



## The Reality of the Finite in Spinoza's System

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## THE REALITY OF THE FINITE IN SPINOZA'S SYSTEM.

IN the frequent notices of Spinoza's philosophy which we find scattered through Hegel's works, the German thinker emphatically exonerates his Jewish predecessor from the accusation of atheism so often brought against him, but at the same time himself brings the counter charge that his system is an "Acosmism," inasmuch as it maintains the exclusive reality of God so strenuously as to relegate the phenomenal world to the limbo of the illusory and unreal, till it becomes a mere semblance of the substantial and true.<sup>1</sup> The importance of this objection, if it is in fact well taken, can hardly be overestimated. For in spite of Hegel's genuine and warm appreciation of Spinozism as an essential moment in the development of philosophic thought, yet his reading of the system really resolves it into a mysticism pure and simple, and abrogates its claim to constitute a naturalistic metaphysic. If it is Spinoza's doctrine that the matters which pertain to our everyday experience, or which are the objects of scientific investigation, — the events which, whether regarded as physical or psychical, constitute our environment and make up our lives, — are in truth nothing but illusion, a veil hiding by its many colored folds that blank undifferentiated unity which alone deserves the name of reality, then is he in harmony not with the spirit that governs our modern science, but rather with that deeply contemplative but unprogressive thought of the East, which presents for the subtle play of the imagination a world composed of the stuff that dreams are made of, but offers to the eager craving of the human intellect no vivifying or illuminating principle. Spinoza's whole attitude toward knowledge, — the intense intellectualism pervading both his psychology and his ethics, and dominating his philosophical outlook, — might of itself lead us to doubt the correctness of the Hegelian interpretation of his ontology. An examination of his teaching in regard

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, *Encyclopædie*, I, S. 110, 300-303; *Geschichte der Philosophie*, III, S. 373, 374.

to the phenomenal world may perhaps reveal what elements in it gave rise to this view and at the same time afford material for its correction.

The heart of the problem lies in the character of the relation between "modes" and "substance" — that "ens absolute infinitum" which Spinoza calls God. The explanation ordinarily given of the Spinozistic "mode" is that it is the individual existent thing, the separate or separable fact, whether psychical or physical, which enters, or may enter, into our experience. Nor is this incorrect; but what must be constantly borne in mind, if this account is not to mislead us, is that Spinoza asserts emphatically the entire dependence of the mode and its relativity to substance. The individual thing, we might say, is never *wholly* individual, for it is, only as a modification or affection of being as infinite. There is, therefore, no absolute dualism between substance and its mode, between the real and the phenomenal. Thus, when he states: "Extra intellectum nihil datur præter substantias earumque affectiones,"<sup>1</sup> it is clear that the only existence the mode possesses is as an affection of substance. This is still more definitely brought out in *Ethics*, I, proposition xv, where it is said that modes can only be in the divine nature, and only through it can be conceived. So also in the corollary to proposition xxv, in Part I, we read: "Individual things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a fixed and determined manner." Reference might be made to a very large number of passages in which this intrinsic and essential dependence of mode on substance, — that is, of the particular thing on being itself, — is strongly asserted. It would be then an entire misreading of Spinoza to explain "substance" as one entity and the "mode" as another, inferior to and different from it. The individual thing is an "affection" of substance — a manifestation, within limits, of being, which taken *per se* is absolutely infinite. Hence, if the reality of the things presented to our experience can only be retained by regarding them as independent of substance, Spinoza's system must indeed be pronounced vulnerable to the imputations

<sup>1</sup> *Ethics*, I, prop. iv.

of being an "Acosmism," for constantly and with insistence does he assert that such "res particulares" are just affections of substance, apart from which they could not conceivably exist.

