove that all that follows from his absolute nature must be eternal and infinite. How his nature comes to be so conditioned that finite things of any sort may follow
from it is left wholly unexplained. The propositions which follow rest upon the assertion—introduced, as it were, by violence—that God is cause of existences as well as of essences.

38. (prop. 25) See the preceding note. The statement in the scholium that God is cause of all things in just the sense in which he is said to be cause of himself (see Note 1), will not square with one of the kinds of causality accepted by Spinoza, that set forth in prop. 28. Each finite thing must have a finite cause external to itself, and unless we simply obliterate the distinctions between things and call them really one and the same (as Spinoza does in the scholium to prop. 15, see Note 30 near the end), we cannot fall back on the causa sui idea.

39. (prop. 28) See Notes 37 and 38.

40. (prop. 28, schol.) Spinoza gives in one of his letters (Letter 64, ed. Van Vloten and Land), as instances of the things immediately produced by God, in the attribute thought, "absolutely infinite understanding"; and in the attribute extension, "motion and rest." As a representative of the second class, he instances "the face of the universe as a whole, which, though it varies in infinite ways, remains always the same."

41. (prop. 29) As all ideas are supposed to flow by strict logical necessity from the idea of God, and all things, by a parallel process, from God, the natural result is a universal determinism. The libertarian reader may console himself with the thought that this deduction of ideas and things has not been made (Introductory Note, II, 14).

42. (prop. 29, schol.) Again, the causa sui notion. The attributes as unmodified constitute God as cause; as modified, they are God as effect. It should be kept
in mind that *natura naturans* does not precede in time *natura naturata*. We have not here a history of creation, but a portrayal of the logical structure of things. Spinoza appears to forget this from time to time, and uses language which is misleading (*read, for example, 33, schol. 2*). In making God as cause in any way distinguishable from God as effect, Spinoza strains somewhat the *causa sui* idea. He, however, regards the two as identical, as constituting, not two things, but one (*25, cor.*).

43. (prop. 30) See the Introductory Note, I, 2.
44. (prop. 32) Read 28, which is referred to in the proof of this proposition, and see Notes 37 and 38, Will is regarded as determined because it is a mode, and all modes are determined, and follow necessarily from the nature of God.

45. (prop. 33, schol. 2) Notice the time-relations introduced everywhere in this second scholium. Spinoza has evidently found it impossible to get on without the "when, before, and after" excluded by the idea of "eternity" (*see Note 42*).

As to the perfection in which God has brought things into being: Spinoza uses the word perfection in a sense quite different from that in which it is used by those whom he criticises. He brings out clearly the difference in the Preface to Part IV. See, also, his definition of perfection in Part II (*def. 6*). When, however, he speaks of things as having been "brought into being by God in the highest perfection," and labors to prove it, he is evidently taking advantage of the associations which cluster around the word as ordinarily used. In the same way he makes use of the associations which cluster around the word God, though his doctrine changes the meaning of the word
to something the ordinary man never thinks of. He writes, for example (Letter 21): "Meanwhile I know (and this knowledge gives me the highest satisfaction and tranquillity of mind) that everything comes to pass by the power and immutable decree of a supremely perfect Being."

46. (appendix) See the preceding note. Spinoza's naturalism is here sufficiently uncompromising. It is well to remember, however, that he did not wholly divorce from the word God the associations which ordinarily accompany it. Had he done so, his philosophy would not have influenced religious minds as it has done since his day.

The force and clearness of this scholium make one regret that Spinoza did not write his whole treatise in the same style. The difficulties met with in the "Ethics" are partly due to its unfortunate mathematical dress.
NOTES TO PART II.

47. (preface) The reader will remember that, in Part I, no indication was given of the way in which modes could be deduced from the essence of God. Part II begins with such notions as body, idea, individual things, man, love, desire, etc. These are not deduced from the idea of God, but simply taken up as given in experience, and then referred to God.

48. (defs.) As regards def. 2, see what I have said concerning Spinoza's doctrine of essences in the Introductory Note (II, 13). This definition demands too much, and would make the essence of a thing strictly identical with the thing itself. Spinoza does not generally use the word essence in this sense. In explanation of def. 4, see Introductory Note, I, 3. Def. 5 takes up duration, or existence in time, which Spinoza contrasts elsewhere with eternity (see Introductory Note, II, 16). We may take exception to the explanation appended to it, it being by no means clear that the existence of a thing may not thus be limited. Of course, no finite thing is wholly independent, and what happens to it is in part due to the influence of external things. As to def. 6, see the second paragraph of Note 45.

49. (axioms) As regards axiom 1, see I, 8, schol. 2, and Introductory Note, II, 13. The four axioms following are simply accepted as facts of experience. It is interesting to note that in axiom 4 he avoids idealism (inconsistently, it is true, see Introductory
Note I, 3) by appealing to the fact that we perceive our body. He forgets that what we perceive is our perceived body, a complex in consciousness, and that it still remains to prove that there is a something else external to this perception, and corresponding thereto. Such a proof he nowhere attempts. He did well not to attempt it, for it is nothing more nor less than the attempt to obtain a conclusion without premises, to gain from experience what experience does not contain and cannot furnish.

Axiom 5 is very interesting. Spinoza has defined God or substance as a being consisting of an infinity of attributes (I, 11). In Part II he teaches that each of these attributes is wholly independent of every other. The modes of each attribute are caused by their attribute alone, and can in no way act upon or be acted upon by the modes in any other attribute. They are, so to speak, in different worlds. This would seem to destroy the unity of substance absolutely, and make it only a name for an infinity of wholly different and independent things, existing without any bond of union whatever. Yet, as we have seen (see Note 3), Spinoza regards substance as giving a unity to the attributes. It is one, while they are many. Extended substance and thinking substance are one and the same substance, apprehended now under this, now under that attribute (7, schol.). And since the modes of each attribute correspond exactly to those of each other attribute (7, cor., and schol.), a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are the same thing, but expressed in two ways. Hence every individual thing is expressed in an infinity of ways, for it appears as a mode in each attribute.

Now, Spinoza accepts it as an axiom that we per-
ceive by sense the modifications of our body; i.e., the mind perceives a mode in another attribute, that of extension. He also accepts it as self-evident that we do not perceive any individual modes except bodies and modes of thinking. But if our mind, a mode of thought, is identical with our body, a mode of extension, it is no less identical with an infinity of other modes. And if it bear the same relation to them that it does to the body, why is its knowledge limited to bodies and modes of thinking?

This difficulty was pointed out by one of Spinoza's contemporaries, and Spinoza attempts to meet it, but without much success (see Letters 63 to 66). He appears to teach that, as the human body has its corresponding idea, the human mind (see prop. 13 and schol.), so the particular mode in each of the other attributes, which corresponds to the human body, has its idea too, and this is in every case related to it as the mind is to the body. All these ideas are distinct from each other and infinite in number. They constitute an infinity of minds. Thus each individual thing is represented once in every attribute except that of thought, and in that one is represented an infinite number of times—or perhaps (though Spinoza could not admit more than one attribute of the same kind) one should say, is represented once in each of an infinite number of thought-attributes, for these ideas seem to belong to different worlds.

It will be noticed that thought is here put on a very different footing from the other attributes. It is, so to speak, spread over all the rest, as existence is spread over all the rest of the elements in the essence in which it is included in I, 19. Of course, this multiplying the number of times each thing is represented
in the attribute thought does not explain why we know only two aspects of each thing. The idealistic reader will take a certain satisfaction in noting that this difficulty really has its root in that first extension of the attribute thought which makes it go beyond itself and seize upon extended things. If it can do this once, why not again?

The doctrine of the infinity of attributes plays no important part in the philosophy of Spinoza: he occupies himself only with thought and extension.

50. (prop. 1) The proof of this proposition brings out well the fact that Spinoza's attributes are universals, abstractions obtained by obliterating differences (see Introductory Note, II, 11). The statement in the scholium, that, since we conceive an infinite being by fixing attention upon thought alone, we must regard thought as one of the infinite attributes of God, needs a little attention. Strictly speaking, by fixing attention upon thought alone, we get nothing but thought, just as by fixing attention upon extension alone we get nothing but extension. Had Spinoza gotten his substance by a further abstraction from the differences between different attributes, then fixing attention upon thought alone would not result in conceiving an infinite being—the infinite being, God, or substance. He only carries his abstraction, however, back to the attributes, and then speaks as if he had reached God or substance. Thinking an attribute is, thus, conceiving an infinite being, for the attributes express the nature of this being. As I have said, Spinoza never clearly distinguishes between the being and its attributes (see Note 3).

Note that in the proof it is not stated that the infinity of the attribute thought depends upon the
fact that the number of modes that express it is infinite, while the scholium makes a thinking being infinite because it can think an infinite number of thoughts. The proof gives us thought as a universal, the element contained in every thought: the scholium gives us infinite thought as an individual made up of parts. The infinity of the former (if we may call it infinity at all) is a very different thing from that of the latter.

51. (prop. 3) It is not proved in prop. 1 that God can think an infinity of things in an infinity of ways. As has been stated just above, the proof of that proposition gives us thought as a universal, a mere abstraction, and overlooks all modal distinctions. These are retained in the scholium. Since they are so retained, it is not true that "we conceive an infinite being by fixing attention upon thought alone." The infinity of the being depends upon our retaining the idea of a multitude of individual thoughts, finite modes, and Spinoza comes back to the idea of God as an aggregate, composed of parts. He is not considering an attribute alone, but an attribute as modified, and his references (I, defs. 4 and 6) are not pertinent. Hence the proof of prop. 3 really rests upon a play upon the words "an infinite thinking being." The conception contained in the scholium of the preceding proposition is substituted for that contained in the proof. This one starts with modes, and does not deduce them from the attribute.

52. (prop. 4) See Introductory Note, I, 2, on the parallelism of ideas and things.

53. (prop. 5) Prop. 3, to which reference is made in the first part of this proof, has been criticised in Note 51. The second part falls back on the notion of
the genus as cause of the species. Ideas are modes of thought, i.e., thought bears to them the relation of universal to particular, hence it is their cause. Extension is not so contained in ideas, hence it cannot be their cause. This doctrine of universals as causes I have discussed at length in the second part of the Introductory Note (10).

54. (prop. 6) See the preceding note. Compare the statements of the corollary with what is said in the scholium to I, 17, near the end (see Note 32).

55. (prop. 7) For the proof and corollary read the Introductory Note, I, 1, which discusses the parallelism of the chain of ideas with that of real causes and effects. As regards the scholium, see Note 3 and the part of Note 49 which is concerned with axiom 5.

As we have seen, Spinoza regards every finite mode as conditioned by an endless series of finite causes (I, 28). He denies that the modes of one attribute can condition those of another (II, 6). Each attribute is, therefore, modified by an infinity of finite modes causally connected with each other, but having no causal connection with the modes of any other attribute. Nevertheless, the modes in each attribute absolutely correspond to the modes in every other. Each mode in one attribute must, therefore, have a corresponding mode in every other attribute, which mode is simply a different way of expressing the same thing. Thus we have in the attribute of extension an infinite series of material things connected with each other in a necessary and fixed order; and in the attribute of thought an infinite series of ideas also connected with each other in fixed order. For every material thing there is a corresponding mode in the attribute of thought, and this is the idea of the thing.
They are also the same with each corresponding mode in the other attributes of substance.

This illustration of the correspondence of modes becomes clearer when we remember that Spinoza regarded all nature as animated (see 13, schol.). In other words, he believed that each material thing has an actually existing counterpart in the attribute thought, which counterpart may properly be called its idea. In this sense of the word the human mind is the idea of the human body (prop. 13). The doctrine of the infinite number of the attributes of substance is, as has been remarked (Note 49), of little significance in Spinoza's philosophy. What is important is his attempt to bridge the gulf between thought and extension. He regarded this identity of the modes in the one substance as furnishing the bridge sought for (see 13, schol.).

Spinoza's formal proof that there is no causal connection between the modes of one attribute and those of another will, as we have seen, not bear critical examination (see props. 5 and 6 and the notes which relate to them). It was, however, very natural that he should take such a position. Descartes had so separated thought and extension in his philosophy as to make almost inevitable the doctrine of Occasional Causes, which arose among his immediate followers. This doctrine held that God is the immediate cause of mental changes which appear to result from material causes, and of material changes which appear to result from mental causes. What appears to us the cause is only the occasion for God's action. This constant interference on the part of an external cause Spinoza could not admit, as it is wholly opposed to his notion of the divine immanence in things. It
was, therefore, necessary for him to deny that thought can act upon extension or extension upon thought. It remained for him to find some explanation of the fact (which it never seems to have occurred to him to question) that thought and things are so related as to make a knowledge of things possible.

