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SPECIA

SONGS.

F. W. BLISS.

PAGE II.

NEW YORK,

1869.
SPINOZA

AND

HIS ENVIRONMENT

A CRITICAL ESSAY

WITH A

TRANSLATION OF THE ETHICS

BY

HENRY SMITH, D.D., LL.D.

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CINCINNATI

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1886
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PREFACE.

It is remarked by Kirchmann in the preface to his German translation of this work, that the Ethics of Spinoza presents more difficulties to the translator than any philosophical work of ancient or modern times. The reason assigned for this assertion, to wit, that the fundamental conceptions of his philosophy are so remote from those of the present day, that the words necessary to express them are hardly to be found in human speech, if true, may well solicit for a translator some indulgence at the hands of criticism.

That the assertion of Kirchmann is substantially correct, any one may satisfy himself by turning to the definitions of the affections found near the close of Part Third of the Ethics. By most writers on the philosophy of mind, who accept the triplex division of its faculties into intellect, sensibilities, and will, the whole of the affections defined by Spinoza, eight and forty in number, would be assigned bodily to the second class. But the great-analyst of pantheism reduces the primary sensibilities to a list of three: desire, joy, grief. These three. No more. All the rest, nearly or quite without exception, borrow an element of their meaning from the intellect.

We can have no clearer demonstration of the corruptibility of human language, of the possible causes of error to be found in the worship of the third class of the Baconian Idols, the idols namely of the market, words. These the philosopher of induction assures us are the currency of ideas, just as money is the currency of commerce, and he maintains that it is subject to a similar debasement. And we can have no stronger proof of the necessity of a more profound study, at least in philosophy and Christian science, of the laws and guards of human speech.

It will not be improper for the writer to state that he has never seen an English translation of any portion of Spinoza's Ethics. His attention has indeed been recently called to the fact that a translation has been made by Dr. E. Willis, of London. But he has
never seen a copy of it, and he therefore knows nothing of its merits or design. The present translation, was undertaken after a careful perusal of the whole work, and completed many years ago, so far forth as was required to furnish the basis of a "criticism on Spinoza's argument for the existence of God."

The first division of the present work, originally prepared by the writer for theological students, as a part of his labors in Lane Theological Seminary, having been solicited for publication, has been carefully recast, and in its present form is intended as a humble "contribution toward a solution of the causes of modern doubt." As it is now presented, it is designed to furnish some aid, not to theological students merely, but to Christian ministers of all Protestant denominations, and to those intelligent laymen who sympathize and co-operate with them, by the pen, in lecturing, and in various other forms, in their efforts to defend the ark of God, "the faith once delivered to the saints," from the assaults of skepticism.

With this intent, it was thought best to complete the translation of the Ethics. True, the chief argument of Spinoza on the problem of the existence of God is found in the First Part, but the ramifications of the argument reach to every part of the work. Besides, no person clergyman or layman, having interest enough in the subject to read this portion of the Ethics, could fail in a desire to have before him the means of examining the entire scheme of thought presented in the most extraordinary production of one of the most subtle and comprehensive intellects which the world has produced.

Let us remember we have here to do with the man in regard to whom Frederick Schleiermacher, the celebrated German theologian and the court preacher of Berlin, makes the following fervid appeal, couched almost in the language of worship: "Sacrifice with me reverentially to the manes of the holy, persecuted Spinoza. Him pervaded the lofty world-spirit. The infinite was his beginning and his end. The universe was his only and his eternal love. In holy innocencen, in deep humility, he mirrored himself in the eternal world. Full of religion was he, and full of the Holy Ghost. And, therefore, there he stands—alone and unapproached."

Let us remember that this is the book of which Victor Cousin thus speaks, whilst standing in the same Jewish synagogue in Amsterdam, from which Spinoza had been expelled: "This book, all bristling as it is with geometrical formulas, so dry and so repulsive in its style, is at the bottom a mystic hymn, a rapture, a sus
piration of the soul after him, who alone can lawfully say, 'I am
that I am.'" This, moreover, is the man in regard to whom he ut-
ters these words of almost lyric rhapsody: "Spinoza is an Indian
Mouni, a Persian Soofee, a monastic enthusiast, and the author,
whom this pretended atheist most resembles, is the unknown author
of the 'Imitation of Jesus Christ.' Here in Amsterdam, every
vestige of him is obliterated, and here to-day, in all the éclat of his
glory, when his ideas are spreading and echoing through the whole
world, nobody can tell me where he lived, or where he died, and of
a surety I am the only person in this synagogue who thinks of Ben-
edict Spinoza."

In the last two chapters of the first division of this work will
be found in a condensed form, a portion of the evidence demon-
strating to the writer's mind the truth of Cousin's declaration that
the ideas of Spinoza are in very deed to-day "spreading and echoing
through the whole world," that both the ideas and the spirit of
this wonderful intellect have so reappeared at the present day in
some of the most striking forms both of philosophic and religious
speculation; are so constantly, even if unconsciously, employed, and
that too by many zealous defenders of the Christian faith, as to
constitute a rehabilitated and apparently Christianized Spinozism,
certainly not the only cause of skepticism, but the very tap-
root of that furious rabies of infidelity which styles itself "modern
doubt."

One thought more and these preliminary remarks shall be con-
cluded. Protestant Christian science. Is there such a thing? Is
the realization of such a conception to be attempted or looked for
in the realm of science? With theological systems, which call
themselves Protestant, whose numbers transcend by far the num-
ber of the Ten Words of Moses, and the Eight Words of Jesus
counted together, is there any hope whatever for the unity of Pro-
testant theological science?

May the writer venture so far upon the interest of the reader in
this very important subject as to direct his attention to a possible
answer to the question, contained in a note, to be found in Chapter
Third at the close of the analysis of Bacon's Idols of the Theater.
The note contains an essay "on the meaning of the word infinite
in the English and Hebrew Scriptures." In this note, aside from
the writer's own attempted contribution to a solution of the problem,
the reader will find some strong and clear words from one of the
ablest of our American theologians. The well known words of
Cecil have become axiomatic: "The meaning of the Bible is the
Bible." Evidently familiar with this axiom, the writer in question presents a plea for a thorough-going and correct Biblical exegesis, which can hardly be surpassed. He urges its indispensable necessity with a force of language and a clearness of demonstration, which the present writer can indeed heartily admire and repeat, but would be far from making a vain attempt to rival.

Lane Seminary, January 30, 1878.
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1. Substance is prior in nature to its affections.
2. Two substances having different attributes have nothing mutually in common.
3. Things which have mutually nothing in common, of these one can not be the cause of the other.
4. Two or more distinct things are mutually distinguished either from the difference of the attributes of their substances, or from the difference of their affections.
5. In the nature of things, two or more substances of the same nature or attribute can not be given.
6. One substance can not be produced from another substance.

Corollary. Substance can not be produced by another.
7. It pertains to the nature of substance to exist.
8. Every substance is necessarily infinite.

Scholium, 1, 2.

9. The more of reality or being any thing has, the more attributes belong to it.
10. Every attribute of one substance may be conceived by itself.

Scholium.

11. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.
12. No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it follows that substance can be divided.
13. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.
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14. Besides God, no substance can be given or conceived.
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15. Whatever is, is in God, and nothing without God can be, nor be conceived.
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16. By the necessity of the divine nature, infinites (i.e., all things which can fall under an infinite intellect) must follow in infinite modes.
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18. God is the immanent, but not the transient cause of all things.
19. God, or all the attributes of God are eternal.
   Scholium. God's existence is eternal truth.
20. The existence of God, and his essence are one and the same.
   Corollary, 1, 2.
21. All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God have always existed and been infinite, or by the same attribute are eternal and infinite.
22. Whatever follows from any other attribute of God, in as far as it is transformed by such a modification, as by the same exists necessarily and as infinite, must also exist necessarily and as infinite.
23. Every mode which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow, either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite.
24. The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.
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   Corollary. Particular things are nothing but affections of the attributes of God.
26. A thing which has been determined to do any thing has been necessarily so determined by God; and that which has not been determined by God is not able to determine itself to action.
27. A thing which has been determined by God to do any thing, can not render itself indeterminate.
28. Any individual thing, or any thing whatever which is finite, and has a limited existence, can not exist nor be determined to action, un-
less it is determined to exist and act by another cause, which is also finite, and has a limited existence. And, again, the cause also can not exist, nor be determined to action, except by another, which is also finite, has a limited existence, and is determined to exist and act, and so on without end.

Scholium. Concerning God, the cause of things.

29. In the nature of things nothing contingent is given, but from the necessity of the divine nature all things have been determined to exist and operate in a certain manner.

Scholium. Natura naturans, and natura naturata.

30. Intellect, whether in reality finite or infinite, must comprehend the attributes and affections of God, and nothing else.

31. Intellect, as a reality, whether it is finite, or infinite, as also will, desire, love, etc., must be referred to natura naturata, but not to natura naturans.

Scholium.

32. Will can not be called a free cause, but only a necessary one.

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4. The idea of God, from which infinite things in infinite modes follow, can be only single.

5. The formal being of ideas, recognizes God as a cause, in so far only as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not in so far as he is expressed by any other attribute. That is, ideas both of the attributes of God and of single things do not recognize the objects or things per-
ceived as an efficient cause, but God himself, in as far as he is a thinking being.

6. The modes of each attribute have God for a cause in so far only as he is considered under that attribute, of which they are modes, and not under any other.

Corollary.

7. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.

Corollary. Scholium.

8. The ideas of single things or of modes not existing must be so embraced in the infinite idea of God as the formal essences of things or of modes are contained in the attributes of God.

Corollary. Scholium.

9. The idea of a single thing, actually existing, has God for a cause, not in so far as he infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of another single thing existing in fact, of which also God is the cause in so far as he is affected by another third thing, and so on without end.

10. It does not pertain to the essence of man to belong to substance, or substance does not constitute the form of man.


11. The first thing which constitutes the actual being of the human mind is nothing else than the idea of some single thing existing in fact.

Corollary. The human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God.

Scholium.

12. Whatever occurs in the object of an idea constituting the human mind, this must be perceived by the human mind, or the idea of this thing will be necessarily given in the mind; that is, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, nothing will be able to happen in that body which is not perceived by the mind.

Scholium.

13. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is body or a certain mode of extension existing in fact, and nothing else.

Corollary. Man consists of mind and body, and the human body exists.

Scholium. Things premised concerning the nature of bodies.

Axioms, 1, 2. Lemma, 1–3. Corollary.


14. The human mind is fitted to perceive very many things, and the better fitted the greater the number of modes in which the body can be disposed.

15. The idea which constitutes the real essence of the human soul is not simple, but is composed of very many ideas.

16. The idea of each mode by which the human mind is affected by
external bodies must involve the nature of the human body, and at
the same time the nature of the external body.

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17. If the human body is affected in a mode which involves the
nature of any external body, the human mind will regard the same ex-
ternal body as existing in fact, or as present to itself, until its body is
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19. The human mind does not cognize the human body itself, or
know that it exists, except by the ideas of the affections, by which the
body is affected.

20. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is given also in God,
and this follows in God in the same, and is referred to God in the
same manner as the idea or knowledge of the human body.

21. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same manner
as the mind itself is united to the body.

Scholium.

22. The human mind perceives not only the affections of the body
but also the ideas of these affections.

23. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives
the ideas of the affections of the body.

24. The human mind does not contain an adequate knowledge of the
parts composing the human body.

25. The idea of each affection of the human body does not contain
an adequate knowledge of an external body.

26. The human mind perceives no external body, as existing in fact,
except through the ideas of the affections of its own body.

Corollary.

27. The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve an
adequate knowledge of the human body itself.

28. The ideas of the affections of the human body, in so far as they
relate only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but con-
 fused.

Scholium.

29. The idea of the idea of each affection of the human body does
not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind.

Corollary. Scholium.

30. We are able to have no knowledge concerning the duration of
our body, except a very inadequate one.

31. Concerning the duration of single things without us, we are able
to have only a very inadequate knowledge.

Corollary. All particular things are contingent and corruptible.
32. All ideas, in so far as they relate to God, are true.
33. There is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false.
34. Every idea, which in us is absolute, or adequate and perfect, is true.
35. Falsity consists in the want of knowledge, which inadequate, or mutilated and confused ideas involve.

Scholium. Concerning falsity and error.
36. Inadequate or confused ideas follow by the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct ideas.
37. That which is common to all, and which is equally in the part and in the whole, constitutes the essence of no single thing.
38. Those things which are common to all, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, can not be conceived except adequately.

Corollary. Certain ideas or notions are common to all men.
39. That which is common to the human body, and to any external bodies, by which the human body is accustomed to be affected, and that which is common and proper to the part of each one of these and to the whole, of this there will also be an adequate idea in the mind.

Corollary.
40. Whatever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are adequate in it, are also adequate.


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41. Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity, but of the second and third is necessarily true.
42. The knowledge of the second and third, and not of the first kind teaches us to distinguish the true from the false.
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Scholium.
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terminated to will this or that by a cause, which also is determined by another, and this again by another, and so on without end.

Scholium.

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1. Our mind does certain things, but also suffers certain things, namely, in so far as it has adequate ideas it necessarily does certain things, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas it necessarily suffers certain things.

Corollary.

2. The body is not able to determine the mind to thought, nor the mind the body to motion or rest, nor to any thing else (if any thing else there is).

Scholium. Mind and body are one and the same thing.

3. The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone, but passions depend alone upon inadequate ones.

Scholium. Concerning the passions.

4. Nothing can be destroyed, except by an external cause.

5. Things, to that extent, are of a contrary nature, that is, they cannot not to that extent be in the same subject, in so far as one is able to destroy another.

6. Every thing, as far as in it lies, strives to persevere in its being.

7. The endeavor, by which every thing strives to preserve its being, is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself.

8. The endeavor by which every thing strives to persevere in its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite one.

9. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct, and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavors to persevere in its own being a certain indefinite time, and is conscious of this, its own endeavor.

Scholium. Will, appetite, desire.

10. The idea, which excludes the existence of our body, can not be posited in our mind, but is contrary to the same.

11. Whatever increases or diminishes, assists or hinders our body's power of action, the idea of the same thing increases or diminishes, assists or hinders our mind's power of thinking.
Concerning the primitive affections, joy, grief, desires.
12. The mind, as far as possible, strives to imagine those things, which increase or assist the body’s power of action.
13. When the mind imagines those things, which diminish or hinder the body’s power of action, it strives, as far as it can, to remember things, which exclude the existence of these.

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15. Any thing whatever is able to be, by accident, the cause of joy, grief, or desire.

Corollary. Scholium. Sympathy and antipathy.
16. From this alone, that we imagine any thing to have something similar to an object, which is accustomed to affect the mind with joy or grief, although that in which the thing is similar to the object, is not the efficient cause of these affections, we shall nevertheless love or hate it.
17. If we imagine a thing, which is accustomed to affect us with the affection of grief to have something similar to another, which is accustomed to affect us with an equally great affection of joy, we shall at once hate and love it.

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Scholium 1. On a thing past or future.

Scholium 2. What hope, fear, confidence, despair, rejoicing, and the sting of conscience are.
19. He who imagines that that which he loves is destroyed, will be affected with grief, but that it is preserved, will be affected with joy.
20. He who imagines that that which he hates is destroyed, will be affected with joy.
21. He who imagines that that which he loves is affected with joy or grief, will also be affected with joy or grief, and each affection will be greater or less in the lover, as each is greater or less in the thing beloved.
22. If we imagine that any one affects with joy a thing which we love, we shall be affected with love towards him. If on the contrary, we imagine the same to affect the same with grief, we, on the contrary, shall be affected with hatred towards him.

Scholium. Commiseration, favor, indignation.
23. He who imagines that which he hates to be affected with grief, will rejoice; if on the contrary, he imagines the same to be affected with joy, he will be grieved, and each affection will be greater or less as its contrary is greater or less, in that which he hates.

Scholium.
24. If we imagine any one to affect with joy a thing which we hate,
we shall be affected with hatred towards him. If on the contrary we imagine the same to affect the same thing with grief, we shall be affected with love towards him.

Scholium. On envy.

25. We endeavor to affirm every thing concerning ourselves, and concerning a thing beloved, which we imagine affects ourselves or a thing beloved with joy, and on the contrary to deny every thing which we imagine affects ourselves or a thing beloved with grief.

26. We endeavor to affirm every thing, concerning a thing which we hate, which we imagine affects it with grief, and on the contrary to deny what we imagine affects it with joy.

Scholium. On pride, over-estimation, and contempt.

27. From the fact that we imagine any thing similar to ourselves, which we had regarded with no affection, to be affected with any affection, we ourselves are affected with this similar affection.


On benevolence.

28. Every thing which we imagine contributes to joy, we endeavor to bring to realization, but what we imagine to be repugnant to the same, or to conduce to grief, we endeavor to remove or to destroy.

29. We shall also endeavor to do every thing which we imagine men regard with joy, and on the contrary, we shall be averse from doing that, to which we imagine men are averse.

Scholium. Ambition, humanity, praise, blame.

30. If any one has done any thing which he imagines affects others with joy, he will be affected with joy, with the concomitant idea of himself as the cause, or he will contemplate himself with joy. If on the other hand he has done any thing which he imagines affects others with grief, on the contrary he will contemplate himself with grief.


31. If we imagine that any one loves, or desires, or hates any thing which we love, desire, or hate, from this very fact we shall more constantly love, etc. But if we imagine that he regards with aversion that which we love, or the contrary, then we shall suffer fluctuation of mind.

Corollary. Scholium.

32. If we imagine that any one rejoices in any thing which only one is able to possess, we shall endeavor to bring it to pass, that he may not possess that thing.

Scholium. Men are naturally envious, ambitious, pitiful.

33. When we love a thing similar to ourselves, we strive as far as possible to bring it to pass, that it on the other hand may love us.

34. The greater the affection with which we imagine a beloved thing is affected toward ourselves, the more shall we glory.

35. If any one imagines that a beloved thing joins another to itself, with the same or a closer bond of friendship, than that with which he
alone possesses the same, he will be affected with hatred toward the beloved thing itself, and he will envy that other.

Scholium. On jealousy.

36. Whoever remembers a thing with which he was once delighted, desires to possess the same with the same circumstances, as when he was at first delighted with it.


37. The desire which springs from grief or joy, or hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the affection is greater.

38. If any one begins to hate a beloved thing, so that love is entirely abolished, for a similar reason he will pursue the same with greater hatred than if he had never loved it; with the greater, the greater had been his previous love.

39. He who hates any one will endeavor to bring evil upon him, unless he fears that from this a greater evil may arise to himself; and on the other hand, he who loves any one, by the same law will endeavor to benefit him.

Scholium. Timidity, shame, consternation.

40. He who imagines himself to be hated by any one, and who does not believe that he has given him any cause of hatred, will on the other hand hate him.


41. If any one imagines that he is loved by any one, and does not believe that he has given any cause for this, he will love the same in return.


42. He who confers a benefit upon any one, moved by love or the hope of glory, will be grieved, if he sees the benefit to be ungratefully received.

43. Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and on the other hand it can be canceled by love.

44. The hatred which is entirely conquered by love passes over into love, and the love is therefore greater than if hatred had not preceded.

Scholium.

45. If any one imagines that one similar to himself is affected with hatred toward a thing similar to himself, which he loves, he will hate him.

46. If any one has been affected by joy or grief, by some one of any class or nation different from his own, with the concomitant idea of him, under the general name of the class or nation as the cause, he will love or hate not him only, but all of the same class or nation.

47. The joy which arises from the fact that we imagine the thing which we hate to be destroyed, or to be affected by other evil, does not arise without some grief of mind.

Scholium.
48. Love and hatred, e. g., towards Peter, is destroyed if the grief which the latter, and the joy which the former involves is associated with the idea of either cause; and to this extent each is diminished, in so far as we imagine Peter to have been not the sole cause of either.

49. Love and hatred toward a thing, which we imagine to be free, must, each from an equal cause, be greater than toward a necessary one.

Scholium.

50. Any thing whatever can become accidentally the cause of hope or fear.

Scholium. Good and evil omens.

51. Different men can be differently affected by one and the same object; and one and the same man can be differently affected by one and the same object at different times.

Scholium. Repentance and self-satisfaction.

52. An object which we have formerly seen together with others, or which we imagine has nothing, except what is common to very many, we shall not contemplate as long as that which we imagine has something peculiar.

Scholium. Admiration, consternation, veneration, horror, devotion, contempt, derision, disdain.

53. When the mind contemplates itself, and its power of action, it rejoices; and the more, the more distinctly it imagines itself, and its power of action.

Corollary.

54. The mind endeavors to imagine only those things which posit its power of action.

55. When the mind imagines its own impotence it is thereby grieved.


Corollary. 2. No one envies virtue to any one but an equal.

Scholium, 2.

56. There are as many species of joy, grief, and desire, and consequently of every affection composed of them, as also of mental fluctuation derived from them, to wit, of love, hatred, hope, fear, etc., as there are species of objects by which we are affected.

Scholium. Gluttony, ebriety, lust, avarice, ambition.

57. Any affection whatever of any individual differs from the affection of another only as the essence of one differs from the essence of another.

Scholium. The difference of affections in animals and men.

58. Besides joy and desire, which are passions, there are other affections of joy and desire, which refer to us in so far as we act.

59. Among all affections, which refer to the mind, in so far as it acts, there are none except those which refer to joy or desire.

Scholium. Animosity, generosity; fastidiousness and tedium.

Definitions of the affections.


IV. General definition of the affections.

PART IV.

Preface. Perfection and imperfection, good and evil.


Axioms.

Propositions.

1. Nothing positive which a false idea contains is canceled by the presence of the true, in as far as it is true.

Scholium. The mind is deceived by imaginations.

2. We suffer, in so far as we are a part of nature, which can not be conceived of by itself without other things.

3. The power by which man perseveres in existence is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.

4. It can not be that man is not a part of nature, and that he can suffer no changes, except such as can be understood by his own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause.

Corollary. Man is always necessarily subject to passions.

5. The power and growth of each passion, and its perseverance in existence is not defined by the power with which we endeavor to persevere in existence, but by the power of the external cause compared with our own.

6. The power of any passion or affection is able to surpass the remaining actions or power of a man, so that the affection may adhere pertinaciously to the man.

7. An affection can not be coerced or destroyed except it be coerced by a stronger and contrary affection.

Corollary.

8. The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else than an affection of joy or grief, as far as we are conscious of it.
9. An affection the cause of which we imagine to be with us at the present time, is stronger than if we imagine the same not to be with us.

Scholium. Corollary.

10. Towards a future thing, which we imagine about to happen speedily, we are more intensely affected than if we imagine its period of existence to be more remote from the present, and by the memory of a thing which we imagine to have passed not long since, we are more intensely affected than if we imagine the same to have taken place long ago.

Scholium.

11. An affection towards a thing which we imagine as necessary, other things being equal, is more intense than towards a possible, or contingent, or not necessary thing.

12. An affection towards a thing which we know not to exist at present, and which we imagine as possible, other things being equal, is more intense than toward a contingent thing.

Corollary.

13. An affection towards a contingent thing which we know not to exist at present, other things being equal, is weaker than an affection towards a past thing.

14. A true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it is true, can coerce no affection, but only in so far as it is considered as an affection.

15. The desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, can be extinguished or coerced by many other desires which arise from the affections by which we are agitated.

16. The desire which arises from a knowledge of good and evil, as far as this knowledge respects the future, can be more easily coerced or extinguished than a desire of things which are at present agreeable.

17. A desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, as far as this is concerned with contingent things, can be thus far much more easily coerced than the desire of things which are present.

Scholium. Men are more moved by opinion than by true reason.

18. The desire which arises from joy, other things being equal, is stronger than the desire which arises from grief.

Scholium. The precepts of reason.

19. Every one, by the laws of his own nature, necessarily seeks that, or is averse to that which he judges to be good or evil.

20. The more any one seeks his own benefit, that is, to preserve his own essence, and is able to do so, with so much the more virtue is he endowed, and on the contrary, in so far as any one neglects his own essence, in so far he is impotent.

Scholium. On the causes of voluntary death.

21. No man can desire to be happy, to do well, to live well, who at the same time does not desire to be, to act, and to live, that is to exist in reality.
22. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this (to wit: the effort of self-preservation).

Corollary. The effort of self-preservation is the first and only foundation of virtue.

23. Man, in so far as he is determined to do any thing by this, that he has inadequate ideas, can not be absolutely said to act from virtue, but only so far as he is determined by this, that he understands.

24. To act absolutely from virtue is nothing else in us than to act, live, preserve one’s essence (these three signifying the same thing) by the guidance of reason, from the principle of seeking one’s own good.

25. No one strives to preserve his own essence for the sake of another thing.

26. What we strive for by reason, is nothing else but to understand, nor does the mind in so far as it employs reason, judge any thing to be useful to it, except that which contributes to its understanding.

27. We know certainly nothing to be good or evil, except that which really contributes to understanding, or which prevents us from understanding.

28. The highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the highest virtue of the mind is to know God.

29. Every particular thing whose nature is entirely different from our own, is able neither to aid nor to hinder our power of action, and absolutely, nothing is able to be good or evil to us unless it has something in common with us.

30. Nothing can be evil through that which it has in common with our nature, but in so far as it is evil to us, in so far it is contrary to us.

31. In as far as any thing agrees with our nature in so far it is necessarily good.

Corollary.

32. In so far as men are subject to passions, in so far they can not be said to agree with nature.

Scholium. Things which agree only in a negation, agree in nothing.

33. Men are able to disagree in nature in as far as they conflict in affections, which are passions, and in so far also one and the same man is variable and inconstant.

34. In so far as men are assailed by affections, which are passions, they can be contrary one to another.

Scholium.

35. In as far as men live under the guidance of reason, in so far only do they always necessarily agree in nature.

Corollary 1. Nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives under the guidance of reason.

Corollary 2. When every man seeks most his own benefit, then are men most useful to each other.

Scholium. On social and solitary life.
36. The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and, therefore, all are able equally to rejoice in it.

_Scholium._

37. The good which every one who follows virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also for other men, and the more the greater the knowledge of God he shall have.

_Scholium 1._ Religion, piety, the honorable and the base.

_Scholium 2._ On the natural and civil state of man. Sin and merit, the just and the unjust.

38. That which so disposes the human body, that it can be affected in very many ways, or which renders the same fit for affecting external bodies in very many ways, is useful to man, and it is the more useful the more fit the body is rendered by it, that it may be affected, and may affect other bodies in the greater number of ways. And that, on the contrary, is noxious, which renders the body less fit for these things.

39. The things which bring it to pass that the relation of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body have to each other, should be preserved, are good, and those on the contrary, evil, which bring it to pass that the parts of the human body should have a different relation of motion and rest to each other.

_Scholium._ On the change of the body in death and disease.

40. Things which contribute to the common society of man, or which bring it to pass that men live harmonious and useful lives are good, and those on the contrary, evil, which introduce discord into the state.

41. Joy is not directly evil, but good; grief, however, on the contrary, is directly evil.

42. Hilarity can not have excess, but is always good, and on the contrary, melancholy is always evil.

43. Titillation is able to have excess and to be evil, but pain is able to be good in so far as titillation or joy is an evil.

44. Love and desire are able to have excess.

_Scholium._ What desires are a species of delirium.

45. Hatred can never be good.

_Scholium 1._ Corollary 1, 2. _Scholium 2._ Soorn and laughter. To use and enjoy things is the part of a wise man.

46. He who lives under the guidance of reason, strives as far as he can, to requite with love or generosity, the hatred, anger, contempt, etc., of another towards himself.

_Scholium._

47. The affections of hope and fear can not be in themselves good.

_Scholium._

48. The affections of over-estimation and depreciation are always evil.

49. Over-estimation easily renders proud the man who is over-estimated.

50. Pity in a man who lives under the guidance of reason, is in itself evil and useless.
Corollary. Scholium. Inhumanity reproved.

51. Favor is not repugnant to reason, but it is possible for it to agree with it, and to spring from it.

Scholium. Indignation is necessarily evil.

52. Self-satisfaction may spring from reason, and it self-satisfaction alone which springs from reason, is the highest which can exist.

Scholium.

53. Humility is not a virtue, or it does not spring from reason.

54. Penitence is not a virtue, or it does not spring from reason, but he who repents of an act is doubly wretched, or impotent.

Scholium. Why the sacred writers so highly commend humility and penitence.

55. The greatest pride or self-distrust is the greatest self-ignorance.

56. The greatest pride or self-distrust indicates the greatest impotence of mind.

Corollary. Scholium.

57. The proud man loves the presence of parasites, but hates the noble-minded.

Scholium. On the evils of pride.

58. Glory is not repugnant to reason, but may spring from it.

Scholium. On vain-glory and shame.

59. To actions to which we can be determined by an affection which is a passion, we can be determined without it by reason.

Scholium. Example in explanation.

60. A desire which springs from joy or grief, which is related to one or to several, but not to all parts of the body, does not possess the relation of utility to the whole man.

Scholium.

61. Desire which springs from reason, can not have excess.

62. In so far as the mind conceives things under the guidance of reason, it is equally affected, whether the idea is of a thing future, or past, or present.

Scholium.

63. He who is led by fear, and does good that he may avoid evil, is not governed by reason.


64. The knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge.

Corollary.

65. Under the guidance of reason, we follow, of two goods the greater, of two evils the less.

Corollary.

66. Under the guidance of reason we seek a future greater good in preference to a less present one, and a less present evil which is the cause of some future evil.


67. The free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.
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68. If men were born free, they would form no conception of good and evil as long as they were free.

69. The virtue of a free man is seen to be equally great in avoiding as in overcoming dangers.
   Corollary. Scholium. What danger is.

70. A freeman who lives among the ignorant, strives as far as possible to decline their favors.
   Scholium. In declining favors regard should be had to the useful and the honorable.

71. Free men alone are mutually most grateful.
   Scholium. On ingratitude.

72. A free man will never act from a covert evil purpose, but always with good faith.

73. A man who follows reason is more free in a state where he lives according to the common decree, than in a desert where he obeys himself alone.
   Scholium. The true liberty of man is true life and religion.

Appendix. Chapters on the life of reason, 1–32.

PART V.

Preface. The remaining part of the Ethics, concerning the way which leads to liberty. The doctrine of the Stoics and Descartes.

Axioms 1, 2.

Propositions.

1. Precisely as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and connected in the mind, exactly in the same way are the affections of the body, or the images of things arranged and connected in the body.

2. If we remove the agitation of mind or the affection springing from the thought of an external cause, and attach it to other thoughts, then love or hatred toward the external cause, as also the fluctuations of mind which spring from these affections will be destroyed.

3. Affection which is passion ceases to be passion as soon as we form a distinct and clear idea of it.

Corollary.

4. There is no affection of the body of which we are not able to form some clear and distinct conception.
   Corollary. Scholium.

5. An affection which we imagine simply, and neither as necessary nor possible nor contingent, is, other things being equal, the greatest of all.

6. In so far as the mind understands all things as necessary, to that extent it has greater power over the affections, or it suffers less from them.
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Scholium.

7. Affections which spring from, or are excited by reason, if regard is had to time, are more powerful than those which relate to single things which are contemplated as absent.

8. The greater the number of concurring causes from which any affection springs, the greater is it.

Scholium.

9. An affection which arises from many and different causes, which the mind contemplates in connection with the affection itself, is less harmful, and we suffer less from it, and we are less affected toward any one cause, than another equally great affection, which is referable to one single cause, or to fewer causes.

10. As long as we are not assailed by affections which are contrary to our nature, so long we have the power of arranging and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the understanding.

Scholium. How to avoid evil affections.

11. The greater the number of things to which any image relates, the more frequently does it occur, or the oftener does it present itself, and the more does it occupy the mind.

12. The images of things are united more easily to images which are related to things which we clearly and distinctly understand, than to others.

13. The greater the number of other things with which any image is associated, the oftener does it present itself.

14. The mind is able to bring it to pass, that all the affections of the body, or the images of things, should stand related to the idea of God.

15. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his affections, loves God, and the more, the more he understands himself and his affections.

16. This love towards God ought chiefly to occupy the soul.

17. God is devoid of passions, and is moved by no affection of joy or grief.

Corollary. Properly speaking, God loves and hates no one.

18. No one is able to hate God.

Corollary. Scholium.

19. He who loves God can not put forth an effort that God should love him in return.

20. This love toward God can not be corrupted by an affection either of envy or of jealousy, but is the more increased the greater the number of men whom we imagine to be united to God by the same bond of love.

Scholium. On the remedies of the affections.

21. The mind is able to imagine nothing, and to remember nothing of past things, save during the existence of the body.
22. In God, nevertheless, there is necessarily given an idea which expresses the essence of this and that human body under the species of eternity.

23. The human mind can not be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something remains which is eternal.

_Scholium._ This eternity of the mind is a certain mode of thinking.

24. The more we understand individual things, the more we understand God.

25. The highest effort of the mind, and the highest virtue, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.

26. The better fitted the mind is for understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, the more it desires to understand things by this same kind of knowledge.

27. From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest satisfaction of mind which can be given.

28. The effort or desire of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge can not arise from the first, but may certainly from the second kind of knowledge.

29. Whatever the mind understands under the species of eternity, it understands this, not because it conceives the present actual existence of the body, but because it conceives the essence of the body, under the species of eternity.

_Scholium._ Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways.

30. Our mind as far as it knows itself and the body, under the species of eternity, so far has necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows itself to be in God, and to be conceived by God.

31. The third kind of knowledge depends upon the mind as upon a real cause in so far as the mind itself is eternal.

_Scholium._ The stronger any one is in this third kind of knowledge, the more perfect and happy is he.

32. Whatever we understand with the third kind of knowledge, in that we delight, and that too with the concomitant idea of God as the cause.

_Corollary._ From the third kind of knowledge arises necessarily the intellectual love of God.

33. The intellectual love of God which arises from the the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.

_Scholium._ Beatitude, in what it consists.

34. The mind is subject to affections which are referable to the passions only whilst the body lasts.

_Corollary._ No love except intellectual love is eternal.

_Scholium._ The common opinion of men concerning the mind's eternity.

35. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.

36. The intellectual love of the mind to God is itself the love of God, by which God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in
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so far as he can be explained by the essence of the human mind, con-
sidered under the species of eternity, that is, the mind's intellectual
love of God, is a part of the infinite love, with which God loves him-
self.

Corollary. The love of God to men, and the intellectual love of
the mind to God is one and the same thing.

Scholium. Beatitude or our liberty consists in constant and eternal
love toward God, or in the love of God toward men.

37. There is nothing in nature which is contrary to this intellectual
love, or which is able to destroy it.

Scholium.

38. The more things the mind understands by the second and third
kinds of knowledge, the less does it suffer from the affections which
are evil, and the less it fears death.

Scholium. Death is the less noxious, the more the mind loves
God.

39. He who has a body adapted to the greatest number of things
has a mind whose greatest part is eternal.

Scholium. On man's felicity or infelicity.

40. The more of perfection any single thing has, the more it acts,
and the less it suffers, and conversely, the more it acts, the more per-
fect is it.

Corollary. The part of the mind which remains (the intellect), is
more perfect than the rest (the imagination).

Scholium. Our mind is as far as it understands, is an eternal mode
of thinking.

41. Although we might be ignorant that our mind is eternal, we
ought still to regard piety and religion, and absolutely all things which
in the fourth part we have shown appertain to animosity and gener-
city as of the first value.

Scholium. The common persuasion of the vulgar concerning
eternal life.

42. Salvation is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself, and we do
not rejoice in it because we restrain our lusts, but, on the contrary, be-
cause we rejoice in it, we are able to restrain our lusts.

Scholium. How much greater and more powerful is the wise man
than the ignorant man, who is moved by lust alone.
THE ENVIRONMENT OF SPINOZA.

A CRITIQUE

ON THE ETHICS OF SPINOZA.
THE ENVIRONMENT OF SPINOZA.

CHAPTER I.

Bacon’s Personality and System.

§ 1. Strictly personal history.

On the 22nd of January, A. D., 1560, the lady of an English lawyer gave birth, at York House, London, to a son whose genius was destined to effect an entire revolution in the world of science. This result was to be produced, not so much by any direct contributions of his own to the scientific knowledge of the world, as by furnishing mankind with the key by which they might be able to unlock the treasury of nature. It is not the purpose of this chapter to attempt any detailed analysis of the system of Bacon, or of his contributions to science. But as it is necessary to refer to him as a part of the Environment of Spinoza, it will be well to recall the leading facts in his life, as also the general scientific condition and wants of his age.

His father, Sir Nicholas Bacon, was a courtier under Henry Eighth and Edward Sixth, and upon the accession of Elizabeth was made keeper of the great seal. In his early years, Bacon manifested great precocity of talent, and it is clear that when a child, he was a pet of the Virgin queen. Yet, during her reign, he was never entrusted with any important office in the gift of the government, a circumstance which has been attributed to the dislike of Cecil, Elizabeth’s distinguished secretary of state. He devoted himself to the study of law, and some time after the death of his father, rose to considerable distinction in the Society of Gray’s Inn, of which he was a member. The period which elapsed from this time to the death of Elizabeth was chiefly devoted to philosophical studies.
XXXVI  THE ENVIRONMENT OF SPINOZA.

Upon the accession of James First of England, and Sixth of Scotland, his longings aspirations for civil preferment were at length gratified. He was one of the two hundred and thirty-seven persons upon whom that learned but vain and weak monarch conferred the honor of knighthood. He rose successively, and, his enemies have said, by unworthy servility, through various grades of preferment. In A. D., 1611, he was made judge of the knight marshal’s court; in A. D., 1613, attorney-general; in A. D., 1617, keeper of the great seal; and in A. D., 1619, lord chancellor of England, the highest legal officer in the realm. In the same year he was created baron Verulam, and viscount St. Albans. The story of Bacon’s moral delinquencies, and of his fall, no one who deals with books at all has failed to read:

"On eagles’ wings immortal scandals fly."

The literal meaning of the terms of his own confession is perhaps sufficient, from the poet’s point of view, to justify Pope in stamping upon literature the infamous, even if impossible, character of the philosopher as:

"The greatest, wisest, meanest of mankind."

Let us, however, not forget the possibilities of human nature. Let us remember that motives have been found powerful enough to induce men to accuse themselves of crimes which they never committed, or to exaggerate into corruption or vice acts which at heart they regarded as simply a neglect of legal forms, as mere irregularities, or at the very worst, as peccadilloes instead of crimes. Proof is not wanting that something very like this was true in Bacon’s case. He erred. He confessed. He was condemned. He was imprisoned. But it seems quite certain that motives of policy, that promises of slight punishment, procured the exaggerated form of his confession. Instantly from the tower he wrote to Buckingham: “I have been a trusty, honest, and Christ-loving friend of your lordship, and the justest chancellor that hath been in the five changes since my father’s time.”

Again and later he writes: “God is my witness, that when I examine myself, I find all well.”
In his will are these words: "For my name and memory, I leave it to men's charitable speeches, to foreign nations, and to the next ages."

Whosoever desires to see the evidence that Bacon's anticipation of more "charitable speeches" even in England, and of the substantial vindication of his moral character from "foreign nations" and "the next ages," is making distinct progress towards a perfect realization, should read his life by Basil Montagu.

Suppose, however, we accept the worst construction which a world not greatly addicted to "charitable speeches" has put upon his conduct, what is the proper inference? The simple, humiliating, yet solemn and salutary lesson taught by the facts would be, that no grasp of intellect, no profundity of reason, no clearness of philosophical insight, is sufficient to guide and sustain poor human nature in the path of rectitude. Let us draw a veil over his frailties. The incomparable service which he has rendered to the cause of true science, if it can not atone for moral faults, at least furnishes us with happier associations, and surrounds the name of Bacon with a luster, through which, to "the next ages," the defects of his character will appear only as spots on the sun.

§ 2. His view of the Scholastic Logic.

At an early age, Bacon conceived a strong dislike to the Aristotelian logic. He perceived very clearly its inadequacy to the accomplishment of the vast objects to which it was applied. It ought, however, here, in justice to Aristotle, to be remarked that he is not to be held responsible for the frivolous and absurd products of the mediaeval scholasticism. Any one, who has even cast his eye over the works of the Stagyrite, knows that the word "Organon," as a designation of a portion of his works, was unknown to him. So far was he from supposing that he had invented an Organon, that is, instrument of universal applicability in pushing forward the work of enlarging the domains of science, that there is no one work of his to which that name has been or can be applied. This desig-
nation, Organon (Lat. organum), was an invention of his followers, and was applied by them to his Tracts on the Categories and on Interpretation, to his Topics, to his book on Sophisms, and to the two works which treat specifically of the Syllogism and of Demonstration, viz., to the Prior and Posterior Analytics. In the first book of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle treats of the construction, elimination and reduction of syllogisms. In the second, he considers the powers of the syllogism, showing that all other forms of reasoning, as induction, enthymeme, and example, may be referred to it, so that there is in reality no other principle of argumentation. In the first book, in scholastic language, he considers the syllogism in fieri. In the second, he considers it in facto esse. In his two books denominated the Posterior Analytics, he treats of the nature, power and properties of demonstration. These are the works to which the designation of Aristotle's Organum has been attached, a name which seems to imply that he regarded the syllogism, as we certainly have no evidence that he did, as the sole instrument by which undiscovered truth was to be brought to light.

As such, however, there can be no doubt that at least his later followers had regarded it. To this circumstance, doubtless, is to be attributed in no small degree, the little progress made in genuine scientific discovery in the long and dreary period during which Aristotle reigned as "lord of the ascendant" in the horoscope of philosophy in the schools of Europe. To this circumstance also, is to be attributed the contempt with which the disciples of Bacon have very generally been inclined to regard the syllogism. They derived their notions of its value from the abuses and perversions of the schools, and we have ample evidence that these prejudices were accompanied in very many cases with a great degree of ignorance in regard to the subject.

Thus much then concerning the Ancient Organum, the Organon of Aristotle. Let us now return to Bacon. It has already been said that he early conceived a dislike for the Aristotelian logic. Perhaps it would be more correct to
say that he conceived a dislike to the abuses of that logic which he found everywhere in the schools. He saw very distinctly the entire inadequacy of the Organum then in use to the solution of the vast questions to which it was applied.

§ 3. The want of Science.

The want of Bacon's age was a want of facts. It was a want, that is, of the very premises, which all deductive reasoning assumes. He perceived clearly that these could never be yielded by the syllogism, and his practical and comprehensive genius accordingly suggested a new instrument (Novum Organum) for the work of scientific research. He endeavored, namely, to make a digest of the rules of legitimate philosophizing. His first work, which prepared the way for the following, and in part unfolded his plan, was published in A. D., 1605, under the title, "Of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning." This was subsequently enlarged, translated into Latin, and published under the title, "De dignitate et augmentis Scientiarum." The design was to distribute the existing sciences under their proper heads, and to indicate the desiderata of science, and the fields which needed further investigation.

The next work, upon which, perhaps, more than any other, the fame of Bacon rests, was printed A. D., 1620, just before his fall. He styled it, in allusion to the common designation of the works of Aristotle already spoken of, the Novum Organum. The design of it was to describe the mode in which the investigation of nature may be pursued. This was the second part of a comprehensive design to renovate the philosophy of the age by pointing out the true mode of interpreting nature, and giving illustrations of its practicability, the whole of which he called the "Instauratio Magna."

The point, however, now in hand, does not lead us to discourse on Bacon in himself considered, or to speak of his works in any detail. We have simply to look at him as a part of the Environment of Spinoza. To this end it is necessary to call attention to the modern historical starting point of two opposing systems of philosophizing, that is to
say, methods of investigating truth, which for the last two and a half centuries have divided the labors of the scientific world.

At the head of the one system stands the name of Francis Bacon, Baron Verulam and Viscount St. Albans. At the head of the other stands an equally illustrious name, to which attention must be directed hereafter.

§ 4. Defect of the syllogism.

For the object now before us, it will be sufficient to present a few of the aphorisms of the Novum Organum, which exhibit in the most general and striking manner the great principles of his method of interrogating nature, a term under which Bacon groups and includes all possible truth knowable by man.

This will form a sufficient basis for the comparison proposed to be made between the two systems of investigating truth to be considered in the following lectures.

In the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth aphorisms of the first book of the Novum Organum, he shows the inadequacy of the existing logic to the construction of science. "It is much more likely," he says, "to confirm and harden vulgar errors than to aid in the investigation of truth. It is, therefore, rather injurious than useful." "The syllogism," says he, "is not applicable to the principles of the sciences, and it is employed in vain upon intermediate axioms, since it is by no means equal to the subtility of nature. It therefore constrains consent without touching the subject matter. Again: The syllogism consists of propositions; propositions consist of words; and words are the counters of notions. If, therefore, the notions themselves, which form the subject matter are confused, or are not legitimately abstracted from the things to which they belong, there can be no solidity in the superstructure which we rear. Our only hope, therefore, lies in true induction."

Here, in the fourteenth aphorism, occurs for the first time the term, which is in fact the watchword of the Baconian method. What he intends by "intermediate ax-
ioms” is clearly indicated, and his whole method, in contrast with that then in common use, is distinctly and beautifully epitomized in the nineteenth aphorism of the same book, thus:


“There are but two methods, actual or possible, of investigating and arriving at truth. The one, starting from sense, and from particulars, leaps at once bound to the most general axioms (adeolat ad axiomata maxime generalia). Regarding these as principles whose truth is firmly established, it proceeds to judge and invent intermediate axioms. This is the method in common use. The other, starting from sense and particulars, establishes axioms by cautiously ascending, step by step, until it reaches those which are most general. This is the true method, but as yet untried.”

Again, in the twenty-second aphorism we have this language: “Each method takes its rise from sense and in particulars, and rests in the most general propositions. But there is an immense difference between them. The one skims superficially over experience and particulars; the other employs them in a proper and orderly manner. The one again, in the outset establishes certain general, abstract, and useless principles; the other rises step by step to those principles, whose truth is recognized by nature herself.”

Many other aphorisms might be quoted in which the difference between the two methods is set forth and placed in different points of view. In book first, aphorism one hundred and four, after showing how strong the natural tendency of the intellect is (a tendency which he thinks has been increased by the use of the syllogism), to leap at once to the most general principles by the former vicious and illicit method of philosophizing, he uses the following language, which at once shows the entire confidence he had in his own method, and exhibits very clearly what that method is:

“We may then at length cherish a good hope for science, when by a genuine flight of stairs, by successive steps, none being intermitted, no hiatus left, we ascend from par-
ticulars to the lower axioms, thence to the middle ones, thence one after another to the higher, and finally reach the most general."

The comparison, it will be seen, is to the act of ascending a ladder, or stairway. Each successive step is a new generalization, to which he gives the name of minor, intermediate, higher axioms, by passing cautiously and continuously through which, none being omitted, no rounds of the ladder left out, we at length reach the top in safety, which is the highest generalization, the ultimate principle of the science which we are laboring to construct.


Here, then, it will be perceived we have, in substance, the entire principle of the Baconian method of investigating truth. If we seek a practical illustration of its substantial correctness, it may be found in any one star of that splendid constellation of sciences, which the last two and a half centuries have given to the world.

That this procedure to a certain extent existed before the days of Bacon, is most certain, and to it, as it exists in its crude state, and in the natural promptings of the mind, the world was indebted for all the real science, which it possessed when Verulam appeared as the reformer of philosophizing, and presented the principles of the "Great Instauration."

§ 7. Bacon’s merits touching induction.

To Bacon, then, we are indebted, not for the procedure itself, but for its erection into a method; for clearing it entirely from other and illegitimate modes of interrogating nature, and putting it into the hands of men as a distinct and intelligible clew, with laws tolerably defined, to guide their future explorations in science. And it is certainly not impossible that even in this, the services of the English philosopher may have been by some overrated.

It has often been observed, that no great movement among mankind takes place, no great discovery is made, until the world is prepared for it by a train of causes,
which operate far too widely to be confined to a single individual. It has well been said that by the early observer the light of the morning may be seen fringing the crests of the mountains, and kindling the eastern clouds long before the king of day appears above the horizon, pours his beams upon the sluggards in the valleys, and wakes the whole world from its slumbers.

That a general dissatisfaction was felt, and had for some time been felt among the foremost intellects of Europe with the old mode of philosophizing, and that some of them had begun almost unconsciously to adopt a better method, may be distinctly seen in the history of astronomical science. The great astronomer of Thorn, Nicholas Copernicus, standing upon those "media axiomata" of that science, which had been previously reached; the position, namely, that by the nature of motion, the apparent motion would be the same, whether the heavens or the earth have a diurnal revolution; the hypothesis of Appolonius Pergaeus, who made the superior as well as the inferior planets revolve around the sun, whilst the sun and moon revolve around the earth as a center; by one of those royal flights of mind, which Bacon calls "anticipaciones naturae," he conjectured the sun to be immovable in the centre of the universe. Aware, however, that conjecture is not science, he returned to his original point of view, constructed a quadrant with movable radii, and also a parallactic instrument, and, making with these an immense number of observations, he established the substantial correctness of the Heliocentric Theory of the Solar Universe.

All this happened before the birth of Bacon, for Copernicus died in A.D. 1543, seventeen years before that event. And in the very age of Bacon himself, Kepler and his friend Galileo succeeded in making those additions to science by which they placed their own,

"Among the few, the immortal names,
Which were not born to die,"

and probably without aid from the English philosopher, but after all by employing essentially the same method. The Novum Organum, it will be remembered, was first
published in A. D. 1620, whilst Holy Church was brandishing her thunderbolt over the head of the Pisan philosopher as early as A. D. 1634.

With the later history of this science every school-boy is familiar, and knows how speedily, with the Baconian clew firmly grasped in his hand, Newton rushed up through all the intermediate rounds of the ladder, and, standing alone upon its summit, proclaimed to the world its ultimate principle, the theory of Universal Gravitation.

§ 8. Is this method of universal applicability?

There are many points concerning the Baconian method which can not here be discussed. One is the question of its universal applicability, and especially its applicability to the construction of a science of mind. It is certainly true, that the first and most successful application of the method was to the physical sciences. And the zeal which Bacon felt for the promotion of these, caused him to occupy himself very much about them, and even tinged the language which he employs in describing his method. To this circumstance, perhaps, is to be attributed the fact that the Baconian method has been so generally denominated the Baconian empiricism, or the empirical system, and that some have sneered at it as worthless for any purpose, except the mere colligation of the facts of external nature. Nothing, however, can be clearer to the reader of Bacon than that he regarded his method as of universal applicability. The very first aphorism of the Novum Organum proclaims this, for it asserts that man knows and can know only what he has observed, whether in the dominion of matter or of mind (re vel mente). Nothing is clearer, as Whewell has expressed it, than that he took firm hold of both the handles of science, the ideal as well as the physical. Indeed, in one of his aphorisms he speaks of Plato, the very corypheus of ancient idealism, as the only one among the ancient philosophers who had made even a partial use of true and legitimate induction. This he did in constructing his definitions.

In conclusion, it may be stated that, five years after his fall, which, notwithstanding the heavy cloud that rested upon him deeply affecting both his health and spirits, were spent in the diligent prosecution of his philosophical labors, he died at Highgate, near London, from the effect, it is said, of some incautious experiments upon the preservation of dead bodies. His death occurred in the year A.D. 1626, at the age of sixty-five.

CHAPTER II.

Bacon's System—continued.

§ 1. Methodology.

In the last chapter attention was directed to the services of Bacon as the great modern reformer of philosophy. These services, however, assumed the form not so much of contributions to the actual amount of human knowledge, as of a system of propædeutics, teaching mankind the true principles of philosophizing, that is to say, of investigating truth. How much higher this service was to the cause of truth and human progress than any addition which a single life could have made to the stores of human knowledge, will be evident to any one who will take pains to compare in detail the extent of man's empire of knowledge to-day, with the boundaries of that empire at the inauguration of the Inductive Method of investigating truth.

§ 2. Value of the ancient sciences.

In aphorisms 71 to 73 of the first book of the Novum Organum, Bacon weighs the contributions of the ancient philosophies to the happiness of man, and, testing them by the standard of the New Testament, "by their fruits ye shall know them," he passes a very severe judgment upon their worth.
"The sciences which we possess," says he, "have been principally derived from the Greeks; for the additions from the Roman, Arabic, and modern writers are but few, and of small importance, and, such as they are, they are founded upon the basis of Greek invention.

"But the wisdom of the Greeks was professional and disputatious, and thus most adverse to the investigation of truth. The name of sophists, therefore, which the contemptuous spirit of those who deemed themselves philosophers rejected, and transferred to the rhetoricians, Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, Polus, might well suit the whole tribe, such as Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Epicurus, Theophrastus, and their successors, Chrysippus, Carneades, and the rest. There was only this difference between them, that the former were mercenary vagabonds, traveling about to different states, making a show of their wisdom, and requiring pay; the latter more dignified and noble, in possession of fixed habitations, opening schools, and teaching philosophy gratuitously."

This judgment of Bacon upon the ancient philosophies has been confirmed by other keen-sighted students of history.

"Socrates," says Sharon Turner, "loved victory as well as truth; he sought to confute, as well as to instruct; a subtle distinction was as valuable in his eyes as a sound judgment; he preferred debate to observation, logic to knowledge." "His acute method of confuting an adversary was refined by Plato; and Aristotle, transcending both in logical acuteness, invented systems and forms of intellectual debate, which have given weapons to the subtilizing talents of every sect. His works were long buried, but his spirit was in the world, and filled Greece with wranglers, with contending systems, and everlasting controversy. An electric activity became the character of the Grecian mind; but it was restlessness without produce. Agitated by eternal debate, never ending but in skepticism that mocked all moral principle, or in a keener resolution to resume the weaupen and re-fight the battle, the Grecian
lost the tact for the appreciation of either moral or physical truth, and both the ability and the wish to acquire it."

In a note to this text he remarks: "The three hundred opinions on happiness, which the Grecian schools maintained, are a sufficient elucidation of their love of useless and endless disputation. Perhaps the best account, in the fewest words, of the absurd and contradictory opinions of the Greek philosophers, even the greatest, on the awful subject of the Deity, and of the gross inconsistencies even of Aristotle, is in the sketch drawn by Velleius, in Cicero's *De Nat. Deorum*. These opinions he truly calls: "Non philosophorum judicia, sed derelictum somnia."†

Much to the same purpose Macaulay, commenting upon the aphorisms of the *Novum Organum*, remarks: "We are forced to say, with Bacon, that the celebrated philosophy (of Socrates and Plato), ended in nothing but disputation." And, borrowing and beautifying a figure from Bacon, he adds: "that it was neither a vineyard nor an olive-ground, but an intricate wood of briers and thistles, from which those who lost themselves in it brought back many scratches and no food." And again: "The ancient philosophy was a tread-mill, and not a path. It was made up of revolving questions; of controversies, which were always beginning again. It was a contrivance for having much exertion and no progress. . . . It might, indeed, sharpen and invigorate the minds of those who devoted themselves to it; and so might the disputes of the orthodox Lilliputians and the heretical Blefuscuadians about the big ends and little ends of eggs."

If these remarks are true, or if they at all approach the truth touching the contributions of the ancient philosophies to the well-being of man, it need not be said they place those philosophies in most striking contrast with that system of philosophizing which we are now considering.

*Sharon Turner's History of England—Middle Ages—Book vi., chapter 1; the whole chapter should be carefully studied.
The watchword of this system is Induction; and induction, as we have seen, travels upward from particulars to generals. The scientific representation of the inductive illation by symbols, like those of algebra, or of the deductive inference of the Aristotelic system, requires a distinct and peculiar logic. To what a degree of perfection this logic of induction has been carried in the distinction between formal and material induction, the one necessitated by the laws of pure thinking, the other dependent for the legitimation of its validity upon other principles, principles entirely distinct from the laws of pure thinking, is well known to the students of the works of Sir William Hamilton, and his disciples. His doctrine of the necessity of the quantification of the predicate, for the construction of the pure or formal Inductive Syllogism, is the fruit of his attempt to produce a syllogism which should represent the laws of pure thinking. To consider this logic here, would be an anachronism. Of course, it was not dreamed of by Bacon; for he detested the logic even of Aristotle. The only inductive illation of Bacon was the inference ex vi materiae; and its validity depended upon principles entirely distinct from the laws of pure thinking. We come, then, to these other principles, for these are the very principles intended to be developed in the Novum Organum. What are they?

At this point, it is necessary that we should guard ourselves against demanding or expecting too much; against anticipating a precision and definiteness of method which the nature of the case forbids. Let it be remembered that we are without the bounds of pure and formal thinking, as in algebra and geometry. Some one has suggested, as a characteristic of the finite reason, “the liability to make mistakes.” This characteristic of the human mind, which is said by some to belong neither to the absolute reason, nor to the form of the brute mind, to instinct, no “guide to reasoning” can erase from our minds. Bacon, indeed, imagined that he had produced a method, which would reduce the difference in human intellects to zero. But Macaulay has justly remarked that, though his philosophy has
flourished for more than two centuries, "the interval between a man of talents and a dunce is as wide as ever."

§ 3. Divisions of the Novum Organum.

The Novum Organum consists of two books. The first is occupied with preliminary statements; with outline sketches of his system; and with a description of the temptations and tendencies of the mind which seduce it from the right path in its search after truth. Macaulay pronounces this book to be the greatest of Bacon's works. It will be profitable, in addition to the quotations which have already been made from it, to dwell upon it a little longer, that we may obtain a clear idea of the view which a mind like Bacon's entertains of the causes which are most apt to lead men astray in the investigation of truth. These causes of error, and tendencies to it, whether subjective or objective, he quaintly styles Idola, idols. He arranges them in four great classes, to each of which he gives a name, drawn from conceits equally fanciful. Let us place these classes before us, in their order:

I. The idols of the Tribe.
II. The idols of the Den.
III. The idols of the Market.
IV. The idols of the Theater.

We will now endeavor to obtain his general idea of them, by considering them briefly in this order.

§ 4. The first class of idols.

I. THE IDOLS OF THE TRIBE.

By the term, tribe, Bacon means race. And the idols of the tribe are those causes of error which are inherent in human nature itself; in the race of mankind. The human understanding is a false standard of the truth of things, and Bacon compares it to those distorted mirrors which project their own inequalities into the objects which they represent. The considerable variety of these causes is discussed in aphorisms forty-fifth to fifty-second inclusive. The more important are the following:
(1.) The tendency to imagine order even where it does not exist, or to a degree in which it does not exist. Bacon cites, in illustration, the original astronomic fiction of perfect circles for the orbits of the heavenly bodies. But we may easily find illustrations of the same tendency in every field of human observation. When a child has learned a general law of construction in his native tongue for a class of words, his tendency is to bring every thing to it, to make irregulars regular. He prefers to say fighted for fought, and sheeps for sheep. In religious matters, an orthodox Christian might easily find an illustration in the doctrines of naturalism, and say, the grown up children who maintain these doctrines insist that, because the Creator in a multitude of instances has ordered the sequences of nature in a particular way, he must so order them in all possible cases. There shall be no departure from them for any purpose however important. There must be an absolute, unbroken uniformity of the law. Nature has pledged itself to this uniformity of sequence.

(2.) The tendency of human nature, after having assumed a position, to force every thing to its support. To one who gives himself up to this spirit, to the worship of this idol, opposite instances are either entirely overlooked, or are forced to speak an unnatural language. In illustrating this tendency in human nature, Bacon remarks: It was well answered by him, who in a temple was pointed to the votive tablets of those who had escaped peril by shipwreck and otherwise, and was pressed to recognize these tablets as proofs of the interposition of the gods; “but where are the portraits of those who have perished in spite of their vows?” Whoever wishes to witness the literal correctness of this illustration in the nineteenth century, should visit the abbey of Einsiedlen, in Switzerland, and carefully inspect the votive tablets hung up in honor of the divine interposition in similar dangers, of the Black Virgin of the Holy Meinrad.

This is the idol of superstition. It is its household god. A few accidental instances of a particular sequence are observed. A generalization is made. This generalization is
regarded now as a fixed law, which every new instance confirms, whilst the eyes are blinded to all contradictory cases. Who likes first to spy the crescent moon over his left shoulder? Any of our popular superstitions will illustrate the tendency. Friday is an unlucky day. Can any one doubt it? Who wishes to be married on Friday? Forty years ago, Capt. De P. was the genial and favorite master of one of the European clipper packets of that day, and will be well remembered by the old citizens of New York. In October, 1836, in a long and stormy voyage to Liverpool, he beguiled the tedium of the passage by manifold spicy anecdotes, exhibiting all the generous impulses and stubborn prejudices of a genuine son of Neptune.

"Gentlemen, land-lubbers," said he, "you laugh at us sailors for our superstition about sailing on Friday. Let me tell you a fact. Mr. —, a shipbuilder of S., determined to explode the superstition and drive it from the sea. He drew the plan of a ship on Friday. He laid her keel on Friday. He launched and christened her on Friday. He finished her on Friday. She set sail on Friday, and, gentlemen, land-lubbers, she was wrecked on Friday."

This is the idol of medical quackery. A thousand instances of the failure of a panacea go for nothing with the victims of medical empiricism.

"How merrily we live that doctors be;
We humbug the patient and pocket the fee."

The understanding is more struck by affirmatives than by negatives, whereas, Bacon affirms that in testing an axiom, that is, a law, the negative instance is more important.

This is the idol of system-builders, whether natural, ethical, or religious. The law, or colligating idea flashes upon the mind from the observation of only a few instances. Some minds are very ready in catching at similarities on which generalizations may be constructed. It amounts sometimes to genius. But the tendency complained of, is that such minds have a disposition to ignore or to warp all conflicting instances. These "anticipations of nature," as Bacon calls them, are to be watched, lest
they convert themselves into idols. It is this danger to which Newton refers when he says:

"Hypotheses non fingo."

It is this tendency to which Victor Cousin refers when he complains that Locke has corrupted all metaphysics at its source, by reducing all infinite and absolute conceptions to his theory of sensation and reflection. And the critics of Victor Cousin may complain that the eclectic philosopher himself has not escaped this very tendency in many of his speculations concerning God, and the impersonality of the reason.

(8.) The human mind is not a dry light (lumen siccum). It borrows a hue from the feelings, from hope, fear, arrogance, pride, and the rest. We hope a certain position may be true, and we lend a favoring ear to all the instances which tend to confirm it. We are inclined to close our ears to all that can be said against it. This is the idol of the projector and castle-builder. He forms an impossible plan. He hopes it may succeed. He catches at every appearance which favors it. He shuts his eyes to every adverse possibility. Experience melts his fanciful frost-work, and shows that it was a dream. How many millenarian days of doom have come and gone in the history of the church.

This is the idol of the spendthrift debtor. He sees this and that possibility of possessing the means of payment. What is possible and desired he believes to be certain. He ventures, and is ruined. This is the idol of the gambler.

In short, Bacon remarks, that the feelings imbue and corrupt the understanding in innumerable and sometimes in imperceptible ways.

(4.) One of the greatest causes of error is found in the dullness and alleged incompetency of the senses. We are inclined to believe in the immediate impression instead of the remote truth, in the external and phenomenal rather than the internal and real. We seem to see the sun revolve around the earth. How many ages did it take to cure the race of that fiction of the senses? This is the idol of the
sensualist. The senses bring a pleasant report. The externals of the object appear to be good. It is seized and appropriated as such. Experience reveals the hidden poison and proves that some things which the senses pronounce good, "at the end may bite like a serpent, and sting like an adder." It is, however, strictly speaking, wrong to charge these errors to the senses, as will be shown in discussing the system of Descartes.

Such are perhaps the most important forms of the Idols of the Tribe.

§ 5. The second class of Idols.

II. THE IDOLS OF THE DEN.

The readers of the Republic of Plato will remember that the seventh book opens with a beautiful simile, illustrating the condition of men in acquiring knowledge. He compares it to the condition of captives in a cave (specus). They are confined so that they can look, but in one direction—forward. Behind them is a fire, and between themselves and the fire pass various objects, as men and animals, whose shadows are projected before the captives, and their voices are returned in an echo from the opposite side of the cavern. Their senses, therefore, take cognizance of no realities, but only of shadows and echoes. That this is the source from which Bacon derived the hint for his "idols of the den or cave," seems not improbable since the idea intended to be conveyed is very nearly identical. To borrow a word from the modern nomenclature of the Kantian philosophy; men do not immediately attain pure "objective" truth. They see only the shadows of it, not now from the condition of the whole race, of the tribe, as Bacon expresses it, but also from personal idiosyncrasies, springing from physical or intellectual temperament, education, habit or accident. The principle idols of the den, or hindrances in the investigation of truth arising from such causes, are the following:

(1.) Some predominant pursuit. The case which Bacon cites in illustration of this form of the idols of the den, is that of Aristotle. Logic was the favorite science of Aris-
tote, and Bacon asserts that he made natural history entirely subservient to logic, and thus rendered it disputatious. And beyond peradventure this was a marked characteristic of the disciples of Aristotle during the long period of the ascendency of his name in the schools of Europe. But we may, perhaps, find more modern illustrations of Bacon's idea.

It has been remarked of the "Cosmos" of the celebrated scientist, Humboldt, that the book contains no mention of the name of God. And an American gentleman, who visited the illustrious German a short time before his death, relates as a fact, that in the course of his interview, the author of Cosmos remarked to him with the greatest apparent naïveté, that he had no talent for religion! What a conception of religion! He had apparently no objection to it, but it did not lie in his department of investigation. How then is this to be accounted for? The difficulty seems to have been that he had worshiped so long his peculiar idol of the den, that nothing else could command his interest and attention.

Again it is well known that an exclusive attention to mathematical pursuits tends to disqualify the mind for the ready perception of truth in moral, that is to say, probable reasoning, and in practical affairs. "Quod erat demonstrandum," the mathematical formula of an inference in reasoning alone could meet the demands of Spinoza's mind in a logical sequence. Bonaparte made La Place, the celebrated author of the Mecanique Celeste, his minister of finance, but finding that his mathematics did not serve him in judging of questions of political economy, at the end of six weeks dismissed him to his starry contemplations.

It has been said that the study of anatomy and surgery has a tendency to produce skepticism. In certain circumstances this may be true, and may also furnish an illustration of the den-idolatry. Let a man accustom himself to look at the human being as a mere physical organism; to trace up the origin of life to a merely physical cause, as for instance to the chemical antagonism of endosmose and exosmose, when placed on opposite sides of a membranous
tissue and it is not difficult to see how this peculiar and constant pursuit may at length blind the mind to the proofs of a higher and a spiritual origin of life; thus converting the worshiper of this idol into a materialist.

(2.) Excess in Synthesis and Analysis.—Under this head Bacon remarks that one of the most marked distinctions in men’s minds is that some are more inclined to mark the differences of things, and others their resemblances. Each class, he says, readily falls into error by catching at too nice distinctions, or at the mere shadows of resemblance. He furnishes no illustrations. Very striking illustrations of his thought however may be found in what are called arguments from analogy. Bishop Whately has warned us against the error of imagining that things are alike in themselves because they are alike in their relations to other things, and again against the mistake of supposing the resemblance in analogy extends further than it really does. Thus prudence not fraud is recommended in the parable of the unjust steward. Some years since a celebrated preacher of New England is reported to have said: “If I were as eloquent as the Holy Spirit I could convert souls as well as He.”

There are doubtless points of resemblance between the persuasive influence attributed in the new Testament to God’s Spirit, but dare we affirm them to be identical in kind?

(3.) Party zeal in favor of certain ages.—Some men are inclined to worship the past and some the future. The blind devotion to antiquity which can see nothing good in the present or in prospect, and the opposite spirit, which catches at every novelty, and regards with contempt “the wisdom of the ancients,” hinder alike the work of investigating truth. These idols must be abjured by the man who would arrive at truth, for she is found not in the accidents of time but in the eternal light of nature.

Though Bacon does not notice the fact in this connection, it has often been noticed and spoken of by others that the extremes of our rational life are much exposed to the adoration of this Janus-faced idol. The young man, however, will be likely to worship the one, the octogenarian the other.
"Laudator temporis acti,"

is noticed by Horace as one of the characteristics of age.

It would not be difficult in this country and in Great Britain, both in religious and civic life, both in church and state, to find abundant examples of the ultra conservatism and ultra progressiveness, which are alike condemned by the spirit of Bacon's aphorism.

(4.) The tendency of some minds is to dwell altogether on general and universal ideas; and the opposite tendency in others is to dwell exclusively upon particulars.

As an example of the latter tendency Bacon instances the school of the philosopher Leucippus, the author of the atomic theory of the universe. On the other hand, with this tendency to neglect the general structure and relations of the universe, and to become buried in the study of particulars, he contrasts the opposite tendency of other ancient philosophers to lose themselves in the vast and the general. He gives no examples, but his full ideas may find a fine illustration by turning to Plato's ideal philosopher in the Socratic Dialogue of Theatetus. Note for instance the passage where Socrates is represented as addressing Theodorus, thus: "Just, Theodorus, as a smart and witty Thracian servant girl is related to have joked Thales, when contemplating the stars and looking upward, he fell into a well, that he was anxious to know what was going on in Heaven but forgot to notice what was before him and at his feet. The same joke is applicable to all who devote themselves to philosophy, for in reality such a one is ignorant about his near neighbor, not only what he is doing but almost whether he is a man or some other animal. But what man is and what such a nature must do and suffer beyond others, this he inquires, and takes pains to investigate."

* With this, one may well compare a passage in the first volume of Dugald Stewart's Elements of Philosophy, on the principles of a philosophical memory, and its effect upon conversational power and business tact. It is said that Newton always reproduced his own doctrines with

some hesitation and difficulty. His memory was philosophical.

Both these extremes are to be avoided. Our generalization will be worthless without a sufficient basis of individual facts, and individual facts will be of little value unless they lead to general principles.

§ 6. The Third Class of Idols.

III. The Idols of the Market.

These are causes of error resulting from the intercourse of men with one another, and hence the fancy of calling them the idols of the forum or the market. To carry out the fancy we may say that the intellectual capital in which men trade consists of ideas; and as words are the representatives of ideas they constitute the circulating medium of the intellectual world. Now in this world of intellect, as well as in that of commerce, our circulating medium is liable to become spurious, or in other ways deranged and corrupted. Words impose upon us for the most in one of two ways:

(1.) Sometimes they are made the names of things which have no real existence. Take as an example the word will used as a substantive. It would perhaps be not a little startling to some persons who have waded through long and subtle discussions on the nature, the powers, the laws, the freedom, the necessity of the human will, to be suddenly and bluntly informed that there is absolutely no such thing as the human will. Yet this assertion is nothing but simple truth, perhaps a little roughly stated. The word is nothing but a generalization indicating certain modes of the mind's action. Regarded as an actual existence it is as much a creature of poetry and personification as the Caliban of Shakespeare or the Spectre of Camoens. It is not to be doubted that this circumstance has contributed not a little to perplex the problem of human freedom, of the so-called necessity or autonomy of the will. It is a very striking remark of Victor Cousin that language is a poet as well as an analyst; and its poetic power, clothing as it can any conception or generalization to which it has given a name
with the attributes of a real existence, has a well-nigh irresistible tendency to corrupt and bias the understanding. In philosophy such words as the *infinite* and the *absolute* may be cited as additional examples of this idol. The inclination of some philosophers, having given a name to these conceptions, is to talk and reason and feel about them precisely as if they were actually existing entities.

(2.) Words again often impose upon us by representing "vicious and unskilful abstractions." The word which Bacon cites as an example of this is the word *moist*. This word, he says, is only a confused sign of different actions, admitting no settled uniformity. In philosophy, in theology and even in common life we can hardly go amiss in seeking illustrations of this idol.

In philosophy proper, striking examples may be found in Hamilton's exposure of the manifold ambiguities to be found even in the chief terms employed. He refers to the six-fold ambiguity of the word *intuition*; to the two-fold ambiguity of the word *absolute*; to the wavering significations of such terms as *reason*, *conception*, *perception* and the like. We may find a kindred illustration in Locke's account of the occasion of writing his Essay. He observed namely that men misunderstood each other and spoke at cross purposes because they attached different significations to words.

In theology and religion we may find examples in the indistinct and vacillating sense of such words as these: *regeneration*, *atonement*, *election*, *ability*, *person*, *one*, *possibility*, and the like. Bishop Whately has done excellent service, alike to philosophy and to religion, by his exposure of the ambiguities lurking in some of these, and in many other similar terms in Appendix I of his treatise on Logic.*

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*See Appendix I to this volume. We have a remarkable illustration of the exceeding difficulty of escaping from the dominion of this class of idols, in a recent discussion between two of the most eminent religious philosophers of our country. The subject in debate is Eudemonism as a theory of Christian Ethics. The debaters were the Rev. Dr. McCosh, of Princeton, and the Rev. Dr. Hopkins, of Williams College. Both these eminent and highly cultured men, distinguished...*
The remedy usually proposed for errors resulting from the ambiguity and indistinctness of words is close definition. And doubtless this is of great importance not only in the investigation, but also in the communication of truth. Victor Cousin has shown that the tendency of Locke and his school was to find all error in this quarter, and hence to reduce all the disputes of men to mere logomachy. A clear and beautiful demonstration of the incorrectness of this doctrine, when carried to this extent, will be found near the close of the twentieth lecture of his history of philosophy. When words represent indistinct and vacillating ideas, they will themselves be indistinct and vacillating in sense. If we wish to reform an imperfect science and to banish disputes concerning it, our only resource is philosophy. To cite the illustration of Cousin, we cannot reform the science of Medicine by reconstructing medical language. We must go behind that, and reform the vicious observations and experiments on which the so-called science is founded. A good system of signs will come spontaneously when this is done, and it would be useless without it.