But when we reflect that substance or God is equivalent to existence itself, in its fullest and richest significance, we find that Spinozism by this dogma of the relativity of the mode is not denying, but rather most strenuously asserting, the reality of the individual and of the world made up of individuals. To say that anything was independent of God, would mean, could the phrase indeed have any meaning, that such thing was outside the sphere of existence, that it was a nonentity. If it *is* at all, an object must pertain to, and be included in, the circle of being. Only in a restricted sense can Spinoza even be said to deny *substantive* existence to the individual. It is true that, *qua* individual, it is not substance. We are told in *Ethics*, Part II, proposition x, that "the being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man," and in the scholium to the same proposition the statement is given in more general form that, while individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet "God does not appertain to their essence"; yet none the less the mode is an expression of God's nature, though a conditioned or limited manifestation. We might say that, though God does not appertain to the essence of the particular things, yet their essence must appertain to God. "All things are in God, and all things which come to pass, come to pass solely through the laws of the infinite nature of God, or follow from the necessity of his essence."<sup>1</sup> There is evidently no barrier set up between the mode and that of which it is a mode. The latter partakes of, though as finite it cannot exhaust, the reality of the "ens absolute infinitum." Yet obviously we have a right to ask for a clearer and fuller account of the relation between the particular and the universal in existence, than is given in the mere statement that the one is the necessary manifestation or expression of the other. To grasp Spinoza's explanation, we must take into consideration some rather obscure elements in his system of thought.

First, let us look at his use of the scholastic expressions

<sup>1</sup> *Ethics*, I, prop. xv, scholium.

“natura naturans” and “natura naturata.” It is not improbable that Spinoza was conscious that these terms were not wholly satisfactory as representations of his ideas, for we find them dropping out of the *Ethics* before the conclusion of the first Part. Of their meaning, however, there is no doubt; they signify respectively nature regarded as active and nature regarded as passive or receptive. By nature as active, we are told, is meant “that which is in itself and is considered through itself, or those attributes of substance which express eternal and infinite essence, in other words, God, in so far as he is considered as a first cause.” “By ‘natura naturata,’” Spinoza continues, “I understand all that which follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.”<sup>1</sup> This passage would alone be sufficient to show that Spinoza does not accept any ultimate or intrinsic duality between the real and the phenomenal, between the unity of being and its manifold expressions, for to suppose that “natura naturans” and “natura naturata” are *two* natures numerically distinct, would be to upset his fundamental dogma that God, nature, the “ens absolute infinitum” is one. Of importance to the correct understanding of Spinoza’s meaning is the statement of Proposition xxxi, that “intellectus actu,” whether finite or infinite, is to be referred to “natura naturata.” In the proof it is affirmed that by the intellect, in this sense, is meant not absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from other modes, and therefore requiring to be conceived through absolute thought. In the scholium to the same proposition, he protests against the assumption that by using the phrase “intellectus actu” he is implying a belief in the existence of a merely potential intellect; in fact, he is by it merely signifying the very act of understanding which is implicit in the perception of anything whatever. The “intellectus actu” is *modal*, whether a finite or an infinite mode, and thus referable to “natura naturata,” whereas “absolute thought” is itself an attribute of God, or God’s very nature in one of its infinite aspects, and so is referable to “natura naturans.”

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, I, prop. xxix, scholium.

There is little difficulty attending Spinoza's conception of God as "natura naturans." As is everywhere made apparent, God, or substance, is by the necessity of his own nature active; and from this same necessity "must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways." Plainly, "natura naturans" is being *per se*, recognized by us as force or activity. But "natura naturata" seems at first sight more puzzling, if it is taken as implying a passivity in God. To conceive of God as inactive is impossible;<sup>1</sup> it might seem then that we must regard "natura naturata" as a merely illusory and deceptive presentation of reality—giving us an *apparently* passive universe, which does not in fact exist. This interpretation would lead to Hegel's conclusion already referred to. But the true explanation becomes clear, when we recall Spinoza's use of the conception of causation. God is infinite cause, the "efficient" and the "first" cause of all; from him, as well as in him, are all things; viewed, then, in relation to the infinite things which follow from him, he is the activity of nature. But such necessarily infinite things are in no sort separate from their divine source; they do not exist outside of, nor along with it,—they are neither emanation nor creation,—but manifestations, expressions of God or being, God as "causa sui." Hence we may regard nature, taken as the totality of such manifestations, as the effect or consequence of which God ("natura naturans") is the cause or ground; but in so doing we are not treating it as though it were something apart from God, something undivine, unreal; rather it is the same being which is now presented as the *resultant* of its own force. The expression "causa sui," would be meaningless were it not possible to conceive of substance as effect. The latter conception gives us "natura naturata," but it is not a positing of an inactive being, a dead, inert universe; it is merely *a view* of reality in which the results of activity are brought out rather than the activity itself. The results are real, not illusory; indeed, an activity which should have no real results would itself be non-real. From proposition xvi of Part I, and from not a few other passages, we gather that Spinoza had fully grasped the idea on which modern German idealists, and Hegel in particular, have laid such