The thesis of prop. 7 is not proved by Spinoza, but simply assumed with the doubtful axiom (I, axiom 4) that, knowledge of an effect depends on knowledge of its cause and involves it. The expressions "knowledge of an effect" and "knowledge of its cause" assume at once the correspondence of the "knowledge" and the "effect" in the one case, and of the "knowledge" and the "cause" in the other. As the words "cause" and "effect" assume the material things in question to be in a certain definite relation, it only remains for the axiom to declare the same relation to hold good between the intellectual factors.

The correspondence of modes is thus simply assumed in proof of our proposition. In the scholium an explanation of the fact is offered. A thing and its idea are declared to be the same thing viewed under different aspects. They are one, because substance is one, and they are modes of substance. This needs some examination. As I have said (Note 3), Spinoza's statements regarding substance are very vague, but whether we regard it as a name for the sum of the attributes, as the sumnum genus, or as a something underlying modes and different from them (substratum), we cannot accept the scholium as really explaining anything. If by substance we mean merely the sum of the attributes, we have plainly no explanation at all. Our calling two distinct things the same thing will not make them correspond, nor can it furnish any
evidence that they do correspond. If substance be
the *summum genus*, the ultimate abstraction, it can
serve our turn no better. It will not explain the
parallelism of two lines of fence to say they are both
"fence." As to the third sense of the word: if the
one substance which Spinoza regards as revealed in
both the thing and the idea of the thing be something
different from both and underlying them (the *sub-
stratum* with which the students of the history of
philosophy are familiar), then proof should be offered
(1) that substance of this kind exists; (2) that the
substance underlying the two modes in question is
really identical, and (3) that a single substance under-
lying two modes would cause such a parallelism of
modes as the one in question. The proofs of the
existence of substance have already been discussed
(see I, 11, and the notes which criticise it). The second
point Spinoza does not prove in any sense which
could serve the desired end. He has argued that
substance is indivisible (I, 12, 13). The substance
underlying one mode is, therefore, identical with the
substance underlying any other mode. If, then, we
argue that a thing is one and the same with the idea
of that thing, on the ground that they are only differ-
ent expressions of the same substance, we may also
argue that a thing is one and the same with the idea
of any other thing. Any attempt to prove the corre-
spondence of modes from identity of underlying sub-
stance must assume that the substance underlying
each material thing is distinct from that underlying
every other material thing, and is identical with that
underlying one particular idea. Such a partition of
substance Spinoza could not admit. As regards the
third point, if it be not incompatible with the unity of
the one substance that it should have two such different manifestations as thought and extension, what reason is there to think it incompatible with its unity that the order and arrangement of parts in its two manifestations should be different?

The reader will remark a close analogy between Spinoza's doctrine of the independence and parallelism of modes in the attributes thought and extension and the modern psychological doctrine of cerebral "automatism." The scholium to prop. 2, Part III, for example, reads like a chapter from a contemporary work on psychology. The failure of Spinoza's arguments to prove that mind and body cannot act on one another does not, of course, dispose of this doctrine.

56. (prop. 8) This corollary and scholium rest on the parallelism of thought and things set forth in the last proposition. Spinoza maintains that an idea cannot have actual existence unless its object has it. The only thing puzzling here is the sort of existence attributed to those things that "do not exist except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists." It is the sort of existence attributed to essences, which (to take the mental series) may be deduced from the idea of God, and in so far may be said to exist when once the idea of God is given. The whole series of "fixed and eternal things" are supposed to be "simultaneous," and given in the highest member of the series from which they may be deduced. Though Spinoza distinguishes between essence and existence, and denies to these things the latter, yet he grants them a shadowy kind of "essential" existence. An actually existing rectangle has, consequently, a dual existence. On this subject of essences, see the Introductory Note, II, 13.
57. (prop. 9) The statement in the proof that God is cause of the idea of an individual thing actually existing only "in so far as he is considered as affected by some other mode of thinking" simply says in other words that each idea is caused by some other idea (see I, 28). All things are said to be in God, and, hence, whatever is caused by anything is caused by God "in so far," etc. As I have said, Spinoza nowhere indicates how the chain of finite existences may be connected with God (see Notes 37 and 38).

As to the corollary: God as a thinking thing means God revealed in the attribute thought (prop. 1). Now the only representative of any individual thing in the attribute thought is the idea of the thing. Hence God’s knowledge of the thing must be shut up to this.

58. (prop. 10) The reader will find a detailed criticism of these arguments by turning to Spinoza’s references and looking up the notes indicated.

The definition of essence made use of in the proof and the scholium to the corollary demands too much of an essence (see Note 48), and would make the essence of a thing identical with the thing itself. When the word is used in its proper sense, it does not follow that, given the essence, the thing is given.

We have seen that, had Spinoza been logical in following up his series of "fixed and eternal things," God would have been to him simply the ultimate universal, the highest abstraction (see Notes 2 and 3). He would thus be included in the essence of each individual thing, for he would be reached by abstracting from all differences of individuals and retaining what they have in common. Given the individual, then, God would be given; but given God, the individual would not be given at all. Yet Spinoza's
"proper order of philosophizing" begins with the abstract and endeavors to develop a concrete.

59. (prop. 11) The only criticism I need make on the proof of this proposition is that props. 21 and 22 of Part I do not, even supposing the reasoning there to be valid, prove that an infinite thing must always necessarily exist.

As to the corollary: the infinite intellect of God, which, as we have seen (Note 49), is an infinite and eternal mode in the attribute thought, is conceived as made up of ideas, and the human mind is regarded as one of its parts, not as subsumed under it as the particular is subsumed under the universal (see V, 40, schol.). This appears to contradict I, 17, schol., which maintains that God's intellect and man's intellect have nothing in common but the name. Possibly this difficulty may be overcome by supposing that in the scholium just mentioned Spinoza is considering God merely as natura naturans, as consisting merely of unmodified attributes. Had he, however, had this thought, he could very easily have said that intellect is a modification of the attribute thought, that no modifications of any sort belong to God regarded as the first cause, and that, consequently, intellect cannot be said to belong to the divine nature in any sense. His language does not entirely fit this interpretation.

In this corollary we again meet the "in so far," etc. (see Note 57). It will recur constantly. It does nothing but remind us that all things are in God. When Spinoza says that God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea, he means merely that the idea in question is the essence of the human mind, and that this is a part of God's intellect. When he says "God has this or that idea,
not merely in so far,” etc., he means that the human mind constitutes only a part of the whole idea of the thing in question, and that this whole is part of God’s intellect.

Thus it will be seen that Spinoza makes the human mind to consist in ideas. He comes very near to a simple and scientific psychology quite up to the requirements of modern thought. His unfortunate realism, his failure to grasp the true difference between imagination and thought, etc., conspired, as the reader will see, to cloud his horizon.

60. (prop. 12) The thing puzzling about this proof is the fact that it is presented as a proof with the “in so far,” etc., as premises (see Notes 57 and 59). The argument really should be that, since the human mind, which is the idea of a given object, exactly represents that object, whatever takes place in the object must be represented in the human mind. Spinoza assumes here, and in the corollary to prop. 9, that this is equivalent to saying the mind knows what takes place in the object.

61. (prop. 13) The proof of this proposition rests upon axioms 4 and 5, which appeal to experience (see Note 49). It would perhaps be better to say there is no proof at all, as everything is given in the axioms, and the detour about ideas being “in God, in so far,” etc., adds nothing to the thought (see Notes 57 and 59), except to keep one in mind of the fact that the mind is to be regarded always as a part of God. It has nothing whatever to do with the proof of the thesis.

The language of the corollary seems to imply that the existence of the body has been proved. It has, however, been assumed with axiom 4. For the scholium, see Note 55.
What follows, as far as the next proposition. I shall not criticise in detail, for it is at least sufficiently intelligible. I shall merely take up two points. The *a priori* proof (*lemma 3, cor.*) that a body in motion cannot, unassisted, come to rest, nor a body at rest set itself in motion, rests upon the thought that the idea of the effect must be actually contained in that of the cause. Out of the mere thought of motion we cannot get rest, or *vice versa*. It is, however, only experience, or a deduction from premises furnished by experience, that can tell us what causes and effects go together. Again, the statement (*lemma 7, schol.*) that the parts of nature may vary in infinite ways without any change of the "whole individual" (*see Note 40*), will be accepted as true or not according to one's definition of what constitutes change in an individual. The doctrine of the conservation of energy appears to furnish what Spinoza was feeling for here.

62. (*prop. 15*) The reference to God in this proof has nothing to do with the argument (*see Note 60*), which rests solely upon the doctrine that an idea exactly represents its object.

63. (*prop. 16*) In this proposition with its corollaries we meet with a serious difficulty. In harmony with the doctrine of the parallelism of thought and things, the object of the idea constituting the human mind has been declared to be the body and nothing else (*prop. 13*), and it has been maintained that everything that takes place in the body, and every part of the body, are represented in the mind (*props. 12 and 15*). There ought, therefore, to be in the mind "objectively" just what is in the body "formally" and no more. But the external causes of the modifications of the body, the things which act
upon it, are not in the body at all. They ought not, then, to be represented in the mind, but in other ideas or minds which are external to the mind. In making the mind perceive anything beyond the body the parallelism of mind and body is violated.

Of course, Spinoza's argument bases itself, in a way, on the doctrine of parallelism. As effect is related to cause, so is the idea of the effect to that of the cause. The former "involves" the latter. But that does not imply that both ideas make part of one mind—the human mind, which is limited to the representation of what takes place in the body, and ought not to include the representation of anything else. I have discussed at length in the Introductory Note (II, 12) the meaning of the word involve. Usually it denotes the relation of particular and universal. I have also shown that Spinoza uses the word cause in two quite distinct senses, the one to indicate the relation of universal and particular, the other to indicate the relation of finite causes and effects as recognized by science. In the latter case the cause is outside of its effect, and is a distinct thing from it. Now, anything that could be regarded as a cause of the modifications of the body in the first sense of the word cause might be said to be in the body, and its idea might be said to be in the mind. But causes of the second kind cannot be in the body, nor can their ideas (if we are to hold to a parallelism) be in the mind. It is true that Spinoza uses the word idea in two senses (I shall discuss this a little later), but everything that has preceded has led up only to ideas of the one kind, i.e., the representatives in the attribute thought of modes in the attribute extension. To put one of these representatives in another—to put the idea of some-
thing else than the body in the mind—is not permissible.

The concession of cor. 2 reminds one of the old "relativity" arguments of Hamilton and others. Spinoza does not attempt to distinguish in detail between what really belongs to external objects and what does not.

64. (prop. 17) For a criticism of the proof of this proposition see the preceding note. In the corollary we find the generally accepted psychological doctrine that, given the same cerebral condition, we will have the same mental activity. With the psychological doctrine we can have no quarrel, as it is a legitimate inference from certain facts given in experience. When, however, we come to examine it in its relation to Spinoza’s theory of knowledge, we find, as has been indicated in the preceding note, serious difficulties.

The two senses in which Spinoza uses the word idea come out clearly in the scholium. The idea of Peter which constitutes the essence of Peter’s mind directly expresses the essence of Peter’s body. It is the mode in the attribute thought, which corresponds to the physical Peter, a mode in the attribute extension. The doctrine of parallelism demands that this correspondence be complete and absolute. There must be nothing in Peter’s body that is not in this idea, and nothing in this idea that is not in his body. But the idea of Peter that is in Paul’s mind is a very different thing. It is not in Peter’s mind at all, but forms, for the time being, a part of Paul’s mind—the idea of Paul, in the sense of the word given above. And there may be in Paul’s mind a vast number of ideas of things other than Paul’s body. As a good Spinozist Paul’s endeavor must be to arrive at the idea of the
"origin and source of nature" and deduce from it a host of ideas which are not ideas of his body.

Now, the doctrine of parallelism, as Spinoza has developed it in what precedes (props. 7, 8, 9, 11, 13) presents us with an infinite series of bodies to which correspond, point for point, an infinite series of ideas. Each idea answers to one body, and each body to that particular idea. This correspondence is explained by the assumption that a body and its idea are really identical with each other. Thus if two bodies are distinct from and outside of each other, their ideas are distinct from and outside of each other. By no possibility can the idea of one body be in the idea of another.