Still the study of words, even as at present representing ideas, is a matter of the utmost importance to the man of science. With very especial emphasis may this be asserted of the advocates of the scientific claims of Christian theology. The very first word is here drawn in question, the definition of the word science and scientific. The general claim of Christian theologians puts the interpretation of the Christian Scriptures in direct comparison with the interpretation of the facts of external nature, the latter bear-

 alike for erudition and for philosophical insight, were keenly alive to the deceptive and seductive power of the idols of the market, for they often refer to the "amphiboly" of words, yet at the close of the whole discussion we have this remarkable statement from Dr. Hopkins: "The points involved in the discussion seem to me to be simple and luminous. Most of the difficulty in making them appear so to others arises from the imperfection of language. This has seemed to me so great that for years I was deterred from attempting any thing. I saw so much on these subjects of mere logomachy. This has been a difficulty between Dr. McCosh and myself. We evidently do not always attach the same shade of meaning to the same word."
ing the designation of the works of God, the former, that of the word of God. The great laws of interpretation apply equally to both. But as the special field of observation to the Christian theologian is the Christian Scriptures, the study of language, and especially of the original languages of his sacred books becomes to him an indispensable part of his professional duty. Exegesis is to be his watchword. It follows that no books should find a more prominent place on the table of a Christian theologian, than lexicons, and books throwing light upon the laws of language, and especially upon the peculiar idioms and difficulties of Biblical language. As, moreover, in case of theological controversy, the final appeal is always to the original Scriptures, no one should consider himself as qualified to engage in it who has not a competent knowledge of the Hebrew, Chaldaic, and Greek languages and dialects; and in general, since the "meaning of the Bible is the Bible," may it not be affirmed that those classes of books should hold the chief places of honor on the theologian's table, which afford the best helps, in ascertaining not the sense which may by possibility be attached to the words of the original Scriptures, but the sense which the writers actually intended to attach to them?

CHAPTER III.

BACON'S SYSTEM—CONCLUDED.

In the endeavor to present a brief analysis of the principles of the Novum Organum, the chief causes of error in investigating truth have been indicated as contained in the first three classes of idols. We come now to the fourth.

§ 1. The fourth class of Idols.

IV. THE IDOLS OF THE THEATER.

The idols of the theater are the errors which spring from philosophical theories. In his forty-fourth aphorism, Ba-
con assigns as the reason for this designation, that he regards all the systems of philosophy current down to his day only as so many plays brought on to the stage, and creating fictitious and theatrical worlds. It is in fact as easy a matter to construct a new system of philosophy, as it is to build a new theory of the solar heavens from the phenomena of the sky. Let a man assume the earth as the center of the planetary motions, and he will have one system of philosophical astronomy, with much to support it. It is an easy matter to call this scheme a science, especially as it contains many particular truths. Let another assume the planet Jupiter in like manner as his center. He will have another system. The sun will yield a third. One of the pleiads a fourth, and so on ad infinitum. It is precisely the same in philosophy proper. Think of the ancient philosophies of the universe crystallizing around the element of water (Thales); fire (Heraclitus); discord and concord (Empedocles); atoms (Leucippus), and the rest. False philosophies Bacon distributes into three species as follows:

(1.) The sophist. The sophist forms the basis of his theory on a few common examples taken from experience, but relies mainly upon his ingenuity and wit for the superstructure. Here once more Aristotle is his example, whose battle-field he says, is the categories; whose weapon is logic, and who drags experiment along as a captive to grace a triumph over truth already accomplished.

(2.) The empiric. The empiric forms his system on a few examples, strict it may be, yet narrow, far narrower than the nature of the subject, and hence he produces monstrous and foolish dogmas. Nobody is more severe than Bacon himself upon that abuse of experiment which has been pointed out for the purpose of stigmatizing his philosophical methods. He cites the alchemists as an illustration of empiricism suited to his day. Upon us illustrations swarm in the pseudo and semi-philosophical speculations of more modern times. Mesmerism, craniology, phrenology, biology, spiritualism, are the verbal signs of half developed
scientific theories, which will doubtless occur to many as examples in point. Macay's work on Popular Delusions will furnish others. In a footnote of Montagu's translation of Bacon, reference is made to the Vulcanist and Neptunian theories of geology.

(3.) The superstitious. The superstitious species is composed of those philosophies which weave theological superstitions into the web of their systems. Bacon says we may find superstition in its grosser forms in the case of Pythagoras, and in a most subtle and refined form, in the philosophy of Plato. It would be no violation of the spirit of Bacon's opinion, if we should add as further illustrations of superstitious philosophies, the various forms of Platonizing philosophies, of which Germany for the last century has been the chief theater. The history of these philosophies as presented by Chalybaeus and Morell demonstrates the fact that the chief speculations relate to God. That these theological speculations can not all be true is absolutely certain, for they devour one another. And when human speculation undertakes to exercise its architectonic ingenuity upon a subject so awful as the existence and nature of the Deity, we may well echo the sentiment of Bacon touching the superstitious form of philosophy. "Against it we must use the greatest caution, for the apotheosis of error is the greatest evil of all, and when folly is worshiped, it is, as it were, the plague-spot of the understanding."

§ 2. Introductory to the Second Book of the Novum Organum.

In looking particularly at the structure of the Novum Organum, we have thus far been engaged in examining Bacon's classification of the various causes of error in investigating truth, found in the first book of that work. We turn now to the second book for a like brief analysis of his principles and method of procedure in the direct business of this investigation. First of all, it will be needful to examine carefully his peculiar terminology. He begins with the two preliminary remarks that the object of investigation is the increase of knowledge, and that true
knowledge is deduced from causes. The word knowledge he apparently uses in the same strict sense in which he employs the words to know in the initial aphorism of the first book. But what now does he mean by cause? Let us consider his language. He says there is a fourfold division of causes, viz: matter, form, efficient cause, and final cause. Speculation concerning final causes, he declares, corrupts science. Speculations concerning efficient cause, and concerning matter, are superficial, and contribute little or nothing to real active knowledge. There remains then only that peculiar kind of cause commonly called form, to be investigated.

Form, in the sense which Bacon attaches to the word is law. Certain phenomena are presented to our observation. Now the law according to which these phenomena appear, is what is meant by the term form. And this in every case is the object of investigation. In one place Bacon expresses himself in regard to form thus: "The form of a thing is its very essence; and the thing differs from the form only as the apparent from the actual object." Let us suppose then that we are engaged in the investigation of some particular phenomenon. The example first presented by Bacon for the illustration of his method is heat. Heat is the observed phenomenon or fact to be investigated, and the point to be determined by the investigation is: "what is the form or law of heat, or in plain English, what is heat?" This is simply to ask to what genus of things, natures, or ideas does heat belong?

The first step to be taken is to collect at hazard all the instances we are able to find in which the phenomenon occurs. This catalogue we will designate as table number one, and call it as Bacon calls it:

§ 3. The first Table.

I. THE TABLE OF EXISTENCE OR PRESENCE.

As an example of the mode of proceeding, Bacon gives us a catalogue of twenty-eight instances in which the phenomenon of heat occurs. It would be tedious, and it is un-
necessary to give the whole. Take as a specimen the following cases:
1. Rays of the sun in summer and at noon.
2. The same reflected and condensed, as from walls and mirrors.
4. Burning lightning.
5. Eruption of flames from the earth.
6. Flame of every kind.
7. Ignited solids and the like.
It must be plain that the extent of this table will depend upon the character of the subject which we are investigating. Some subjects will require an immense number of such observations, and some only a very few.
The next step is to proceed to the formation of a table of instances from which the required phenomenon is absent. This table Bacon styles:

§ 4. The second Table.

II. THE TABLE OF ABSENCE OR OF REJECTIONS.

But now as the whole universe may be divided and exhausted by a negative, since every thing in it is either Cæsar or not Cæsar, it would be an endless labor to examine all the existences in which the required phenomenon does not occur. We are, therefore, to be guided in forming our table of rejections by keeping our eye fixed upon our table of existence already formed. We may thus arrange our negative instances under the affirmative, and this will often show the limitation of the former, and may help us to arrive at the true form or law of the phenomenon which we are investigating.

For instance, in investigating the form or law of heat, we may take as an example a few instances only.

1st Negative to 1st Affirmative.
The rays of the moon, stars and comets are not found warm to the touch.

2nd Neg. to 2nd Affirm.
Rays of the sun in the middle region of the air give no heat.
3rd Neg. to 2nd Affirm.
The reflection of the rays of the sun in polar regions is weak, and produces no heat.
9th Neg. to 4th Affirm.
Some coruscations emit light without burning, but are not accompanied by thunder.
11th Neg. to 6th Affirm.
The *ignis-fatua* is said to have but little heat. Flame is said to have been seen around the head and hair of boys and virgins; and it is not known what is the heat of the flame ancienly called Castor and Pollux, and by the moderns St. Ermus’s fire.

These may serve as specimens illustrating the manner of constructing the table of rejections or of absence. In investigating his particular example of heat, Bacon carries his negative instances to the number of thirty-two. The next step is to form:

§ 5. The third Table.

III. The Table of Degrees.

By this is meant a table of instances in which the given phenomenon is present in a greater or less degree. It was said before that the law or form of a thing is its very essence. Hence nothing can be a real form or law, which does not uniformly increase or diminish with the given nature or phenomena. In the present example, the phenomenon whose law is sought, is heat. In constructing the table of degrees, Bacon first cites a large number of instances in which the phenomenon, or as he terms it, *nature*, is present only potentially, not sensibly, as in the case of metals, sulphur, wood, plants, and the like. These are capable of developing heat in certain circumstances. He next enumerates many instances in which the phenomenon under examination is present to the touch. The lowest form is in animal bodies, admitting still of many degrees. Animals become warm by motion. Fever increases animal heat. Flame of vivid lightening is exceedingly hot. Motion increases heat, as is shown in the bellows and blow-pipe. The anvil becomes hot under the hammer. If an ignited
body has no room in which to move itself, the fire is extinguished.

This table of instances, in which the phenomenon is present in a greater or less degree, he carries up to the number of forty-one observations, which as before it will not be necessary for us to present.

Now these three tables having been formed, we have before us the elements of a real, practical induction. It will have been noticed how suggestive of experiment the attempt to form such tables will prove in all cases, where a phenomenon may be made more clear and distinct by removing obstacles; and also how strongly it will stimulate the faculties of observation.

The next object is to find the point of colligation. That is, we wish to find some common principle which is always present and absent when the given phenomenon is present and absent, and which increases with it. If we had attempted this from a mere affirmative table we should have rushed into wild theories. The power to recognize truth at once affirmatively, however it may belong to God and angels, does not belong to man. He must proceed by negations and exclusions. Hence in using these three tables we must proceed to construct another. This is:

§ 6. The fourth Table.

IV. THE TABLE OF REDUCED EXCLUSION.

This table is to be formed by reviewing the three tables already constructed. In the concrete form, in which phenomena present themselves, we are liable to mistake some concomitant and accidentally present element for the true law. The object of this table then is by a comparison of instances to reject these non-essential elements, and thus arrive at the residuum, which is the true cause or law sought. In presenting once more his example of heat under this table Bacon gives fourteen cases of exclusion. Four or five of them will answer our purpose.

1. The sun’s rays are warm; therefore exclude terrestrial nature. That is to say, earthy substance can not be a law of heat, because here is a case in which it exists in its absence.
2. Common fire is hot, so are subterranean fires, therefore reject celestial nature. That is to say, pure ether or the like can not be the law of heat, for here is a case which excludes it.

4. Iron ignited heats, without losing substance. Therefore reject importation of substance as a law of heat.

5 and 6. Water boils without light, and the moon shines without heat. Therefore reject light or flame as a law of heat.

14. On account of heat excited by friction reject principle nature. That is, reject any thing absolutely and positively existing uncaused by some preceding act.

This then is a specimen of the method by which, in reviewing the first three tables we rid ourselves of various things, which we might by possibility mistake for the required law or cause of the phenomenon. This table will not in all probability at first be perfect. It may require long observation and many experiments to make it so. Were it perfect we might proceed directly to the affirmative, with the certainty that the residuum would be the desired law. As we approach this perfection we may venture, subject to further rectification, to permit the mind to exert itself in finding the colligating principle. When we venture upon this affirmation we have reached an important stage in our work, which Bacon, in his usual fanciful manner, denominates the first vintage.

In the example under examination, Bacon considers himself as justified, from an inspection of the tables, in venturing upon the affirmation that the law of heat is motion.

Now if this induction is the true one, it follows that, in logical language, motion is the genus of heat. The idea is not that motion produces heat or heat motion, but that motion is the very essence of heat. Yet the two ideas are not identical in such a sense as to be perfectly convertible terms. One is a genus, the other is a species.

We are next then to proceed to another point: to the examination of what, in logical technics, is called the differentia of the two conceptions; that is, to those limitations of the genus which will make it convertible with the species,
or an exact definition of it. In the present example, from
the instances already cited, Bacon discovers four limita-
tions of the general idea of motion, necessary to bring it to
the form or law, or essence of heat.

1. The first is that heat is an expansive motion. The
body in which the phenomenon appears strives to occupy a
greater space than before.

2. It is an expansive motion, tending upward and outward.

3. It is not a uniform expansive motion of the whole,
but only of small particles of the body, in which the phe-

omenon appears.

4. This stimulating and penetrating motion is rapid,
never sluggish. Fire does its work quickly.

Having previously found the genus to which the phe-

nomenon under examination belongs, and having now dis-
covered the necessary limitations of that conception, we are
prepared to give a logical definition, which shall express
the true form or law, or essence of heat, thus:

"Heat is an expansive motion, tending upward and out-
ward, restrained and striving to exert itself in the smaller
particles of the body in which it appears."

Such are the leading steps in the method of practical
induction. If the process has in any given case been cor-
rectly performed, we have plainly reached a safe working
principle from which we may reason downward without
fear of error.

§ 7. Conclusion of the Novum Organum.

In the remaining portion of the second book of the
Novum Organum, Bacon treats of some remaining helps for
insuring a genuine induction. In some cases it will not be
necessary to go, at least to any length, into the minutiae of
the process which has been described. In some instances
the law of the phenomenon is so obvious that only an exam-
ple or two will be required to satisfy the observer. In
other cases there will be great uncertainty at the best, and
this history of the phenomenon will be found incomplete
and unsatisfactory.

In the remaining portion of the Novum Organum, Bacon
particularly describes, to the number of twenty-seven, certain kinds of instances, which, when a given phenomenon is under investigation, are of the highest moment, as tending to cut short the work and bring us rapidly to the goal. Such instances he denominates, in order, let us imagine, to mark their royal significance and value, prerogative instances. They can not, however, be considered here.

Before concluding, it seems only just that a word should be spoken touching Lord Macaulay’s estimate of the second book of the *Novum Organum*. In his brilliant and celebrated essay on Bacon, we find the following humorous illustration of the manner in which an unlettered man who never heard of the *Novum Organum* or its author, still necessarily philosophises after the method of the second book, and therefore proves the analysis of little or no value.

“We are not inclined to ascribe much practical value to the analysis of the inductive method which Bacon has given in the second book. It is indeed an elaborate and a correct analysis. But it is an analysis of that which we are all doing from morning to night, and which we continue to do, even in our dreams. A plain man finds his stomach out of order. He never heard Lord Bacon’s name. But he proceeds in the strictest conformity with the rules laid down in the second book of the *Novum Organum*, and satisfies himself that minced pies have done the mischief. ‘I ate minced pies on Monday and Wednesday, and I was kept awake by indigestion all night.’ This is the *comparentia ad intellectum instantiarum convenientium*. ‘I did not eat any on Tuesday and Friday, and I was quite well.’ This is the *comparentia instantiarum in proximo quae natura data privantur*. I ate very sparingly of them on Sunday, and was very slightly indisposed in the evening. But on Christmas day I almost dined on them, and was so ill that I was in some danger.’ This is the *comparentia instantiarum secundum magis et minus*. ‘It can not have been the brandy which I took with them. For I have drunk brandy daily for years without being the worse for it.’ This is the *rejectio naturarum*. Our invalid then proceeds to what is termed by Bacon *vindemiatio*, and pronounces that
minced pies do not agree with him. We repeat we dispute neither the ingenuity nor the accuracy of the theory contained in the second book of the *Novum Organum*; but we think that Bacon greatly overrated its utility. We conceive that the inductive process, like many other processes, is not likely to be better performed merely because men know how they perform it. William Tell would not have been one whit more likely to cleave the apple if he had known that his arrow would describe a parabola under the influence of the attraction of the earth.

We can not perceive that the study of grammar makes the smallest difference in the speech of people who have always lived in good society. Not one Londoner in ten thousand can lay down the rules for the proper use of *will* and *shall*. Yet not one Londoner in a million ever misplaces his *will* and *shall*. No man uses figures of speech with more propriety because he knows that one figure is called a metonymy and another a synecdoche. A drayman in a passion calls out, 'You are a pretty fellow,' without suspecting that he is uttering irony, and that irony is one of the four primary tropes.' Thus far Lord Macaulay, in estimating the value of the second book of the *Novum Organum*. The brilliancy of this criticism ought not to blind our eyes to its fallacy. In essence what is it but a plea for ignorance, and an abandonment of all intellectual culture? Such reasoning would compel us to cast our grammars and our arithmetics into the fire. Are not "plain men" constantly talking and communicating their ideas, who never looked into a grammar or even a spelling book? Did not a certain "plain man," whose wife taught him his letters, become president of the United States? Are not cobblers and market-women every day casting accounts according to the necessary relations of numbers who never heard of Pike, nor Adams, nor Thompson? The argument proves too much, and therefore proves nothing. If the aborigines of America wished to find their way from Niagara Falls to the Atlantic Ocean, they struck out into the pathless forests. If they were not waylaid and slain, and no other insuperable obstacle presented itself; if they
were not fatigued and led to abandon the undertaking; if they were not seduced from it to engage in something else; in a word if they reached the ocean they doubtless passed over the intermediate space. Was the journey then so easy, swift and pleasant, that we should do well to vacate our roads and break up our railways? The difference in the facilities for travel in our country now and at the period of the landing of the pilgrims is but a faint image of what the Baconian philosophy has done for mankind in facilitating the investigation of truth. The absurdity of reasoning like this has been admirably shown by Whately in reference to similar objections made against the study of logic. On the whole, however, Macaulay, though at the expense of a little self-inconsistency, does justice to the great genius of Bacon. "Some people may think the object of the Baconian philosophy a low object, but they can not deny that high or low it has been attained. They can not deny that every year makes addition to what Bacon called 'fruit.' They can not deny that mankind have made and are making progress in the road which he pointed out to them." As our present discussions have a primary reference to theological speculation, it will not be an impertinence to express the hope that the day may not be distant when theologians shall be better acquainted with its way-boards, and better aware of its tempting by-ways; shall learn to walk in it with fewer wanderings, and with more heedful and diligent steps.

ON THE MEANING OF THE WORD "INFINITE" IN THE ENGLISH AND HEBREW SCRIPTURES.

Those Christian philosophers who claim for Christian theology the character of a science, are wont to represent the Scriptures as presenting a field of investigation lying side by side with that of external nature. These two fields they designate severally as the word of God, and the works of God. The elements of the latter are the facts of nature correctly observed. The elements of the former are the facts of speech, that is, the words of the Holy Scriptures, in their genuine sense, for "the meaning of the Bible is the
Bible.” Who then is the true Christian philosopher? He is the true Biblical exegetist, the correct interpreter of the meaning of the language of the sacred Scriptures. In Dr. Shedd’s very able work on Homiletics and Pastoral Theology, we find the following clear and strong statement of the case:

“The thorough exegesis and comprehension of the written word of God endows the human mind with authority. ‘By what authority doest thou these things? And who gave thee this authority to do these things?’ was a question which the chief priests and the elders put to Jesus Christ. If it was a natural question for them to ask of the Son of God, it is certainly a natural question for the secular, and especially for the unbelieving world to ask of the Christian herald. By what right does a mortal man rise upon the rostrum, and make positive statements concerning the origin of the human race, the dark, mysterious beginnings of human history, the purposes and plans of the infinite mind, and conclude with announcing alternatives of eternal salvation and eternal damnation? With respect to these dark and difficult problems, all men stand upon a common level, if divine revelation is thrown out of the account.” · · · “By what title does a mere fraction of the equally rational and equally immortal masses that crowd this planet arrogate to itself the position of the tutor, and demand of the remaining majority to take the attitude of the pupil?” · · · “Unless christendom possesses a superior knowledge, it has no right to instruct heathendom; and, unless the Christian clergy are endowed with the authority of a special revelation, and can bring credentials therefor, they have no right to speak to their fellow men upon the subjects of human duty. The first and indispensable requisite, consequently, both in speculative theology, and in practical homiletics, is authority, and this authority must be found in a direct and special communication from the mind of God, or it can be found nowhere. Throw the Scriptures out of the account and the whole human race is upon a dead level.” Thus much by way of introduction.
Let us turn now to the definition of God as presented in the shorter catechism of the Westminster Symbol. The connection of this definition with the name of George Gillespie is well known. Assuming now, as the Scriptures assume it, the existence of God, what does the Westminster Symbol affirm concerning his attributes. "God is a spirit, infinite, eternal, unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." The first attribute named, is that of infinity. God then is infinite. But that word is obscure. What does it mean in this definition? Can Brahmanism inform us? Can Buddhism? Can Confucianism? Can Islamism? Shall we appeal to Socrates, or Plato? Or shunning all such authorities as heathen, shall we turn a listening ear to Bacon, to Descartes, to Kant, to Coleridge, to Hamilton, to Calderwood, to McCosh? These are great names. But according to Dr. Shedd, will they constitute a sufficient authority for the Christian theologian and the "Christian herald"?

Is it not plain that Christian theology when it claims authority for the soundness of its teachings must appeal always and only to the Christian Scriptures well understood. The question thus presented is this: What is the testimony of the Holy Scriptures to the true meaning of the word "infinite"? To the law and to the testimony. If we follow Bacon's method of constructing science, our first step will be to form a table of instances in which the word occurs. In fulfillment of this requirement we take the English concordance, and find (it may be to our surprise) that the word occurs but four times in our authorized version of the Scriptures.

We will first look at these passages in our version, and then analyze them in the original.

I. THE ENGLISH VERSION.

The four instances in which the word occurs are as follows:

1. Ps. 147:5. Great is our Lord, and of great power; his understanding is infinite.

2. Job 22:5. Is not thy wickedness great, and thine iniquities infinite?
8. Nah. 2:9. For there is none end of the store; but in the margin, "and their infinite store."

4. Nah. 3:9. Ethiopia and Egypt, her strength, and it was infinite.

We are endeavoring to ascertain the meaning of the word infinite in the Scriptures in its application to God. It appears then that of the four instances in which the word is used in our version, in only one has it any reference to the attributes of God. As, however, the final appeal must be always to the original languages of the Scriptures, we turn next to examine the original.

II. THE HEBREW ORIGINAL.

An examination of the Hebrew text develops the fact that there are two distinct phrases to which the translation infinite is given in our version, meaning severally, "without number," and "without end." It is found that these Hebrew phrases are used in a much larger number of instances than the word infinite, which represents them in the four instances already cited from the English version. Our field of observation will be thus very considerably enlarged, and an examination of the entire number of instances in which they are employed in the Scripture will leave us little room to question what is the genuine meaning which the sacred writers attached to the forms of speech, translated "infinite" in our version. A search has been made by a sharp-sighted Hebrew scholar for the "instances" in which these two phrases 'en mtspar = "without number," and en kets, sometimes also written 'en kets, = "without end," are found in the Hebrew text. The result is a table of instances for the former reaching the number of seventeen, and for the latter, a table of ten instances, thus enlarging our field of observation in the ratio of four to twenty-seven. The following analysis presents the instances in detail:

Table First.

\[ \text{Table First.} \]

\[ \text{Table First.} \]

\[ \text{Table First.} \]

1. Ps. 147:5. English version, "His understanding is infinite," i.e., Heb., without number. (See Ps. 40:5 for sense.)
The Hebrew words here rendered \textit{infinite} occur besides, in the following passages in application to the subjects here noted in connection with each reference:

2. Gen. 4:49. "for it (the corn gathered by Joseph) was \textit{without number} = \textit{infinite}.

3. Judg. 6:5. "for both they and their camels were \textit{without number} = \textit{infinite}.

4. Judg. 7:12. "and their camels were \textit{without number} = \textit{infinite}.

5. 1 Chron. 22:4. "and cedar trees in abundance;" Heb., \textit{without number} = \textit{infinite}.

6. 1 Chron. 22:16. "of the gold, the silver, and the brass, and the iron, there is no number" = \textit{without number} = \textit{infinite}.

7. 2 Chron. 12:13. "and the people were \textit{without number} = \textit{infinite}.

8*. Job 5:9. (Spoken of God). "Which doeth great things and unsearchable; marvelous things \textit{without number} = \textit{infinite}.

9*. Job 9:10. (Spoken of God). "Which doeth great things past finding out; yea, and wonders \textit{without number} = \textit{infinite}.

10. Job 21:33. (Spoken of men). "as they are innumerable before him;" Heb., \textit{no number} = \textit{infinite}.

11. Solomon's Song, 6:8. "and virgins \textit{without number} = \textit{infinite}.

12. Ps. 40:12. "for innumerable evils have compassed me about;" Heb., \textit{without number} = \textit{infinite}.


14. Ps. 105:34. "and the locusts came and the caterpillars, and that \textit{without number} = \textit{infinite}.

15. Jer. 2:32. "yet have my people forgotten me days \textit{without number} = \textit{infinite}.

16. Jer. 46:23. (Spoken of an army). "they are more than the grasshoppers, and are innumerable;" Heb., "\textit{without number} = \textit{infinite}.

17. Joel 1:6. (Spoken of locusts). "for a nation is
come up upon my land, strong, and without number" = infinite.

*Table Second.*

\[ \text{Job 22:5. E.V.} \quad \text{Is not thy wickedness great, and thine iniquities infinite?} \] \[ \text{Heb., without end.} \]


2. Nah. 2:9. E.V. (Margin). “for there is none end of the store and glory out of all the pleasant furniture” = infinite.

3. Nah. 3:9. E.V. (Spoken of populous No). “Ethiopia and Egypt were her strength, and it was infinite”; Heb., without end.

The expressions rendered infinite in these three passages are really identical, although there are two modifications of form in the Hebrew word. Both are from the same root. The expressions occur in addition in the following passages. The subjects referred to are given as in the previous table.

4. Is. 2:7. “Their land is full of silver and gold, neither is there any end of their treasures;” Heb., no end = infinite.

5. Is. 2:7. “their land is full of horses, neither is there any end of their chariots;” Heb., no end = infinite.

6*. Is. 9:7. “Of the increase of his government and peace there shall be no end” = infinite.

7. Nah. 3:3. “and there is none end of their corpses” = infinite.

8. Eccl. 4:8. “yet there is no end of all his labor” = infinite.

9. Eccl. 4:16. “There is no end of all the people” = infinite.

10. Eccl. 12:12. “of making many books, there is no end” = infinite.

The four starred citations are the only ones in which there is any reference to God’s attributes or works.

It is believed that these seven and twenty instances cover the whole testimony of the Holy Scriptures touching the point in hand. It is believed that taken together they
prove beyond dispute that the word infinite at least in the Protestant Christian Scriptures means always, the indefinitely great, and can in no instance be shown to mean the philosophical infinite. It is believed that we have here not a speculation, but a fact of exegesis. If this is true it is the duty of scientific Protestant theologians to adjust systematic theology to its requirements. Again, if this is a fact of genuine biblical exegesis, it remains for scientific theologians to determine its bearing upon the hitherto insoluble problem of the personality of God.

CHAPTER IV.

DESCARTES' PERSONALITY AND SYSTEM.

§ 1. Personal History.

René du Perron Descartes, or as he was styled in the scholastic world Renatus Cartesius, was born at La Haye, Touraine, France, in A. D. 1596, thirty-six years after the birth of Bacon, the English philosopher. He was a child of slender constitution, but like Bacon of great precocity of genius. He completed his course of study at the Jesuit College of La Fleche, at the age of sixteen, having been engaged in it more than eight years, and having made great proficiency in mathematics and in the learned languages, though he found little satisfaction, it is said, in the logical and ethical studies of the day.

Shortly after this, having been permitted by his father to live in Paris, without control or supervision, he ran for a year a career of folly if not of vice; but being reclaimed by forming an acquaintance with Mydorge, a distinguished mathematician, he spent the two following years in seclusion in the Faubourg St. Germain, ardently devoted to mathematical studies. In the year 1617 he entered the Dutch army as a volunteer. Whilst in Holland he composed a work on music, which however was not published until many years afterward. In A. D. 1619, he entered the
Bavarian army as a volunteer, and whilst the army was in winter quarters at Neuburg, on the Danube, he gave himself, without cessation, to his favorite mathematical studies.

Here a circumstance occurred which gives us a glimpse of the temperament of the man. Whether the temperament thus indicated is truly philosophic, and whether it may not account for some of the vagaries into which he ran, so far at least as an important portion of his speculations in physics is concerned, every reader will judge for himself. Whilst lying in bed, his mind filled with the enthusiastic meditations engendered by his studies, he had three successive dreams, revealing to him an infallible method of investigating truth, which he believed to be divinely inspired, and in gratitude for which he vowed a pilgrimage to the House of our Lady of Loretto,* a vow which some years afterwards he religiously performed. It would be tedious and not in keeping with the present purpose to follow Descartes through the various phases of his erratic and restless life, or even to enumerate the manifold products of his pen. In Paris, in a. d. 1627–28, from his friend Mydorge, he learned the art of grinding lenses, which greatly aided him in his investigations touching vision.

§ 2. His Works.

He finally fixed his residence in the village of Egmond, near Amsterdam, and devoted himself to studies in metaphysics, theology, meteorology, and dioptrics. This was in a. d. 1629. In a. d. 1637 he published an anonymous work on the Method of Conducting Reason, and in illustration of it, essays on Dioptrics, Meteors, and Geometry. In the meantime he had completed his "Treatise on the World," but the publication of it was delayed by the persecution of Galileo. In a. d. 1641 he published the work which forms the basis of his metaphysical reputation: "Meditations on the First Philosophy, in which are demonstrated the existence of God and the immortality of the soul."

*See Addison’s Travels in Italy, and also Evettis’ Classical Tour.
§ 3. His Method.

Our object is to ascertain precisely his method—the method namely which he proposed for investigating truth, a method which we have seen he fancied to be divinely inspired. Let it be noted then in the first place that he starts from a position of universal skepticism. He believes neither the existence of nature nor his own existence. We are not however to understand this as a real, but only as a posited, or assumed skepticism. He found himself in the outset involved in the labyrinths, perplexities and trivialities of the scholastic philosophy. He desired to find the one foundation upon which all truth and all knowledge rest. He desired, as Spinoza, the most distinguished of his immediate disciples informs us, four things: first, to lay aside all prejudices; secondly, to discover the foundation upon which all things rest; thirdly, to detect the cause of error; and fourthly, to secure a clear and distinct understanding of every thing. But how now was he to clear his mind of all prejudices? It could be done, he supposed, only by assuming a position of universal skepticism, or rather doubt. When he meditated upon the reports of his senses, he found that they often deceived him. He therefore felt compelled to doubt the certainty of the knowledge derived from them. He observed that in dreams he often had the same conviction of the existence of the object presented to his mind as he had in regard to the objects of his senses in his waking hours. He concluded therefore that he could not trust the reports of his senses, and must seek some more solid foundation for truth to rest upon. When he meditated upon universals, such as corporeal nature taken together, its extent, figure and quantity, as well as upon mathematical truths, though these seemed more certain than the immediate products of sensation, yet he found occasion for doubt even here, for he was satisfied that many had erred concerning them, and besides he found an old opinion clinging to him, that there is an omnipotent God, who might perhaps have so created him as that he should be deceived in regard to these truths. He therefore determined, in order to clear his mind from all prejudices, to assume a position
of universal doubt, and to seek for some new method of arriving at truth and certainty.

§ 4. His first step criticised.

What is his first step in this work? He is now in an assumed state of doubt in regard to every thing. What remains? Is any thing left? Yes. I doubt, says he. But if I doubt, then plainly, I also think, for doubting itself is thinking. It is certain then that I think. But if I think, then I exist. Cogito, ergo sum.

It need not be said, that regarded as an argument, in the light of the Aristotelic logic, the famous aphorism can not bear the test of an examination. In that light many have been disposed to regard it, and have made themselves very merry over the pretended demonstration. "The fate of this celebrated axiom," says one writer, "should teach us to beware of attempting to explain ultimate principles. Cogito ergo sum, Descartes considered as incontrovertible, but it involves a petitio principii in its very first step. Cogito is equivalent to I am a thinking being. Sum is equivalent to I am in being. This is saying I am a thinking being, therefore I am in being. Here, it is evident, every thing is assumed." He proceeds to compare it with the syllogism ridiculed by Cicero. "Si lucet, lucet; lucet autem, lucet igitur."

In one passage Dr. Reid calls this argument of Descartes an enthymeme, and says that philosopher would have us believe that he got out of his delirium of doubt by this logical argument: "Cogito ergo sum," but it is evident he was in his senses all the time, and that he never seriously doubted of his existence. For he takes it for granted in this argument, and prove nothing at all. I am thinking, says he, therefore I am. And is it not as good reasoning to say: I am sleeping, therefore I am; or I am doing nothing, therefore I am? If a body moves it must exist, no doubt, but if it is at rest it must exist also."

§ 5. Spinoza's Defense.

Let us, however, do full justice to Descartes. This max-

* Reid's Inq. Introd.
im is not an enthymeme in reality, though it is one in form. "This is not," says his ardent admirer and disciple, Spinoza, who in accordance with the bent of his own genius, undertook the task of reducing the philosophy of Descartes to a geometrical form—"this is not a syllogism with a suppressed major. For if it were a syllogism, the premises should be clearer and better known than the conclusion ergo sum, and thus ego sum would not be the foundation of all knowledge, and besides the conclusion would not be certain, for it would depend upon the premises whose certainty he placed in doubt. Therefore cogito ergo sum is a single proposition equivalent to this, ego sum cogitans."

Let us then treat this maxim, not as a conclusion derived from other propositions, but as an intuitive truth. So Descartes regarded it, and thus vindicated himself against the objections made to it.


In this view let us inquire what is the witness upon which he relies to verify this truth? There can be but one answer. It is consciousness. Consciousness testifies to the existence of thought. Descartes accepts this testimony. What follows? Thought is a phenomenon, an attribute, which like any other attribute implies a subject, a substance. This subject is *being.* It is I. This the Cartesian ποιημα in the Cartesian Δοξ ποιημα στοιχεια. It is the foundation upon which he uprears the whole superstructure of science. Can there now be any doubt touching the correctness of this position? None whatever. No philosopher and no other sane human being can deny it. What then constitutes the remarkable character of this position in the method of Descartes? It is that he sets out with a position of universal skepticism. He is determined to admit nothing which he does not positively know. He will not admit the testimony of his senses for they may deceive him. He is determined he will not be deceived. He knows that he thinks, and if he thinks then he knows that he exists.

But now how does he know that he thinks? Plainly upon the testimony of *consciousness.* Suppose then we
propose to Descartes this inquiry: How do you know that consciousness may not deceive you? What must be his reply? He has none to give. He accepts its testimony without a doubt. Man was made for faith. If he can not believe the testimony of consciousness he can believe nothing.


One of the most modern analyses of the fact of perception is that this phenomenon involves a relation between two terms, sensation, which is in the mind, and an object in the external world, the former of which, from its entirely relative character, involves the latter. Now Descartes admits sensation because he is conscious of it as a mental fact, but he denies perception because the other term, an external object, involves the existence of a bodily organism of which he is not certain because his senses have sometimes deceived him. He has in former times, it is true, had a strong conviction of the existence of an external world. That conviction is however no evidence of its existence, because he has had often an equally strong conviction of the actual existence of the phantasms of dreams, and because he has known his senses sometimes to deceive him. They may therefore by possibility always deceive him; lead him to believe in a world which has no existence, and thus vitiate the whole foundation of science.

Let us now pause to inquire for a moment into the validity of Descartes' reason for rejecting the testimony of the bodily senses. This reason is that the senses sometimes deceive us—sometimes lead us into error.

§ 8. Do the senses deceive us?

On a certain occasion the following fact occurred at a city situated on the Ohio river. A gentleman attempting to go on shore, in the night, from a wharf-boat at the landing, supposed he saw in the star-light, a safe bridge of planks connecting the boat with the shore. With perfect confidence in the veracity of his sense of sight, he stepped from the boat upon this imaginary bridge, and was precipitated into the water. It was an unpleasant accident, and
might have proved fatal. What occasioned it? Plainly, replies the principle of the Cartesian philosophy, his organs of vision deceived him. His eyes informed him there was a bridge there, but they lied. In like manner, since they are proved false witnesses in this case, they may be false witnesses in others. They have ruined their credit. They are never to be trusted. And what is true of the eyes is true of every sense. Every sense sometimes reports to us as fact what has no existence. Therefore the testimony of the senses is not to be credited; and if we have no better evidence of the existence of the universe of matter than that of our senses, we never can be certain that it exists. Alas! then for the existence of an outer world; alas! even for our own bodily organism. Even that must forever escape us.

But now let us proceed to examine these witnesses a little further. Let us imagine for a moment these poor culprit eyes endowed with intelligence and a tongue, and permitted to answer for themselves. Place them on trial for attempted homicide, and ask them if they plead guilty or not guilty? "Not guilty" is the clear, unaltering reply. "But prisoners, can you pretend to deny it? Did you not distinctly inform this poor gentlemen that there was a safe bridge by which he might reach the shore?" "We gave him no such information," firmly respond the accused. "There was in truth no bridge, and:

'Optics sharp it needs we seen
To see what is not to be seen.'"

"What then did you report to him?" "We reported the facts precisely as they were. We reported to him the shadeings of a sheet of water lying between the boat and the shore. We reported him a sheet of water looking just as a sheet of water, occupying such a position and seen in such a light ought to look. We reported to him the exact truth and nothing but the truth." "Why then did his eyes mistake it for a bridge?" "That," reply the accused, "is a question for him to answer. We pity the poor gentleman most heartily and hope he may detect the scoundrel cheat
who deceived him. The fault is certainly not ours, and we
dare not positively say whose it is, but we more than sus-
pect the real offender to be a blundering caitiff, who has
often taxed us with his misdeeds."

§ 9. The true culprit.

Like other miscreants he has many aliases. But they
generally call him Mind, Thought, Judgment, Reason,
Intuition, sometimes with an assumption of royal infalli-
bility: The Reason, par excellence, and even The Pure
Reason, with a claim to all the attributes of Omiscience.

Let us dismiss the illustration, and come back to our
personal observations, and to the convictions which the
intellectual culture of the civilized world has certainly pro-
duced. We look out over the surface of this vast and solid
globe. It appears firm and motionless. We lift up our eyes
to the vault of heaven. The innumerable fires flaming in
the vast concave above us appear to be marching in solemn
majesty around us, and doing obeisance to our mother
Earth. But is it so? And if not, as we know it is not,
what then? Have our eyes deceived us? Is it our or-
gans of vision which are falsifying and belittling that
grand panorama, with which the Builder of the universe
oversarched our terrestrial dwelling? No. It is mind. It
is judgment. It is intuition. It is reason. It is that very
mind, judgment, intuition, reason, which though it can not
account even for the rays which issue from the glittering
spangles that deck the skirts of his garment, sometimes
affects to be able to comprehend all the modes of his infi-
nite and absolute Being, and to be competent to sit in judg-
ment upon his ways.

§ 10. The fixed point of the Cartesian Method.

The truth then is that the witness which Descartes has
called, and to whose veracity alone he has seen fit to trust,
is no more competent and no more trustworthy than many
others which our Maker has furnished in the constitution
which he has given us. At present, however, our business
is not so much to criticise as to ascertain his method. The
fixed point in that method we have now found. It is Existence in so far as it is attested by thought alone. But now as thought has in it nothing material, so it can not attest the existence of a material subject. So far as this principle is concerned, at least in its primary movements, it confines him to the sphere of spiritual consciousness. He is in a world of ideas. He has no direct proof of an outer world, because he has shut the mouths of the only witnesses whom our Framer has furnished to bear testimony to its existence. How can he escape from his realm of shadows? An effort will be made in another chapter to show how he at least attempts it. This will put the reader in possession of enough of the spirit of the Cartesian dialectics, to enable him to judge with sufficient accuracy of the value of his method as an instrument in the construction of science.

CHAPTER V.

DESCARTES' SYSTEM—CONCLUDED.

§ 1. The Cartesian World.

We have so far traced the operations of Descartes' mind in endeavoring to establish a method of philosophizing, which should lead infallibly to truth and certainty in our knowledge, as to find his fixed point. That point is: existence established by thought alone.

We have seen that in thus limiting himself to the single witness of conscious thought, and decreeing the credibility of every other principle of our constitution, he shut himself up within the sphere of his own spiritual life. Within that sphere, indeed, every thing was certain. But as thought presents none of the characteristics of the phenomena of matter, of course it reveals nothing material in the existence which it attests. The world of matter then escapes entirely from the grasp of his principle. What then? Does Descartes abandon it? Somehow he has a conviction of the existence of an external world.
But the point is to prove it. The problem is to prove the truth of this conviction; to demonstrate the existence of a world of matter without an a priori admission of the trustworthiness of the testimony of the senses. He exists indeed, but as yet he exists only as a spirit. He may even be a king. He may say to this servant go, and he goeth, and to another come, and he cometh. But he wields a shadowy sceptre over an empire of ghosts. We see precisely his predicament. He is not content with his dominion. He desires to escape from it. Though like Selkirk in Juan Fernandez, he is “monarch of all he surveys,” he desires to abdicate and to escape to the terra firma of the world of matter. His eyes and his ears indeed tell him that world is close at hand, separated only by a narrow strait. He can see the cottages upon its hill-sides. He can hear the shouts of its inhabitants. Every breeze comes laden with the odor of its flowers. But then his senses are not credible witnesses of its existence. It may be all a dream, a vision, an idea, a non-entity. He is in search of truth, of some solid foundation upon which his convictions of the existence of a material world can rest securely. Must then his troubled spirit like the starling of Sterne, forever beat its wings against the iron bars of its cage of skepticism, and find no egress? Like the starling will it be forced to cry forever: “I can’t get out. I can’t get out”? No.

§ 2. The Escape apriorism.

Necessity is the mother of invention. The imprisoned spirit of the philosopher casts its longing eyes upwards. Joyful discovery! Glorious hope of deliverance! The bars of its cage are all perpendicular. It is open at the top. The spirit of the philosopher takes wing. It mounts. It soars to heaven’s gates. It gazes in upon the invisible. It interrogates the infinite and the eternal, and returns to earth to inform its astonished inhabitants, that the bodies which they tenant are in very deed flesh and blood, that the ground they tread, and the air they breathe are veritable entities and no phantasms of the imagination. Such is a true history of the first appearance in modern philosophi-


cal method of the famous \textit{a priori} argument for the existence of God. We will speak elsewhere of Anselm. Let us not, however, prejudge the argument. Let us not call it an invention, born of an unreasonable skepticism, devised to meet and overcome an otherwise insuperable difficulty. To this injustice the circumstances of the case might, it is true, sorely tempt us. But let us not yield to the temptation. Let us not forget that necessity is sometimes the mother of discovery as well as of invention. Let us look a little at the argument itself. Before presenting it, however, in a formal manner, it will be well to refer to the train of meditation which led to it, made it available, and caused it to play so conspicuous a role in his philosophical method. \textit{Dubit, cogito, ergo sum.} Here, then, is the starting point.

\textit{§ 3. The Cartesian Measure of Truth.}

Existence having been ascertained by thought alone, the foundation of all other knowledge is given with this truth. It is given, however, upon what condition? Upon this condition. Inasmuch as this is true, \textit{every thing else is true which is as distinctly and clearly perceived as this.} Here, then, we have the Cartesian measure and rule of truth.

\textit{Whatever is as clearly and distinctly perceived as our existence, in so far as that existence is revealed by thought alone, is true.}

Why, now, did not Descartes perceive the existence of the material world, of his own body even, as clearly and distinctly as his spiritual existence? Because, when he recalled his former thoughts, such as, that his mind was a subtle something, like air, or fire, or ether, infused into the grosser parts of his body; such as, that his body was better known to him than his mind, and more clearly and distinctly perceived by him, he saw, or thought he saw, that these thoughts conflicted with the knowledge which he had gained, and of which he was certain. He was able, namely, to doubt concerning his body, but he was not able to doubt concerning his essence, in so far as he was a thinking being. Besides, he did not clearly and distinctly per-
ceive these things, and, therefore, in accordance with his prescribed rule, he was bound to reject them.

There is one fact which must be constantly borne in mind, if we would clearly understand why it was that Descartes supposed that he did not as clearly and distinctly apprehend the existence of matter, as he did that of his own thinking essence. He had not escaped from the thraldom of the representational theory of perception. He recognized sensation, indeed, as a fact of mind. But then that which he apprehended was something in his mind representing the outer world, and not the veritable external world itself. Therefore, he supposed he did not clearly perceive it, and might be mistaken about its existence.

He then proceeded to inquire what were the things which belonged to his essence, in so far as he knew it, and found such truths as these: “that he wished not to be deceived; that he desired to understand many things; that he doubted concerning every thing which he did not understand; that as yet he affirmed only one thing; that he denied and rejected as false every thing else; that he involuntarily imagined many things; and, finally, that he observed many things which seemed to come from the senses.”

Thus he found the following modes of thought, concerning which he could not doubt, since, according to his principle he clearly and distinctly perceived them, viz: “doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing and its negative, imagining, and feeling.” All these modes of thought could, be distinctly understood by themselves alone, and were rendered obscure and indistinct by ascribing to them any of the things concerning which he doubted.

§ 4. The Argument.

How then is he ever to arrive at the knowledge of any thing except his own existence in so far as that existence is attested by thought alone? He does it, or imagines he does, by proving from thought alone the existence of a God of perfect veracity, who would not constitute us with faculties which will deceive us.
What then is the argument?

The argument is, that we are able to form a conception of God, and if we are able to form a conception of God, then God exists.

The postulates upon which the argument, if reduced to form, rests, are these: first, when we say that something is contained in the idea or conception of any thing, it is the same as to say that this is true concerning it, or that it may be truly affirmed of that thing.

And, secondly, in the idea or conception of every thing there is contained existence, either possible or necessary. Now, necessary existence is contained in the conception of God, or the being who is in the highest degree perfect, for otherwise, he would be conceived as limited, which is contrary to the supposition: contingent or possible being is contained in the conception of a limited or finite thing.

These are the postulates. With these postulates the argument is perfectly simple.

Since it is one and the same thing to say that something is contained in the nature or conception of a thing, and to say that that something is true concerning it, and since necessary existence is contained in the very conception of God as a being absolutely perfect, therefore God exists.

§ 5. Object of the Discussion.

Our main object in speaking of Descartes is to ascertain his method, in order that we may judge of its probable influence as an instrument in the construction of science.

It is not necessary to this object to examine the argument at all. To do it at length would be to plunge a little prematurely perhaps, into the abysses of ontology. Let us, however, not fail to ask ourselves whether we comprehend it? The question is not whether we understand it. It is one thing to understand a logical sequence, and quite another thing to comprehend the elimination of the terms upon which it depends.

But not to press this question before passing on to the main object in view, let us call attention again to the start-
ing point of Descartes, and to his rule and measure of truth.

The starting point is existence attested by thought alone. The measure of truth is, that whatever is equally clear and distinct to the mind with existence thus attested is true. Now the idea of an absolutely perfect being, assumes Descartes, is equally clear to us with the idea of our own existence attested by thought. Therefore, there must be such a being. The question which we desire now to consider, is whether it is possible to form the idea of such a being upon the basis of the truth which the Cartesian principle admits. The conception in question is that of an absolutely perfect being.

§ 6. Criticism of the Argument.

We surely can not fail to notice that the term perfect is one of the most ambiguous, as well as one of the most general, abstract, and comprehensive terms in the language, or in any language. It involves a vast multitude of subordinate ideas. Amongst others, it involved when applied by Descartes to God the idea of philosophical infinity. How now does the human mind come in possession of this idea? This is a difficult, and to a certain extent a mooted question. We must feel our way carefully. In the first place we shall not fail to notice that the logic of language seems to declare that the idea of the finite was the prior idea in the human intelligence.

In the next place, the same authority seems to declare that it is a negative idea, for all that language asserts of the idea is that it is not finite, that it is not limited. But as many profound and learned men have claimed for it a positive character, we will feel our way as cautiously as possible. At this point, then, let us not fail to remind ourselves of the distinction between the logical and chronological order of ideas, so clearly stated and illustrated in the lectures of Victor Cousin. The logical order of ideas is the order of nature, the order of actual existence. The chronological is the order of acquisition, the order in which the human mind becomes possessed of any given idea. Suppose we
desire to express the old theological view of creation, that it was the act of a spiritual being producing the material universe out of nothing. Here, evidently, are two distinct ideas or thoughts, a spiritual being, and a material being. What is the logical order, the order of nature? Which must have existed first? Evidently, we answer, the spiritual being, without which the other never would have existed. On the other hand, in the chronological order, the order of the acquisition of ideas, a knowledge of the existence of matter must antedate a knowledge of the distinction between spirit and matter. We return now to the question before us. How does the human intelligence become possessed of the idea of absolute infinity? Evidently, it may be derived by abstracting it from our conception of space or time. These are both limitless. Descartes had this idea of infinity. Where did he get it? Did it originate in his idea of space? That is impossible upon his principles. For it is demonstrable that the idea of space cannot be conceived without an antecedent idea of body. Give to the mind the idea of body and it seizes at once upon the idea of space, the place, namely, necessary for the existence of body. Upon no other condition can it arrive at the idea of space.

But Descartes’ principle rejects the idea of body, of matter, even of his own material organism. Is he not bound then to reject the resulting idea of space, an idea which can be reached in no other way? If the antecedent is uncertain, indistinct, and not to be admitted, what becomes of the consequent? By his own principle then, he could not have reached the idea of infinity, through the idea of space. Could he have done it through the idea of time? What is time?

Owing to the imperfection of language, it is impossible to define metaphysical ideas without the use of tropes. Time absolute bears the same relation to a succession of events, which space bears to body.

We may say then tropically, that time is the space necessary for the succession or flow of events. The idea, therefore, of infinite or absolute time, is given only upon the condi-
tion that we have the antecedent idea of a succession of events. In no other way is it possible to reach it. With Descartes' principle could it have been reached in this way? Recur to that principle. The only certain truth is, existence revealed by thought alone. What is the witness which attests the existence of thought? It is consciousness. It can be nothing else. In this witness Descartes confides, and in no other.

Let us grant to him that it is a competent witness. What is its testimony?

It is present thought from which results present existence.

But do present thought and present existence contain the idea of succession? Assuredly not. In order to the idea of succession, there must be the idea of a past thought, or a past series of thoughts.

On this condition alone is the idea of succession possible. What faculty, what witness is it which affirms the existence of past thoughts?

Is it the same witness which attests present thought? Is it consciousness? No. It is a different witness. It is memory.

Though consciousness precedes and conditions memory, it is impossible to confound memory with consciousness. If we say with Locke, in reducing the basis of personal identity to consciousness, that the remembrance of a past action is only the consciousness of it, and this consciousness is the witness of personal identity, then personal identity is lost in regard to every thing which is forgotten.

Victor Cousin has shown this clearly.

Memory then is a faculty entirely distinct from consciousness. It is a witness not needed to attest present thought and present existence; not needed to establish the certainty of the Cartesian principle. It must then be rejected. Yet plainly it is a witness indispensable in acquiring the idea of succession. For unless I remember the thought which I had a moment ago, it is impossible for me to perceive that my present thought has succeeded it. The Cartesian principle then does not yield the idea of succession. But the
antecedence of that idea is the condition of attaining the idea of time absolute and illimitable, from which the idea of infinity may be abstracted.

Where then did Descartes obtain the idea of infinity? The principle of his method does not yield it. Yet he had before his mind the conception of an infinite, an absolutely perfect being. How did it come there? Our necessary conclusion seems to be that it came there through the operation of the very faculties whose testimony he discredit and rejects.

We are now looking at Descartes as a part of the Environment of Spinoza. In order to indicate the relation of the two philosophers, it was necessary to present the primary development of the Cartesian method in its application to the doctrine of the divine existence. We shall have occasion to refer to the argument again, and again, in speaking of the progress and full blown result of the same method, in the hands of his great Hebrew disciple, and especially in the hands of his followers.

§ 7. Merits of Descartes.

The merits of Descartes were unquestionably great; and the impression which he made upon his age was profound. It required no ordinary man, educated as he had been, to break away from the logic of the schools; to attack and expose the learned nonsense with which mankind had for ages been content to cover up their ignorance. "By the spreading of the Cartesian system," says Dr. Reid, "materia prima, substantial forms, and occult qualities, with all the jargon of the Aristotelian physics, fell into utter disgrace, and were never mentioned by the followers of the new system, but as a subject of ridicule."

The simple object in speaking of Descartes, as has been again and again remarked, is to ascertain his method, and to bring that method into juxtaposition and comparison with that of Bacon.

What now is the method of Descartes as indicated by the process through which we have seen him pass? He first establishes the truth of his own existence in so far as a thinking essence is concerned.
He then proves (or imagines he proves) the existence of an all perfect being, on the sole basis of his ability to form the conception of such a being. Having done this, he infers the existence of an external world, on the ground that a perfect being can not be a deceiver, and would not have created him with deceptive faculties.

Having thus reached the external world, he is at liberty to use his eyes and ears like other men, and undoubtedly he did use them upon many subjects to very good advantage. But no one can fail to mark the tendency of his mind in the steps which have been pointed out. Let us, however, here revert to an aphorism of Bacon, already cited. "There are," says that philosopher, "but two methods, actual or possible, of investigating and arriving at truth. The one starting from sense and from particulars, leaps at one bound to the most general axioms (advolat ad axiomata maxime generalia) and regarding these as principles whose truth is firmly established, it proceeds to judge and invent intermediate axioms. The other starting from sense and particulars, establishes axioms by cautiously ascending step by step, until it reaches those which are most general. This is the true method, but as yet untried."

It is scarcely necessary to inquire to which of these two methods of investigating truth the already considered procedure of Descartes belongs.

God is the central point of all science. The being of God is the magnetic truth which polarizes the universe. All the lines of science in every department of creation converge and struggle upward towards this central polar point. Our belief in the existence of God and of his various attributes, as a fact of personal history, is one thing. That belief and knowledge may come in various ways; just as the belief and knowledge of the Newtonian theory of the solar system may be propagated by tradition, by books, by oral instructions, by authority, without rendering the reasons upon which the doctrine rests. But "theology is the science of God," it is the process by which the human spirit endeavors to verify its belief in his infinite existence and in his glorious attributes.
DESCARTES' SYSTEM.

Considered as a science it remains to be shown how a certain knowledge of the true doctrine of God's being can claim exemption from the process which legitimates, and stamps with a scientific value, any other speculation of the human mind. This certainly can not be so, unless man is endowed with a power which enables him to reach per saltum the highest of all truths, whilst it is demonstrably destitute of a power which enables it to reach in this way a certain knowledge of any one general truth which stands far below it.

The scientific method of Descartes permits him to leap at one bound from the observation of a few facts of consciousness to the most sublime heights of human knowledge, to the very apex of science. Can it be possible that the very same method can be safely trusted in this highest and most difficult of all speculations, which when applied to the planetary system, landed him upon his theory of celestial vortices? Dare we trust it? If it should be wrong, if it should even be defective or distorted, and we reason downward from it, as we have a right to do from all truly scientific principles, it vitiates and falsifies every thing below.

That this consequence has been the actual result of this method, in the hands of one at least of the followers of Descartes, we shall have occasion to notice in the following lectures.

In conclusion it may be remarked that Descartes lived long enough to see his philosophy become wide-spread and very popular. He heard the echoes of the silver trumpet of his fame from every country in Europe. In A.D. 1649 he was invited by the Queen of Sweden to take up his residence in her court, and to induct her into the principles of his philosophy.

He arrived at Stockholm in October of that year, and received from the princess the offer of 30,000 crowns a year with the property in perpetuity, from which it was derived. He did not, however, live long to enjoy her bounty. He came to his death from an inflammation of the lungs in February of the following year, A.D. 1650, in the fifty-fourth year of his age. Seventeen years afterwards his remains
were conveyed to Paris, and interred with great pomp in
the church of St. Geneviève du Mont.

CHAPTER VI.

Spinoza's Personality.

§ 1. The two Philosophies.

We have thus far looked at the leading features, drawn
"in small," of the two methods of investigating truth,
which for the last two and a half centuries have guided the
labors of the philosophic world, the method of Bacon and
that of Descartes. These two philosophers are often com-
pared with each other from a very inadequate point of
view. The splendid and solid results, which the history of
modern science shows to have followed the application of
the Baconian principles to investigations in natural philos-
ophy, have produced the almost universal impression and
admission, that in this department of human knowledge
Bacon is "facile princeps," and caused him to be regarded
as the champion, the Magnus Apollo of Physics. In the
world of mind, however, the results of the application of
these principles have been less numerous and less imposing.
This is doubtless due in part to the greater difficulties in
the way of the observation of facts and of making experi-
ments; but partly also to the smaller number of laborers,
and to the failure of some of the ablest of them fully to
apprehend and rigidly to apply those principles. This last
remark finds a striking illustration in the case of Locke.

As a matter of fact, however, Descartes labored with no
less assiduity than Bacon in the world of physics. In this
department of science, so far as the observation and colli-
gation of facts are concerned, his contributions to science
probably exceeded those of Bacon. But in physics Des-
cartes' method of constructing science proved a signal fail-
ure; and some of the most brilliant of his physical theories
of the universe, which were once "the cynosure of all eyes," have almost vanished from the memory of mankind. In the world of mind; however, the result has been different. The cause of this it is not easy fully to assign. It may have been owing in part to the mistakes of the followers of Bacon, noticed above; in part to the inherent difficulty of the work where subject and object, observer and observed, are identical, the difficulty of verifying and varying our facts by experiment; and in part also to the eager impetuosity of the intellect, its tendency to rush illicitly to first principles. There are doubtless other tendencies of human nature, especially those connected with traditional religion, which have had no small influence both in leading men to impose sophistical conclusions upon their own minds, and in blinding them to the sophistry of others. In addition to all, the Cartesian philosophy has found a host of advocates, and among them men of exceptional power, of quite extraordinary genius; men who, if any circumstance had led them to adopt a false theory, would be well-skilled "to make the worse appear the better reason." Especially does this remark find a verification among a people, who from natural genius and temperament are strongly predisposed to profound and difficult, not to say at times to fanciful speculation. The political institutions of this remarkable people having interdicted to the human intellect (to a considerable extent) many of the fields of practical investigation, in which under freer forms of government it finds delighted and useful exercises, have in a measure driven it back upon itself; to seek its enjoyment in the creations of the imagination, and in part in building and demolishing metaphysical systems, whose rise and whose ruin, whose evolutions and revolutions could be effected with as much safety to the governing powers, as the marching and counter-marching of the armies of the kingdom of Brobdignag.

For some such reason, it may be, the comparison which is often made between Bacon and Descartes, represents them as co-laborers in the world of science, the one in the world of physics, the other in that of metaphysics. Such, for instance, is the point of view in which they are pre-
sented in the sketch of Morell. Now that both methods appeal to observation in some possible sense of that word, as a starting point, is true. But that the method of Descartes was observation, in the sense in which Bacon uses the word observe in the initial aphorism of the Novum Organum, is not true. It is absolutely certain, on the contrary, that he means by it a condition of induction, in a sense which puts the word in direct contrast with the method of Descartes.

It is now proposed briefly to examine the most remarkable metaphysical fruit of the Cartesian method in the hands of the earliest disciple of that great philosopher.

§ 2. Character and early history of Spinoza.

The world has produced no intellect more comprehensive, more profound, more subtle, than that of Spinoza. And Spinoza has produced no other book, which for all these qualities can be compared with his Ethics. It is the task before us, as candidly and conscientiously as possible to examine this extraordinary product of human genius.

Baruch Spinoza, the son of a Portuguese Jew, who to escape the trials to which he was exposed in his native country emigrated to Holland, was born in the city of Amsterdam on November 24th, A. D. 1632, and was consequently somewhat more than seventeen years of age at the death of Descartes. Having in after life abandoned the religion of his fathers, he changed his prænomen from Baruch to Benedict. His parents, who are said to have been respectable, placed their son in the hands of the rabbins to be educated. At their death they left three children, Benedict and two sisters, Rebeca and Miriam. In favor of these two sisters Spinoza relinquished all claims to his patrimony, reserving for his own use only a solitary bed. What was the date of this event we are not informed. Spinoza, as is manifest from his works, was endowed with superior talents, and while engaged in the study of the Hebrew, and in the diligent perusal of the Jewish scriptures and of the Talmud, he is said to have puzzled his rabbinical teachers with hard questions.

Soon after, at the instigation of some friends, he under-
took to master the Latin language. In the elements of this language, he had as a teacher a German physician by the name of Van den Ende, who is said to have planted in the mind of the young man the seeds of Atheism. A passion conceived for the daughter of his teacher perhaps contributed to cultivate the soil of his heart, and prepare it for the reception of them. We are told, however, that a fellow student from Hamburg carried off the prize. After this he devoted himself for a time to theological studies, and subsequently abandoning these, applied himself to physics and philosophy. In these latter studies he chose the writings of Des Cartes as his guide; and, being convinced by the skeptical principles of that philosopher that the doctrines of the Rabbins were not of divine origin, he exposed himself to the odium theologicum of the Jews. It is even said that they attempted to assassinate him, and that he preserved for some time a garment pierced by a dagger stroke. At any rate, about the year A. D. 1660, he was publicly excommunicated from the synagogue of the Portuguese Jews of Amsterdam. Disturbed by the persecution of his enemies, he left Amsterdam in A. D. 1660, and took up his abode with a friend in the country, between the city and Auwerkerke. In A. D. 1661 he retired to Rheinburg, near Leyden. There, in the year A. D. 1663, he published his "Cartesii principia philosophiae in more geometrico demonstrata." In A. D. 1664 he betook himself to a small town in the neighborhood of the Hague. Finally, in A. D. 1669, he removed to that city, residing at first in the family of a widow lady, and subsequently, from the year A. D. 1671 until his death in the year A. D. 1677, in the family of a painter of some note by the name of Van der Spyck.

Spinoza is said to have been a man of even and philosophic temper, agreeable and courteous in his manners, neat and elegant, though not extravagant, in his dress, and stoical in his estimation of wealth. He rejected an offer of his friend Simon de Vries to make him his heir. Indolence and pride he esteemed the greatest of vices, and the knowledge of God the highest of virtues. Concerning
his death there are various opinions; one of which is, that he committed suicide by poison. The more probable opinion is, that his death was natural, though sudden. He had been afflicted with phthisis from his twentieth year, and the disease had gradually increased upon him in consequence of his studious and sedentary life. He expired suddenly on the 21st of February, A.D. 1677, in the 45th year of his age.

§ 3. The works of Spinoza.

During his life he published two works, of which the first is entitled "Renati Des Cartes Principia philosophiae," to which is appended his "Cogitata metaphysica," and the second, "Tractatus theoligico-politicus." On the year of his death the "Opera posthuma" appeared, containing the Ethica, the Tractatus politicus, the De Emendatione Intellectus, the Epistolarae et ad eas Responsones; and the Compendium Grammaticae linguae Hebrae. We have besides a long list of MSS. works which are either lost or at least never published, as well as some treatises which are known to be spurious. The work on which his philosophical reputation chiefly reposes, and in which his peculiar principles are distinctly and fully delineated, is his Ethica. This work is worthy of examination, not merely as a literary curiosity, though an attempt to reduce to a geometrical form and to demonstrate upon a basis of postulates and definitions the laws of man's spiritual nature may well be regarded as a curiosity, not merely on account of the comprehensiveness of its plan, and the strictness of its logic, though in this respect it is admirable, but chiefly as the first fruits of the Cartesian method of philosophizing: an exhibition of what that method is able to accomplish for science and for the welfare of man in the hands of a thinker, who for power of concentration and acuteness of thought has had few equals and probably no superior in the field of metaphysics. That, in this statement, the strength of Spinoza's genius is not overestimated, is evident from the impression which his writings made upon his age, from the multitude of replies which they immedi-
ately elicited, as well as from the fact that they have imparted tone and character to an entire school of philosophy.


Says Bruder, a German editor of his works, writing in the year 1843, "whilst engaged the last year in composing an essay upon the personality of the Deity, Spinoza was among the chief philosophers to whose reasonings I was obliged to attend. For he is evidently esteemed the head and leader of all our modern advocates of pantheism. From a repeated perusal of his works," he continues, "I am firmly persuaded that he is the author of all the more recent philosophy, which is called the philosophy of nature, of identity, of the absolute; and that the greater part of the philosophies of our day rest upon his principles. That Fichte has returned to him his books in many places bear witness. What Jacobi thinks may be seen in his work entitled 'Jacobi über die Lehre des Spinoza.' How highly Schelling esteemed him, and that he takes his rise in him, is apparent. Hegel has followed in his footsteps. Among theologians," continues Bruder, "Frederick Schleiermacher has extolled him in the following terms: 'Opfert mit mir ehrerbietig den Manen des heiligen, verstossenen Spinoza. Ihn durchdrang der hohe Weltgeist. Das Unendliche war sein Anfang und sein Ende. Das Universum sein einzige und sein ewige Liebe. In heiliger Unschuld und tiefer Demuth spiegelte er sich in der ewigen Welt. Voller Religion und voll heiligen Geistes. Und darum steht er auch da allein und unerreicht, Meister in seiner Kunst, aber erhaben über die profane Zunft, ohne Jünger und ohne Bürgerrecht.'"

"Sacrifice with me reverentially to the Manes of the holy, persecuted Spinoza. Him pervaded the lofty World-Spirit. The infinite was his beginning and his end. The universe was his only and his eternal love. In holy innocence, in deep humility, he mirrored himself in the eternal world; full of religion and full of the Holy Ghost. And therefore there he stands alone and unapproached, master
in his art, but exalted above the profane rabble, without disciples and without citizenship."

No one needs to be informed that these are among the most illustrious names in the realm of German rationalistic philosophy. They all bow at the shrine of Spinoza.

In reading such tributes no one will need to be reminded how infectious is the devotion even of cultivated intellect rapt into ecstasy by the enthusiasm with which genius inspires its worshipers. In the minds of those who sympathize with its principles, that enthusiasm converts its hero into a demi-god, and robes him in a misty splendor which magnifies, while it dazzles.

In such minds it is far from impossible that the most sacred and inviolable distinctions, the most precious and irrefragable truths may be melted down, may utterly perish and disappear in the mystic fire which consumes them. Within the cloudy convolutions of the tabernacle of glory in which fancy has enthroned the object of their adoration, error and even absurdity may lie close-wrapped and secure forever from their detection; nay, crime itself and blasphemy sanctified by association with their idol, may cast off the slough of deformity, and, converted into heroic virtues like Satan habited in the garments of an angel, may demand imperiously the incense of worship.

On no other principle can such language as that from the mouth of Schleiermacher be accounted for.

§ 5. Victor Cousin on Spinoza.

A remarkable passage illustrating the contagious power of genius of which we are speaking, having Spinoza for its subject, occurs in the works of a philosopher who professes not to accept his doctrines. The writer referred to is Victor Cousin. The passage may be found in his "Journal d'un voyage en Holland;" a journey made while he was engaged as minister of public instruction in France in collecting facts in regard to the educational establishments of several countries of Europe, in September, 1836. The passage is too long to be inserted entire, and a translation, therefore, only of the most striking parts is presented.
While in Amsterdam, having failed to find any one who could satisfy his curiosity either in regard to some Cartesian manuscripts which he supposed existed there, or in regard to the house or the Burgwaal where Spinoza was born, he wandered alone into the synagogue of the Portuguese Jews. It was a splendid structure, and crowded with worshipers, for the occasion was a great Jewish festival.

"Notwithstanding," says he, "my respect for every species of worship, and for the Jewish worship in particular, as the herald of our own, I confess that whilst in this synagogue, I thought only of Spinoza." He then proceeds briefly to characterize and to disavow his doctrines, referring to his discussion of them in his lectures of 1829; and, speaking of the work into which we are about to look, he proceeds: "This book, all bristling as it is, after the manner of the age, with geometrical formulas, so dry and so repulsive in its style, is at the bottom a mystic hymn, a rapture, a suspension of the soul after him who alone can lawfully say, I am that I am." At a later point, kindling into a glow of fresh sympathy and new enthusiasm upon the recollection of his persecutions and his poverty, he pours forth a lament of almost lyric pathos and grandeur.

"Adoring the Eternal in the face of the Infinite, he disdained the passing world. He knew neither pleasure nor action, nor glory, for he did not suspect even his own. In youth he sought to know the passion of love, but he did not know it, for he did not inspire it. Poor and suffering, his life was an expectation and a meditation of death. He lived in a faubourg of this city, or in a neighboring village, or in a corner of the Hague, gaining, by polishing glasses, the little bread and milk he needed to sustain him; hated, repudiated by the men of his communion, suspected by all others, escaping persecution and outrage only by concealing his life; humble and silent; possessing a sweetness and patience of temper which was proof against insult; passing through the world without wishing to stop in it; not dreaming of working an effect in it, or of leaving a trace upon it. Spinoza is an Indian Mouni, a Persian Sufec, a monastic enthusiast, and the author whom this
pretended Atheist most resembles is the unknown author of the 'Imitation of Jesus Christ.' Here in Amsterdam every vestige of him is obliterated; and here to-day, in all the éclat of his glory, when his ideas are spreading and echoing through the whole world, nobody knows his name, nobody can tell me where he lived or where he died, and of a surety I am the only person in this synagogue who thinks of Benedict Spinoza."


It is well nigh impossible to arouse ourselves from the fascinations of a rhapsody like this. Who is not ready to confess to a strong sympathy with genius in distress, with genius especially suffering under persecution? But it is necessary to remind ourselves that admiration, enthusiasm, and sympathy are not philosophy, not safe guides in the investigation of truth.

A persecuted doctrine is not, therefore, or of necessity, a true doctrine; else the most contradictory dogmas might stand side by side in the sacred temple of science, baptized, hallowed, and converted into eternal verities by the magic of human suffering. That Spinoza suffered a degree of persecution is doubtless true; but, in this passage, sympathy has greatly overdrawn the picture. That he was poor, is likewise true; but it was a poverty self-chosen, and self-imposed. Nor was it by any means so great as this enthusiastic rhapsody would lead us to imagine; else could he not have had the means to be, in his apparel, elegans et nitidus praesertim quum exiret, as his biographer assures us was the fact; else could he not have sent back to his friend De Vries a donation of two thousand florins, on the ground that he did not need it; else, also, it could not have been true, that he refused to accept more than three hundred florins of the annuity of five hundred which De Vries directed to be paid him, and which the brother of De Vries urged upon his acceptance. Let us, then, dismiss the man from our thoughts, and look with the calmness, as well as the candor, which the whole history of science proves to be the only true philosophic spirit, upon the work
in which Spinoza has embalmed his doctrines. It has already been remarked that, in the Ethics of Spinoza, his metaphysical system is fully presented, and that the form of it is strictly geometrical. His whole system is built upon a body of definitions and axioms, like a mathematical treatise. It has been remarked, by Jouffroy, that to develop and fully to discuss the system of Spinoza, would require a course of lectures running through many months. The present attempt to sketch his system, has no such comprehensive and exhaustive aim.

§ 7. Divisions of the Ethics.

The truth is, that the real difficulties of Spinoza lie within a very small compass, viz., in his definitions, axioms, and postulates. The rest grow out of the geometrical form of the treatise, and the constant and wearisome reference to definitions; or, to previously established propositions and corollaries. There are, indeed, some incomprehensible things in this book; but the most incomprehensible of them all will be found to arise from starting the inquiry how he reconciles himself to himself.

He has not attempted the task of reconciling his maxims of life with the necessary deductions from his principles. Had he done so and succeeded, he would have removed a great stumbling block from the way of his readers.

In conclusion it may be remarked, that the Ethics of Spinoza is a work consisting of five parts, as follows:

Part I.—Of God.

Part II.—Of the Nature and Origin of Mind.

Part III.—Of the Origin and Nature of the Affections.

Part IV.—Of human Slavery, or Concerning the Powers of the Affections.

Part V.—Of the power of Intellect, or Concerning Human Liberty.
CHAPTER VII.

SPINOZA'S ETHICS EXAMINED.

§ 1. The two Philosophies in the Concrete.