<sup>1</sup> *Ethics*, II, prop. iii, scholium.

stress, that an absolute being which should not imply self-differentiation, evolution, an 'änders-sein,' would be a mere non-entity. But perhaps more firmly than any other philosopher did he hold to the counter proposition, that such differentiation is only a relative one, and that the world of relation is unthinkable except as we can conceive in thought the unity to which that world belongs. The effect is not something quite other than the cause, but the same fact regarded in new connections. 'Force' and 'matter' are not separable 'things,' but two ways of envisaging the physical universe. 'Thinking' and 'ideas' are similarly two aspects of the one mental current making up our consciousness. So, to revert to our immediate subject, "natura naturans" and "natura naturata" are the one being, viewed now as cause or ground of itself, now as its own effect or consequence.

"Natura naturata," or nature as effect, is, however, not a mere congeries of separable and finite things. The modes of which it consists are "infinite modes"; and here we meet with a group of Spinozistic conceptions, highly important to the system, yet introduced so apparently at haphazard, and presented with such perfunctory and vague explanation, as to leave the student in some doubt as to whether Spinoza himself had thoroughly mastered their significance. These conceptions are "the things immediately produced by God," or "infinite modes" following necessarily from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, and "things produced by means of some such infinite modifications." Since nowhere else do we find Spinoza's thought so obscured and hampered by the inadequacy of his terminology as in this connection, it may be desirable to trace out somewhat carefully the various stages in his presentation of this part of his teaching; for we meet with these same ideas differently formulated in most of his philosophical works.

In the "Short Treatise," Part I, chapters viii and ix, we find, after an account of "natura naturans" which does not differ essentially from that given in his maturer work, the following description of "natura naturata." "'Natura naturata' we shall divide into two, a universal and a particular. The universal consists in all the modes that immediately depend on God, of which we shall

treat in the following chapter. The particular consists in all the particular things which are caused by the universal modes. So that 'natura naturata' requires substance in order that it may be rightly conceived." "Now as concerns the universal 'natura naturata' or the modes or creatures which immediately depend on, or are made by God, of these we know but two, namely, motion in matter and the understanding in the thinking thing. Of these we affirm that from all eternity they have been and throughout all eternity will remain unchangeable. Truly a work as great as befitted the greatness of the master-worker." "Now as to what particularly concerns motion, since this belongs more properly to the treatise on natural science than to this—how that it has existed from all eternity and shall remain unchangeable through eternity; that it is infinite in its kind; and that through itself it can neither exist nor be conceived, but only by means of extension—of all this, I say, we shall not treat here, but only affirm of it this, that it is a son, creature, or effect immediately produced by God."

"As concerns understanding in the thinking thing, this too, like the first, is a son, creation, or immediate product of God, made by him from all eternity, and through all eternity remaining unchangeable."

Here, then, in the earliest formulation of Spinoza's philosophy (if we except the two dialogues contained in the "Short Treatise"), we have the distinct assertion of things produced immediately by God as identical with infinite modes, and these limited, so far as our knowledge goes, to two—motion in being as extended and understanding in being as conscious; while a strong emphasis is laid on their unchangeableness and their "eternity." Allowance being made for the figurative language of the early work, there seems no reason to believe that Spinoza ever departed from, or in any important respect modified, the position here laid down.

In the second Appendix, which is certainly of later date than the "Treatise" itself, we find the correlation of "infinite modes" in the physical and the psychical attributes again implied, though the phrase "infinite idea" takes the place of "understanding." "It



is to be observed that the most immediate modification of the attribute which we call thought, has in itself objectively<sup>1</sup> the formal existence of all things. . . . From the all or thought is produced an infinite idea which contains objectively in itself the whole of nature as it actually is."<sup>2</sup> "We thus take it as proved that in extension there is no other modification than motion and rest, and that each particular bodily thing is nothing else than a definite proportion of motion and rest."<sup>3</sup> In the *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione*, we meet with these same "creatures immediately produced by God," under a different name, *i. e.*, the "fixed and eternal things."<sup>4</sup> The name need not surprise us, since we have noticed that it was on the eternity and unchangeableness of the infinite modifications that Spinoza laid stress in the "Short Treatise."