This doctrine in no way demands a correspondence between Paul's idea of Peter and Peter as he is. It does demand a correspondence between Paul's idea of Peter and some modification of Paul's body. Paul's mind is only a part of the infinite intellect of God (prop. 11, cor.), and the idea of Peter (Peter's mind) is another part. Hence that Peter should be in any way represented in Paul's mind, or that Paul should be able to represent in his mind the whole of nature or any large part of nature seems to contradict the doctrine of parallelism of modes, or, at least, to complicate it by the addition of a quite new doctrine. We have here a second parallelism of ideas and things, which must be carefully distinguished from the first. It is this second parallelism, which suddenly appears with the double meaning of the word "idea," that ought to be the important one to Spinoza. His concern is with the reality of knowledge, and it is with knowledge that this is concerned. That he confused the two senses of the word idea seems plain, if only
from the fact that he leaps, without warning the reader, from the one parallelism to the other.

It would hardly be just to close this criticism without adding the statement that Spinoza finds himself in good company when he falls into perplexing difficulties over the problem of the possibility and reality of knowledge. The doctrine of the duality of ideas and things, convenient and unobjectionable in psychology, will not pass in epistemology. This is not the place to discuss the subject at length, and I must refer the reader to my monograph "On Sameness and Identity," § 35.*

65. (prop. 19) The references to God add nothing to the argument (see Notes 57 and 59). Spinoza's reasoning is, in substance, as follows: The human mind is the idea or knowledge of the human body. The human body is not independent, but a part of a system of finite modes and related to other bodies. The mind is similarly related to other ideas. To express this thought in other words, we may say God has the idea of the human body, i.e., knows the human body, and so far as he is affected by the ideas of many individual things. Hence God has an idea of the human body, i.e., knows the human body, in so far as he is affected by many other ideas, i.e., consists of other ideas in addition, and not in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or, in other words, is the human mind. Thus the human mind (the knowledge of the human body) does not know the human body. But the ideas of the modifications of the body are in the mind, and whatever is in the mind the mind perceives. These modifications involve the existence of the body, and hence through them the mind perceives the body.

* See also my article in The Psychological Review, vol. i, No. 2.
It seems scarcely necessary to criticise such a bit of reasoning, but I may simply point out: (1) That even if the human mind be regarded as related to other ideas, the knowledge of the human body is not to be found in any part of this system of ideas outside of the human mind, for the latter, and that alone, is the knowledge of the human body. Hence the knowledge of the human body must be in God, not in so far as he has other ideas, but in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind. (2) That the reasoning of the first part of the proof may be applied as well to "ideas of the modifications of the body," as to "the idea of the body," for these modifications are part of a system of things, too.

It seems odd that Spinoza should have defined the mind as "the knowledge of the human body," and yet have denied to it a knowledge of the human body. He appears to have been trying to adjust to his doctrine the experienced fact that when the body is affected in certain ways consciousness results, and when the body is not so affected there is no consciousness. As his doctrine of parallelism demanded a duplication of things in the attribute thought, he had to regard the "idea of the body" as existing even when consciousness seemed absent. We have here the double sense of the word "idea" discussed in the preceding note. The mind itself is the idea of the body in the one sense of the word, and its knowledge is (or includes) the idea in the other sense. It is well to bear this in mind in reading what follows.

66. (prop. 20) This proposition really gives us the thought series of things in infinite repetition. We have not merely the parallelism of things and their ideas, but of these ideas with their ideas, etc., etc.
The existence of these series is not arrived at by deduction from the attribute thought, but is accepted to explain the experienced fact that we can have an idea of an idea as we have an idea of an object. Just as Spinoza's epistemology holds to a duality of objects and their ideas, so his psychology gives us a similar duality of ideas and ideas of these ideas. The one position is perhaps as reasonable as the other.

67. (prop. 21) The relation of an idea and its idea cannot be the same as that of an idea and its material object, for, as Spinoza points out in the scholium, the latter are in two different attributes, and the former in one and the same attribute. When the Spinozist encounters the "same" thing in different attributes he has some way of marking a duality and distinguishing "phases" of the thing. But the "same" thing in the same attribute appears to yield an identity so complete as to make impossible any distinction of phases or capacities. Thus the infinite number of series of modes in the attribute thought melted into each other in fact, and do not remain separate.

68. (prop. 22) Spinoza has put the ideas of the modifications of the body in the human mind. He falls back upon the doctrine of parallelism to prove that these ideas of ideas are referred to God in the same way as the ideas themselves (see prop. 20). This means simply that they are really parallel to the ideas or exactly correspond to them. He then argues that, since the ideas of the modifications are referred to God "in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind," the ideas of them, which are referred to him in the same way, must be referred to him too "in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human
mind”—in other words, must be in the human mind. But the doctrine of parallelism demands that the words “in the same way” must mean “in a similar way,” or we have no parallelism, but a complete identity. Spinoza really makes the ideas of ideas melt into the ideas themselves when he thus puts them in the mind (see the preceding note).

Spinoza makes the mind to consist of ideas. It is “the idea of the body,” and made up of many different ideas. He nowhere treats it as a substratum or “unit-being” which has ideas. When, therefore, he speaks of the mind as knowing this or that, a literal interpretation of his language would lead us to conclude that the idea of the body, which is unconscious of the body and of itself, is conscious of the modifications of the body, of the ideas of them, and of the ideas of these ideas, etc., etc. In other words, it is conscious of certain things in itself, and reaches across to its parallels and knows certain things in them. From these things it infers itself (prop. 23), the body (prop. 19), and other bodies (prop. 16).

The general difficulty of conceiving the mind as reaching across to something beyond itself and knowing it is met with in every epistemology which tries to hold to a world beyond consciousness. It is not peculiar to Spinoza. It makes the act of knowing unintelligible, and simply takes refuge in words to which no clear thought corresponds.

On the other hand, Spinoza’s doctrine offers difficulties peculiar to itself. The mind is the idea or knowledge of the human body. This knowledge is in God, and it is in God “as modified.” God “as modified” is only another name for the whole system of finite things. When we say God knows the human
body we simply mean that he has an idea of it (proof of prop. 19), and this is equivalent to saying that the idea is in him "as modified," i.e., it is a part of the system of things, or, limiting ourselves to the attribute thought, a part of the system of finite ideas. God then only knows the human body in so far as he constitutes or is the human mind (see Note 65). Surely, then, the human mind ought to know the human body. The human mind is God "in so far as" he knows the human body. Yet Spinoza denies that the human mind knows the human body.

Again, it seems strange that the human mind should know certain things in itself, and yet not know itself. It is not a "substratum," a something "behind" the things it knows, but consists of ideas. If it knows some of the ideas in itself, why does it not know the rest? Why, in other words, does it not know all of itself?

In props. 20–23 Spinoza advances the doctrine that to know an idea we must have an idea of that idea—a duplicate, as it were. What is here the knower? Is it this duplicate? As we have just seen, he tries to solve the problem of reflective knowledge, the "know that I know," by a multiplication of parallel ideas and a melting of them into one again (see Notes 66 and 67). Perhaps we may say that he made consciousness to consist in such a multiplication, and mere knowledge of the sort represented by "the idea of the body" in a single layer of ideas.

In all this discussion of the mind and its knowledge we can see that Spinoza is trying to adjust to his philosophy certain things gathered from experience, and of which it is sufficiently difficult to give a consistent analytic account. Using language in its ordinary
sense, it is quite true that we do not know all about
the body or all about the mind. Psychologists gener-
ally are ready to admit that our knowledge of both
is based upon conscious experiences which are a result
(or concomitant) of certain modifications of the body.
We all speak of having an idea of an object when our
attention is directed to the object, and having an idea
of an idea, when we are engaged in a somewhat dif-
ferent mental operation. What is really implied in
such statements? Spinoza has offered his own ex-
planations, which are not free from difficulties, as we
have seen. One good thing he has done: he has
dropped the mind as a metaphysical entity behind
ideas, and made it a group of ideas. So far, he has
rendered us service.

69. (prop. 23) See the notes to Spinoza’s references.

70. (prop. 24) The only point I need criticise here is
this: Even supposing the human body to be com-
posed of parts which may be replaced by other bodies,
and which only belong to it while they are in it and
function in a certain way, that does not imply that
“the idea of the body” does not include the ideas of
these parts as they are at the time they compose the
body. What they are at other times and in other
circumstances may not concern it. For a criticism of
the word “involve,” see Note 63. The word “ade-
quate” should mark only this distinction between a
complete knowledge of the bodies which compose the
human body, and a knowledge of them in their
relations to it.

71. (prop. 25) As regards the part of the argument
in which Spinoza refers to prop. 9, see Note 65.

72. (prop. 27) See Note 70, on the use of the word
“adequate.” The reasoning here is analogous.
73. (prop. 28) The reasoning is sufficiently clear. We do not know all about a part of a system, unless we know the whole system. In this proposition and scholium the idea of the body (the mind) and the ideas of the modifications of the body are treated as fragmentary and incomplete on the same ground. Compare with this argument that of prop. 19. There this very same bit of reasoning is employed in making a distinction between the two, and denying to the mind any knowledge of the body (see Note 65). It will be noticed that Spinoza uses “clear and distinct” as synonymous with “adequate.” Note also that Spinoza has argued (25 and 27) that the ideas of the modifications of the body do not “involve” an adequate knowledge of the body or of external bodies. How, then, can the fact that we do not have an adequate knowledge of the human body or of external bodies make these ideas like conclusions without premises? As Spinoza is using the word “involve,” it means “implied in, as the cause is implied in its effect.” If we know the body and external bodies in so far as they are causally related to these ideas of the modifications of the body, we have an adequate (i.e., complete) knowledge of the modifications of the body. No premise is lacking.

74. (prop. 29) Just as the body, the idea of the body (the mind), and the idea of the idea of the body (consciousness of the mind) are parallel, so are the modifications of the body, the ideas of such modifications, and the ideas of these ideas. If, then, the idea of a modification of the body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the body, the idea of that idea cannot involve an adequate knowledge of the mind.
The knowledge of things which the mind acquires according to "the ordinary course of nature" does not seem incompatible with some sort of a parallelism between mind and body. But the determination of the mind from within, of which the scholium makes mention, introduces us to a subject treated of at length in Part V, and which the student will find it hard to adjust to the Spinozistic doctrine. Compare with this scholium prop. 28 of Part I.

75. (prop. 30) See my discussion of the dual causality found in the "Ethics" (Introductory Note, II, 15).

76. (prop. 32) The reference to God has nothing to do with the argument. The doctrine of parallelism assumes for every idea a corresponding object, and the axiom referred to is interpreted as meaning that every idea with a corresponding object is true. It would naturally follow that every idea must be true.

77. (prop. 33) Here again the reference to God is useless. It has just been assumed that every idea is true. It follows that no idea can be false, in any positive sense of the word, i.e., in any sense which would deny the assumption just made.

78. (prop. 35) Spinoza could not make falsity to consist in the non-correspondence of any idea with its object (see the two notes preceding). He, hence, makes it to consist in the possession of a fragmentary or incomplete idea. But the doctrine of parallelism requires that each fragment of an idea have its fragment of an object corresponding to it. It must then be true (see Note 76), and falsity is in no sense opposed to truth. The fact is that Spinoza really includes more in his idea of falsity than he says he does. This is shown in his two illustrations in the scholium. For example, if his doctrine regarding the will be true,
the man who thinks himself free has an idea which does not correspond to the facts as they are. He thinks, as Spinoza admits, that his actions are not determined, when they are determined. This is not the same thing as simply being ignorant of the fact that they are determined. Spinoza distinguishes between ignorance and error, but his definition of error rubs out the distinction.

On this whole subject of the truth or falsity of ideas, Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism has very important bearing, as the reader has seen. As I have pointed out, Spinoza really has two doctrines of parallelism, and he passes from the one to the other, apparently ignorant that he has made a leap. The student would do well to bear in mind what has been said in Note 64.

79. (prop. 37) See Note 48, on the definition of essence.

80. (prop. 38) There is a weak point in the proof of this proposition. The nature of the human body and that of external bodies are only involved “to some degree” in the ideas of the modifications of the human body. It is conceivable that something common to every part of all these bodies may not be so involved. It is hardly necessary to keep repeating that the references to God do not really touch the argument at all. They are merely tautological, and could perfectly well be dispensed with. The proofs of the next two propositions contain the same tautology.