At the close of the last chapter, the general divisions of the Ethics of Spinoza were given, and the portions of the work were indicated in which the chief difficulties are to be found. Attention was called to the fact, that he begins at the top of the Baconian ladder. He begins with God, and reasons synthetically down to man; to his nature, his intellect, his affections, his prospects, and his duties. Every thing lies wrapped up and hidden in his first principle; and the business of philosophy, in his view, is to grasp that principle, to secure what he calls an "adequate" idea of God, and then to deduce from it every thing else. To which of the two methods described in a former chapter this procedure belongs, it is not necessary to say. The Baconian method travels upward from particulars to principles. It denies that any "adequate" knowledge of a principle can be had, without a previous collection and scrutiny of the particulars of which the principle is the uniting element. The Cartesian method permits us, from the observation of a few particulars, to determine the nature and laws of even an infinite principle, and then to reason down to the particulars which it embraces. We know where this method landed Des Cartes in Physics. It landed him in the theory which explained the planetary motions by the dream of celestial vortices. We know where the method of Bacon landed Sir Isaac Newton in the same science. It planted his feet upon the principle of Universal Gravitation. It is plain, then, which of the two is the safer method in Physics. It will be for us to decide, each one for himself, after a careful, even if brief, examination of Spinoza's chief doctrines, whether there is any such peculiarity in the subject which meta-physics discusses, as to convert into puerility and folly a method of investigating truth embalmed in the history of every genuine science
which adorns modern civilization. And though men of lofty intelligence, and of unquestioned genius, have given their sanction to a different method, a method which claims for the human mind the power of a direct and positive vision of Infinite and Absolute Being, it still remains lawful for every independent investigator to raise the question, whether loyalty to truth prevents him from inquiring whether the history of this method, faithfully rendered, presents any real progress in knowledge of higher value to mankind than the dreamy cosmogony of the "Vestiges of Creation," than the lunar visions of the New York Sun, or even than the wonderful poetic fictions of the travels of Gulliver and the floating Dominion of Laputa.

§ 2. Design of the First Book of the Ethics.

It will be remembered that, at the close of the last chapter, attention was called to Spinoza's doctrine of God. This is the theme of the first book of his Ethics. We will begin by giving his view of the Deity, as presented in the summary of points proved in this first book, which he makes in the appendix with which it closes. Then we will go back, and look a little at the process by which some of the most important of these conclusions are reached. "In this book," says he, "I have explained the nature of God, and his properties, as: that he necessarily exists; that he is only one; that he exists and acts from the sole necessity of his nature; that he is the free cause of all things, and in what sense free; that all things exist in God, and so depend upon him, that without him they can neither exist nor be conceived; and, finally, that all these things have been predetermined by God, not indeed from the freedom of his will, or from his absolute good-pleasure, but by the absolute nature of God, or, what is the same thing, by his infinite power."

To make these doctrines a little more perspicuous, or to bring them a little more perfectly within the beat of our common phraseology, it may be said that the amount of these teachings is: that God is the only substance in existence, developing himself in the mode of extension called
body, and in the mode of thought called mind; that this existence, and this development, arise from the necessity of his nature; that he is free in the sense that there is nothing to oppose this development; but not in a sense which implies will, for he has no will; that all that we are, and all that appears to exist, are only modes of the divine extension and thought.

In other words, the doctrine is a vast and subtle scheme of pantheistic fatalism. The form of these doctrines, and the grounds upon which they rest, will appear more fully as we proceed. The book commences with a body of definitions and axioms, upon which the whole superstructure is upreared. Upon their face, they bear evidence of being the very Ultima Thule of abstraction, and, upon close examination, they will be found petitiones principii of every objectionable doctrine in the book.

§ 3. The Geometrical Basis of Book First.

We have, then, the following eight definitions:

1. By causa sui, I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature can not be conceived as not existing.

2. That thing is said to be finite, in its kind, which can be limited by another thing of the same nature. Thus one thought is limited by another thought. But body is not limited by thought, nor thought by body.

3. By substance I understand that which is conceived in itself and by itself, that is, that whose conception does not need the conception of another thing by which it must be formed.

4. By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives concerning substance as constituting its essence.

5. By mode I understand the affections of substance, or that which is in another by which it is conceived.

6. By God I understand the being absolutely infinite, that is, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.

7. That thing will be called free which exists by the sole necessity of its nature, and is determined to action by itself
alone, but necessary or rather compelled (coēcta), which is
compelled by another to exist and act in a certain and de-
terminate manner.

8. By eternity I understand existence itself, as far as it is
conceived necessarily to follow from the sole definition of an
eternal thing.

Then follow seven axioms:

1. All things which exist, exist in themselves or in an-
other.

2. That which can not be conceived by another must be
conceived by itself.

3. From a given determinate cause an effect necessarily
follows, and on the other hand, if no determinate cause is
given, it is impossible that an effect should follow.

4. A knowledge of the effect depends upon a knowledge
of the cause, and involves the same.

5. Things which have mutually nothing in common can
not be mutually understood by each other, or the con-
ception of one does not involve the conception of the
other.

6. A true idea must agree with its object.

7. Whatever can be conceived as not existing, the es-
rence of this does not involve existence.

Upon the basis of these definitions and axioms he pro-
ceeds to demonstrate geometrically the existence and at-
tributes of God, as well as his modes of existence. It
would be a barren as well as well as a tedious labor to fol-
low him through all these demonstrations. There are two
or three prominent points which characterize the philoso-
phy of Spinoza in relation to the Deity, and which form the
gist of his whole system. With the establishment or re-
utation of the positions which involve these points, Spino-
ism as such must stand or fall.


To an examination of these points special attention will
be given after a presentation of the formal argument by
which he supposes himself to demonstrate the existence of
God. This is found under the eleventh Proposition of Part
I., of his Ethics. The enunciation of the proposition in the original Latin is as follows:

"Deus, sive substantia constans infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque æternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit, necessario existit."

Then follows, after the manner of Euclid, the demonstration thus:

"If you deny, conceive if it is possible, that God does not exist. Then (by Ax. vii.), his essence does not involve existence. But this (by Prop. vii.), is absurd, therefore, God necessarily exists."

The 7th axiom here referred to has been already given, viz: "That whatever can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve existence." The 7th proposition here cited is, that "it pertains to the nature of substance to exist." This proposition again is proved by referring to a preceding proposition, and to a definition. In the end, then, we come back, as in all geometrical demonstrations we must, to the definitions and axioms. We shall be obliged, therefore, at last, carefully to examine these definitions and axioms, and to test their truth by comparing their several products with each other, or with known and established truths reached by some other method.

Before attempting this, let us look at another form of Spinoza's argument in proof of the existence of God. That which has just been given, it will be noticed, is indirect. It is an example of the reasoning technically known as the reductio ad absurdum, or ad impossibile.

The direct or ostensive argument, of which a literal translation is appended, stands thus:

"Of every thing a cause or reason must be assigned, why it exists, or why it does not exist. For example, if a triangle exists, a cause must be given why it exists, but if it does not exist, a reason or cause must be given which prevents its existence, or which cancels its existence. For example, the reason why a square circle does not exist, is indicated by its very nature, to wit: because it involves a contradiction. But on the other hand, why substance exists, follows solely from its nature, because, namely, it in-
volves existence. See Prop. vii. But the reason why a circle, or why a triangle exists, or does not exist, follows not from their nature, but from the order of universal corporeal nature, for from this it must follow either that a triangle now necessarily exists, or that it is impossible that it now exists. But these things are manifest of themselves. From which things it follows that that necessarily exists in regard to which no reason or cause is given which cancels its existence. If, therefore, no reason or cause can be given which prevents God from existing, or which cancels his existence, it must be concluded that he necessarily exists. But if such reason or cause should be given, this must be given either within the nature of God or without his nature, that is, in another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature, this would be to concede that God exists, or that there is a God. But substance, which should be of another nature, by Prop. ii., would have nothing in common with God, and, therefore, could neither yield his existence, nor cancel it.

"Since, therefore, a reason or cause which cancels the divine existence can not be given without the divine nature, it must necessarily be given (if, indeed, he does not exist) within his nature, which involves a contradiction. But to affirm this concerning an absolutely infinite and absolutely perfect being is absurd, therefore, neither within God, nor without God is any cause or reason given which cancels his existence, and, therefore, God necessarily exists."

This argument is given at length as a specimen of the general manner of Spinoza. It exhibits the strictly logical character of his mind, and also his adroitness in seizing upon the media of proof.

§ 5. Criticism of Spinoza’s Definition of Substance.

But we must not forget that Bacon has spoken the truth, and only the truth, when he says that “the syllogism is not applicable to the principles of the sciences, since it is by no means equal to the subtlety of nature.” It is precisely these principles which Spinoza has assumed in his definitions and axioms, and his system, therefore, as is the
case with any system grounded upon the deductive logic, must stand or fall with the truth or falsity of the principles assumed.

In proceeding then to examine those principles which give tone and character to his whole system, we come first to his definition of the term substance. Let us carefully examine Spinoza's idea of Substance in order to see whether it is an idea which we can recognize as a legitimate product of the human intelligence possessing the characteristics of truth and certainty.

"By substance," says he, "I understand that which is conceived in itself and by itself; that is, that whose conception does not need another thing by which it must be formed."

Let us now ask ourselves, whether this is the idea of substance which reason, upon the data of perception or of consciousness, reveals to us? At this point let us recall the distinction, already referred to, between the logical and chronological order of ideas. "Cogito, ergo sum" (I think, and therefore I am), it will be remembered, is the starting point of Des Cartes. Here, then, are two ideas, Thought and Existence. If we ask which of these, in the order of knowledge, precedes and conditions the other, the answer must be, Thought conditions Existence; that is, in the chronological order we obtain that idea first. If it is asked which of these, in the logical order, conditions the other, the answer will be, Existence precedes and conditions Thought. We must exist before we can think.

What power of the human intelligence reveals to us this existence? We call it Reason. Take another step. Add memory to consciousness, and we have a succession of thoughts which, reason assures us, spring from one and the same existence. What is the fundamental characteristic of this existence? Reason imposes upon us the necessity of supposing a subject to which these thoughts belong. This subject now of our thoughts, which reason imposes upon us the necessity of presupposing as underlying our thoughts, is it or is not what we understand as
spiritual substance? It certainly is. And this, so far as we are able to trace it, is our primary idea of Substance.

In the same way precisely, upon the experimental data given by the senses, the validity of whose testimony has already been vindicated in speaking of Des Cartes, by reason we reach the idea of material substance, the subject which underlies the phenomena of sensation and constitutes their bond of union.

Here, then, is a two-fold idea of substance. Spiritual substance revealed by reason as the subject of the observed phenomena of thought. Material substance revealed by the same attribute of the human intelligence as the subject of the observed phenomena of matter. Let us note now one common characteristic of these substances. They are no abstractions. They are realities. They are entities, the existence of which forces itself by reason, upon the belief of universal man. But are these the substance of Spinoza? Far from it. "By substance," says he, "I understand that which is in itself and by itself; that is, whose conception does not need the conception of another thing by which it must be formed." Again, "That thing is called finite, in its kind, which can be terminated by another thing of the same nature, e.g. body is called finite, because we always conceive another greater. So thought is bounded by another thought. But body is not bounded by thought nor thought by body." Once more (Prop. viii.), "Every substance is necessarily infinite." The substance, then, which reason reveals, and the existence of which it forces the mind to admit, is not the substance of Spinoza, and will by no means answer the purpose, which he had in view. These substances are finite, but his substance is infinite. These are existing entities, it remains to be seen whether his is not a pure abstraction.

§ 6. Time, Space, and Infinity.

We have already seen what, so far as we are able to trace it, is the origin of our idea of absolute infinity. Upon the data of conscious thought and memory, we grasp by reason
the idea of absolute time, which includes the idea of infinity. In like manner upon the data of a conscious report of the senses, which give the phenomena of matter, we grasp by reason the idea of absolute space, which also underlies the idea of infinity.

What, now, do we, nay what do all men who are not laboring to construct a system, understand by the idea of time absolute? Do we understand by it any thing else than the room necessary for the flow of events, supposing events to transpire; to come upon the stage of being? We understand by it nothing more. It does not include, in our idea of it, any event, or any being.

In like manner, what do we—what do all men not bound to a system—understand by the idea of space? We understand by it simply the place or room necessary for the existence of body, supposing body to appear upon the stage of creation. It does not include, in our idea of it, any body, or any existence whatever. Yet both these ideas are absolute, necessary, and infinite. Once in the mind they can never be blotted out. They can never be annihilated. The present point, however, is simply the idea of absolute infinity. It may be suggested either by time absolute or by space absolute. Such, so far as we can trace them, are the facts of consciousness, sanctioned by the observation of universal man. Does Spinoza recognize and admit them? They would ruin his system. It will be necessary, then, carefully to examine his definitions of the words which stand connected with this idea of infinity.

First, then, let us look after his idea of Time. It may be found in Def. v., of Part II., of the Ethics, to which we shall be obliged more than once to refer, in order to a clear understanding of his doctrine of God, contained in Part I. of the work. Time, then, in so far as his system contains the idea, is described in Part II., Def. v., thus: "Duration is an indefinite continuation of existence." Here is nothing absolute, nothing infinite. It is a merely relative idea, and its correlative is existence. In Part I., Def. viii., already cited, he defines eternity thus: "Eternity is existence itself, as far as it is conceived to follow from the sole defi-
nition of an eternal thing." The system of Spinoza, then, formally rejects the idea of absolute time. With him existence is every thing.

Again, let us look after his idea of space. The attempt to find it in his system will be made in vain. The most careful perusal of the Ethics, we are confident, will be able to detect no recognition of the idea of space. Indeed, it would be an inconsistency in him to recognize it,—for he defines substance to be that whose conception does not need the conception of another thing by which it must be formed.

Now, if the idea of space or of a pure vacuum, the very idea which reason reveals to us as the necessary, absolute, and infinite, logical condition of the idea of body, should be admitted, it would follow that vacuum is substance, for it does not need the conception of any thing else by which it is formed; and since he proves, in Part I., Prop. xiv., that God is the only substance, it would follow that God is a vacuum. The system of Spinoza would thus be reduced to Atheism, or rather to a pure Nihilism, which, in this sense at least, he did not design it to be. His Ethics contains no definition of space nor of extension. But in Part II., Prop. viii., we are told that Extension is an attribute of God, and in a corollary of Prop. xiv., Part I., we are informed that whatever thing is extended is either an attribute of God or an affection of an attribute. By extension he means with Des Cartes that which has three dimensions, and with Des Cartes he denies a vacuum. Des Cartes maintains that nothing or a vacuum has no properties, but as space, or rather extension, has three dimensions, it must be substance, it must be the element of body, and he reduces himself, therefore, to the necessity, whatever infinity he attributes to what we call space, to attribute the same to matter also.

Des Cartes, however, perfectly discriminates between God and nature, and recognizes two infinite substances, both of them standing the test of his measure and rule of truth, viz., that they are ideas as clear and certain as his own existence, revealed by thought alone.

On the contrary, without here repeating the propositions
which prove the points, Spinoza teaches that it is absurd to suppose the existence of more than one substance; that, since the idea of extension (that is, in our conception, space) can not be denied, it must be an attribute of this substance. Now, as God is a substance, and as it is absurd to suppose more than one substance, God must be a substance infinitely extended.

§ 7. An Extraordinary Spectacle.

Here, then, we are brought again to his first principle, Substance; and we must not leave it until it has been subjected to a more careful examination. But at this point, it is impossible our attention should not be strongly arrested by the extraordinary spectacle before us. Here are the two leaders and pioneers of a school of philosophizing, which grounds and uprears itself upon their method. The method of certainty with these two philosophers is identical: Existence revealed by thought alone. The rule and measure of truth is identical: Whatever is as clearly seen as existence, thus ascertained, is true. Behold our leaders confronting each other! Behold them virtually condemning each other’s doctrine. Condemning each other’s doctrine in regard to what? Touching some triviality? Some accident of philosophy? No; but upon the very foundation principle of their whole system. The one maintaining the existence of two infinite substances, which stand the test of the measure of all truth: the other declaring the idea to be an absurdity, and maintaining that there is but one.
CHAPTER VIII.

Spinoza's Ethics—concluded.

§ 1. The two a priori Leaders confronted.

The peculiar conceptions of Spinoza which we have thus far examined, all find their culminating point in his conception of Substance, the fundamental unity of his philosophy. Thus far we have found him, after rejecting in opposition to the demand of universal reason the idea of absolute time, after denying in the face of the same authority, but with the support of his great leader Des Cartes, the idea of absolute space, in the sense of a vacuum, at length assert, in opposition to the unequivocal testimony of both together, the absurdity of the existence of two substances, and proclaim his discovery of the one and the only substance.

Attention has already been drawn to the remarkable spectacle thus presented in the very pioneers of a great school and system of philosophizing. They are both men of exceptional, nay of extraordinary intellectual stature. Nobody can read intelligently the Ethics of Spinoza, without finding himself in the grasp of a giant intellect; and Spinoza declares of his master, that he never uttered any thing which was not profound. Yet here they stand before us, each holding in his hand an infallible clew, a method of investigating truth, claiming to lead, without danger of mistake, to perfect certainty; a method filled with a horror of error so intense as to reject every primary witness to truth except the solitary voice of spiritual consciousness; here they stand confronting each other, and condemning each other's doctrine, upon the fundamental unity of their whole system of philosophy.

The position of Des Cartes, that there must be at least two substances, being assumed as the starting point in constructing science, by reasoning downward from it, would give us one set of conclusions. The position of Spinoza,
that there is and can be but one, would plainly give us quite another set. Alas for our infallible method!

§ 2. Spinoza’s Discovery and its Proof.

But we can not leave Spinoza here. We must proceed to a fuller development of his grand discovery. The Fifth Definition of the First Part of the Ethics not only gives the characteristic quality of God, but affirms him to be identical with the Substance which he has discovered. If any one had disputed with the great metaphysical geometrician the identity of these two conceptions, and demanded the proof of it, he would, doubtless, have been pointed to Prop. xiv., Part I., which reads thus:

“Since God is the absolutely infinite being, concerning whom no attribute which expresses the essence of Substance can be denied, and since, in Prop. xi., I have proved that he necessarily exists; if there were any substance except God, this substance must be explained by some attribute of God, and thus there would exist two Substances having the same attribute, which, in my Fifth Proposition, I have proved to be absurd: and, therefore, no other substance can be given, and consequently not even conceived. For, if it could be conceived, it must be conceived as existing, which, by the first part of this demonstration, is absurd.”

§ 3. Analysis of the Argument.

The demonstration seems rigid, as well as geometrical. But it includes a reference to Prop. xi., Part I., and that proposition contains a term not previously explained. As the same word is also contained in this demonstration, it is very necessary to settle its meaning. This word is Essence. What does Spinoza mean by essence? We search in vain for an answer in Part I., in which he discusses the nature of God. First only in Part II., as Def. ii., do we find not only a clear, but a strong and striking explanation of its meaning, thus: “I say that belongs to the essence of any thing which being given, the thing is necessarily given, and which being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken
away; or, that without which the thing, and, *vice versa*, that which without the thing can neither exist nor be conceived."

Let us thank the great discoverer for this clear and strong statement. It should have been found already in Part I., since he uses it in his very definition of God. Let us, however, as we now have it, not fail to remember it. Before proceeding further, it will be necessary to remind ourselves of Spinoza's definition of Attribute (Part I., Def. iv.), and to notice the fact, that *this* definition also contains the same term, *essence*; another proof of the importance of the word, as well as of the statement that it should have been found defined in Part I.:

"I understand by attribute that which the intellect perceives concerning substance as constituting its essence."

We have obtained from the First Part of the Ethics, Spinoza's definition of *substance*, his definition of God, the identification of this idea with that of *substance*, and, also, his definition of *attribute*. Now it is a peculiar doctrine of Spinoza touching the attribute of substance, that each one of them may be conceived by itself alone. This is demonstrated in the Tenth Prop. of Part I. It is impossible, however, to obtain from his First Part, whose subject is God, a full development of his nature. We have been obliged already to resort to his Second Part for a definition of the term essence. It was necessary to obtain this in order to understand his idea of substance.

In like manner there are two propositions bearing upon the nature of God's *attributes* necessary to be known, which we find first clearly stated and proved only when we turn to the Second Part. The First Proposition of Part II. asserts that thought is an attribute of God, or that God is a thinking *thing*. The Second Proposition, Part II., is that extension is an attribute of God, or that God is a *thing* extended.

We have thus sought out and brought together eight distinct propositions which find their common gist and center in Spinoza's idea of substance. Let us arrange them in order and number them.
§ 4. The Eight Factors of Substance.

1. The idea of substance is a perfectly absolute conception. That is to say, it needs the conception of nothing else to produce it.
2. God is an entity absolutely infinite.
3. The conception of substance, and that of God are identical.
4. Attribute is that which the intellect ascribes to substance as constituting its essence.
5. Every attribute of a substance can be conceived by itself alone.
6. Essence is that which constitutes the conception of any thing. It is that without which the thing, and *vice versa*, which without the thing can neither be, nor be conceived.
7. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking entity.
8. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended entity.

We have here then found eight distinct propositions scattered in different places in the Ethics, having their common gist and center in Spinoza's conception of substance. They must all be true of that conception. They are necessary to its very essence, for they are conceptions which being given, the thing is given, and being taken away, the thing is taken away. Let us now, by a careful examination, endeavor to ascertain whether they are self-consistent; whether in the nature of things they can by any possibility, co-exist.

§ 5. The Attribute of Extension.

First of all, then, we will examine the seventh and eighth of these propositions, but for convenience sake we will invert the order, and begin with the conception of extension.

Let us propose then the question, what has extension to do with substance? Answer, extension is an attribute of God. Part II., Prop. ii. But as God is identical with sub-
stance, consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, extension is as well an attribute of substance. But now let us confine the idea to God and let us ask, is extension God? Apparently, no, for “extension is an attribute of God,” and an attribute is that, Def. iv., Part I., which the intellect perceives concerning substance as constituting its essence. Since, however, extension is an attribute of God constituting his essence, and since essence is that which being given the thing is given, and being taken away the thing is taken away, so that, if it were possible to take away God’s extension, we should take away his essence, and if we should take away his essence, we should take away his existence, it would follow that extension is God. But according to the doctrines of Spinoza is this a conceivable supposition? By the definition of attribute, it is not an absolute, but only a relative idea; it is only that which the intellect perceives concerning substance as constituting its essence. But can we not conceive the divine attributes as absolute? Certainly, responds Spinoza. Prop. x., Part I. “Every attribute of a substance must be conceivable by itself alone.” Very well. This destroys the definition of attribute as a relative idea, the absolute one being substance. Its relativity is gone. We have a new absolute conception, viz: infinite extension. If, then, we are able to conceive of infinite extension by itself alone, it follows that we are able to conceive of the abolition the utter annihilation of every thing beside. Let us make this conception. Let us conceive the abolition of every other conception except this single one of absolute extension. Done. For Spinoza asserts it to be possible. Does God remain, or is God destroyed? Since infinite extension is an attribute of God expressing infinite essence, which being given the thing is given, and being taken away the thing is taken away, it is mathematically certain that God remains, and mathematically certain that infinite extension is God. And since in mathematics subject and predicate are convertible terms, it is mathematically certain that God is infinite extension.
§ 6. The Attribute of Thought.

Let us turn now, as was proposed, to the seventh in this series of propositions, and ask whether thought is an attribute of substance and of God? This is affirmed by Spinoza, for it is formally stated and proved as the First Proposition of Part II. He affirms also of thought, as of every other attribute of substance and of God, Prop. x., Part I., that it may be conceived by itself alone. It may be shown, however, as in the case of extension, that to make this conception is to destroy its relativity. It can no longer be an attribute of substance or of God. It becomes an absolute entity of itself. But since these two incompatibilities are demanded by the system, viz., that a conception must be at once relative and absolute, let us as in the former case make the supposition. What follows? If we conceive of infinite thought by itself alone, by that act we conceive of the utter abolition, the entire annihilation of every attribute and every thing beside. When now we have made this conception, does God remain, or is he destroyed? He remains. For as before, since infinite thought is an attribute of God expressing infinite essence, which being given the thing is given, and being taken away the thing is taken away, it is mathematic ally certain that God remains, and mathematic ally certain that infinite thought is God. And since in mathematics subject and predicate are convertible, it is mathematic ally certain that God is infinite thought.

But it has already been proved that God remains, when his essence as infinite extension is granted, and his essence as infinite thought is annihilated. Now it is proved by the same reasoning that God remains when his essence as infinite thought is granted, and his essence as infinite extension is annihilated. It is needless to say that we have here a palpable and insuperable contradiction. If infinite extension is God, and infinite extension is annihilated, God is annihilated, and does not remain. This contradiction might be presented in many forms. Enough that we have it in one. What is the origin of it? It is claiming for an
entirely subordinate idea, the power of its principal. To claim for the subordinate attribute the sole characteristic of its principal substance, which is the power of being conceived by itself alone, is to demand that we admit that which is unthinkable. Contradictions will emerge in whatever direction we turn. It is in vain that Spinoza attempts to draw a distinction between the absolutely infinite, and the suum generis infinite. The sophism lies in confounding the relative with the absolute, and demanding for the former an incompatible and unthinkable power.

§ 7. Result of the criticism.

It has already been suggested that there are two distinct methods in which we may test the truth of a principle, assuming it to be correct. We may reason downward from it, and compare the products of our deductions with the truths already known but established by some other method, inquiring whether these known truths would be confirmed or overturned, by the necessary deductions from the principle in question. Or on the same assumption of its correctness, we may make inferences from the principle in different lines of argument.

To both of these tests we have now subjected Spinoza’s principle that there is but one substance in the universe. By the first method it has been shown that this principle conflicts with the ideas of absolute time and absolute space and annihilates them. But these are necessary conceptions of the human reason. If the principle of Spinoza is correct, then there is no such idea as time absolute, and no such idea as absolute space, in the only sense in which consciousness attests their existence, and the belief and attestation of universal man is a lie.

By the second method it has been shown that the principle of Spinoza yields results which are positively self-contradictory, categorically affirming God’s existence in one line of argument in the sense in which it categorically denies it in another, the primary principle remaining precisely the same.

It is as certain then as any thing human can be, that the
philosophy of Spinoza proceeds upon false assumptions. We might then stop precisely here and claim that the system of Spinoza has been overthrown; since its central principle by the strictest deductions of his own geometric method of proof, not only yields results which come into collision with known truth, but conclusions which contradict each other.

§ 8. Spinoza's Fallacies in detail.

But it will not perhaps be without a useful result if we examine a little more in detail the origin of several of his principal fallacies. "Divide and conquer," is a well-known maxim in military tactics. It remains to be seen by the final judgment of the world, whether truth in philosophy will finally succumb to a policy, which has sometimes routed armies. The definitions and axioms of Spinoza, which are essential to the construction of his system, are at best but half-truths, and some of them are falsehoods, which owe their deceptive power entirely to the ambiguity of words. Let us look at some of the most important of them.

§ 9. Fallacy in the Definition of Substance.

First then Substance. "By substance," says he, "I understand that which is conceived in itself and by itself; that is, that whose conception does not need the conception of any other thing by which it must be formed."

Now it is an essential characteristic of a good definition, and more especially of a definition to be employed in geometric and mathematical reasoning, that it should clearly distinguish the object defined from every thing else. Let us ask then, what is the great, what indeed is the sole characteristic of substance as given in this definition? It is, that it is capable of being conceived by itself alone. It is that which does not need the conception of any other thing by which it must be formed. Suppose now we impose upon Spinoza the task of making clear to our minds the difference between the idea of substance thus defined, and the idea of a pure vacuum? Will not this definition of
substance apply with entire exactness to the idea of a perfect vacuum? What more perfect negative definition could we desire to express the idea which reason forces upon all men, than we should have by substituting the word vacuum for the word substance in this definition? Is not a vacuum precisely that which does not need the conception of any other thing by which it must be formed? Suppose, however, that Spinoza should deny, as he does deny, the existence of a vacuum, and demand to know what proof can be presented of its existence. Our sufficient reply might be: We do not know whether a vacuum actually subsists or not in rerum natura. One thing we know, we have a conception of the idea, and that the proof of it is quite as strong as that of the existence of the substance which he has defined; for the two ideas are precisely identical, so far forth as any characteristic is presented.

Will Spinoza deny that we are able to form the idea of a pure vacuum? What then does he mean when he maintains with Des Cartes that space is not a vacuum? He must have had the conception of a pure vacuum, else he could not have compared with it the idea of space, and declared them to disagree. The truth is, the idea of space, and the idea of a pure vacuum, which reason necessitates and imposes upon the conception and belief of the human race, save only upon system-building philosophers, are one and identical; and both the idea that vacuum is not space, and the proof of it, viz., that one has no properties, whilst the other has the property of extension, are alike the vagaries of speculation, destitute of any positive proof. But allowing these vagaries to be sense and reason, and that a pure vacuum is something different from space, having no length, no breadth, no thickness, no predicable property whatever, it can not fail to strike us as not a little remarkable that this is a conception which Spinoza's definition of substance, if expressing any thing whatever, expresses admirably well, to-wit: "that, whose conception does not need the conception of any other thing by which it must be formed."
§ 10. Fallacy in the Definition of Attribute.

We will now pass to another of his definitions, that of Attribute. It has already been given. But let us repeat it. "By attribute, I understand that which the intellect perceives concerning substance as constituting its essence."

Attention has already been directed to the circumstance, that in the definition he uses an important term, and one which plays no insignificant role in his philosophy, and which nevertheless has had no definition itself. That term is essence. The definition of attribute is at the opening of Part I. Essence is first defined at the opening of Part II. This is mentioned to show how ill suited are geometrical forms to metaphysical and moral reasoning. As then we are not informed what is meant by the term essence, our definition, in a mathematical point of view, is properly no definition.

Passing over, however, this palpable fault, and assuming that we know the essence of a thing to be the reality of it, the only information which the definition gives us is, that attribute is something which the intellect perceives concerning substance as constituting its essence. Now what has been shown by the definition to be the great, indeed the only characteristic of substance? It is, that it is that which does not need the conception of any other thing by which it must be formed. But does not this equally characterize attribute? Yes. For in Part I, Prop. x, it is proved upon the sole basis of these two definitions, that attribute can be conceived by itself alone. So then, it appears that the sole characteristic of substance is equally a characteristic of attribute. The definition of substance will therefore apply not only to a vacuum, but equally well to an attribute. And so far as any ideas are concerned, which are contained in these words, all three might be used as convertible terms. All that we are told about them is that they do not need the conception of any other thing by which they must be formed. What now is this but mere metaphysical prestidigitation? What indeed is it but to say that vacuum is vacuum, and substance is substance,
and attribute is attribute? May we not at least affirm that Substance of this description well merits the sarcasm of Locke? “Had the poor Indian philosopher,” says that writer, “who imagined that the world wanted something to bear it up, but thought of this word substance, he needed not to be at the trouble to find an elephant to support it, and a tortoise to support his elephant. The word substance would have done it effectually.”

§ 11. Fallacy in the Definition of Body.

In connection with these definitions, let us spend a few moments in examining his definition of the word Body, though we shall be obliged to go into Part II. in order to find it. It seems to be the policy of Spinoza to “divide and conquer;” to put as wide a space as possible between ideas, which in fact and nature belong together. “By body,” says he, Part II., Definition i, “I understand the mode, which expresses the essence of God, as far as he is considered as something extended, in a certain determinate manner. See Corollary, Proposition xxi, Part I.”

This is his definition. But we are also referred to a certain corollary for further light. What is that corollary? It is, that particular things are nothing but affections or modes of the attributes of God, by which those attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate (limited) manner. Here again we are referred to another proposition and another definition. Without however wearying ourselves with all these shifts and doublings, inseparable perhaps from the geometrical method of proof, let us come at once to his idea. It is, that body is a mode or affection of the divine attribute of extension. What is Extension? It is space. It is the three dimensions, length, breadth, thickness. Now let it be remembered that according to Spinoza body is not God; for body is determinate, limited, finite, imperfect. God is absolute, illimitable, infinite, perfect. Body is bounded by other bodies, says Spinoza. God is boundless. Body again is not even an attribute of God. It is an affection of an attribute which constitutes God’s essence. An affection of what attribute? Of extension,
Every thing of reality then, every thing of essence, which body has is extension. It has and can have nothing else even of the divine essence. Behold the problem which Spinozism, and we may add the entire Cartesian philosophy as well, has imposed upon the human understanding. It is this: "Extension being given, it is required to construct from it a body, something which has not merely length, breadth and thickness, but solidity, color, odor, sapidity, and if body has any other properties, these also. Remember there must be no reality in body which is not in extension, otherwise there would be something in a mode or affection of a thing which is not in the thing itself. We may imagine our body to be blown to atoms by an explosion; nay, we may conceive it to be absolutely annihilated so that not one particle of it remains in the universe. Let us be calm. Our body has lost nothing of its essence; nothing of its nature. Is not extension left? Does not the space which it occupied remain? Body and space do not differ in re, says this astonishing philosophy.

We shall, then, by possibility, be able to recover that lost body of ours. To that end we want nothing except the solution of this simple problem. Extension being given, required the mode of working it up into a body. If the doctrine of this philosophy, that there is nothing in body which is not also in extension, is truth, and will bear the test of experiment, we ought now to be on the eve of a great discovery. The mysteries of magic ought to be unveiled and out-peered. A secret should be struggling for birth outvieing the charm which the sorceress of Iolchos taught to the daughters of Pelias. Spinoza and the Cartesian philosophy are charged with the duty of informing us distinctly how body comes from its element; that is, how extension is compounded into the infinitely varied corporeal objects around us. Where are we to find the solution of this problem? In two places in the Ethics of Spinoza. The first is in a corollary under Prop. xiv., Part I. That proposition we have already seen to be: "Besides God no substance can either be given or conceived." The corollary stands thus: Sequitur rem extensam et rem cogitan-
tem vel Dei attributa esse vel affectiones attributorum.” Literally translated, this means:

“It follows, that any thing extended and any thing thinking are either attributes of God, or affections of attributes.”

The second passage is (Part II, Prop. ii.): “Extension is an attribute of God, or God is a Thing extended.” The secret is ours. The mystery is solved. We demanded of the philosophy of Spinoza to inform us how space or extension is transmitted into Body? We are informed that extension is an attribute of God, or, and let us mark well this pretended equivalent or, God is a Thing extended.

Now, since God is Res Extensa, it might appear to a careless student of Spinoza, that we have a very satisfactory account of the mode in which particular things or bodies are produced. It required only that this infinite res extensa should project or develop itself into the form of the finite or particular things around us, and body is produced. Are we, then, after all, to content ourselves with a metaphysical juggl? In so far as this infinitely extended thing has in it the element of body, we demanded to know what that element is. We were informed that it is the infinite attribute of extension. What does that include? Solidity? No. Color, sound, odor, sapidity? None of them. It is simply the three dimensions. This is the element, and nothing but this, which Spinoza and the Cartesian philosophy as well, is charged with the responsibility of converting into the multitudinous bodies around us, and disclosing the process. How does it fulfill this obligation? By presenting the stupendous equivocation, or God is a Thing extended.

In whatever direction we turn, we find ourselves entangled in contradictions or fallacies. It would not be impossible, in like manner, to expose the sophistries involved in every fundamental principle which characterizes the system of Spinoza, or which renders it proper to call it Spinozism. But this would be to extend the refutation far beyond the limits at present prescribed. We must be content with
merely glancing at one more term, whose definition gives character to his philosophy.

§ 12. Fallacy in the definition of Cause.

The term in hand is Cause. The definition of it is not only the very first given in the Ethics, but it is also very peculiar. It stands thus:

"By Causa sui (self-cause) I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature can not be conceived as not existing." To say nothing at present of the expression self-cause, this is no proper conception of the idea of cause, as conceived of by the reason of universal man. We understand by existence, that which underlies phenomena. Substance is existence. By cause we understand force, that which produces phenomena, which phenomena we therefore denominate effects. The very expression, causa sui, is, therefore, a solecism in human language. Now, existence abstracted from cause, the human reason does not conceive as producing effects. Men do not speak of matter, in so far as it is a mere existence, as the cause of its own qualities, but only as that which underlies them. As now by robbing substance of its characteristic of existence, and transferring that to the idea of cause, Spinoza was able, by a stroke of the pen, to reduce God to nature, and to confound all distinction between them; so, by robbing cause of its dynamic character, of the idea of force, and substituting for it the idea of simple existence, he is easily able to banish a personal God from the universe; to reduce that universe to a vast machine, working in virtue of necessary laws, without free will, without design, without aiming to accomplish any end whatever. Such, in brief, is the system of Spinoza. It converts God into a machine, and, of course, it converts man into a machine, for man is only a limited mode of God's existence. It seems necessarily a contradiction of his system that he counsels men to govern their lives by reason. How can they? The system itself, as Jouffroy has shown, is a vast scheme of Fatalism, self-executing and inexorable in its ongoings and developments. The German word Ent-
Wickelung sums up and characterizes its entire influential possibilities upon mankind.

CHAPTER IX.

Spinoza's Environment in the Nineteenth Century.


There are three problems pertaining to the spiritual nature of man which may well be called by way of eminence, the great problems of humanity. The first relates to the existence of God, the second to the freedom of the human will, the third to the immortality of the soul. There are no other problems of equal interest, none in which humanity has a stake so deep and so permanent as in these. Of such mark and significance are they, that there are no others with which the human mind has so universally and persistently wrestled. Age after age it has been foiled and worsted by their insoluble mysteries, and age after age it has returned undaunted with an unextinguished and an inextinguishable curiosity to the task. As merely speculative problems, the history of philosophic opinion affords us small hope that they ever will be solved. "Not to despair of philosophy," may indeed be, as a strong writer has declared it to be, "the last infirmity of noble minds," but it may be an infirmity still. We may well suspect the difficulties which these problems present, to be insuperable by the human mind, in accordance with a striking observation of the same writer. "As the greyhound can not outstrip his shadow, nor the eagle the atmosphere in which he soars, so the mind of man can not transcend that sphere of limitation within which and through which exclusively the possibility of thought is realized."

The Ethics of Spinoza embraces all these problems. But
as we have confined our attention chiefly to the first of them, the existence of God, we will limit the discussion to the same topic in the subject now in hand, the Environment of Spinoza in the Nineteenth Century. It may be well, however, before presenting the great names which must form the chief moments in his environment, to cast a glance across the centuries falling within the Christian era. We shall thus be able to bring the problem as it was left by the Greek philosophers, into juxtaposition with it as it stood at the opening of our century. It will enable us to see whether any progress, and if any what, had been in the mean time made in settling the elements of this great problem of the race.

The existence of God then—how is the human mind to satisfy itself in regard to the question whether there is a personal, omniscient, all-powerful, just and good Being, who presides over the destinies of the universe? Is the problem capable of solution? What is the answer of Greece at the opening of the Christian era? The testimony of Paul gives the popular answer, inscribed upon the Athenian altar, Ἀνώτατος θεός—To the unknowable God. This settles the question for the most intellectual and highly cultured people of the ancient world. They had pronounced the problem insoluble. They had declared God, in any such sense as that which we are considering, not only unknown, but unknowable, for such appears to be the true meaning of this adjective. But how now stood the case with the philosophers?

The history of Greek philosophy is in the main only a fragment of the history of the struggle of the human reason to recover the lost conception of God, if it had ever been possessed, or to form it anew if it never had. Sometimes as we read the pages of these philosophers we are ready to exclaim with delight: they have grasped it, the problem is solved. What elevation and breadth of thought for example in this fragment from Parmenides, which may be found among the collections of the “inexhaustible Fabricius,” and of which a rough version is appended.
"Sole, self-produced with neither change nor bounds,  
It was not, will not be, but ever is,  
One and forever! Can'st thou find its birth?  
Whence waxed? From non-existence I admit  
Thee not to say nor think; for say nor think  
Must thou, that nothing is. For from what need,  
Later or soon to be, assumed it life?"

Look again at this fragment of Empedocles derived from the same source:

"Not furnished he with human head and form,  
Not from his back adown two limbs project,  
No feet, nor supple knee, nor part of shame  
Are his, but sacred mind ineffable."

Our admiration, however, is destined to suffer a severe collapse, when with all these sublime flights of language, we find occasion to doubt whether God is at all by them distinguished from the universe; whether the distinction between spirit and matter is as yet at all attained, and whether their spherical god is any thing more than a kind of pantheistic deity in the shape of a globe.

Turn to Plato, the literary paragon of the Greek philosophy, born B. C., 430, and of whose immortal dialogues in which he embalmed alike the name and the doctrines of the great teacher of Greece, Charles Sumner spoke so beautifully, as shining with a clear and stellar luster across the centuries. Yes, Plato! has the stellar ray of the Socratic dialogues, borne with it through the lapse of the ages the light of the living God, the essence of his being and his character? Has this stellar light any warmth? Any life-giving power? It had been falling full upon the "eye of Greece," upon Athens the intellectual center of the world, for more than a third of a millenium, when the apostle Paul found its "stellar brightness" dimly lighting up an altar with the inscription: To the Unknowable God. Such is the monument of Greece to the god of the Socratic philosophy. The speculations of Plato were doubtless wonderful and sublime. But Professor Dunbar, while doing the amplest justice to the reach of his thought in the Phaedon and Timaeus, still affirms that he imagined matter
to be eternal, to contain in itself the germ of all evil, made up of contrary principles, and so intractable as to resist the power of the Deity himself. Did Plato worship the Deity to whom his countrymen, as a nation of idolaters, erected the monumental altar? What then does Cudworth mean when he admits that he was a polytheist?

§ 2. The history of the Problem for the first eighteen centuries of the Christian Era.

Such was the aspect of our question at the opening of the Christian era. Let us take a flight across the ages. Let us alight on the fast-anchored isle, in the middle of the century which heralds our own. Europe has been Christianized and theologized, and philosophized, in some sense again and again. Let us strive to catch a glimpse of our question on the outer edge of its environment to-day, before we enter within that environment itself in our own epoch.

Scholasticism has dreamed its dream. Bacon has come and gone. Descartes and Spinoza have done their work. So have Locke, and Newton, and Hobbes. Dr. Samuel Clarke, born A.D., 1675, died A.D., 1729, next to Newton and Locke the most famous of English philosophers and theologians, has published his treatise on the "Being and Attributes of God in answer to Hobbes and Spinoza," in which he attempts a peculiar form of the rationalistic argument. After presenting the ordinary teleological proof, he adds, that an eternal necessity is the ground of the existence of the Infinite First Cause, and he asserts that to deny this, is to maintain contradictions. When pressed by an opponent with difficulties, Dr. Clarke presented the following as a perfect a priori demonstration of the existence of God. Space and eternity are infinite ideas. Every man possesses them. They are attributes, and as being universal, they are necessary attributes. They, therefore, imply a necessary substance which is infinite. This substance is God. To the reply of his opponent that space and eternity could hardly be called attributes or property, for that they remain even upon the supposition that all substance is an-
nihilated, he had only to answer that the supposition is absurd, and beyond this point, the thing was not to be reasoned about. We shall look, hereafter, to the validity of this reasoning, and simply refer to it here.

Let us catch one more glimpse of our problem outside the epoch which forms our chief theme, and we will then present directly the pith of our subject. George Berkeley, bishop of Cloyne, in Ireland, the celebrated idealist, born A. D. 1684, died A. D. 1753, published A. D. 1732 “Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher.” In the fourth dialogue of this work, with admirable elegance of language and felicity of illustration, he presents the ordinary teleological argument for the existence of God. Yet, for some reason, we can not feel absolutely satisfied. We feel that the arrow is not brought fully to the mark. As there are many effects in the universe, so it is possible for us to infer many causes, and as polytheism is the actual Credo of the majority of mankind, so we are half inclined to suspect it may be the natural product of the human reason. True, indeed, by the law of parsimony, by that principle of philosophizing which forbids us to suppose more causes for an effect than are sufficient, we may say that the light of nature is exhausted in proving the existence of one God; that the cause which is equal to the production of a man, is equal to the production of a universe; yet we find it so difficult, if not so impossible, to conceive of a cause which possesses at once infinity and personality, our reason so staggers and faints under the burden of an attempt to prove by a retrogression in the line of causes, such an unconditioned cause, that we remain, not indeed, it may be, in doubt about the actual existence of God, but about the power of the speculative reason to prove that existence.

In A. D. 1755 appeared in London the essays of the celebrated Scotch historian, philosopher, and skeptic, David Hume, born A. D. 1711, died A. D. 1776. The relation of his philosophical speculations to those of Berkeley is well known. The idealism of the one destroyed the reality of matter, and made the existence of the universe impossible. The materialism of the other destroyed the reality of Spirit,
and made the existence of God impossible. In this sketch now, how stands our problem? What we are attempting to prove is the existence of God, as the sole first cause of all things. It assumes two primary elements, matter and spirit. Look at the solutions thus far.

1. The solution of Plato. This asserts that God is spiritual in some sense, and eternal. It asserts the equal eternity of matter, as an independent and intractable entity. It is essentially the Manicheism of a later age, and therefore denies the existence of God as a First Cause.

2. The solution of Clarke. This asserts that God is the infinite first cause of all things, material and spiritual. His attributes are to be proved teleologically from his acts. His unconditioned existence can be proved only from the absolute conception of time and space, which, as being necessary and universal, must be regarded as attributes, and therefore prove an Unconditioned First Cause.

3. The solution of Berkeley. Here the problem has no element of matter. There is no proof whatever of the existence of a material world. The solution, therefore, denies the existence of God, as the first cause of the universe in the sense in which the human reason accepts it.

4. The solution of Hume. Here the problem has no element of Spirit. There is matter; that is all. Therefore there is no God. The problem disappears in Atheism.

With these preliminary glances at the elements and conditions of our great problem, we proceed to the subject before us. The Environment of Spinoza in the Nineteenth Century.

Some of the figures which must constitute this environment are so conspicuous that no one can mistake them or doubt the order in which they should be presented, so far as they can be presented at all. The state of the problem, as annihilated by the Scotch skeptic, David Hume, both logically and historically, introduces to us one of the greatest names in philosophy.
§ 3. Personal history of Kant.

Immanuel Kant.

The history of letters presents few sharper contrasts between the physically insignificant and the intellectually gigantic than in the case of the author of the "Critique of Pure Reason." Born in a remote corner of continental Europe, never having wandered, during a life of eighty years, more than seventeen German miles from his native town, the weakly son of a German saddler has made the city of his birth to philosophy, what Pisa and Florence and Thorn are to science; what Weimar and Rudolstadt, what Stratford-upon-Avon and Abbotsford are to poetry: the goal of a pilgrimage. The great thinker of Königsberg, carving out at once his science and the technics needed for the expression of it, remains to-day the corphæus of pure philosophy, swaying still an almost imperial scepter in the realm of metaphysics. Born in Königsberg in A. D. 1724, he died there in A. D. 1804, at the age of eighty years, working at his favorite problem up to the close of life. We are thus able to rank him as belonging to the environment of Spinoza in the nineteenth century, and, though that environment is crowded with illustrious personages, the colossal statue of Kant still lifts its kingly front before us, as if demanding our oath of fealty. Every incident in the history and habits of such an intellect is worthy to be studied, but they can not be noticed here. The darling object of his life was the rehabilitation of the great problem of humanity, smitten and all but annihilated by the blows of the skeptic of Edinburgh.

To do this, required a new analysis and measurement of the human soul, a new "Critique" of the powers and possibilities of the human reason. This book we are now to examine, simply to seek the response of the greatest of the thinkers of our epoch to the question, whether the problem still remains, and, if so, what light it throws upon the method of Spinoza. It must be clearly understood that the object before us now, is not at all to defend Kant nor even to expound him. This, if required, must be sought
elsewhere. The simple design now before us, is to find the judgment of the founder of the transcendental philosophy, and, up to the present day, the highest authority within its domain, touching the validity and success of the method of Spinoza in his attempt to solve the highest problem of humanity. This will be done for the most part by simple quotations from Haywood’s translation of the “Critick of Pure Reason,” published in London, 1848.*

§ 4. The Kantian System.

Though it would be desirable to read them after examining an analysis of the entire Kantian system, like that given by Morell, it will nevertheless, be sufficient for our particular purpose, to bear in mind the famous distinction of the transcendental philosopher between pure reason, the organ of infinite and absolute conceptions, and the pure understanding, the organ of conceptions which are limited and contingent. Let us now hasten to our task. Before presenting the passages which bear directly upon our object, it may be well to cite two or three which show his general style of thought and illustration.

§ 5. Preliminary Quotations.

“A philosopher was asked, how much does smoke weigh? He answered: Subtract from the burnt wood the weight of the remaining ashes, and you have the weight of smoke. He presupposed, therefore, as undeniable, that even in fire the matter (substance) does not diminish, but only the form of it undergoes a change” (p. 152).

Again, without giving his exact words, we have (p. 192) the following fine comparison: “‘The Pure Understanding’ may be likened to an island, inclosed by nature with unchangeable limits. ‘Pure Reason’ may be likened to the wide and stormy ocean which surrounds it, full of fogs and

*The translation of Haywood, referred to in the text, entitled “Critick of Pure Reason,” was employed in presenting the doctrines of Kant before the improved translation of Meiklejohn, entitled “Critique of Pure Reason,” had been made. A careful collation, however, of the passages quoted from Kant, reveals no reason for a change.
clouds, and icebergs and speculators—sailors, that is—roving round in search of discoveries."

The following gives a glimpse of his view of the third great problem of the race, Immortality, as well as a hint of his judgment touching the practical value of pure speculation: "The right, and even the necessity, of the admission of a future life, according to the principles of the Practical conjoined with the Speculative use of reason, is not in the least lost. For the mere speculative proof without this, has never been able to exercise an influence upon the general reason of mankind. It is so placed upon a hair's point, that even the school can retain it only so long as it turns unceasingly about itself, like a top; and consequently furnishes, in its own eyes, no permanent basis on which any thing could be built. The proofs which are used in the world, remain all hereby in their undiminished force."

§ 6. Division of all Speculative Proofs of God's Existence.

With these incidental citations we turn now directly to our great question. In the third division of the second book of the section called Transcendental Ethics, Kant divides all possible speculative proofs of the existence of God into three. He denominates them severally:

The Ontological,
The Cosmological,
The Physico-theological.

Each of these he examines, and pronounces upon the value of the speculative proof derived from it.

We present them in their order:

§ 7. The Ontological Proof.

1. The Ontological Proof. By this he means unquestionably a priori proof, proof derived that is, from the pure reason. Let us, then, examine carefully the judgment which he expresses of the value of this proof in the extracts which follow:

"If I do away with the predicate of an identical judgment, and retain the subject, a contradiction arises, and consequently I say the predicate belongs to the subject
necessarily. But if I annul the predicate, together with the subject, no contradiction arises, for there is no more any thing which could be contradicted. To assume a triangle and yet to do away with the three angles of the same, is contradictory; but to do away with the triangle together with the angles, is no contradiction. It is the same with the conception of an absolutely necessary being. If you do away with the existence of this, you thus do away with the thing itself, together with all its predicates. Whence, then, is the contradiction to be deduced?” (p. 418).

Another similar extract: “I can not make to myself the least conception of a thing which, if it were annulled with all its predicates, would leave behind a contradiction. And without a contradiction I have, by means of pure conceptions a priori, no mark of impossibility” (p. 414).

Once more: “Our conception of an object may, therefore, contain whatever and how much soever we will, yet must we quit it, in order to confer existence upon it. In objects of the senses, this occurs by means of the connection with any one of my perceptions according to empirical laws; but in objects of pure thinking there is no means at all for cognizing their existence, since this must be wholly cognized a priori. But our consciousness of all existence (whether through perception immediately, or through syllogisms, which connect something with perception) belongs wholly to the unity of experience; and an existence out of this field can not, indeed, be absolutely declared to be impossible, but it is a presupposition which we can not justify by any thing.” (p. 418).

Again: “The celebrated Leibnitz was far from effecting that as to which he flattered himself; that is, to wish to discover a priori, the possibility of so elevated an Ideal Being” (p. 419).

Finally: “There is, therefore, in the so celebrated Ontological proof of the existence of a Supreme Being from conceptions, all the toil and labor lost. And a man would just as little become richer in knowledge from mere ideas, as a merchant in fortune, if, in order to better his situation,
he were to add ciphers to the credit of his cash account” (p. 419).

So far as the ontological proof is concerned, let us pause here. The testimony of Kant to the invalidity of the proof of God’s existence drawn from the pure reason, is clear, distinct, positive, and reduplicated in form. Now, as Spinoza’s argument is purely a priori, inferring God’s existence from man’s power of forming an ideal conception of his being, we have not the slightest room to doubt that Kant places the argument of Spinoza in the same category with that of Leibnitz.

§ 8. The Cosmological Proof.

2. The Cosmological Proof. The argument seems to be essentially this. Posited, a single datum from experience, you have therewith given the cosmos, and along with it God, the absolutely necessary Being. This argument is briefly stated and criticised in the following extracts:

“If something exists then must also an absolutely necessary Being exist. Now I, myself, at least, exist. Consequently, an absolutely necessary Being exists.” (p. 420.)

Thus criticised: “In this cosmological argument so many sophistical principles meet, that speculative reason seems in this case to have summoned all its dialectical art in order to effect the greatest possible transcendental illusion.” (p. 426.)

Again: “The unconditioned necessity which we require so indispensably as the ultimate support of all things, is the real abyss of the human reason. We cannot guard against the thought, yet, also, we cannot bear it, that a Being which we represent to ourselves as the highest among all possible should say, as it were to itself: ‘I am from eternity to eternity. Besides me there is nothing, except that which is something merely by my will. But whence am I then?’ Here every thing sinks away under us, and the greatest perfection, like the smallest, floats without support from the speculative reason, to which it costs nothing to let one as well as the other disappear without the least impediment.” (p. 428.)
These extracts will suffice for the cosmological argument, and according to the highest transcendental authority, demonstrate its impossibility. Only one more argument remains to the speculative reason for the accomplishment of its work, and we hasten to present it. This is,


3. The Physico-theological Proof. Of the reach and value of this proof, Kant speaks as follows:

"If neither the conception of things in general, nor the experience of any existence in general can afford what is demanded, there still remains possible a means to be tried, whether a determined (limited) experience does not furnish a proof of the existence of a Supreme Being. Should this be impossible, there is then no satisfactory proof possible at all from mere speculative reason as to the existence of a Being which answers to our transcendental idea.

"We shall soon perceive that a very easy and valid answer to this question may be expected. For how can ever experience be given which should be conformable to our idea? That which is peculiar to this last, consists precisely in this, that an experience can never be congruous to it. The transcendental idea of a necessary, all-sufficient, original Being, is so immensely great, so highly raised above all that is empirical, which is always conditioned, that partly we can never collect enough matter in experience to fill up such a conception, and partly, we always grope about among the conditioned, and shall seek in vain after the unconditioned." (p. 431.)

Another quotation: "Everywhere we see a chain of effects and causes, of ends and means, regularity in beginning and ending, and since nothing has come of itself into the state in which it is, it always thus indicates further back, another thing as its cause, which renders exactly the same further inquiry necessary, so that in such a way, the great whole must sink into the abyss of nothing, if we did not admit something existing in itself, originally, and independently, external to this infinite contingent, which main-
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tains, and as the cause of its origin at the same time secures its duration.” (p. 432.)

Again: “Physico-theology can, therefore, give no determined conception of the Supreme Cause of the world, and, consequently, can not be sufficient for a principle of theology, which in its turn is to constitute the foundation of religion.” (p. 481.)

Two or three further quotations will sum up the judgment of the founder of the transcendental philosophy upon the value of the whole speculative proof of the existence of God.

First: “Transcendental ideas will, therefore, have in all likelihood their good, and consequently, immanent use; although if their meaning be misunderstood, and they be taken for conceptions of real things, they may be transcendental in their application, and precisely on that account deceitful.” (p. 446.)

Once more: “Now this Being of reason (ens rationis ratiocinatae), is certainly a mere idea, and is, therefore, not admitted absolutely, and as something real, in itself, but only laid at the foundation problematically (since we can not attain to it by means of any conceptions of the understanding), in order to look upon all the connection of the things of the sensible world, as if they had their foundation in the Being of Reason.” (p. 472.)

Finally: “I am certainly not of the opinion, which eminent and reflecting men, for example Sulzer, have so often expressed, when they have felt the weakness of the arguments hitherto adduced, that we might hope we should still one day find out evident demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of our pure reason: ‘There is a God.’ ‘There is a future life.’ I am certain rather that this will never happen.” (p. 511.)

The conclusion of the discussion must be adjourned to another chapter.
CHAPTER X.

SPINOZA'S ENVIRONMENT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY—CONTINUED.

§ 1. Transition to the Second Witness.

Does the a priori argument of Spinoza prove the being of God as a really existing entity? To this question the nineteenth century has already uttered in our ears its earliest response. The voice has fallen upon them with a ringing clearness and an unmistakable power. The answer is, No! Once more: Can the cardinal propositions of the pure reason, "There is a God," "There is a future life," ever be demonstrated? With a shrill, bursting, reduplicated emphasis the same voice answers; it answers with a volume and rush of sound which smites the ear like the trumpet stop of an organ: "I am certain this will never happen." This answer comes from an unexpected quarter. It comes from the man who rescued from utter extinction the problem of the divine existence, perishing under the atheistic blows of the Scotch materialist. It comes from the father and founder of the transcendental philosophy. It comes from the author of the distinction between the Reine Vernunft and the Reiner Verstand, the organ of the absolute and the organ of the contingent, the reason and the understanding. It is the voice of Immanuel Kant, the most colossal intellectual figure in the ranks of the philosophy to which he gave his name, and beyond all competition up to the present day the most perfect master of "pure thinking" in the sense of that philosophy, since the days of Spinoza himself. Our business with Kant is not to defend him. It is not to condemn him. It is not even to explain him. It is simply to rank him in the Environment of Spinoza, and to obtain his judgment upon an argument whose massiveness, subtleness, and intellectual splendor seems to have dazed and confounded the whole world. That judgment, be it true or false, has been pronounced
with a distinctness of accentuation which no candid mind will dare to question.

We must now pass on to listen to the voice of the next most eminent figure in the Environment of Spinoza in the Nineteenth Century. Among English speaking scholars there will be no hesitation in uttering his name. Logically and chronologically, it claims the second place in this illustrious environment. It will be the voice of a man whose birth in Ottery St. Mary in Devonshire, almost synchronizes with the birth of the American republic after the close of the revolutionary war. It will be the voice of the boy prodigy of the blue coat school at London, whose proud spirit at ten years of age in disdaining the patronage of a friend whose aid had procured him the humiliating benefit of a place at a charity school, rivaled that with which Johnson at maturity repudiated the patronage of Chesterfield. It will be the voice of the republican dreamer and enthusiast of Nether-Stowey, the husband of one of the three beautiful sisters Fricker, whose three spouses, Southey himself and Lovell, projected a new republic, a new utopia of liberty and equality styled pantisocracy, in the wilds of the new world. It will be the voice of the most brilliant of the three friends, Southey, Wordsworth and himself, whose combined luster forms the splendid constellation of the Lake School of Poetry. It will be the voice of the author of Christabel, and the Hymn of Chamouni, and the Ancient Mariner. It will be the voice of the multifarious student of German belleslettres and poetry and metaphysics, under the patronage of the Wedgwoods at Katzeburg and Göttingen. It will be the voice of the voluminous and ill-paid writer and lecturer; the voice of the poet-metaphysician of world-wide fame, hailing from London and Highgate; the voice of the most erudite, profound, and eloquent talker of modern or of ancient times. Whenever and wherever he opened his lips, a rapt attention never failed to follow. Let us also listen for a little time to the voice of

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE.

No English speaking student of philosophy has failed to
read the metaphysical works of Coleridge. In talking about a genius so many sided, and of such multifarious learning, there is always a tendency to wander from any given point. Let us remember we have nothing now to do with the philosophy of Coleridge himself, with the truth or falsehood of his system, if system he had, with its possibility or impossibility. We have to do with Coleridge simply as a witness for or against the validity of the a priori argument of Spinoza for the existence of God. The precise form of the question has already been given in speaking of the testimony of Kant. It is whether this argument is valid in proving the being of God as a really existing entity.

§ 2. Relation of Coleridge to H. C. Robinson.

It so happens that we have in the diary and correspondence of Henry Crabbe Robinson, this very testimony in the record of manifold conversations and discourses made at the very time when they were uttered. It is the record of a sympathizing and learned London barrister at law, a familiar friend not only of Coleridge, but of almost all the intellectual notabilities of England and the continent, covering a period from A. D., 1775, to A. D., 1867. Let us listen to this testimony, and as far as possible, confine it to the point in hand. Our first quotation shall be from this diary under date of Dec. 20th, 1810, when Robinson met the great metaphysician at the house of the Lamba. It reads thus:

§ 3. Quotations from Robinson's Diary.

"As I entered, he (Coleridge), was apparently speaking of Christianity. He went on to say that miracles are not an essential in the Christian system. He insisted that they were not brought forward as proofs; that they were acknowledged to have been performed by others as well as by the true believers. Pharaoh's magicians wrought miracles, though those of Moses were more powerful. In the new Testament the appeal is made to the knowledge which the believer has of the truths of his religion, not to the wonders wrought to make him believe. Of Jesus Christ he asserted that he was a Platonic philosopher.
And when Christ spoke of his identity with the Father, he spoke in a Spinozistic or Pantheistic sense, according to which he could truly say that his transcendental sense was one with God, while his empirical sense retained its finite nature. On my making the remark that in a certain sense every one who utters a truth may be said to be inspired, Coleridge assented, and afterwards named Fox and others among the Quakers, Madame Guyon, St. Theresa, etc., as being also inspired.

On my suggesting in the form of a question that an eternal, absolute truth could not be proved by an accidental fact in history, he at once assented, and declared it to be not advisable to ground the belief of Christianity on historical evidence. He went so far as to affirm that religious belief is an act not of the understanding, but of the will. To become a believer, one must love the doctrine, and feel in harmony with it, and not sit down coolly to inquire whether he should believe it or not.”

Notwithstanding the skeptical tendency of such opinions, Coleridge added that, “accepting Christianity as he did in its spirit, in conformity with his own philosophy, he was content, for the sake of its divine truths, to receive as articles of faith, or perhaps I ought to say leave undisputed, the miracles of the New Testament, taken in their literal sense.”

“Coleridge warmly praised Spinoza, Jacobi-on Spinoza, and Schiller, ‘Ueber die Sendung Moses.’ And he concurred with me in thinking the main fault of Spinoza to be his attempt to reduce to demonstration that which must be an object of faith.”

Let us pass on to other quotations, reserving comment for the present, only remembering that these were opinions expressed by Coleridge when he was forty-eight years of age, in the ripeness of his manhood, his doctrines already thought out and settled, and his fame world-wide.

The next quotation gives us Robinson’s second private interview with Coleridge, the first being only one day before. It is about a month earlier than the last. It bears date November 15, 1810. “A very delightful evening at
Charles Lamb’s. Coleridge very, very eloquent on German metaphysics and poetry, Wordsworth and Spanish politics. . . . Of Kant he spoke in terms of high admiration. In his ‘Himmel’s System,’ he appeared to unite the genius of Burnet and Newton. He praised also the ‘Träume eines Geistersehers,’ and intimated that he should one day translate the work on the Sublime and Beautiful. The ‘Kritik der Urtheilskraft’ he considered the most astonishing of Kant’s works. Both Fichte and Schelling he thought would be found at last to have erred when they deviated from Kant, but he considered Fichte a great logician, and Schelling perhaps a still greater man. In both, he thought, the want of gratitude toward their master a sign of the absence of the highest excellence.”

Our next citation bears date of May 3, 1812. “A call on Coleridge. He said that from Fichte and Schelling he had not gained any one great idea. To Kant his obligations were infinite, not so much for what Kant had taught him in the form of doctrine as from the discipline gained in studying the great German philosopher. Coleridge is indignant at the low estimation in which the post-Kantians affect to hold their master.”

The next quotation is, for the purpose in hand, perhaps the most remarkable in the whole diary. It bears date October 3, 1812, about two years after Robinson’s introduction to Coleridge, the latter being now at the age of fifty. The record reads: “Coleridge walked with me to A. Robinson’s for my Spinoza, which I lent him. While standing in the room, he kissed Spinoza’s face in the title-page, and said: ‘This book is a gospel to me.’ But in less than a minute he added: ‘His philosophy is nevertheless false. Spinoza’s system has been demonstrated to be false, but only by that philosophy which has demonstrated the falsehood of all other philosophies. Did philosophy commence with an it is instead of an I am, Spinoza’s would be altogether true.’ And, without allowing a breathing time, Coleridge parenthetically asserted: ‘I, however, believe in all the doctrines of Christianity, even the Trinity.’ A.
Robinson afterwards observed: 'Coleridge has a comprehensive faith and love.'

Our next citation bears date of February 26, 1812, a few months previous to the last. "A dinner party, Coleridge, Godwin, etc. The company rather too numerous. Coleridge by no means the eloquent man he usually is. It was not till ten minutes before he went away that he fell into a declaiming mood, 'having,' as Godwin said, 'got upon the indefinites and infinites,' viz., the nature of religious convictions. He contended that the external evidences of Christianity would be weak but for the internal evidence arising out of the necessity of our nature—our want of religion."

§ 4. Quotations from other Friends of Coleridge.

These passages present the chief testimony to the opinion of Coleridge on the question in hand, to which attention will be directed, after the citation of some fragments of testimony from several sources, designed to confirm their candor and substantial correctness, as well as to throw light upon the character of the great witness and upon the unprecedented estimation in which he was held by his immediate and familiar contemporaries.

Wordsworth's Opinion. Under date of July 25, 1834, Robinson records the death of Coleridge, and adds: "Wordsworth declared to me in 1812, that the powers of Coleridge were greater than those of any man he ever knew. His genius he thought to be great, but his talents still greater. And it was in the union of so much genius with so much talent, that Coleridge surpassed all the men of Wordsworth's acquaintance."

Landor's Opinion. In a letter to Robinson by Walter Savage Landor (summer of 1834), the following passage occurs. Having spoken of the death of Scott and Byron, he adds: "These deaths were only the pattering before the storm. Goethe, your mighty friend, dropped into the grave. Another, next to him in power, goes after him, the dear, good Coleridge. How is Wordsworth? It appears
as if the world were cracking all about me, and leaving me no object on which to fix my eyes."

De Quincey's Opinion. In Norton's Life of Coleridge we find the following statement: "In the course of this year (1807) Mr. De Quincey, who was a young man of fortune, presented to Mr. C. a gift of three hundred pounds. He had become deeply interested in him through sympathy with his sufferings as an opium-eater, and had an excessive admiration for his powers of mind. This sum of money, for a time, rendered Coleridge easy in his circumstances; but before long a large portion of it had been spent in procuring opium. At length, in 1808 or 1809, leaving his wife and children to be taken care of by Southey, at Keswick, he went to live with Wordsworth, at Grassmere. Here 'The Friend' was projected and in a good part written, and here its publication was commenced in numbers, June 8, 1809. In a note it is added: Writing in 1834, De Quincey speaks of him with characteristic extravagance as having the 'largest and most spacious intellect, the subtlest and most comprehensive, in my judgment, that has yet existed among men.'"

Southey's Statement. The following statement is most reluctantly inserted, and only to throw light upon the possible condition of the great metaphysician during the period in which his most pronounced opinions upon Spinoza were uttered. Mr. Southey, the brother-in-law, with whom his wife and children for years found a refuge, writing to Mr. Cottle in April, 1814, says: "It seems dreadful to say this with his expressions (of guilt) before me, but it is so, and I know it to be so from my own observation and from that of all with whom he has lived. The Morgans, with great difficulty and perseverance, did break him of the habit at a time when his ordinary consumption of laudanum was from two quarts a week to a pint a day" (p. lxviii). Again, in a letter immediately subsequent: "His miseries of body and mind all arise from one accursed cause, excess in opium, of which he habitually takes more than ever was known to be taken by any person before him. Perhaps you are not aware of the costliness of the drug. In the
quantity which C. takes, it would consume more than the whole which you propose to raise. A frightful consumption of spirits is added” (p. lxxi).

In April, 1816, a refuge was found for him in the family of a physician named Gilman, in Highgate; and the same record of his life adds: “On the 15th of April, Coleridge went to Mr. Gilman’s to reside. There for eighteen years he lived, and there he died.”

§ 5. Recapitulation of the Testimony of Coleridge.

The testimony of the second great witness in the environment of Spinoza in the nineteenth century is now before us, together with a statement of some facts touching the personal history of the witness, absolutely necessary to be known, in order to judge of his competency. Let us turn now to examine the bearing and value of the testimony as an answer to the question before us, viz.: Does the a priori argument of Spinoza prove the being of God as a really existing entity? Remembering, however, that Coleridge is always speaking as a Christian, even in his character as a philosopher, we are obliged to follow the order and connection of his utterances. Let us, then, put our questions in this relation:

1. What does the witness think of miracles as a part of the Christian system? Answer:

   “Not an essential in the Christian system.”
   “Not brought forward as proofs.”
   “Performed by others, as well as true believers.”
   “Pharaoh’s magicians wrought miracles.”
   “The New Testament appeals to the knowledge of the believer, not to the wonders wrought to make him believe.”

2. Does the witness then reject miracles? Answer:

   “Accepting Christianity in its spirit, in accordance with my philosophy, I am content to receive as articles of faith, or rather to leave undisputed, the miracles of the New Testament, taken in their literal sense.”

3. Does the witness reject the miracles of the Old Testament?
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"I am a great admirer of the opinion of Schiller, in his 'Ueber die Sendung Moses.' " *

Now, whoever has read this essay of the great German

* Appendix No. III. In this very remarkable essay Schiller cites the Egyptian historian, Manetho, as authority for saying that Moses was an apostate Egyptian priest. Having traced with great skill the previous history of the Israelites down to the birth of Moses, and his adoption by Pharaoh's daughter, the theory is perfectly reasonable that he was a pupil of the Egyptian priesthood. The apostolic Stephen represents him as educated in all the wisdom of the Egyptians; and the Jewish historian, Philo, says that Moses was initiated by the Egyptian priests into the philosophy of the symbols and hieroglyphs, as well as into the secrets of the sacred animals. Schiller declares that this testimony is confirmed by others, and says that the first look into the so-called Egyptian mysteries, discloses a remarkable similarity between these mysteries and the subsequent acts and ordinances of Moses. The following passages, literally translated from the "Sendung Moses," will more perfectly reveal its spirit and doctrine. "As Egypt was the first cultivated state known to history, and since the earliest mysteries originated from the Egyptian, all probability points to these as the place where the idea of the unity of a Supreme Being first took shape in a human brain. The fortunate discoverer of this soul-lifting idea, sought out among those around him suitable subjects to whom he might commit it as a sacred treasure, and so it was transmitted from one thinker to another, through who can say how many generations, until at last it became the property of an entire, though small society, who were capable of grasping it, and of giving it further development."

Thus far the first quotation from Schiller. Since, now, the popular religion was polytheistic, for which a knowledge of the divine unity naturally bred contempt, it became necessary to propagate this new wisdom under a veil of symbols, in order not to arouse the wrath of the populace. Hence sprung the language of hieroglyphs, a picture language concealing general ideas under a combination of sensible signs, the interpretation of which rested on arbitrary rules. With these was combined a system of ceremonies, containing these hidden truths; a kind of free-masonry, which, under the name of mysteries, had its seat in the temples of Isis and Serapis; the model of the later mysteries of Eleusis and Samothraca. He declares it beyond doubt that the contents of the most ancient mysteries in Heliopolis and Memphis, in their uncorrupted state, were the unity of God and the contradiction of paganism; and that the immortality of the soul was taught in them. Under an old statue of Isis we find the words, "I am that which is;" and upon one of the pyramids of Saïs the inscription: "I am all that is, that was, and that shall be; no mortal man has lifted my veil." No one dared
dramatist and historian, produced when lecturer at Jena, knows that while profuse in his laudation of Moses as a great national lawgiver, leader, and statesman, he utterly enter the temple of Serapis who did not bear upon his breast or forehead the Iao, or I-ha-ho, a name almost identical in sound with the Hebrew Jehovah, and probably identical also in meaning, and no name was uttered in Egypt with more reverence than this name Iao.

By degrees these mysteries, presided over by hierophants, who taught the initiated the sacred contents of the hieroglyphs and other symbols, degenerated into a kind of idolatry, and, the key of the sacred language having been lost, priestcraft and legerdemain took the place of true worship and genuine instruction.

It is not easy to determine at what period in the history of this wonderful institution the education of Moses fell, whether in its most flourishing age, or, as Schiller thinks more probable, at the time of its approaching downfall; as the adoption of some of its not very creditable artifices by the Hebrew lawgiver leads us to suppose. Still, it is plain that the spirit of its original founders had not yet entirely vanished, and that the knowledge of the divine Unity was still communicated to the initiated.

In this remarkable essay, the flight of Moses to the Arabian Desert, and his mental history while in the service of a Bedouin Sheik, is made to furnish a most influential momentum in Hebrew history. Here one of the most extraordinary minds which the world has produced, stored with its highest learning and purest knowledge, conceived the great idea of creating a commonwealth, by delivering from bondage a community of slaves.

How could he accredit himself to them as commissioned of God to deliver them? And in what God should he teach them to trust? Their conception of God was false. It was that he is a merely national God. And a people of slaves, sunk in ignorance and superstition, were not capable of receiving the great inheritance of the Egyptian sages. His solution of these problems will be found in the following extract, literally translated from the "Sendung Moses."