It is necessary to study somewhat closely the account given of these "fixed and eternal things." After laying down the rules for the definition of "created" and "uncreated" things, Spinoza asserts the paramount importance of a knowledge of particulars. Then, in regard to the order of knowledge, he requires that first there should be established the existence and nature of the being which is the cause of all things, so that its "objective essence" being the cause of all our ideas, our mind may, as completely as possible, reflect the essence, order, and union of nature. For this, he says, we must, avoiding all abstractions, deduce our ideas from the sequences of "physical things" or "real entities." But he adds that these latter are not the innumerable mutable things, but "fixed and eternal things." What we want to apprehend is the intrinsic essence of things, and (since the mutable individual things only give us what are external, or at best unessential properties) "this is to be sought from fixed and eternal things only, and also from the laws inscribed in them, as it were, in their true codes, according to which all particular things are produced and or-

<sup>1</sup>As has often been pointed out, "objective" means for Spinoza mental or subjective, while "formal" signifies "actual," or, approximately, what we mean by "objective."

<sup>2</sup>*Opera*, Ed. Van Vloten and Land, Vol. III, p. 100.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 103.

<sup>4</sup>On this point see the admirably clear explanation in Pollock's *Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy*, chapter iv.

dered." The particular mutable things are wholly dependent on those that are fixed and eternal, and the latter, he goes on to state, though themselves particular, are, owing to their power and presence everywhere, to us as universal, and stand as genera to the mutable things. To apply the knowledge of these fixed and eternal things is, however, peculiarly difficult, because they do not exist in a temporal series, but are "by nature simultaneous," so that something more than an apprehension of them is required if we are to understand the time-sequence of particulars. What this "something more" is, Spinoza does not tell us.<sup>1</sup>

At first sight, this account of the "fixed and eternal things" seems full of the most curious, because the most obvious, contradictions. Taken by itself, the passage is hardly intelligible. What can they be, these "physical things," which are "real entities" and "fixed and eternal things," which are not, like the "mutable" things, innumerable, and so beyond the reach of human weakness to compass, which are "singular things" and yet "like universals to us"? Undoubtedly the language here is highly obscure, and we can hardly believe that the thoughts to be expressed were quite clear in the writer's mind when these phrases were penned. Some correlation between these "fixed and eternal things" of Spinoza and the "Ideas" of Platonism, at once suggests itself to every reader. Yet it is impossible to introduce the Platonic "idea" into the Spinozistic ontology without producing utter confusion. It seems, indeed, probable that the passage in question does point to an influence on Spinoza's development, not from Plato himself, but from the neo-Platonism of Renaissance thinkers. But the expression "physical things" alone would prove that we are not being introduced to Plato's world of ideas. Undoubtedly what Spinoza has in view here is the double manifestation of reality as existence moving in space and the same existence conditioned by mental activity. In the cruder, but more intelligible language of the "Short Treatise," it is "motion," regarded as the essence of the material world, and "understanding," regarded as the essence of the mental world, and as corresponding to and coördinate with motion, that are the

<sup>1</sup> *Opera*, Vol. I, pp. 30-32.

“fixed and eternal” things. It is, however, to the *physical* side that Spinoza directs attention, probably because in the *De intellectus emendatione* he is dealing with the epistemological problem, and we must know physical things, objects moving in “space, before we know them as reflexions in consciousness. Putting together the statements of the “Short Treatise,” of its second Appendix, and of the *De intellectus emendatione*, we can see that “motion” is for him the dynamic aspect of matter, and like the latter is infinite and eternal, and that the *activity of consciousness*, variously called by him “infinite idea,” “understanding,” and “infinite intellect,” is the similar dynamic aspect of mind or thought.