81. (prop. 39) This proposition and corollary are puzzling. As I shall try to show later, Spinoza must mean by that which is common to all things (38) one of God’s attributes. If this is what he does mean,
it is easy to see why he regarded it as adequately known—it cannot be carried back to anything else as an effect of that something else. But here he intimates that the human body and other bodies may have several things in common, and that the number is variable. I do not think this can be adjusted to the rest of his doctrine (see Note 82).

82. (prop. 40, schol. 2) In this scholium Spinoza has admirably described the process of forming the concept, the universal. Leaving out of view the reference to the “images” formed in the body, his account of the origin of the “transcendental” and “universal” notions is clear and sensible, and quite in harmony with modern doctrine. It is strange that he should contrast with these notions those that he calls “common.” The only difference that there can be is a difference in degree of generality. All concepts are formed in the same way, and they do not differ in kind but in degree.

I have discussed at some length in the Introductory Note (II, 13) Spinoza’s doctrine regarding essences. Essences are in reality nothing but class notions, universals, formed as Spinoza has said universals are formed. He, however, overlooks this fact and treats them as something quite different.

83. (prop. 40, schol. 1) The student will find the kinds of knowledge discussed also in the “Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Blessedness,” Part II, chaps. 1 and 2, and in the treatise “On the Improvement of the Understanding.” The three expositions are substantially in harmony, and the illustration of the three numbers appears in all.

I think it will throw some light on this scholium if we bear in mind in reading it the dual causality found
in the "Ethics," and discussed at length in the Introductory Note (II, 15). It will be remembered that Spinoza has placed each finite particular thing in an infinite series of finite causes and effects, and has asserted that it must be determined by some other finite thing (see I, 28). We have here the series of real causes and effects of the kind recognized in the sciences. On the other hand, he has brought forward still another series of causes and effects, that of "fixed and eternal things," which correspond to the hierarchy of conceptions, and are subsumed under each other as lower and higher. In this case, what he regards as the cause is not a cause at all, but a more abstract conception, which embraces the lower if we are considering its "extension," as the logicians say, but is contained in it, if we are considering its "intension."

Now he has stated that when the mind imagines, it knows things inadequately, for its knowledge is caused by something external to it. It has, consequently, "conclusions without premises" (*prop. 28). Here he is considering the series of finite real things in which cause and effect are external to each other.

On the other hand, he has stated that in certain cases the mind is determined from within (*prop. 29, *schol.), and in that case its knowledge is complete and adequate. Here it has in itself both cause and effect, premises and conclusion.

It is evident that in thus distinguishing between imagination and knowledge in which the mind is active, Spinoza passes from the one causal series to the other. Since every idea must be a modification of an attribute of God, it "involves," *i.e.*, carries within itself, its own ultimate cause, the attribute. When an idea is referred to the attribute, that is when we are
considering its relation to the series of "fixed and eternal things," we do not go beyond the mind itself for a cause, and we may call our knowledge adequate. Of course there is a difficulty in adjusting to each other the two kinds of causality, but I need not dwell upon that here, as I have already discussed it.

Knowledge of the first kind is imagination. It is inadequate. In knowledge of the second and third kinds we know adequately, for we start with what is adequately known. To be adequately known an idea must be completely in the mind. Spinoza has just maintained that the ideas completely in the mind are the ideas of what is common to all things. But the only things really common to all things are God's attributes—the attribute extension, for example, being that which is common to all extended things, and which, diversely "modified," constitutes their being. In knowing an attribute we know adequately, for we have reached the end of our series. Thus knowledge of the second and third kinds would consist in a deduction along the series of "fixed and eternal things," from an attribute of God.

To this interpretation of Spinoza, which is in harmony with the general teachings of the "Ethics," it may be objected in the first place that it rubs out the distinction drawn between the knowledge of the second and third kinds; and, in the second place, that it does not fit prop. 39, with its corollary, the illustrations given in the "De Intellectus Emendatione," nor the illustration of the three numbers. The force of these objections must be admitted. It should, however, be remembered that in the propositions to follow Spinoza does really make the "common notions" identical with a knowledge of the eternal
and infinite essence of God (see props. 44 to 47). In other words a common notion means simply knowledge of one of God's attributes. It should also be borne in mind that this scholium, although in substantial harmony with the other two presentations of the same subject, is better adjusted to the general doctrine of the "Ethics." It looks as if Spinoza had used the material at hand in his earlier work "On God, Man," etc., without wholly recasting it, or wholly adjusting it to his philosophy in its final form.

As to the intuitive character of the third kind of knowledge. As may be seen, Spinoza did not make it really intuitive, but describes it as a process of inference. It proceeds from this to that (see Note 130 for a further discussion of the kinds of knowledge).

84. (prop. 43) The argument of the proof is as follows: Given an adequate idea in the human mind (that is, an idea which is true, and really has an object corresponding to it), there must be in the same mind an idea of this idea, i.e., the mind must be conscious of its knowledge, and adequately conscious. This means that the man is certain of the thing known.

It will be noticed that the truth of the idea, the fact that it has a corresponding reality, is presupposed, and then it is assumed that the mind is conscious, not merely that it has an idea, but that it has a true idea, i.e., that the idea corresponds to its object. I have criticised Spinoza's criterion of truth in the Introductory Note (I, 3). The references to God have nothing to do with the argument.

Spinoza's statement that an idea is not "something passive like a picture on a panel" is quite contrary to the teachings of his earlier philosophy (see the treatise
"On God, Man and His Blessedness," Part II, chap. 15). I think his abandonment of his former position introduces confusion into his thinking. If one assume that the external object causes the idea, one may regard the presence of the idea as a guarantee of the presence of the object. If the idea be independent, the assumption that it is related to an object seems gratuitous. However, one may argue on the other side, that as long as one regards an idea of whatever sort as analogous to a complete or incomplete picture on a panel, one cannot see how in having an idea one can have anything beyond the idea itself; in other words, how, in having an idea, one can reach beyond the idea to a thing. Hence it is the notion that ideas are not like pictures, but something wholly different, that has led Spinoza to treat them as he does. The position is, I think, well taken. It is this notion that has led Spinoza to reason as he has, and even in his earlier work, where he explicitly maintains the opposite doctrine, he is evidently influenced by it. It has made of ideas for him, as for many writers later, a something incomprehensible. It has been a source of endless confusion in psychology and epistemology.

85. (prop. 44) If the interpretation of Spinoza's words regarding reason, which I have given in Note 83, be correct, reason can only descend from an attribute of God to a thing along the series of "fixed and eternal things." It must make a logical deduction of the thing. It cannot concern itself with the real finite causes which lie outside of the thing and condition as described in I, 28. Hence it must regard everything as necessary, for everything it knows it knows as a logical consequence from an attribute of God,
This deduction from God's attributes has been sufficiently criticised in the Introductory Note.

86. (prop. 44, cor. 2) The phrase "under a certain form of eternity" (sub quadem aeternitatis specie) means "as in a certain sense eternal." In the same way Spinoza speaks of accepting something "under the form of the good," or rejecting it "under the form of the evil," i.e., accepting it or rejecting it as good or evil ("Short Treatise on God, Man and His Blessedness," Part II, chap. 17).

The idea contained in this proof is that what is known as logically implied in the nature of God does not belong more to this time than to that. We may regard simply the relation of the thing to God, and realize that the question of time does not enter into the problem. Of course when we call this "eternal" we are really bringing in the notion of time, if we use the word in its common acceptation. The reader will notice that Spinoza constantly does introduce the idea of time when he is discussing eternity. (See the discussion of eternity in the Introductory Note, II, 16.)

87. (prop. 45) The attribute is here treated as the ultimate abstraction reached by overlooking differences. It is "involved" in every idea, i.e., contained in it as the abstract is in the concrete. It is a cause, the ultimate cause, in the series of "fixed and eternal things." All these points have been discussed in the Introductory Note, II. For the relation of attribute and substance, see Note 3.

In the scholium we meet again the two kinds of causality recognized in the "Ethics." It will be remembered that in Part I (see 8, schol. 2, latter part) Spinoza distinguished between existence and essence, putting the latter in the series of "fixed and eternal"
causes, and accounting for the former by a reference to the order of nature. Here he tries to regard existence as in some sense referable to the same source as essence, the series of “fixed and eternal things.” This is not in harmony with his earlier statements, and his reference to I, 24, cor., does not help him at all.

88. (prop. 46) As the attribute expresses God’s essence, and as the attribute is the abstract element contained in every idea, the whole attribute (the abstraction) is in every idea, and the idea “adequately involves” God’s essence.

89. (prop. 49) By will Spinoza here understands, not what commonly goes by the name of volition, but the intellectual process of assent. Volition proper he appears to include under “the desire through which the mind seeks or avoids things” (48, schol.). On this question of the relation of will and understanding see the scholium following, with its note.

90. (prop. 49, schol.) There are several points in this scholium which need a little criticism.

As to the certainty enjoyed by the man who has a true idea, and the undoubting acquiescence of the man who has a false one. Spinoza has defined certainty as “the mode in which we perceive the real essence of a thing” (“De Int. Emendat.,” ed. van Vloten and Land, p. 12). To him, therefore, the man who possesses a true idea alone is certain. But as a matter of fact, from the standpoint of each of the men, the certainty resolves itself into a confidence in the truth of the idea possessed. Both are confident (i. e., subjectively certain) though we may happen to know that one has misplaced his confidence. The man who is wrong may feel quite as sure he is right as the man who really is right. And it is not by con-
sidering an idea itself that we can prove the truth (objective validity) of the idea (see Introductory Note, I, 3).

Spinoza's doctrine regarding understanding and will is in some respects pretty closely in harmony with that of a number of modern psychologists. He discards " faculties" as a something distinct from the phenomena they have been employed to explain, and reduces understanding and will to a collection of individual ideas and volitions. He then identifies will with the activity inherent in ideas, and maintains that every idea involves an affirmation or negation. From this he argues that there are as many separate affirmations or negations as there are ideas, and no more, so that will cannot extend beyond understanding (cf. Descartes, whom he is refuting, " Meditation" 4); he argues, again, that since ideas are not free but determined, so are volitions.

The modern psychologist is also inclined to cast aside " faculties" and confine himself to a study of mental phenomena simply. He does not divide them into the fixed and separate classes once generally accepted, but distinguishes between their sensory and their motor aspects, recognizing that every idea has its motor aspect. He is inclined to regard a deliberate volition, a conscious determination marked by a sense of effort, as differing in degree and not in kind from what is present in all mental activity, but is often less marked. Like Spinoza, he is disposed to treat the sensory and the motor aspect of mental phenomena as alike determined.

I do not think that this view of mental phenomena, the reduction of understanding and will to separate " ideas" and " volitions," wholly disposes of the prob-
lem of the freedom of the will. If we mean by freedom undetermined action, we may assume that, at some point in our mental experience, the nexus is broken in such a way that what follows is not conditioned by what precedes, and cannot be wholly accounted for by a reference to it. If we embrace the doctrine of a parallelism of conscious states and cerebral changes, we must, of course, assume that, corresponding to the break in the mental series, there is a break in the physical series, too. The man who repudiates "faculties" may not be inclined to make such assumptions, but he is not forced to deny such possibilities. He may still be a libertarian, if he wishes to.

As to Spinoza's reflections concerning the benefits to be derived from his doctrine. In reading the first it is well to bear in mind what Spinoza really means by God. The student who has read carefully the parts of the "Ethics" I have criticised so far, will not be much impressed by it. In reading the others, it is well to note that what our author says fits better a fatalistic than a deterministic doctrine. Discontent, anger, ridicule, may be regarded by the determinist as useful factors in determining actions, even though themselves determined. Whether they are to be indulged in or not is a question apart from that of the freedom of the will.

NOTE ON THE MIND AND ITS KNOWLEDGE.

As, in the notes which precede, the exposition and criticism of Spinoza's teachings regarding the nature of the mind and the nature and extent of its knowledge are necessarily somewhat disconnected, and as this part of the "Ethics" appears to present great diffi-
culties to most readers, I append this note, in which I gather up in outline the positions taken by our author and my own criticism of them.

In the opening propositions of Part II, Spinoza develops his doctrine of the parallelism of modes in the two attributes thought and extension. He maintains that "whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under that of thought, or under any other attribute whatever, we shall find there follows one and the same order, or one and the same concatenation of causes, that is, the same thing" (7, *schol.*). Corresponding to each thing there exists an idea, which is the idea of that thing, and perfectly reflects it. Ideas and things are to be referred to God in the same way, that is, ideas are related to the attribute thought exactly as things are related to the attribute extension. The place of an idea in its series corresponds to the place of its object, the thing, in its series; and whatever takes place in the thing, every modification to which it may be subjected, has its representative in the corresponding idea. This correspondence of idea and object is explained by the statement that they are really but the one thing viewed in two ways.