"But grant that he could succeed in communicating to the Hebrews the knowledge of the true God; in their condition this God would be of no avail, and a knowledge of him would rather ruin his enterprise than promote it. The true God troubled himself no more about the Hebrews than about any other people. The true God could not fight for them; nor for their pleasure subvert the laws of nature. He would let them fight out their own quarrel with the Egyptians, and by no miracle would he mix himself in the strife. In this predicament what was to be done? Shall he, then, announce to them a false and fabulous God, against which his own reason rebelled, and which the mysteries had made odious to him? For this his understanding is too
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ignores his claims to all prophetic and all miraculous powers. All that is mere orientalism. There are, then, no miracles in the Old Testament.

4. What does the witness think of Christ? Answer:
   "He was a Platonic philosopher."
   "When he spoke of his identity with the Father, he spoke in a Spinozistic or Pantheistic sense."
   "In his Transcendental sense, he was one with God."
   "In his empirical sense, he retained his finite nature."
   "Every one who utters a truth is inspired."
   "Not advisable to ground Christianity on historical evidence."
   "The external evidence of Christianity weak, but for our want of religion."

5. What does the witness think of Spinoza? Answer:
   "This book is a gospel to me." Spoken while kissing his picture.
   "His philosophy is false."
   "Demonstrated to be false, but only by that philosophy which has demonstrated the falsehood of all other philosophies. Did philosophy begin with It is, instead of I am, it would be altogether true."

As the allusion here may be obscure, it may be remarked that Coleridge's great master, Kant, denying the real entity of God to be proved by the pure reason, does not deny, nevertheless, the existence of God as a real entity. He enlightened, his heart is too sincere and noble. On a lie he will not find his beneficent undertaking. The fire which now animates him will not lend its holy inspiration to a deception. And in a role so contemptible, and which so thoroughly contradicted his inmost convictions, he would speedily fail, in courage, joy, and persistency. No. He will make the benefit which he is to confer upon his people perfect. He will make them not merely independent and free, he will make them enlightened and happy. He will lay a foundation for eternity. Consequently it can not be laid on deceit, it must be laid on truth. But how is he to reconcile these contradictions? He can not announce the true God to the Hebrews, for they are not capable of receiving him; a false one he will not announce, for he despises so contemptible a part. There remains to him, therefore, as a final necessity, no other method than to announce to them the true God under the guise of fables."
SPINOZA'S ENVIRONMENT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY. clv

leaves it to be proved by what he calls the Practical Reason. That is to say, he relegates the proof from the realm of pure reason to that of the understanding. Accordingly, no human being can say "It is certain there is such a God," but only "I am certain." This is Kant's language, or, as Coleridge here puts it, philosophy begins with an "I am," not with an "It is."

6. What is the witness' opinion of Immanuel Kant?
Answer:
"My obligations to him were infinite."
"Fichte and Schelling erred when they deviated from Kant."
Again: "Their want of gratitude is a sign of the absence of the highest excellence."
"Post-Kantians affecting to hold the great master in low esteem!"

So far forth as the present witness is concerned, we are approaching the conclusion of our work. We have but one more question to propound. It is this:

7. Does the witness think that the a priori argument of Spinoza proves the being of God as a really existing entity?
Answer:
"The philosophy of Spinoza has been demonstrated to be false." Again:
"If philosophy commenced with It is, instead of I am, Spinoza would be true."

Now, as we have seen, this is simply to pass a judgment on the argument of Spinoza in the very terms of his acknowledged master, Immanuel Kant. It is to declare the God of the pure reason to be an idea simply, and not a really existing entity. It is to deny the possibility of the proof of the being of a living and really existing Deity by the alleged highest power of the human intelligence. If now, this necessary decision from the language of the greatest of the disciples of Kant makes the only unity of Jesus Christ with the Father to be not a reality, but only an idea, what is the necessary inference? Plainly it will remain for the expounders of the "theosophic metaphysics," of the great "Logician, Metaphysician, Bard," to
make the world understand how not orthodoxy, not miracles, not the incarnation, can survive the utterance of his testimony; but how it is possible to attach any meaning whatever to the words of Jesus Christ, "I and my Father are one." The testimony of Coleridge to the value of the a priori argument of Spinoza, and of Kant as well, leaves nothing in heaven as the Father of the Founder of Christianity but an empty Idea.

The voice of the second great witness in the Environment of Spinoza in the Nineteenth Century has now spoken. The substantial meaning of that voice, though its utterances are sometimes mystified and embarrassed by questions of practical religion, and of church obligations, which do not belong to philosophy, is, nevertheless, not to be mistaken. It is this: The Transcendental Philosophy, the Philosophy of Pure Reason denies the validity of the argument of Spinoza, to prove the being of God as a really existing Entity.

§ 6. Transition to the next Witness.

Our discussion must draw to a close. There is space but for one witness more. Who shall he be? To our imagination a multitude of distinguished, nay in part even illustrious men, on both sides the Rhine on the continent, on both sides also of the British Channel, on both sides the Solway and the Tweed, on both sides the Irish Sea, and on both sides of the Atlantic ocean, are most worthy to be summoned to the stand. Who shall he be? Whom do candor, and simple fair dealing require us to cite next? Before naming him let us state the case. The two witnesses who have already testified, are both advocates of the philosophy of pure reason. They are the two most illustrious figures, the two most potent and authoritative voices which the transcendental philosophy has produced. Will it be presumptuous to say that the transcendental philosophy is not the only philosophy known to the British Islands and to America, nay even to the continent of Europe?

Where, as a matter of Philosophy, have the two witnesses already cited, left our question touching the possi-
bility of finding and knowing God as a real entity? The one has shut it out of the realm of pure reason, and left Him to be found, if found at all, in empirical proofs. The other seems to have relegated the question beyond the realm not of pure reason only, but of all philosophy, if philosophy be regarded as belonging to the human intelligence. What then? Does transcendentalism deny the existence of the true God, the God of the Christian religion, in which Coleridge was a believer? It would be most uncandid to affirm it; it simply declares that transcendentalism can not find him. Kant, the master, who was a pure thinker, a philosopher, and only a philosopher, unvexed by religious dogmas, is very clear and explicit in his declaration. He declares, in regard to the question of the proof of God's existence, that it is "the real abyss of the human reason." He affirms "that the highest perfection, like the lowest, floats without support" from reason, in the face of this stupendous question.

But what then? In this chaos of reason, amid this nether darkness, these abysmal horrors, are we to lie prostrate, confounded, and despairing forever? Are we finite beings to be subjected to the hard necessity of proving or grasping by speculative reason a positive infinity of being, before we can believe in a Being infinite? Before citing our next witness, let us feel our way to a new aspect of the question. Let us take our departure from Kant's own beautiful figure already cited in which he compares "the pure understanding to an island with unchangeable limits, and the pure reason to a wide and stormy ocean full of fogs and clouds, and icebergs, and sailors roving around in search of discoveries."

Let us then suppose a human being to awake to conscious and reflecting existence upon an islet in the middle of the ocean. Let this be the scene of his earliest development and experience. He makes excursions upon the bosom of the limitless waters. In whatever direction he moves, the horizon moves with him. He returns to his isle a speck upon the bosom of the infinite deep. How much does he know of that boundless expanse of waters. To him it is in-
finite. What does he know about it? For an answer turn back to the initial aphorism of the Novum Organum already cited, which declares that man, the minister and interpreter of nature knows what he has observed, and that he neither knows nor can know more. In like manner it would appear that our islander "knows" what he has observed. No more. He knows that on all sides that ocean transcends his power of vision. Does he know any thing of that unexplored expanse? Nothing. Has he, however, any doubt of the existence of that which he has partly explored; any doubt that on all sides the same mighty deep stretches out its existence indefinitely beyond? He has no doubt. He believes with the highest certainty which the mind of man can attain. This picture suggested by Kant himself, presents us, however, with a new aspect of our great question. It brings us, moreover, within the penumbra of another philosophy, a philosophy even more venerable in years than that which has been called from Kant the transcendental. It has long been known, but without any sneering allusion to the other, as the "philosophy of common sense."

§ 7. The last Witness.

Simple justice requires that the next witness cited in the Environment of Spinoza in the Nineteenth Century, should be a representative of this philosophy. Can there be a doubt who it should be? Can there be a doubt that it should be the voice which has already uttered in our ears the remarkable words: "As the greyhound cannot outstrip his shadow, nor the eagle the atmosphere in which he soars, so the mind of man can not transcend that sphere of limitation within which, and through which exclusively, the possibility of thought is realized"? Can there be a doubt that it must be the voice of one of the most remarkable men of our age, the man who with a wealth of erudition gathered from an exploration of the whole field of metaphysical learning, and a vigor and penetration of thought unsurpassed since the days of the Stagyrite, has buttressed the barrier walls of the philosophy of common sense, until they seem to look more inexpug-
nable than ever before? Can there be a doubt that it must be the venerable voice of Sir William Hamilton.

It is suggested by Morell, the very able historian of modern philosophy, that the future debate in philosophy is most likely to be that between Hamilton and Cousin, that is to say, whether the infinite, the absolute, the unconditioned, is really cognizable by the human reason, or whether it is not; whether our notion of it is positive or only negative. Now, although it is well-known that Morell has a decided leaning toward a priorism, as is shown in his passage at arms with Dr. Chalmers, he is candid enough to say: “We freely confess we are not yet prepared to combat the weighty arguments by which the Scotch metaphysician seeks to establish the negative character of this great fundamental conception, neither on the other hand are we prepared to admit his inference.” It is enough for our purpose that the debate is still an open one, and that the unquestioned character and competency of the witness is admitted. It must be remembered that the question still before us is: Does the a priori argument of Spinoza prove the being of God as a really existing entity?

We must, moreover, allow the witness to testify in the terms of his own school of philosophical thought, and without direct and personal reference to Spinoza. It will not be forgotten that all the conceptions embraced in Spinoza’s definition and proof of God’s existence, are infinite, absolute, and unconditioned, and it is assumed that these conceptions are within the grasp of the human mind, being included in the very definition of his existence.

Question 1. Does the definition of an infinite or absolute term give us a knowledge of it?

Answer. “Let us be warned from recognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily co-extensive with the horizon of our faith.”

Question 2. When the human intelligence has formed a conception of God, does this prove the reality of that conception as an existing entity?
Answer. "To think that God is as we can think him to be, is blasphemy."

Question 3. Is the being of God as an existing entity thinkable at all?

Answer. "The capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of existence."

Again: "True are the declarations of a pious philosophy; a God understood would be no God at all."

Once more: "The divinity in a certain sense is revealed: in a certain sense is concealed. He is at once known and unknown. But the last and highest consecration of all true religion must be an altar Αγών Θεοῦ; to the unknowable God."

These questions must suffice, and the testimony of the witness must be closed. Scant justice, it is true, is done either to the "philosophy of common sense," or to the great witness himself. It would be easy to cite his point blank testimony to our question in Hamilton's celebrated demonstration of the insolubility of the problem of God's existence, as presenting two opposite poles of thought, one of which must be true, but neither of which is conceivable. The one pole is an eternal retrogression of causes. The other is an absolute beginning, a coming of something from nothing. Both of these are inconceivable, unthinkable. But the discussion must be arrested here. Briefly, but substantially, the testimony of the nineteenth century is now before us. The verdict of all its philosophies may be pronounced in the words of Coleridge himself:

"Spinoza's system has been demonstrated to be false."
CHAPTER XI.

Rehabilitated and Christianized Spinozism.

§ 1. Only two possible Philosophies.

In the nineteenth aphorism of the first book of the Novum Organum we have this assertion: "There are only two methods, actual or possible, of investigating and arriving at truth." In the twenty-second aphorism we find this statement: "Each method takes its rise from sense and in particulars, and rests in the most general propositions. But there is an immense difference between them. The one skims superficially over experience and particulars; the other employs them in a proper and orderly manner. The one again in the outset establishes certain general abstract and useless principles; the other rises step by step to those principles, whose truth is recognized by nature herself."

Once more, in the same book, aphorism one hundred and four, we have the latter of these two methods, which is his own induction, thus vividly pictured: "We may then at length cherish a good hope for science when by a genuine flight of stairs, by successive steps, none being intermitted, no hiatus left, we ascend from particulars to the lower propositions, thence to the middle ones, thence one after another to the higher, and finally reach the most general." This picture has been set to music by one of the sweetest of our American poets, whose silver notes, like those of our own "Robert of Lincoln," are poured forth in a full tide of song as he mounts gracefully upward, a winged prophet of nature, "singing all the way to heaven:"

"The mighty pyramids of stone,
Which wedge-like cleave the desert airs,
When nearer seen, when better known,
Are but gigantic flights of stairs."
This is induction glorified, set to music, brought into accord with the universal symphony of nature, of whom it is written in the book of Job that in the matin song of creation, "the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy." Let us now remember that there are only two possible methods of arriving at truth. This is one of them. Nobody can possibly fail to apprehend it.

What is the other? Can there be any doubt that it is that method of investigating truth, whose modern starting point is found in the works of Descartes, and whose clearest statement and defense is found in the works of his expounder and admiring disciple, Benedict de Spinoza? True, indeed, Anselm of Canterbury is often referred to as the starting point. But his most famous work, "Cur Deus Homo," is rather an application of the a priori method to the exposition of Scripture doctrine, than a statement and defense of the method itself. His speculation concerning the necessary and eternal exactitude of the number of the heavenly hierarchy fractured by the rebellion of the fallen angels, and to be refilled from the ranks of redeemed men, is a good illustration of the speculative spirit of the method as applied to the business of the interpretation of Scripture.

The first clear statement in modern times of this a priori method as a philosophy, is found in the "Meditationes de Prima Philosophia," of the illustrious Freuchman, and the most clear and formal defense of it in the "Renati Descartes Principia Philosophiae" of his follower, Spinoza. What is the method thus presented and defended by the most illustrious of the a priori philosophers? In the fourth and fifth chapters of this critique will be found an attempt to analyze the system of Descartes, and to state his reasonsings in the nomenclature of our more recent metaphysics. In those chapters an attempt is made, with what success the reader will judge, to demonstrate that the system of Descartes bears all the characteristics of the only other system besides his own, of investigating and reaching truth, which Bacon declares to be either existing or possible. The language of Bacon describing this other possible system, as
found in the fourteenth aphorism already cited, is: “Starting from sense, and in particulars it leaps at one bound to the most general proposition (advolat ad axiomata maxime generalia). Regarding them as principles, whose truth is firmly established, it proceeds to judge and to invent intermediate propositions. This is the method in common use.”

Such is the only other possible method as characterized by Bacon. If the analysis above referred to is accepted as in its main features correct, we are justified in giving it a name. It is the Cartesian method. And if Bacon’s assertion that only two methods of investigating truth are possible is true, then only two philosophies are possible. We may call them by various names. In essence and spirit they are severally one. Let us call them provisionally, the Baconian and the Cartesian.

§ 2. The Drift of each Philosophy.

Now it is to be remarked that these two philosophies have each its peculiar drift or tendency, or as the German language expresses it, Trieb, and each drift its peculiar issue, or as the German language so happily expresses the thought, its Aus-artung, its peculiar degeneration, that is, tendency to lose its proper genus and become something else.

The drift of the Baconian philosophy, let it be admitted, is in the direction of materialism, and its possible degeneration (aus-artung) is materialistic atheism. But the history of philosophy shows that this drift was a very slow one. Bacon was a Christian, and his writings show that he did not dream of atheism even as a possible result of his system. Yet the Baconian philosophy to-day stands face to face with this tremendous issue. But it is not itself, it is its aus-artung, its de-generation.

In like manner the drift of the Cartesian philosophy was in the direction of idealism, and its possible degeneration (aus-artung), was virtual atheism, by the substitution of a mere conception for a really existing entity, under the name of God. But the history of philosophy shows that in the Cartesian philosophy, this drift (Trieb) was very
rapid. Descartes was a Christian, and did not dream of denying the real existence of God. But his immediate disciple, follower, expounder, repudiated the Deity of his Master. The very earliest movement of the Cartesian philosophy was itself an aus-artung, a de-generation. It denied the existence of God as a personal and actually existing entity, and though retaining in its vocabulary the name of God, its aus-artung, in virtual atheism, was reached before the body of the illustrious Frenchman had been resting more than ten years in the crypt of St. Geneviève du Mont. This is evident from the fact that Spinoza died in February, A. D., 1677, whilst the remains of Descartes were removed from Stockholm to Paris in A. D., 1667.

Let us now come, without too many words, to the point at which we are aiming. How many philosophies are possible? Two, and only two. What are they as existing to-day? We have called them, provisionally, the Baconian and the Cartesian. What is the critical question between them? What is the exact point of bifurcation between them? It is not a question of induction or deduction, of intuition or syllogism, of sciences inductive and sciences demonstrative, for all these, within their proper spheres, the adherents of both philosophies admit to be possible and legitimate. The exact and only question between them is: does man possess a faculty, a power, call it by what name we will, which enables him to gaze directly at infinite and absolute being, so that in virtue of the action of this faculty, he is able to affirm positively: I know that there is a God, for I can see him. This, in its last and closest analysis, appears to be the Cartesianism of to-day.

The Baconian philosophy, whilst admitting the value of intuition in its proper place, denies to it any range of power like this. Now, the claim that the human reason, as the organ of infinite and absolute ideas, possesses this vision of God, is identical in spirit with the claim of Des Cartes. As we have seen in his case, the rapid set and tendency of this philosophy, its Trieb, its drift, swift and almost certain, was to pure idealism, to substitute a conception for a reality, a dream for an entity, the throne of the universe
filled with an empty vision, which only "the likeness of a kingly crown had on," for the living, personal God, the Sovereign and Lord of the universe.

Now, as the drift of the Cartesianism of the 17th century flowed with a swift and rapid current toward idealism, in the form of Spinozism, the same is true of the Cartesianism of to-day. We come, then, without further introduction, to the evidence of this, by indicating some signs of a "Rehabilitated and Christianized Spinozism."


In the fifty-sixth aphorism of the first Book of the Novum Organum, under the head of the idols of the Den, Bacon has noted a tendency to error, to be found probably in all religions, and in all epochs of their development. In that aphorism it is thus stated: "Some dispositions evince an unbounded admiration for antiquity; others eagerly embrace novelty; and but few can preserve the just medium, so as neither to tear up what the ancients have correctly laid down, nor to despise the just innovations of the moderns." Bearing in mind these characteristics which are also further described, in the second chapter of this Critique, we will take a rapid glance at the aspects and tendencies of religious thought in England and the United States in the early years of the fourth decade of our century, as compared with its aspects and tendencies today, after a lapse of somewhat more than forty years. The glance must necessarily be rapid, as well as brief. In the year 1833, a young American, then already distinguished, and since then having reached a world-wide fame, paid a visit to Coleridge, then within about a year of his death. Carlyle he found on his farm in the wilds of Scotland. Wordsworth he saw living at Rydal Mount. Even then the young American was a philosophic Nimrod, and his game was man. He saw all the philosophic notabilities within his reach. Not that he confined himself to them, for he does not hesitate to tell us what he thinks of the English character and the English religion. There are few more interesting books than Emerson's "English
Traits.” We refer to it, however, chiefly to fix the date of our first glance at the Anglican church. It is of the tone of English religious thought in this year, of which Emerson thus speaks: “The torpidity on the side of religion of the vigorous English understanding shows how much wit and folly can agree in one brain. Their religion is a quotation; their church is a doll; and any examination is interdicted with screams of terror. In good company, you expect them to laugh at the fanaticism of the vulgar; but they do not; they are the vulgar.” This quotation shows that Modern Doubt had not yet greatly shaken the faith of the “vigorous English understanding,” in the solid foundations of its religion. Nor does this judgment confine itself to the Established Church, for in the same chapter he proceeds to say: “But the religion of England, is it the Established Church? No. Is it the sects? No. They are to the Established Church, as cabs are to a coach, cheaper and more convenient, but really the same thing.” Such, then, was the tone of religious thought in England in 1833.


Confining ourselves to the Anglican Church, and referring again to Bacon’s Idol of the Den, the great divisions in it at that day, representing these two tendencies, were commonly known as the High Church and the Low Church.

As concrete realities, we may point first to Oxford, where at that moment was flourishing the most pronounced form of High Churchism, in that celebrated association, whose doctrines have become historical under the term Tractarianism, but equally well known as Puseyism. True to the traditions of that ancient seat of learning, in which had flourished the school of Laud, the Oxford of that day was eminent and conspicuous to the whole world as the vindicator of its historic fame, in the championship of the past, and as the worshipper of antiquity. Here that illustrious orientalist, Edward Bouverie Pusey, canon of Christ Church, and Royal Professor of Hebrew, had gathered about him a body of men of the highest talent, himself
the central figure of the group: John Keble, professor of poetry and author of the “Christian Year;” John Henry Newman, Richard Hurrell Froude, the highly gifted young tutor of Oriel College, who died at the early age of thirty-three years; and Arthur Philipp Perceval, royal chaplain and rector of East Horsley. At the period which we are considering, then, the most eminent theater of High Churchism in the Anglican Church was the ancient University of Oxford, and of all the learned and capable men who gave body and character to the Tractarian school Pusey was the most conspicuous. Without asserting an absolute identity, it will not be far wrong to say, that at that period, in the eye of the world, Puseyism and aristocratic High Churchism were identical.

On the other hand, the Low Church section of the Establishment had found its chief support in the rival University of Cambridge. We can not here attempt to follow its fortunes, or to describe its leaders. The adherents of Low Church views were sometimes styled, almost in contempt, the Evangelicals. At the period here referred to, the Commentary of Thomas Scott, which had been widely published both in England and the United States, was, in Biblical Exegesis, the representative best known to the masses, of the spirit of this section of the Anglican Church. Let it be remembered that, ignoring all individual exceptions, we are now looking at the bisection of the Anglican Church, as it presented itself to the gaze of the world, in the early years of the fourth decade of the century, and that only in the relation indicated in the Baconian Idol of the Den above referred to. Our space will allow us no further detail.

§ 5. Bi-section of the Anglican Church in A. D., 1878.

We have now reached the later years of the eighth decade of the century. Forty-five years have passed since Emerson first visited England, and paid his respects to Coleridge and Carlyle, and Wordsworth and Landor, and the other notabilities of that day. Let us keep to our point. Let us turn our gaze upon the Anglican Established Church in the
year of grace, 1878, and ask whether we find in it the bisection of 1833, the words High Church and Low Church? They have disappeared from the sky of the church life of Anglicanism, and in their place we find blazing in its heavens, as if hung upon the stars for the world to read, the mystic words: Broad Churchism, Ritualism. What do they mean? What is Broad Churchism? What Ritualism? What is the magic abracadabra which has wrought the change? Who are the high priests of this modern cabala? And what is the secret of their cabalism? Looked at from our Baconian point of view, the Broad Church section has become not only the aristocratic church, but the church of progress. The star of its hope is beaming upon the sky of the future. The ritualistic section, on the contrary, has redoubled the conservative tendency of Puseyism, and gazes with an intense longing into the distant past. Such is the swift change wrought in the aspect of the Anglican Church, within less than half a century. What is the mighty power which has wrought it? Are we premature in suggesting it may be the Cartesianism of the nineteenth century? At least let us not fail to notice that this power, like the original Cartesianism, has been not only stupendous in its force, but swift in its current; its drift, its Triebe, has been like the silent suck and hurry of the upper waters of the Niagara river. We gaze in silent awe, panic stricken, and praying for the safety of that magnificent argosy, the Broad Church of England, yet at the bottom of our hearts expecting the thunder plunge. We have called this section of the Anglican church magnificent. It is nothing less. It numbers, or has recently numbered among its founders, men among the most eminent in Great Britain, for genius and scholarship, not to say for social position as well. We desire to signalize those best known to fame in America: Thomas Arnold, of Rugby (†1841), by way of eminence the schoolmaster of England and America, a man of wonderful gifts and power, the founder of the Broad Church, best known to the world; his illustrious disciple, Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, the companion and preacher to the Prince of Wales through Palestine and the Orient; the Dean of
Westminster, the multifarious scholar, historian, essayist, and Biblical critic; Frederick W. Robertson, the celebrated preacher of Trinity Chapel, Brighton, devout, sincere, filled with a native religiosity of temperament well fitted to impress and captivate the popular mind. We omit to speak of the long list of illustrious names which remain, Archdeacon Hare (the bosom friend of Baron Bunsen), Maurice, Kingsley, Alford, Conybeare and Howson, and Trench, to say nothing of the celebrated authors of the “Oxford Essays and Reviews:” Goodwin, Jowett, Powell, Pattison, Temple (the successor of Arnold at Rugby), Williams and Wilson. Here then is indeed an illustrious intellectual following.

This splendid following, a competent authority, writing more than twenty years since, declares to embrace about one-seventh of the clergy of the Anglican Church, and several bishops. No one will imagine that it has been waning since, either in splendor or in power.

§ 6. Cause of the present bi-section.

Such, then, rudely outlined, is the stupendous phenomenon which presents itself to the gaze of the world, in the sky of the Anglican Church. What we are seeking is the cause which produced it. In attributing this phenomenon as a concrete reality to men, as its author some have pointed to Stanley, some, as we have seen, to Arnold of Rugby. Let us attempt another solution. Let us turn from individual men to great underlying forces. The spiritual force which produced the change which we have sketched in the great Anglican Church from Puseyism to Broad Churchism, is due to the philosophy introduced into England and popularized as a working force by Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Let it be here observed that we have nothing to do with Coleridge’s system of Christian doctrine, whether that system is to be called a theology or a theosophy. We speak solely of the philosophy of Coleridge, and will endeavor to state and condense the reasons for the solution just presented.
§ 7. First proof that its cause is the Philosophy of Coleridge. Synchronism.

(1.) Its development synchronizes with the changes which have been presented. In the preceding chapter will be found a sketch of the career of that wonderful man. Reference in this has been made to Emerson's visit in 1833. Coleridge was then entering upon the last year of his life. Within a few years, the last star in that galaxy of intellectual lights, of which he was the sun and center, had sunk below the horizon. Did that illustrious body of thinkers and writers leave nothing behind them? To speak now of nothing else, the "works of Coleridge" remained. A few years previous to this, one of the most remarkable of American scholars, President Marsh of the University of Vermont, had introduced this philosophy to American readers. Along with it came pouring into the language a new philosophical vocabulary. The pure reason, the pure understanding, subject and object in a new metaphysical relation, whose paronym, subjectivity and objectivity, and even subjectify and objectify, were at that time a puzzle to our theologians. The secret of Kantianism, much less the "secret of Hegel," had scarcely then begun to dawn upon the horizon of American theology. Some years later, and two years after the death of Coleridge, some of the earlier American theologues, drawn to Halle by the fame of Tholuck, made known to American scholars principally by the papers of Dr. Robinson, used to try the patience of the great German scholar, by their endeavor to exact from him the precise difference between the subjective and the objective view of the same thing. To him this terminology was no new thing, for in philosophy he distinctly avowed himself a Neologist, a Hegelian.

Can any doubt that this method of philosophizing was the same in essence, with that which was introduced into England by Samuel T. Coleridge, that as a working force it was shaped, condensed and Anglicised by that body of illustrious men, of whom he was the central figure, and whose generation we may regard as terminating with his life?
Can we doubt that this is the philosophy which that generation of thinkers and writers bequeathed to this? Is it to be questioned that the Kantian philosophy, as interpreted by Coleridge, is, in its chief spirit, the philosophy of that body of scholars of ecumenic fame, who in their ecclesiastical activity, have built and christened the Broad Church? One thing is certain. The synchronism of the two movements, if two there are, is perfect.


(2.) The action of these two forces in their interpretation of the Scriptures is entirely homogeneous. In the first place, they both incline to deny the reality of the miracles of Scripture. The evidence of this on the part of the Coleridgian philosophy, is presented in the last chapter. The admission of the New Testament miracles, as we there saw, was a concession to his church relations. It is a part not of his philosophy, which in his acceptance of his Schiller’s “Mission of Moses” discards them, but of his theosophic theology.

How stands this tendency in the Broad Church? The latest utterances of Dean Stanley, its most conspicuous leader, in affirming that “the last word concerning miracles remains to be spoken,” have produced the strong impression that that word, clearly spoken, will be, “No miracles.” At present we puzzle ourselves with the question, how much does he mean? Is it absolute, or, as in the case of Coleridge, only theosophic? Is his language a philosophy, or only a theology?

It is here to be remembered that the doctrinal system of the Broad Church is yet in a transition state. It is not an esse, but only a posse. In many points, doubtless, its different writers will be found to express views widely diverging from each other. In reading them we are struck chiefly by one characteristic. It is their negativeness. They are much occupied in showing, as touching Scripture doctrine, that the language of the Bible does not teach what the old orthodoxy understood it to teach. Whoever, for example, has read Dean Stanley’s papers on “The Epistle of the
Corinthians in relation to the Gospel History;" "On the Gift of Tongues, and the Gift of Prophesying;" "On the Resurrection of Christ," and others of this class, will be struck with this feature of his discussions; and perhaps will be reminded of the criticism of a great man touching the style of Gibbon, that it has the appearance of a man who dares not look you in the face. You may suppose yourself respectfully proposing to Dean Stanley these questions: Do you believe, sir, in the Incarnation of Christ, in his Death and Resurrection? Hear his answer: "The expressions, 'faith in Incarnation,' 'faith in his merits,' 'faith in his blood,' are expressions which, though employed in later times, and, like other scholastic or theological terms often justly employed as summaries of the Apostle's (Paul's) statement, yet are in no instances his own statements of his own belief and feeling." Again, in the same connection, he remarks: "The language of our Lord in the Gospels, like that of St. Paul regarding him in the Epistles, is not 'Believe in my miracles,' 'Believe in my Death,' 'Believe in my Resurrection,' but 'Believe in me.'"*

It is perhaps enough to say of Broad Church doctrine, that it is not yet a creed, but only a criticism. It is not yet a sein, but only a werden.

In the next place, both these forces incline to discredit or travesty the orthodox interpretations of Scripture doctrine. Take the doctrine of the character of God. For an illustration of this tendency in the case of Coleridge's philosophical speculations, we may refer to his conversation with Henry Crabbe Robinson, in which he compares Christ to a Platonic philosopher; in his empirical sense distinct from the Father, in his Spinozistic or Transcendental sense, one with him.

Let us turn now to note the same tendency in the utterances of the Broad Church. Take the following passages from the wonderfully captivating sermons of F. W. Robertson. Want of space compels the narrowest possible limits to the citations. Take the following statement from

* See the first paper above quoted, near the close.
his sermon on the Trinity: "Love in God is what love is in man; justice in God is what is justice in man; creative power in God is what creative power is in man," etc. What does that mean? It is not a mere flight of rhetorical eloquence, for it is repeated and elaborated elsewhere. Take the following passage from his sermon on "The Christian Aim and Motive:" "But let us examine more deeply this assertion, that our nature is kindred with that of God; for, if man has not a nature kindred to that of God, then a demand such as that, 'Be ye the children of,' that is like, 'God,' is but a mockery of man. We say, then, in the first place, that in the truest sense of the word, man can be a creator. The beaver makes his hole, the bee makes its cell, man alone has the power of creating. The mason makes, the architect creates. In the same sense that we say God created the universe, we say that man is also a creator." There is much more to the same purpose, for it is elaborately argued, that there is an infinitude in the very nature of man, and that the above assumption is not blasphemous. There is certainly no design of charging the brilliant young preacher with intentional blasphemy. But let us inquire to what science of God does this exegesis belong? In a former chapter it has been shown that speculative philosophy has as yet reached but four possible analyses of God's being and character. The solution of Plato, God a Spiritual being, but not the first cause of all things, matter being equally a self-existent and eternal entity; the solution of Clarke, God the sole spiritual first cause of all things; the solution of Berkeley, matter disappears, every thing is ideal; the solution of Hume, spirit disappears, every thing is material. To which of these four does the teaching of Robertson belong? Evidently to the Platonic—God spiritual and eternal, but matter a distinct and eternal entity. God, therefore, is not the sole first cause. The teaching necessarily asserts the eternity of matter, and denies to God the power of bringing the external universe from nothing. In a word, God is not omnipotent, and God is not the First Cause of all things,
in the senses of the old English orthodox interpretation of Scripture.

Having space for no further citations, we refer to his sermons "On the Sympathy of Christ;" "On the Sacrifice of Christ;" and "On Christian Casuistry," as further examples of the point in hand. In the first two he utterly eviscerates of its meaning the old orthodox interpretation of the Scriptures relating to the vicarious Sacrifice of Christ, and expressed by the word Atonement. In the last he not only destroys the old orthodox idea of Inspiration, but he leaves nothing in its place; and suggests the supposition that his ideas of inspiration coincide with those of Coleridge as expressed to Henry Crabbé Robinson.

It would be easy to multiply citations not only from Robertson, but from other Broad Church writers, and especially from the very able papers of the Oxford Reviewers, as further proofs of our point, viz., that though Broad Churchism is not yet a doctrine, but only a criticism, "it inclines to discredit and travesty the old orthodox interpretation of Scripture doctrine." But we must forbear further illustration in this direction, and turn to another point.

In considering the Coleridgian Philosophy and Broad Churchism as working forces, two great points of similarity have thus far been presented; first, the synchronism of the two movements is perfect; secondly, the action of the two forces in Scripture interpretation is homogeneous. One more point remains.


(3.) The drift of these combined forces is toward the theory of the Impersonality of God. This is its metaphysical goal. This is its Aus-artung, its degeneration: the Impersonality of God.

In illustrating this point, it will be assumed as already proved, that the two forces are identical in philosophy, and that it is the philosophical force which underlies the ecclesiastical. Our illustrations may, therefore, be fairly drawn from other quarters than Broad Church writers. Let us note, then, the following particulars:
First. The watchword of this philosophy is reason. This does not mean the faculty of reasoning simply. It is a vastly higher power. It is the reason by way of eminence, The pure reason, in distinction from the understanding. It is the organ of infinite and absolute ideas. This celebrated distinction, as we have seen, was introduced into the Coleridgean philosophy from the system of Immanuel Kant. We move not now the question of the object of Kant in its introduction. It has been already demonstrated that he denied utterly that it has any power to prove the being of God as a really existing entity, and warned his readers against any use of it for this purpose as utterly fallacious. In other words, he warns us against its tendency to degenerate into an empty idealism, vox et preterea nihil. Let us note an illustration of this tendency as seen in the works of the great Eclectic Philosopher. It is quoted from a translation of Cousin's Critique upon Locke, used for a time as a text book in some American colleges, "Independent of our will, reason intervenes. The reason makes its appearance in us, though it is not ourselves, and in no way can it be confounded with our personality. Reason is impersonal. Whence comes this wonderful guest within us, and what is the principle of this reason which enlightens without belonging to us? This principle is God, the first and last principle of every thing." A little later speaking of Enthusiasm, which he denominates a mode or state of reason, he says: "The word sufficiently explains itself. Enthusiasm, θεος εν ημιν, is the spirit of God within us. It is immediate intuition, opposed to induction and opposed to demonstration. It is the primitive spontaneity opposed to the ulterior development of reflection. It is the apperception of the highest truths by reason, in their greatest independence both of the senses and of our personality." There is much more to the same purpose. Yet this is the same Victor Cousin who attempts to hold the balance level between the two philosophies; who tells us that there is no bad way in which to prove the existence of God, and that it can be established by a rapid induction. This is the same Cousin who tells us that the God of the Hebrews is a
gloomy superstition; who glorifies the Ethics of Spinoza as a “mystic hymn,” a rapture, a suspiration of the soul after Him who only can lawfully say, “I am that I am”; who compares this “pretended atheist” with the unknown author of the “Imitation of Christ,” and who declares in regard to Spinoza, that his ideas are “spreading and echoing through the whole world.” Is there any reason to doubt that it is one and the same philosophy whose spirit is Spinozistic, whose terminology is Kantsian, whose Christianized transformation is Coleridgianism, and whose de-generation, whose Aus-artung is already reached by Cousin in the impersonality of reason and of God.

Secondly. The drift of these combined forces is toward an absolute denial of the miraculous element in Christianity.

It has already been shown respecting Coleridge himself, that in regard to the old Testament miracles, in accepting the doctrines of Schiller’s “Mission of Moses,” his rejection of the Old Testament miracles was due not to his philosophy, but to his “theosophy.” We have noted in the case of Dean Stanley, a decided drift from a criticism of the New Testament text designed to discredit miracles and inspiration, towards a more and more distinct declaration rejecting them. The public mind begins to be aware that the culmination of this drift in the case of the Dean of Westminster is to be—no miracles in the purified and regenerated Christian system. Let us suppose the culmination reached. Mark now the inferences. Pass by the question of the miracles wrought by Christ himself, which, by the way, Coleridge affirms can prove nothing, and are never alleged as proofs. Pass them by. Let us come to the birth of Jesus of Nazareth. There are no miracles. The doctrine of Schiller is an absolute denial of any fracture in the sequences of nature. No miracles. Let us ask now in regard to Jesus of Nazareth, the old question, Whose son was he? It is not necessary more distinctly to state the blasphemy. The substance of it may be found detailed in the story of the noble Roman
matron Paulina, made the victim of religious superstition, in the worship of the god Anubis, in the temple Isis, at Rome. The story will be found related in the eighteenth book of the Antiquities of the Jews. Josephus represents the fact as having occurred in the 28th year of the Christian era, and of course during the life-time of the founder of Christianity. We have seen that the Broad Church critic long ago affirmed that the language both of Jesus Christ and of Paul is not “believe in my miracles,” “believe in my death,” “believe in my resurrection,” but: *believe in me.* At present, the same voice is understood to declare for an absolute deliverance of the Christian system from the incumbrance of Miracles. The drift, let us suppose, is consummated. There are absolutely no miracles. What then is to be said touching the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. It is a historic fiction. It never occurred. “And if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain?” Christianity is founded upon a historic fiction.

Thirdly. The *logical* drift of these combined forces is toward an open and pronounced Spinozism. The proof of this may be found in the writings of an American scholar who, in his first and only visit to Coleridge, avowed himself a Unitarian. As a native of Massachusetts, his induction into the spirit of the Kantian metaphysics, can be easily understood. Since that long past visit to England, his fame has become universal in Christendom. Eminent orthodox authority has pronounced him the foremost philosopher in America. Ever a welcome guest at our literary and educational centres, all highly cultured circles regard themselves as honored by the presence of the Sage of Concord.

Are the utterances of such an author to be spoken of as Spinozism? Why not? It is truth. They are the utterances of a highly cultured, and if one pleases to say so, Christianized Spinozism, but, in essence and spirit, they are Spinozism, nevertheless. Take the following passages from his writings:
REHABILITATED AND CHRISTIANIZED SPINOZISM.

"Man is made of the same atoms as the world is. He shares the same impressions, predispositions and destiny. When his mind is illumined, when his heart is kind, he throws himself joyfully into the sublime order and does with knowledge what the stones do by structure."—Emerson's "Conduct of Life."

"The simplest person, who in his integrity worships God, becomes God, yet, forever and forever, the influx of this better, this universal self, is new and unsearchable."—Emerson's "The Oversoul."

"Meanwhile within man, is the soul of the whole, the wise silence, the universal beauty, to which every part and particle is related, the eternal One."—The same.

Again: "Standing upon the bare ground, my head bathed in the blithe air, and uplifted into infinite space, all mean egotism vanishes. I am become a transparent eye-ball. I am nothing; I am all; the currents of universal being circulate through me; I am part and particle of God."—Emerson's "Nature."

"The world proceeds from the same spirit as the body of man. It is a remoter and inferior incarnation of God, a projection of God in the unconscious."—The same.

§ 10. Coleridgism and Spinozism identical.

Can any reasonable man doubt that this is the same "mystic hymn," the same "rapture," the same "aspiration of the soul after Him who alone can lawfully say 'I am that I am,'" which, according to Cousin, constitutes and characterizes the spirit of the Ethics of Spinoza? The philosophy is the same, the organ is the same, though the hymn is played upon the stop of the nineteenth century with its higher culture, and more musical expression, instead of that of the seventeenth. It is a verification of the words of Cousin in regard to the Portuguese Jew, that his ideas "are spreading and echoing through the whole world."

In another respect it fairly represents the Ethics of Spinoza. It is the utterance of an iron logic. It is the culmination, the Aus-artung of the Coleridgian philosophy,
reached by the necessity of an adamantine logic, its links infrangible, its conclusions as strict as those which the philosopher of Pantheism ushers in with the geometrical formula: Quod erat demonstrandum. Ralph Waldo Emerson, from the logical point of view, may be regarded as the best and fairest representative of the drift of the Coleridgian philosophy, which the age has produced.

At this point our discussion must be arrested. The illustrations of this chapter, for obvious reasons, have been drawn chiefly from the Anglican Church. But though the prevalence of the Cartesian philosophy in England and the United States is due to that ecclesiastical organization, it has by no means confined itself to it. It would be easy to show that many dissenters in England, and many members of various “sects” in the United States, have been, and still continue to be its earnest and active coadjutors. But of this if at all elsewhere. We must be content with having shown that Spinozism is not dead, and with having presented at least some grounds for the conviction, that it is “the Taproot of Modern Doubt.”
THE ETHICS
OF
BENEDICT SPINOZA

GEOMETRICALLY DEMONSTRATED IN FIVE PARTS

WHICH TREAT

I. Of God.

II. Of the Nature and Origin of Mind.

III. Of the Origin and Nature of the Affections.

IV. Of Human Slavery; or, Concerning the Powers of the Affections.

V. Of the Power of the Intellect; or, Concerning Human Liberty.
THE ETHICS.

PART FIRST.—OF GOD.

DEFINITIONS.

I. By *Self-cause* I understand that whose essence involves existence; or that whose nature can not be conceived as not existing.

II. That thing is called *finite in its kind*, which can be limited by another of the same nature. Thus thought is limited by another thought. But body is not limited by thought, nor thought by body.

III. By *Substance* I understand that which is in itself, and is conceived by itself; that is, that whose conception does not need the conception of another thing by which it must be formed.

IV. By *Attribute* I understand that which the intellect perceived concerning substance as constituting its essence.

V. By *Mode* I understand the affections of substance, or that which is in another, by which it is conceived.

VI. By *God* I understand the being absolutely infinite; that is, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.

*Explication.*—I say absolutely infinite, but not in its own kind (*sui generis*); for whatever is infinite only in its own kind, of this we are able to deny infinite attributes; but what is absolutely infinite, to its essence pertains whatever expresses essence, and involves no negation.

VII. That thing will be called *free*, which exists from the sole necessity of its nature, and is determined to action by itself alone; but necessary, or rather forced, which is determined by another to exist and operate in a certain and determinate manner.

VIII. By *Eternity* I understand existence itself as far as 1

(1)
it is conceived to follow necessarily from the sole definition of an eternal thing.

*Exposition.*—For such an existence as eternal truth, or as the essence of a thing is a conception, and cannot therefore be explained by duration or time, although duration is conceived to want beginning and end.

**Axioms.**

I. All things which are, are in themselves or in another.

II. That which can not be conceived by another must be conceived by itself.

III. From a given determinate cause an effect necessarily follows, and contrariwise, if no determinate cause is given, it is impossible that an effect should follow.

IV. The knowledge of an effect depends upon the knowledge of the cause, and involves the same.

V. Things which have mutually nothing in common, can not be mutually understood by each other, or the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.

VI. A true idea must agree with its object.

VII. Whatever is able to be conceived as not existing, the essence of this does not involve existence.

**Propositions.**

Proposition I. *Substance is prior in nature to its affections.*  
*Demonstration.*—This is evident from Def. iii. and v.

Prop. II. *Two substances, having different attributes, have nothing mutually in common.*

*Dem.*—This is evident from Def. iii. For each must be in itself, and must be conceived by itself; or the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.

Prop. III. *Of things which have nothing mutually in common, one can not be the cause of the other.*

*Dem.*—If they have nothing mutually in common, then (by Ax. v.) they can not be mutually understood by each other, and therefore (by Ax. iv.) one can not be the cause of the other. *Q. E. D.*

Prop. IV. *Two or more distinct things are distinguished*
from each other either by a difference of the attributes of the substances, or by a difference of their affections.

Dem.—All things which are, are in themselves or in another (by Ax. i.); that is (by Deff. iii and v.), beside the intellect nothing is given except substances and their affections. Nothing therefore is given except the intellect, by which several things can be mutually distinguished except substances, or what is the same thing (by Ax. iv.), their attributes and their affections. Q. E. D.

Prop. V. In the nature of things two or more substances of the same nature, or attribute, can not be given.

Dem.—If several distinct substances should be given, they should be distinguished, either by a difference of attributes, or by a difference of affections (by the foregoing Prop.). If only by a difference of attributes, then it is granted, there is given only one thing of the same attribute. But if by a difference of affections, since substance is prior in nature to its affections (by Prop. i.), then the affections being laid aside, and it being considered in itself, that is (by Deff. iii. and vi.), truly considered, it can not be conceived to be distinguished from another; that is (by the foregoing Prop.), there can not be given several substances, but only one. Q. E. D.

Prop. VI. One substance can not be produced by another substance.

Dem.—In the nature of things two substances of the same attribute can not be given (by the foregoing Prop.), that is (by Prop. ii.), which have any thing mutually in common. Therefore (by Prop. iii.), one can not be the cause of the other, or one can not be produced by the other. Q. E. D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that substance can not be produced by another. For in the nature of things, nothing is given except substances and their affections, as appears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v. But it can not be produced by substance (by the foregoing Prop.). Therefore, absolutely, substance can not be produced by another. Q. E. D.

Otherwise.—This is still more easily demonstrated by the
absurd contradictory. For if substance could be produced by another, the knowledge of it ought to depend upon a knowledge of its cause (by Ax. iv.), and therefore (by Def. iii.) there would not be substance.

PROP. VII. *It pertains to the nature of substance to exist.*

Dem.—Substance can not be produced by another (by Corollary of the foregoing Prop.); it will therefore be the cause of itself; that is (by Def. i.), its essence necessarily involves existence, or it pertains to its nature to exist. Q. E. D.

PROP. VIII. *Every substance is necessarily infinite.*

Dem.—Substance of one attribute exists only alone (by Prop. v.), and it pertains to its nature to exist (by Prop. vii.). It will therefore, from its nature, exist either as finite or as infinite. But it will not exist as finite. For (by Def. ii.) it must be limited by another of the same nature, which also must necessarily exist (by Prop. vii.) and therefore there would be given two substances of the same attribute, which is absurd (by Prop. v.). It exists therefore as infinite. Q. E. D.

Scholium I.—Since to be finite is in reality in part a negation, and to be infinite the absolute affirmation of the existence of any nature, it follows from Prop. vii. alone, that every substance must be infinite.

Schol. II.—I doubt not but that to all who judge of things confusedly, and are not accustomed to recognize things by their first causes, it may be difficult to conceive the demonstration of Prop. vii.; because, namely, they do not discriminate between the modifications of substances and substances themselves, and do not know how things are produced. Whence it comes to pass, that they attribute to substances the beginning which they see natural things have, and without any mental repugnance feign trees as speaking, like men, and imagine men to be formed alike from stones and seed, and that any forms whatever may be transformed into any others. Thus likewise those who confound divine nature with human easily attribute human affections to God, especially whilst they are ignorant how affections are produced in the mind.
of God.

But if men would attend to the nature of substance, they
would not in the least doubt the truth of Prop. vii.; in-
deed this proposition would become an axiom to all, and
would be reckoned among common notions. For by sub-
stance they would understand that which is in itself, and
is conceived by itself; that is, that, the knowledge of which
does not need the knowledge of any thing else. But by
modes they would understand that which is in another,
and the conception of which is formed by the conception
of the thing in which they are. For this reason we are
able to have true ideas of modes having no existence,
since, although they do not really exist without the intel-
lect, yet their essence is so comprehended in another, that
they may be conceived by the same. But the truth of
substances is without the intellect only in themselves, be-
cause they are conceived by themselves. If therefore any
one should say that he has a clear and distinct, that is, the
true idea of a substance, and that nevertheless he doubts
whether such a substance exists, this verily would be to say
(as must be clear to an attentive person), that he has a true
conception, but still is in doubt whether it is not a false
one; or if one should maintain that substance can be cre-
ated, he would at the same time maintain that a false idea
can be made true, than which nothing more absurd can be
conceived. It must therefore of necessity be admitted that
the existence of substance, as touching its essence, is an
eternal truth.

But from this we are able in another way to conclude
that only one of the same nature can be given, which I
have thought it worth while here to show. But that I may
do this in an orderly way, it is to be noted (1) that the true
definition of any particular thing, involves and expresses
nothing except the nature of the thing defined. From
which this follows (2), that a definition neither involves nor
expresses any number of individuals, since it expresses
nothing except the nature of the thing defined—ē g., the
definition of the triangle expresses nothing except the sim-
ple nature of the triangle, but not any certain number of
triangles. It is to be noted (3) that there is given neces-
sarily some certain cause of every existing thing, on ac-
count of which it exists. Finally it is to be noted (4) that
this cause, on account of which any thing exists, must
either be contained in the very nature and definition of the
existing thing (to wit, because it pertains to its nature to
exist), or it must be given without it. These things being
given, it follows, that if in nature some certain number of
individuals exist, a cause must necessarily be given, why
these individuals, and why neither more nor fewer exist.
If, e. g., in the nature of things, twenty men exist (whom,
for the sake of greater perspicuity, I suppose to exist to-
gether, and that before in nature no others had existed), it
will not suffice (in order, namely, that we may render a
reason why twenty men exist) to show the cause of human
nature in general, but will be necessary, in addition, to
show the cause why neither more nor fewer than twenty
exist; since (by Note iii.) the cause of each, why it exists,
must be given. But this cause (by Notes ii. and iii.) can
not be contained in human nature itself, because the true
definition of man does not involve the number twenty, and
therefore (by 'Note iv.) the cause why these twenty men
exist, and consequently why each one exists, must neces-
sarily be given without each; and therefore it may be in-
ferred absolutely that every thing of whose nature more
individuals are able to exist, must necessarily have an ex-
ternal cause for their existence. Now since (as already
shown in this Scholium) it pertains to the nature of sub-
stance to exist, its definition must involve necessary exist-
ence; consequently, from the sole definition of it, its exist-
ence must be inferred. But from its definition (as we have
shown in Notes ii. and iii.), the existence of several sub-
stances can not be deduced; it follows therefore necessarily
from this, as was asserted, that only one single substance
of the same nature exists.

Prop. IX. The more of reality or being any thing has, the
more attributes belong to it.

Dem.—This is evident from Def. iv.

Prop. X. Every attribute of a substance may be conceived by
itself.
Dem.—For an attribute is that which the intellect perceives concerning substance, as constituting its essence (by Def. iv.), and therefore (by Def. iii.) it must be conceived by itself. Q. E. D.

Schol.—From these things, it appears, that although two attributes are conceived as really distinct, that is, one without the help of the other, we are still not able thence to conclude that these constitute two entities or two diverse substances; for this belongs to the nature of substance, that each of its attributes may be conceived by itself, since all the attributes which it has, have always been in it, and one could not have been produced by another; but each expresses the reality or being of the substance. It is far from being absurd to attribute several attributes to one substance; on the contrary, nothing in nature is clearer, than that each entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that the more reality or being it has, the more attributes it may have, which express as well necessity or eternity, as infinity; and consequently nothing also is clearer, than that being absolutely infinite (as was shown in Def. vi) must necessarily be defined as being which consists of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.

But now if any one demands, by what sign we are able to discriminate the difference of substances, let him read the following propositions, which show that in nature, only one single substance exists, and that this is absolutely infinite; for which reason, this sign is demanded in vain.

Prop. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.

Dem.—If you deny it, conceive, if it can be done, that God does not exist. Therefore (by Ax. vii.) his essence does not involve existence. But this (by Prop. viii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists. Q. E. D.

Otherwise.—Of every thing a cause or reason must be assigned, as well why it exists, as why it does not exist—e. g. if a triangle exists, a reason or cause must be given, why it exists; but if it does not exist, a reason also or cause must
be given, which prevents its existence, or which cancels its existence.

But this reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing, or it must be without it—e. g. the reason or cause why a square circle does not exist, its own nature indicates; to-wit., because it involves a contradiction. (See Prop. vii.) But the reason why a circle or a triangle exists, or why it does not exist, does not follow from its nature, but from the order of universal corporeal nature; for from this it must follow, either that a triangle now necessarily exists, or that it is impossible that it now exists. But these things are self-evident. From which things it follows, that that necessarily exists, of which no reason or cause can be given which prevents its existence. If therefore no reason or cause can be given which prevents the existence of God, or which cancels his existence, it must be concluded that he necessarily exists. But if such a reason or cause could be given, this would be given either within the nature of God, or without it; that is, in another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature, by this it would be conceded that God is given. But substance, which should be of another nature, would have nothing in common with God (by Prop. ii.), and therefore could neither posit nor cancel his existence. Since therefore a reason or cause, which would cancel the divine existence, can not be given without the divine nature, it must necessarily be given, if indeed 'he fails not exist, within his own nature, which would involve a contradiction. But to affirm this concerning a being absolutely infinite, and in the highest degree perfect, is absurd. Therefore neither within God, nor without God, is any cause or reason given, which cancels his existence, and therefore God necessarily exists. Q. E. D.

Otherwise.—To be able not to exist is impotence, and contrariwise, to be able to exist is power (as is self-evident). If therefore that which now necessarily exists is only finite beings, then finite beings are more powerful than the being absolutely infinite: but this (as is self-evident) is absurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or being absolutely
infinite also necessarily exists. But we exist either in ourselves, or in another which necessarily exists. (See Ax. i., and Prop. vii.). Therefore being absolutely infinite, that is (by Def. vi.) God, necessarily exists. Q. E. D.

Schol.—In this last demonstration, I have desired to show the existence of God à posteriori, that the demonstration might be more easily apprehended; but not for the reason that the existence of God does not follow from the same proof à priori. For since to be able to exist is power, it follows that the more of reality appertains to the nature of any thing, so much the more power to exist it has from itself; and therefore that being absolutely infinite, or God, has from itself absolutely infinite power of existing, and therefore absolutely exists. Still many perhaps will not be able easily to see the evidence of this demonstration, because they have been accustomed to contemplate only those things which are derived from external causes; and from these they see that those things also perish easily which spring quickly into being, that is, which easily exist; and on the other hand, they judge those things more difficult of production, that is, not so easily brought into being, to which they conceive more as belonging. But that they may be freed from these prejudices, I have no need here to show in what sense the position is true, that what quickly springs into being, also quickly perishes, nor even whether, in reference to the totality of nature, all things are equally easy, or the reverse. It is sufficient merely to remark that I am not here speaking of things which spring from external causes, but concerning substances only, which (by Prop. vi.) can be produced by no external cause. For things which spring from external causes, whether they consist of many parts or of few, whatever of perfection or reality they have, owe the whole of this to the force of the external cause; and therefore their existence arises from the sole perfection of the external cause, and not from its own. On the contrary, whatever perfection substance has, is due to no external cause; wherefore, its existence also must follow from its own nature alone, which consequently is nothing else than its es-
sence. Perfection therefore does not cancel the existence of a thing, but on the contrary posits it; but imperfection on the other hand cancels it, and therefore, concerning the existence of nothing, are we able to be more certain, than concerning the existence of being absolutely infinite, or perfect; that is, of God. For since his essence excludes all imperfection, and involves absolute perfection, it removes thereby every ground of doubt concerning his existence, and gives the highest certainty of it, which, I believe, will be clear to one, giving to the subject a moderate degree of attention.

Prop. XII. No attribute of substance can be truly conceived, from which it follows that substance can be divided.

Dem.—For the parts into which substance, thus conceived, would be divided, will either retain the nature of substance, or they will not. If the first then (by Prop. viii.), each part must be infinite and (by Prop. vi.) its own cause, and (by Prop. v.) it will consist of a different attribute; and therefore from one substance, it will be possible to constitute several, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd. Add to this, that the parts (by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with the whole, and the whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. x.) would be able, both to be and to be conceived, without its parts, which no one can doubt to be absurd. But let the second be posited, to wit, that the parts will not retain the nature of the substance, then, when the whole substance should be divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of the substance, and would cease to be, which (by Prop. vii.) is absurd.

Prop. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.

Dem.—For if it were divisible, the parts into which it would be divided would either retain the nature of substance absolutely infinite or they would not. If the first, then will several substances of the same nature be given, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd. If the second is posited, then (as above) substance absolutely infinite can cease to be, which (by Prop. xi.) is also absurd.

Coroll.—From these things it follows, that no sub-
stance, and therefore no corporeal substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.

Schol.—That substance is indivisible, may be more simply understood from this ground alone, that the nature of substance can not be conceived, except as infinite, and that by a part of substance nothing else can be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii.) implies a manifest contradiction.

Prop. XIV. Besides God, no substance can be either given or conceived.

Dem.—Since God is being absolutely infinite, concerning which no attribute, which expresses the essence of substance, can be denied (by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if any substance except God could be given, this must be explained by some attribute of God, and thus two substances of the same attribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; and therefore no substance without God can be given, and hence not even conceived. For if it could be conceived, it must necessarily be conceived as existing; but this (by the first part of this Dem.) is absurd. Therefore besides God no substance can be either given or conceived. Q. E. D.

Coroll. I.—Hence it follows most clearly: 1. That God is single; that is (by Def. vi.), that in the nature of things only one substance is given, and that this is absolutely infinite, as we have already intimated (Schol., Prop. x.).

Coroll. II.—It follows: 2. That the extended thing and the thinking thing are either attributes of God, or (by Ax. i.) affections of the attributes of God.

Prop. XV. Whatever is, is in God; and without God nothing can either be or be conceived.

Dem.—Besides God, no substance (that is [by Def. iii.] the thing which is in itself and is conceived by itself) can be given or conceived (by Prop. xiv). But (by Def. v.) modes without substance can neither be nor be conceived; wherefore these are able to be in the divine nature alone, and to be conceived by it alone. But besides substances and modes nothing is given (by Ax. i.). There-
fore, without God, nothing is able to be or to be conceived. Q. E. D.

Schol.—There are those who conceive of God, as consisting of body and mind, as a man, and subject to passions; but how widely these err from a true knowledge of God, is sufficiently evident from the things already demonstrated. But I pass these by; for all who have in any measure considered the divine nature, deny that God is corporeal. This also they prove most satisfactorily by this, that by body we understand, whatever quantity, having length, breadth, and depth, is terminated by some certain figure; than which nothing could be more absurdly spoken of God, a being namely absolutely infinite. However, by other reasons, through which they endeavor to prove the same thing, they clearly show that they remove corporeal or extended substance itself altogether from the divine nature, and regard it as created by God. But by what divine power it could have been created, they are altogether ignorant; which clearly shows that they do not understand what they themselves utter. I have demonstrated, as I judge, with sufficient clearness (see Coroll. Prop. vi., and Schol. ii., Prop. viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by another. Further, we have shown (Prop. xiv.), that besides God no substance is given or can be conceived; and hence we conclude that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God. But in order to a fuller explication, I shall refute the arguments of opponents, which all reduce themselves to these. First, that corporeal substance, as substance, consists, as they think, of parts, and therefore they deny that the same can be infinite, and consequently can appertain to God. But they explain this by many examples, from which I will adduce one or more. If corporeal substance, they say, is infinite, it may be conceived to be divided into two parts; each part will be either finite or infinite. If the former, then an infinite is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If the latter, then an infinite is posited doubly greater than another infinite, which is also absurd. Furthermore, if an infinite quantity is measured by parts equaling
feet, it must consist of an infinite number of such parts; so also, if it should be measured by parts equaling inches; and therefore one infinite number will be twelve times greater than another infinite. Finally, if from one point of any infinite quantity it is conceived that two lines, as A B, and A C, of a certain and determinate distance in the beginning, should be extended into infinity; it is certain that the distance between B and C continually increases, and at length, from determinate will become indeterminable. Since therefore these absurdities follow, as they think, from supposing quantity to be infinite, it is thence concluded that corporeal substance must be finite, and consequently does not appertain to the essence of God. A second argument is sought also from the supreme perfection of God. For God, they say, since he is a being supremely perfect, can not suffer; but corporeal substance, since it is divisible, is able to suffer; it follows therefore that it does not belong to the essence itself of God. These are arguments which I find in authors, by which they endeavor to show that corporeal substance is unworthy the divine nature, and can not appertain to it. However, if any one will rightly consider the matter, he will find that I have already replied to these proofs, since they all have their foundation in this alone, that they suppose corporeal substance to be composed of parts, which I have already shown (Prop. xii., with Coroll. Prop. xiii.) to be absurd. From this, if any one will properly consider the case, he will see that all these absurdities (for I do not dispute that they are absurd), from which they wish to infer that extended substance is finite, by no means follow from the supposition that quantity is infinite, but from their supposition that infinite quantity is mensurable and is composed of finite parts; wherefore, from the absurdities which are thence derived, they are able to conclude nothing, except that infinite quantity is not mensurable, and that it can not be composed of finite parts. But this is the same which we above (Prop. xii., etc.) have already demonstrated. Wherefore, the weapon which they
aim at us, they in reality hurl against themselves. If therefore, from this, their own absurdity, they persist in concluding that extended substance must be finite, they commit the same error as one who, having attributed to a circle the properties of a square, concludes that the circle has no center, from which all the lines drawn to the circumference are equal. For corporeal substance, which can be conceived only as infinite, as single, and as indivisible (see Props. v., viii., xii.), this, for their conclusion, they conceive to be finite, to consist of parts, to be multiplex and divisible. In like manner, others, after supposing that a line is composed of points, know how to find many arguments by which they show that a line can not be infinitely divided. And certainly it is not less absurd to assume the position, that corporeal substance is composed of bodies or parts, than that body is composed of surface, surface of lines, and that lines finally are composed of points. But this all must admit, who know the clear reason to be infallible, and especially those who deny that there is a vacuum. For if corporeal substance could be so divided that its parts should be really distinct, why then could not one part be annihilated, the rest remaining as before, mutually connected? and why must all be so conjoined that there can be no vacuum? Surely, of things which are in reality distinct from each other, one may be without another and remain in its own place. Since therefore there is no vacuum in nature (concerning which elsewhere), but all parts must so meet that no vacuum can be given, it also follows from this, that these can not in reality be distinguished; that is, that corporeal substance, in as far as it is substance, can not be divided. If now any one should ask, why we are by nature so prone to divide quantity, I answer, that quantity is conceived by us in two ways, to wit, abstractly, or superficially; that is, as we imagine it, or as substance, which is done by the intellect alone. If therefore we consider quantity, as it is in the imagination, which is often and easily done by us, it will be found finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we consider it as it is in the intellect, and conceive it, in as far as it is sub-
stance, which is done with very great difficulty, then, as we have already demonstrated, it will be found infinite, single, and indivisible, which, to all who know how to distinguish between imagination and intellect, will be sufficiently manifest; especially if attention also is given to this, that matter is everywhere the same, and that parts are not distinguished in it, except in so far as we conceive it to be affected in different modes, whence its parts are distinguished only modalwise, but not in reality; e.g., water, in so far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts to be separated from one another, but not in so far as it is corporeal substance, for thus far it is not separated, nor divided. Again, water, as water, is generated and perishes; but, as substance, it is neither produced nor does it perish. And by these reasons, I suppose, I also reply to the second argument, since it has its foundation in this, that matter, as substance, is divisible, and is composed of parts. Were this however not the case, I know no reason why it should be unworthy the divine nature, since (by Prop. xiv.) no substance, without God, can be posited from which it could suffer. All things, I say, are in God, and all things which are produced are produced solely by the laws of the infinite nature of God, and (as already shown) follow from the necessity of his essence; wherefore it can by no means be said that God suffers from another, or that extended substance is unworthy the divine nature, although it is supposed divisible, provided only it is granted to be eternal and infinite. But of this, enough for the present.

Prop. XVI. By the necessity of the divine nature, infinites (that is, all things which can fall under an infinite intellect) must follow in infinite modes.

Dem.—This proposition must be manifest to every one, if only attention is given to this, that from the definition given of any thing whatever, the intellect infers several properties, which indeed necessarily follow from the same (that is, from the very essence of the thing), and the more of reality the definition of the thing involves. But since the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by Def. vi.), of which also each one expresses infinite essence in its
own kind, therefore, from the necessity of the same, infinites in infinite modes must necessarily follow (that is, all things which can fall under an infinite intellect). Q. E. D.

Coroll. I.—Hence it follows that God is the efficient cause of all things which can fall under an infinite intellect.

Coroll. II.—It follows, secondly, that God is cause per se, but not per accidens.

Coroll. III.—It follows, thirdly, that God is absolutely the first cause.

Prop. XVII. God acts by the sole laws of his own nature, and is forced by no one.

Dem.—By the sole necessity of the divine nature, or (what is the same thing) from the sole laws of the same nature, we have already shown (Prop. xvi.) that infinites absolutely follow; and we have demonstrated (Prop. xv.) that nothing is without God, nor is able to be conceived; but that all things are in God; wherefore nothing can be without him, by which he can be determined or forced to act, and therefore God acts by the sole laws of his own nature, and is forced by no one. Q. E. D.

Coroll. I. Hence it follows, first, that no cause can be given, whether extrinsically or intrinsically, which can incite God to action, except the perfection of his own nature.

Coroll. II.—It follows, secondly, that God alone is a free cause. For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his own nature (by Prop. xi. and Coroll. i. and Prop. xiv.), and by the sole necessity of his own nature, he acts (by preceding Prop.). Therefore (by Def. vii.) he alone is a free cause. Q. E. D.

Schol.—Others think that God is a free cause, for the reason that he is able, as they think, to bring it to pass, that those things which we have said follow from his nature, that is, which are in his power, may not come into being, or that they may not be produced by him. But this is the same as if they should say that God is able to effect, that from the nature of a triangle it should not follow that its three angles should be equal to two right angles,
or that from a given cause there should not follow an effect, which is absurd. Again, I shall show below, without any aid from this proposition, that to the nature of God there appertains neither intellect nor will. I know indeed there are many who suppose themselves able to demonstrate that there appertains supreme intellect and free will to God, for they say they know nothing more perfect which they can attribute to God than that which is the highest perfection in us. Again, although they conceive God to be in reality in the highest degree intelligent, they still do not believe that he is able to cause all things, which he knows, to exist; for they think that in this way they should destroy the power of God. If, say they, he had created all things which are in his intellect, he would then have been able to create nothing more, which they believe assails the omnipotence of God; therefore they prefer to decide that God is indifferent to all things, creating nothing else, except that which, by a certain absolute will, he has decreed to create. But I think I have shown with sufficient clearness (see Prop. xvi.), that from the supreme power of God, or from his infinite nature, infinite things in infinite modes—that is, all things—have necessarily flowed, or always follow by the same necessity; in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity to eternity that its three angles are equal to two right ones. Wherefore the omnipotence of God in reality has been from eternity, and in the same reality will remain to eternity. In this way, according to my judgment, is the omnipotence of God far more perfectly presented. Indeed, to speak plainly, these opponents seem to deny the omnipotence of God. For they are forced to admit that God knows infinite things which are producible, but which nevertheless he will not be able to create. For otherwise, that is, if he should create all that he knows, according to them, he would exhaust his omnipotence, and render himself imperfect. In order therefore that they may present God as perfect, they are under the necessity of presenting him at the same time as unable to
effect all things to which his power extends, than which I do not see what could be imagined more absurd, or more repugnant to the omnipotence of God. Again, let me here say something touching the intellect and will which we commonly ascribe to God. If to the eternal essence of God intellect and will in fact appertain, by each of these attributes something different must be understood from what men commonly understand. For the intellect and will which constitute the essence of God must differ in the highest degree from our intellect and will, and can agree with them in nothing except the name; indeed, in no other respect than the celestial constellation of the dog agrees with the barking animal which bears the same name. This I will proceed to demonstrate. If intellect appertained to the divine nature, it could not, as in the case of our intellect, be posterior (as many think) or simultaneous in nature with the things known, since in causality God is prior to all things (by Coroll. i., Prop. xvi.). On the contrary, truth and the formal essence of things is such, because it exists as such objectively in the intellect of God. Wherefore the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute the essence of God, is in reality the cause of things, at once of their essence and of their existence; which seems also to have been observed by those who have asserted that the intellect, will, and power of God are one and the same thing. Since therefore the intellect of God is the sole cause of things, to wit, as we have shown, both of their essence and of their existence, he must necessarily differ from them, both in respect to essence and in respect to existence. For that which is caused differs from its cause, precisely in that which it has from the cause; e.g., a man is the cause of the existence, not of the essence of another man, for this is an eternal truth. Therefore they may altogether agree in essence, but in existence they must differ. Therefore, if the existence of one perishes, that of the other will not therefore perish; but if the essence of the one should be destroyed and become false, the essence of the other would be destroyed also. Wherefore, the thing which is the cause
both of the essence and of the existence of any effect, must
differ from such an effect, both in respect to essence and in
respect to existence. But the intellect of God is the cause
both of the essence and of the existence of our intellect;
therefore the intellect of God, as far as it is conceived to
constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect, both
in regard to essence and in regard to existence; nor can it
agree with it in any thing but in name, as we asserted.
As touching the will, we may proceed in the same way, as
any one will easily see.

Prop. XVIII. God is the immanent, but not the transient
cause of all things.

Dem.—All things which are, are in God, and must be
conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), and therefore (Cor-
roll. i., Prop. xvi.) God is the cause of all things which are
in himself. This is the first. Then, without God, no sub-
stance can be given (by Prop. xiv.); that is (by Def. iii.),
a thing which is in itself, without God. This is the sec-
ond. God therefore is the immanent cause of all things,
but not the transient. Q. E. D.

Prop. XIX. God, or all the attributes of God, are eternal.

Dem.—God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop.
xi.) necessarily exists; that is (by Prop. vii.), to whose na-
ture it appertains to exist, or (what is the same thing) from
whose definition it follows that it exists, and therefore (by
Def. viii.) is eternal. Then by the attributes of God, that
is to be understood, which (by Def. iv.) expresses the es-

cence of the divine substance; that is, that which belongs
to substance. This very thing, I say, must the attributes
contain. But (as I have already demonstrated, Prop. vii.)
eternity belongs to the nature of substance; therefore each
one of the attributes must contain eternity, and thus all
are eternal.

Schol.—This proposition is very clearly evident from the
manner in which (Prop. xi.) I have demonstrated the exis-
tence of God. From this demonstration, I say, it is evi-
dent that the existence of God, as well as his essence, is
an eternal truth. Once more, in Part I., Prop. xix., of
Cartesius Princip. of Philos., I have demonstrated, in
another way, the eternity of God, but it is not needful to repeat it here.

Prop. XX. The existence of God and his essence, are one and the same.

Dem.—God (by the preceding Prop.) and all his attributes, are eternal; that is (by Def. viii.), each of his attributes expresseth existence. Therefore the same attributes of God, which (by Def. iv.) explain the eternal essence of God, explain, at the same time, his eternal existence; that is, that very thing which constitutes the essence of God, constitutes, at the same time, his existence, and thus this and his essence are one and the same. Q. E. D.

Coroll. I.—Hence it follows: I. That the existence of God, as well as his essence, is an eternal truth.

Coroll. II.—It follows: II. That God, or all the attributes of God, are immutable. For if they should be changed in respect to existence, they would also be changed in respect to essence (by preced. Prop.); that is, as is self-evident, from true they would become false, which is absurd.

Prop. XXI. All things, which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God, must have existed always, and as infinite, or by the same attribute they are eternal and infinite.

Dem.—Conceive, if it can be done, and if you deny this, that, in some attribute of God, something follows from its absolute nature which is finite, and has a determinate existence or duration; e. g., the idea of God in thought. But thought, since it is supposed an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) infinite in its nature. But in so far as it holds an idea of God, it is supposed finite. But (by Def. ii.) it can not be conceived finite, unless it is limited by thought itself. But it is not limited by thought itself, in so far as it constitutes the idea of God, for thus far it is supposed to be finite; therefore it must be limited by thought, in so far as it does not constitute the idea of God, which, nevertheless (by Prop. xi.), must necessarily exist. Thought then is posited not constituting the idea of God, and therefore, from its nature, in as far as it is absolute thought, the idea of God does not necessarily follow. (For it is conceived as constituting and not constituting the
idea of God.) This is contrary to the hypothesis. Therefore, if the idea of God in thought, or any thing (for the example is indifferent, as the demonstration is universal) in any attribute of God, follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of the attribute itself, this must, of necessity, be infinite, which was the first thing to be proved.

Again, that which thus follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute, cannot have a limited duration. For, if you deny it, let a thing be supposed, which follows from the necessity of the nature of some attribute, to be posited in some attribute of God, e.g., the idea of God in thought, and let this be supposed once not to have existed, or about not to exist hereafter. But since thought is supposed as an attribute of God, it must also exist necessarily, and as immutable (by Prop. xi, and Coroll. ii, Prop. xx). Wherefore, beyond the limits of the duration of the idea of God (for it is supposed once not to have existed, or that it will hereafter cease to exist), thought without the idea of God must exist. But this is contrary to the hypothesis; for it is supposed that, from the thought posited, the idea of God necessarily follows. Therefore the idea of God in thought, or any thing which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God, can not have a limited duration, but by the same attribute is eternal. This was the second thing. Note that the same may be affirmed of any thing whatever which, in any attribute of God, follows necessarily from God’s absolute nature.

Prop. XXII. Whatever follows from any other attribute of God, in as far as it is transformed by such a modification, as exists necessarily and as infinite by the same, must also exist both necessarily and as infinite.

Dem.—The demonstration of this proposition proceeds in the same way, as the demonstration of the preceding proposition.