Coming now to Spinoza's mature expression of this doctrine, we find in the *Ethics*, Part I, proposition xxi, the statement that whatever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must be eternal and infinite. In Letter lxiv, in answer to Tschirnhausen's questions, Spinoza states that examples of these are, in thought, absolutely infinite understanding, and, in extension, motion, and rest, precisely the teaching of his earlier works, as we have seen. *Ethics*, I, proposition xxii, asserts that whatever follows from any attribute of God, as modified by such necessarily existent and infinite modes, is itself “necessarily existent,” which is for Spinoza the same as eternal and infinite. The one example offered Tschirnhausen of modes of this kind is “*facies totius universi*,” and he is referred for further explanation to the *Ethics*, Part II, Lemma vii, scholium, which shows clearly that by “*facies totius universi*” is meant the totality of physical nature, “conceived as an individual, whose parts, that is all bodies, vary in infinite ways without any change in the individual as a whole.” This passage enables us to see the character of these mediated infinite modes, as we may call them, as distinguished from the immediately produced motion and thought-activity. The mediated infinite modes are not, *per se*, indivisible; they consist of ‘parts,’ just as the finite mode, *e. g.*, the human body, does; only these parts are infinite in number. No student can fail to observe Spinoza's omission of any specified mediated infinite mode in the psychical sphere. This may have been due to

his unwillingness to introduce into a letter a discussion of a conception still ill-defined in his own mind, and for which his philosophical vocabulary was unprovided with an appropriate term. He can hardly have been unconscious of the gap thus left in his system. Admitting this imperfection in his account of God as thinking thing, in relation to the facts of consciousness, we may tabulate his exposition of God's being in relation to the physical world only in the following scheme.

God = "ens absolute infinitum," existence *per se*, which is self-activity, and in its essential nature infinite, timeless, and indivisible.

Extension = Existence in one of its "attributes" or aspects (that is, one out of the infinite possible ways in which it is cognizable), and therefore necessarily infinite, timeless, and indivisible.

Motion, or Motion and Rest = The immediate resultant of the infinite activity, when that is regarded as extension, — timeless, infinite, and immutable.

The physical universe as a whole, "*facies totius universi*" = That which follows from extension as affected by motion, or the totality of matter as subject to the laws of motion. It is, *as a whole*, permanent and infinite, but is made up of an infinite number of finite and mutable facts.

The finite modes as physical = The individual material things. These are infinite in number, divisible, mutually limited, and susceptible to change through their determination by each other. Each, however, is a modification or manifestation under limiting conditions of the infinite activity, working under spatial conditions, or of "God as an extended thing."

A corresponding scheme for "God as thinking thing" could of course be readily formulated. As Sir Frederick Pollock suggests, the "*idea Dei*" may be used to correspond to the "*facies totius universi*," the "infinite intellect" then representing the dynamic expression of absolute consciousness; but, as he points out, it is not clear that this was Spinoza's own procedure.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, from *Ethics*, I, proposition xxi, it would rather seem that the "*idea Dei in Cogitatione*" was one of the things which follow immediately from the nature of God, and therefore analogous

<sup>1</sup> *Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy*, 2<sup>d</sup> ed., p. 176.

with motion rather than with the "facies totius universi." Yet taking together the various passages in Parts I and II of the *Ethics*, and reading them in the light of the explanations offered in Letters xxxii and lxiv, we can gather, first, that Spinoza did recognize the existence of consciousness as a totality, in which each individual mind and fact of mentality exists, and of which each forms a part, and that such totality of consciousness is infinite, its 'parts' being finite but infinite in number. It must, of course, be remembered that, according to the Spinozistic view, each 'thing' great or small, has its psychical as well as its physical existence. Secondly, this conscious totality may be conceived dynamically, its existence is at the same time force. The all-inclusive consciousness is then equivalent to the "facies totius universi," it is this viewed under the attribute of thought; while, just as the "facies totius universi" is the total "res extensa" as conditioned by motion, so is this all-inclusive consciousness the "res cogitans" as conditioned by that universal and ceaseless activity, call it by what name we will, which is the psychical equivalent of physical motion.