The mind is declared to be the idea of the body. It is that which corresponds, in the attribute thought, to that particular mode in the attribute extension. It exactly represents the body, is, like the body, highly complex; and, in fact, is composed of the ideas of the parts of the body. Whatever takes place in the body (any modification of the body) must be perceived by the mind, for the idea of it is in the mind, which is, as has just been stated, the idea of the body.

So far Spinoza's doctrine is sufficiently consistent
with itself. What follows cannot be reconciled with it. The reasoning continues thus:

The modifications of the body perceived by the mind are the joint effect of the nature of the body itself and of that of the external body acting upon it (16). Each modification “involves” the nature of these bodies, and accordingly its idea “involves” their ideas. Hence the human mind perceives external bodies and its own body (17, 19). It knows them, not directly, but only through their ideas being involved in the ideas of the modifications. In other words, it knows them by inference.

Again: since an infinite thinking being must have an idea of whatever is in him (3), there must be in God an idea of the mind. As, furthermore, ideas are always parallel with their objects, this idea of the mind is in God in the same way as the idea of the body (20). In other words, it exactly corresponds in its series to the idea of the body in its series. To express the same thing in still other words, it is united to the mind as the mind is united to the body (21). Now, since the ideas of ideas are exactly parallel with the ideas themselves, we must reason about the idea of the mind as we reason about the mind. The mind does not directly know the body, but only the modifications of the body; and, similarly, it perceives the ideas of the ideas of the modifications of the body, but it does not perceive directly itself (22 and 23). It knows itself only by inference from the ideas of the ideas of the modifications of the body (23). Its nature is “involved” in these ideas.

This reasoning concerning the mind’s knowledge of the body and of itself is evidently loose and arbitrary. If the mind is the knowledge of the body,
why does it not know the body? Where is the knowledge of the body, if not in the mind? Spinoza can offer no valid reason for making the mind know the modifications of the body and not the body itself. Again, what is meant by saying that the modifications of the body “involve” the body and external bodies? Manifestly only that these are joint causes of the modifications in question. But “involve” usually means, in the “Ethics,” “contain,” as the concrete contains the abstract, or the particular the universal (see Introductory Note, II, 12). It cannot mean that here, for we are dealing, not with the series of “fixed and eternal things,” but with individual real objects, which exist external to one another, and stand side by side in a series. How, then, can the knowledge of these things be gotten out of the knowledge of the modifications of the body? Evidently Spinoza has passed to a new parallelism. He has made a jump. He has used the word idea in a double sense, and deceived himself. His doctrine of parallelism demands that the idea of the body (the mind) should perfectly represent the body. It does not demand that anything in the idea of the body should truly represent something external to the body, an external body; nor does it demand that any part of the idea of the body, that is, the ideas of the modifications, should in any way contain that which represents something else than the modifications of the body, that is, the body itself. We do speak of having ideas of things external to the body, but this sense of the word idea is quite different from that in which we employ the word when we speak of the mind as “the idea of the body.” Spinoza’s parallelism covers only this last use of the word, and yet he assumes that
ideas in both senses of the word are truly representa-
tive of things.

He reasons about knowledge of mind just as he
reasons about knowledge of body, but he has to con-
tend with the added difficulty that he makes ideas of
ideas distinct from and parallel with the ideas them-
selves, and yet puts them in the same attribute.
There seems, consequently, no reason for keeping
them separate, and in fact he lets them melt into each
other, after distinguishing them from each other, and
he loses his parallelism.

What is "the mind" as Spinoza uses the term? A
literal interpretation of his words would lead us to
suppose that it is simply "the idea of the body," and
that this "idea of the body" is in all cases the
knower. Yet he puts the ideas of ideas in the
mind too (22), and seems to cover by his use of
the word both the idea of the body and the idea of
the idea of the body, thus melting them into one. It
is easy to see that he is influenced here by the notion
(still held almost everywhere) that knower and thing
known, idea and object, must in some sense be dis-
tinct and different. The knowledge of the body (the
idea of the body, the mind) must be a different thing
from the body, and, in the same way, the idea of the
mind must be a different thing from the mind. It
must be, so to speak, a duplicate. But where can
one put this idea of the mind? Surely it must be
in the mind, and nowhere else. Thus, I think, did
Spinoza reason. Strict consistency would have com-
pelled him to declare the idea of the mind the knower
of the mind, if the mind is the knower (or the knowl-
dge) of the body, but he did not choose to do this.
Instead of confining the knowledge of the mind to
the idea of the mind, and denying it of the mind itself, he allows the two to melt into each other, and says the mind can, under such and such conditions, know itself.

As to the extent of the mind’s knowledge and the kinds of knowledge, Spinoza reasons thus:

The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts which compose the human body, for they belong to the essence of the human body only in so far as they function in a certain way (24). Nor can the mind adequately know either its own body or any external body, since both of them are involved in the modifications of the human body (which it does know) only in a certain capacity, i.e., in so far as they are causes of these modifications (25 and 27). Furthermore, the ideas of the modifications of the body themselves, as they exist in the human mind, resemble conclusions without premises (28), that is, are not clear, but confused; for they are effects, and their causes lie beyond the limits of the human mind.

The same reasonings may be applied to the idea of the human mind, and to the ideas of the ideas of the modifications of the body (28, schol., and 29).

Of the duration of our own body and of external bodies our knowledge must be very inadequate, for the duration of a body does not depend on its essence but upon the common order of nature. Now the order of nature as a whole is not contained “objectively” in the human mind, for that is only a part of the system of ideas, and it is the whole system as a whole that reflects nature. Hence we cannot have an adequate knowledge of the duration of our body or of that of other bodies (30, 31).
But there are some things that we do adequately know. That which is common to all things, and exists equally in the part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except adequately (38). That which is thus contained in every part of each thing must be an attribute of God, and in knowing it we know the eternal and infinite essence of God (45, 46, and 47). Since all ideas in the mind which follow from ideas that are in the mind adequate, are also themselves adequate (40), we have here a fruitful source of adequate ideas. They may be obtained by deduction from the idea of one of God’s attributes.

To criticise briefly this reasoning: To the statement that the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts which compose the human body, one may object that the mind (i.e., that in the attribute thought which exactly corresponds to the body) ought, according to the doctrine of parallelism logically carried out, to involve a knowledge of every part of the body as long as it remains a part of the body. Is the mind not composed of the ideas of the parts of the body (15)? And if the mind cannot know adequately either its own body or any external body, that ought not to make the ideas of the modifications of the body like conclusions without premises, for bodies are known so far as they are involved in these modifications, that is, so far as they may serve as premises.

As to our knowledge of the duration of things. If, from the ideas of the modifications of the body, we can pass to a knowledge of the body and external bodies, if, that is, we can pass along the line of finite causes from one thing to things beyond it, why can we not infer the “order of nature,” so far as it is
"involved in" (or concerns) the human body or any other body of which we have knowledge? Spinoza's argument concerning our knowledge of the duration of things, if valid, would deny that we can know the human body or external bodies at all.

In the part of the argument just criticised Spinoza has used the word "involve" in the sense of "related to, as a cause is related to its effect." Now he uses it in the sense of "contained in, as the universal is contained in the singular, the abstract in the concrete." The impossibility of a deduction of the concrete from the abstract, of lower orders of being from an attribute, I have pointed out in the Introductory Note (II, 14). The second and third kinds of knowledge Spinoza makes to rest on such a deduction—a descent along the series of "fixed and eternal things," that Jacob's ladder of a mystic's dream.
NOTES TO PART III.

91. (defs.) As an effect is brought about by its cause, so the idea of the effect is conceived through that of its cause (see Introductory Note, I, 4). We are cause of an effect when it is due to our nature or essence alone (on essences and their causality see Introductory Note, II, especially §§ 10, 13, 14, 15). The reader will notice that the confusion of logical deduction with causation plays an important rôle in the remaining parts of the "Ethics."

92. (prop. 1) As usual, the references to God add nothing to the argument. The student should remember that Spinoza regards an idea as cause of another when he conceives of the latter as logically deduced from the former (see the preceding note). If, then, an idea is adequate in our mind, all that may be deduced from it must be referred to our mind, and to our mind alone. Hence our mind is its sole cause, and is wholly active in bringing it forth.

93. (prop. 2) The parallelism of ideas and things brought forward in this proposition has already been discussed at length, and I refer the reader to the references given in the text and the notes corresponding to them. In the scholium we have an excellent statement of the "automaton" theory of mind so much discussed at the present day.

94. (prop. 3) The word "essence" is loosely used in this proposition and in those that follow. In so far as the word indicates a link in the chain of "fixed
and eternal things," that to which it is applied should contain no inadequate ideas, for all that is in it should be arrived at by a descent along that series from the idea of God. The mind "considered as a part of nature, which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived by itself, and independently of other parts," cannot be an essence in the strict sense of the word (see Introductory Note, II, 13).

95. (prop. 4) Of course, if we keep our attention merely upon the "nature" of a thing, we will think of nothing but the "nature" of that thing; but that does not prove that the "nature" of the thing in any sense brings about the real existence of the thing or causes it to continue in existence. This "nature" is not a cause, and cannot either produce or destroy the thing. Spinoza, as we have seen (Introductory Note, II, 10), made such abstractions causes, though he was also forced to admit causes of a different kind, real causes (Ibid., 15).

96. (prop. 6) See the preceding note. Elsewhere ("Cog. Metaph." I, 6) Spinoza applies this reasoning to prove that a body once in motion must continue in motion unless brought to rest by an external cause. Inertia he makes a special case of the conatus, or will to persist, which is proper to every essence.

97. (prop. 7) See Note 94, on the double use of the word essence. The word here is used to cover the whole being of the mind.

98. (prop. 10) The reference to God does not affect the argument, for the statement that an idea is in God in so far as he has an idea of our body means simply that the said idea is in our mind.

99. (prop. 11) There is a passage in Martineau ("Study of Spinoza," II, ch. 3, § 3) on pleasure, pain,
and desire, to which I refer the reader. Martineau regards pleasure and pain as passive indications in consciousness of changed conditions in the body. Desire he makes the reaction of the mind's essence, and, hence, an activity. It should be remembered, however, that Spinoza does not here use the word "essence" in its strict sense. He is not dealing with a universal, belonging to the series of "fixed and eternal things," but with an individual thing, which forms part of the real system of things or nature. It is important to note this, for, in using the word "essence" in this ambiguous way, Spinoza appears to fill up in a manner the gap between essences and real individual things—in other words, to bring together the two kinds of causes recognized in the "Ethics" and in some passages wholly cut off from each other (see Introductory Note, II, 15). If we are active and free (see Part V) in so far as our actions are determined by our essence (in the strict sense), then, in acting freely, we bridge the gulf between the series of "fixed and eternal things" and the individual finite things which together make up the system of nature. As, however, that, on the mental side, which corresponds to the physical relation of cause and effect, is logical deduction, this means that we deduce individuals from universals. This is, as we have seen, not consistent with what Spinoza teaches elsewhere.

100. (defs. of the emotions) The explanations appended to the definitions of the emotions I omit for lack of space. The dynamic of the emotions, as Spinoza has worked it out, is very ingenious. The interest attaching to this part of the "Ethics" is, however, rather psychological than philosophical, and I shall not linger over it. A brief exposition
of the general lines of our author's reasoning must suffice.

The student should bear in mind what has been said about the dual causality recognized in the "Ethics" (Introductory Note, II, 15). On the one hand we have the series of "fixed and eternal things," the hierarchy of essences, which come by deduction from the idea of God; on the other the nexus of real causes, the individual things found in nature, each of which, whether it be physical or mental, is conditioned by its antecedent in the same real series. Reason descends along the series of essences; imagination has to do with the order of real causes, and knows things as forming part of the system of nature. As Spinoza would express it, it knows them confusedly. The passions are mental states thus confusedly known (see general def. of the emotions). We suffer from a passion in so far as something takes place in us that cannot be deduced from our essence (in the strict sense of the word), but is caused by the action of other real things upon us.