Prop. XXIII. Every mode, which exists necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow, either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute transformed by a modification, which exists both necessarily and as infinite.

Dem.—Mode is in another, by which it must be con-
ceived (by Def. v.); that is (by Prop. xv.), is in God alone, and can be conceived through God alone. If, therefore, a mode is conceived necessarily to exist, and to be infinite, each must be necessarily inferred, or is perceived through some attribute of God, in as far as the same is conceived to express infinity and necessity of existence, or (what, by Def. viii., is the same) eternity; that is (by Def. vi. and Prop. xix.), as far as it is absolutely considered. Mode, therefore, which exists both necessarily, and as infinite, must follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God; and that either directly (for which see Prop. xxi.), or by the mediation of some mode, which follows from his absolute nature; that is (by preceding Prop.), which exists necessarily, and as infinite. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXIV. The essence of the things produced by God does not involve existence.

Dem.—This is evident from Def. i. For that whose nature (namely, considered in itself) involves existence is its own cause, and exists from the sole necessity of its own nature.

Coroll.—Hence it follows, that God is the cause, not only that things begin to exist, but also that they persevere in existence; or, to use a scholastic phrase, that God is the causa essendi of things. For, whether things exist or do not exist, as often as we attend to their essence, we find that this involves neither existence nor duration; and, therefore, their essence can be the cause neither of their existence, nor of their duration, but God alone, to whose nature it appertains to exist (by Coroll. i., Prop. xiv.).

Prop. XXV. God is not only the efficient cause of the existence of things, but also of the essence.

Dem.—If you deny, then God is not the cause of the essence of things; and, therefore (by Ax. iv.), the essence of things can be conceived without God: but this (by Prop. xv.) is absurd. Therefore, God is the cause even of the essence of things. Q. E. D.

Schol.—This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi. For, from this proposition, it follows, that from the given divine nature, as well the essence of things, as
their existence must be inferred; and to express it briefly, in the sense in which God is said to be his own cause, he must also be said to be the cause of all things. This will also be more clearly evident from the following corollary.

Coroll. — Particular things are nothing but affections of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain and limited manner. The demonstration is clear from Prop. xv., and Def. v.

Prop. XXVI. A thing, which has been determined to do any thing, has been necessarily so determined by God; and that which has not been determined by God, is not able to determine itself to action.

Dem. — That, by which things are said to be determined to any action, is necessarily something positive — as is self-evident. And therefore, from the necessity of his nature, God is the efficient cause as well of its essence as of its existence (by Props. x xv. and xvi.). This was the first point to be proved. From this, also, that which was proposed as the second most clearly follows. For if a thing, which has not been determined by God, should be able to determine itself, the first part of this demonstration would be false — which is absurd, as we have shown.

Prop. XXVII. The thing which has been determined by God to do any thing, can not render itself indeterminate.

Dem. — This proposition is evident from Ax. iii.

Prop. XXVIII. Any individual thing, or any thing whatever, which is finite and has a limited existence, can not exist, nor be determined to action, unless it is determined to exist and act by another cause, which is also finite and has a limited existence. And again, the cause also can not exist, nor be determined to action, except by another which is also finite, has a limited existence, and is determined to exist and act — and so on, without end.

Dem. — Whatever is determined to exist and act, has been so determined by God (by Prop. xxvi., and Coroll., Prop. xxiv.). But that which is finite and has a limited existence, can not have been produced from the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for whatever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God, this is infinite
and eternal (by Prop. xxi.). It must, therefore, have followed from God, or from some attribute of his, considered as affected in some manner; for, besides substance and modes, nothing is given (by Ax. i, and Def. iii. and v.); and modes (by Coroll., Prop. xxv.) are nothing but affections of the attributes of God. But from God, or from some attribute of his, in as far as affected by some modification, which is eternal and infinite, it could not have followed (by Prop. xxii.). It must therefore have followed, or have been determined to exist and act by God, or by some attribute of his, in as far as affected by some modification which is finite and has a determinate existence. This was the first point.

Then, again, this cause, or this mode (by the same proof already adduced in Part I.), must also have been determined by another, which is also finite and has a determinate existence, and this last again (by the same proof) by another—and so on (by the same proof), without end.

Q. E. D.

Schol.—Since some things must have been produced immediately from God, to-wit, those things which follow necessarily from his absolute nature, these primary things mediately producing those, which still can neither be nor be conceived without God, it follows hence, first, that God is the absolutely proximate cause of the things immediately produced by him; but not, as they say, in their own kind (suo genere). For effects of God, without their cause, can neither be, nor be conceived (by Prop. xv. and Coroll., Prop. xxiv.). It follows secondly, that God can not properly be said to be the remote cause of individual things, unless, perhaps, that we may distinguish these from those which he has immediately produced, or rather which follow from his absolute nature. For, by remote cause, we understand one which is in no way connected with the effect. But all things, which are, are in God, and so depend upon God, that without him they can neither be nor be conceived.

Prop. XXIX. In the nature of things nothing contingent is given; but all things, by the necessity of the divine nature, have been determined to exist and act in a certain manner.
Dem.—Whatever is, is in God (by Prop. xv.). But God can not be said to be a contingent thing. For (by Prop. xi.) he exists necessarily, but not contingently. Again the modes of the divine nature have followed from the same, necessarily, but not contingently (by Prop. xvi.), and that, in so far as the divine nature is considered absolutely (by Prop. xxi.), or as determined to act in a certain manner (by Prop. xxvii.). Furthermore of these modes God is not only the cause of their simple existence (by Coroll., Prop. xxiv.), but also (by Prop. xxvi.) in so far as they are considered as determined to do any thing. This (by the same Prop.) is impossible, if they are not determined by God; and it is not a contingent thing that they determine themselves; and *vice versa* (by Prop. xxvii.) if they are determined by God, it is impossible, and it is not a contingent thing that they render themselves indeterminate. Wherefore, all things, by the necessity of the divine nature, are determined not only to exist, but to exist and act in a certain manner, and nothing contingent is given. Q. E. D.

Schol.—Before proceeding further, I wish here to explain, or rather to remind the reader, what we are to understand by the expressions, *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*. From what has already been said, I suppose it already evident that by *natura naturans* we are to understand that, which is in itself, and is conceived by itself, or such attributes of substance as express eternal and infinite essence, that is (by Coroll. i., Prop. xiv. and Coroll. ii., Prop. xvii.) God, in so far as he is considered as a free cause. By *natura naturata*, I understand all that, which follows from the necessity of the divine nature, or of any one of the attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, in as far as they are considered as things, which are in God, and which without God can not be nor be conceived.

Prop. XXX. *Intellect whether in reality finite or infinite, must comprehend the attributes and affections of God, and nothing more."

Dem.—A true idea must agree with its object (by Ax. vi.), that is (as is self evident) that, which is contained in
the intellect objectively, must necessarily be given in na-
ture; but in nature (by Coroll. i., Prop. xiv.) only one sub-
stance is given, namely, God; nor any other affections (by
Prop. xv.) except those which are in God, and which (by
the same Prop.) without God can neither be nor be con-
ceived; therefore intellect, whether in reality finite or in-
finite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the af-
fections of God, and nothing else. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXXI. Intellect as a reality, whether it is finite or in-
finite, as also will, desire, love, etc., must be referred to natura
naturata, but not to natura naturans.

Dem.—For by intellect (as is self evident) we do not un-
derstand absolute thought, but only a certain mode of
thinking, which mode differs from others, namely, from
desire, love, etc., and thus (by Def. v.) must be conceived
by absolute thought, namely (by Prop. xv. and Def. vi.),
must so be conceived by some attribute of God, which ex-
presses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, that
without it, it can neither be nor be conceived; and, there-
fore (by Schol., Prop. xxix.), must be referred to natura
naturata, but not to natura naturans, as also the other
modes of thinking. Q. E. D.

Schol.—The reason why I here speak concerning intel-
lect in reality, is not because I grant that there is any in-
tellect in potentiality, but because I desire to avoid all con-
fusion. I have been unwilling to speak save of a thing
most clearly perceived by us, namely, of intellection itself,
than which nothing is more clearly perceived by us. For
we are able to understand nothing, which does not lead to
a more perfect knowledge of intellection.

Prop. XXXII. Will can not be called a free cause, but only
a necessary one.

Dem.—Will is only a certain mode of thinking, just like
intellect, and thus (by Prop. xxviii.) each volition is able
neither to exist nor to be determined to action, unless it
shall be determined by another cause, and this again by
another, and so on without end. Because if will is sup-
posed to be infinite, it must also be determined by God to
exist and act, not in so far as he is substance absolutely in-
finite, but in so far as he has an attribute, which expresses
the infinite and eternal essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii).
In whatever way, therefore, it is conceived, whether finite
or infinite, it requires a cause by which it shall be deter-
minded to exist and act, and, therefore (by Def. vii.), it can
not be said to be a free cause, but only a necessary or
forced one. Q. E. D.

Coroll. I.—Hence it follows (1), that God does not act
from free will.

Coroll. II.—It follows (2) that will and intellect stand so
related to the nature of God, as do motion and rest; and
absolutely as all natural things which (by Prop. xxix.)
must be determined by God to exist and act in a certain
manner. For will, as all the rest, requires a cause by
which it shall be determined to exist and act in a certain
mode. And although from a given will or intellect infinites
may follow, God can not therefore any more be said to act
from freedom of will, than he can be said to act from free-
dom of motion or rest, on account of the effects of these,
for infinites follow from these also. Wherefore, will no
more appertains to the nature of God than other natural
things, but stands related to it in the same way as motion
and rest, and all the remainder, which we have shown, fol-
low from the necessity of the divine nature, and are deter-
mined by the same to exist and act in a certain mode.

Prop. XXXIII. Things could have been produced by God
in no other mode, and in no other order, than they have been
produced.

Dem.—For all things have followed necessarily from the
given nature of God (by Prop. xvi.), and from the neces-
sity of the nature of God, have been determined to exist
and act (by Prop. xxix.) If therefore things of another
nature could have been, or have been determined to action
in another manner, so that the order of nature should be
different, then the nature of God could have been another
than it now is; and hence (by Prop. xi.) that must exist,
and consequently there could be given two or more Gods,
which (by Coroll. i., Prop. xiv.) is absurd. Wherefore,
things could have been produced by God in no other way, etc. Q. E. D.

Schol. I.—Having thus shown, with more than noon-day clearness, that there is in things absolutely nothing, on account of which they may be called contingent, I will now explain, in a few words, what we are to understand by contingent; but first, what by necessary and by impossible. Any thing is called necessary, either by reason of its essence, or by reason of its cause. For the existence of any thing follows either from its essence and definition, or necessarily from a given efficient cause.

Again, from these causes also a thing is called impossible; to-wit, because either its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause is given, determined to produce such a thing. But any thing is called contingent for no other cause than out of regard to a defect in our knowledge. For a thing, whose essence we do not know to involve a contradiction, or concerning which we know very well that it involves no contradiction, and yet we are able to affirm nothing certainly concerning its existence, for the reason that the order of causes is concealed from us, this never can appear to us either necessary or impossible, and therefore we call it either contingent or possible.

Schol. II.—From the foregoing it clearly follows, that things have been produced by God in the highest perfection; since from a given, most perfect nature, they have followed necessarily. Nor does this convict God of any imperfection; for his perfection compels us to affirm this. Yea, from the contrary of this, it would clearly follow (as I have just shown), that God would not be in the highest degree perfect; to-wit, because if things had been produced in another mode, another nature must be attributed to God, different from that which we have been compelled to attribute to him, from a consideration of most perfect Being. I do not doubt, however, that many may reject this sentiment as absurd, and may be unwilling to apply their minds to a consideration of it, and that from no other reason than because they have been
accustomed to attribute to God another liberty, far different from that which has been presented (Def. vi.) by us; namely, absolute will. But neither also do I doubt, if they would consider the matter, and rightly weigh the series of our demonstrations, that they would utterly reject at length such a liberty as they now attribute to God, not merely as nugatory, but as a great obstacle to knowledge. Nor is there any need that I should here repeat the things which have been said in the Scholium of Proposition xvii. Still, out of courtesy to them, I shall show still further, that should it be granted that will appertains to the essence of God, it would still follow from his perfection that things could have been created by God in no other mode or order. It will be easy to show this, if we first consider what they themselves concede; namely, that it depends upon the sole decree and will of God, that every thing is what it is. For otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things. Then again, because all the decrees of God have been established from eternity by God himself. For otherwise, he would be convicted of imperfection and inconstancy. But since, in the eternal, there is no When, no Before, and no After, it follows hence from the sole perfection, namely, of God, that God can never decree, and could never have decreed, another thing; or that God was not before his decrees, and can not be without them. But they say, that, although it should be supposed that God had made another nature of things, or that from eternity he had decreed another thing concerning nature and its order, no imperfection in God could thence be concluded. But if they say this, they grant, at the same time, that God is able to change his decrees. For if God had decreed concerning nature and its order, another thing than he has decreed, that is, that he had willed and conceived another thing concerning nature, then he would necessarily have had another intellect than he now has, and another will than he now has. And if it is permitted to attribute another intellect and another will to God, and without any change of his essence and his perfection, what reason can be given why he can not change his decrees concerning things created, and nevertheless remain equally perfect? For his
intellect and will, in regard to created things and their order, stands in the same relation to his essence and perfection, in whatever way it is conceived.

Again, all the philosophers whom I have seen grant that in God there is no intellect in potentiality, but only in reality. But since both his intellect and his will are not distinguished from his essence, as all grant, it follows hence also, that if God had had another intellect in reality, and another will, his essence also would have been necessarily another. And therefore (as I inferred in the outset), if things had been produced by God otherwise than they now are, the intellect of God and his will, that is, his essence (as is granted), must have been another, which is absurd.

Since therefore things could have been produced by God in no other mode or order, and that this is true follows from the highest perfection of God, no sound reason can persuade us to believe that God would have been unwilling to create all things which are in his intellect in that same perfection in which he perceived them. But they will say that there is in things neither perfection nor imperfection, but that which is in them on account of which they are perfect or imperfect, and are called good or evil, depends solely upon the will of God; and therefore if God had willed he might have caused that that which is now perfection should be the highest imperfection, and the reverse. But what would this be other than openly to affirm that God, who necessarily knows that which he wills, should be able to cause by his own will, that he may know things in another mode than he does know them, which, as I have shown already, is a great absurdity. Wherefore I am able to retort the argument upon themselves thus. All things depend upon the power of God. That things therefore may be otherwise constituted, the will of God must necessarily be otherwise constituted; but the will of God can not be otherwise constituted (as we have already shown most clearly from the perfection of God). Therefore neither can things be otherwise constituted. I confess that this opinion, which subjects all things to a certain indifferent will of God, and makes all things depend upon his good
pleasure, errs from the truth less than that of those who
assert that God does all things for the sake of the good.
For these seem to place something without God, which
does not depend upon God, to which God in action attends,
at which he is aiming as at a certain end. This surely is
nothing else than to subject God to fate, than which nothing
more absurd can be asserted concerning God, whom we
have shown to be the first and only free cause, as well
of the essence of all things as of their existence. There
is no reason why I should spend time in refuting this
absurdity.

Prop. XXXIV. *The power of God is his very essence.*

*Dem.—* For it follows from the sole necessity of God's
essence that God is the cause of himself (by Prop. xi.) and
(by Prop. xvi. and its Coroll.) of all things. Therefore
the power of God, by which himself and all things are and act,
is his very essence. *Q. E. D.*

Prop. XXXV. *Whatever we conceive to be in the power of
God, that necessarily is.*

*Dem.—* Whatever is in the power of God, this (by the
foregoing proposition) must be so comprehended in his es-
sence that it follows from it necessarily, and therefore it
necessarily is. *Q. E. D.*

Prop. XXXVI. *Nothing exists from whose nature some ef-
fect does not follow.*

*Dem.—* Whatever exists expresses the nature or essence of
God in a certain and determinate manner (by Coroll., Prop
xxv.), that is (by Prop. xxxiv.), whatever exists expresses the
power of God, which is the cause of all things, in a certain
and determinate manner, and therefore (by Prop. xvi.) from
it some effect must follow. *Q. E. D.*

APPENDIX.

By these things I have explained the nature of God and
his properties, as, that he necessarily exists; that he is a
unit; that, from the sole necessity of his nature, he is and
acts; that he is the free cause of all things and in what
way; that all things are in God, and so depend upon him;
that without him they can neither be nor be conceived;
and finally that all things have been predetermined by God, not indeed by freedom of will or from his absolute good pleasure, but from the absolute nature or infinite power of God. Moreover, wherever opportunity has presented itself, I have endeavored to remove prejudices, which might prevent the perception of my demonstrations: But because not a few prejudices still remain, which also, and that in the highest degree, could and can prevent men from comprehending the connection of things in the way in which I have explained it, I have judged it worth while to subject these prejudices here to the test of reason. And since all the prejudices which I undertake here to indicate, depend upon this one, to wit, that men commonly suppose that all natural things, like themselves, act for an end—yea, they hold it as certain that God directs all things to some certain end; for they say that God made all things for man, and man, that he might worship himself—this prejudice, therefore, I will first consider. I will first of all seek for the cause why the majority of men acquiesce in this prejudice, and why all are by nature so inclined to embrace it. Secondly, I will show its falsity. And finally, how prejudices concerning good and evil, merit and demerit, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and deformity, and other things of this kind have arisen. But to deduce these from the nature of the human mind does not belong to this place. It will be sufficient if I begin with a position which must be admitted by all; to wit, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that all have a propensity, of which they are conscious, to seek their own advantage. From these things it follows, first, that men think they are free, since they are conscious of their own appetites, and as touching the causes by which they are disposed to desire and to will, because they are ignorant of these, they do not think of them even in a dream. It follows, secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for the advantage which they seek; whence it comes to pass that they always desire to know only the final causes of the things done; and when they have heard them, they are satisfied; for the reason that they have no further cause of doubt. But
if they can not hear these from another, they have no re-
source but to turn to themselves and consider the ends by
which they are accustomed to be determined to similar
things. And thus necessarily they judge the disposition
of another by their own. Moreover, since both within
and without themselves they find many means which con-
tribute in no small degree to secure their own advantage, as
e. g., the eyes to seeing, the teeth to masticating, herbs and
animals for nutrition, the sun for giving light, the sea for
nourishing fishes, etc., it comes to pass that they consider all
natural things as means to their advantage. And because
they know these means to have been found, and not formed by
themselves, they have hence a ground of belief that there is
some other one who has prepared these means for their use.
For after they have once regarded things as means, they
are not able to believe that these means made themselves,
but from the means which they are accustomed to provide
for themselves, they are obliged to conclude that there
must be some governor or governors of nature, endowed
with human freedom, who have provided all things for
them, and made them for their use. And the disposition
of these rulers, since they have never heard any thing con-
cerning it, they are obliged to judge from their own, and
so decide that the gods direct every thing for the use of
men, that they may bind men to themselves, and be held
in the highest honor by them. Whence it comes to pass
that they have severally excogitated every one from his
own disposition, divers modes of worshiping God, that God
may love them beyond others, and direct all nature for the
use of their blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. And
thus this prejudice was converted into superstition, and
struck its roots deeply into their minds. It became the
cause why each one put forth every effort to understand
the final causes of all things, and to explain them. But
whilst they have sought to show that nature does nothing
in vain (that is, which is not for the use of men), they seem
to have proved nothing else, than that nature and the gods,
equally with men, are insane. Look, I pray, to the issue
of this reasoning. Among so many utilities of nature,
they must find not a few disadvantages, such as tempests, earthquakes, diseases, etc., and they decide that these have happened, because the gods are angry on account of injuries done them by men, or on account of faults committed in their worship. And although experience may daily refute it, and show by infinite examples that utilities and disadvantages happen alike to the pious and the impious, they have not therefore abandoned an inveterate prejudice, for they have found it more easy to place this among other unknown things of whose utility they are ignorant, and thus retain their present and innate state of ignorance, than to destroy this whole fabric and excogitate a new one. For this reason they hold it as certain that the judgments of the gods far surpass the human comprehension. This, indeed, would have been a sufficient cause, why truth should have escaped the human race forever, had not mathematics, which employs itself not about ends, but only about the essences and properties of figures, indicated to men another test of truth. And aside from mathematics, other causes also might be assigned (which it is superfluous here to enumerate), by which occasion has been given for men to become aware of these prejudices, and to be led to the true knowledge of things.

I have thus far explained that which I promised as the first thing. But that I may now show that nature has proposed no end for itself, and that all final causes are nothing but human imaginations, not many words will be required. For I believe this is now sufficiently evident, as well from the principles and causes from which I have shown this prejudice to have derived its origin, as from Prop. xvi. and Coroll. of Prop. xxxii., as also from all the proofs by which I have shown, that all things proceed from a certain eternal necessity, and from the highest perfection of nature. Still I will add that this doctrine of an end altogether perverts nature. For that, which in reality is a cause, it regards as an effect, and the reverse. Again, that which in nature is antecedent, it makes posterior. And finally, that which is supreme and most perfect, it renders most imperfect. For (to omit the two former as
self-evident) as is clear from Props. xxi., xxii., and xxiii.,
that effect is most perfect, which is produced immediately
by God, and the more intermediate causes any thing needs,
the more imperfect is it. But, if the things which have
been produced immediately by God, have been made in
order that God might attain his own end, then necessarily
the latter, on account of which the former were made,
were the most excellent of all. Again, this doctrine de-
struys the perfection of God, for if God acts for an end, he
necessarily desires something which he lacks. And
although theologians and metaphysicians distinguish an end
of need, and an end of assimilation, they nevertheless con-
fess that God has done all things for his own sake, and
not for the sake of the things to be created, because they
are able to assign nothing before the creation, except God,
on whose account God acted; and, therefore, they are
necessarily compelled to confess that God lacked those
things, for the sake of which he wished to provide the means,
and that he desired them, as is clear of itself. Nor
is this to be overlooked, that the abettors of this doctrine,
who have sought to show their acuteness in presenting the
ends of things, have brought to the proof of this doctrine
of theirs a new mode of reasoning, to-wit, not the reductio
ad impossibile, but ad ignorantiam, which shows that for
this doctrine there was no other mode of argument. If
e. g. a stone had fallen from some height upon some one’s
head and killed him, they will demonstrate in this way;
that the stone fell in order to kill the man. For unless
it had fallen for this purpose, by the will of God, how
could so many circumstances (for often many concur) have
eoperated by chance? You will answer, perhaps, that
this happened because the wind blew, and because the
man went thither. But they insist, why did the wind blow
at that time? Why did the man go thither at that very
time? If you again answer that the wind arose at that
time, because the sea on the preceding day, the weather
having before been calm, began to be agitated; and
because the man had been invited by a friend, they
will still insist, because there is no end of asking, but
why was the sea agitated? why was the man invited at that time; and so they will not cease to demand the causes of causes, until you take refuge in the will of God, that is, in the asylum of ignorance. So, also, when they look at the fabric of the human body, they are astonished, and because they are ignorant of the causes of so great art, they conclude that it was constructed not by mechanical, but by divine or supernatural art, and constituted in such a way that one part might not injure another. And hence it comes to pass, that he who seeks to understand the true causes of wonders, and of natural things, as a wise man, and not to gaze at them, as a fool, is everywhere esteemed as a heretic and an impious wretch, and is denounced by those whom the vulgar worship as the interpreters of nature and of the gods. For they know that, ignorance being removed, wonder, that is, the sole method of reasoning and defending their authority, is removed also. But I leave this topic and proceed to that which I proposed to do in the third place.

After men had persuaded themselves that all things which are done are done for their sakes, they must needs judge that to be, in every thing, the most important, which was most useful to themselves, and esteem all those things most excellent by which they were most favorably affected. From hence they must have formed those notions by which they explained the natures of things, to wit, good, evil, order, confusion, warm, cold, beauty, and deformity, and because they esteem themselves free, hence arose these notions, viz., praise and blame, demerit and merit. The latter of these, however, I shall subsequently explain, when I shall come to treat of human nature; the former I shall briefly explain here.

All that, namely, which conduces to health and to the worship of God, men have called good; what is contrary to these, evil. And because those who do not understand the nature of things affirm nothing concerning them, but represent them only by imagination, they regard imagination as knowledge, and so firmly believe that there is an order in things, being ignorant of things and their nature. And
when they are so arranged that, when they are represented to us by the senses, we are able easily to imagine them, and consequently easily to remember them, we say they are well ordered; if the contrary, we say they are badly ordered or confused. And since those things are especially agreeable to us, which we are able easily to imagine, therefore men prefer order to confusion, as if order were any thing in nature save a relation to our imagination. And they say that God created all things in order; and in this way, without knowing it, they attribute imagination to God; unless perhaps they prefer to say that God, foreseeing the human imagination, disposed all things in this way that men might most easily imagine them; nor will it, perhaps, occasion them hesitation, that infinite numbers of things are found which far surpass our imagination, and multitudes which confound it, on account of its weakness. But on this point, enough.

Again, other notions also, besides modes of imagining, by which the imagination is in divers ways affected, are nothing, and yet by the ignorant are regarded as prominent attributes of things; because, as already observed, they believe that all things were made for their sakes, and they say that the nature of any thing is good or bad, sound or putrid, and corrupt, according as they are affected by them. E.g. if the motion which the nerves receive from objects presented by the eyes, conduce to health, the objects by which it is caused are called beautiful, but those which excite the contrary motion are called ugly. The things which excite the sense through the nostrils they call odoriferous or fetid; through the tongue, sweet or bitter, well-flavored or insipid, etc.; the things through the touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, etc. And finally, the things which move the ears are said to give out noise, sound, or harmony, of which the last has so deranged men that they believe God is delighted with harmony. Nor are there wanting philosophers who have persuaded themselves that the celestial motions form a harmony. All this shows well enough that every one has judged of things according to the disposition of his brain, or rather has accepted the af-
ections of the imagination for real things. It is not, therefore, surprising (be it remarked in passing), that so many controversies, as we see, have arisen among men, from which at last has sprung skepticism. For, although human bodies agree in many things, yet in most they disagree, and therefore what to one seems good, to another appears evil; what to one well-ordered, to another confused; what to one is agreeable, to another is disagreeable; and thus concerning other things which I here pass by, both because this is not the place in which to discuss them at large, and because all have had sufficient experience in them. In every one's mouth we find the sentiment: "So many heads, so many minds;" "each one is full of his own opinion;" "the differences of heads are not less than the differences of tastes." Such expressions show sufficiently that men judge of things from the disposition of the brain, and that they rather imagine things than understand them. For if they had understood things, all these, as mathematics prove, if they did not allure, would at least convince them.

We see, therefore, that all the reasons by which the multitude is accustomed to explain nature are only modes of imagining, and not the nature of any thing, but indicate only the constitution of the imagination. And because men regard names as belonging to entities existing beyond the region of the imagination, I call the entities themselves, not those of reason, but of the imagination; and therefore all the arguments which are cited against me, derived from similar notions, can be easily repelled.

For many are accustomed to reason thus: If all things have followed from the necessity of the perfect nature of God, whence come so many imperfections in nature? For instance, the corruption of things, even to stench, deformity which excites disgust, evil, sin, etc. But, as I have just said, they are easily confuted. For the perfection of things is to be estimated from their nature and power alone, nor are things more or less perfect because they please or offend the senses of men; because they are favorable or repugnant to human nature. But to those who ask why
Has God not so created all men, that they should be governed by the sole guidance of reason? I have only to answer, because there was not wanting to him material for creating all things, from the highest to the lowest degree of perfection; or, to speak more properly, because the laws of his nature were so ample that they sufficed to produce all things which could be conceived by any infinite intellect, as I have demonstrated in Proposition xvi. These are the prejudices which I have undertaken to signalize. If any of this description still remain, any one may correct them by moderate meditation.
PART SECOND.

CONCERNING THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND.

I now pass to the explication of those things which must necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and infinite Entity. Not indeed all things, for I have demonstrated (Prop. xvi., Part I.) that infinite things, with infinite modes, must follow from it: but only those things which are able to lead us, as it were, by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind, and its highest happiness.

Definitions.

I. By Body, I understand the mode which expresses, in a certain and determinate manner, the essence of God, in so far as it is considered as a thing extended. See Coroll., Prop. xxv., Part I.

II. I say that belongs to the essence of a thing which, being given, the thing is necessarily posited, and which, being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken away; or, that, without which the thing, and vice versa, which, without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.

III. By Idea, I understand a conception of the mind which the mind forms, because it is a thinking thing.

Explication.—I call it rather conception than perception, because the word perception seems to indicate that the mind suffers from an object. But conception seems to express the action of the mind.

IV. By an adequate idea, I understand an idea which, as far as it is considered in itself, without relation to an object, has all the properties or intrinsic characteristics of a true idea.

Exp.—I say intrinsic, in order that I may exclude what is extrinsic, namely, the agreement of an idea with its object.
V. Duration is indefinite continuation of existence.

Exp.—I say indefinite, because it can by no means be determined by the very nature of the existing thing, nor even by an efficient cause, since this necessarily posits the existence of the thing, but does not cancel it.

VI. By Reality and Perfection, I understand the same thing.

VII. By Single Things, I understand things which are finite, and have a determinate existence. Because, if several individuals so concur in one action that altogether are the cause of one effect, I consider them all as one single thing.

Axioms.

I. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that is, from the order of nature, it can as well happen that this or that man exists, as that he does not exist.

II. Man thinks.

III. The modes of thinking, as love, desire, or whatever affections of the mind are named, are not given, unless in the same individual there is given the idea of the thing loved, desired, etc. But the idea may be given although no other mode of thinking may be given.

IV. We know by sensation that a certain body is affected in many modes.

V. Neither by sensation nor by perception, do we know any single things, except bodies and modes of thinking.

See the Postulates after Prop. xiii.

Prop. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.

Dem.—Single thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which, in a certain and determinate manner, express the nature of God (by Coroll. Prop. xxv., Part I). There belongs therefore to God (by Def. v., Part I) an attribute, the conception of which all single thoughts involve, by which they also are conceived. Thought is therefore one of the infinite attributes of God, which expresses eternal and infinite essence (see Def. vi., Part I), or God is a thinking thing.
Schol.—This proposition is also obvious from this, that we are able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For the more a thinking being is able to think, the more of reality or perfection we conceive the same to contain; therefore a being, which is able to think infinite things in infinite modes, is necessarily, in virtue of thinking, infinite. Since therefore, by attending to thought alone, we may conceive an infinite being, thought (by Def. iv. and vi., Part I.) is necessarily one of the infinite attributes of God, as we proposed to prove.

Prop. II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is a thing extended.

Dem.—The demonstration of this proceeds in the same manner as that of the preceding proposition.

Prop. III. In God is given necessarily an idea, both of his essence and of all things which necessarily follow from his essence.

Dem.—For God (by Prop. i., Part II.) is able to think infinites in infinite modes, or (what is the same thing, by Prop. xvi., Part I.) it is possible to form the idea of his own essence and of all things which necessarily follow from it. But every thing which is in the power of God necessarily is (by Prop. xxxv., Part I.); therefore such an idea is necessarily given, and (by Prop. xv., Part I.) only in God. Q. E. D.

Schol.—The multitude, by the power of God, understand his free will, and his right over all things which are. These last are accordingly commonly regarded as contingent. For they say God has the power of destroying and reducing to nothing all things. Moreover they very often compare the power of God with the power of kings. But this we have refuted, in Coroll. i. and ii., Prop. xxxii., Part I., and in Prop. xvi., Part I., we have shown that God acts by the same necessity by which he knows himself, that is, as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all alike declare) that God knows himself, by the same necessity also it follows, that God does infinite things in infinite modes. Again, in Prop. xxxiv., Part I., we have shown that the power of God is nothing except his active essence;
and therefore it is as impossible for us to conceive that God does not act as that God is not. Moreover, if it were worth while to pursue the subject longer, I could here further show that the power which the multitude ascribe to God is not only human (which shows that God, by the multitude, is conceived to be man or like man), but even that it involves impotence. But I am unwilling to discourse so often concerning this matter. I merely again and again beg the reader, that he would once and again weigh what, in Part I., from Prop. xvi. to the end, has already been spoken on this theme. For no one can rightly apprehend what I intend, unless he is exceedingly careful not to confound the power of God with the human power and right of kings.

Prop. IV. The idea of God, from which infinites in infinite modes follow, can be only single.

Dem.—The infinite intellect comprehends nothing except the attributes of God and his affections (by Prop. xxx., Part I). But God is single (by Coroll. i., Prop. xiv., Part I). Therefore, the idea of God, from which infinites in infinite modes follow, can be only single. Q. E. D.

Prop. V. The formal being of ideas recognizes God as its cause, in so far only as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not in so far as he is expressed by any other attribute;* that is, ideas both of the attributes of God and of single things do not recognize the objects, or things perceived, as an efficient cause, but God himself, in as far as he is a thinking thing.

Dem.—This is evident from Prop. iii. of this part. For we there concluded that God is able to form the idea of his own essence, and of all things which necessarily follow from it, from this alone, viz., that God is a thinking thing, and not from this, that he is the object of his own idea. Wherefore the formal being of ideas recognizes God as its cause, in so far as he is a thinking being. But it may be otherwise demonstrated in this way. The formal being of ideas is a mode of thinking (as is self-evident); that is (by Coroll., Prop. xxii., Part I), a mode which expresses the nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, in a certain way, and therefore (by Prop. x., Part I.) involves a

*Or rather by the other attribute, viz., extension.—Ed.
conception of no other attribute of God, and consequently (by Ax. iv., Part I.) is an effect of no other attribute except thought; and therefore the formal being of ideas recognizes God only, in so far only as he is considered as a thinking thing, etc. Q. E. D.

Prop. VI. The modes of each attribute have God for a cause, in so far only as he is considered under that attribute of which they are modes, and not under any other.

Dem.—For each attribute is conceived by itself without the other (by Prop. x., Part I.) Wherefore the modes of each attribute involve the conception of its own attribute; but not of the other; and therefore (by Ax. iv., Part I.) they have God for their cause, in so far as he is considered under that attribute of which they are modes, and not under any other. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence it follows, that the formal being of things, which are not modes of thinking, does not therefore follow from the divine nature, because he previously knew the things; but the things represented in thought, follow and are inferred from their own attributes, in the same manner and by the same necessity as we have shown ideas to be inferred from the attribute of thought.

Prop. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.

Dem.—This appears from Ax. iv., Part I. For the idea of every thing caused, depends upon a knowledge of the cause of which it is the effect.

Coroll.—Hence it follows, that God's power of thinking is equal to his actual power of acting; that is, whatever follows formally from the infinite nature of God, all this from the idea of God, in the same order and in the same connection, follows in God objectively.

Schol.—Here, before we proceed further, we must recall to mind what we have previously shown; namely, that whatever can be perceived by an infinite intellect, as constituting the essence of substance, all this pertains only to one substance, and consequently that thinking substance, and extended substance, is one and the same substance, which is comprehended now under this and now under that
attribute. Thus also the mode of extension, and the idea of this mode, is one and the same thing; but it is expressed in two modes; which some of the Hebrews seem to have seen as through a cloud, who, namely, decide that God, the intellect of God, and the things known by him, are one and the same; e.g., a circle existing in nature, and the idea of an existing circle, which also is in God, is one and the same thing, which is explained by different attributes; and therefore, whether we conceive the nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute whatever, we shall find that one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes that is, that the same things, reciprocally follow. For no other reason have I said, that God, e.g., is the cause of the idea of a circle, in so far only as he is a thinking thing; but the cause of the circle itself, only in so far as he is an extended thing. Because the formal being of the idea of a circle can be perceived only by another mode of thinking than its proximate cause, and this again by another, and so on without end. So that, as long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of all nature, or the connection of causes by the single attribute of thought; and in so far as they are considered as modes of extension, the order of all nature also must be explained by the single attribute of extension. I understand the same concerning other attributes. Wherefore God is in very deed, the cause of things as they are in themselves, since he consists of infinite attributes; nor can I, at present, explain these matters more clearly.

Prop. VIII. The ideas of single things, or of modes not existing, must be so embraced in the infinite idea of God as the formal essences of single things, or of modes, are contained in the attributes of God.

Dem.—This proposition is evident from the preceding Scholium.

Coroll.—Hence it follows, that as long as single things do not exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of God, their objective being or ideas do not exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and
when single things are said to exist, not merely in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of God; but in so far also as they are said to endure, their ideas also involve the existence by which they are said to endure.

Schol. — If any one desires an example for the fuller explication of this matter, I shall indeed be able to give none, which can adequately explain the thing of which I here speak, as it is peculiar. Still, as far as may be, I will endeavor to illustrate the thing. The circle then is of such a nature that, of all the right lines mutually cutting each other in the same, the rectangles contained by the segments* are mutually equal. Wherefore, in a circle there are contained infinite, mutually equal rectangles; but no one of them can be said to exist, except in so far as the circle exists, nor can even the idea of any one of these rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as it is comprehended in the idea of a circle. Now, from these infinites, let two only be conceived to exist, viz: E. and D.

Now, indeed, the ideas of these also now exist, not only in so far merely as they are comprehended in the idea of a circle, but also in so far as they involve the existence of their rectangles, from which it comes to pass that they may be distinguished from the remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.

Prop. IX. The idea of a single thing, actually existing, has God for its cause, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of another single thing existing in fact, of which also God is the cause in so far as he is affected by another third thing, and so on without end.

Dem. — The idea of a single thing, existing in fact, is a mode of thinking single and distinct from the rest (by Coroll. and Schol. Prop. viii. of this Part), and therefore (by Prop. vi. of this Part) has God for its cause in so far only as he is a thinking thing. Not however (by Prop. xxviii., Part I.), in so far as he is absolutely a thinking thing, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and of this again, in so far as affected by another, and so on without end. But the order and connection of ideas (by Prop. vii. of this Part) is the same as the order and

* Euclid, B. III., Prop. 35.
connection of causes; therefore of one single idea, another idea, or God in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea, is the cause; and of this again in as far as he is affected by another, and so on without end.  Q. E. D.

Coroll. — Whatever happens in the single object of any idea, of this the knowledge is given in God, only in so far as he has the idea of the same object.

Dem. — Whatever happens in the object of any idea, of this the idea is given in God (by Prop. iii. of this Part), not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered affected by another idea of a single thing (by preceding Prop); but (by Prop. vii. of this Part) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things; therefore the knowledge of that which happens in any singular object, will be in God as far only as he has an idea of the object.  Q. E. D.

Prop. X. It does not pertain to the essence of man to belong to substance, or substance does not constitute the form of man.

Dem. — For to belong to substance involves necessary existence (by Prop. vii., Part I.). If therefore it pertains to the essence of man to belong to substance, then substance being given, man would necessarily be given (by Def. ii. of this Part), and consequently man would necessarily exist, which (by Ax. i. of this part) is absurd. Therefore, etc.  Q. E. D.

Schol. I. — This Proposition may also be demonstrated from Prop. v., Part I., viz., that two substances of the same nature are not given. But since several men can exist, therefore that which constitutes the form of man is not the being of substance. Moreover, this Proposition is evident from the remaining properties of substance, to wit, that substance is in its own nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, etc., as any one is able easily to see.

Coroll. — Hence it follows that the essence of man is constituted by certain modifications of God’s attributes. For the essence of substance (by the foregoing Prop.) does not belong to the essence of man. It is therefore (by Prop. xv., Part I.) something which is in God, and which, without God, can neither be nor be conceived, either (by Coroll.
Prop. xxv., Part I.) an affection, or a mode, which expresses the nature of God in a certain and determinate manner.

Schol. II. All indeed must concede that without God nothing can be nor be conceived. For it is confessed by all that God is the sole cause of all things, as well of their essence as of their existence; that is, God is the cause, as it is expressed, not only of their Becoming, but of their Being. But now many say: that belongs to the essence of any thing, without which the thing can not be nor be conceived; and therefore they believe either that the nature of God pertains to the essence of created things, or that created things can be and be conceived without God; or they are not perfectly satisfied which is the more certain. The cause of this I believe to have been that they have not kept to a regular order of philosophizing. For the divine nature, which should have been considered before all, because both in knowledge and in nature it is prior in the order of knowledge, they have believed to be last; and things which are called objects of the senses, to be prior to all. Whence it has come to pass that whilst natural things have been under contemplation, they thought of nothing less than concerning the divine nature; and when subsequently they have applied the mind to the contemplation of the divine nature, they have been able to think of nothing except their first figments, of which they have built up their knowledge of natural things, since these could render no aid to the knowledge of the divine nature; and therefore it is not wonderful that they should have everywhere contradicted themselves. But I pass this by. For my only purpose here is to render a reason, why I could not say, that that pertains to the essence of any thing, without which the thing can not be nor be conceived; namely, because single things can not be, nor be conceived, without God; and yet God does not belong to their essence; but I have said that that necessarily belongs to the essence of a thing, which being given, the thing is posited; and which being taken away, the thing is canceled; or that, without which the thing, and vice versa, that which, without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.
Prop. XI. The first thing, which constitutes the actual Being of the human mind, is nothing else than the idea of some single thing existing in fact.

Dem.—The essence of man (by Coroll. preceding Prop.) is constituted from certain modes of God’s attributes, to wit (by Ax. ii. of this Part), from modes of thinking, of all which (by Ax. iii. of this part), the idea is prior in nature; and this being given, the remaining modes (to which, namely, the idea is by nature prior) must be in the same individual (by Ax. iv. of this Part). Therefore the idea is the first thing which constitutes the essence of the human mind. But not an idea of a thing not existing. For then (by Coroll., Prop. viii., of this Part) the idea itself could not be said to exist; therefore it will be the idea of a thing existing in fact. But not of an infinite thing. For (by Props. xxi. and xxiii., Part I.) an infinite thing must always necessarily exist; but this (by Ax. i. of this Part) is absurd. Therefore the first thing which constitutes the actual essence of the human mind, is the idea of a single thing, existing in fact. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence it follows, that the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God; and hence when we say, that the human mind perceives this or that—we say nothing else, than that God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is explained by the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea; and when we say that God has this or that idea, not merely in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, but in so far as simultaneously with the human mind he has also the idea of another thing, then we say that the human mind perceives a thing partially or inadequately.

Schol.—Here, doubtless, my readers will hesitate, and many things will suggest themselves to prompt delay. For this reason I beg them to proceed leisurely with me, and to come to no decision concerning these matters until they shall have read the whole.

Prop. XII. Whatever occurs in the object of an idea consti-
tuting the human mind, this must be perceived by the human mind, or the idea of this thing will be necessarily given in the mind; that is, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, nothing will be able to happen in that body which is not perceived by the mind.

Dem.—For whatever happens in the object of any idea whatever, the knowledge of it is necessarily given in God (by Coroll., Prop. ix., of this Part), as far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the same object; that is (by Prop. xi. of this Part), as far as it constitutes the mind of any thing. Whatever therefore happens in the object of an idea constituting the human mind, the knowledge of it is necessarily given in God, in as far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by Coroll., Prop. xi., of this Part), the knowledge of this thing will necessarily be in the mind, or the mind will perceive it. Q. E. D.

Schol.—This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly understood from Schol., Prop. vii., of this Part, which see.

Prop. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else.

Dem.—For, if the body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the affections of the body would not be in God (by Coroll., Prop. ix., of this Part), in so far as he constitutes our mind, but in so far as he constitutes the mind of another thing—that is (by Coroll., Prop. xi., of this Part), the ideas of the affections of the body would not be in our mind. But (by Ax. iv. of this Part), we have the ideas of the affections of the body; therefore, the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, that, too (by Prop. xi. of this Part), actually existing. Again, if besides the body there were also another object of the mind, since (by Prop. xxxvi., Part I.) nothing exists from which some effect does not follow, the idea (by Prop. xi. of this Part) of some effect of it must necessarily be given in our mind; but (by Ax. v. of this Part) no idea of this is given. Therefore, the object of our mind is a body existing, and nothing else. Q. E. D.
Coroll.—Hence, it follows that man consists of mind and body, and that the human body so exists, as we by sensation perceive it.

Schol.—From these things we understand not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also what is to be understood by the union of mind and body. But no one will be able adequately or distinctly to understand this, unless he first adequately knows the nature of our body. For the points thus far presented are very general, and pertain to men no more than to other individuals, all of which, in howsoever different degrees, are still animate. For, the idea of any thing whatever is necessarily given in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way as the idea of the human body; and, therefore, whatever we have said concerning the idea of the human body, that must necessarily be said concerning the idea of any thing whatever. But, still, we can not deny that ideas, like their objects, differ from each other—that one is more excellent than another, and contains more of reality, just as the object of one is more excellent than the object of another, and contains more of reality; and, therefore, in order to determine in what respect the human mind differs from others, and in what respect it excels others, it is necessary for us, as we said, to know the nature of its object—that is, the nature of the human body. But this I am not able here to explain, nor is this necessary for those things which I wish here to demonstrate. Still, I say, in general, the better adapted any body is than others to do many things at once, so much the better adapted is its mind to perceive many things at once; and the more the actions of one body depend upon itself alone, and the less other bodies concur with it in action, the better adapted is its mind for understanding distinctly. And from these things we are able to recognize the superiority of one mind over others; and, again, to see the reason why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, and many other things, which, in the sequel, I shall deduce from these. For this reason I have thought it worth while to explain and demonstrate more exactly these very things; to which end it
is necessary to premise a few things concerning the nature of bodies.

Ax. I.—All bodies either move or are at rest.

Ax. II.—Every body moves now more slowly, now more rapidly.

Lemma I. Bodies are distinguished from one another by the relation of motion and rest, swiftness and slowness, and not by the relation of substance.

The first part of this I suppose to be self-evident. But, that bodies are not distinguished by the relation of substance, appears from Props. v. and viii., Part I. But, it appears more clearly still from what has been said in Scol., Prop. xv., Part I.

Lemma II. All bodies agree in certain things.

Dem.—For all bodies agree in these respects, that they involve the conception of one and the same attribute (by Def. i. of this Part). Then again, in that they are able to move now more slowly, now more rapidly, and absolutely to move and to remain at rest.

Lemma III. A body in motion, or at rest, must have been determined to motion or rest by another body, which also has been determined to motion or rest by another, and this again by another, and so on without end.

Dem.—Bodies (by Def. i. of this Part) are single things, which (by Lemma i.) are distinguished from one another by the relation of motion and rest; and therefore (by Prop. xxviii., Part I) each one must necessarily have been determined to motion or rest by another single thing, namely (by Prop. vi. of this Part), by another body, which (by Ax. i.) is also either in motion or at rest. But this again (by the same relation) had not been able to be in motion or at rest, except it had been determined to motion or rest by another, and this again (by the same relation) by another, and so on without end. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence it follows, that a body in motion will move until it is determined to rest by another body; and that a body at rest will also continue at rest until it is determined to motion by another. This also is self-evident. For, when I suppose a body, e. g., A, to be at rest, and do
not attend to other bodies in motion, I shall be able to say nothing concerning the body, A, except that it is at rest. Because, if it afterward happens that the body, A, is moved, this surely could not have occurred from the fact that it was at rest; for from this nothing else could have followed than that the body, A, should be at rest. If, on the contrary, it is supposed that the body, A, is in motion, so long as we attend only to A, we are able to affirm nothing concerning it, except that it is in motion. Should it afterward happen that A assumes a state of rest, this certainly could not have resulted from the motion which it had; for from motion nothing else could result, except that A should move; it happened therefore from a thing which was not in A, namely, from an external cause, by which it was determined to a state of rest.

Ax. I.—All the modes in which any body is affected by another body follow from the nature of the body affected, and at the same time from the nature of the body affecting; so that one and the same body is differently moved, according to the different nature of the moving bodies, and on the other hand, as different bodies are differently moved by one and the same body.

Ax. II.—When a body in motion impinges upon another at rest, which it is unable to move, it is reflected, so that it continues to move, and the angle of the line of the motion of reflection with the plane of the body at rest will be equal to the angle which the line of the motion of incidence makes with the same plane.

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But these things relate to the most simple bodies, which, namely, are distinguished from each other alone by motion and rest, swiftness and slowness. We now proceed to composite bodies.

Def.—When several bodies of the same or of different magnitude are so coerced by others that they rest one upon
another, or if they are moving in the same or in different
degrees of swiftness, so that they communicate their mo-
tions to each other in a certain way, we shall call these
bodies mutually united, and consider all together as one
body, or as composing an individual, which is distinguished
from others by this union of bodies.

Az. III.—The greater or the less the surfaces, by which
the parts of an individual or a composite body rest upon
each other, with the more difficulty or ease can they be
forced to change their position, and consequently with the
more ease or difficulty can it be brought about, that the
individual itself should assume another figure. But hence
bodies whose parts rest upon one another by great surfaces,
I shall call hard; by small surfaces, soft; or finally, whose
parts move among one another, fluid.

Lemma IV. When from a body or an individual which is
composed of several bodies, certain bodies shall be separated,
and at the same time as many others of the same nature suc-
cceed in their place, the individual will retain its own nature as
before, without any change of its form.

Dem.—For bodies (by Lemma i.) are not distinguished
by the relation of substance; but that which constitutes the
form of an individual consists (by preceding Def.) in a
union of bodies; but this (by hypothesis) will be retained,
although a continual change of bodies takes place; the in-
dividual therefore, in the relation both of substance and
mode, will retain its own nature as before. Q. E. D.

Lemma V. If the parts composing an individual become
greater or less, yet in such proportion that all maintain to each
other the same relation of motion and rest, the individual will
likewise retain the same nature as before, and without any
change of form.

Dem.—The demonstration of this is the same as that of
the preceding Lemma.

Lemma VI. If certain bodies, composing an individual, are
forced to deflect a motion which they have toward one part to-
ward another part, but in such wise that they are able to con-
tinue their motions, and to communicate them to each other in
the same way as before, the individual will likewise retain its own nature, without any change of form.

Dem.—This is self-evident. For it is supposed to retain all that which in its definitions we have said constitutes its form.

Lemma VII. The individual, moreover, thus composed, retains its own nature, whether it moves as a whole, or is at rest, or moves toward this or toward that part, provided each part retains its own motion, and communicates it, as before, to the rest.

Dem.—This is evident from its definition, which see before Lemma iv.

Schol.—From these things then, we see in what way a compound individual may be affected in many modes, its nature nevertheless being preserved. But, hitherto, we have considered an individual composed only of bodies, which are distinguished from each other only by motion and rest, swiftness and slowness, that is, of the most simple bodies. But, now, if we conceive of another composed of several individuals of different nature, we shall find that it may be affected in several other modes, its nature nevertheless being preserved. For since each part of it is composed of several bodies, each part will therefore be able (by preceding Lemma), without any change of its nature, to move now more slowly, now more swiftly, and consequently to communicate its motions more slowly or more swiftly to the rest. But if we conceive a third class of individuals, composed of these second, we shall find they may be affected in many other modes, without any change of form. And if we proceed thus without end, we shall easily conceive all nature to be one individual, whose parts, that is all bodies, vary in infinite modes, without any change of the whole individual. If it were my purpose to treat professedly of body, it would devolve upon me to explain and demonstrate these things more at length. But I have already said that I have another design, and that I adduce these things for no other reason than that I am able easily to infer from them the things which I have it in mind to demonstrate.
Postulates.

I. The human body is composed of many individuals (of different nature), each one of which is exceedingly compound.

II. Of the individuals of which the human body is composed, some are fluid, some soft, and some finally very hard.

III. The individuals composing the human body, and consequently the human body itself, are affected by external bodies in very many modes.

IV. The human body needs, in order to its preservation, very many other bodies, by which it is, as it were, continually recreated.

V. When a fluid part of the human body is so determined by an external body, that it often impinges upon another soft part, it changes its plane, and, as it were, impresses certain vestiges of the external impelling body upon it.

VI. The human body is able to move external bodies in very many modes, and to dispose them in very many modes.

Prop. XIV. The human mind is fitted to perceive very many things, and the better fitted, the greater the number of modes in which its body can be disposed.

For the human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in very many modes by external bodies, and is disposed to affect external bodies in very many modes. But all things which happen in the human body (by Prop. xii. of this Part), the human mind must perceive; therefore the human mind is fitted to perceive very many things, and the better fitted, etc. Q. E. D.

Prop. XV. The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind, is not simple, but is composed of very many ideas.

Dem.—The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind, is an idea of body (by Prop. xiii. of this Part), which (by Post. i.) is composed of very many, very compound individuals. But of each individual composing the
body, the idea (by Coroll., Prop. viii., of this Part) is necessarily given in God; therefore (by Prop. vii. of this Part) the idea of the human body is composed of these very many ideas of the parts composing it. *Q. E. D.*

Prop. XVI. *The idea of each mode, by which the human body is affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human body, and at the same time the nature of the external body.*

Dem.—For all the modes in which any body is affected, follow from the nature of the body affected, and at the same time from the nature of the body affecting (by Ax. i. after Coroll., Lemma iii.) therefore their idea (by Ax. iv., Part I.) necessarily involves the nature of each body; therefore the idea of each mode in which the human body is affected by an external body, involves the nature of the human body and of the external body. *Q. E. D.*

Coroll. I.—Hence it follows, first, that the human mind perceives the nature of very many bodies, together with the nature of its own body.

Coroll. II.—It follows, second, that the ideas, which we have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of our body than the nature of the external bodies, which I have explained by many examples in the Appendix of Part I.

Prop. XVII. *If the human body is affected in a mode which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard the same external body as existing in fact, or as present to itself, until its body is affected in a manner which excludes the existence or presence of this same body.*

Dem.—This is evident. For as long as the human body is thus affected, so long the human mind (by Prop. xii. of this Part) will regard this affection of the body, that is (by the preceding Prop.), will have the idea of the mode actually existing, which involves the nature of the external body, that is, the idea, which does not exclude but posits the existence or presence of the nature of the external body; therefore, the mind (by Coroll. i., preceding) will regard the external body as existing in fact, or as present, until it is affected, etc. *Q. E. D.*
Coroll.—The external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, although they may not exist nor be present, the mind will still be able to contemplate, as if they were present.

Dem.—If external bodies so determine the fluid parts of the human body, that they often impinge upon the softer, they change their planes (by Post. v.), whence it comes to pass (see Ax. ii., after Coroll., Lemma iii.), that they are reflected from them in a manner different from that to which they were formerly accustomed; and also that afterwards by meeting these new planes by their own spontaneous motion, they are reflected in the same way, as if they were impelled towards these planes by external bodies, and consequently, that when thus reflected they proceed to move, they affect the human body in the same manner; and the mind (by Prop. xii. of this Part) will think of this, that is (by Prop. xvii. of this Part), the mind will again regard the external body as present; and this as often as the fluid parts of the human body, by their own spontaneous motion shall meet the same planes. Wherefore, although the external bodies by which the human body has once been affected, do not exist, the mind nevertheless will regard the same as present, so often as this action of the body is repeated. Q. E. D.

Schol.—We see, therefore, how it can come to pass that we may regard those things, which are not, as present, as often happens. And it is possible that this may result from other causes, but it suffices me here to have indicated one by which I might explain the matter, just as if I had indicated the true cause. Still I believe that I am not straying much from the truth, since all the things which I have assumed as postulates contain scarcely any thing not supported by an experience, concerning which we can not doubt, after we have shown that the human body exists, as we by sensation perceive it. (See Coroll. after Prop. xiii. of this Part). Moreover (from Coroll. preceding, and Coroll. ii., Prop. xvi., of this Part), we clearly understand what the difference is between the idea, e. g., of Peter, which constitutes the essence of the mind of Peter himself and
the idea of Peter himself, which is in another man, suppose of Paul. For the former expresses directly the essence of Peter’s own body and involved existence only as long as Peter exists; but the latter indicates rather the constitution of Paul’s body than the nature of Peter, and, therefore, whilst the constitution of Paul’s body lasts, the mind of Paul, although Peter does not exist, will nevertheless regard him as present to itself. Again, that we may retain familiar forms of speech, we will call the affections of the human body, whose ideas represent external bodies as present to us, the pictures of things, although they do not bring back the forms of the things. And when the mind in this way contemplates bodies we shall say that it imagines them. And here, that I may begin to indicate what is error, I desire it to be noted that the imaginations of the mind, considered in themselves, contain no error, or that the mind does not err from the circumstance, that it imagines, but only in so far as it is considered to want the idea, which excludes the existence of these things. For, if the mind, when it imagines non-existing things as present to itself, at the same time should know that these things do not really exist, it would certainly attribute this power of imagination to a virtue and not to a vice of its nature; especially if this faculty of imagination depended solely upon its own nature, that is (by Def. vii., Part I.), if this faculty of imagination appertaining to the mind were free.

Prop. XVIII. If the human body has once been simultaneously affected by two or more bodies, when the human mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will also at once recollect the others.

Dem.—The mind (by Coroll. preceding) imagines any body, for the reason that the human body is affected and disposed by the traces of an external body, in the same manner as it is affected when certain of its parts have been impelled by the external body itself; but (by the hypothesis), the body was then so disposed, that the mind imagined two bodies simultaneously; therefore, now also will it imagine two simultaneously, but the mind when it imagines either, will at once remember the other. Q. E. D.
Schol.—Hence we clearly understand what memory is. For it is nothing else than a certain concatenation of ideas, involving the nature of things which are external to the human body. This is formed in the mind, according to the order and concatenation of the affections of the body. I say, first, that the concatenation is of those ideas only which involve the nature of things, which are external to the human body; but not of the ideas which express the nature of these same things. For they are really (by Prop. xvi. of this Part) the ideas of the affections of the human body, which involve at once the nature of this and of the external bodies. I say, secondly, that this concatenation takes place according to the order and concatenation of the affections of the human body, in distinction from the concatenation of ideas, which takes place according to the order of the intellect, by which the mind perceives things through their first causes, and which is the same in all men. And hence, further, we clearly understand why the mind from the thought of one thing at once falls upon the thought of another, which has no likeness to the former; as, e.g., from the thought of the word *pomus*, a Roman at once falls upon the thought of fruit, which has no similitude with this articulate sound, nor any thing in common, except that the body of the same man has often been affected by these two; that is, that this man has often heard the word *pomus* when he was beholding the fruit, and thus every one, from one thought falls upon another, as each one’s habit has ordered the pictures of things in the body. For the soldier, e.g., from seeing the tracks of a horse in the sand from the thought of a horse will fall upon the thought of a horseman, and thence upon the thought of war, etc. But the husbandman, from the thought of a horse, will fall upon the thought of a plow, a field, etc.; and thus each one, according as he has been accustomed to connect images in this or in another manner, from one will fall upon this or another thought.

Prop. XIX. *The human mind does not cognize the human body itself, nor know that it exists, except by the ideas of the affections, by which the body is affected.*
Dem.—For the human mind is itself the idea or knowledge of the human body (by Prop. xiii. of this Part) which (by Prop. ix. of this Part) is indeed in God, in as far as he is considered as affected by another idea of a single thing; or because (by Post. iv.) the human body needs very many bodies, by which it may be, as it were, continually recreated; and the order and connection of ideas is the same (by Prop. vii. of this Part) as the order and connection of the causes; this idea will be in God, in so far as he is considered as affected by the ideas of very many individual things. God, therefore, has the idea of the body or knows the human body, in as far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in as far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by Coroll., Prop. ii., of this Part), the human mind does not know the human body. But the ideas of the affections of the body are in God, in as far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the mind perceives the same affections (by Prop. xii. of this Part), and therefore (by Prop. xvi. of this Part), the human body itself, and that (by Prop. xvii. of this Part), as existing in fact. Therefore, the human mind perceives, in so far only, its own human body. Q. E. D.

Prop. XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is given also in God, and this follows in God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human body.

Dem.—Thought is an attribute of God (by Prop. i. of this Part); and, therefore (by Prop. iii. of this Part), both of this and of all his affections; and therefore (by Prop. xi. of this Part), the idea of the human mind also must necessarily be given in God. Hence, it does not follow that this idea or knowledge of the mind is given in God in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is affected by another idea of a singular thing (by Prop. ix. of this Part). But the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of the causes (Prop. vii. of this Part). It follows, therefore, that this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God, and is referred to God in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the body. Q. E. D.
Prop. XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind, in the same manner as the mind itself is united to the body.

Dem.—That the mind is united to the body we have shown by this, to wit., that the body is the object of the mind (see Props. xii. and xiii. of this Part); and, therefore, for the same reason, the idea of the mind must be united with its object—that is, with the mind itself—in the same way as the mind itself is united with the body. Q. E. D.

Schol.—This proposition is far more clearly understood from what was said in the Schol., Prop. vii., of this Part. For there we showed that the idea of the body, and the body—that is (by Prop. xiii. of this Part), mind and body—are one and the same individual, conceived now under the attribute of thought, and now under that of extension; wherefore, the idea of the mind and the mind itself is one and the same thing, which is conceived under one and the same attribute, viz., thought. It follows, I say, that the idea of the mind, and the mind itself in God, by the same necessity, are given from the same power of thinking. For in reality the idea of the mind—that is, the idea of the idea—is nothing else than the form of the idea, in so far as this, as a mode of thought, is considered without reference to the object. For, as soon as any one knows any thing, he at once knows that he knows it, and at the same time he knows that he knows what he knows—and so on, without end. But of this hereafter.

Prop. XXII. The human mind perceives not only the affections of the body, but also the ideas of these affections.

Dem.—The ideas of the ideas of the affections in God follow in the same manner, and are related to God in the same manner, as the ideas of the affections themselves. This is proved in the same manner in Prop. xx. of this Part. But the ideas of the affections of the body are in the human mind (by Prop. xii. of this Part); that is (by Coroll., Prop. xi., of this Part), in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind. Therefore, the ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the knowledge or idea of the human mind—that is (by Prop. xxi. of this Part), in the human mind itself, which—for
this reason perceives not only the affections of the body, but also the ideas of them. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body.

Dem.—The idea or knowledge of the mind (by Prop. xx. of this Part) in God, follows and is related to God in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the body. But since (by Prop. xix. of this Part) the human mind does not know its human body—that is (by Coroll., Prop. xi., of this Part), since the knowledge of the human body is not related to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore, the knowledge of the mind is not related to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind: and, therefore (by the same Coroll., Prop. xi., of this Part), the human mind, to this extent, does not know itself. Again, the ideas of the affections, by which the body is affected, involve the nature of the human body itself (by Coroll., Prop. xvi., of this Part)—that is (by Prop. xiii. of this Part), agree with the nature of the mind; wherefore, the knowledge of these ideas necessarily involves the knowledge of the mind: but (by Prop. preceding), the knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself; therefore, the human mind, to this extent only, knows itself. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXIV. The human mind does not contain an adequate knowledge of the parts which compose the human body.

Dem.—The parts composing the human body do not belong to the essence itself of the body, except in so far as they communicate, in a certain way, their motions to each other (see Def. after Coroll., Lem. iii.); and not in so far as they are able to be regarded as individuals without relation to the human body. For the parts of the human body (by Post. i.) are very composite individuals, whose parts (by Lem. iv.) are able to be separated from the human body, its nature and form being entirely preserved, and to communicate their motions (see Ax. ii., after Lem. iii.) in another way to other bodies; and, therefore (by Prop. iii. of this Part), the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God (by Prop. ix. of this Part), in so far as he is consid-
ered as affected by another idea of a single thing, which single thing, in the order of nature, is prior to the part itself (by Prop. vii. of this Part). Moreover, the same may be said concerning each part of the individual itself composing the human body; and, therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the human body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many ideas of things, and not in so far as he has only an idea of the human body—that is (by Prop. xiii. of this Part), the idea, which constitutes the nature of the human mind; and, therefore (by Coroll., Prop. xi., of this Part), the human mind does not contain an adequate knowledge of the parts which compose the human body. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXV. The idea of each affection of the human body does not contain an adequate knowledge of an external body.

Dem.—We have shown (see Prop. xvi. of this Part) that the idea of an affection of the human body contains the nature of the external body, in so far as the external body determines, in a certain way, the human body itself. But in so far as the external body is an individual, which is not related to the human body, the idea or knowledge of it is in God (by Prop. ix. of this Part), in so far as God is considered as affected by the idea of another thing, which (by Prop. vii. of this Part) is prior in nature to the external body itself. Therefore, an adequate knowledge of the external body is not in God, in so far as he has an idea of the affection of the human body, or the idea of an affection of the human body, does not contain an adequate knowledge of an external body. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXVI. The human mind perceives no external body, as existing in fact, except through the ideas of the affections of its own body.

Dem.—If the human body has in no way been affected by any external body, then (by Prop. vii. of this Part) neither has the idea of the human body, that is (by Prop. xiii. of this Part), neither has the human mind been in any way affected by the idea of the existence of this body, or it does not in any way perceive the existence of this external body. But in as far as the human body is in any
way affected by any external body, in so far (by Prop. xvi. of this Part, with its Coroll.) it perceives the external body. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—In as far as the human mind imagines an external body, in so far it has not an adequate knowledge of it.

Dem.—When the human mind contemplates external bodies, through the ideas of the affections of its own body, we say it then imagines them (see Schol., Prop. xvii., of this Part); nor (by Prop. preceding) is the mind in any other way able to imagine external bodies, as existing in fact. But, therefore (by Prop. xxv. of this Part), in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an adequate knowledge of them. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXVII. The idea of any affection of the human body, does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.

Dem.—Each idea of any affection of the human body involves in so far the nature of the human body, as the human body itself is considered as affected in a certain manner (see Prop. xvi. of this Part). But, in so far as the human body is an individual, which is able to be affected in many other ways, the idea of any affection, etc. (see Dem., Prop. xxv., of this Part).

Prop. XXVIII. The ideas of the affections of the human body, in so far as they relate only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.

Dem.—For the ideas of the affections of the human body involve the nature both of external bodies and of the human body (by Prop. xvi. of this Part), not merely of the human body; but they must also involve the nature of its parts, for the affections are modes (by Post. iii.), by which parts of the human body, and consequently the whole body are affected. But (by Props. xxiv. and xxv. of this Part) an adequate knowledge of external bodies, as also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in so far as he is considered by the human mind, but in as far as he is considered as affected by other ideas.
Therefore, these ideas of the affections, in so far as they relate to the human mind alone, are, as it were, consequences without premises, that is (as is self-evident), confused ideas. \( Q. E. D. \)

\textit{Schol.}—The idea, which constitutes the nature of the human mind, is in the same way demonstrated, not to be, when considered in itself alone, clear and distinct, as also the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the affections of the human body, in so far as they relate to the mind alone, as any one can see.

\textit{Prop. XXIX.} The idea of the idea of each affection of the human body, does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind.

\textit{Dem.}—For the idea of an affection of the human body (by Prop. xxvii. of this Part), does not involve an adequate knowledge of the body itself, or does not adequately express its nature, that is (by Prop. xiii. of this Part), does not adequately agree with the nature of the mind, and therefore (by Ax. vi., Part I.) the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not involve an adequate knowledge of it. \( Q. E. D. \)

\textit{Coroll.}—Hence it follows that the human mind as often as it perceives things from the common order of nature, has an adequate knowledge, neither of itself, nor of its body, nor of external bodies, but only a confused and mutilated knowledge. For the mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body (by Prop. xxiii. of this Part). But it does not perceive its own body (by Prop. xix. of this Part), except by the ideas themselves of the affections, by which also alone (Prop. xxvi. of this Part) it perceives external bodies; and, therefore, in so far as it has these, it has an adequate knowledge (by Prop. xix. of this Part), neither of its own body, nor (Prop. xxvii. of this Part) of external bodies (Prop. xxv. of this Part), but only a mutilated and confused knowledge (Prop. xxviii. of this Part, with its Schol.). \( Q. E. D. \)

\textit{Schol.}—I say expressly that the mind has an adequate knowledge, neither of itself, nor of its own body, nor of
external bodies, but only a confused knowledge, as often as it perceives things according to the common order of nature; that is, as often as it is determined to contemplate this or that, externally by the fortuitous meeting of things, and is not internally, namely, from the circumstance that it contemplates several things at once, determined to understand their points of agreement, difference, and opposition. For as often as it is internally disposed in this or in some other way, it then contemplates things clearly and distinctly, as I shall show below.

Prop. XXX. We are able to have no knowledge concerning the duration of our body, except a very inadequate one.

Dem.—The duration of our body does not depend upon its essence (by Ax. i. of this Part), nor even upon the absolute nature of God (Prop. xxi., Part I.). But (Prop. xxviii., Part I.) it is determined to exist and act by such causes, as are also determined by others to exist and act in a certain and determinate way, and these again by others, and so on without end. Therefore, the duration of our body depends upon the common order of nature and the constitution of things. But in what way things are constituted, of this an adequate knowledge is given in God, in as far as he has ideas of all these, and not in so far only as he has the idea of the human body (by Coroll., Prop. ix., of this Part), wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God very inadequately, in as far as he is considered only to constitute the nature of the human mind; that is (by Coroll., Prop. xi., of this Part), this knowledge in our mind is very inadequate. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXXI. Concerning the duration of single things without us, we are able to have only a very inadequate knowledge.

Dem.—Every single thing, as the human body, must be determined to exist and act, in a certain and determinate way, by another single thing; and this again by another, and so on without end (Prop. xxviii., Part I.). But since from this common property of single things we have demonstrated in the preceding proposition, that we have only a very inadequate knowledge concerning the duration of our body; therefore the same must be concluded concern-
ing the duration of single things, because, namely, we are able to have a very inadequate knowledge of it. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence it follows that all particular things are contingent and corruptible. For we are able to have concerning their duration no adequate knowledge (by Prop. preceding), and this is what we are to understand by the contingency of things and the possibility of corruption. (See Schol. i., Prop. xxxiii., Part I.) For (Prop. xxix., Part I.) beyond this, nothing contingent is given.

Prop. XXXII. All ideas in so far as they are related to God are true.

Dem.—For all ideas, which are in God, agree altogether with their objects (by Coroll., Prop. vii., of this Part), and therefore (by Axi. vi., Part I.) are true. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, on account of which they are called false.

Dem.—If you deny it, conceive, if it is possible, a positive mode of thinking, which constitutes the form of error or falsity. This mode of thinking can not be in God (by Prop. preceding); but without God it can not be nor be conceived (Prop. xv., Part I.). Therefore there can be given nothing positive in ideas, on account of which they are called false. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXXIV. Every idea which in us is absolute, or adequate and perfect, is true.

Dem.—When we say that there is given in us an adequate and perfect idea, we say nothing else (by Coroll., Prop. xi., of this Part) than that in God, in as far as he constitutes the essence of our mind, is given an adequate and perfect idea, and consequently (Prop. xxxii. of this Part) we say nothing else than that such an idea is true. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXXV. Falsity consists in the want of knowledge, which inadequate, or mutilated and confused ideas involve.

Dem.—There is nothing positive in ideas which constitutes the form of falsity (Prop. xxxiii. of this Part); but falsity can not consist in absolute privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and be deceived); neither also in absolute ignorance; for to be ignorant and to err are differ-
ent things; wherefore it consists in the privation of knowledge, which an inadequate knowledge of things, or inadequate and confused ideas involve. Q. E. D.

Schol.—In the Scholium to Prop. xvii. of this Part, I have explained in what way error consists in a want of knowledge; but for a fuller explication of this matter I will give an example, to wit: Men are deceived, because they think themselves to be free, which opinion consists alone in this, that they are conscious of their own actions, and are ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. This therefore is their idea of liberty, that they know no cause of their actions. For when they say that human actions depend upon the will, these are words which contain no idea. For all are ignorant of what the will is, or how it moves the body. Those who talk about seats and abodes of the soul excite laughter or disgust. So when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be some two hundred feet distant from us. The error does not consist in this imagination alone, but in the fact that whilst we thus imagine it, we are ignorant of its true distance and of the cause of this imagination. For although we may afterwards know that it is distant from us more than six hundred diameters of the earth, we still imagine it to be near at hand; for we do not imagine the sun to be near for the reason that we are ignorant of its true distance, but because an affection of our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as the body itself is affected by it.

Prop. XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.

Dem.—All ideas are in God (Prop. xv., Part L), and as far as they are related to God are true (Prop. xxxii. of this Part), and (Coroll., Prop. vii., of this Part) adequate; and therefore are neither inadequate nor confused, except in so far as they are related to any one's single mind (concerning which see Props. xxiv. and xxviii. of this Part); and therefore all, both adequate and inadequate, follow by the same necessity (Coroll., Prop. vi., of this Part.) Q. E. D.

Prop. XXXVII. That which is common to all (concerning
this see above Lemma ii.), and which is equally in the part and in the whole, constitutes the essence of no single thing.

Dem.—If you deny, conceive this, if it is possible, to constitute the essence of any single thing, viz., the essence of B. Then (by Def. ii. of this Part) this without B could neither be nor be conceived; but this is contrary to the hypothesis: therefore this does not pertain to the essence of B nor constitute the essence of any other single thing. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXXVIII. Those things which are common to all and which are equally in the part and in the whole, can not be conceived except adequately.

Dem.—Let A be something, which is common to all bodies, and which is equally in the part of each body as in the whole. I say that A can not be conceived, except adequately. For the idea of it (Coroll., Prop. viii. of this Part) will be necessarily adequate in God, both in so far as he has the idea of the human body and in so far as he has the ideas of its affections, which (Props. xvi., xxv. and xxvii. of this Part) contain in part the nature both of the human body and of external bodies; that is (Props. xii. and xiii. of this Part), this idea will necessarily be adequate in God as far as he constitutes the human mind, or as far as he has ideas, which are in the human mind; therefore the mind (Coroll., Prop. xi., of this Part) necessarily perceives A adequately, and that, both in as far as it perceives itself, and in as far as it perceives its own body, or any external body, nor can A be conceived in any other way. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or notions common to all men. For (Lem. ii.) all bodies agree in certain things, which (Prop. preceding) must be adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.