As regards the nature of the actual phenomenal 'things' which compose the multiplicity of the world we live in, Spinoza's teaching is clear enough. The finite mode, like the existence of which it is the limited manifestation, is cognizable as physical and psychical. It is conditioned by its fellows, and the specific character of each object is what it is because of its interaction with other modes.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, each is "conditioned by the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist but to exist and operate in a particular manner."<sup>2</sup> If we do not firmly hold to the conception of the oneness of God, or "ens," with the whole world, we shall find here a contradiction. Each thing depends on God both for the fact and the manner of its existence,<sup>3</sup> and yet each is determined by the other finite existences with which it is, as we may say, in touch. Yet Spinoza's meaning is easily grasped. *Being* is concrete reality, all-extensive, all-embracing. Of that reality the particular thing — this atom, this plant, this human

<sup>1</sup> *Ethics*, I, prop. xxvii.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, I, prop. xxix.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, I, prop. xxv.

being — is part and parcel ; its emergence and continuance in the world are existing facts. Nor could existence *be* without things that *are*, things infinite in number and in variety.<sup>1</sup> Yet that *this particular thing* should be so and not otherwise, is obviously not explained by a mere reference to the “ens absolute infinitum.” The particularity involves relation to other particulars, each of which, of course, is equally “a modification or affection of existence itself,” or is “God as modified by some finite modification.” When we consider any individual thing as a psychological fact, we regard it as a phenomenon of being as “res cogitans” ; it is a fact of consciousness to be explained, if explicable at all, by its relations to other facts of consciousness. Similarly, the physical phenomenon can only be understood by referring it to the physical events on which it depends.<sup>2</sup>

The foundation by Spinoza of this restriction of the explanation of the physical and psychical to the respective sphere of each order of fact, has been of capital importance to the cause of clear and exact thinking. But his justification of the restriction is often lost sight of even by those who recognize its value. Mental and material phenomena do not interact, just because beneath the diversity which their very terms express, lies the oneness of the fact which each partially expresses. So far from being “separated from each other by the whole diameter of being,” the physical and psychical are just the two expressions of being itself. “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.”<sup>3</sup> “So long as we consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the whole of the order of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the attribute of thought only. And in so far as we consider things as modes of extension, we must explain the whole of the order of nature through the attribute of extension only, and so on in the case of other attributes. Wherefore, of things as they are in themselves, God is really the cause, inasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes.”<sup>4</sup> The reference to things in

<sup>1</sup> *Ethics*, I, prop, xvi.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, II, prop. vi.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, II, prop. vii.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, II, prop. vii, scholium. It is curious that, while these statements of

themselves in this passage shows the reality as well as the limitations of the world of our experience. The bounds of our knowledge are set by our ignorance of more than two of the aspects or "attributes" of infinite being. Yet this knowledge is not illusory; for we really understand a finite manifestation of existence, a "mode of substance," in so far as we know the conditions on which all its physical and psychical phenomena depend. From the foregoing examination of Spinoza's doctrine, we can, I think, safely conclude that the dualism which differentiates between an Absolute, as an intrinsic and independent reality, and a phenomenal world of manifold appearance having no intrinsic reality, is wholly foreign and adverse to his ontology. It is existence itself, existence not *per se* divisible, yet evidenced in the manifold, that is the center round which his whole thought turns. Being is by him fittingly designated God. This it is which is at once the most certain and obvious of truths, and the most inexhaustible of mysteries. With it all knowledge starts and in it culminates. Of being everything partakes; and so nothing that presents itself to our senses, our imagination, or our reason is altogether illusory. But with Spinoza, as with all the great philosophers from Plato to Hegel, we constantly find the problems of being passing over into problems of knowledge. The more thorough-going an ontology is, the more directly does it lead to the questions that lie at the root of a consistent and rational epistemology. The more strenuously we endeavor to define adequately the forms of existence, the more evident does it become that, in so doing, we are differentiating between modes of apprehension. Hence the student of Spinoza is not surprised to find that his theory of being is inextricably bound up with his theory of knowledge, and that each requires the other for its complement and explication.

E. RITCHIE.

Spinoza offer the clearest and sharpest contradiction to materialism in any of its forms, yet the modern materialist constantly appeals to the authority of his name. Haeckel is the latest offender in this respect. Of course Spinoza is equally opposed to *subjective* idealism as an ontology.