Now, in Part III, Spinoza is dealing with the imagination, with real existences which have their place in nature. When, therefore, he uses the word essence in this Part, as he constantly does, he does not use it in the strict sense, but as standing for the whole being of the thing in question—for the thing as it actually exists. An essence as thus understood is individual, and not universal, and the essence of each man is distinct from, and may be different from, that of every other man. Such as it is, each essence or each thing strives to persevere in its being (props. 4–7). In prop. 12 Spinoza assumes without proof—for it cannot be deduced from the propositions
referred to (see Notes 95 and 96)—that it goes beyond this, and endeavors to enlarge or render more perfect its being. This endeavor or impulse is desire. 

*Pleasure* is the passage to a greater perfection; *pain* is the reverse. All other emotions arise from these. In its effort to enlarge its being the mind seeks pleasure, and in its effort to avoid a diminution of its being it avoids pain. Thus it strives to maintain pleasant images and to banish painful ones. To this we must refer such passions as love and hate, intemperance, lust, etc. Some passions are to be explained through the laws of association—as, for example, avarice. The sympathetic emotions are accounted for by the fact that, when we think of a being that resembles us as feeling pain or pleasure, there is set up in our body a modification similar to that which is present when we feel pain or pleasure ourselves. Hence we really do feel pain or pleasure.

Dr. Martineau’s exposition of Spinoza’s treatment of the emotions is clear and systematic, and to it I refer the reader who cares to go into the question. The criticism which will probably occur first to most students of Part III of the “Ethics” is that Spinoza treats man as an isolated and independent phenomenon, as a being without a history. The study of the emotions from a phylogenetic standpoint belongs to a later time.
NOTES TO PART IV.

101. (preface) Note Spinoza's treatment of essences in this Preface. He makes an essence a pattern or standard, a type-idea gained from an examination of individuals and used as a norm. Perfection, in one of the senses of the word, means harmony with this idea. Such a pattern is not a changeless, eternal, independent thing, but is our creature. This is the doctrine of the greater part of the preface.

At the end Spinoza returns to the strict meaning of the word essence. Perfection means not merely harmony with the type-idea, but also quantity of being. A thing becomes more perfect as its being is increased. This would seem to argue that a horse, for example, might become more perfect in ceasing to be a horse and in becoming a man. Spinoza avoids this conclusion by holding that increase of being must take place within the limits set by the type-idea. He thus makes the type-idea or essence something fixed and unchangeable, an eternal thing not arbitrarily constructed. Neither of the senses in which the word "essence" is used in this preface will fit the treatment of essences in Part III. There the word is used to denote an individual real thing (see the preceding note).

The use of the word "perfection" to indicate amount of being or reality was in harmony with the thinking of Spinoza's day, but seems strange to us. Of course, this sense of the word should be sharply
distinguished from the one which makes perfection to consist in harmony with an ideal or pattern. Compare with this preface the appendix to Part I. Note that when Spinoza calls God perfect (as in I, 33 schol.) he can only mean that there is no limit to his "reality."

102. (def. 8) Remember what I have just said about the use of the word "essence" in Part III. In the reference here given (III, 7) the word is used to indicate the whole actual being of a thing. In this Part Spinoza uses the word in a different sense. The essence of the mind now means the part of it which consists of adequate ideas; and, as we shall see later (Part V), this essence belongs to the series of "fixed and eternal things," and does not form "a part" of nature. In so far as this essence is active, man acts freely and virtuously.

103. (appendix) In Part III, as I have said, Spinoza is wandering in the world of the imagination, the world of real existing things. The problem of the "Ethics" is to indicate the path by which one may escape from this "City of Destruction" to the "Celestial City" of real essences. Our author is on his way in Part IV, and when he reaches prop. 21 of Part V he may be said to have arrived. In Part III the essence of the mind means the whole mind regarded as an existent thing, a link in the chain of natural things and subject to natural law. In Part IV the essence of the mind is a part of the mind, and this part has become emancipated from the bondage to natural law. It is, to be sure, still in the real world, but it is there as a missionary—in it, but not of it. In the last half of Part V this part of the mind has turned into a pure essence, in the strict sense of the
word, and has withdrawn from all communication with real existences. Spinoza has indicated no way in which existences may turn into essences, or essences be really present and active in the world of existences. Such an intercommunication between the two worlds is inconsistent with his own doctrine (Introductory Note, II, 15). Nevertheless, this is the path he actually takes in the "Ethics," and it is the path which he indicates for all who seek salvation or blessedness (V, 42, schol.).

Part IV contains those portions of the "Ethics" which we would now regard as strictly ethical. It is occupied in setting forth "the right method of living," and treats man as a social being, having rights and duties. It is interesting to notice how Spinoza incorporates all this in his philosophy. He reasons as follows:

The whole effort of man is to preserve his being, and the more capable he is of doing this, the more virtuous is he (props. 20, 22). But a man has virtue or power only in so far as he is determined to actions by his essence (def. 8), i.e., by the part of him which is composed of adequate ideas. Hence our sole aim must be to gain adequate ideas, and our blessedness must consist in their possession. So far we have a pure egoism; the highest law for each man is the law of self-preservation. The problem is to derive from this a social morality, and Spinoza goes about its solution thus:

A thing wholly different from our nature cannot have any effect upon us whatever, for its conception cannot have anything in common with that of our nature, and, hence (see II, 6), it and our nature cannot be causally related. Whatever is to act upon us must
then have something in common with our nature. But nothing can be bad for us through that which it has in common with our nature, for in that case it would be bad for itself. This is evident, for, when we say that a thing has something in common with our nature, we mean that in it and in our nature there is an identical element, \( x \). To say that the \( x \) in the thing hurts the \( x \) in us amounts—since \( x \) is \( x \)—to saying that \( x \) hurts itself, which is absurd, for it contradicts III, 4 (see IV, 30). Thus a thing cannot be bad for us, through that which it has in common with our nature. Again, in so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature (contains a common element) it must be good for us. This is evident, for \( x \) must strive to keep \( x \) in being (IV, 31).

Now, in so far as men live in obedience to reason they are in harmony, for their actions are determined by the essence of man, and this is the same in every man (IV, 35). Hence man is useful to man, and the good that each man desires for himself he must desire for all other men too (IV, 37). Man must, therefore, care for his fellow man, for self-interest demands it.

Thus does Spinoza pass from an uncompromising egoism to an altruistic utilitarianism. His reasoning, as one may easily see, is bad, and the error lies in assuming that the "essence" in each man is strictly identical with that in each other man, and cannot be helped or hurt without helping or hurting that other. The \( x \) in this man and the \( x \) in that are not strictly identical, they are only alike; and it is conceivable that the one should destroy the other and itself remain uninjured (see Introductory Note, II, 9). That Spinoza practically abandons the egoistic standpoint in his recognition of the validity of commonly ac-
cepted moral maxims is evident from the way in which he meets such a concrete case as the following: May a man, in obedience to the law of self-preservation, break faith to escape death? He answers, No; for if reason persuaded one man to do so, it would be right for all men to do so. This would mean that reason would not persuade men to subject themselves to common laws, which is absurd. The argument palpably does not prove that it may not serve the interests of a particular man to break faith. He certainly does not persevere in his being by dying.
NOTES TO PART V.

104. (prop. 2) As the reader may easily see, an emotion is, in the thesis of this proposition, distinguished from the thought of its external cause, and treated as though it may remain an emotion when detached from the latter; in the proof the thought of the external cause is regarded as belonging to the essence of the emotion (the love or the hate). Of course, if the thought of the object loved belongs to the essence of love, then, in banishing this thought, we destroy the love. But we cannot, in that case, separate the love from the thought of its external cause, and join it to other thoughts. The reasoning is loose.

105. (prop. 3) The reasoning here is not good. The passions have been defined as confused ideas. Of all our ideas we may have ideas, and the latter are parallel with the former as ideas are parallel with things (see II, 20, ff.). But as the idea of an idea exists in the same attribute with said idea, the two are only logically, not really, distinct—they are, in fact, identically the same thing (see Note 67). It should follow that we cannot form a clear and distinct idea of a confused idea or passion. This forming a clear idea of a passion must then amount to substituting for the passion a clear idea. What does this imply?

Bear in mind the dual causality of the "Ethics" (Introductory Note, II, 15)—the hierarchy of essences on the one hand, and the chain of real individual
existences, the order of nature, on the other. Everything in nature must have its cause in the real world of individual things (I, 28), as well as its cause in the world of essences (I, 25). As will be remembered, Spinoza has indicated no way of bringing together these two kinds of causes.

Now, we are the adequate cause of an emotion, or, in other words, are active or free (see III, defs. 1, 2, and 3, and V, Pref.), in so far as the emotion is wholly due to our nature or essence. This means (see Introductory Note, I, 4) that the emotion which is a link in the series of finite real existences, is logically deduced from our essence. Such a descent from the essence to the individual Spinoza has declared to be impossible (Introductory Note, II, 7). He attempts, as I have said before, to bridge the gulf which separates essence from existence by using the word essence in a double sense.

Again, ideas which are adequate (clear and distinct) in us are those which are logically deduced from some attribute of God; they come to us by filtering through the series of essences (see my note "On the Mind and its Knowledge"). When, therefore, we form a clear idea of a passion, we are really not forming an idea of a passion at all; we are substituting for an idea which must be accounted for by a reference to the order of nature one which is derived from the world of essences. How such an idea can be brought into the system of real things and become a part of nature without breaking the nexus of natural causes Spinoza nowhere indicates. This is the old difficulty of the dual causality.

106. (prop. 4) See the references in the text and my notes corresponding.
That which is common to all things is the attribute of which they are modes. Of this attribute we have an adequate idea. But even if we admit this it does not follow that there is no modification of the body of which we cannot form a clear and distinct (an adequate) conception, as is inferred in the proof; nor does it follow that there is no emotion of which we cannot form a clear and distinct conception, as is inferred in the corollary. I do not clearly conceive a chair in clearly conceiving extension, nor a given passion in clearly conceiving thought. To clearly conceive any mode, to have, that is, an adequate idea of it, I must deduce it from its attribute along the series of "fixed and eternal things." See the two notes immediately preceding.

107. (prop. 6) One may accept as a psychological fact the influence upon the emotions of a recognition of things as necessary or as natural, and may even say that this gives the mind a greater power over the emotions, without at all accepting Spinoza's interpretation of this phrase.

108. (prop. 7) Spinoza's reasoning is as follows: An emotion is stronger when we conceive of its cause as present. An emotion that springs from reason always has a present cause, for reason arrives at every mode by a deduction from an attribute of God, and this must be present in everything. Hence an emotion that springs from reason is always powerful and can overcome others.

It is evident that the words "emotions which arise out of, or are produced by reason," must not be understood in their ordinary sense. They are used in a technical sense, so to speak, and have reference to the deduction of ideas from the idea of God, the
descent along the series of essences (Introductory Note, II, 14 and 15).

109. (prop. 10) Again the struggle between the two kinds of causes. When we are not harassed by emotions contrary to our nature, the essence of the mind is free to act and to deduce the modifications of the body from the attribute of extension, or, in other words, to arrange them "according to the intellectual order." This formation of clear and distinct ideas I have discussed in Note 105.

110. (prop. 10, schol.) Spinoza's maxims are excellent, but the reader should notice that all this has nothing to do with the arrangement and concatenation of the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order (see the preceding note). Spinoza had much the same notion of what is reasonable as any other sensible man. His ethical teachings are highly valuable, but they are loosely connected with his metaphysic. One might subscribe to the greater part of what he says on the conduct of life and the ordering of the emotions in obedience to reason, and yet repudiate his world of essences altogether. I think he himself was misled by the double sense of the expression, "emotions which arise out of, or are produced by reason" (see Note 108). His philosophy demands that the words be taken in one sense, and his ethical maxims take them in another.

111. (prop. 12) See Notes 106 and 108.

112. (prop. 14) See Note 106. Again the attempt to carry back existing things to the idea of God. As I have so often had occasion to say, Spinoza nowhere attempts this deduction (see Introductory Note, II, 14 and 15).

113. (prop. 15) The student must not forget that
Spinoza does not use words in their ordinary senses. He sometimes slips into the ordinary sense, as we have seen in what precedes, but when he does so his reasoning suffers. The word God, for example, should have, to the consistent Spinozist (if, indeed, there can be a consistent Spinozist) a very peculiar connotation. God is the highest universal, that which is present in all things (Introductory Note, II, 14); and love toward God is the pleasure which arises in the mental exercise of deducing the concrete (the individual thing) from the abstract (the attribute). This is, of course, something very different from what is commonly meant by love toward God.