Prop. XXXIX. That which is common to the human body and to any external bodies, by which the human body is accustomed to be affected, and that which is common and proper to the part of each one of these and to the whole, of this there will also be an adequate idea in the mind.

Dem.—Let A be that, which is common and proper to the human body, and to any external bodies, which is
equally in the human body, and in these external bodies, and which finally is equally in the part of each body, and in the whole. The idea of A itself will be given in God adequately (Coroll., Prop. vii., of this Part), both in so far as he has the idea of the human body, and in so far as he has the idea of the posited external bodies. Now, let it be supposed that the human body is affected by an external body, by that which it has in common with it, viz., by A. The idea of this affection will involve the property of A (Prop. xvi. of this Part), and therefore (by Coroll., Prop. vii., of this Part) the idea of this affection, in so far as it involves the property, will be adequate in God, in so far as he is affected by the idea of the human body; that is (Prop. xiii. of this Part) in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; and therefore (Coroll., Prop. ii., of this Part) this idea in the human mind is adequate. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence it follows that the mind is the better adapted to perceive more things adequately, the more things its body has in common with other bodies.

Prop. XL. Whatever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are adequate in it are also adequate.

Dem.—This is evident. For when we say that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are adequate in it, we say nothing else (by Coroll., Prop. xi., of this Part) than that in the divine intellect an idea is given, of which God is the cause, not in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by the ideas of very many single things, but in so far only as he constitutes the essence of the human mind.

Schol.—I have thus explained the cause of the notions, which are called common, and which are the foundation of our reasoning. But there are other causes of some axioms or notions, which it may be expedient to explain in this method of ours; for from this it would be evident what notions are pre-eminently useful, and what are of scarcely any use. And then again, what are common, what are clear and distinct only for those who are not laboring under prejudices, and what finally have no sufficient ground.
Moreover it would be evident whence those notions are derived, which are called Secondary, and consequently the axioms which are founded on them, as well as other meditations which I have had concerning these things. But as I have reserved these matters for another treatise, and moreover would not weary by too great prolixity, I have determined at present to pass over them. Still, not to omit any thing necessary to knowledge, I annex briefly the causes from which terms, called Transcendental, have derived their origin as Being, Thing, Something. These terms arise from this, namely, that the human body, since it is limited, is capable of forming distinctly in itself, at the same time, only a certain number of images (what an image is I have explained in Schol., Prop. xvii., of this Part). If this number is exceeded, these images will begin to be confused; and if the number of images which the body is capable of forming distinctly, at the same time, in itself, is greatly exceeded, all will be utterly confounded with each other. Since this is so, it is evident from Coroll., Prop. xvii. and Prop. xviii., of this Part, that the human mind will be able distinctly to imagine at the same time so many bodies, as images can be, at the same time, formed in its own body. But when the images in the body are entirely confused, the mind also will imagine all the bodies confusedly, without any distinctness, and as it were comprehend them under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of Being, Thing, etc. This may also be inferred from the fact that the images do not always possess equal strength, and from other causes analogous to these, which it is not necessary here to explain, since for the object which we seek it is sufficient to consider only one. For all come to this, that these expressions signify ideas, in the highest degree confused. Again, for similar causes those notions have arisen, which are called Universal, as Man, Horse, Dog, etc.—that is to say, because in the human body so many images, e.g., of men are formed, that they surpass the power of imagining, not indeed entirely, but yet to such an extent that the mind is unable to imagine the small differences of individuals (as the color, size, etc., of each), and the determinate number
of them, and distinctly imagine only that in which, so far as the body is affected by the same things, all agree. For by this the body was most affected, to wit, by each individual; and this it expresses by the name of Man, and this it predicates of numberless individuals. For a determinate number of individuals, as we have said, it is unable to imagine. But it is to be noted that these notions are not formed by all in the same manner; but they change in every case according to the relation of the thing, by which the body has been more frequently affected, and as the mind with greater facility imagines or remembers; e. g., those who have very frequently contemplated the stature of men will understand by the name Man an animal of erect stature; but those who have been accustomed to contemplate another characteristic will form another common image of men, for example, that man is a risible animal, a two-footed animal, an animal without feathers, a rational animal; and thus of other things, each one, according to the disposition of his body, will form the universal images of things. It is not wonderful therefore that so many controversies have arisen among philosophers, who have wished to explain natural things solely by the images of the things.

Schol. II.—From what has been said above, it clearly appears that we perceive many things, and form universal notions:

I. From individuals, represented through the senses to the intellect, in a mutilated, confused, and disorderly manner (see Coroll., Prop. xxix., of this Part); and I have been accustomed therefore to call such perceptions, knowledge from confused experience.

II. From signs; e. g., from the fact that we remember things from certain words heard or read, and of these we form certain ideas similar to those by which we imagine the things (see Schol., Prop. xviii., of this Part). Both these methods of contemplating things I shall, in future, call Knowledge of the first class, Opinion, or Imagination.

III. From the fact, that we have common notions, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (see Coroll.,
Props. xxxviii. and xxxix., with its Coroll., and Prop. xl. of this Part; and this I shall call Reason, and Knowledge of the second class. Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I shall show in the sequel, a third, which we shall call Intuitive knowledge. But this kind of cognition proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. All these I will explain by an example of one thing. Let there be given, e. g., three numbers to obtain a fourth, which is to the third, as the second to the first. Merchants do not hesitate to multiply the second and third, and to divide the product by the first; because, namely, they have not yet forgotten what they heard from the master, without any demonstration, or because they have often tried it in the most simple numbers, or from the force of the demonstration, Prop. xix., Lib. vii., Euclid, to wit: from the common property of proportionals. But, in the most simple numbers, there is no need of these. E. g., given the numbers 1, 2, 3. No one fails to see, that the fourth proportional is 6; but this much more clearly, because, from the very ratio which we see, at the first look, the first number has to the second, we infer the fourth.

Prop. XLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity, but of the second and third is necessarily true.

Dem.—To the knowledge of the first kind, we have said in the foregoing scholium, that all those ideas appertain, which are inadequate and confused; and, therefore (by Prop. xxxv. of this Part), this knowledge is the sole cause of falsity. Again, to the knowledge of the second and third, we have said that those appertain which are adequate; and, therefore (by Prop. xxxiv. of this Part), it is necessarily true.

Prop. XLII. The knowledge of the second and third, and not of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false.

Dem.—This proposition is self-evident. For, he who knows how to distinguish between the true and the false, must have an adequate idea of the true and the false—that
is (by Schol. ii., Prop. xl., of this Part), must know the true and the false in the second or third kind of knowledge.

Prop. XLIII. *He who has a true idea, at the same time knows that he has a true idea, nor is he able to doubt concerning the truth of the thing.*

Dem.—A true idea in us, is that which is adequate in God, as far as he is explained by the nature of the human mind (by Coroll., Prop. xi., of this Part.) Let us assume, then, that there is in God, as far as he is explained by the nature of the human mind, an adequate idea, A. Of this idea there must necessarily be, in God also, an idea which is related to God, in the same manner as the idea, A (by Prop. xx. of this Part, of which the demonstration is universal). But the idea, A, by the supposition, is related to God, in as far as he is explained by the nature of the human mind; therefore, also, the idea of the idea, A, must be related to God in the same way—that is (by the same Coroll., Prop. xi., of this Part), this adequate idea of the idea, A, will be in the mind itself, which has the adequate idea, A; and, therefore, he who has an adequate idea, or (by Prop. xxxiv. of this Part), he who truly knows a thing, must at the same time have an adequate idea of his knowledge, or true knowledge—that is (as is self-evident), must at the same time be certain. Q. E. D.

Schol.—In the scholium of Prop. xxi. of this Part, I have explained what is the idea of an idea; but, it is to be noted, that the preceding proposition is sufficiently manifest of itself. For no one, who has a true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest certainty; for, to have a true idea, signifies nothing else than to know a thing perfectly, or in the best manner. Nor, indeed, is any one able to doubt concerning this thing, unless he thinks that an idea is a dumb thing, like a picture in a tablet, and not a mode of thinking—that is, of knowledge itself. And I ask, who is able to know that he knows any thing, unless he first knows the thing, that is—who is able to know that he is certain concerning any thing, unless he is certain concerning that thing? Again, what can be more clear and
certain than a true idea which is the standard of truth? Verily, as light manifests itself, and darkness as well, so truth is the standard of itself, and of the false. By these things, I think myself to have replied to the following questions, viz., if a true idea is distinguished from the false, as far only as it is said to agree with its object, then a true idea has nothing of reality or perfection beyond a false (since they are distinguished by a single extrinsic denomination); and, consequently, also, neither has a man who has true, any preference to him who has only false ideas. Again, whence happens it that men have false ideas? And, finally, how does any one know certainly that he has ideas which agree with their objects? To these questions, I say, I think myself to have already made answer. For, as to what pertains to the difference between a true idea and a false, it is evident, from Prop. xxxv. of this Part, that they stand related to each other, as entity to non-entity. But the causes of falsity I have most clearly shown from Props. xix. to xxxv., with its scholium. From which, also, it is apparent how a man, who has true ideas, differs from a man who has only false ones. Finally, touching what pertains to the last, viz., how a man is able to know that he has an idea which agrees with its object, this, I have sufficiently and more than sufficiently shown, arises solely from this, that he has an idea which agrees with its object, or that truth is its own standard. To this add, that our mind, as far as it perceives things truly, is a part of the infinite intellect of God (by Coroll., Prop. xi., of this Part); and, therefore, it is as necessary that the clear and distinct ideas of the mind should be true, as that those of God should be.

Prop. XLIV. It pertains not to the nature of Reason to contemplate things as contingent, but as necessary.

Dem.—It belongs to the nature of Reason to perceive things truly (by Prop. xli. of this Part; namely (by Ax. vi., Part I.), as they are in themselves—that is (by Prop. xxix., Part I), not as contingent, but as necessary. Q. E. D.

Coroll. I.—Hence it follows that it depends upon the im-
agination alone, that we contemplate things, both in respect to the past and the future, as contingent.

Schol.—But I will explain in a few words in what way this happens. We have shown above (Prop. xvii. of this Part, with its Coroll.) that the mind, although things do not exist, nevertheless always imagines them as present to itself, unless causes occur which exclude their present existence. Again, we have shown (Prop. xviii. of this Part) that if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies at the same time, when the mind subsequently imagines either of them, it will at once remember the other also, that is, it will contemplate both as present to itself, unless causes occur which exclude their present existence. Moreover, no one doubts but that we also imagine time, namely, from the fact that we imagine some bodies to move more slowly or swiftly than others, or with equal celerity. Let us then suppose that a boy, who yesterday morning saw Peter for the first time, saw Paul at noon, and Simeon at evening, and to-day again Peter, in the morning. From Prop. xviii. of this Part, it is evident that as soon as he sees the morning light, he will imagine the sun passing from thence through the same part of the heavens, as he saw it on the day before, or he will imagine the whole day, and simultaneously with the morning Peter, with noon Paul, and with evening Simeon; that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simeon, with relation to future time, and on the contrary, if he sees Simeon at evening, he will refer Paul and Peter to past time, imagining them, namely, simultaneously with past time, and this the more constantly, the more frequently he has seen them in the same order. Because, if at any time it happens that on any other evening he sees Jacob in the place of Simeon, then on the following day, at evening, he will imagine now Simeon and now Jacob, but not both together. For by the supposition he has seen at evening one of the two, but not both at once. Therefore, his imagination will fluctuate, and in future evening time he will imagine now the one, and now the other, that is neither certainly; but he will contemplate each as a contingently future thing. But this fluctuation
of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination is of things which we contemplate in the same manner with relation to time past or present, and consequently we shall imagine things, whether related to present, past, or future time as contingent.

Coroll. II.—It belongs to the nature of reason to perceive things under the form (specie) of eternity.

Dem.—For it belongs to the nature of reason to contemplate things as necessary, and not as contingent (by preceding Prop.). But this necessity of things (by Prop. iv. of this Part.) it perceives truly, that is (by Ax. vi., Part I.), as it is in itself. But (by Prop. xvi., Part I.) this necessity of things is itself the necessity of the eternal nature of God. Therefore, it is of the nature of reason to contemplate things under this form of eternity. Add, that the foundations of reasons are notions (by Prop. xxxviii. of this Part), which explain those things which are common to all, and which (by Prop. xxxvii. of this Part) explain the essence of no single thing, and which, therefore, must be conceived without any relation of time, but under a certain form of eternity. Q. E. D.

Prop. XLV. The idea of every body whatever, or of a single thing absolutely existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Dem.—The idea of an individual thing actually existing, necessarily involves both the essence of the thing itself and the existence (by Coroll., Prop. viii., of this Part). But individual things (by Prop. xv., Part I.) can not be conceived without God; but because (by Prop. vi. of this Part) they have God for a cause, as far as he is considered under an attribute, of which the things themselves are modes, their ideas (by Ax. iv., Part I.) must necessarily involve the conception of their attribute, that is (by Def. vi., Part I.), the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q. E. D.

Schol.—Here by existence, I do not understand duration, that is, existence, in as far as it is conceived abstractly, and as it were a certain species of quantity. For I am speaking concerning the very nature of the existence, which is attributed to single things, because from the eternal
necessity of God's nature, infinite things follow in infinite modes (see Prop. xvi., Part I). I am speaking, I say, concerning the existence itself of single things, in so far as they are in God. For, although each is determined to exist in a certain mode by another single thing, yet the power, by which each perseveres in existing, follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature. Concerning which thing, see Coroll., Prop. xxiv., Part I.

Prop. XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which each idea involves, is adequate and perfect.

Dem.—The demonstration of the preceding proposition is universal, and whether the thing is considered as a part or as a whole, the idea of it, whether it be of the whole or of a part (by the preceding Prop.), involves the eternal and infinite essence of God. Wherefore, that which gives a knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God, is common to all, and is equally in a part, as in the whole, and therefore (by Prop. xxxviii. of this Part) this knowledge will be adequate. Q. E. D.

Prop. XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Dem.—The human mind has ideas (by Prop. xxii. of this Part), from which (by Prop. xxiii. of this Part) it perceives itself and its own body (by Prop. xix. of this Part) and (by Coroll., Prop. xvi., and by Prop. xvii. of this Part) external bodies, as actually existing; and therefore (by Props. xlv. and xlvi. of this Part) it has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q. E. D.

Schol.—Hence we see that the infinite essence of God and his eternity are known to all. But since all things are in God, and are conceived through God, it follows, that from this knowledge we are able to deduce very many things which we know adequately, and, therefore, to form that third kind of knowledge, concerning which we have spoken in Schol. ii., Prop. xl., of this Part, and concerning whose excellence and utility there will be an opportunity for us to speak in the Fifth Part. But that men do not possess an equally clear knowledge of God as they
have of common notions, comes from hence, that they can
not imagine God as they do bodies, and that they join the
name God to images of things which they are accus-
tomed to see, and which they are scarcely able to avoid
because they are constantly affected by external bodies.
And, indeed, very many errors consist alone in this, that
we do not rightly apply names to things. For when any
one says that the lines which run from the center of a cir-
cle to its circumference are unequal, he certainly, at least
for the time, understands by circle a different thing from
the mathematicians. So when men make mistakes in
reckoning, they have different numbers in the mind and on
paper. Wherefore, if you regard their mind, they do not
mistake, yet they appear to err because we think they
have the very numbers in the mind which are upon the
paper. If this were not the case, we should not believe
them to be mistaken, as I did not regard a certain person
to be in error, whom I lately heard cry out that his yard
had flown into his neighbor’s hen, because, namely, his
mind seemed to me clear enough. And hence, very many
controversies arise, namely, because men do not correctly
explain their own mind, or because they badly interpret
the mind of another. For, in reality, when they are most
contradicting themselves, they are thinking either the
same thing, or something different, so that what they
think to be errors and absurdities in another are not so.

Prop. XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free
will, but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause,
which also is determined by another, and this again by another,
and so on without end.

Dem.—The mind is a certain and determinate mode of
thinking (by Prop. xi. of this Part), and, therefore (by
Coroll. ii., Prop. xvii., Part I.), can not be the free cause of
its own actions, or is not able to have the absolute faculty
of willing and not willing, but must be determined to this
or that volition (by Prop. xxviii., Part I.) by a cause which
also is determined by another cause, and this again by an-
other, etc. Q. E. D.

Schol.—In the same manner it is demonstrated that there
is in the mind no absolute faculty of knowing, desiring, loving, etc. Whence it follows that these and similar faculties are either entirely fictitious, or are nothing but metaphysical entities, or universals which we are accustomed to form from particulars. So that intellect and will stand related to this and that idea, or to this and that volition in the same way as petrifaction to this and that stone, or as man to Peter and Paul. But the cause why men think themselves to be free we have explained in the appendix of Part I. But before I proceed further, it must here be observed that by will I understand the faculty of affirming or denying, but not the desire. I say I understand the faculty by which the mind affirms or denies what is true, or what is false, and not the desire by which it seeks things, or is averse to them. But after we have demonstrated that these faculties are universal notions which are not distinguished from the particulars from which we form them, it must now be inquired whether the volitions themselves are any thing but the very ideas of things. It is to be inquired I say, whether there is in the mind any other affirmation or denial except that which the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves. On this point see the following Proposition, as also Definition iii. of this Part, in order that thought may not be confounded with pictures. For by ideas I do not understand images such as are formed in the bottom of the eye, and if you will, in the middle of the brain, but a conception of thought.

Prop. XLIX. In the mind there is no volition or affirmation and denial, except that which the idea, in as far as it is an idea, involves.

Dem.—In the mind, by the foregoing Proposition, there is no absolute faculty of willing and not willing, but only single volitions, to wit: this and that affirmation, and this and that negation. Let us conceive then some single volition, that is, a mode of thinking, by which the mind affirms that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones. This affirmation involves the conception or idea of a triangle; that is, without the idea of a triangle, it can not
be conceived. For it is the same thing, if I say that A must involve the conception B, as that A without B can not be conceived. Again, this affirmation, also (by Ax. iii. of this Part), can not be without the idea of a triangle. This affirmation, without the idea of a triangle can not be, nor be conceived. Further, this idea of a triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that its three angles equal two right ones. Wherefore, also, vice versa, this idea of a triangle can neither be, nor be conceived without this affirmation, and, therefore (by Def. ii. of this Part), this affirmation pertains to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing else. And what we have said concerning this volition (since we have taken it at random), may be said also concerning any volition whatever, to wit: that it is nothing but the idea. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Will and intellect are one and the same.

Dem.—Will and intellect are nothing but the single volitions themselves, and are ideas. (Prop. xlvi. of this Part, and its Schol.) But a single volition and idea are one and the same (by preceding Prop.), therefore, will and intellect are one and the same. Q. E. D.

Schol.—In this way we have removed the cause which is commonly regarded as the cause of error. We have shown above that falsity consists only in the privation which mutilated and confused ideas involve. Wherefore, a false idea, in so far as it is false, does not involve certainty. When, therefore, we say that a man acquiesces in the false, and does not doubt concerning it, we do not for this reason say that he is certain, but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in the false because there are no causes which may produce a fluctuation in his imagination. On this point see Schol. of Proposition lxiv. of this Part. Let a man, therefore, be supposed to adhere to the false ever so firmly, we shall, nevertheless, never say that he is certain. For by certainty we understand something positive (see Prop. lxiii. of this Part), but not the privation of doubt. But by the privation of certainty we understand falsity. But for the more perfect explication of the preceding proposition, some things remain to be suggested.
It remains next to reply to objections which may be opposed to this doctrine, and finally that I may remove every scruple, I have thought it worth while to indicate some uses of the doctrine. I say some, because the most important of them will be better understood by what we shall have to say in Part V.

I begin then with the first, and admonish my readers that they should carefully distinguish between an idea or conception of the mind, and the images of things which we form by the imagination. For it is necessary that they discriminate between ideas, and the words by which we indicate things. Since, because these three, viz., images, words, and ideas are by many either entirely confounded or not with sufficient accuracy, or finally not cautiously enough discriminated, they remain utterly ignorant of this doctrine of the will, which is absolutely necessary to be known, both for speculation and for the wise conduct of life. Those, namely, who suppose that ideas consist in the images, which are formed in us, by the meeting of bodies, persuade themselves that those ideas of things, of which we are able to form no similar image, are not ideas, but figments only, which we form arbitrarily; they look at ideas, therefore, as mute pictures upon a tablet, and preoccupied by this prejudice they do not see that an idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves an affirmation or a negation. Again, those who confound words with the idea, or with the affirmation itself, which the idea involves, think themselves able to will contrary to that which they perceive; when they affirm or deny in words alone something contrary to that which they perceive. But these prejudices he is able easily to put aside who attends to the nature of thought, which by no means involves the conception of extension; and therefore he will understand clearly that an idea (since it is a mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of any thing nor in words. For the essence of words and images is constituted by corporeal motions alone, which by no means involve the conception of thought.

Let it suffice thus briefly to have admonished my readers concerning these matters, and let us pass to consider an-
ticipated objections. The first of these is, that they think it evident that the will is more extensive than the intellect, and therefore different from it. The reason, however, why they suppose the will to be more extensive than the intellect is, the alleged experience, that they need no greater faculty of assenting or of affirming and denying than we now have, in order to assent to infinite other things which we do not perceive, but rather a greater faculty of knowing. Will is therefore distinct from intellect, since the latter is finite, but the former infinite. Secondly, it is possible to be objected to us that experience seems to teach nothing more clearly than that we are able to suspend our judgment, so as not to assent to things which we perceive. This, also, establishes the point that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he perceives any thing, but only in so far as he assents or dissents. E. g., he who imagines a winged horse, does not therefore grant that there is a winged horse, that is, is not therefore deceived, unless he grants that a winged horse exists; experience, therefore, seems to teach nothing more clearly than that will, or the faculty of assenting is free, and is different from the faculty of knowing. Thirdly, it is possible to object that one affirmation does not seem to contain more of reality than another, that is, we do not seem to need greater power for affirming that to be true, which is true, than for affirming anything to be true which is false; but we perceive that one idea has more of reality or perfection than another, for in what degree some objects are more excellent than others, in that degree also are the ideas of some more perfect than those of others, from which things there seems clearly to be a difference between will and intellect. Fourthly, it is possible to be objected, if man is not actuated by free will, what then will happen if he stands in equipoise like the ass of Buridan? Will he perish with hunger and thirst? If I should grant this I should seem to be conceiving an ass or the statue of a man, not a man; but if I deny, then he will determine himself, and consequently has the faculty of going and of doing as he will. Still other objections may be presented, but as I am not bound to confute every
dreamer, I am careful to reply only to these, and that as briefly as possible. To the first, then, I say that I grant the will to be more extensive than the intellect, if by intellect they understand only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will is more extensive than the perceptions or the faculty of conceiving. Nor, indeed, do I see why the faculty of willing should be said to be infinite, rather than the faculty of perceiving; for, as with the same faculty of willing we are able to affirm infinite things (yet one after another, for infinite things simultaneously we can not affirm), so also we are able to grasp by the senses, or to perceive infinite bodies (namely, one after another), by the same faculty of perception. What if they say that there are infinite things which we are unable to perceive? I reply that we are able to reach them by no thinking, and consequently by no faculty of willing. But they say if God should will to effect that we should perceive them he must give us a greater faculty of perception, but not a greater faculty of willing than he has given, which is the same as if they should say that if God should will to effect that we should know infinite other beings, it would be necessary that he should give us a greater intellect; but not a more universal idea of being than he has given, in order to embrace these same beings. We have shown that will is a universal thing, or an idea by which we explain all single volitions, that is, that which is common to them all. Since, therefore, they believe this common or universal idea of all volitions to be a faculty, it is not strange that they say this faculty extends infinitely beyond the limits of the intellect. For the term universal is spoken equally, concerning one individual as concerning many, and concerning infinite individuals. To the second objection, I reply by denying that we have a free power of suspending the judgment. For when we say that any one suspends the judgment we say nothing else than that he sees that he does not adequately perceive the thing. Suspension of the judgment is therefore in reality perception, and not free will. That this may be clearly understood, let us conceive a boy imagining a horse, and perceiving nothing else. Since
this imagination involves the existence of a horse (by Coroll., Prop. xvii., of this Part), and the boy perceives nothing, which excludes its existence, he will necessarily contemplate a horse as present, nor will he be able to doubt concerning its existence, although he is not certain concerning it. But this we experience daily in dreams; nor do I believe there is any one who thinks that when he dreams he has free power of suspending judgment touching the things which he dreams, and to effect that those things which he dreams of seeing he does not dream, and still it happens that even in dreams we suspend judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming. Furthermore, I grant that no one is deceived, in so far as he perceives, that is, I grant that the imaginations of the mind in themselves considered, involve no error (see Schol., Prop. xvii., of this Part), but I deny that a man affirms nothing, in so far as he perceives. For what else is it to perceive a winged horse than to affirm wings concerning a horse? For if the mind should perceive beyond the horse, nothing else, he would contemplate it as present, nor would he have any cause of doubting concerning its existence, nor any faculty of dissenting, unless the imagination of a winged horse is joined to an idea which excludes the existence of the same horse, or because he perceives that the idea of a winged horse, which he has, is inadequate; and then he will necessarily deny the existence of this same horse, or he will necessarily doubt concerning it. And I consider myself by these things to have answered the third objection also, namely, that the will is something universal, which is predicated of all ideas; and that it signifies only that which is common to all ideas, viz., affirmation, of which therefore the adequate essence, as far as it is abstractly conceived, must be in every idea, and in this way only the same in all; but not in so far as it is considered to constitute the essence of the idea; for in this respect particular affirmations differ from each other equally with ideas themselves; e. g., the affirmation which the idea of a circle involves differs from that which the idea of a triangle involves, just as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle. Again, I
absolutely deny that we need an equal power of thinking in order to affirm that to be true which is true, as to affirm that be true which is false. For these two affirmations, if you regard the mind, stand mutually related, as entity to nonentity. For there is nothing positive in the ideas which constitute the form of falsity. (See Prop. xxxv. of this Part, with its Schol., and Schol., Prop. lxvii., of this Part.) Wherefore, it must here be specially noted how easily we are deceived when we confound universals with particulars, and the entities of reason and abstracts with realities.

Finally, as touching the fourth objection, I say, I grant, that a man placed in such equipoise (namely, who has no other perception than hunger and thirst, this food and this drink, which are equally distant from him) will perish of hunger and thirst. If they ask me if such a man is not rather to be esteemed an ass than a man, I say I do not know, just as I do not know how to regard him who hangs himself, and how to regard boys, fools, and madmen.

It remains now to indicate how much the knowledge of this doctrine contributes to the conduct of life, which may easily be apprehended from what follows, namely:

I. In so far as it teaches us to act from the impulse of God alone and to become partakers of the divine nature, and so much the more, the more perfect the actions we perform and the more we know God. This doctrine then, besides rendering the mind in every way quiet, has also this, that it teaches us in what our highest felicity or beatitude consists, namely, in the knowledge of God alone, from which only we are led to do those things which love and piety prompt. Whence we clearly understand how much they err in the true estimate of virtue who expect for virtue and the best actions, as for the severest slavery, to be adorned by God with the highest rewards; just as if virtue itself and the service of God were not essential happiness and the highest liberty.

II. In so far as it teaches how we ought to bear ourselves in regard to the things of fortune, or the things which are not in our power, that is, about things which do not follow from our nature; namely, to expect and to bear with equa-
nimity both faces of fortune; namely, because by the eternal decree of God all things follow by the same necessity, as from the essence of a triangle, it follows that the three angles are equal to two right ones.

III. This doctrine is profitable in reference to social life, in so far as it teaches to hate no one, to despise no one, to insult no one, to be angry with no one, to envy no one. Further, in so far as it teaches that each one should be content with his own, and should help his neighbor; not from womanish pity, partiality, or superstition, but from the sole promptings of reason; namely, as time and the occasion demand, as I shall show in the Third Part.

IV. Finally, this doctrine contributes not a little to civil society, in so far as it teaches in what way citizens are to be governed and led; namely, that they may not act as slaves, but that they may freely do those things which are best. I have accomplished what I had purposed to discuss in this Scholium, and with this I finish the Second Part, in which I think myself to have explained the nature of the human mind and its properties with sufficient fullness, and as clearly as the difficulty of the subject permitted, and to have delivered doctrines from which many excellent and most useful things, as well as things useful to be known, can be inferred, as will in part appear from what follows.
PART THIRD.

CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTIONS.

Many who have written concerning the Affections and men's mode of living seem to have treated not concerning natural things, which follow the common laws of nature, but concerning things which are beyond nature. Indeed they seem to conceive of man in nature as of an imperium in imperio. For they believe that man rather disturbs the order of nature than follows it, and that he has absolute power over his actions, and that he is determined by nothing but himself. Again, they ascribe the cause of human impotence and inconstancy not to the common power of nature, but to I know not what vice of human nature, which accordingly they lament, deride, contemn, or, as often happens, detest; and he who understands best how to cavil most eloquently and acutely at the impotence of the human mind, is esteemed as it were divine. Still there have not been wanting most eminent men (to whose labor and diligence we confess ourselves much indebted) who have written many excellent things concerning the right method of living, and have given to men many counsels of prudence; but the true nature and powers of the Affections, and what, on the other hand, the mind can do in governing them, no one, so far as I know, has determined. I know, indeed, that the very celebrated Des Cartes, although he believed that the mind has absolute power over its actions, still attempted to explain the human Affections through their own primary causes, and at the same time to show the way in which the mind is able to have an absolute empire over the affections, but in my judgment certainly he exhibited nothing but the acumen of his own great genius, as in its proper place I shall demonstrate. I wish here to return to
those who have preferred rather to detest or deride the Affections and acts of men than to understand them. To them doubtless it will appear strange that I attempt to treat geometrically of the vices and follies of men, and that I wish to demonstrate by sure reasoning those things which they denounce as repugnant to reason, and as being vain, absurd, and revolting. But this is my reason. There is in nature nothing which can be ascribed to a fault of hers. For nature is always the same and everywhere one, and her virtue and power of action are the same; that is, the laws and rules, according to which all things are done, and are changed from one form into another, are everywhere and always the same, and therefore there must be also one and the same way of understanding natural things of whatever kind, namely, by the universal laws and rules of nature. Therefore the affections of hatred, anger, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow, from the same necessity and virtue of nature as other particular things; and hence they indicate certain causes by which they are understood, and have certain properties, equally worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing, by the contemplation of which alone we are delighted. Therefore, concerning the nature and powers of the affections, and the power of the mind over them, I shall treat in the same method as in the preceding parts I have treated of God and the Mind, and I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if the question were concerning lines, planes, or bodies.

Definitions.

I. An adequate cause, I call one whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived by it. An inadequate, on the other hand, or partial cause, I call one whose effect can not be understood by itself alone.

II. I say that we then act, when any thing within us, or without us, takes place of which we are the adequate cause—that is (by preceding Def.), when any thing in us or without us follows from our nature which can be clearly and distinctly understood by this alone. But, on the contrary, I say that we suffer, when any thing takes place within us,
or any thing follows from our nature, of which we are only
the partial cause.

III. By Affection I understand the affections of the body,
by which the body's power of action is increased or di-
minished, assisted or hindered, and the like touching the
ideas of these affections.

If, therefore, we can be the adequate cause of any of
these affections, then by affection I understand action;
otherwise, suffering.

Postulates.

I. The human body can be affected in many modes, by
which its power of acting is increased or diminished; and
also by others, which render its power of acting neither
greater nor less.

This postulate, or axiom, rests upon Post. i. and Lemm.
v. and vii., which see, after Prop. xiii., Part II.

II. The human body can suffer many changes, and still
retain the impressions, or traces, of objects (concerning
which see Post. v., Prop. ii.), and, consequently, the same
images of things; of which definition see Schol., Prop.
 xvii., Part II.

Prop. I. Our mind does certain things, but also suffers cer-
tain things, namely: in so far as it has adequate ideas, it ne-
necessarily does certain things; and in so far as it has inadequate
ideas, it necessarily suffers certain things.

Dem.—Of every human mind whatever, some ideas are
adequate, but others are mutilated and confused (by Schol.,
Prop. xli., Part II.). But the ideas which are adequate in
the mind of any one, are adequate in God, in so far as he
constitutes the essence of the same mind (by Coroll., Prop.
 xli., Part II.); and those which are inadequate in the mind,
are adequate in God (by the same Coroll.), not in so far as
he merely contains the essence of the mind, but in so far
also as he at the same time contains in himself the minds
of other things. Again, from any given idea whatever,
some effect must necessarily follow (by Prop. xxxvi., Part
I.), of which effect God is the adequate cause (see Def. i. of
this Part), not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he
is considered in that given idea of the affection (see Prop.
ix., Part II.). But of that effect, of which God is the cause, in so far as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in the mind of any one, this same mind is the adequate cause (by Coroll., Prop. xi., Part II.). Therefore, our mind (by Def. ii. of this Part), as far as it has adequate ideas, necessarily does certain things. This was the first point. Again, whatever necessarily follows from an idea which in God is adequate, not in so far as he has in himself the mind of one man merely, but in so far as together with the mind of this man he has in himself the minds of other things, of this the mind of this man is not the adequate cause (by same Coroll., Prop. xi., Part II), but the partial; and, therefore (by Def. ii. of this Part), the mind, in as far as it has inadequate ideas, necessarily suffers some things. This was the second point. Therefore, our mind, etc. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence, it follows that the mind is subject to the more passions the more inadequate ideas it has, and that, on the contrary, it does the more things the more adequate ideas it possesses.

Prop. II. The body is not able to determine the mind to thought, nor the mind the body to motion or rest, or to any thing else (if there is any thing else).

Dem.—All modes of thinking have God for a cause, as far as he is a thinking thing, and not in so far as he is explained by another attribute (by Prop. vi., Part II.). Therefore, that which determines the mind to think is a mode of thinking, and not of extension—that is (by Def. i., Part II.), it is not body. This was the first point. Again, the motion and rest of a body must have its origin from another body which also has been determined to motion or rest by another, and, absolutely, whatever originates in body, this must arise from God, in so far as he is considered as affected by some mode of extension, and not in so far as he is considered as affected by some mode of thought (by the same Prop. vi., Part II.)—that is, it can not arise from mind, which (by Prop. xi., Part II.) is a mode of thought. This was the second point. Therefore, the body is not able, etc. Q. E. D.
Schoel.—These matters are more clearly understood by what has been said in the scholium of Prop. vii., Part II., namely, that the mind and body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, and now under that of extension. Whence it comes to pass, that the order and concatenation of things is one, or nature is conceived under this or under that attribute; consequently, that the order of the actions and passions of our body are in nature simultaneous with the order of the actions and passions of the mind. This is also evident from the manner in which we have demonstrated Proposition xii., Part II. But although these things are so, and no reason for doubting remains, yet I scarcely believe, unless I shall prove the thing by experiment, that men can be induced to consider these matters impartially; so firmly have they been persuaded, that by the command of the mind alone, the body sometimes moves, sometimes rests, and does very many things which depend upon the sole will of the mind and the power of thinking. For what the body possesses power to do, no one has as yet determined, that is, experience has thus far taught no one what the body, by the sole laws of nature, in so far as she is considered as merely corporeal, is able to do, and what it is not able to do unless it is determined by the mind. For thus far no one has known so accurately the frame of the body that he has been able to explain all its functions, to pass in silence at present the fact that many things are observed in brutes which far surpass human sagacity, and that somnambulists do in dreams very many things which they would not dare when awake, which is sufficient proof that the body by the sole laws of its own nature is able to do many things at which its mind wonders. Again, no one knows in what way, and by what means the mind moves the body, nor how many degrees of motion it is able to give to the body, nor with how great swiftness it is able to move the same. Whence it follows that when men say that this or that action of the body originates in the mind which holds the empire over the body, they know not what they say, and do nothing else than confess in fine
words, that they are ignorant, without wondering at it, of the cause of this action. But they say, whether they know or are ignorant by what means the mind moves the body, they still learn by experience that unless the human mind is in a condition to think, the body is inert—since they experience that it is in the sole power of the mind to speak, to be silent, and many other things, which, therefore, they believe depend upon the decree of the mind. But, as touching the first, I ask whether experience does not also teach that if on the other hand the body is inert, the mind is not at the same time unfitted for thinking? For when the body is resting in sleep, the mind at the same time remains asleep with it, nor has it the power of thinking as when awake. Again, I believe that all have experienced that the mind is not always equally fitted for thinking concerning the same subject, but as the body is better fitted that the image of this or that object should be excited in it, so the mind is better fitted to contemplate this or that object. But they will say that from the sole laws of nature, in so far as she is considered as merely corporeal, it can not possibly be that the causes of edifices, pictures, and things of this kind, which are the product of human art alone, should be derived, nor would the human body ever be able to build any temple unless it were determined and led by the mind. But I have already shown that they are ignorant what the body is able to do, or what can be deduced from the sole contemplation of its nature, and that they themselves have experienced that very many things are done by the sole laws of nature which they never would have believed could be done except with the direction of the mind, as are those things which somnambulists do in dreams, and which they themselves wonder at when awake. I add here that the very frame of the human body, which far surpasses in skill every thing framed by human art, not to mention (because I have shown it above) that from nature, considered under whatever attribute, infinite things follow. As touching the second point, human affairs would indeed be far more happily constituted if it were equally in man’s power to be silent
and to speak. But experience sufficiently, and more than sufficiently, teaches that men have nothing less under their power than the tongue, and that they are able to govern nothing less than their own appetites; whence it comes to pass that many believe that we do freely only those things which we moderately desire, because the appetite for these things can be easily checked by the remembrance of some thing else, which we frequently recollect, but by no means those things which we desire by a strong affection, or one which cannot be silenced by the memory of some thing else. However, unless they have experienced that we do very many things of which we afterwards repent, and that often, as when we are shaken by contrary affections, we see the better and follow the worse, nothing hinders us from believing that we do all things freely. Thus, an infant believes that he desires milk freely; an angry boy vengeance, and a cowardly one flight. A drunken man again believes that he is speaking from a free decree of the mind, the things touching which when sober he wishes he had kept silence, so an insane man, a garrulous man, a boy, and others of this description believe themselves to be speaking from a free decree of the mind, when, nevertheless, they are unable to restrain the impetus of speaking which they have. So that experience itself, not less clearly than reason, teaches, that men believe themselves to be free from the sole cause that they are conscious of their own actions, and are ignorant of the causes by which they are determined, and moreover, that the decrees of the mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, and therefore vary with the varying disposition of the body. For every one governs all things according to his affection, and those who are shaken by contrary affections do not know what they wish, and those who are moved by no affection are driven hither and thither by a trifle. All these things very clearly show that both the decree of the mind, and appetite, and the determination of the body are simultaneous in nature, or rather one and the same thing, which, when it is considered under the attribute of thought, and is explained by it, we call a decree, and when it is considered
under the attribute of extension, and is deduced from the laws of motion and rest, we call a determination. This will be still more clear from what is now to be said. For there is another thing which I wish here to be specially noted, namely: that we are able to do nothing from a decree of the mind unless we remember it. *E.g.*, we are not able to speak a word unless we remember it. Again, it is not in the free power of the mind to remember any thing, or to forget it. Wherefore, this alone is believed to be in the free power of the mind, that we are able from the sole decree of the mind to be silent, or to speak the thing which we remember. But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we speak from the free decree of the mind, still we either do not speak, or if we speak, this is done by the spontaneous movement of the body. Again, we dream that we conceal some thing from men, and that by the same decree of the mind, by which, when we are awake, we keep silence touching things which we know. Finally we dream that we do certain things by a decree of the mind, which, when awake, we should not dare to do. I therefore should be very glad to know whether there are two kinds of decrees, the one of fantastic persons, the other of the free? Because if any one is not willing to rave to this extent, it must be granted that this decree of the mind which is believed to be free is not distinguished from imagination itself, or from memory, and that it is nothing else but the affirmation which an idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves. (*See Prop. xlix., Part II.*) And, therefore, these decrees of the mind originate from the same necessity in the mind as the ideas of things existing in reality. Those, therefore, who believe that they speak from a free decree of the mind, or are silent, or do any thing, dream with their eyes open.

**Prop. III. The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone; but passions depend alone upon inadequate ones.**

**Dem.—**The first thing, and that which constitutes the essence of the mind, is nothing else than the idea of a body actually existing (by Props. xi. and xiii., Part II.) which (by Prop. xv., Part II.) is composed of many others, of
which some (by Coroll., Prop. xxxviii., Part II.) are ade-
quate, but some inadequate (by Coroll., Prop. xxix., Part II.). Therefore, whatever follows from the nature of the mind, and of which the mind is the proximate cause by which this must be known, must necessarily follow from an adequate idea, or from an inadequate one. But, as far as the mind (by Prop. I. of this Part) has inadequate ideas, it necessarily suffers; therefore, the actions of the mind follow from adequate ideas only, and the mind suffers only be-
cause it has inadequate ideas. Q. E. D.

Schol.—We see, therefore, that passions are to be referred to the mind only in so far as it has something which in-
volves a negation, or in so far as it is considered a part of nature which can not by itself, separately from other things, be clearly and distinctly perceived; and in this way I should be able to show, that passions are to be referred to individual things, in the same way as to the mind, and that they can not be perceived in any other way. But it is my purpose to treat only of the human mind.

Prop. IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by an external cause.

Dem.—This proposition is self-evident; for the definition of each thing affirms the essence of the thing itself, but does not deny it; or, it posits the essence of the thing, but does not cancel it. Whilst, therefore, we attend only to the thing itself, but not to external causes, we shall be able to find nothing in it which would be able to destroy it. Q. E. D.

Prop. V. Things are of a contrary nature in so far—that is, they can not be in the same subject in so far—as one is able to destroy another.

Dem.—For, if they could agree together—or, if they could be at the same time in the same subject—then there could be some thing posited in the same subject which could destroy it, which (by preceding Prop.) is absurd. Therefore, things are, etc. Q. E. D.

Prop. VI. Every thing, as far as in it lies, strives to perse-
vere in its being.
Dem.—For single things are modes, in which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain and determinate way (by Coroll., Prop. xxxv., Part I.)—that is (by Prop. xxxiv., Part I), things which express the power of God, by which God is and acts in a certain and determinate manner; nor does any thing possess in itself any thing by which it can be destroyed, or which may cancel its existence (by Prop. iv. of this Part). But, on the contrary, it is opposed to every thing which can cancel its existence (by preceding Prop.); and, therefore, as far as it is able, and in itself, it strives to persevere in its being. Q. E. D.

Prop. VII. The endeavor by which every thing strives to persevere in its being, is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself.

Dem.—From the given essence of every thing, certain things necessarily follow (by Prop. xxxvi., Part I); nor can things be other than that which necessarily follows from their determinate nature (by Prop. xxix., Part I); wherefore, the power of each thing, or the endeavor by which it strives to persevere in its being, is nothing but the given or actual essence of the thing itself. Q. E. D.

Prop. VIII. The endeavor by which every thing strives to persevere in its own being involves no finite time, but an indefinite one.

Dem.—For, if it involved a limited time, which determined the duration of the thing, then it would follow, from the sole power itself by which the thing exists, that the thing would not be able to exist after that limited time, but that it must be destroyed—but this (by Prop. iv. of this Part) is absurd; therefore, the endeavor by which a thing exists involves no definite time. But, on the other hand, since (by the same Prop. iv. of this Part), if it is destroyed by no external cause, by the same power by which it now exists it will always continue to exist; therefore, this endeavor involves an indefinite time. Q. E. D.

Prop. IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavors to persevere in its own being a certain indefinite time, and is conscious of this its own endeavor.
Dem.—The essence of the mind is constituted of adequate and inadequate ideas (as we have shown in Prop. iii. of this Part); and, therefore (by Prop. vii. of this Part), both in so far as it has these and those, will endeavor to persevere in its own being—and that (by Prop. viii. of this Part) for an indefinite duration. But since the mind (by Prop. xxiii., Part II.), by the ideas of the affections of the body, is necessarily conscious of itself, it is, therefore (by Prop. vii. of this Part), conscious of its own endeavor. Q. E. D.

Schol.—This endeavor, when it has reference to the mind alone, is called Will; but, when it has reference to the mind and body at once, it is called Appetite—which, therefore, is nothing else than the very essence of man, from whose nature those things follow necessarily which contribute to his preservation; and, therefore, man is determined to do these same things. Again, between appetite and desire there is no difference—except that desire, for the most part, has reference to men, in so far as they are conscious of their appetite; and, therefore, it may be thus defined, viz., desire is appetite with a consciousness of the same. From all these things together, therefore, it is evident, that we endeavor, will, seek, desire nothing, because we judge it to be good; but, on the contrary, that we therefore judge any thing to be good because we strive after, will, seek, and desire it.

Prop. X. An idea which excludes the existence of our body can not be posited in our mind, but is contrary to the same.

Dem.—Whatever is able to destroy our body can not be given in the same (by Prop. v. of this Part), and therefore neither can its idea be given in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (by Coroll., Prop. ix., Part II.), that is (by Props. xi. and xiii., Part II.), the idea of this thing can not be given in our mind; but contrariwise, since (by Props. xi. and xiii., Part II.), the first thing which constitutes the essence of the mind is the idea of a body existing in reality, the first and chief endeavor of our mind is (by Prop. vii. of this Part), to affirm the existence of our body, and there-
fore the idea which denies the existence of our body is contrary to our mind, etc. *Q. E. D.*

Prop. XI. *Whatever increases or diminishes, assists or hinders our body’s power of action, the idea of the same thing increases or diminishes, assists or hinders our mind’s power of thinking.*

Dem.—This Proposition is evident from Proposition vii., Part II., and also from Proposition xiv., Part II.

Schol.—We see, therefore, that the mind can suffer great changes, and can pass now to a greater and now to a less perfection, which, indeed, explains to us the passions of joy and grief. By joy, therefore, in what follows, I shall understand passion, in which the mind passes to greater perfection. But by grief, passion in which it passes to a less perfection. Again, I call the affection of joy, related at once to mind and body, titillation or hilarity; but that of grief, I call pain or melancholy. But it is to be noted that titillation and pain relate to man when one part of him is affected beyond the rest; but hilarity and melancholy, when all are equally affected. Again, what desire is, I have explained in Proposition ix. of this Part, and beyond these three I recognize no other primary affection. I shall show in the sequel that the rest originate in these three. But before I proceed further, I wish to explain more fully Proposition x. of this Part, that it may be more clearly understood in what way one idea is contrary to the other.

In the Scholium of Proposition xvii., Part II., we have shown that the idea which constitutes the essence of the mind, involves the existence of the body, so long as the body exists. Again, from what we have shown in Corollary, Proposition viii., Part II., and in its Scholium, it follows that the present existence of our mind depends upon this alone, viz., that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Finally, we have shown that the power of the mind, by which it imagines things and remembers them, depends solely upon this (see Props. xvii. and xviii., Part II., with its Scholium), that it involves the actual existence of the body. From these things it follows that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagination is
taken away so soon as it ceases to affirm the present existence of the body. But the cause why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body can not be the mind itself (by Prop. iv. of this Part), nor even because the body ceases to exist. For (by Prop. vi., Part II.) the cause, why the mind affirms the existence of the body, is not because the body begins to exist; wherefore, by the same reason, neither does it cease to affirm the existence of its body, because the body ceases to be; but (by Prop. viii., Part II.) this has its origin in another idea, which excludes the present existence of our body, and consequently also of our mind, and which, therefore, is contrary to the idea which constitutes the essence of our mind.

Prop. XII. The mind, as far as possible, strives to imagine those things which increase or assist the body's power of action.

Dem.—As long as the human body is affected in a manner, which involves the nature of any external body, so long the human mind will contemplate the same body as present (by Prop. xvii., Part II.), and consequently (by Prop. vii., Part II.), as long as the human mind contemplates any external body as present, that is (by Schol. of same Prop.), imagines it, so long the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of the same external body; but therefore, as long as the mind imagines those things, which increase or assist our body's power of action, so long the body is affected in modes, which increase or assist the power of action in the same (see Post. i. of this Part); and consequently (by Prop. xi. of this Part), so long the mind's power of thinking is increased or assisted, and hence (by Prop. vi. or ix. of this Part), the mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine the same things. Q. E. D.

Prop. XIII. When the mind imagines those things which diminish or hinder the body's power of action, it strives, as far as it can, to remember things which exclude the existence of these.

Dem.—As long as the mind imagines any such thing, so long the mind's and body's power is diminished or hindered (as demonstrated in preceding Prop.), and still it will continue to imagine this until the mind imagines another thing, which excludes the present existence of this (by
Prop. xvii., Part II.), that is (as we have just shown), the mind's and body's power is diminished or hindered until the mind imagines another thing, which excludes the existence of this, and which, therefore, the mind (by Prop. ix. of this Part), as far as it can, will endeavor to imagine or remember. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence it follows that the mind is averse to imagine those things which diminish or hinder the power of itself and of the body.

Schol.—From these things we clearly understand what love is, and what hatred is. Love, namely, is nothing else than joy, with the concomitant idea of the external cause, and hatred is nothing else than grief, with the concomitant idea of the external cause. We see, again, that he who loves necessarily endeavors to have present and to preserve the thing which he loves; and, contrariwise, he who hates, endeavors to remove and to destroy the thing which he hates. But concerning all these matters, we shall treat more at length in the sequel.

Prop. XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two affections simultaneously, when subsequently it is affected by either of them, it will also be affected by the other.

Dem.—If the human body has once been simultaneously affected by two bodies, when the mind afterwards imagines either of them, it will also immediately remember the other (by Prop. xviii., Part II.). But the imaginations of the mind indicate rather the affections of our body, than the nature of the external bodies (by Coroll. ii., Prop. xvi., Part II.), therefore, if the body, and consequently the mind (see Def. iii. of this Part), has once been affected by two affections, when subsequently it is affected by either of them, it will also be affected by the other. Q. E. D.

Prop. XV. Any thing whatever is able to be, by accident, the cause of joy, grief, or desire.

Dem.—Let it be posited that the mind is simultaneously affected by two affections—by one, namely, which neither increases nor diminishes its power of action, and by another, which either increases or diminishes the same. (See Post. i. of this Part). From the preceding Proposition it is evi-
dent that when the mind is subsequently affected by the
former, from its true cause, which (by the hypothesis) of
itself neither increases nor diminishes its power of think-
ing, it will also be immediately affected by the other also,
which increases or diminishes its power of thinking, that
is (by Schol., Prop. xi., of this Part), it will be affected
by joy or grief; and therefore that thing, not of itself, but
by accident, will be the cause of joy or grief. But in the
same way it can easily be shown that that thing can be, by
accident, the cause of desire. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—From this alone, that we contemplate any thing,
with the affection of joy or grief, of which it is not the ef-
cient cause, we are able to love or to hate the same.

Dem.—For from this alone it comes to pass (by Prop.
xiv. of this Part) that the mind, by subsequently imagin-
ing this thing, is affected with the affection of joy or grief, that
is (by Schol., Prop. xi., of this Part), that the power of
the mind and body is increased or diminished, etc. And con-
sequently (by Prop. xii. of this Part) that the mind desires
to imagine the same, or (by Coroll., Prop. xiii., of this
Part) is averse to it; that is (by Schol., Prop. xiii., of this
Part), that it loves or hates the same. Q. E. D.

Schol.—Hence we understand how it can come to pass
that we may love or hate certain things without any cause
known to us, but merely, as men say, from sympathy or
antipathy. To this also are to be referred also those ob-
jects which affect us with joy or grief from this alone, that
they have something similar to the objects which are accus-
tomed to affect us with the same affections, as I shall show
in the following Proposition. I know indeed that the au-
thors who first introduced these names of sympathy and
antipathy, wish to indicate by them certain occult qualities
of things; but nevertheless I think it is permitted to us to
understand by the same, known or manifest qualities also.

Prop. XVI. From this alone, that we imagine any thing to
have something similar to an object, which is accustomed to af-
flect the mind with joy or grief, although that, in which the thing
is similar to the object, is not the efficient cause of these affec-
tions, we shall nevertheless love or hate it.
Dem.—That which is similar to the object, in the object itself (by hypothesis), we have contemplated with the affection of joy or grief; and therefore (by Prop. xiv. of this Part) when the mind is affected by the image of it, it will also be immediately affected by this or that affection, and consequently the thing, which we perceive to possess the same, will be (by Prop. xv. of this Part), by accident, the cause of joy or grief; and therefore (by preceding Coroll.), although that in which it is similar to the object, is not the efficient cause of these affections, we shall nevertheless love or hate it. Q. E. D.

Prop. XVII. If we imagine a thing which is accustomed to affect us with the affection of grief, to have something similar to another, which is accustomed to affect us with an equally great affection of joy, we shall at once hate and love it.

Dem.—For (by hypothesis) this thing in itself is a cause of grief, and (by Schol., Prop. xiii., of this Part) in so far as we imagine the same with this affection, we hate it; and in so far moreover as we imagine it to have something similar to another, which is accustomed to affect us with an equally great affection of joy, we shall love it with an equal degree of joy (by Prop. preceding); and therefore we shall at the same time hate and love it. Q. E. D.

Schol.—This constitution of the mind, which, namely, arises from two contrary affections, is called a fluctuation of mind, and stands related to affection as doubt does to imagination (see Schol., Prop. xlv., Part II.); nor do fluctuation of mind and doubt differ from each other, save in the degree of greater and less. But it is to be noted that in the preceding Proposition I have deduced these fluctuations of mind from causes which are a cause absolutely of one, and accidentally of another, affection. This I have done because they could thus be more easily deduced from what precedes; not because I deny that fluctuations of mind often arise from an object, which may be the efficient cause of each affection. For the human body (by Post. i., Part II.) is composed of many individuals of different nature, and therefore (Ax. i., after Lem. iii., which see after Prop. xiii., Part II.) it can be affected by one and the same body
in very many and different modes; and, contrariwise, because one and the same thing can be affected in many modes; therefore also it will be able to affect in different modes also one and the same part of a body; from which things we can easily conceive that one and the same object can be the cause of many and of contrary affections.

Prop. XVIII. By an image of a past thing, or of a future, man is affected with the same affection of joy or grief, as by the image of a thing present.

Dem.—As long as a man is affected by the image of any thing, he will contemplate the thing as present, although it does not exist (Prop. xvii., Part II., with the Coroll. of the same), nor does he imagine it as past or future, except in so far as its image is joined to an image of time, past or future. (See Schol., Prop. xlv., Part II.) Wherefore, the image of a thing considered in itself alone is the same, whether it is referred to time future, or past, or present, that is (Coroll. ii., Prop. xvi., Part II), the constitution of the body or the affection is the same, whether the image is of a past thing, of a future, or of a present; and therefore the affection of joy or grief is the same, whether the image is of a thing past, or future, or present. Q. E. D.

Schol.—I here call a thing past or present, in so far as we have been or shall be affected by the same; e. g., in so far as we have seen it, or shall see it, it has strengthened or will strengthen, it has injured or will injure, us. For in so far as we thus imagine the same, in so far we affirm its existence, that is, the body is affected by no affection which excludes the existence of the thing; and therefore (by Prop. xvii., Part II.) the body by the image of the same thing is affected in the same manner as if the thing were itself present. However, since it frequently happens that persons of much experience fluctuate so long as they contemplate a thing as future or past, and generally doubt concerning the event of the thing (see Schol., Prop. lxiv., Part II.), it comes to pass that affections which originate from similar images of things, are not therefore constant, but that they are frequently disturbed by the images of other things, until men become certain by the event of the thing.
Schol. II.—From what has now been said, we understand what hope, fear, confidence, despair, rejoicing, and the sting of conscience are. For hope is nothing else than inconstant joy, arising from the image of a future thing, or of a past thing concerning the issue of which we are in doubt. Fear, on the contrary, is inconstant grief, arising from the image of a doubtful thing. Furthermore, if the doubt of these affections is removed, from hope comes confidence, and from fear, despair; namely, joy or sorrow, arising from the image of a thing which we have feared or hoped for. Again, rejoicing is joy arising from the image of a past thing, concerning the event of which we have been in doubt. Finally, the sting of conscience is the grief opposed to joy.

Prop. XIX. He who imagines that that which he loves is destroyed will be affected with grief; but that it is preserved, will be affected with joy.

Dem.—The mind, as far as it can, endeavors to imagine those things, which increase or assist the body's power of action (by Prop. xii. of this Part), that is (by Schol. of the same Prop.), those things which it loves. But the imagination is assisted by those things which posit the existence of the thing, and, on the contrary, it is hindered by those things which exclude its existence (by Prop. xviii., Part II.); therefore, the images of the things which posit the existence of the beloved thing, assist the effort of the mind by which it endeavors to imagine the beloved thing, that is (by Schol., Prop. xi., of this Part), they affect the mind with joy; and, on the contrary, what things exclude the existence of the beloved thing hinder the same endeavor, that is (by the same Schol.), affect the mind with grief. Therefore, he who imagines that that which he loves is destroyed will be affected with grief, etc. Q. E. D.

Prop. XX. He who imagines that that which he hates is destroyed will be affected with joy.

Dem.—The mind (Prop. xiii. of this Part) endeavors to imagine those things which exclude the existence of the things by which the body's power of action is diminished or hindered, that is (by Schol. of the same Prop.), it endeavors to imagine those things which exclude the exist-
ence of the things which it hates; and, therefore, the image of the thing, which excludes the existence of that which the mind hates, assists this effort of the mind, that is (by Schol., Prop. xi., of this Part), affects the mind with joy. Therefore he who imagines that which he hates to be destroyed, will be affected with joy. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXI. He who imagines that that which he loves is affected with joy or grief, will also be affected with joy or grief; and each affection will be greater or less in the lover, as each is greater or less in the thing beloved.

Dem.—The images of the things (as in Prop. xix. of this Part has been demonstrated), which posit the existence of the beloved thing, assist the effort of the mind by which it endeavors to imagine the beloved thing itself. But joy posits the existence of the beloved thing, and the more so, the greater the affection of joy is; for (by Schol., Prop. xi., of this Part) it is a transition to a greater perfection; therefore, the image of the joy of a beloved thing assists in the lover the effort of the mind itself, that is (Schol., Prop. xi., of this Part), affects the lover with joy, and so much the more, the greater this affection is in the thing beloved. This was the first point. Again, in as far as any thing is affected with grief, in so far it is destroyed, and the more, the more it is affected with grief (by the same Schol., Prop. xi., of this Part), and therefore (Prop. xix. of this Part) he who imagines that that which he loves is affected with grief will also be affected with grief, and with the greater, as this affection is greater in the thing beloved. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXII. If we imagine that any one affects with joy a thing which we love, we shall be affected with love towards him. If, on the contrary, we imagine the same to affect the same with grief, we, on the contrary, shall be affected with hatred towards him.

Dem.—He who affects a thing which we love with joy or grief, affects us also with joy or grief, if indeed we imagine the beloved thing affected with joy or grief (by preceding Prop.). But this joy or grief is supposed to be given in us with the concomitant idea of the external cause; therefore
(by Schol., Prop. xiii., of this Part), if we imagine that any one affects with joy or grief a thing which we love, we shall be affected toward the same with love or hatred. Q. E. D.

Schol.—Proposition xxi. explains to us what commiseration is, which we are able to define as being grief arising from the harm of another. But I know not by what appellation to indicate the joy which arises from the good of another. Furthermore, we shall call love towards him, who benefits another, favor; and, on the contrary, hatred towards him who injures another, indignation. Finally, it is to be noted that we pity not only the thing which we love (as we have shown in Prop. xxi.), but also that towards which we had previously had no affection, provided only we shall judge it to be similar to ourselves (as I shall show hereafter), and therefore that we regard with favor him who benefits a similar thing, and on the contrary, with indignation, him who brings harm upon a similar thing.

Prop. XXIII. He who imagines that which he hates to be affected with grief will rejoice; if, on the contrary he imagines the same to be affected with joy he will be grieved; and each affection will be greater or less as its contrary is greater or less in that which he hates.

Dem.—In as far as the hated thing is affected with grief, it is destroyed, and the more the greater the grief with which it is affected (by Schol. xi. of this Part). He, therefore, who imagines (by Prop. xx. of this Part) that a thing which he hates is affected with grief, will, on the contrary, be affected with joy; and with the greater, the greater the grief with which he imagines the hated thing to be affected. This was the first point. Again, joy posits the existence of the thing rejoiced over, and the more so the greater the conceived joy. If any one imagines him whom he hates to be affected with joy, this imagination (Prop. xiii. of this Part) will hinder his effort, that is (Schol., Prop. xi., of this Part), he who hates will be affected with grief, etc. Q. E. D.

Schol.—This joy can scarcely be solid and free from any conflict of mind. For (as I shall show directly in Prop.
xxvii. of this Part) in as far as he imagines a thing similar to himself to be affected with an affection of grief, in so far he must be affected with grief; and the contrary, if he imagines the same to be affected with joy. But we are here speaking of hatred alone.

**Prop. XXIV.** If we imagine any one to affect with joy a thing which we hate, we shall be affected with hatred towards him. If on the contrary we imagine the same to affect the same thing with grief, we shall be affected with love towards him.

**Dem.**—This proposition is demonstrated in the same way as Prop. xxii. of this Part, which see.

**Schol.**—These and similar affections of hatred are to be referred to envy, which, therefore, is nothing else than hatred itself, in so far as it is considered as so disposing a man, that he rejoices over the evil of another, and on the contrary is grieved by the good of the same.

**Prop. XXV.** We endeavor to affirm every thing concerning ourselves, and concerning a thing beloved, which we imagine affects ourselves or a thing beloved with joy, and, on the contrary, to deny every thing which we imagine affects ourselves or a thing beloved with grief.

**Dem.**—That which we imagine affects a thing beloved with joy or grief, affects us with joy or grief (by Prop. xxi. of this Part). But the mind (by Prop. xii. of this Part), as far as it can, endeavors to imagine those things which affect us with joy, that is (by Prop. xvii. Part II., and its Coroll.), to contemplate them as present; and, on the contrary (by Prop. xiii. of this Part), to exclude the existence of those things which affect us with grief; therefore we endeavor to affirm every thing concerning ourselves, and concerning a thing beloved, which we imagine affects ourselves or a thing beloved with joy; and the contrary. **Q. E. D.**

**Prop. XXVI.** We endeavor to affirm every thing concerning a thing which we hate, which we imagine affects it with grief, and, on the contrary, to deny what we imagine affects it with joy.

**Dem.**—This proposition follows from Prop. xxiii. as the preceding one from Prop. xxi. of this Part.
Schol.—From these things we see, it may easily happen, that a man thinks of himself, or of a beloved object, better than is just, and, on the contrary, concerning a thing which he hates worse than is just, which imagination, when it respects the man himself who thinks of himself better than is just, is called pride, and is a species of delirium, because the man is dreaming with his eyes open, that he is master of all those things which he has secured only in imagination, and which he therefore contemplates as real, so long as he is unable to imagine the things which exclude their existence, and limit his power of action. Pride, therefore, is joy arising from this, that a man thinks of himself better than is just. Again, joy which arises from this, that a man thinks of another better than is just, is called over-estimation, and that finally, contempt, which arises from this, that he thinks of another less than is just.

Prop. XXVII. From the fact that we imagine any thing similar to ourselves, which we had regarded with no affection, to be affected with any affection, we ourselves are affected with this similar affection.

Dem.—The images of things are affections of the human body, the ideas of which represent external bodies as present to us (by Schol., Prop. xvii., Part II.), that is (Prop. xvi., Part II.), the ideas of which involve the nature of our body, and at the same time the present nature of the external body. If, therefore, the nature of the external body is similar to the nature of our body, then the idea of the external body, which we are imagining, involves an affection of our body similar to the affection of the external body; and, consequently, if we imagine any one similar to ourselves to be affected with any affection, this imagination will express an affection of our body similar to this affection; and, therefore, from the fact that we imagine any thing similar to ourselves to be affected with any affection, we are affected with this similar affection. Because if we hate a thing similar to ourselves, in so far (by Prop. xxiii. of this Part) we shall be affected with this contrary affection, but not with a similar one. Q. E. D.

Schol.—This imitation of affections, when it respects
grief, is called commiseration (concerning which see Schol., Prop. xxiii., of this Part); but when related to desire, it is called emulation, which, therefore, is nothing else than the desire of any thing, which is produced in us by the fact, that we imagine others similar to ourselves to have the same desire.

Coroll. I.—If we imagine any one whom we have regarded with no affection, to affect with joy a thing similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love toward the same. If, on the contrary, we imagine the same to affect the same with grief, on the contrary we shall be affected with hatred toward him.

Dem.—This is demonstrated from the preceding proposition in the same manner, as Prop. xxii. of this Part, from Prop. xxi.

Coroll. II.—A thing which we pity, we can not hate, from the fact that its misery affects us with grief.

Dem.—For if we could for this cause hate it, then (by Prop. xxiii. of this Part) we should rejoice in its grief, which is against the hypothesis.

Coroll. III.—The thing which we pity, we shall endeavor, as far as we are able, to deliver from misery.

Dem.—That which affects with grief a thing which we pity, affects us also with a similar grief (by preceding Prop.); and, therefore, we shall strive to imagine every thing which excludes its existence, or which destroys the thing (by Prop. xiii. of this Part)—that is (by Prop. ix. of this Part), we shall seek to destroy it, or shall be determined to destroy it: and, therefore, we shall strive to deliver from its misery the thing which we pity. Q. E. D.

Schol.—This will, or appetite for benefiting, which arises from the fact that we pity the thing upon which we wish to confer benefit, is called benevolence; which, therefore, is nothing else than desire arising from commiseration. But, concerning love and hatred toward him who has done good or evil to a thing which we imagine to be similar to ourselves, see Schol., Prop. xxii., of this Part.

Prop. XXVIII. Every thing which we imagine contributes to joy, we endeavor to bring to realization; but, what we imag-
ine to be repugnant to the same, or to conduce to grief, we endeavor to remove, or to destroy.

Dem.—What we imagine to conduce to joy, we endeavor, as far as we can, to imagine (by Prop. xii. of this Part)—that is (by Prop. xvii., Part II.), we shall endeavor, as far as we can, to contemplate it as present, or as existing in fact. But the endeavor, or power, of the mind in thinking is equal and simultaneous in nature with the body's endeavor, or power, of action (as clearly follows from Coroll., Prop. vii., and Coroll., Prop. xi., Part II.); therefore, we absolutely endeavor, or (what, by Schol., Prop. ix., of this Part, is the same) we seek and intend that it, may exist. This was the first point. Again, if that which we believe to be the cause of grief—that is (by Schol., Prop. xiii., of this Part), if that which we hate we imagine to be destroyed, we shall rejoice (by Prop. xx. of this Part), and, therefore (by the first Part of this), we shall endeavor to destroy, or remove it from us (by Prop. xiii. of this Part), that we may not contemplate it as present. This was the second point. Therefore, every thing which we imagine to conduce to joy, etc. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXIX. We shall also endeavor to do every thing which we imagine men* regard with joy; and, on the contrary, we shall be averse from doing that to which we imagine men are averse.

Dem.—From the fact that we imagine that men love or hate any thing, we shall love or hate the same (by Prop. xxvii. of this Part—that is (by Schol., Prop. xiii., of this Part), for this very reason, we shall be rejoiced or grieved by the presence of this thing; and, therefore (by preceding Prop.), every thing which we imagine men love, or regard with joy, we shall endeavor to do, etc. Q. E. D.

Schol.—This effort to do or to omit any thing for this sole cause, that we may please men, is called Ambition—especially when we strive so earnestly to please the multitude, that we do or omit certain things to our own or another's harm; otherwise, it is commonly called human—

*Understand here, and in what follows, men whom we regard with no affection.
ity. Again, the joy with which we imagine the action of another by which he endeavors to please us, I call praise; but, the grief by which we turn with aversion from his action, I call blame.

Prop. XXX. If any one has done any thing which he imagines affects others with joy, he will be affected with joy with the concomitant idea of himself as the cause; or, he will contemplate himself with joy. If, on the other hand, he has done any thing which he imagines affects others with grief, on the contrary, he will contemplate himself with grief.

Dem.—He who imagines that he has affected others with joy or grief, by this very thing (Prop. xxvii. of this Part) will be affected with joy or grief. But, since a man (Props. xix. and xxiii., Part II.) is conscious of himself through the affections by which he is determined to action; therefore, he, who has done any thing which he imagines affects others with joy, will be affected with joy with the consciousness of himself as the cause; or, he will contemplate himself with joy, and the contrary. Q. E. D.

Schol.—Since love (Schol., Prop. xiii., of this Part) is joy, with the concomitant idea of the external cause—and hatred grief, with the concomitant idea of the external cause; therefore, this joy and grief will be a species of love and hatred. But, because love and hatred are referred to external objects, therefore, we shall signalize these affections by other names, namely: joy, with the concomitant idea of the external cause, we shall call glory—and grief, with the concomitant idea of the external cause, on the contrary, shame. Understand, when joy and grief arise from the fact that a man believes himself to be praised or blamed—that is joy, with the concomitant idea of the external cause—I shall call self-satisfaction, and the grief opposed to the same, repentance. Again, since (Coroll., Prop. xvii., Part II.) it may happen, that the joy with which any one imagines he affects others is merely imaginary, and (Prop. xxv. of this Part) each one strives to imagine every thing concerning himself which he imagines affects him with joy, it may easily occur, that a glorious
man will be proud, and imagine himself agreeable to all, when he is distasteful to all.

Prop. XXXI. If we imagine that any one loves, or desires, or hates any thing which we love, desire or hate; from this very fact we shall more constantly love, etc. But, if we imagine that he regards with aversion that which we love, or the contrary, then we shall suffer fluctuation of mind.

Dem.—From this fact alone, that we imagine any one to love, we shall love the same (Prop. xxvii. of this Part). But, by the hypothesis, we love the same without this; therefore, a new cause of love is added by which it is favored, and, therefore, that which we love we shall on this account love more constantly. Again, from the fact, that we imagine any one to regard any thing with aversion, we shall regard the same with aversion (by the same Prop.). But, if we suppose that we, at the same time, love this very thing, then, at the same time, we shall both love it and be averse to it—or (see Schol., Prop. xvii., of this Part), we shall suffer fluctuation of mind. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence (from Prop. xxviii. of this Part), it follows, that every one strives, as far as he can, that every one should love that which he loves, and hate that which he hates—whence the poet says:

"Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes; Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."

Schol.—This effort to bring it about that every one should approve what he loves or hates, is in reality ambition (see Schol., Prop. xxix., of this Part), and we therefore see that every one naturally seeks, that others should live according to his disposition. Since all alike seek this, they are mutually in each other's way, and since all wish to be praised or loved by all, they mutually fall into hatred.

Prop. XXXII. If we imagine that any one rejoices in any thing which only one is able to possess, we shall endeavor to bring it to pass that he may not possess that thing.

Dem.—From this fact alone, that we imagine any one to rejoice in any thing (by Prop. xxvii. of this Part with its i. Coroll.), we shall love that thing, and shall desire to re-
joice in it. But (by the hypothesis), we imagine it stands opposed to this joy, that he rejoices in this same thing, therefore (by Prop. xxviii. of this Part), we shall strive that he may not possess the same. Q. E. D.

Schol.—We see, therefore, since this is frequently manifested in the nature of men, that they pity those who are unfortunate, and envy those who are prosperous, and (by the preceding Prop.), they hate them the more, the more they love the thing which they imagine another to possess. We see again, that from the same property of human nature, from which it follows that men are pitiful, it also follows that they are envious and ambitious. Finally, if we will consult experience, we shall find that she teaches all these things, especially if we give attention to the earlier years of our life. For we shall learn by experience, that boys, because their body is constantly, as it were, in equilibrium, laugh or weep, for this reason alone, that they see others laugh or weep; and whatever else they see others do, they at once desire to imitate it, and in short, they desire for, themselves all those things by which they imagine others are delighted, to wit: because the images of things, as we have said, are themselves the affections of the human body, or the modes in which the human body is affected by external causes, and disposed to do this or that.

Prop. XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves, we strive as far as possible to bring it to pass, that it on the other hand may love us.

Dem.—A thing which we love, we especially endeavor, as far as we can, to imagine (Prop. xii. of this Part). If, therefore, the thing is similar to ourselves, we shall especially endeavor to affect it with joy (Prop. xxix. of this Part), or we shall strive, as far as we are able, to bring it to pass that the beloved thing may be affected with joy, with the concomitant idea of ourselves, that is (by Schol., Prop. xiii., of this Part), that it, on the other hand, may love us. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXXIV. The greater the affection with which we imagine a beloved thing is affected toward ourselves, the more shall we glory.
Dem.—We strive (by preceding Prop.), as far as we can, that a beloved thing may on the other hand love us, that is (Schol., Prop. xiii., of this Part), that a beloved thing may be affected with joy, with the concomitant idea of ourselves. Therefore, the greater the joy, with which we imagine the beloved thing to be affected on our account, the more is this endeavor assisted, that is (by Prop. xi. of this Part with its Schol.), with the greater joy are we affected. But when we rejoice, because we have affected with joy another similar to ourselves, then we contemplate ourselves with joy (Prop. xxx. of this Part), therefore, the greater the affection with which we imagine a beloved thing to be affected toward us, with the greater joy shall we contemplate ourselves, or (Schol., Prop. xxx., of this Part), we shall glory the more. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXXV. If any one imagines that a beloved thing joins another to itself, with the same or a closer bond of friendship, than that with which he alone possesses the same, he will be affected with hatred towards the beloved thing itself, and he will envy that other.

Dem.—The greater the love with which any one imagines a beloved thing to be affected towards himself, the more will he glory (by preceding Prop.), that is (Schol., Prop. xxx., of this Part), rejoice, and therefore (Prop. xxviii. of this Part), he will strive, as far as he can, to imagine the beloved thing bound to himself as closely as possible, which endeavor or appetite is increased if he imagines another desires the same thing for himself (Prop. xxxi. of this Part). But this endeavor or appetite is supposed to be hindered by the image of the beloved thing itself, with the concomitant image of him whom the beloved thing has joined to itself; therefore (by Schol., Prop. xi., of this Part), by this very fact, it will be affected with grief, the idea of the beloved object being concomitant with the image of the other as the cause; that is (by Schol., Prop. xiii., of this Part), he will be affected with hatred toward the beloved thing, and at the same time towards that other (by Coroll., Prop. xv., of this Part),
whom, moreover (Prop. xxiii. of this Part), he will envy, because he is delighted by the beloved thing. \textit{Q. E. D.}

\textit{Schol.}—This hatred toward the beloved thing, joined to envy, is called jealously, which, therefore, is nothing else than a fluctuation of mind, arising from love and hate together, with the concomitant idea of the other, who is envied. Moreover, this hatred toward the beloved thing will be greater in proportion to the joy with which the jealous man was accustomed to be affected by the reciprocal love of the beloved thing, and also in proportion to the affection with which he had been affected towards him whom he imagines to have joined the beloved thing to himself. For if he hated him for that reason (Prop. xxiv. of this Part), he will hate the beloved thing because he imagines that it affects with joy that which he hates, and, also (Coroll., Prop. xv., of this Part), because he is compelled to associate the image of the beloved thing with the image of that which he hates, a reason which often occurs in love to a woman. For he who imagines that a woman whom he loves has prostituted herself to another, will be grieved not simply because his appetite is hindered, but, also, because he is forced to associate the image of a beloved thing with the secrets and the evacuations of another, he will hate her; add finally to this, that the jealous man is not received with the same countenance, by her, which the beloved thing was wont to show him, for which cause also, the lover is grieved, as I shall now show.

\textbf{Prop. XXXVI. Whoever remembers a thing with which he was once delighted, desires to possess the same with the same circumstances, as when he was at first delighted with it.}

\textit{Dem.}—Whatever a man has once seen with the thing which delighted him, this (Prop. xv. of this Part) will be accidentally a cause of joy; and, therefore (Prop. xxviii. of this Part), he will desire to possess every thing which delighted him, or he will desire to possess the thing, with all the same circumstances as when he was first delighted with the same. \textit{Q. E. D.}

\textit{Coroll.}—If, therefore, he shall find that one of these circumstances is wanting, the lover will be grieved.
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Dem.—For in as far as he finds that any circumstance is wanting, so far he imagines something, which excludes the existence of this thing. But since from love, he is desirous of this thing, or circumstance (by preceding Prop.), therefore (Prop. xix. of this Part), in as far as he imagines the same to be wanting, he will be grieved. Q. E. D.

Schol.—This grief, as far as it respects the absence of that which we love, is called regret.

Prop. XXXVII. The desire which springs from grief, or joy, or hatred, or love, is greater in proportion as the affection is greater.

Dem.—Grief diminishes or hinders a man's power of action (Schol., Prop. xi., of this Part), that is (Prop. xxvii. of this Part), it diminishes or hinders the effort, by which he endeavors to persevere in his own being; and, therefore (Prop. v. of this Part), it is contrary to this effort, and that which a man affected by grief strives after, is to remove grief. But (by the definition of grief) the greater the grief is, so much greater the part of the man's power of action, which it necessarily opposes; therefore, the greater the grief is, with the greater power of action will the man, on the other hand, endeavor to remove the grief, that is (Schol., Prop. ix., of this Part), with the greater desire or appetite will he endeavor to remove the grief. Again, since joy (by the same Schol., Prop. xi., of this Part) increases or assists a man's power of action, it is easily demonstrated in the same way, that a man affected with joy, desires nothing else than to preserve the same, and that with the greater desire, the greater is the joy. Finally, since hatred and love are themselves affections of joy or grief, it follows that effort, appetite, or desire, which springs from hatred or love, will be greater in proportion to the hatred and love. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXXVIII. If any one begins to hate a beloved thing, so that love is entirely abolished, for a similar reason, he will pursue the same with greater hatred than if he had never loved it, with the greater, the greater had been the previous love.

Dem.—For if any one begins to hate the thing which
he loves, more appetites of his are hindered, than if he had not loved the same. For love is joy (Schol., Prop. xiii., of this Part), which a man, as far as he can (Prop. xxviii. of this Part), strives to preserve; and that too (by the same Schol.), by contemplating the beloved thing as present, and by affecting the same (Prop. xxi. of this Part) with joy, as far as he is able, which endeavor, indeed (preceeding Prop.), is the greater, the greater is the love, as also the effort to bring it to pass that the beloved thing may love him in return (see Prop. xxxiii. of this Part). But these efforts are hindered by hatred toward the beloved thing (by Coroll., Prop. xiii., and by Prop. xxiii. of this Part); therefore, the lover (Schol., Prop. xi., of this Part) from this cause also will be affected with grief, and the greater, the greater the love had been; that is, besides the grief, which was the cause of the hatred, another arises from the fact that he has loved the thing, and consequently he will contemplate the beloved thing with a greater affection of grief—that is (Schol., Prop. xiii., of this Part), he will pursue it with greater hatred—than if he had not loved it, and by so much greater, as the love had been greater. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXXIX. He who hates any one, will endeavor to bring evil upon him, unless he fears that from this a greater evil may arise to himself; and on the other hand, he who loves any one, by the same law will endeavor to benefit him.

Dem.—To hate any one is (Schol., Prop. xiii., of this Part) to imagine any one as a cause of grief; and, therefore (Prop. xxviii. of this Part), he, who hates any one, will endeavor to remove or to destroy the same. But if from this he fears something more grievous, or (what is the same thing) a greater evil to himself, and believes that he can avoid it by not bringing upon him, whom he hates, the evil which he meditated, he will desire to abstain (by the same Prop. xxviii. of this Part) from bringing the evil; and that (Prop. xxxvii. of this Part) with a greater effort than that by which he was moved to bring the evil. This, therefore, as we said, will prevail. The demonstration of the second part proceeds in the same way. Therefore, whoever hates any one, etc. Q. E. D.
Schol.—By good I here understand every kind of joy, and whatever, moreover, conduces to the same, and especially that which satisfies desire of whatever kind this may be. But by evil every kind of grief, and especially that which frustrates desire. For above (in Schol., Prop. ix., of this Part), we have shown that we desire nothing, because we judge this to be good, but on the contrary, we call that good which we desire, and consequently that which we dislike we call evil; wherefore, every one from his own affection judges or estimates what is good, what evil, what better, what worse, and what finally is best or what worst. The ambitious man desires nothing so much as glory, and on the contrary fears nothing so much as shame. Again, to the envious man nothing is more pleasant than the unhappiness of another, and nothing more disagreeable than the happiness of another, and thus each one from his own affection judges any thing to be good or evil, useful or detrimental. But this affection, by which a man is so disposed, that he should not will that which he wills, or that he should will that which he does not will, is called timidity. This, therefore, is nothing else than fear, in so far as a man is disposed by the same to avoid an evil, which he judges future, by a lesser one (see Prop. xxviii. of this Part). But if the evil, which he fears is disgrace, then timidity is called shame. Finally, if the desire of avoiding a future evil is restrained by timidity in view of another evil, so that he knows not which he prefers, then fear is called consternation, especially if each evil which he fears is of the highest degree.

Prop. XL. He who imagines himself to be hated by any one, and does not believe that he has given him any cause of hatred, will, on the other hand, hate him.

Dem.—Whoever imagines any one to be affected with hatred will, for this reason, also be affected with hatred (Prop. xxvii. of this Part)—that is (Schol., Prop. xiii., of this Part), with grief, with the concomitant idea of the external cause. But, he (by the hypothesis) imagines no cause of this grief, except him who hates him; therefore, for this reason, that he imagines himself to be hated by
any one, will be affected with grief, with the concomitant idea of him who hates him, or (by the same Schol.), he will hate him. Q. E. D.

Schol.—But, if he imagines that he has given just cause of hatred, then (by Prop. xxx. of this Part, and its Schol.) he will be affected with shame. But this (by Prop. xxv. of this Part) rarely happens. Moreover, this reciprocation of hatred can also arise from this—that hatred follows from the effort to bring evil upon him who is hated (Prop. xxxix. of this Part). Whoever, therefore, imagines that he is hated by any one, will imagine that he is the cause of some evil, or grief; and will, therefore, be affected by grief, or fear, with the concomitant idea of him who hates him as the cause—that is, he will be, on the other hand, affected with hatred, as above.

Coroll. I.—He who imagines that one whom he loves is affected with hatred toward him, will be agitated at once by hatred and love. For, in so far as he imagines that he is hated by the same, he is determined (by preceding Prop.) reciprocally to hate him. But (by the hypothesis), he loves him, nevertheless; therefore, he will be agitated at once by hatred and love.

Coroll. II.—If any one imagines that some evil has been brought upon him from hatred, by some one whom he had previously regarded with no affection, he will at once endeavor to return the same evil to him.

Dem.—Whoever imagines that any one is affected with hatred toward himself (by preceding Prop.), will, in return, hate him, and (Prop. xxvi. of this Part) will endeavor to remember every thing which can affect the same with grief, and will strive (Prop. xxxix. of this Part) to bring the same upon him. But (by the hypothesis) the first thing which he imagines of this kind is evil brought upon himself; therefore, he will at once endeavor to bring the same upon the same. Q. E. D.

Schol.—The effort to bring evil upon him whom we hate, is called anger; but, the effort to return the evil brought upon us, is called vengeance.

Prop. XLI. If any one imagines that he is loved by any one,
and does not believe that he has given him any cause for this (which, by Prop. xvi., and by Prop. xvi., of this Part, may happen), he will love the same in return.

Dem.—This proposition is demonstrated in the same way as the preceding. See also its scholium.

Schol.—Because, if he should believe that he has given just cause of love, he will glory (by Prop. xxx. of this Part, with its Schol.) which, indeed (Prop. xxiv. of this Part), more frequently happens, and of which we have said that the contrary happens when any one imagines himself to be hated by any one (see Schol., preceding Prop.). Furthermore, this reciprocal love, and, consequently (Prop. xxxix. of this Part), the endeavor to benefit him who loves us, and who (by the same Prop. xxxix. of this Part) endeavors to benefit us, is called favor, or gratitude; and, therefore, it appears that men are more ready for vengeance than for returning a benefit.

Coroll.—He who imagines that he is loved by one whom he hates, will be agitated at once by hatred and love. This is demonstrated in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding proposition.

Schol.—Because, if hatred prevails, he will endeavor to bring evil upon him by whom he is loved, which affection is called cruelty—especially if it be believed that he who loves has given no ground of hatred, in the ordinary sense.

Prop. XLII. He who confers a benefit upon any one, moved by love or the hope of glory, will be grieved if he sees the benefit to be ungratefully received.

Dem.—He who loves any thing similar to himself, endeavors, as far as he can, to bring it to pass, that he may be reciprocally loved by it (Prop. xxxiii. of this Part). Whoever, therefore, from love toward any one, bestows a benefit, does this from the desire, of which he is possessed, that he may be reciprocally loved—that is (Prop. xxxiv. of this Part), from the hope of glory, or (by Schol., Prop. xxx., of this Part) of joy; and, therefore (Prop. xii. of this Part), he will endeavor to imagine, as far as he can, this cause of glory—or, he will endeavor to contemplate it as existing in reality. But (by the hypothesis) he imagines
another thing, which excludes the existence of the same cause; therefore (by Prop. xix. of this Part), he will for this reason be grieved. Q. E. D.

**Prop. XLIII.** Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and on the other hand it can be canceled by love.

*Dem.*—If any one imagines that he whom he hates is reciprocally affected with hatred toward him, from this reason (Prop. xl. of this Part) there arises a new hatred, the first (by hypothesis) still remaining. But if on the contrary he shall imagine that the same is affected with love toward himself, in as far as he imagines this, in so far (Prop. xxx. of this Part) he contemplates himself with joy, and in so far (Prop. xxix. of this Part) he will endeavor to please the same—that is (Prop. xl. of this Part), in so far he endeavors not to hate him, and not to affect him with grief, which effort indeed (Prop. xxxvii. of this Part) will be greater or less in proportion to the affection from which it springs; and, therefore, if it should be greater than that which springs from hatred, and with which he endeavors (Prop. xxvi. of this Part) to affect the thing which he hates with grief, it will conquer it, and expel hatred from his mind. Q. E. D.

**Prop. XLIV.** The hatred which is entirely conquered by love, passes over into love; and the love is, therefore, greater than if hatred had not preceded.

*Dem.*—The demonstration proceeds in the same way as that of Prop. xxxviii. of this Part. For, whoever begins to love a thing which he hated, or was accustomed to contemplate with grief, rejoices in the very thing which he loves; and to this joy, which love involves (see its definition in Schol., Prop. xiii., of this Part), that joy also is added, which springs from the fact that the effort to remove the grief which hatred involves (as we have shown in Prop. xxxviii.) greatly assists it with the concomitant idea of him whom he hated, as the cause.

*Schol.*—However this matter may be, still no one will endeavor to hate any thing, or to be affected with grief, in order that he may possess this greater joy, that is, no man from the hope of recovering from harm, will desire harm
to be brought upon himself, nor will he desire to be sick from the hope of getting well. For every one will always endeavor to preserve his own being, and to remove grief, as far as he is able. Because, if the contrary could be conceived that a man is able to desire to hate any one, in order that he may afterwards cherish him with greater love, then he will desire always to hate the same. For the greater the hatred has been, the greater will be the love, and, therefore, he will always desire that hatred may be more and more increased, and for the same reason the man will more and more endeavor to be sick, that he may afterwards possess the greater joy from the health to be restored, and, therefore, he will always endeavor to be sick, which (Prop. vi. of this Part) is absurd.

Prop. XLV. *If any one imagines that one similar to himself is affected with hatred toward a thing similar to himself which he loves, he will hate him.*

*Dem.—* For the beloved thing will reciprocally hate him, who hates itself (Prop. xii. of this Part); therefore, the lover who imagines any one to hate the beloved thing, for this reason imagines the beloved thing to be affected with hatred, that is (Schol., Prop. xv., of this Part), with grief, and consequently (Prop. xxii. of this Part) is grieved, and that with the concomitant idea of him, who hates the beloved thing, as the cause, that is (Schol., Prop. xiii., of this Part), will hate him. *Q. E. D.*

Prop. XLVI. *If any one has been affected by joy or grief, by some one of any class or nation different from his own, with the concomitant idea of him, under the general name of the class or nation as the cause, he will love or hate not him only, but all of the same class or nation.*

*Dem.—* The demonstration of this is evident from Prop. xvi. of this Part.

Prop. XLVII. *The joy, which arises from the fact that we imagine the thing, which we hate, to be destroyed, or to be affected by other evil, does not arise without some grief of mind.*

*Dem.—* This is evident from Prop. xxvii. of this Part. For in as far as we imagine a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with grief, in so far we are grieved.
**Schol.**—This proposition can also be demonstrated from the Corollary of Prop. xvii., Part II. For as often as we remember the thing, although it does not exist in reality, we contemplate the same only as present, and the body is affected in the same manner; wherefore, in as far as memory is active, in so far the man is determined to contemplate the same with grief, which determination, the image of the thing still remaining, is hindered, indeed, by the memory of those things which exclude the existence of this; but it is not canceled, and, therefore, the man rejoices only in so far as this determination is hindered; and hence it comes to pass that this joy, which arises from the evil of the thing, which we hate, is repeated as often as we remember the same thing. For, as we said, when the image of this thing is excited, because this involves the existence of the thing itself, it determines the man to the contemplation of the thing with the same grief with which he was wont to contemplate the same when it existed. But because he associated with the image of the thing itself, other things which exclude the existence of the same, this determination to grief is at once restrained, and the man once more rejoices, and this so often as the repetition takes place. And this is the reason why men rejoice as often as they remember any evil now past, and why they delight to narrate the perils from which they have been delivered. For when they imagine any peril, they contemplate the same as still future, and are determined to fear it, which determination is once more restrained by the idea of freedom, which they associated with the idea of this peril when they were freed from it, and which rendered them once more secure, and therefore they again rejoice.

**Prop. XLVIII.** _Love and hatred, e. g. towards Peter is destroyed, if the grief which the latter and the joy which the former involves, is associated with the idea of another cause; and to this extent each is diminished, in so far as we imagine Peter to have been not the sole cause of either._

**Dem.**—It is evident from the sole definition of love and hatred, which see in the Schol., Prop. xiii., of this Part.
For on this account alone joy is called love, and grief hatred toward Peter, because, namely, Peter is considered to be the sole cause of this or that effect. This, therefore, being entirely, or in part taken away, the affection toward Peter also is entirely or in part canceled. Q. E. D.

Prop. XLIX. Love and hatred toward a thing which we imagine to be free, must each from an equal reason be greater than toward a necessary one.

Dem.—A thing which we imagine to be free, must (by Def. vii., Part I.) be perceived by itself and without others. If, therefore, we imagine the same to be the cause of joy or grief, for this reason (Schol., Prop. xiii., of this Part) we shall love or hate the same, and (by Prop., preceding) with the highest love or hatred which can spring from the given affection. But if we imagine the thing, which is the cause of the same affection, as necessary, then (by same Def. vii., Part I.) we shall imagine not itself alone, but it with others, to be the cause of this affection, and therefore (by Prop. preceding) love and hatred toward it will be less. Q. E. D.

Schol.—Hence it follows, that men, because they suppose themselves to be free, regard themselves with greater love and hatred than other things; in addition to which there is the imitation of the affections, concerning which see Props. xxvii., xxxiv., xl., and xliii., of this Part.

Prov. I. Any thing whatever can become accidentally the cause of hope or fear.

Dem.—This proposition is demonstrated in the same way as Prop. xv. of this Part, which see, together with the Schol. of Prop. xviii. of this Part.

Schol.—The things which are accidentally the causes of hope, or fear, are called good or bad omens. As far as these same omens are the cause of hope or fear, so far (Def. of hope and fear, which see in Schol. ii., Prop. xviii., of this Part) are they the cause of joy or grief; and, consequently (Coroll., Prop. xv., of this Part), so far we love or hate the same, and (Prop. xxviii. of this Part) endeavor to employ them as means to those things which we hope for, and to remove as obstacles or causes of fear. Moreover, from Prop. xxv. of this Part, it follows, that we by nature
are so constituted that we believe easily the things which we hope for, but with difficulty those which we fear, and that, concerning these, we think more or less justly. But from these things have arisen the superstitions, with which men are everywhere agitated. But I do not think it worth while to show here the fluctuations which spring from hope and fear; since it follows, from the sole definition of these affections, that hope is not given without fear, nor fear without hope (as we shall explain more at large in its proper place)—and, moreover, since in as far as we hope or fear any thing, in so far we love or hate the same. Therefore, whatever we have spoken concerning love and hatred, every one will be able easily to apply to hope and fear.

Prop. II. Different men can be affected differently by one and the same object, and one and the same man can be differently affected by one and the same object at different times.

Dem.—The human body (Post. iii., Part II.) is affected by external bodies in very many modes. Two men, therefore, at the same time can be differently affected; and, therefore (Ax. i., which is after Lem. iii., which see after Prop. xiii., Part II.), can be differently affected by one and the same object. Again (by the same Post.), the human body can be affected now in this, and now in another mode; and, consequently (by the same Ax.), be affected by one and the same object differently at different times. Q. E. D.

Schol.—We see, therefore, that it can happen, that what one loves another hates; and what the latter fears, the other does not fear; and that one and the same man now loves what he formerly hated, and now braves what he formerly feared, etc. Again, because every one judges from his own affection what is good, what evil, what better, what worse (Schol., Prop. xxxix., of this Part), it follows, that men are able to vary both in judgment and affection. (That this is possible, notwithstanding the human soul is a part of the divine intellect, we have show in Schol., Prop. xvii., Part II.). And hence it comes to pass, when we compare men with one another, that they are distinguished from ourselves solely by the difference of affections, and that we
call some intrepid, others timid, and others by a different designation. *E. g.*, I shall call him intrepid, who contemns an evil which I am accustomed to fear; and if, moreover, I attend to this, that his desire of bringing evil upon him whom he hates, and of benefiting him whom he loves, is not restrained by the fear of evil by which I am accustomed to be restrained, I shall call him audacious. Again, he will seem to be timid, who fears an evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if, moreover, I attend to this, that his desire is restrained by the fear of an evil which is unable to restrain me, I shall say that he is pusillanimous—and so every one will judge. Finally, from this nature of man, and inconstancy of judgment, and as man often judges concerning things solely by the affection, and as the things which he believes contribute to joy or grief, and the occurrence of which, therefore (Prop. xxviii. of this Part) he strives to promote or to prevent, are often merely imaginary, to pass in silence other things which (in Part II.) we have proved concerning the uncertainty of things, we easily conceive that a man may be in a condition both to be grieved and to rejoice—or, to be affected as with grief, so with joy, with the concomitant idea of himself as the cause; and, therefore, we easily understand what repentance is, and what self-satisfaction is. For repentance is grief, with the concomitant idea of self; and self-satisfaction is joy, with the concomitant idea of self as the cause; and these affections are exceedingly vehement, because men believe themselves to be free (see Prop. xlix., of this Part).

Prop. LII. An object which we have formerly seen together with others, or which we imagine has nothing except what is common to very many, we shall not contemplate as long as that which we imagine has something peculiar.

Dem.—As soon as we imagine an object which we have seen with others, we at once remember the others also (Prop. xviii., Part II., of which see also the Schol.); and thus, from the contemplation of the one, we immediately fall into the contemplation of another. And the same is the relation of the object, which we imagine has nothing ex-
cept what is common to many. For, for this reason, we suppose that we are contemplating nothing in it which we have not before seen with the others. But, when we suppose that we are imagining in any object something peculiar which we have never before seen, we say nothing else than that the mind, whilst that object is contemplated, has in itself nothing else into the contemplation of which it can fall from the contemplation of that, and, therefore, has been determined to the contemplation of that alone. Therefore, an object, etc. Q. E. D.

Schol.—This affection of the mind, or the imagination of a single thing, as far as it subsists in the mind alone, is called wonder—which, if moved by an object which we fear, is called consternation; because, the wonder at an evil thing so holds a man suspended in the sole contemplation of it that he is not able to think concerning other things by which he might be able to avoid that evil. But, if that which we wonder at is the prudence, industry, or any thing of this kind, of some man, because we on this account are contemplating a man far excelling us, then wonder is called veneration; and, again, horror—if we are wondering at a man’s anger, envy, etc. Again, if we are wondering at the prudence, industry, etc., of a man whom we love—love, on this account, will be greater (Prop. xii. of this Part); and this love, joined to wonder, or veneration, we call devotion. And after this manner we are able to conceive hatred, hope, security, and other affections joined to wonder; and, therefore, are able to deduce more affections than we have words in common use to mark. Whence it is apparent that the names of the affections have been rather taken from the common use of them, than from an accurate knowledge of the same.

To wonder stands opposed contempt, the cause of which, however, is often this: because, namely, from the fact that we see some one admire, love, fear, etc., any thing—or, from the fact that any thing at first sight appears similar to things which we admire, love, fear, etc. (by Prop. xv., with its Coroll., and Prop. xxvii. of this Part)—we are de-
terminated to admire, love, fear, etc., the same thing. But if, from the presence of the thing itself, or from more accurate contemplation, we are compelled to deny concerning it all that which can be a cause of admiration, love, fear, etc., then the mind, from the very presence of the thing itself, remains determined rather to think those things which are not in the object, than those which are in it; when still, on the contrary, from the presence of the object, it is accustomed to think that especially which is in the object. Furthermore, as devotion arises from admiration of a thing which we love, so does derision from the contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and disdain from a contempt of folly, as veneration from an admiration of prudence. Finally, we are able to conceive love, hope, glory, and other affections joined to contempt, and thence to deduce other affections besides, which are not commonly distinguished by any particular word.

Prop. LIII. When the mind contemplates itself and its power of action, it rejoices; and the more, the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of action.

Dem.—Man knows himself only by the affections of his body, and the ideas of them (Props. xix. and xxiii., Part II.). When, therefore, it comes to pass that the mind is able to contemplate itself, it is, for this reason, supposed to pass to a greater perfection—that is (Schol., Prop. xi. of this Part), to be affected with joy, and with the greater, the more distinctly it is able to imagine itself and its own power of action. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—This joy is more and more promoted, the more a man imagines himself to be praised by others. For, the more he imagines himself to be praised by others, with the greater joy he imagines others to be affected by himself, and this with the concomitant idea of himself (Schol., Prop. xxix. of this Part); and, therefore (Prop., xxvii. of this Part), he is affected with greater joy, with the concomitant idea of himself. Q. E. D.

Prop. LIV. The mind endeavors to imagine only those things which posit its power of action.

Dem.—The mind’s effort, or power, is itself—the essence
of the mind itself (by Prop. vii. of this Part). But, the essence of the mind (as is self-evident) affirms that only which the mind is and can do, but not that which it is not and can not do; therefore, it endeavors to imagine only that which affirms or posits its power of action. Q. E. D.

Prop. LV. When the mind imagines its own impotence, it is thereby grieved.

Dem.—The essence of the mind affirms that only which the mind is and can do, or it is of the nature of the mind to imagine only those things which posit its power of action (by preceding Prop.). When, therefore, we say that the mind, whilst it is contemplating itself, imagines its own impotence, we say nothing else than that, whilst the mind endeavors to imagine something which posits its power of action, this effort is hindered, or (by Schol., Prop. xi., of this Part) that it is grieved. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—This grief is more and more enhanced, if the mind imagines itself to be vituperated by others; which is demonstrated in the same way as Coroll., Prop. liii., of this Part.

Schol.—This grief, with the concomitant idea of our imbecility, is called humility; but the joy which arises from the contemplation of ourselves, is called self-love, or self-satisfaction. And since this is so often repeated as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power of action, it hence comes to pass, that every one takes pleasure in narrating his own deeds, and in showing his own powers of body and of mind; and that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one another. From which things it follows, that men are by nature envious (see Schol., Prop. xxiv., and Schol., Prop. xxxii., of this Part); or, that they rejoice on account of the imbecility of their equals, and, on the other hand, are grieved by the vigor of the same. For, as often as any one imagines his own actions, so often he is affected with joy (by Prop. liii. of this Part); and with the greater, the more of perfection the actions express and the more distinctly he imagines the same; that is (by what was said in Schol. i., Prop. xl., Part II.), the more he is able to distinguish the same from others, and to contemplate them as single things. Wherefore, every one will then most rejoice
from the contemplation of himself, when he contemplates something in himself, which he denies concerning others. But if that which he affirms concerning himself relates to the universal idea of man or of animal, he will not so much rejoice; and, on the contrary, he will be grieved, if he imagines his own, compared with actions of others, to be more weak, which grief indeed (Prop. xxviii. of this Part) he will strive to remove, and that by falsely interpreting the actions of his equals, or by adorning as much as possible his own. It appears, therefore, that men are by nature inclined to hatred and envy, to which must be added education itself. For parents, by the sole stimulus of honor and envy, are accustomed to excite their children to virtue. But the objection may perhaps remain, that we not infrequently admire the virtues of men, and venerate them. That I may remove this, therefore, I add the following corollary.

Coroll.—No one envies virtue to any one, except to an equal.

Dem.—Envy is hatred itself (Schol., Prop. xxiv. of this Part), or (by Schol. of Prop. xiii. of this Part) grief—that is (Schol., Prop. xi., of this Part), an affection by which the power of action, or endeavor, is restrained. But man (Schol., Prop. ix., of this Part) neither endeavors nor desires to do any thing save what is able to follow from his given nature; therefore, man desires not a power of action for himself, or (what is the same thing) desires to predicate no virtue of himself which is peculiar to another nature and foreign to his own. And, therefore, his desire can not be restrained—that is (Schol., Prop. xi., of this Part), he can not be grieved—by the fact that he contemplates some virtue in any one dissimilar to himself, and, consequently, he will not be able to envy him. But he will his equal, who is supposed to be of the same nature with himself. Q. E. D.

Schol.—When, therefore, we have said, in scholium of Prop. liii. of this Part, that we venerate a man from the fact that we admire his prudence, fortitude, etc., this takes place (as is evident from the proposition itself) because we imagine these virtues appertain to him singly, and not as
common to our nature; and, therefore, we shall no more envy them than we do height to trees, or strength to lions, etc.

Prop. LVI. There are as many species of joy, grief, and desire—and, consequently, of every affection composed of them—as, also, of mental fluctuation derived from them, namely, love, hatred, hope, fear, etc.—as there are species of objects by which we are affected.

Dem.—Joy and grief—and, consequently, affections composed of them, or derived from them—are passions (Schol., Prop i., of this Part); but (by Prop. i. of this Part) we necessarily suffer, as far as we have inadequate ideas: and, in so far as we have the same (Prop. iii. of this Part), we suffer only to that extent—that is (Schol., Prop. xl., Part II.), to that extent only do we necessarily suffer, in so far as we imagine, or (Prop. xvii., Part II., with its Schol.) in so far as we are moved by an affection which involves the nature of our body, and the nature of an external body. The nature, therefore, of each passion must necessarily be so explained, that the nature of the object by which we are affected may be expressed. For the joy which arises from an object—e.g., A involves the nature of the object itself, and the joy which arises from the object B the nature of this object B; and, therefore, these two affections of joy are by nature different, because they arise from causes of a different nature. So, also, the affection of grief, which arises from one object, is different in nature from the grief which springs from another cause—which also is to be understood concerning love, hatred, hope, fear, fluctuation of mind, etc.; and, therefore, there are necessarily as many species of joy, grief, love, hatred, etc., as there are species of objects by which we are affected. But desire is the very essence or nature of every thing, in so far as it conceived as determined by any given constitution to do some thing (Schol., Prop. ix., of this Part); therefore, as every one is affected by external causes with this or that species of joy, grief, love, hatred, etc.—that is, as its nature is constituted in this or that manner, so the desire of it must necessarily be one or another, and the nature of one desire must differ so much from the nature of
another, as the affections from which each arises differ from each other. There are, therefore, so many species of desire, as there are species of joy, grief, love, hatred, etc., and, consequently (as now shown), as there are species of objects by which we are affected. Q. E. D.

Schol.—Among the species of affections, which (by Prop. preceding) must be very numerous, the conspicuous ones are gluttony, ebriety, lust, avarice, and ambition, which are only notions of love or desire—which explain the nature of each affection by the objects to which they refer. For, by gluttony, ebriety, lust, avarice, and ambition, we understand nothing else than the immoderate love or desire of feasting, drinking, copulation, riches, and glory. Moreover, these affections have no opposites, in so far as we distinguish them from one another by the objects alone to which they are referred. For temperance, which we are accustomed to oppose to luxury, and sobriety to ebriety, and, finally, chastity to lust, are not affections, or passions, but they indicate the power of mind which moderates these affections. But I can not here explain the remaining species of affections (because they are as many as the species of objects); nor, if I could, is it necessary. For that which we propose, to wit., to determine the powers of the affections, and the power of the mind over the same, it is sufficient for us to have the general definition of each affection. It is sufficient, I say, for us to understand the common properties of the affections, and of the mind, that we may be able to determine of what sort, and how great, is the power of the mind in moderating and restraining the affections. Therefore, however great may be the difference between this and that affection of love, hatred, or desire—e. g., between love of children and love of wife—still, to know these differences, it is not necessary further to examine the nature and origin of the affections.

Prop. LVII. Any affection whatever of any individual differs from the affection of another, only as the essence of one differs from the essence of another.

Dem.—This proposition is evident from Aœ. i., which see, after Lem. iii., Schol., Prop. xiii., Part II. But, still, we
shall demonstrate it from the definitions of the three primitive affections. All affections refer to desire, joy, or grief, as the definitions which we have given of them show. But desire is itself the nature or essence of each (see its definition, Schol., Prop. ix., of this Part); therefore, the desire of each individual differs from the desire of another, only as the nature or essence of one differs from the essence of another. Again, joy and grief are passions, by which each one's power, or effort to persevere in his own being, is increased or diminished, aided or hindered (Prop. xi. of this Part, and its Schol.). But, by the effort to persevere in his own being, as far as it relates to mind and body at once, we understand appetite and desire (Schol., Prop. ix., of this Part); therefore, joy or grief is desire itself, or appetite, as far as it is increased or diminished, aided or hindered, by external causes—that is (by the same Schol.), the nature itself of each one; and, therefore, the joy or grief of each one differs from the joy or grief of another, only as the nature or essence of each differs from the essence of another: and, consequently, any affection whatever, of any individual, differs from the affection of another, only, etc.

Q. E. D.

Schol.—Hence, it follows that the affections of animals, which are called irrational (for we can not doubt that brutes have sensations after we have known the origin of mind), differ from the affections of men, only as their nature differs from human nature. The horse, indeed, and the man are moved by the sexual desire; but the former by an equine, and the latter by a human desire. So, also, the desires and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds, must be different from each other. Although, therefore, each lives content with its own nature, in which it consists, and rejoices in it, yet that life, with which each one is contented, and the joy, is nothing else than the idea, or soul, of the same individual; and, therefore, the joy of one differs from the joy of another so much by nature, as the essence of one differs from the essence of another. Finally, from the preceding proposition, it follows, that there is also no little difference between the joy, by which, e.g., a drunkard is
governed, and that which a philosopher possesses—a thing which I desire here, in passing, to note. Thus much concerning the affections which relate to man, in so far as he suffers. It remains to add a few things concerning those which relate to him, in so far as he acts.

Prop. LVIII. Besides joy and desire, which are passions, there are other affections of joy and desire, which relate to us in so far as we act.

Dem.—When the mind conceives itself, and its power of action, it rejoices (Prop. liii. of this Part). But the mind necessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or adequate idea (Prop. xliii., Part II.). But, the mind conceives certain adequate ideas (Scol. ii., Prop. xi., Part II.). Therefore, it also rejoices, in so far as it conceives adequate ideas—that is (Prop. i. of this Part), in so far as it acts. Again, the mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavors to persevere in its own being (Prop. ix. of this Part). But, by endeavor, we understand desire (by the same Schol.); therefore, desire refers to us, also, in so far as we understand, or (Prop. i. of this Part) in so far as we act. Q. E. D.

Prop. LIX. Among all affections, which refer to the mind, in so far as it acts, there are none, except those which refer to joy, or desire.

Dem.—All affections relate to desire, joy, or grief, as their definitions, which we have given, show. But by grief we understand, that the mind’s power of thinking is diminished or hindered (Prop. xi. of this Part, and its Schol.); and therefore the mind, in so far as it is grieved, to that extent is diminished or hindered, in its power of understanding, that is, of acting (Prop. i. of this Part); and therefore no affections of grief can be referred to the mind, in so far as it acts; but only affections of joy and desire, which (by preceding Prop.) are also, to that extent, referred to the mind. Q. E. D.

Schol.—All actions, which follow from affections, which relate to the mind in so far as it understands, I refer to bravery, which I distinguish into animosity and generosity. For by animosity I understand the desire by which every
one endeavors to preserve his own being, by the sole prompting of reason. By *generosity* I understand the desire by which every one, by the sole prompting of reason, endeavors to aid other men, and to unite them to himself in friendship. Therefore those actions, which aim only at the benefit of the agent, I refer to animosity, and those which aim also at the benefit of another, I refer to generosity. Temperance, therefore, sobriety, and presence of mind in dangers, etc., are a species of animosity; but modesty, clemency, etc., are a species of generosity. And by these things, I consider myself to have explained, and to have exhibited by their own primitive causes, the principal affections and fluctuations of mind, which spring from the composition of the three primitive affections, to wit: desire, joy, and grief. From which things it is apparent, that we are agitated by external causes in many ways, and that, just like the waves of the sea, agitated by contrary winds, we fluctuate, ignorant of the result and of our fate. But I have said, that I have shown the principal only, not all the conflicts of mind, which can exist. For by proceeding in the same way as above, we are easily able to show, that love is associated with penitence, disdain, or the feeling of shame, etc. Indeed, from what has already been said, it is clearly evident to every one, that the affections can be compounded in so many ways, one with another, and that thence so many variations arise, that they can be bounded by no number. But it is sufficient for my purpose, to have enumerated only the principal; for the rest, which I have omitted, are rather curious than useful. But concerning love, this remains to be noted, namely, that it very often occurs, whilst we are enjoying the thing which we desired, that the body, from this fruition, acquires a new constitution, by which it is otherwise determined, and other images are excited in it, and at the same time the mind begins to imagine other things, and to desire other things. *E.g.*, when we imagine something, which is accustomed to please us by its taste, we desire to enjoy the same, to wit., to eat it. But whilst we are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled, and the body is otherwise constituted. If, therefore,
the body, being now otherwise disposed, the image of the same food, because it is itself now present, is intensified, and consequently the effort also, or the desire of eating the same, this new constitution will oppose this desire or effort, and consequently the presence of the food, which we desired, will be odious, and this is what we call disgust, or tedium. But I have passed by the external states of the body, which are observed in the affections as trembling, pallor, sighing, laughter, etc., because they relate to the body alone, without any relation to the mind. Finally, concerning the definitions of the affections, certain things are to be noted, which, therefore, I shall repeat here in order; and what is to be observed in each one, I shall introduce in the same.

DEFINITIONS OF THE AFFECTIONS.

I. Desire is the very essence of man, so far as it is conceived as determined, by any given affection of his, to doing something.

Exp.—We have said above, in Schol., Prop. ix., of this Part, that desire is appetite, with a consciousness of the same; but that appetite is the very essence of man, in so far as he is determined to do those things which subserve his preservation. But in the same Scholium, I have also remarked, that I, in reality, recognize no difference between human appetite and desire. For whether man is conscious of his appetite or not, still the appetite remains one and the same; and therefore, that I may not seem guilty of tautology, I have been unwilling to explain desire by appetite; but I have endeavored so to define the same, that I may comprehend together all the efforts of human nature, which we signify by the name of appetite, will, desire, or impetus. For I could have said, that desire is the very essence of man, in so far as he is conceived as determined to do something; but from this definition (by Prop. xxiii., Part ii.) it would not follow, that the mind can be conscious of its desire or appetite. Therefore, that I may include the cause of this consciousness, it has been necessary (by the same Prop.) to add: as far as it is determined by any given affection of his, etc. For by any affec-
tion of the human essence, we understand the constitution of the same essence, whether that it is innate, or that it is conceived by the sole attribute of thought, or by the sole attribute of extension, or finally that it refers at once to each. Here, therefore, I understand by the name of desire, any efforts, impetus, appetites, and volitions, which, differing according to the differing constitution of the same man, are therefore not infrequently opposed to each other, so that the man is drawn in different ways, and knows not whither he may turn.

II. Joy is the transition of man from a less to a greater perfection.

III. Grief is the transition of man from a greater to a less perfection.

Exp.—I say transition. For joy is not itself perfection. For if man were born with perfection, to which he passes, he would be possessor of the same, without the affection of joy; which is more clearly apparent from the affection of grief, which is contrary to this. For that grief consists in the transition to a less perfection, but not in a less perfection itself, no one is able to deny, since man is unable to be grieved, in so far as he is a partaker in any perfection. Nor are we able to say that grief consists in the privation of a greater perfection, for privation is nothing; but the affection of grief is an act, which, therefore, can be nothing else but the act of passing to a less perfection—that is, an act by which a man’s power of action is diminished or hindered (Schol., Prop. xi., of this Part). But the definitions of hilarity, titillation, melancholy, and pain, I omit, because they relate especially to the body, and are only species of joy or grief.

IV. Admiration is the imagination of some thing in which the mind remains for this reason fixed, because this particular imagination has no connection with others. (See Prop. lii., with its Schol.)

Exp.—In the Schol. of Prop. xviii., Part II., we have shown what is the cause why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, at once falls into the thought of another thing, to wit, because the images of these things
are mutually associated, and so arranged, that one follows the
other, which indeed can not be conceived when the image
of the thing is new; but the mind will be detained in the con-
templation of the same thing until, by other causes, it is deter-
mind to think of others. Therefore, the image of the new
thing, considered in itself, is of the same nature as the
rest, and, for this cause, I do not reckon admiration among
the affections; nor do I see a reason why I should do this,
since the distraction of mind arises from no positive cause
which draws away the mind from other things, but only
from this, that a cause is wanting why the mind, from the
contemplation of one thing, is determined to think of oth-
ers. Therefore, I recognize (as remarked in Schol., Prop.
xi., of this Part) only three primitive, or primary affec-
tions, namely, joy, grief, and desire; and I have spoken of ad-
miration, for no other reason than because it is customary
that certain affections, which are derived from the three
primitive ones, should be indicated by different names
when they refer to objects which we admire—which rea-
sion, indeed, moves me to adjoin, also, a definition of con-
tempt.

V. Contempt is the imagination of something which
touches the mind so little, that the mind itself, from the
presence of the thing, is rather moved to imagine those
things which are not in the thing itself, than those which
are in it (Schol., Prop. lii., of this Part).

The definitions of veneration and disdain I here omit,
because, so far as I know, no affections of the mind derive
their names from these.

VI. Love is joy, with the concomitant idea of an exter-
nal cause.

Exp.—This definition explains, with sufficient clearness,
the essence of love; but, that of the authors, who define
“love to be the will of the lover to join himself to the
thing beloved,” expresses not the essence of love, but its
property; and, because the essence of love has not been
sufficiently seen by the authors, neither have they been
able to have a clear conception of its property—and hence
it comes to pass, that all have judged their definition to be
very obscure. But, it is to be noted, when I say, that property in a lover is to join himself in will to the beloved thing, I do not understand, by will, consent or deliberation of mind, or a free decree (for this we have demonstrated, Prop. xlviii., Part II., to be fictitious); neither, also, the desire of joining himself to the beloved thing when it is absent, nor of persevering in its presence when it is present (for love can be conceived without this or that desire); but, by will, I understand acquiescence, which is in the lover on account of the presence of the beloved thing, from which the joy of the lover is strengthened or, at least, nourished.

VII. Hatred is grief, with the concomitant idea of the external cause.

Exp.—The things to be noted here are easily perceived from what was said in the explication of the preceding definition. (See also, Schol., Prop. xiii., of this Part.)

VIII. Propensity is joy, with the concomitant idea of something which is accidentally a cause of joy.

IX. Aversion is grief, with the concomitant idea of something which is accidentally a cause of grief. (See Schol., Prop. xv., of this Part.)

X. Devotion is love toward him whom we admire.

Exp.—That admiration which arises from the novelty of the thing, we have shown from Prop. li. of this Part. If, therefore, it happens that we often imagine that which we admire, we shall cease to admire the same; and we, therefore, see that the affection of devotion easily degenerates into simple love.

XI. Derision is joy arising from this, that we imagine something which we contemn in a thing which we hate, to exist in it.

Exp.—As far as we contemn a thing which we hate, so far we deny existence concerning it (Schol., Prop. lii., of this Part); and to that extent (Prop. xx. of this Part) we rejoice. But, since we suppose that a man, nevertheless, hates that which he derides, it follows, that this joy is not solid (Schol., Prop. xlvii., of this Part).

XII. Hope is inconstant joy, arising from the idea of a
thing future or past, concerning the realization of which we somewhat doubt.

XIII. **Fear** is inconstant grief, arising from the idea of a thing future or past, concerning the realization of which we are somewhat in doubt. (See Schol. ii., Prop. xviii., of this Part.)

**Exp.**—From these definitions it follows, that hope is not given without fear, nor fear without hope. For, whoever depends upon hope, and doubts concerning the event of the thing, he is supposed to imagine something which excludes the existence of the future thing, and to that extent is grieved (Prop. xix. of this Part), and, consequently, that, whilst he is depending upon hope, he fears whether the thing will happen. But, on the other hand, he who is in fear—that is, doubts concerning the event of the thing which he hates—also imagines something which excludes the existence of the same thing; and, therefore (Prop. xx. of this Part) rejoices, and, consequently, to that extent, he has hope that it may not happen.

XIV. **Security** is joy, arising from the idea of a thing future or past, concerning which the cause of doubting is taken away.

XV. **Despair** is grief, arising from the idea of a thing future or past, concerning which the cause of doubting is taken away.

**Exp.**—Therefore, security arises from hope, and despair from fear, when the cause of doubting concerning the event of the thing is taken away—which happens, because the man imagines the future or past thing to be present, and contemplates it as present; or, because he imagines other things, which exclude their existence, which fill him with doubt. For, although concerning the event of individual things we are never able to be certain (Coroll., Prop. xxxi., Part II.), it may nevertheless happen, that we do not doubt concerning their event. For, we have shown it to be one thing (Schol., Prop. xl ix., Part II.) not to doubt concerning a thing, and another to have a certainty of the thing; and, therefore, it is able to happen that, from the image of a past thing, or of a future, we may be affected
with the same affection of joy or grief, as from the image of a present thing, as we have demonstrated in Prop. xviii. of this Part, which see, with its Schol. ii.

XVI. Rejoicing is joy, with the concomitant idea of a past thing, which has happened beyond hope.

XVII. The sting of conscience is grief, with the concomitant idea of a past thing, which has happened beyond hope.

XVIII. Commiseration is grief, with the concomitant idea of an evil, which has happened to another, whom we imagine to be similar to ourselves. Schol., Prop. xxii., and Schol., Prop. xxvii., of this Part.

Exp.—Between commiseration and pity there seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that commiseration respects a single affection and pity, its habit.

XIX. Favor is love towards any one, who has benefited another.

XX. Indignation is hatred towards any one, who has injured another.

Exp.—I know that these names, by common use, signify another thing. But my purpose is not to explain the signification of words; but to explain the nature of things, and to indicate them by words, whose signification, which they have from use, is not altogether at variance with the signification, in which I wish to employ them. To note this once is sufficient. But of these affections see the cause in Coroll. i., Prop. xxvii., and the Scholium of Prop. xxiii., of this Part.

XXI. Overestimation is to think of any one, from love, more than is just.

XXII. Depreciation is to think of any one from hatred, less than is just.

Exp.—Therefore overestimation is the effect or property of love, and depreciation that of hatred, and, therefore, overestimation can be defined to be, love in so far as it so affects a man, that he thinks concerning a beloved thing more than is just, and on the contrary, depreciation, to be hatred in so far as it so affects a man, that he thinks concerning a
thing which he hates less than is just. See Schol., Prop. xxvi., of this Part.

XXIII. Envy is hatred, in so far as it so affects a man that he is grieved by the happiness of another, and on the contrary that he rejoices in the evil of another.

Exp.—Pity is commonly opposed to envy, which, therefore, though against the common signification of the word, may be thus defined:

XXIV. Pity is love, in so far as it so affects a man that he rejoices in another's good, and on the contrary that he is grieved by another's evil.

Exp. But concerning envy, see Schol., Prop. xxiv., and Schol., Prop. xxxii., of this Part. But these are affections of joy and grief, which the idea of an external thing accompanies, as an absolute or accidental cause. Hence, I pass to others, which the idea of an internal thing accompanies as cause.

XXV. Self-satisfaction is joy, arising from this, that a man contemplates himself, and his own power of action.

XXVI. Humility is grief, arising from this, that a man contemplates his own impotence, or imbecility.

Exp.—Self-satisfaction is opposed to humility, in so far as we understand by the same, joy, which arises from this, that we are contemplating our power of action, but in so far as we understand by it also joy, with the concomitant idea of something done, which we believe ourselves to have done from a free decree of the mind, then it is opposed to repentance, which is thus defined by us:

XXVII. Repentance is grief, with the concomitant idea of something done, which we believe ourselves to have done from a free decree of the mind.

Exp.—The causes of these affections we have shown in Schol., Prop. li., of this Part, and Props. liii., liv., lv., of this Part, and its Schol. But concerning a free decree of the mind, see Schol., Prop. xxxv., Part II. But here, moreover, it comes to be noted, that it is not wonderful that grief follows all acts whatever, which from custom are called wrong, and joy, those which are called right. For that this depends especially upon education we easily un-
understand, from what has been said above. Parents, namely, by blaming the former, and by often reproving their children on account of the same; on the other hand, by persuading to the latter and praising them, bring it about, that emotions of grief should be associated with the former, and of joy with the latter. This also experience itself confirms. For custom and religion is not the same in all, but on the contrary, what among some is sacred, among others is profane, and what among some is honorable, among others is base. As, therefore, any one has been educated so he will repent of any deed, or will glory in the same.

XXVIII. Pride is to think of one’s self, from self-love, more than is just.

Exp.—Pride, therefore, differs from overestimation, because the latter relates to an external object, but pride to the man himself, thinking concerning himself more than is just. But as overestimation is the effect of property of love, so is Pride of self-love, which, therefore, can also be defined, that it is the love of self, or self-satisfaction in so far as it so affects a man, that he thinks concerning himself more than is just (see Schol., Prop. xxvi., of this Part). To this affection there is no contrary. For no man, from hatred of himself, thinks concerning himself, less than is just; indeed, no man thinks concerning himself less than is just, in so far as he imagines that he can not do this or that. For, whatever a man imagines that he can not do, this he necessarily imagines, and by this imagination he is so disposed that he can not in reality do that which he imagines he can not. For as long as he imagines that he can not do this or that, so long he is not determined to do it, and, consequently, so long it is impossible to him that he should do it. However, if we attend to the things which depend upon opinion alone, we shall be able to conceive it possible to happen, that a man may think concerning himself less than is just, for it may happen that any one, whilst he is sadly contemplating his imbecility, imagines that he is condemned by all, and that, whilst others think of nothing less than to contemn him. Moreover, it is possible that a man
thinks concerning himself less than is just, if he shall deny concerning himself at the present time, something of which, in relation to the future, he is uncertain, as if, e. g., he should make the denial: that he is able to conceive nothing certain, and that he is able to desire, or to do nothing but wicked and base things. Again, we can say, that any one thinks concerning himself less than is just, when we see that he, from the too great fear of disgrace, dares not do those things which others, his equals, dare. This affection, therefore, we are able to oppose to pride, which I shall call self distrust; for, as pride arises from self-satisfaction, so from humility arises self-distrust, which, therefore, is thus defined by us:

XXIX. Self-distrust is to think concerning one's self, from grief, less than is just.

Exp.—Still, we are often accustomed to oppose humility to pride; but we are then attending rather to the effect, than to the nature of each. For, we are accustomed to call him a proud man who boasts too much (see Schol., Prop. xxx., of this Part), who narrates only his own virtues, and only others' vices, who wishes to be preferred to all, and, finally, who walks with the dignity and grace with which they are accustomed to walk who far surpass him in station. On the contrary, we call him humble, who blushes too often, who confesses his own faults, and narrates the virtues of others, who yields to all, and who, finally, walks with a bowed head, and neglects to adorn himself. But these affections, namely, humility and self-distrust, are very rare. For human nature, in itself considered, strives against these as far as it can (Prop. xv. and liv. of this Part); and, therefore, those who are believed to be most self-distrustful and humble, are often most ambitious and envious.

XXX. Glorifying is joy, with the concomitant idea of some action of our own which we imagine that others praise.

XXXI. Shame, or mortification, is grief, with the concomitant idea of some action which we imagine others blame.
Exp.—Concerning these things, see Schol., Prop. xxx., of this Part. But here is to be noted the difference between disgrace and shame. For disgrace is grief, which follows a fact of which we are ashamed. Shame is the fear, or shrinking from disgrace, by which a man is restrained from committing any thing base. Impudence is commonly opposed to shame, which in reality is not an affection, as I shall show in its place; but the names of the affections, as said before, respect rather their use than their nature. But I have now done with these affections of joy and grief, which I had proposed to explain. I proceed, therefore, to those which I refer to desire.

XXXII. Regret is the desire or appetite of possessing something which is cherished by the memory of the thing itself, and at the same time is restrained by the memory of other things which exclude the existence of the very thing desired.

Exp.—When we recollect any thing, as we have already frequently said, we are by this disposed to contemplate the same thing with the same affection, as if the thing were present; but this disposition, or endeavor, when we are awake, is often restrained by the images of things which exclude the existence of that which we remember. When, therefore, we remember a thing which affects us with any kind of joy, by this very thing we endeavor to contemplate the same, with the same affection of joy, as if present, which effort, indeed, is immediately restrained by the memory of things which exclude its existence. Wherefore regret in reality is grief, which is opposed to that joy, which arises from the absence of a thing which we hate; concerning which see Schol., Prop. xlvi., of this Part. But, because the name, regret, seems to relate to desire, therefore I refer this affection to the affection of desire.

XXXIII. Emulation is the desire of something which is produced in us by the fact, that we imagine others to have the same desire.

Exp.—He who flees because he sees others flee, or who fears because he sees others fear—or even he who, because he sees that some one has burned his hand, draws back his
own hand and moves his body as if he were burning his hand—we shall say is imitating the affection of another, not that he is emulating it; not because we know one cause of emulation, and another of imitation, but because it comes to pass, by usage, that we call him alone emulous who imitates what we judge to be reputable, useful, or pleasant. But, concerning the cause of emulation, see Prop. xxvii. of this Part, with its scholium. But why envy is frequently joined to this affection, see Prop. xxxii., of this Part, with its scholium.

XXXIV. Favor, or gratitude, is desire, or the impulse of love, with which we endeavor to benefit him who has conferred benefit upon us from a like affection of love. (See Prop. xxxix., with Schol., Prop. xli. of this Part.)

XXXV. Benevolence is the desire of benefiting him whom we pity. (See Schol., Prop. xxvii., of this Part.)

XXXVI. Anger is the desire by which we are incited, from hatred, to bring evil upon him whom we hate. (See Prop. xxxix. of this Part.)

XXXVII. Vengeance is a desire by which, from a reciprocal hatred, we are incited to bring evil upon him who, from a like affection, has brought harm upon us. (See Coroll. ii., Prop. xl., of this Part, with it scholium.)

XXXVIII. Cruelty, or rage, is a desire by which any one is incited to bring evil upon him whom we love or pity.

Exp.—Clemency is opposed to cruelty. It is not a passion, but a power of mind, by which a man moderates anger and vengeance.

XXXIX. Dread is the desire of avoiding by a less, a greater evil, which we fear. (See Schol., Prop. xxxix., of this Part.)

XL. Audacity is a desire by which any one is incited to do any thing, at his peril, which his equals fear to undertake.

XLI. Pusillanimity is spoken of him whose desire is restrained by the dread of a danger which his equals dare to undergo.

Exp.—Pusillanimity is, therefore, nothing else than the
fear of some evil which very many are not wont to fear; wherefore I do not refer it to the affection of desire. Still I wish here to explain the same, because, in so far as we attend to desire, it stands really opposed to audacity.

XLII. Consternation is spoken of him whose desire of avoiding evil is restrained by an admiration of the evil which he fears.

Exp.—Consternation, therefore, is a species of pusillanimity. But, because consternation arises from a double dread, it may be more conveniently defined as Fear which restrains an astonished man, or one so fluctuating that he is not able to remove the evil. I say astonished, in so far as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be restrained by admiration. But I say fluctuating, in so far as we conceive the same desire to be restrained by the dread of another evil which equally tortures him; whence it comes to pass, that he knows not which of the two he should avert. Concerning these things, see Schol., Prop. xxxix., and Schol., Prop. lii., of this Part. But, concerning pusillanimity and audacity, see Schol., Prop. li., of this Part.

XLIII. Humanity or modesty is a desire of doing those things which are pleasing to men, and of omitting those things which are displeasing.

XLIV. Ambition is the immoderate desire of glory.

Exp.—Ambition is the desire by which all affections (Props. xxvii. and xxxiii. of this Part) are cherished and strengthened, and therefore this affection is scarcely able to be overcome. For as long as a man is held by any desire, he is at the same time necessarily held by this. Every most excellent man, says Cicero, is most especially led by glory. Even philosophers inscribe their names in the books which they write, concerning the condemning of glory, etc.

XLV. Gluttony is the immoderate desire, or even love of feasting.

XLVI. Ecbriety is the immoderate desire and love of drinking.

XLVII. Avarice is the immoderate desire and love of riches.
XLVIII. Lust is also the desire and love of sexual copulation.

Exp.—Whether this desire of copulation is moderate or not, it is commonly called lust. Moreover, these five affections (as said in Schol., Prop. lvi., of this Part) have no contraries, for modesty is a species of ambition, concerning which see Schol., Prop. xxix., of this Part; again that temperance, sobriety, and chastity indicate a power of mind, and not a passion I have already shown. And although it is possible that a man, avaricious, ambitious, or timid, may abstain from too much food, drink, or sexual cohabitation; still avarice, ambition, and the fear of luxury, are not contrary to ebriety or chastity. For the avaricious man often desires to indulge to excess in another's food and drink. But the ambitious man, provided he hopes for secrecy, will be temperate in nothing, and if he lives among drunkards and libidinous men, will, for the reason that he is ambitious, be the more inclined to the same vices. Finally, the timid man does that which he does not wish. For although, for the sake of avoiding death, he casts his riches into the sea, he still remains avaricious, and if the libidinous man is grieved because he can not indulge his propensity, he does not therefore cease to be libidinous. And absolutely, these affections respect not so much the acts of feasting, drinking, etc., as the appetite and love itself. Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to these affections, except generosity and animosity, concerning which in the sequel.

The definitions of jealousy and of the other fluctuations of the mind I pass in silence, both because they arise from a composition of the affections, which we have already defined, and because the most have no names, which shows that it is sufficient for the purposes of life to know them only in the general. But from the definition of the affections, which we have explained, it is clear that they all arise from desire, joy, or grief, or rather that there is nothing except these three, each one of which is commonly called by various names, on account of their various relations and extrinsic characteristics. If now we will attend
to these primitive affections, as far as they relate to the mind alone, and to those things which we have said above concerning the nature of the mind, we shall be able to define them as follows:

GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE AFFECTIONS.

Affection, which is called a suffering state of the mind, is a confused idea, by which the mind affirms of its body or of some part of it a greater or less power of existence than before, and which being granted, the mind itself is determined to thinking this rather than that.

Exp.—I say, in the first place, that affection or passion of the mind is "a confused idea." For we have shown that the mind suffers in so far only (Prop. iii. of this Part) as it has inadequate or confused ideas. Again, I have said, "by which the mind affirms of its body or of some part of it, a greater or less power of existing than before." For all ideas of bodies which we have indicate rather the actual constitution of our body (Coroll. ii., Prop. xvi., Part II.), than the nature of an external body; but these things, which constitute the form of the affection, must indicate or express the constitution of the body, or of some part of it, which the body itself or some part of it has, because its power of action, or power of existing, is increased or diminished, aided or hindered. But it is to be noted, when I say, "greater or less power of existing than before," that I do not understand, that the mind compares the present constitution of the body with the past; but that the idea which constitutes the form of the affection, affirms something concerning the body, which in effect involves more or less of reality than before. And because the essence of the mind consists in this (Props. xi. and xiii., Part II.), that it affirms the actual existence of its body, and we understand by perfection the very essence of a thing; it follows, therefore, that the mind passes to a greater or less perfection, when it happens to it to affirm something concerning its body, or some part of it, which involves more or less of reality than before. When, therefore, I said above, that the mind's power of thinking is
increased or diminished, I have wished to understand nothing else, than that the mind has formed an idea of its body, or of some part of it, which expresses more or less of reality than it had affirmed concerning its body. For the excellence of ideas and the actual power of thinking is estimated from the excellence of the object. Finally, I have added, "and which being granted, the mind itself is determined to thinking this, rather than another thing," in order that besides the nature of Joy and Grief, which the first part of the definition explains, I might express also the nature of Desire.
PART FOURTH.

CONCERNING HUMAN SLAVERY, OR CONCERNING THE POWERS OF THE AFFECTIONS.

Preface.

Human impotence in moderating, and restraining the affections, I call Slavery, for a man who is subject to the affections is not master of himself, but at the disposal of fortune, in whose power he is to such a degree, that he is forced, although he may see the better, yet to follow the worse. The cause of this, and what besides of good or evil the affections have, I have proposed, in this Part, to demonstrate. But before I begin, I desire to premise a few things concerning perfection and imperfection, and concerning good and evil.

He who has determined to do any thing, and has done it perfectly, not only himself, but every one who has correctly known the mind of the author of the work, and his design, or has believed that he knew it, will say that his work is perfect. E.g., if any one has seen some work (which I suppose not yet accomplished), and has known the design of the author of this to be to build a house, he will say the house is imperfect; and on the other hand, that it is perfect, as soon as he has seen the work carried to the end, which the author had determined to give to it. But if any one sees some work whose like he has never seen, and has not known the mind of the artist, he certainly will not be able to know whether this work is perfect or imperfect. And this seems to be the primary signification of these words. But after men have begun to form general ideas, and to excogitate examples of dwellings, edifices, towers, etc., and to prefer some examples of things to others, it comes to pass, that each one will call that perfect which he sees to correspond with the general idea, which he has
formed of this kind of thing, and that on the other hand, imperfect, which he sees not to agree with his own conceived example, although in the opinion of the artist it might be perfectly finished. Nor does there seem to be any other reason why they commonly call natural things, namely, which have not been made by human hands, perfect or imperfect, for men are accustomed to form general ideas both of natural things and of artificial. These they hold, as it were, as examples of things, and believe that nature (which they suppose acts only for the sake of some end), beholds them, and proposes them to itself as exemplars. When, therefore, they see that something is done in nature, which does not agree with the conceived example, they believe that nature itself is then defective, or has erred and left that thing imperfect. We see, therefore, that men have been accustomed to call natural things perfect or imperfect rather from prejudice than from a true knowledge of them. For we have shown in the Appendix of Part I., that nature does not act for an end; for that eternal and infinite Being, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity by which it exists. For from the same necessity of nature by which it exists, by the same, we have shown that it acts. (Prop. xvi., Part I.) The reason, therefore, or cause, why God or Nature acts, and why it exists is one and the same. As, therefore, it exists for the sake of no end, it also acts for no end; but as of existing, so also of action it has no principle or end. But the cause, which is called final, is nothing but the human appetite itself, as far as it is considered as the principle or primary cause of any thing. E.g., when we say that inhabitation was the final cause of this or that house, we certainly mean nothing else than that a man, because he imagined the conveniences of domestic life, had an appetite for building a house. Wherefore, inhabitation, as far as it is considered as a final cause, is nothing but this particular appetite, which in reality is the efficient cause, that is regarded as primary, because men are generally ignorant of the causes of their appetites. For they are, as I have often said, conscious indeed of their own actions and appetites,
but ignorant of the causes by which they are determined to desire any thing. Moreover, the common phrases that Nature is defective, or faulty, or produces imperfect things, I reckon among the fictions, concerning which I have treated in the Appendix of Part I. Perfection, therefore, and imperfection are in reality only modes of thinking, namely, notions, which we are accustomed to frame, because we compare individuals of the same species or genus with each other, and for this reason I have said above (Def. vi., Part II.), that by reality and perfection I understand the same thing, for we are accustomed to reduce all the individuals of nature to one genus, which is called most general, namely, to the notion of entity, which belongs absolutely to all the individuals of Nature. As far, therefore, as we reduce all the individuals of nature to this genus, and compare them mutually, and find that some have more of entity or reality than others, to that degree we say that some are more perfect than others, and as far as we attribute any thing to some, which involves negation, as limit, end, impotence, etc., to that extent we call them imperfect, because they do not affect our minds equally with those which we call perfect, and not because there is any thing in them which is their own, defective, or because Nature has committed a fault. For nothing attaches to the nature of any thing, except that which follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause, and whatever follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause, this necessarily happens. As touching good and evil, they also indicate nothing positive in things, in themselves considered, and are nothing else than modes of thinking, or notions, which we form by comparing things with one another. For one and the same thing is able to be, at the same time, good, bad, and indifferent. E. g., music is good for a melancholy person, bad for a person in sorrow, to a deaf man it is neither good nor evil. But although the thing is so, still these words are to be retained by us. For because I wish to form an idea of man, as a pattern of human nature, upon which we may gaze, it will be useful for me to retain these same words in the sense spoken of. By good,
therefore, in the sequel I understand that which we certainly know to be a means of approaching more and more to that pattern of human nature which we propose to ourselves. But by evil, that which we certainly know, hinders us from realizing the same pattern. For we shall call men more perfect or more imperfect, as they approach more or less to this same pattern. For it is first of all to be noticed, when I say, that any one passes from a less to a greater perfection and the contrary, I do not understand that he is changed from one essence or form to another—for a horse, e. g., is as much destroyed by being changed into a man as into an insect; but that we conceive his power of action to be increased or diminished, in as far as this is understood by his own nature.

Finally, by perfection in general I understand reality, as I have said, that is the essence of any thing as far as it exists and operates in a certain mode, no regard being had to its duration in time. For no individual thing can therefore be called more perfect because it has persevered longer in existing; for the duration of things can not be determined from their essence, since the essence of things involves no certain and determinate time of existence; but every thing, whether more or less perfect, will always be able to persevere in existing with the same force with which it began to exist, so that in this respect all are equal.

Definitions.

I. By Good I understand that which we certainly know to be useful to us.

II. But by Evil that which we certainly know hinders us from becoming partakers of some good.

Concerning these, see the conclusion of the foregoing preface.

III. Individual things I call contingent, in so far as whilst we attend to their essence alone, we find nothing which necessarily posits their existence, or which necessarily excludes it.

IV. The same individual things I call possible, in so far as whilst we attend to the causes by which they must be
produced, we are ignorant whether they have been determined to produce the same.

In Schol. I., Prop. xxxiii., Part I., I have made no difference between possible and contingent, because there there was no need accurately to distinguish them.

V. By contrary affections in the sequel I understand those which draw the man in different directions, although they may be of the same genus, as luxury and avarice, which are species of love, and are not by nature, but only accidentally contrary.

VI. What I understand by an affection toward a future, present, and past thing, I have explained in Schol. I. and II., Prop. xviii., Part III., which see.

But here it must further be noted that we are not able distinctly to imagine distance, whether of time or of space, except to a certain limit; that is, as we are accustomed to imagine all those objects, which are more than two hundred feet distant from us, or whose distance from the place in which we are surpasses that which we can distinctly imagine, to be equally distant, and hence to be as if in the same plane; so, also, objects whose time of existence we imagine to be distant from the present by a greater interval than what we are accustomed distinctly to imagine, we imagine all to be equidistant from the present, and refer to one and the same moment of time.

VII. By the end, on account of which we do any thing, I understand appetite.

VIII. By virtue and power I understand the same thing, that is (Prop. vii., Part III.), virtue, in so far as it refers to man, is the very essence of the man, or his nature in so far as he has the power of doing certain things, which can be understood by the sole laws of his nature.

Ax.—No particular thing is given in the nature of things, than which another more powerful and stronger may not be given. But any thing whatever being given, another more powerful is given by which this given thing can be destroyed.

Propositions.

Prop. I. Nothing positive which a false idea contains is taken away by the presence of the true, as far as it is true.
Dem.—Falsity consists in the sole privation of knowledge, which inadequate ideas involve (by Prop. xxxv., Part II.), and these have nothing positive on account of which they are called false (Prop. xxxiii., Part II.). But on the contrary, as far as they are related to God, they are true (Prop. xxxii., Part II.). If, therefore, the positive, which a false idea has from the presence of the true (as far as it is true), were taken away, then an idea, true in itself would be taken away, which is absurd (by Prop. iv., Part III.). Therefore nothing positive, which a false idea contains, etc. Q. E. D.

Schol.—This Proposition is understood more clearly from Coroll. ii., Prop. xvi., Part II. For imagination is an idea which indicates rather the present constitution of the human body, than the nature of an external body; not indeed, distinctly, but confusedly; whence it comes to pass that the mind is said to err. E. g., when we behold the sun, we imagine the same to be about two hundred feet distant from us; in which we are deceived so long as we are ignorant of its true distance; but its distance being known, the error indeed is taken away; but not the imagination, that is, the idea of the sun, which explains its nature, in so far only as the body is affected by the same; and therefore, although we know its true distance we nevertheless imagine it to be near to us. For as we have said in Schol., Prop. xxxv., Part II., we do not for that reason imagine the sun to be so near, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun in so far as the body is affected by the same. Thus, when the rays of the sun, falling upon the surface of water, are reflected to our eyes, we imagine the sun just as if it were in the water, although we know its true place. And so other imaginations by which the mind is deceived; whether these indicate the natural constitution of the body, or that its power of action is increased or diminished, they are not contrary to the true, and do not disappear in its presence. It comes to pass, indeed, when we falsely fear some evil, that fear disappears when the true intelligence is heard; and, on the contrary, also, it
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happens, when we fear an evil, which is really about to come, that the fear also departs when the false intelligence is heard; but for this reason imaginations depart not from the presence of truth as truth, but because others occur stronger than these, which exclude the present existence of the things which we imagined, as we have shown (Prop. xvii., Part II.).

Prop. II. We suffer, in so far as we are a part of Nature, which can not be conceived of by itself, without other things.

Dem.—We are then said to suffer when something arises in us, of which we are only the partial cause (Def. ii., Part III.), that is (Def. i., Part III.), something which can not be deduced from the sole laws of our nature. We suffer, therefore, as far as we are a part of Nature, which can not be conceived by itself alone without other things. Q. E. D.

Prop. III. The power by which man perseveres in existence is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.

Dem.—This is evident from the Axiom of this Part. For man being given, something else is given more powerful, suppose A.; and A. being given, then another thing, suppose B., is given more powerful than A. itself, and so without end; and therefore the power of man is limited by the power of another thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. Q. E. D.

Prop. IV. It can not be that man is not a part of nature, and that he can suffer no changes except such as can be understood by his own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause.

Dem.—The power by which any individual thing, and consequently man, preserves its being is the very power of God or Nature (Coroll., Prop. xxiv., Part I.), not in so far as it is infinite, but in so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence (Prop. vii., Part III.). The power of man, therefore, as far as it is explained by his actual essence, is a part of the infinite power of God or nature, that is, of his essence (Prop. xxxiv., Part I.). This was the first point. Again, if it were possible that a man could suffer no changes, except such as may be understood
by the sole nature of man himself, it would follow (Props. iv. and vi., Part III.) that he could not perish, but that he would always necessarily exist. But this must follow from a cause whose power is finite or infinite, namely, either from the sole power of man, who would be able to remove from himself the other changes which might arise from external causes, or from the infinite power of nature by which all individual things would be so directed, that man could possibly suffer no other changes save those which look to his preservation. But the first is absurd (by preceding Prop., whose demonstration is universal, and can be applied to all particular things). Therefore, if it were possible that man should suffer no changes, except such as could be understood by the sole nature of man, and consequently (as we have shown) that he would always necessarily exist, this must follow from the infinite power of God; and, consequently (Prop. xvi., Part I.), the order of universal nature, in so far as it is conceived under the attributes of extension and thought, must needs be derived from the necessity of the divine nature considered as affected by the idea of any man; and, therefore (Prop. xxi., Part II.), it would follow that man would be infinite, which (by Part I. of this Demonstration) is absurd. Therefore, it can not be that man suffers only those changes of which he himself is the adequate cause. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence it follows that man is necessarily always obnoxious to the passions, and that he follows the common order of nature, and obeys the same, and accommodates himself to it, as the nature of things demands.

Prop. V. The power and growth of each passion and its perseverance in existence is not defined by the power with which we endeavor to persevere in existence, but by the power of the external cause compared with our own.

Dem.—The essence of passion is not able to be explained by our own essence (Defs. i. and ii., Part III.), that is (Prop. vii., Part III.), the power of a passion is not able to be defined by the power with which we endeavor to persevere in our being; but (as shown in Prop. xvi., Part II.)
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must necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own. *Q. E. D.*

**Prop. VI.** *The power of any passion or affection is able to surpass the remaining actions or power of a man, so that the affection may adhere pertinaciously to the man.*

*Dem.*—The power and growth of any passion and perseverence in its existence is limited by the power of an external cause compared with our own (by preceding Prop.), and, therefore (by Prop. iii. of this Part), is able to overcome the power of a man, etc. *Q. E. D.*

**Prop. VII.** *An affection can not be coerced or destroyed, except it be coerced by a stronger and contrary affection.*

*Dem.*—An affection, as far as it relates to the mind, is the idea, with which the mind affirms the power of its existing body to be greater or less than before (general definition of the affections at the end of Part III.). When, therefore, the mind is agitated by any affection, the body is agitated by a similar affection, by which its power of action is increased or diminished. Moreover, this affection of the body (Prop. v. of this Part) receives its power of persevering in its existence from its own cause, which power, therefore, can be neither coerced nor destroyed, except by a corporeal cause (Prop. iv., Part III.), which affects the body with an affection contrary to it (Prop. v., Part III.) and stronger (Ax. of this Part). And, therefore (Prop. xii., Part II.), the mind is affected with the idea of an affection, stronger and contrary to the former, that is (by general definition of the Affections), the mind will be affected with an affection stronger than the former and contrary to it, which, namely, will exclude or destroy the existence of the former, and hence the affection can be neither destroyed nor coerced except by a contrary and stronger affection. *Q. E. D.*

**Coroll.**—An affection, as far as it relates to the mind, can be neither restrained nor destroyed, except by the idea of an affection of the body, contrary to the affection which we are suffering, and stronger than it. For an affection, which we are suffering, can be neither coerced nor de-
stroyed, except by an affection stronger than the same, and contrary to it (preceding Prop.), that is (by definition, general affections), except by the idea of an affection of the body stronger than the one suffered, and contrary to it.