114. (prop. 17) As the reader will see on looking up Spinoza's references, II, 32, and II, def. 4, have little connection. The reasoning of this proposition is as follows: one is subject to a passion when he is acted upon from without, i.e., when what takes place in him cannot be deduced wholly from his essence or nature. In other words, he is passive in so far as he has inadequate ideas. God cannot have inadequate (fragmentary) ideas, for all that exists comes from him. Hence he is without passions. Again, God cannot be affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain, for he belongs to the world of essences (I, 20), and these emotions imply change. See, below, the note to 18, schol.

115. (prop. 18) Comprehending God as the cause of pain means deducing the pain, along the series of "fixed and eternal things," from the idea of God. I have discussed in Note 105 what it means to form a clear idea of (comprehend the causes of) a passion.

If we make pain something positive, and place it as an element in the system of real things, there is no
escape from referring it to God as its cause, since everything must be referred to him. But Spinoza treats it somewhat as we might treat the notion "in part," in saying we know such and such a thing "in part," but God cannot know it in part, nor could we, if our knowledge were more perfect.

116. (prop. 19) See Note 113.
117. (prop. 20, schol.) In this scholium Spinoza makes a transition to the puzzling question of the mind's immortality. The reader will notice that the opening and closing sentences of the scholium do not admit of a ready adjustment to the doctrine of parallelism he has developed in Part II. It is here hinted, and later plainly taught, that the mind may continue to exist when the body is destroyed. See the following notes.

118. (prop. 21) See the references in the text and my notes corresponding. Spinoza follows the Aristotelian tradition in making memory and imagination dependent upon the existence of the body, and reason independent and imperishable. See Ueberweg's "History of Philosophy," vol. i, § 49.

119. (prop. 22) Once more the dual causality (see Introductory Note, II, 15). The essence of the human body, like all other essences, belongs to the series of "fixed and eternal things," and its idea comes by logical deduction from the idea of God. One should note that Spinoza brings together, by the use of an insidious phrase, this essence and the individual existing thing, a body. He talks of the essence of this or that human body, just as he does of the existence of this or that human body. This makes of the essence, no longer a universal, but a component part of an individual; it has become "an occurrence" of
the essential qualities, not those qualities abstractly considered. It is, then, no longer a true essence, a something common to a class of things. In my Introductory Note (II, 9) I have warned the reader of the danger of giving to universals a local habitation in an individual, of making them concrete. In so doing we bring our universal into the system of real existences, but when there it is no longer a universal. The whole of an individual existent human body is individual and real—no part of it can be singled out from the rest and be dubbed its essence. It takes a class of things to have an essence, and when we consider but one single thing, the notion of essence disappears. One man cannot walk in single file. The reader will notice in what follows that Spinoza does make the essence a part of the individual mind, and grants to that part immortality while denying it to the rest. This conversion of the abstract into the concrete was forced upon him, for he had to make contact somewhere between the world of essences and the world of real things.

120. (prop. 23) Spinoza's doctrine of immortality is perhaps the most disputed point in his system. Some have believed that he teaches a doctrine of personal immortality, as it is commonly understood; others have supposed him to mean by immortality only a state of intellectual clarity, and in no sense a continuance of mental life after the death of the body; still others have supposed that he did not clearly understand his own meaning, and that his utterances are, in consequence, inconsistent with each other; and some have gone so far as to accuse him of a deliberate intention to conceal his true thought. The charge of disingenuousness may be dismissed,
for, though Spinoza often uses words in a sense widely different from that in which they are generally accepted, he is sufficiently frank in the rest of his book, and does not hesitate to oppose commonly received opinions.

The student who has followed thus far my criticisms of Spinoza's reasonings should be able to see, I think, where the difficulty lies. Bear in mind our author's division of things into the world of essences and the world of real existences (Introductory Note, II, 15). All essences are eternal. The human mind, which is composed of ideas, contains some adequate and some inadequate ideas. All its adequate ideas come to it along the chain of essences, and themselves belong to the world of essences, thus participating in the eternity of essences. The part of the human mind composed of adequate ideas is thus eternal, and cannot perish. It is obtained by logical deduction from the idea of God, and is, so to speak, eternally contained in that idea.

So much for Spinoza's argument. It is clear that it is open to criticism. In the first place, adequate ideas are referred to the world of essences, and yet made a part of an actually existing individual thing, the human mind. I have criticised this in the preceding proposition. In the second place, the parallelism of mind and body is violated, for it is plainly indicated that the whole of the body may be destroyed, while a part of the mind continues to exist. The doctrine of parallelism would demand that a part of the body continue to exist, too—as much of it as can properly be called "essence." In the third place, the eternity attributed to the indestructible part of the mind cannot, it is claimed, be defined in
terms of time, and cannot have any relation to time, and yet Spinoza speaks of this something as remaining after the destruction of the body, and it is indicated that it existed before the body. All this means nothing at all, if we completely abstract from the notion of time. The reader will notice that, in the propositions to follow, Spinoza has a very hard time, indeed, with his timeless eternity. It absolutely refuses to stay timeless; and we can scarcely condemn it, for we may set down its efforts to gain time as the conatus or impulse to persevere in its thinkable being, a life-and-death struggle to mean something. As there still exist philosophers who believe that the words "timeless eternity" are not without significance to them, I shall point out in the following notes Spinoza's inconsistency, even at the risk of being a little tiresome. (On the eternity of essences, see Introductory Note, II, 16.)

There is one point in the scholium which may seem obscure, the mind's feeling of its own immortality. We may understand this in two ways: Spinoza may have meant that we are as conscious of the presence in our mind of adequate ideas (abstractions, concepts, essences) as of inadequate (sense-perceptions), and hence may know clearly that we are immortal; or he may have appealed to the "feeling of immortality" as it exists in many persons, the instinctive belief in a future life. Perhaps his words may be interpreted in both ways.

121. (prop. 24) I have shown in the Introductory Note (II, 8) that Spinoza sometimes makes God the universal obtained by abstracting from the differences of things, and sometimes makes him the sum total of things. If we mean by the word God the sum total
of things, then, of course, it follows that the better we comprehend particular things the better we comprehend God; if, on the other hand, we mean simply and strictly the highest universal, this does not follow. I have also shown, however, that Spinoza does not keep his universals strictly universal, but makes them in some sense concrete. He conceives of God as the source from which all things flow, from which they derive both their existence and their essence. Now, if it belongs to God's essence or nature to unfold into a system of things, and if our comprehension of things consists in seeing them flow from God (or as logically contained in God), we may say that in comprehending things we are comprehending God. This derivation of the ideas of things from the idea of God I have discussed at length in the Introductory Note.

122. (prop. 25) I have discussed the kinds of knowledge in Note 83. The virtue of the mind Spinoza regards as identical with its power. As it is its nature to know, and as it cannot do anything else, its virtue is proportional to its knowledge. But the mind is active (i.e., really knows things completely) in so far as it has adequate ideas (i.e., ideas which can be deduced along the series of essences from the idea of God). Hence its highest endeavor is to know things by the third kind of knowledge, that is, to know them by such a deduction from the idea of God.

123. (prop. 28) I do not think that there is really any difference between the second and third kinds of knowledge (see Note 83). Spinoza's reasoning in this proposition may seem a little obscure, but it becomes clear when one remembers that he makes desire the very essence of a man, regarded as a cause, and that he has held that adequate ideas can only spring from
adequate ideas. Hence the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge (i.e., the cause of such a knowledge of things) must itself consist of adequate ideas, and must spring from adequate ideas.

124. (prop. 29) The reasoning here is loose, and the student will find it difficult to obtain Spinoza's conclusion from the references given in the text. I think the argument he means to present is about as follows: The mind is the idea of the body, and its knowledge of the body and of other real things is based upon the ideas it has of the modifications of the body. It can only have ideas of such modifications, and, hence, can only know the body and other existing things, as long as the body exists. In other words, it can only know real existing things, things which "endure," as long as the body exists, and through its ideas of the modifications of the body. It can, thus, only have such knowledge as long as it conceives the present existence of its body. But there are some things that the mind knows under the form of eternity. It has, in other words, some adequate ideas, and the part of it composed of adequate ideas is eternal. But the part of the mind which is eternal is the essence of the mind, the part which corresponds in the world of thought to the essence of the body in the world of extension. Hence the mind can only conceive things under the form of eternity in so far as it is itself eternal, or in so far as it represents the eternal essence of the body. We may say, then, that it can only conceive things under the form of eternity in so far as it conceives the essence of the body under the form of eternity.

See my note "On the Mind and its Knowledge," appended to the notes to Part II. It will be noticed
that Spinoza's argument given above rests on the doctrine of parallelism. We have on the one hand the correspondence between knowledge of individual real things, things that "endure," and real things, and on the other that between essence of mind (adequate ideas) and essence of body. It will be evident to a reader of the note referred to just above that Spinoza reasons loosely.

125. (prop. 30) The mind, that is, knows itself as deduced along the series of essences from the idea of God. (See Note 121).

126. (prop. 31) The argument here is that the mind in so far as it is eternal, or in so far as it belongs to the series of "fixed and eternal things," has a knowledge of God (for the idea of God is, as immanent cause, involved in every essence). Hence, having the idea of God, it may have an adequate knowledge of all that is involved in this idea—which ought to mean a knowledge of everything. But when Spinoza makes the mind the adequate cause of this knowledge he reasons badly, for the mind's essence is only one of many essences which have been obtained by deduction from the idea of God, and the mind ought to be regarded as the formal cause (on making essences causes, see Introductory Note, II, 10) only of ideas which follow from it, and not of those which follow from other essences, in the line of descent toward individuals. If it be argued that the mind may know all things by such a deduction on the ground that it contains the idea of God, from which all are to be derived, one may answer that Spinoza has held that every idea, without exception, involves the idea of God (II, 46). Hence a mind consisting of any ideas whatever might be regarded as the adequate cause of
all that can be deduced from the idea of God, and not merely a mind regarded as an essence, or as eternal.

In the scholium it is maintained that the more adequate ideas the mind possesses the better its knowledge of itself and of God. What I have said just above shows that this is not reasonable. The possession of any idea ought to give one an adequate (perfect) knowledge of God, and, hence, of one's self and everything else.

Note the temporal flavor given to eternity in the scholium.

127. (prop. 32, cor.) Do not confound this intellectual love of God with love of God in the ordinary sense of the words. It is nothing more nor less than the pleasure arising from intellectual activity. He who deduces individual extended things from the attribute of extension, or individual ideas from the attribute thought, and feels pleasure therein, is engaged in loving God. The words are highly misleading, and must be taken in the strict technical sense given them by Spinoza.

128. (prop. 33) Spinoza's two orders of being, existences and essences, here entangle him in desperate difficulties. The third kind of knowledge is declared to be eternal. This means that it never began to be; and it follows that the love which springs from it never began to be. But how then can the mind "endeavor" to know things by this kind of knowledge (props. 25 and 28)? Must it not, while endeavoring to gain such knowledge, be without it? And may not the amount of such knowledge in any given mind progressively increase (38, and 39 and schol.)?

The difficulty lies in this: Spinoza has conceived
of the world of essences as eternally contained in God; they do not flow from him by a historical process, but exist in him and are related to him as the conclusion in a syllogism is related to the premises. Now the mind, or the idea of the body, is an existent thing, and belongs to the world of existences. Things in this world are perishable, and not eternal. The problem is to transfer a part of the mind, as it were, to this other world in which things are eternal; to turn a greater or less portion of it into an essence. Spinoza does not succeed any better here than he does in his earlier attempts to make contact between the two worlds.

Note, again, the temporal flavor of the eternity in the scholium: "The mind has eternally had these same perfections that we have just conceived of as added to it," etc. I may remark in passing that if the mind has always had these perfections, why has it endeavored to obtain them; and why should it endeavor to obtain any more, for it must already have those it desires to obtain, if it ever can have them, since they are eternal and cannot begin to be. As the reader must see, in talking of a timeless eternity one is simply playing with words. "Has had" and "will have" mean nothing if we abstract all idea of time.

129. (prop. 34) Again the notion of time is introduced. It is implied that, although the imagination cannot remain after death, another part of the mind can (see prop. 23).

130. (prop. 36) The thesis of this proposition reminds one of the constant tautological references to God in Part II. God, "in so far as he can be expressed by the essence of the human mind," is nothing
else than the essence of the human mind, i. e., its eternal part. Hence, of course, it is mere tautology to say that the mind's love toward God is God's love of himself. Compare with this the scholium to prop. 40. On the nature of this love, see Note 127.

The corollary appears to contradict what is said in the corollary to prop. 17. In the latter, however, Spinoza is speaking of love as a passion, a love accompanied by pleasure. Here he is speaking of a love which is a pure activity, and "blessedness" has taken the place of the pleasure.

The distinction made in the scholium between the second and third kinds of knowledge is not in harmony with what I have said in Note 83 about the kinds of knowledge. I there said that there was really no difference between knowledge of the second and third kinds. It does not appear to me that it is consistent with Spinoza's doctrine to make such a distinction. Knowledge is adequate when it can be wholly accounted for without going beyond the limits of the mind itself, that is, when it carries within itself its own explanation—can be deduced from the attribute which it "involves." But knowledge thus deduced from an attribute is of the third kind. Whether the deduction stops somewhere in the series of essences before it reaches concrete individuals does not affect the question (see the definition of knowledge of the third kind in II, 40, schol. 2). In this scholium Spinoza appears to mean, by knowledge of the second kind, knowledge which passes from the idea of God to some essence not at the bottom of the series, and by knowledge of the third kind, knowledge which goes all the way to the bottom. This would make the two kinds of knowledge differ, not in their start-
ing point (the idea of an attribute) but in the point where they end. The reader will notice that this does not adjust itself to the illustration of the three numbers (II, 40, *schol. 2*), for there the three kinds of knowledge are made to end with the same fact, the difference between them being that they start from different premises. That knowledge of the second kind should start from the idea of an attribute seems plain from II, 37, 38, 45, 46, and 47. That it should end where knowledge of the third kind ends may be inferred from the illustration of the three numbers. It cannot, then, be consistently distinguished from knowledge of the third kind.

131. (prop. 37) Spinoza's reasoning here is as follows: the essence of the mind, regarded as an eternal truth, is deduced from the nature of God. That is, its relation to the nature of God is similar to that of the truth that the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles to the nature of the triangle. If, then, the essence of the mind were destroyed, an eternal truth would not be an eternal truth. As the intellectual love arises out of this relation of the mind's essence to God, it, too, must be eternal and indestructible. Note the reference to time in this use of the word "destroy." The plain implication is that what cannot be destroyed will continue to exist.

132. (prop. 38) The reader will notice, on looking up II, 11, that the essence of the mind, as there treated, is an actually existing thing, a something belonging to the world of real existences, not to the world of essences. In making a part of it continue to exist when the rest has been destroyed, Spinoza has transferred it from the one world to the other (*see Notes 119 and 120*).
Note, again, the temporal flavor of Spinoza's eternity: a part of the mind will perish, but the eternal part will "remain."

133. (prop. 39) In this proposition and scholium it comes out clearly that in passing from bondage to freedom, from the state of perishable beings to that of immortal and imperishable, we are converting ideas of memory or imagination into ideas of the reason. We are, in other words, transferring ideas from the world of real existences to that of essences (see the preceding note). I should like the reader, after finishing this Part of the "Ethics," to peruse once more the second part of my Introductory Note. It is really important to have clearly in mind what is meant by the world of essences, if one is to comprehend Spinoza's difficulties with his two orders of being. He quite cuts them off from one another, and then allows the gulf between them to be filled up by essences that become individual things (or parts of individual things), and by individual things which become essences (modifications of the body which come to be referred to the idea of God).

134. (prop. 40) The argument of the proof hinges, I think, on the statement in the scholium to III, 3, to the effect that passions or passive states cannot be attributed to the mind except in so far as it contains something that involves negation. Thus it seems to follow that the more perfect a thing is the less passive it is, for perfection is identical with reality, and reality is the opposite of negation. The corollary infers from this that the part of the mind which abides (the essence or reason) is more perfect than the part which perishes (the imagination).

All this reasoning rests upon Spinoza's distinction
between the world of existences and the world of essences. An existing thing is a part of nature and cannot be explained without a reference to other parts; in other words, does not carry its explanation (cause) within itself. It is then incomplete, it lacks being, or involves negation. Essences are complete in themselves, and do not thus lack being. But it should be remarked that, as has been pointed out, Spinoza has already incorporated his essences in the system of nature. The part of the mind which abides is a part of the mind, that is, a part of a real existent thing, a part of nature, and hence should need explanation in just the same way as other real things in nature. It should then involve negation, or lack perfection, as much as the part of the mind which perishes. I may further mention that one may take exception to Spinoza's statement that things regarded as a part of nature involve negation, and hence lack perfection.

Note, again, the time-content given in the corollary to the idea of eternity. A part of the mind "perishes," and a part of it "abides." Note, also, that in the scholium Spinoza has come back from the idea of God as the highest universal, to the idea of him as a sum total made up of parts (see Introductory Note, II, 8). The opening sentence of the scholium shows how Spinoza has forgotten the parallelism of mind and body.

135. (prop. 41) See Notes 102 and 103. Piety and religion and the rest should be taken in the strict Spinozistic sense. We have seen what love of God means to the consistent Spinozist. (Note 113.) We have seen also that virtue means simply power, and that it is the sole duty of man to consult his own interests (IV, def. 8, and ap. VIII). Now, as the
mind is capable of no activity or perfection save knowledge, and as it passes to a greater perfection, and hence experiences pleasure, only in knowing, it must regard as of the highest importance increase of knowledge, and that whether this knowledge is to "abide" or not. In Part V of the "Ethics" we discover that it is to abide.

I do not, of course, mean to say that the words piety, religion, and virtue did not mean more to Spinoza than his philosophy would permit them to mean. They did mean more to him, I am sure; but, in so far as they did mean more, he was not a good Spinozist.

136. (prop. 42) The only point that can cause difficulty here is the somewhat inconsistent treatment of love toward God, or blessedness. This is said to spring from knowledge, and is thus treated as something distinct from the knowledge. It is then identified with virtue, or knowledge.

Note, again, Spinoza’s treatment of eternity in the scholium: the wise man "never ceases to be, but is always possessed of true satisfaction of soul." Subtract from this sentence all idea of time, and see what is left.
INDEX.

Active, when we may be said to be, 135; mind, in having adequate ideas is, 136.
Ambition, 151.
Anger, 151.
Attribute, defined, 25. See Substance.
Automatism, 137 ff.
Avarice, 151.
Aversion, 148.

Beauty, relativity of, 70.
Benevolence, 151.
Blessedness, defined, 160; not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself, 207.
Body, defined, 74; relation to mind, 87 ff. and 137 ff.; composition and identity of individual bodies, 88 ff.
Boldness, 151.
Bondage, 153.

Cause, of itself, defined, 25; when adequate, 135.
Certainty, 124 ff.
Compassion, 149.
Common Notions, their nature and origin, 112 ff.
Confidence, 149.
Consternation, 151.
Contempt, 148.
Contingent, why things are so called, 59; definition of, 157.
Contrary Emotions, 158
Cowardice, 151.
Cruelty, 151.

Death, not feared by a mind endowed with clear knowledge, 202.

Derision, 149.
Descartes, on the emotions, 133; on the seat of the soul, 172.
Design. See Final Causes.
Desire, 145, 148.
Despair, 149.
Devotion, 149.
Disappointment, 149.
Drunkenness, 151.
Duration, 75. See Time.

Emotion, defined, 135; definitions of individual emotions, 148–151; general definition of the emotions, 152; emotions produced by reason the most powerful, 180; how to control the emotions, 183 ff.
Emulation, 150.
End, of need, 68; of assimilation, 68; God does not act with a view to, 64 ff.; definition of, 159.
Envy, 150.
Error. See Falsity.
Essence, definition of, 74; what is common to all things the essence of no individual thing, 109.
Eternity, defined, 26; form of, 119, 193 ff.; of the mind, 193 ff.
Evil, relative, 156; definition of, 156.

Falsity, nothing positive, 108; definition of, 108; does not involve certainty, 124.
Fear, 149.
Final Causes, origin of the belief in, 64 ff.
Form, of eternity, 119, 193 ff.  
Free, a thing free when, 26;  
why men think themselves free, 65.

Glorying, 150.  
God, or substance, defined, 25;  
consists of infinite attributes,  
34; necessarily exists, 34 ff.;  
the efficient cause of all things, 44;  
acts solely from the necessity of his nature,  
44; an immanent cause, 48;  
is eternal, 48; does not act  
from the freedom of his will,  
58; could not have produced things in any other way than  
they have been produced, 59 ff.;  
his perfection an argument against the freedom of  
his will, 60; his power itself  
his essence, 63; is a thinking thing, 76;  
is an extended thing, 76; has necessarily an  
idea of his own essence, and  
of all those things which follow from it, 76; the idea of  
God, but one, 78; he is the  
cause of the modes in any attribute only in so far as he is  
considered under that attribute, 79; has a knowledge of  
the human mind, 100; is without passions, 188; cannot  
be hated, 188; loves himself with an infinite love, 200.  
Good, origin of the notion, 70,  
156; defined, 157; what things good, 162; superstition regards pain as good,  
169.  
Gratitude, 150.  

Hate, 148.  
Hope, 149.  
Humility, 150.  

Idea, defined, 74; when adequate, 75; their order and  
connection the same as the order and connection of  
things, 79; the idea of the mind united to the mind as  
the mind is united to the body, 100; all ideas true in  
so far as referred to God,  
107; they contain no positive element of falsity, 108;  
ideas, when adequate, true,  
108; the idea of what is common to the human body  
and external bodies adequate,  
110; ideas that follow from adequate ideas themselves  
aesthetic, 111.  
Imagination, 95 ff.  
Immortality, 193 ff.  
Impossible, a thing, when, 59.  
Inclination, 148.  
Indignation, 149.  
Individual things, defined, 75.  
Infinite, the, 39-43.  

Joy, 149.  

Knowledge, of the first, second,  
and third kinds, 114, 115;  
that of the first kind, the sole  
cause of falsity, 115; that of the  
second and third kinds true, 115; the only true end of  
man, 160; man's highest endeavor to know things by  
knowledge of the third kind,  
194; from this kind of knowledge springs the intellectual  
love of God, 199.  See Mind.  

Longing, 150.  
Love, defined, 148; toward  
God, 187 ff.  
Lust, 151.  
Luxury, 151.  

Marriage, 165.  
Memory, 98.  
Mind, what constitutes the  
being of the, 85; perceives  
what takes place in the body corresponding to it, 86; its
union with the body, 87 ff.; has more perceptions as the body is capable of more changes, 94; the idea which constitutes its essence not simple, 94; knows the body only through the ideas of the modifications of the body, 99; only knows itself in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body, 101; does not have an adequate knowledge of the parts that compose the human body, 102; perceives external bodies only through the ideas of the modifications of its own body, 103; has a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of the body, 106; or of external things, 107; has an adequate knowledge of the essence of God, 121; cannot act upon the body, 137; strives to persevere in its being, 145.

Mode, defined, 25; infinite modes, 53-55; all modes necessarily determined to existence and action by God, 53 ff.; parallelism of, in different attributes, 78 ff., 137, 175.

Modesty, 151.

Necessary, a thing necessary or coerced when, 26, 53; the will a necessary cause, 57.
Natura Naturans, 56.
Natura Naturata, 56.

Order, relativity of the notion, 70.
Overestimation, 149.

Pain, 148.
Parallelism of modes. See Mode.
Passion, ceases to be such when clearly conceived, 176.

Passive, when we may be said to be, 135.
Perfection, origin and significance of the term, 153 ff.; identical with reality, 75, 157.
Pineal gland, as seat of the soul, 172-175.
Pleasure, 148.
Possible, individual things when, 158.
Power, identical with virtue, 159.
Pride, 150.

Reality, the same as perfection, 75, 157.
Reason, regards things not as contingent but as necessary, 117; perceives things under the form of eternity, 119.
Repentance, 150.
Revenge, 151.

Self-abasement, 150.
Self-preservation, the highest law of nature, 161.
Self-satisfaction, 150.
Shame, 150.
Social intercourse, its utility, 162 ff.
Substance, defined, 25; cannot be produced by anything else, 29; existence belongs to its nature, 29; necessarily infinite, 29; consists of infinite attributes, 34; necessarily exists, 34 ff.; is indivisible, 37 ff.; God the only substance, 38 ff.; does not constitute the essence of man, 83.
Sympathy, 150.

Time, can be conceived by the mind only while the body endures, 192-194.
Timidity, 151.
Truth, its own norm, 115-117.

Underestimation, 150.