Prop. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else than an affection of joy or grief, as far as we are conscious of it.

Dem.—We call that good or evil which favors or obstructs the preservation of our being (Def. i. and ii. of this Part), that is (Prop. vii., Part III.), which increases or diminishes, assists or coerces, our power of action. As far, therefore (Def. of joy and grief, in Schol., Prop. xi., Part III.), as we perceive any thing to affect us with joy or grief, we call the same good or evil; and, therefore, the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else than the idea of joy or grief, which necessarily follows from the affection itself of joy or grief (Prop. xxii., Part II.). But this idea is united to the affection in the same way as the mind is united to the body (Prop. xxii., Part II.), that is (as shown in Schol. of the same Prop.), this idea is not in reality distinguished from the affection itself, or (by general definition of Affections) from the idea of an affection of the body, except in conception alone; therefore this knowledge of good and evil is nothing else than the affection itself, as far as we are conscious of the same. Q. E. D.

Prop. IX. An affection, the cause of which we imagine to be with us at the present time, is stronger than if we imagine the same not to be with us.

Dem.—An imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates a thing as present (Def. in Schol., in Prop. xvii., Part II.), which, nevertheless, rather indicates the constitution of the human body, than the nature of the external thing (Coroll. ii., Prop. xvi., Part II.). An imagination, therefore, is an affection (by general definition of the Affections), in so far as it indicates the constitution of the body. But an imagination is more intense (Prop. xvii., Part II.), as long as we imagine nothing, which excludes the present existence of the external thing; therefore, also,
an affection, the cause of which we imagine to be present with us, is more intense or stronger than if we imagined the same not to be present. Q. E. D.

Schol.—When above, in Prop xviii, Part III., I said, that we are excited by the same affection from the image of a future or a past thing as if the thing which we imagine were present, I said expressly that this is true as far as we attend to the sole image of the thing itself; for it is of the same nature, whether we have or have not imagined the thing: but I have not denied that the same is rendered weaker, when we contemplate other things present to us, which exclude the present existence of the future thing, which I then neglected to say, because I had determined to treat in this part of the powers of the affections.

Coroll.—The image of a future or past thing, that is, of a thing which we contemplate with reference to future or past time, the present being excluded, other things being equal, is weaker than the image of a present thing; and, consequently, the affection toward a future thing, or a past, other things being equal, is more feeble than an affection toward a thing present.

Prop. X. Toward a future thing, which we imagine about to happen speedily, we are more intensely affected, than if we imagine its period of existence to be more remote from the present; and by the memory of a thing which we imagine to have passed not long since, we are more intensely affected, than if we imagine the thing to have passed long ago.

Dem.—For, in so far as we image a thing soon to happen, or to have passed not long since, by this we imagine something which less excludes the presence of the thing, than if we imagine the future period of the existence of the same to be more remote from the present, or that it passed long since (as is self-evident); and, therefore (by preceding proposition), to that degree, we shall be more intensely affected toward the same. Q. E. D.

Schol.—From those things, which we have noted at Def. vi. of this Part, it follows, that objects which are distant from the present by an interval of time greater than we can determine by imagination, although we may understand
that they are distant from each other by a long interval of
time, affect us with an equal feebleness.

Prop. XI. An affection toward a thing which we imagine as
necessary, other things being equal, is more intense, than toward
a possible, or contingent, or not necessary, thing.

Dem.—In so far as we imagine a thing to be necessary,
to that extent we affirm its existence, and on the contrary
we deny the existence of the thing in as far as we imagine
the same to be not necessary (Schol. i., Prop. xxxiii., Part
I.); and hence (Prop. ix. of this Part) an affection toward
a necessary thing, other things being equal, is more intense,
than toward one not necessary. Q. E. D.

Prop. XII. An affection toward a thing which we know not
to exist at present, and which we imagine as possible, other
things being equal, is more intense, than toward a contingent
thing.

Dem.—As far as we imagine a thing contingent, we are
affected by no image of another thing which posits the exis-
tence of the thing (Def. iii. of this Part); but, on the
other hand (by hypothesis), we imagine certain things which
exclude its present existence. But, in so far as we imagine
the thing possible in the future, to that extent we imagine
certain things which posit its existence (by Def. iv. of this
Part)—that is (Prop. xviii., Part III.), which cherish hope
or fear; and, therefore, an affection toward a possible thing
is more vehement. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—An affection toward a thing which we know not
to exist at present, and which we imagine is contingent, is
much weaker than if we imagine the thing to be present
with us.

Dem.—An affection toward a thing which we imagine to
exist at present, is more intense than if we imagined the
same as future (Coroll., Prop. ix., of this Part), and is much
more vehement if we imagine the future time to be not far
distant from the present (Prop. x. of this Part). An affec-
tion, therefore, toward a thing whose time of existing we
imagine to be far distant from the present, is much weaker
than if we imagined the same to be present, and still (pro-
position preceding) is more intense than if we imagined the
same thing as contingent; and, therefore, an affection toward a contingent thing is much weaker, than if we imagined the thing to be present with us. Q. E. D.

Prop. XIII. An affection toward a contingent thing which we know not to exist at present, other things being equal, is weaker than an affection toward a past thing.

Dem.—In so far as we imagine a thing as contingent, we are affected by the image of no other thing which posits the existence of the thing (Def. iii. of this Part). But, on the contrary (according to hypothesis), we imagine certain things which exclude the present existence of the same. But as far as we imagine the same with reference to past time, to that extent we are supposed to imagine something which reduces the same to memory, or which excites the image of the thing (Prop. xviii., Part II., with its Schol.), and therefore, to that extent, effects that we should contemplate it as if it were present (Coroll., Prop. xvii., Part ii.). And, therefore (Prop. ix. of this Part), an affection toward a contingent thing which we know not to exist at present, other things being equal, is weaker than an affection toward a past thing. Q. E. D.

Prop. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil, in as far as it is true, can coerce no affection; but only in so far as it is considered as an affection.

Dem.—An affection is an idea, by which the mind affirms a greater or less power of its existing body than before (general definition of affections), and, therefore (Prop. i. of this Part), has nothing positive which can be taken away by the presence of the true; and, consequently, the true knowledge of good and evil, as far as it is true, is able to coerce no affection. But, in as far as it is an affection (Prop. viii. of this Part), if it is stronger than the affection to be coerced, to that extent only (Prop. vii. of this Part) can it coerce the affection. Q. E. D.

Prop. XV. The desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil can be extinguished or coerced by many other desires, which arise from the affections, by which we are agitated.

Dem.—From a true knowledge of good and evil, in so
far as this (Prop. viii. of this Part) is an affection, necessarily arises desire (Def. i., Aff.), which is the greater, in proportion to the affection from which it arises (Prop. xxxvii., Part III.). But because this desire (by hypothesis) arises from this, that we understand something truly, this therefore follows in us, in as far as we act (Prop. iii., Part III.). And therefore must be understood by our sole essence (Def. ii., Part III.), and consequently its power and growth must be defined by human power alone. Furthermore, desires which arise from the affections, by which we are agitated are also the greater, the more vehement these affections are; and therefore their power and growth (Prop. v. of this Part) must be defined by the power of external causes, which, if it is compared with our own, indefinitely surpasses our own power (Prop. iii. of this Part). And therefore the desires which arise from similar affections can be more vehement than that which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil; and hence (Prop. vii. of this Part) are able to coerce or extinguish the same. Q. E. D.

Prop. XVI. A desire which arises from a knowledge of good and evil, as far as this knowledge respects the future, can be more easily coerced or extinguished than the desire of things which are at present agreeable.

Dem.—An affection toward a thing which we imagine to be future is weaker than toward one present (Coroll. Prop. ix. of this Part). But a desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, although this knowledge may concern things which are good in the present, can be extinguished or coerced by some rash desire (Prop. preceding, whose demonstration is universal); therefore the desire which arises from the same knowledge, as far as it respects the future, can be more easily coerced or extinguished, etc. Q. E. D.

Prop. XVII. A desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, as far as this is concerned with contingent things, can be, thus far, much more easily coerced than the desire of things which are present.

Dem.—This proposition is demonstrated in the same
way as the preceding, from Coroll., Prop. xii., of this Part.

Schol.—I believe I have shown the cause why men are moved more by opinion than by true reason, and why the true knowledge of good and evil may excite agitation of mind, and may often yield to every kind of lust. Hence the words of the poet:

"I see the right, and I approve it, too;  
I see the wrong, and yet the wrong pursue."

This same thing the preacher seemed to have had in mind, when he said: "He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." But I do not say these things, to this end, that I may thence infer that to be ignorant is better than to know, or that a wise man differs in nothing from a fool in governing his affections; but because it is necessary to know both the power and the impotence of our nature, that we may be able to determine what reason can and can not do in governing the affections; and in this Part I have said I am about to treat concerning human impotence alone. For I have determined to treat separately concerning the power of reason over the affections.

Prop. XVIII. The desire which arises from joy, other things being equal, is stronger than the desire which arises from grief.

Dem.—Desire is the very essence of man (Def. i., Aff.), that is (Prop. vii., Part III.), the effort by which a man endeavors to persevere in his own being. Wherefore, desire which arises from joy, by the very affection of joy (see Def. of joy in Schol., Prop. xi., Part III.) is aided or increased; but, on the contrary, that which arises from grief, by the affection itself of grief (by the same Schol.) is diminished or coerced. And therefore the power of desire which arises from joy must be defined both by human power and also by the power of the external cause; but that which arises from grief, by human power alone; and hence the former is stronger than the latter. Q. E. D.

Schol.—Thus briefly have I explained the causes of human impotence and inconstancy, and why men do not observe the precepts of reason. It remains now that I
should show what that is which reason prescribes to us, and what affections accord with the rules of reason, and what, on the other hand, are opposed to them. But before I begin to demonstrate these in our prolix geometrical order, I desire first briefly to exhibit these dictates of reason, that my views may be more easily apprehended, when presented in detail. Since reason can demand nothing against nature, she therefore demands that each one should love himself, should seek his own advantage, what in reality is his advantage, and should desire all that which in reality leads man to a greater perfection, and absolutely that each one should endeavor to preserve his own being, as far as in him lies. This indeed is as necessarily true as that a whole is greater than its part (Prop. iv., Part III.). Again, since virtue (by Def. viii., this Part) is nothing else than to act according to the laws of one's own nature, and no man strives (Prop. vii., Part III.) to preserve his own being, except by the laws of his own proper nature; hence it follows, first, that the foundation of virtue is the very effort of preserving one's own being, and that happiness consists in this, that a man is able to preserve his own being. Secondly, it follows that virtue is to be sought for its own sake, nor is there any thing which is more excellent than it, or which is more useful to us, on account of which it should be sought. Thirdly, it follows that they who put themselves to death are impotent of mind, and that they are entirely subdued by external causes, hostile to their own nature. Moreover, from Postulate iv., Part II., it follows that we can never bring it to pass, that we should stand in need of nothing without us for our preservation, and that we may so live that we may have no commerce with things which are without us; and if, moreover, we regard our mind, our intellect would surely be more imperfect, if the mind were alone, and knew nothing except itself. There are, therefore, many things without us which are useful to us, and which, moreover, are to be sought. Of these none more excellent can be conceived than those which are entirely in accordance with our own nature. For, if two individuals, e. g., of a nature entirely the same, are mu-
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tually joined, they compose an individual doubly more powerful than when single. To man, therefore, nothing is more useful than man; nothing, I say, are men able to desire more excellent for the preservation of their own being than that all should so agree in all things that the minds and bodies of all should compose, as it were, one mind and one body, and all together, as far as possible, should endeavor to preserve their own being, and all together seek for themselves the common utility of all. From which it follows that men who are governed by reason, that is, men who seek their own utility from the guidance of reason, desire for themselves nothing which they do not desire for other men, and, therefore, that the same be just, faithful, and honest.

These are those dictates of reason, which I had here proposed in a few words to indicate before I should begin to demonstrate the same in fuller detail. This I have done for this reason, that if possible, I might conciliate to myself the attention of those who believe it a fountain of impiety, that, namely, each one should be held to seek his own utility, but not a fountain of virtue and piety. Therefore, after having briefly shown the fact to be the reverse, I proceed to demonstrate it in the same way which I have thus far pursued.

Prop. XIX. Each one by the laws of his nature necessarily seeks that, or is averse to that which he judges to be good or evil.

Dem.—The knowledge of good and evil (Prop. viii. of this Part), is the affection itself of joy or grief in so far as we are conscious of the same, and hence (Prop. xxviii., Part III.), each one necessarily seeks that which he judges to be good, and on the contrary, is averse to that which he judges to be evil. But this seeking is nothing else than the very essence or nature of man (by Def. App., which see in Schol., Prop. ix., Part III., and Def. i., Aff.) Therefore, every one by the sole laws of his own nature, necessarily seeks that, or is averse to that, etc. Q. E. D.

Prop. XX. The more every one seeks his own benefit, that is, to preserve his own essence, and is able to do so, with so much
the more virtue is he endued, and on the contrary, in as far as
any one neglects his own benefit, that is, to preserve his own es-
sense, in so far is he impotent.

Dem.—Virtue is human power itself, which is defined by
the simple essence of man (Def. viii. of this Part), that is
(Prop. vii., Part III.), which is defined by the sole effort by
which man endeavors to persevere in his own essence. The
more, therefore, every one endeavors to preserve his own
essence, and is able to do it, with the more virtue is he en-
dued, and consequently (Props. iv. and vi., Part III.), in as
far as any one neglects to preserve his own essence in so
far is he impotent. Q. E. D.

Schol.—No one, therefore, unless overcome by causes ex-
ternal, and contrary to his own nature, neglects to seek his
own benefit, or to preserve his own essence. No one, I
say, from a necessity of his own nature, but only when
forced by external causes, is averse to nourishment, or puts
himself to death, a thing which may occur in many ways.
For example, one slays himself, when forced by another,
who turns back his right hand, which by chance had
grasped a sword, and compels him to direct the weapon
against his heart; or because from the command of a tyrant,
as Seneca, he is forced to open his own veins, that is, he de-
sires to avoid a greater evil by a less; or finally, because
secret external causes so dispose his imagination, and so af-
fected the body, that it takes on another nature, contrary to
the former one, and whose idea can not be given in the
mind. (Prop. x., Part III.) But that man from the neces-
sity of his own nature should endeavor not to exist or to be
changed into another form, is as impossible as that he should
become something from nothing, as any one can see by mod-
erate reflection.

Prop. XXI. No man can desire to be happy, to do well, to
live well, who at the same time does not desire to be, to act, and
to live, that is, to exist in reality.

Dem.—The demonstration of this Proposition, or rather
the very thing is evident of itself, and also from the defini-
tion of Desire. For the desire (Def. i., Aff.) of living
happily, acting well, etc., is the very essence of man, that
is (Prop. vii., Part III.), the effort with which every one strives to preserve his own essence. Therefore, no one can desire, etc. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this (to wit, the effort of self-preservation).

Dem.—The effort of self-preservation is the very essence of a thing. (Prop. vii., Part III.) If, therefore, any virtue could be conceived prior to this, to wit, this effort, then (Def. viii. of this Part), the essence of a thing would be conceived as prior to the thing itself, which (as is self-evident) is absurd. Therefore, no virtue, etc. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—The effort of self-preservation is the first and only foundation of virtue. For prior to this principle nothing else can be conceived (Prop. preceding), and without it (Prop. xxi. of this Part), no virtue can be conceived.

Prop. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is determined to do any thing by this, that he has inadequate ideas, can not be absolutely said to act from virtue, but only in so far as he is determined by this, that he understands.

Dem.—In as far as man is determined to action by the fact that he has inadequate ideas, in so far (Prop. i., Part III.), he suffers, that is (Def. i. and ii., Part III.), he does something which can not be perceived by his sole essence, that is (Def. viii. of this Part), which does not follow from his own virtue. But in as far as he is determined to do something by the fact that he understands, in so far (same Prop. i., Part III.) he acts, that is (Def. ii., Part III.), does something which is perceived by his sole essence, or (Def. viii. of this Part), which follows adequately from his own virtue. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXIV. To act absolutely from virtue is nothing else in us than to act, live, preserve one’s essence (these three signify the same thing), by the guidance of reason, from the principle of seeking one’s own good.

Dem.—To act absolutely from virtue is nothing else (Def. viii. of this Part) than to act from the laws of one’s own nature. But we act thus only in so far as we understand (Prop. iii., Part III.). Therefore to act from virtue
is nothing else in us than from the guidance of reason, to act, live, preserve one's own essence, and that (Coroll., Prop. xxii., of this Part) from the principle of seeking one's own good. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXV. No one strives to preserve his own essence for the sake of another thing.

Dem.—The effort with which every thing strives to persevere in its own essence is defined by the simple essence of the thing itself (Prop. vii., Part III.), and that alone being given; but it does not necessarily follow from the essence of another thing (Prop. vi., Part III.) that everything endeavors to preserve its own essence. This Proposition, moreover, is evident from Coroll., Prop. xxii., of this Part. For if man, for the sake of another thing, should strive to preserve his own essence, then that thing would be the primary principle of virtue (as is self-evident), which (by aforesaid Coroll.) is absurd. Therefore no one strives, etc. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXVI. What we strive for by reason is nothing else but to understand; nor does the mind, in so far as it employs reason, judge any thing to be useful to it, except that which contributes to its understanding.

Dem.—The effort of self-preservation is nothing but the essence of the thing itself (Prop. vii., Part III.), which, in virtue of its existence, is conceived to have power to persevere in existence (Prop. vi., Part III.), and to do those things which necessarily follow from its own given nature (see Def. App. in Schol., Prop. ix., Part III.). But the essence of reason is nothing else than our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly understands (see its Def. in Schol. ii., Prop. xi., Part II.). Therefore (Prop. xi., Part II.), what we strive after by reason is nothing else but to understand. Again, since this effort of the mind, by which the mind, in so far as it reasons, endeavors to preserve its own essence, is nothing else but to understand (as has just been shown), therefore, this effort to understand (Coroll., Prop. xxii., of this Part) is the first and sole principle of virtue, and we shall not strive to understand things for the sake of any end (Prop. xxv. of this Part), but on the contrary, the
mind, in so far as it reasons, will be able to conceive nothing to be good to itself, except that which helps it to understand (Def. i. of this Part).  Q. E. D.

Prop. XXVII. We know certainly nothing to be good or evil, except that which really contributes to understanding, or which prevents us from understanding.

Dem.—The mind, in as far as it reasons, desires nothing else than to understand, nor does it judge any thing to be useful to it, except that which conduces to understanding (Prop. preceding). But the mind (Props. xli. and xliii., Part II., of which see also Schol.) has no certainty of things, except in so far as it has adequate ideas, or (what by Schol., Prop. xli., Part III., is the same thing), in so far as it reasons; therefore, we certainly know nothing to be good, except that which conduces really to understanding; and, on the contrary, that to be evil which prevents us from understanding.  Q. E. D.

Prop. XXVIII. The highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the highest virtue of the mind is to know God.

Dem.—The highest thing which the mind is able to understand is God, that is (Def. vi., Part I.), the Being absolutely infinite, and without whom (Prop. xv., Part I.) nothing can be, nor be conceived; and therefore (Prop. xxvi. and xxvii. of this Part), the mind’s highest benefit or (Def. i. of this Part) good, is the knowledge of God. Again, the mind, in as far as it understands, in so far alone acts (Props. i. and iii., Part III.), and in so far alone can it be said absolutely that it acts from virtue. Therefore, the absolute virtue of the mind is to understand. But the highest thing which the mind can understand is God (as we have just demonstrated). Therefore, the highest virtue of the mind is to understand or to know God.  Q. E. D.

Prop. XXIX. Every individual thing whose nature is entirely different from our own, is able neither to aid nor to hinder our power of acting, and absolutely nothing is able to be good or evil to us unless it has something in common with us.

Dem.—The power of every individual thing, and consequently (Coroll., Prop. x., Part II.) of man, by which he exists and operates, is determined only by another indi-
vidual thing (Prop. xxviii., Part I.) whose nature (Prop. vi., Part II.) must be understood by the same attributes by which human nature is conceived. Therefore, our power of acting, in whatever way this is conceived, can be determined, and consequently sided or hindered, by the power of another individual thing which has something in common with us, and not by the power of a thing whose nature is entirely different from ours, and because that is called good or evil, which is the cause of joy or grief (Prop. viii. of this Part), that is (Schol., Prop. xi., Part III.), which augments or diminishes, assists or hinders our power of acting; therefore, a thing whose nature is entirely different from our own, can be to us neither good nor evil. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXX. Nothing can be evil through that which it has in common with our nature; but in as far as it is evil to us, in so far it is contrary to us.

Dem.—We call that evil which is the cause of grief (Prop. viii. of this Part), that is (see its Def. in Schol., Prop. xi., Part III.), which diminishes or hinders our power of action. If, therefore, any thing were evil to us through that which it has in common with us, then a thing would be able to diminish or hinder that very thing which it has in common with us, which (Prop. iv., Part III.), is absurd. Therefore, nothing can be evil to us through that which it has in common with us; but, on the contrary, in as far as it is evil, that is (as we have just shown), in as far as it is able to diminish or hinder our power of action, in so far (Prop. v., Part III.) it is contrary to us. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXXI. In as far as any thing agrees with our nature, in so far it is necessarily good.

Dem.—In as far as any thing agrees with our nature, it can not (Prop. preceding) be evil. Therefore, it will be necessarily either good or indifferent. If this is posited, to wit, that it is neither good nor evil, then (Ax. of this Part) nothing would follow from its nature which would contribute to the preservation of our nature, that is (by hypothesis), which would contribute to the preservation of the nature of the thing itself. But this is absurd (Prop.
vi., Part III.). Therefore it will be, in so far as it agrees with our nature, necessarily good. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence it follows, that the more any thing agrees with our nature, the more useful it is to us, or the more good; and, on the other hand, the more useful any thing is to us, the more it agrees with our nature. For, in as far as it does not agree with our nature, it will necessarily be different from our nature, or contrary to the same. If different, then (Prop. xxix. of this Part) it will be able to be neither good nor evil; but, if contrary, then also it will be contrary to that which agrees with our nature, that is (Proposition preceding), it will be contrary to good, or it will be evil. Nothing, therefore, except in so far as it agrees with our nature, can do good; and, therefore, the more any thing agrees with our nature, the more useful is it, and the converse. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXXII. In as far as men are subject to passions, in so far they can not be said to agree with nature.

Dem.—Things which are said to agree in nature, are understood to agree in power (Prop. vii., Part III.), but not in impotence, or negation, and, consequently (Schol., Prop. iii., Part II.), not also in passion; wherefore men, in as far as they are subject to passions, can not be said to agree with nature. Q. E. D.

Schol.—The thing is also self-evident; for he who says that white and black agree only in this, that neither is red, affirms absolutely that white and black agree in nothing. For if any one says that a stone and a man agree only in this, that each is finite, impotent, or that it does not exist from the necessity of its own nature, or, finally, that it is indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, he affirms altogether that a stone and a man agree in nothing; for things which agree in negation alone, or in that which they have not, these in reality agree in nothing.

Prop. XXXIII. Men are able to disagree in nature, in as far as they conflict in affections, which are passions, and in so far also one and the same man is variable and inconstant.

Dem.—The nature or essence of the affections can not be explained by our sole essence or nature (Def. i. and ii.,
Part III.), but must be defined by the power, that is (Prop. vii., Part III.), nature of external causes, compared with our own. Whence it comes to pass, that there are as many species of every affection as there are species of objects by which we are affected (Prop. lvi., Part III.), and that men are differently affected by one and the same object (Prop. li., Part III.), and to that extent disagree in nature, and, finally, that one and the same man (Prop. li., Part III.) is differently affected toward the same object, and to that extent is variable, etc. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed by affections which are passions, they can be contrary one to another.

Dem.—A man, e. g., Peter, may be a cause that Paul may be grieved, for the reason that he has something similar to a thing which Paul hates (Prop. xvi., Part III.); or for the reason that Peter alone possesses something which Paul himself also loves (Prop xxxii., Part III., with its Schol.), or for other reasons (the chief of these see in Schol., Prop. lv., Part III.). And, moreover, it may thence come to pass (Def. vii., Affections), that Paul may hate Peter; and, consequently, it may easily occur (Prop. xl., Part III., with its Schol.), that Peter, on the other hand, may hate Paul; and, furthermore (Prop. xxxix., Part III.), that they may strive to bring evil upon each other, that is (Prop. xxx. of this Part), that they may be contrary to each other. But the affection of grief is always passion (Prop. l., Part III.); therefore men, in as far as they are assailed by affections which are passions, are able to be contrary one to another. Q. E. D.

Schol.—I have said, that Paul may hate Peter because he imagines that Peter possesses that which Paul himself also loves; whence it would seem prima facie to follow, that these two, from the fact that they both love the same thing, and consequently from the fact that they agree in nature, are mutually injurious to each other; and, therefore, if this is true, Props. xxx. and xxxi. of this Part would be false. But, if we will examine the matter without prejudice, we shall see that all these things are entirely congruous. For these two are not mutually injurious, in as far as they agree
in nature, that is, in as far as each loves the same thing; but in so far as they are at variance with each other. For, in as far as each loves the same thing, by this the love of each is promoted (Prop. xxxi., Part III.); that is (Def. vi., Affections), by this the joy of each is promoted. Wherefore it is by no means the fact that, in as far as they love the same thing and agree in nature, they are mutually injurious. But the cause of this thing, as I have said, is nothing else than because they are supposed to disagree in nature. For, we suppose that Peter has an idea of a beloved thing already possessed, and Paul on the contrary an idea of a beloved thing lost. Whence it happens, that the latter is affected with grief, and the former on the contrary with joy; and to this extent they are mutually contrary. And in this way we are easily able to show, that the remaining causes of hatred result from this alone—that men disagree in nature, and not from that in which they agree.

Prop. XXXV. In as far as men live under the guidance of reason, in so far only do they necessarily always agree in nature.

Dem.—In as far as men are assailed by affections which are passions, they are able to be different in nature (Prop. xxxii. of this Part) and contrary to each other (Proposition preceding). But in so far only are men said to act, in as far as they live under the guidance of reason (Prop. iii., Part III.); and, therefore, whatever follows from human nature in as far as it is defined by reason, this (by Def. ii., Part III.) must be understood by simple human nature, as its proximate cause. But, because every one by the laws of his nature seeks that which is good, and endeavors to remove that which he judges to be evil (Prop. xix. of this Part)—and since, moreover, that which, under the dictate of reason, we judge to be good or evil is necessarily good or evil (Prop. xli., Part II.), therefore men, in as far as they live under the guidance of reason, in so far only do of necessity those things which are necessarily good to human nature, and consequently to every man; that is (Coroll., Prop. xxxi., of this Part), which agrees with the
nature of every man. And, therefore, men also necessarily agree always with one another, in as far as they live under the guidance of reason. \textit{Q. E. D.}

\textit{Coroll. I.}—There is no individual thing in nature, which is more useful to man, than a man who lives under the guidance of reason. For that is most useful to man, which most agrees with his own nature (Coroll., Prop. xxxi., of this Part); that is (as is self-evident), man. But man acts absolutely from the laws of his own nature, when he lives under the guidance of reason (Def. ii., Part III.); and to that extent only does he always necessarily agree with the nature of another man (Prop. preceding). Therefore, among individual things, there is nothing more useful to man than a man, etc. \textit{Q. E. D.}

\textit{Coroll. II.}—When every man most seeks his own benefit, then are men mutually most useful to one another. For the more each one seeks his own benefit, and strives to preserve himself, the more is he endued with virtue (Prop. xx. of this Part), or what is the same (Def. viii. of this Part), with the greater power of acting from the laws of his own nature, is he endued; that is (Prop. iii., Part III.), for living under the guidance of reason. But men then most agree with nature, when they live under the guidance of reason (Prop. preceding). Therefore (preceding Coroll.) men will then be most useful to each other, when every one most seeks his own benefit. \textit{Q. E. D.}

\textit{Schol.}—What we have here presented experience itself also daily attests by so many and so luminous evidences, that it has almost become a proverb: that man is God to man. Still it rarely happens, that men live under the guidance of reason; but, as the matter stands with them, they are often mutually envious and injurious. Nevertheless, they are hardly able to pass a solitary life, so that definition which makes man a social animal, would be satisfactory to most persons; and the fact really is, that from the common society of men, many more advantages than disadvantages arise. Let the satirical therefore deride human affairs, as much as they please, let theologians decry them, let melancholy people praise as much as they are able,
an uncultured, rustic life, denounce men and admire brutes; still men will find, by experience, that they are able, by mutual aid, to procure for themselves much more easily the things which they need; and that they are able only by their united powers to avoid the dangers which threaten them. I omit here to remark, that it is much better, and more worthy of our knowledge, to contemplate the doings of men than of brutes. But of these matters, more in detail elsewhere.

Prop. XXXVI. The highest good of those who follow virtue, is common to all, and therefore all are able equally to rejoice in it.

Dem.—To act from virtue, is to act under the guidance of reason (Prop. xxiv. of this Part), and whatever we attempt to do from reason, is to understand (Prop. xxvi. of this Part); and therefore (Prop. xxviii. of this Part), the highest good of those who follow virtue, is to know God; that is (Prop. xlvi., Part II., and its Schol.), the good which is common to all men, is able to be equally possessed by all men, in so far as they are of the same nature. Q. E. D.

Schol.—But if any one asks, what if the highest good of those who follow virtue, should not be common to all? would it not thence follow, as above (Prop. xxxiv. of this Part), that men, who live under the guidance of reason, that is (Prop. xxxv. of this Part), men, in so far as they agree in nature, would be contrary one to another? He may have this answer: that it arises not from accident, but from the very nature of reason, that the highest good of man is common to all, to wit, because it is deduced from the human essence itself, in as far as it is defined by reason; and because man could not be nor be conceived, if he had not the power of rejoicing in this highest good. For it pertains to the essence of the human mind (Prop. xlvii., Part II.) to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Prop. XXXVII. The good which every one, who follows virtue, seeks for himself, he will desire also for other men, and the more, the greater the knowledge of God he shall have.
Dem.—Men, in as far as they live under the guidance of reason, are most useful to man (Coroll. i., Prop. xxxv., of this Part); and therefore (Prop. xix. of this Part), under the guidance of reason, we shall endeavor of necessity to bring it to pass, that men may live under the guidance of reason. But the good, which every one, who lives by the dictate of reason, that is (Prop. xxiv. of this Part), who follows virtue, seeks for himself, is to understand (Prop. xxvi. of this Part). Therefore, the good, which every one, who follows virtue, seeks for himself, he will desire also for other men. Again, desire, in as far as it relates to the mind, is the very essence of the mind (Aff. Def. i.); but the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (Prop. xi., Part II.), which involves the knowledge of God (Prop. xlvii., Part II.), and without which it can neither be nor be conceived (Prop. xv., Part I.). And therefore the greater knowledge of God the essence of the mind involves, the greater also will be the desire with which he, who follows virtue, desires for another the good which he seeks for himself. Q. E. D.

Otherwise.—The good which man seeks for himself and loves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that others love the same (Prop. xxxi., Part III.). And therefore (Coroll. of same Prop.) he will strive that others love the same. And because this good is common to all, and all are able to rejoice in it (Prop. preceding), therefore he will strive (for the same reason) that all rejoice in the same, and (Prop. xxxvii., Part III.) the more, the more he enjoys this good. Q. E. D.

Schol. 1.—He who endeavors from affection alone, that others should love what he loves, and that others should live according to his disposition, acts from impulse alone, and therefore is odious, especially to those to whom other things are agreeable, and who moreover are also anxious, and are striving with a similar impulse, that others on the other hand should live according to their disposition. Moreover since the highest thing which men seek from affection, is often a good of such a character, that only one can be its possessor, hence it happens that they who love are not
self-consistent in mind, and whilst they rejoice to rehearse
the praises of the thing which they love, they fear they
shall be believed. But he who strives to lead others by
reason, acts not by impulse, but humanely and benignantly,
and is most self-consistent in mind.

Furthermore, whatever we desire and do, of which we
are the cause, in as far as we have an idea of God, or know
him, I refer to Religion. But the desire of well doing,
which is produced by the fact that we are living under the
guidance of reason, I call Piety. Again, the desire with
which a man who lives under the guidance of reason is
possessed of joining others to himself in friendship, I call
Honor; and that is honorable, which men who live under the
guidance of reason praise, and that, on the contrary, base
which opposes the conciliation of friendship. Moreover, I
have also shown what are the foundations of the state.
Again, the difference between true virtue and impotence is
easily perceived from what has been said above, to wit, that
true virtue is nothing else than to live under the sole
guidance of reason; and, therefore, impotence consists in
this alone, that a man suffers himself to be led by things
which are external to himself, and is determined by them
to do those things which the common constitution of ex-
ternal things, but not those things which his own very na-
ture, considered in itself alone, demands. These are the
things which, in the Scholium of Proposition xviii. of this
Part, I promised to demonstrate from which it appears that
the law forbidding the slaying of brutes is founded rather
in idle superstition and effeminate pity than in sober rea-
son. Indeed, reason teaches us the necessity of uniting
with men in seeking our interest, but not with brutes or
things whose nature is different from human nature; but
that the same right which these have in relation to us we
have in relation to them. Yea, since the right of every
thing is defined by the virtue or power of every thing, men
have a far greater right over brutes than these over men.
Still, I do not deny that brutes have sensation; but I deny
that it is not, therefore, lawful for us to consult our inter-
est, and to use them at pleasure, and to treat them as our
convenience may require, since they do not agree with us in nature, and their affections are different in nature from human affections (Schol., Prop. lvii., Part III.). It remains that I should explain what the just is, and what the unjust, what sin and what merit are. Concerning this matter, see the next Scholium.

Schol. II.—In the appendix of Part I., I promised to explain what praise and blame is, what merit and what sin, what the just and what the unjust. As touching praise and blame, I have given an explanation in the Scholium of Proposition xxix., Part III.; but this is the place for speaking concerning the others. But first a few things must be said concerning the natural and civil state of man.

Every one exists by the highest right of nature, and consequently by the highest right of nature every one does those things which follow from the necessity of his own nature; and, therefore, by the highest right of nature every one judges what is good and what is evil, and consults for his own interest according to his own disposition (Props. xix. and xx. of this Part), and avenges himself (Coroll. ii., Prop. xi., Part III.), and strives to preserve that which he loves, and to destroy that which he hates (Prop. xxviii., Part III.). Because, if men would live under the guidance of reason, every one (Coroll. i., Prop. xxxv., of this Part) would possess this in his own right, and without any injury of another. But because they are subject to affections (Coroll., Prop. iv., of this Part) which far exceed human power or virtue (Prop. vi. of this Part), therefore they are often drawn in different directions (Prop. xxxiii. of this Part), and are mutually contrary to one another (Prop. xxxiv. of this Part), whilst they really need one another’s aid (Prop. xxxv. of this Part). In order, therefore, that men may be able to live in concord, and to aid one another, it is necessary that they should yield their natural right, and secure their mutual safety, by willing to do nothing which could issue in the injury of another. But in what way it can be brought about, that men who are necessarily subject to the affections (Coroll., Prop. iv., of this Part), and inconstant and variable (Prop. xxxiii. of this Part),
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may be able to render themselves mutually secure, and to have mutual confidence, appears from Proposition vii. of this Part and Proposition xxxix. of Part III. Namely, because no affection can be restrained, except by an affection stronger and opposed to the affection to be restrained, and because every one abstains from inflicting injury from the fear of greater injury. By this law, then, Society could be established, provided she assumes the right which every one has of avenging himself, and of judging concerning good and evil. She must, therefore, have the power of prescribing the common mode of living, and of passing laws, and of confirming them, not by reason, which is unable to restrain the affections (Schol., Prop. xvii., of this Part), but by threats. But this society, confirmed by laws and by the power of self-preservation, is called the State, and they who are defended by its right are called Citizens. From these things we may easily understand that there is nothing in a state of nature which, by the consent of all, is either good or evil; inasmuch as in a state of nature every one consults only for his own interest, and prompted by his own disposition, and in as far only as he has regard to his own benefit, determines what is good and what evil, and is not obliged by any law to obey any one but himself. In a state of nature, therefore, sin can not be conceived; but it belongs to the civil state, where what is good and evil is determined by the common consent, and where every one is bound to obey the state. Sin, therefore, is nothing else than disobedience, which, for this reason, is punished by the sole right of the state, and, on the contrary, obedience is attributed to the citizen as merit, because, for this very reason, he is judged worthy to enjoy the benefits of the state. Again, in a state of nature, no one is, by common consent, master of any thing, nor is there in nature any thing which can be said to belong to this man and not to that; but all things belong to all; and hence, in the natural state, no wish can be conceived of giving to every one his own, or of taking away from any one that which is his; that is, in a natural state there is nothing which can be called just or unjust, but it belongs to the civil state, where
it is determined, by common consent, what belongs to this man and what to that. From these things it is apparent that the just and the unjust, sin and merit, are external notions, but not attributes which explain the nature of the mind. But enough of this.

Prop. XXXVIII. That which so disposes the human body that it can be affected in very many ways, or which renders the same fit for affecting external bodies in very many ways, is useful to man; and it is the more useful the more fit the body is rendered by it, that it may be affected and may affect other bodies in the greater number of ways. And that, on the contrary, is noxious, which renders the body less fit for these things.

Dem.—The more fit the body is rendered for these things, the more fit is the mind rendered for perceiving (Prop. xiv., Part II.), and, therefore, that which disposes the body in this way, and renders it fit for these things, is necessarily good and useful (Props. xxvi. and xxvii. of this Part), and the more useful, the more fit it is able to render the body for these things, and, on the contrary (Prop. xiv., Part II., inversely, and Props. xxvi. and xxvii. of this Part), noxious, if it renders the body less fit for these things. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXXIX. The things which bring it to pass that the relation of motion and rest which the parts of the human body have to each other should be preserved, are good; and those on the contrary evil, which bring it to pass that the parts of the human body should have a different relation of motion and rest to each other.

Dem.—In order that it may be preserved, the human body needs very many other bodies (Post. iv., Part II.). But that which constitutes the form of the human body, consists in this, that its parts communicate their own motions in a certain relation mutually to each other (Def. before Lemma iv., after Prop. xiii., Part II., which see). Therefore, the things, which effect that the relation of motion and rest which the parts of the human body mutually have to each other, should be preserved, the same preserve the form of the human body, and consequently bring
it to pass (Post. iii. and vi., Part II.) that the human body should be able to be affected in many ways, and to affect in many ways external bodies, and therefore (Prop., preceding) are good. Again, the things which bring it to pass, that the parts of the human body should obtain a different relation of motion and rest, these (same Def., Part II.) bring it to pass that the human body should put on another form, that is (as is self-evident, and as we have said at the close of the preface of this Part), that the human body should be destroyed, and consequently rendered unfit altogether that it should possibly be affected in many ways, and therefore (Prop. preceding) are evil. Q. E. D.

Schol.—To what extent these things are able to benefit or injure the mind, will be explained in the Fifth Part. But here it is to be noted that I understand that the body then undergoes death, when its parts are so disposed that they obtain toward each other a different relation of motion and rest. For I dare not deny that the human body, the circulation of the blood, and other things on account of which the body is supposed to live, being retained, could nevertheless be changed into another nature altogether different from its own. For no reason forces me to decide that the body does not die, unless it is changed into a corpse; but experience itself seems to persuade the reverse. For it sometimes happens that a man undergoes changes of such a character, that I could not well say that he is the same man. I have heard the story of a Spanish poet, who had been seized by a disease, and who, although he recovered from it, remained, nevertheless, so oblivious of his past life, that he would not believe the fables and tragedies which he had made to be his own. Indeed, he might have been regarded as a grown up infant, if he had also forgotten his native tongue. And if this seems incredible, what shall we say concerning infants? A man of advanced age believes their nature to be so different from his own, that he could not be persuaded that he ever had been an infant, except from the case of others he made the same supposition concerning himself. But not to supply to the superstitions
material for raising new questions, I choose to drop this
subject in the middle.

PROP. XL. Things which contribute to the common society
of men, or which bring it to pass that men live harmonious,
are useful, and those on the contrary, evil, which introduce dis-
cord into the state.

Dem.—For things, which bring it to pass, that men live
harmoniously, at the same time bring it to pass that they
live under the guidance of reason (Prop. xxxv. of this
Part), and, therefore (Props. xxvi. and xxvii. of this Part),
are good, and (for the same reason) those on the contrary
are evil, which excite discord.  Q. E. D.

PROP. XLI. Joy is not directly evil, but good; grief, how-
ever, on the contrary, is directly evil.

Dem.—Joy (Prop. xi., Part III., with its Schol.) is an
affection by which the body's power of action is increased
or assisted; but grief, on the contrary, is an affection by
which the body's power of action is diminished or hind-
ered; and, therefore (Prop. xxxviii. of this Part), joy is
directly good, etc.  Q. E. D.

PROP. XLII. Hilarity can not have excess, but is always
good, and on the contrary melancholy is always evil.

Dem.—Hilarity (see Def. in Schol., Prop. xi., Part III.)
is joy, which, in so far as it refers to the body, consists in
this, that all the parts of the body are equally affected,
that is (Prop. xi., Part III.), that the body's power of action
is increased or assisted, so that all its parts obtain to each
other the same relation of motion and rest; and, therefore
(Prop. xxxix. of this Part), hilarity is always good, and
can not have excess.  But melancholy (whose Def. see in
same Schol., Prop. xi., Part III.) is grief, which, in so far
as it relates to the body, consists in this, that the body's
power of action is absolutely diminished or hindered, and,
therefore (Prop. xxxviii. of this Part), is always evil.  Q.
E. D.

PROP. XLIII. Titillation is able to have excess, and to be
evil, but pain is able to be good in so far as titillation or joy is
evil.

Dem.—Titillation is joy, which, in as far as it relates to
the body, consists in this, that one or several of its parts are affected beyond the rest (see its Def. in Schol., Prop. xi., Part III.). Of this affection the power is able to become so great as to overcome the other activities of the body (Prop. vi. of this Part), and adhere obstinately to it, and therefore prevent the body from being fit to be affected in the highest number of other ways, and, therefore (Prop. xxxviii. of this Part), is able to be evil. Again, pain, which on the contrary is grief, considered in itself, is not able to be good (Prop. xli. of this Part). But because its force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own (Prop. v. of this Part), we are able, for this reason, to conceive infinite degrees and modes of the force of this affection (Prop. iii. of this Part); and, therefore, to conceive it to be such, that it may be able to restrain titillation so that it will not have excess, and to that extent (by first part of this Prop.) to bring it to pass that the body should not be rendered less fit, and, therefore, to that extent, will be good. Q. E. D.

Prop. XLIV. Love and desire are able to have excess.

Dem.—Love is joy (Def. vi., Aff.), with the concomitant idea of an external cause. Titillation, therefore (Schol., Prop. xi., Part III.), is love, with the concomitant idea of an external cause; Love, therefore (Prop. preceding), is able to have excess. Again desire is the greater, the greater the affection from which it springs (Prop. xxxvii., Part III.). Wherefore, as the affection is able (Prop. vi. of this Part) to overcome the other activities of the man, so also will the desire, which springs from the same affection, be able to overcome the other desires, and hence to have the same excess, which in the preceding Proposition we have shown titillation to have. Q. E. D.

Schol.—Hilarity, which I have said is good, is more easily conceived than observed. For the affections, by which we are daily assailed, for the most part relate to some part of the body, which is affected beyond the others, and hence the affections for the most part are in excess, and so detain the mind in the sole contemplation of one object, that it is unable to think of others; and although men are
subject to various affections, and therefore there are rarely found those who are always assailed by one and the same affection, there are still not wanting those to whom one and the same affection obstinately adheres. For we sometimes see men so affected by a single object, that, although it is not present, they still believe it to be in their presence. When this occurs to one not asleep, we say that he is delirious or insane. And we do not regard as less insane those who are inflamed with love, and who dream night and day of a sweet-heart, or a courtesan, because they excite our ridicule. But when a miser thinks of nothing else than gain or money, an ambitious man of glory, etc., these are not considered insane, because they are commonly harmful, and are esteemed worthy of hatred. But in reality avarice, ambition, lust, etc., are species of delirium, although they are not reckoned among diseases.

Prop. XLV. Hatred can never be good.

Dem.—A man whom we hate we endeavor to destroy (Prop. xxxix., Part III.), that is (Prop. xxxvii. of this Part), we strive after something which is evil. Therefore, etc. Q. E. D.

Schol. I.—Let it be noted that I, here and in the sequel, understand by hatred only that which exists towards men.

Coroll. I.—Envy, scorn, contempt, anger, vengeance, and the other affections which are related to hatred, or arise from it, are evil, which is evident also from Prop. xxxix., Part III., and Prop. xxxvii. of this Part.

Coroll. II.—Whatever we seek from the fact that we are affected by hatred is base, and in the state is unjust. This is also evident from Prop. xxxix., Part III., and from the Definition of the base and the unjust, in Schol., Prop. xxxvii., of this Part.

Schol. II.—Between scorn (which, in Coroll. i., I have said is evil) and laughter, I recognize a great difference. For laughter, like jesting, is pure joy; and therefore, provided it falls not into excess, is in itself good (Prop. xli. of this Part). Nothing indeed but grim and gloomy superstition forbids joyousness. For why is it any more important to extinguish hunger and thirst than to expel melancholy?
This is the result of my reasoning, and is my opinion. No divinity, and no other being, save an envious man, delights in my impotence and distress, nor ascribes to us tears, sighs, fear, and other things of this kind, which are the signs of an impotent mind, as a virtue; but, on the contrary, with the greater joy we are affected, we pass to the greater perfection, that is, we necessarily participate the more in the divine nature. It is therefore the part of a wise man to use things, and enjoy them, only not to disgust (for this is not to enjoy). It is the part, I say, of a wise man to refresh himself with moderate and agreeable food and drink, as also with fragrant odors, with the beauty of flourishing plants, with ornamentation, with music, with field sports, theatrical entertainments, and other things of this description, which any one is able to enjoy without any harm to others. For the human body is composed of very many parts of a different nature, which constantly need new and different nutriment, so that the whole body may be equally fit for all the things which are able to follow from its own nature, and consequently that the mind also may be equally fit at the same time for understanding the more. Therefore this mode of life agrees most perfectly, both with our principles and with common practice. Wherefore, if any, this mode of life is best, and in every way to be commended; nor is there any need of speaking more clearly or in detail on these matters.

Prop. XLVI. He who lives under the guidance of reason, strives, as far as he can, to requite with love or generosity the hatred, anger, contempt, etc., of another towards himself.

Dem.—All the affections of hatred are evil (Coroll. i., preceding Prop.); therefore he who lives as far as he can under the guidance of reason, will strive to bring it to pass that he be not assailed by the affections of hatred (Prop. xix. of this Part), and consequently (Prop. xxxvii. of this Part) he will strive that another also may not suffer the same affections. But hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and, on the contrary, can be extinguished by love (Prop. xliii., Part III.), so that hatred may pass over into love (Prop. xlv., Part III.). Therefore he who lives under the guidance of rea-
son will strive to requite another's hatred, etc., with love, that is, with generosity (whose Def. see in Schol., Prop. lix., Part III.). Q. E. D.

_Schol._—He who wishes to avenge injuries with reciprocal hatred lives miserably indeed. But, on the contrary, he who seeks to conquer hatred by love, contends very joyfully and securely. He withstands with equal ease one man and many, and requires in the least possible degree the aid of fortune. But those whom he vanquishes retire from the contest joyful, not from a loss, but from an increase of strength. All which things follow so clearly from the simple definitions of love and of intellect, that there is no need to demonstrate them in detail.

Prop. XLVII. The affections of hope and fear can not be in themselves good.

_Dem._—The affections of hope and fear are not posited without grief. For fear (by Def. xiii., Aff.) is grief, and hope (see Expl., Def. xii. and xiii., Aff.) is not given without fear, and hence (Prop. xlii. of this Part) these affections can not be in themselves good, but only in so far as they are able to restrain the exchanges of joy (Prop. xliii. of this Part). Q. E. D.

_Schol._—Add to this that these affections indicate a defect of knowledge, and impotence of mind, and for this reason also, assurance, despair, transport and remorse, are signs of an impotent mind. For, although assurance and transport are affections of joy, they still suppose that grief has preceded them, namely, hope and fear. The more, therefore, we endeavor to live under the guidance of reason, the more we shall endeavor to free ourselves from the suspense of hope and fear, as far as we can to command fortune, and to guide our actions by the fixed counsel of reason.

Prop. XLVIII. The affections of overestimation and depreciation are always evil.

_Dem._—For these affections (Def., Aff. xxi. and xxii.), are repugnant to reason, and, therefore (Props. xxvi. and xxvii. of this Part), are evil. Q. E. D.

Prop. XLIX. Overestimation easily renders proud the man who is overestimated.
POWERS OF THE AFFECTIONS.

Dem.—If we see that any one from love esteems us beyond justice, we easily glory (Schol., Prop. xli., Part III.), or are affected with joy (Def., Aff. xxx.), and the good which we hear declared concerning ourselves we easily believe (Prop. xxv., Part III.). And, therefore, from self-love we think of ourselves beyond what is just, that is (Def., Aff. xxviii.), we shall easily become proud. Q. E. D.

Prop. L. Pity in a man who lives under the guidance of reason, is in itself evil and useless.

dem.—For pity (Def., Aff. xviii.), is grief, and, therefore (Prop. xli. of this Part), bad in itself, but the good which results from it, namely, that we endeavor to free from misery the man whom we pity (Coroll. iii., Prop. xxvii., Part III.), we shall desire to do from the sole prompting of reason (Prop. xxxvii. of this Part), and only from the sole dictate of reason are we able to do any thing which we certainly know to be good (Prop. xxvii. of this Part). And, therefore, pity in a man who lives under the guidance of reason, is in itself bad and useless. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence it follows, that a man who lives according to the dictates of reason, endeavors, as far as he can, to bring it to pass that he may not be touched by pity.

Schol.—He who rightly knows that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and take place according to the eternal laws and rules of nature, will indeed find nothing which is worthy of hatred, or ridicule, or contempt, nor will he pity any one, but as far as human virtue serves, he will endeavor to do well, as the saying is, and to be happy. Add to this, that he who is easily touched by the affection of pity, and is moved by the misery or the tears of another, often does something of which he subsequently repents, partly because we do nothing from affection which we certainly know to be good, and partly because we are easily deceived by false tears. But I here speak expressly of a man who is living under the guidance of reason. For he who is moved neither by reason nor pity to bring aid to others is rightly called inhuman. For (Prop. xxvii., Part III.), he seems to be unlike a man.
Prop. LI. *Favor is not repugnant to reason, but it is possible for it to agree with it, and to spring from it.*

Dem.—For favor is love towards him who benefits another (Def. xix., Aff.). And, therefore, may be referred to the mind in so far as it is said to act (Prop. lix., Part III.), that is Prop. iii., Part III.), in so far as it understands. And, therefore, it agrees with reason, etc. *Q. E. D.*

Another Proof—He who lives under the guidance of reason, desires for another also, the good which he seeks for himself (Prop. xxxvii. of this Part). Wherefore, his effort to do good is aided by the fact that he sees any one doing good to another, that is (Prop. ii., Part III.), he will rejoice, and that (by hypothesis) with the concomitant idea of him who is benefiting another, and hence (Def. Aff. xix.), he favors him. *Q. E. D.*

Schol.—Indignation, as it is defined by us (Def., Aff. xx.), is necessarily evil (Prop. xlv. of this Part). But it is to be observed that when the Sovereign Power, from the desire of which it is possessed, to keep the peace, punishes a citizen who has injured another, I do not say that It is indignant against the citizen, because it is not excited by hatred to destroy a citizen; but moved by piety rather, It punishes him.

Prop. III. *Self-satisfaction may spring from reason, and that self-satisfaction alone which springs from reason, is the highest which can exist.*

Dem.—Self-satisfaction is joy, springing from the fact that a man contemplates himself and his power of action. (Def., Aff. xxv.) But man's true power of action or virtue is reason itself (Prop. iii., Part III.), which the man clearly and distinctly contemplates (Props. xl. and xliii., Part II.). Therefore, self-satisfaction arises from reason. Again, the man, whilst he contemplates himself, perceives clearly and distinctly, or adequately, only these things which follow from his power of action (Def. ii., Part III.), that is, (Prop. iii., Part III.), which follow from his power of understanding. And, therefore, from this contemplation alone, the highest self-satisfaction which can exist arises. *Q. E. D.*

Schol.—In truth, self-satisfaction is the supreme thing
which we can hope for. For (as we have shown, Prop. xxv. of this Part), no one strives to preserve his own essence for the sake of any end, and because this self-satisfaction is more and more promoted by praise (Coroll., Prop. liii., Part III.), and on the contrary (Coroll. i., Prop. lv., Part III.), is more and more destroyed by blame, therefore, we are chiefly influenced by glory, and can hardly endure life with reproach.

Prop. LIII. *Humility is not virtue, or it does not spring from reason.*

Dem.—*Humility is grief which arises from this, that a man is contemplating his own impotence.* (Def., Aff. xxvi.) But in as far as a man knows himself by true reason, in so far he is supposed to understand his own essence, that is (Prop. vii., Part III.), his own power. Wherefore, if a man, whilst he is contemplating himself, perceives any impotence of his own, this is not from the fact that he understands himself, but (as we have shown, Prop. lv., Part III.), from the fact that his power of action is hindered. But if we suppose that a man conceives his own impotence to be due to the fact that he perceives something greater than himself, by the knowledge of which he sets bounds to his power of action, then we conceive nothing else than that the man distinctly understands himself (Prop. xxvi. of this Part), [and] that his power of action is promoted. Wherefore, humility or grief arising from the fact that a man is contemplating his own impotence, springs not from a true contemplation, or from reason, nor is it a virtue, but a passion.

Q. E. D.

Prop. LIV. *Penitence is not a virtue, or it does not spring from reason; but he who repents of an act is doubly wretched, or he is impotent.*

Dem.—The first part of this is demonstrated like the preceding proposition. But the second is evident from the sole definition of this affection (Def., Aff. xxvii.). For, in the first place, he suffers himself to be overcome by perverse desire, and then by grief.

Schol.—Because men rarely live according to the dic-
tate of reason, these two affections, humility and penitence, and besides these, hope and fear, bring greater benefit than harm; and therefore, if there must be sin, it is best to sin in this direction. For, if men who are impotent of mind were all equally proud, were ashamed of nothing and feared nothing, by what bonds could they be held together or constrained? The rubble is terrible, unless itself is in terror. Wherefore it is not wonderful that the prophets, who looked to the advantage not of the few but of the many, so highly commend humility, penitence, and reverence. And, in very deed, those who are the subjects of these affections, can be much more easily led than others, so that they may at length live according to the dictates of reason; that is, may be free, and enjoy a happy life.

Prop. LV. The greatest pride, or self-distrust, is the greatest self-ignorance.

Dem.—This is evident from Defs., Affections xxviii. and xxix.

Prop. LVI. The greatest pride, or self-distrust, indicates the greatest impotence of mind.

Dem.—The first foundation of virtue is to preserve one's own essence (Coroll., Prop. xxii. of this Part), and that under the guidance of reason (Prop. xxiv. of this Part). He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the foundation of all the virtues, and consequently of all the virtues themselves. Again, to act according to virtue is nothing else than to act according to the guidance of reason (Prop. xxiv. of this Part); and he who acts according to the guidance of reason, must necessarily know himself to act by the guidance of reason (Prop. xliii., Part II.). He, therefore, who is most ignorant of himself, and, consequently (as we have just shown), of all the virtues, acts least from virtue, that is (as appears from Def. viii. of this Part), is most impotent in mind; and, therefore (Prop. preceding), the greatest pride, or self-distrust, indicates the greatest impotence of mind. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence it follows most clearly, that the proud and the self-distrustful are most subject to the passions.

Schol.—Yet self-distrust can be more easily corrected
than pride, since the latter is an affection of joy, but the former of grief, and therefore (Prop. xviii. of this Part) pride is the stronger.

Prop. LVII. *The proud man loves the presence of parasites, or flatterers, but he hates the noble-minded.*

Dem.—Pride is joy arising from this, that the man thinks of himself more than is just (Defs., Affections xxviii. and xxix.), which opinion the proud man will strive as far as possible to cherish (Schol., Prop. xiii., Part III.). And, therefore, they will love the presence of parasites and flatterers (whose definitions, as well known, I omit), and they will avoid the noble-minded, who think of them according to justice. Q. E. D.

Schol.—It would be tedious to enumerate all the evils of pride, since the proud are subject to all the affections; but to none less than the affections of love and pity. But we must here by no means omit to say, that he will also be called proud who thinks of others less than is just; and, therefore, in this sense pride must be defined, since it is joy springing from a false opinion that the man esteems himself as superior to others. And pusillanimity, in contrast with this pride, is to be defined as grief arising from the false opinion, that the man believes himself to be inferior to others. This being granted, we easily conceive that the proud man is necessarily envious (Schol., Prop. xxxv., Part III.), and that he hates most those who are most praised for their virtues, that his hatred is not easily overcome by love or kindness (Schol., Prop. xii., Part III.), and that he is pleased only by the presence of those who humor his impotent mind, and make an insane man out of a foolish one. Although pusillanimity is contrary to pride, still the pusillanimous man approximates very closely to the proud man. For, since his grief arises from this, that he judges his impotence from the power or virtue of others, his grief therefore will be alleviated, that is, he will rejoice, if his imagination is occupied in contemplating another's vices, whence comes the proverb "misery loves company"; and on the contrary, he will be the more grieved, the more he believes himself to be inferior to others. Hence it comes to
pass, that none are so prone to envy as the pusillanimous; and that they will especially endeavor to observe the deeds of men rather for caviling than to correct them; and that they will praise only pusillanimity, and will boast of it, but in such a way as to seem pusillanimous. And these things follow as necessarily from this affection, as from the nature of a triangle it follows that its three angles are equal to two right ones. And now I have said that I call these and similar affections evil, in as far as I attend to human utility alone. But the laws of nature respect the common order of nature, of which man is a part. I desire, in passing, to make this observation, lest any one should suppose that my purpose has been to speak of the vices and absurd acts of men, rather than to demonstrate the nature and properties of things. For, as I have remarked in the preface of Part III., I consider human affections, and their properties, precisely as I do other natural objects. And, assuredly, the human affections indicate, if not human power, yet the power and skill of nature not less than many other things which we admire, and with the contemplation of which we are delighted. But I proceed to note those things concerning the affections which bring advantage to men, or which bring injury to them.

Prop. LVIII. Glory is not repugnant to reason, but may spring from it.

Dem.—This is evident from Def., Aff. xxx., and from the definition of the Honorable, which see in Schol. i., Prop. xxxvii., of this Part.

Schol.—That which is called vainglory is self-satisfaction, which is sustained solely by the opinion of the multitude, and this ceasing, the self-satisfaction itself ceases, that is (Schol., Prop. lii., of this Part), the supreme good which every one loves. Whence it comes to pass that he who grounds his fame on the opinion of the multitude, with constant care and anxiety, strives, acts, and seeks to maintain his fame. For the rabble is changeable and inconstant, and speedily disappears if one’s fame is not preserved; indeed, since all desire to catch the applause of the multitude, every one easily checks the fame of another.
Hence, since the strife is concerning what is esteemed to be the highest good, a prodigious zeal springs up to put one another down by any means, and he who at length comes off victor may rather boast that he has injured another, than profited himself. This glory, therefore, or self-satisfaction, is truly vain, because it is a nullity.

What is to be said concerning shame may be easily gathered from what we have said concerning pity and penitence. I add only this, that as pity, so also shame, although it is not a virtue, is still good, in so far as it indicates in regard to the man who is affected by shame; that he has a desire to live honorably, as in the case of pain, which to this extent is called good, in so far as it indicates that the injured part has not yet putrified; wherefore, although the man who is ashamed of any act, is in reality in grief, he is still more perfect than the shameless man, who has no desire of living honorably.

These are the matters which I had undertaken to present touching the affections of joy and grief. As touching the desires, these are good or evil according as they spring from good or evil affections. But in truth all of them are blind, in so far as they are produced in us by affections, which are passions (as may be easily inferred from what we have said in Schol., Prop. xliv., of this Part), nor would they be of any use, if men could be easily led to live according to the dictate of reason alone, as I will now in a few words show.

PROP. LIX. To all actions to which we can be determined by an affection, which is a passion, we can be determined without it by reason.

Dem.—To act from reason is nothing else (Prop. iii., and Def. ii., Part III.) than to do those things which follow from the necessity of our nature, considered in itself alone. But grief is an evil in so far as it diminishes or hinders the power of action (Prop. xli. of this Part). Therefore, from this affection we can be determined to no action, which we could not do if we were led by reason. Moreover, joy is evil only in so far as it prevents that a man should be fitted for action (Prop. xli. and xliii. of this Part), and therefore, to this extent also we can be determined to no action, which
we could not do if we were led by reason. Finally, in as far as joy is good, in so far it accords with reason (for it consists in this, that the man’s power of action is increased or assisted), and it is a passion only in as far as the man’s power of action is thereby not increased to that extent that he does not adequately conceive himself and his own actions (Prop. iii., Part III., with its Schol.). Therefore, if a man affected by joy should be led to such perfection that he should conceive himself and his actions adequately, he would be fitted, yea better fitted, for the same actions to which he is now determined by affections, which are passions. But all affections are resolvable into joy, grief, and desire (see Exp., Def., Aff. iv.), and desire (Def., Aff. i.) is nothing else than the effort of action itself. Therefore, to all actions to which we are determined by affection, which is passion, we are able to be led without it by reason alone. Q. E. D.

Otherwise—Every action is called evil, in so far as it arises from the fact that we are excited by hatred or any evil affection (Coroll. i., Prop. xliv., of this Part). But no action, considered in itself alone, is good or evil (as we have shown in the preface of this Part), but one and the same action is now good and now evil. Therefore, we can be led by reason to the same action, which is now evil, or which springs from some evil affection (Prop. xix. of this Part). Q. E. D.

Schol.—These matters are more easily explained by an example. The action of whipping, in as far as it is considered physically, and as we attend to this only, since the man raises his arm, closes his hand, moves his whole arm with force backwards, is a virtue which is conceived of from a view of the entire structure of the human body. If then, a man, moved by anger or hatred, is determined to close his hand, or move his arm, this, as we have shown in Part II., takes place, because one and the same action may be connected with various views of things; and therefore, both from those views of things which we conceive confusedly, and those which we conceive distinctly and clearly, we may be determined to one and the same action.
It appears, therefore, that every desire which springs from an affection, which is a passion, would be of no use if men could be led by reason. We may now see why a desire, which springs from an affection, which is a passion, is called by us blind.

Prop. LX. *A desire which springs from joy or grief, which is related to one, or to several, but not to all parts of the body, does not possess the relation of utility to the whole man.*

Dem.—Let a part of the body, e. g., A, be supposed to be so strengthened by the force of an external cause, that it is more powerful than the rest (Prop. vi. of this Part), this part then will not strive to lose its own powers so that the remaining parts of the body may perform their own office. For it would then possess a force or power of losing its own powers, which (Prop. vi., Part III.) is absurd. Therefore this part, and consequently (Props. vii. and xii., Part III.), the mind also will strive to preserve this condition; therefore a desire which springs from such an affection of joy does not possess a relation to the whole. But, if on the contrary, the part A is supposed to be restrained, so that the rest are too strong for it, it may be demonstrated in the same way that neither does the desire which springs from grief possess a relation to the whole. *Q. E. D.*

Schol.—Since, then, joy oftentimes (Schol., Prop. xlii., of this Part) relates to one part of the body, we therefore oftentimes desire to preserve our essence, no regard being had to our whole health. Add to this, that the desires by which we are most engrossed (Coroll., Prop. ix., of this Part) have regard only to the present time, and not to the future.

Prop. LXI. *Desire which springs from reason can not have excess.*

Dem.—Desire (Def., Aff. i.), absolutely considered, is itself the essence of man, in as far as it is conceived of as determined in any way to do something. Therefore, desire which springs from reason, that is (Prop. iii., Part III.), which is produced in us in as far as we act, is itself the essence of man or his nature, in as far as it is conceived of as determined to do those things which are adequately conceived by the sole essence of man. (Def. ii., Part III.). If,
therefore, this desire could have excess, then human nature, considered in itself alone, would be able to exceed itself, or could do more than it can, which is a manifest contradiction. And, therefore, this desire can not have excess. Q. E. D.

Prop. LXII. In as far as the mind conceives things under the guidance of reason, it is equally affected whether the idea is of a thing future, or past, or present.

Dem.—Whatever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, this whole conception is made under the same relation of eternity, or necessity (Coroll. ii., Prop. xliiv., Part II.), and it is affected with the same certainty (Prop. xliii., Part II., and its Schol.). Therefore, whether the idea is of a future thing, or a past, or a present, the mind conceives the thing by the same necessity, and is affected with the same certainty, and whether the idea is of a thing future, or past, or present, it will still be equally true (Prop. xli., Part II.), that is (Def. iv., Part II.), it will still have always the same properties of an adequate idea. And, therefore, in as far as the mind conceives things under the guidance of reason, it is affected in the same way, whether the idea is of a thing future, past, or present. Q. E. D.

Schol.—If we could have an adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and could determine by reason their times of existence, we should contemplate with the same regard things future and present, and the good which the mind conceives of as future, it would desire, as much as the present, and, therefore, it would necessarily neglect a less present good, for a greater future one, and what would be in the present a good, but the cause of some future evil, it would by no means desire, as we shall presently demonstrate. But concerning the duration of things (Prop. xxxvi., Part II.), we can have only a very inadequate knowledge, and we determine the times of the existence of things (Schol., Prop. xliiv., Part II.), by the imagination alone, which is not equally moved by the image of a present thing and of a future. Whence it comes to pass that the true knowledge of good and evil which we have is only abstract or universal, and the judgment which we form concerning
the order of things, and the connection of causes, that we
may be able to determine what may be good or evil to us
at present, is rather imaginary than real. And, therefore,
it is not wonderful if the desire which springs from the
knowledge of good and evil, in so far as this regards the
future, is capable of being more easily repressed than the
desire of things which are agreeable at present. Concern-
ing this, see Proposition xviii. of this Part.

PROP. LXIII. He who is led by fear, and does good that
he may avoid evil, is not governed by reason.

Dem.—All affections which relate to the mind, in as far
as it acts, that is (Prop. iii., Part III.), which relate to the
reason, are no other than the affections of joy and desire
(Prop. lix., Part III.). And, therefore (Def., Aff. xiii.), he
who is led by fear, and does good from the fear of evil is
not governed by reason. Q. E. D.

Schol. I.—The superstitious, who know better how to de-
nounce vices than to teach virtues, and who seek not to
lead men by reason, but so to restrain them by fear, that
they may rather flee from evil, than love the virtues, aim
at nothing else than that others should become equally
miserable with themselves, and, therefore, it is not to be
wondered at that they are often troublesome and disgusting
to men.

Coroll.—By the desire which springs from reason we pur-
sue good directly, and flee from evil indirectly.

Dem.—For the desire which springs from reason, can
arise from the sole affection of joy, which is not passion
(Prop. lix., Part III.), that is, from joy which can not have
excess (Prop. lxi. of this Part), but not from grief. And,
therefore, this desire springs (Prop. viii. of this Part), from a
knowledge of the good, but not of the evil. And, there-
fore, under the guidance of reason we seek the good di-
rectly, and to that extent only avoid the evil. Q. E. D.

Schol. II.—This corollary is explained by the example of
the sick and the well man. The sick man swallows that
which he dislikes from the fear of death, but the well man
delights in food, and thus enjoys life better than if he feared
death, and desired directly to avoid it. If a judge, not
from hatred, anger, etc., but solely from a regard to the public welfare, condemns a culprit to death, he is governed by reason alone.

Prop. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge.

Dem.—The knowledge of evil (Prop. viii. of this Part), is grief itself, in as far as we are conscious of the same. But grief is a transition to a less perfection (Def., Aff. iii.), which, moreover, can not be understood by the essence of man itself (Props. vi. and vii., Part III.). And, hence, (Def. ii., Part III.), is passion, which (Prop. iii., Part III.), rests upon inadequate ideas, and consequently (Prop. xxix., Part II.), the knowledge of it, namely, the knowledge of evil, is inadequate. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence it follows that if the human mind had only adequate ideas, it would form no notion of evil.

Prop. LXV. We should follow, under the prompting of reason, of two goods, the greater, and of two evils, the less.

Dem.—A good which prevents us from enjoying a greater good, is in reality an evil, for evil and good (as we have shown in the preface of this Part), are spoken of things, in as far as we reciprocally compare them, and (for the same reason), a less evil is in reality a good. Wherefore (Coroll., Prop. preceding), under the conduct of reason, we seek or pursue, only the greater good, or the less evil. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Under the prompting of reason we seek a less evil for the sake of a greater good, and we neglect a less good, which is the cause of a greater evil. For the evil, which is here called less, is in reality a good, and the good, on the contrary evil. Wherefore (Coroll., Prop. preceding) we seek the one and neglect the other. Q. E. D.

Prop. LXVI. Under the guidance of reason we seek a future greater good in preference to a less present one, and a less present evil, which is the cause of some future evil.

Dem.—If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of a future thing, it would be moved by the same affection toward a future thing as toward a present (Prop. lxii. of this Part). Wherefore, as far as we attend to reason
POWERS OF THE AFFECTIONS.

itself, as in this Proposition we suppose ourselves to do, it is the same thing, whether a greater good, or a future evil, or a present, is supposed. And hence (Prop. lxiii. of this Part) we prefer a future greater good to a present less one, etc. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Under the guidance of reason we shall seek a less present evil, which is the cause of a greater future good, and we shall neglect a less present good, which is the cause of a greater future evil. This Corollary bears the same relation to the preceding Proposition, as the Coroll. of Prop. lxv. bears to its Proposition.

Schol.—If these things are compared with those which we have shown in this Part, as far as to Prop. xviii., concerning the powers of the affections, we shall easily see what is the difference between the man who is governed by affection alone, or opinion, and the man who is guided by reason. For the former wills, avoids, and does things of which he is in the greatest ignorance; but the latter obeys himself alone, and does only those things which he knows to be of the first importance in life, and which moreover he most desires, and, therefore, I call the former a slave, and the latter a free man; and I desire to add a few observations concerning this man's disposition and mode of life.

Prop. LXVII. The free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation of life, not of death.

Dem.—A free man, that is, one who lives by the dictate of reason alone, is not ruled by the fear of death (Prop. lxiii. of this Part); but he desires good directly (Coroll. of same Prop.), that is (Prop. xxiv. of this Part), to act, live, preserve his essence, on the basis of seeking his own benefit. And, therefore, he thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation of life. Q. E. D.

Prop. LXVIII. If men were born free, they would form no conception of good and evil, as long as they remained free.

Dem.—I have said that he is a free man, who is led by reason alone. Therefore he, who is born free and remains free, has only adequate ideas, and hence has no conception
of evil (Coroll., Prop. lxxiv., of this Part), and consequently (for good and evil are correlative) not of good.  Q. E. D.

Schol.—That the hypothesis of this Proposition is false, and can not be conceived possible, except in so far as we attend to human nature alone, or rather to God, not as infinite, but as far only as he is the cause why man exists, is evident from Proposition iv. of this Part. But this thing, and others which we have now demonstrated, seem to have been signified by Moses, in his history of the first man. For in this no other power of God is conceived, except that by which he created man, that is, the power by which he designed man’s benefit alone; and in this view, he relates that God prohibited the free man from eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that as soon as he should eat of it, he would at once fear death, rather than desire to live. Again, that a wife having been formed from the man who was altogether in harmony with his own nature, he knew that there could be nothing in nature, which could be more useful to him than she; but because he afterward believed that brutes were similar to himself, he immediately began to imitate their affections (Prop. xxxvii., Part III.), and to lose his liberty which the patriarch afterward regained, led by the spirit of Christ, that is, the idea of God, upon which alone it depends that man may become free, and may desire for other men the good which he desires for himself, as we have demonstrated before (Prop. xxxvii. of this Part).

Prop. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be equally great in avoiding as in overcoming dangers.

Dem.—An affection can be restrained and destroyed only by being controlled by a contrary and stronger affection (Prop. vii. of this Part). But blind audacity and fear are affections, which can be conceived as equally great (Props. iii. and v. of this Part). Therefore, equally great virtue of soul or fortitude (Def. in Schol., Prop. lix., Part III.) is required for restraining audacity as for restraining fear, that is (Def., Aff. xl. and xlii.), a free man declines dangers, moved by the same virtue of soul by which he attempts to overcome the same.  Q. E. D.
Coroll.—Therefore, to a free man a flight, in time, is reckoned as belonging to animosity in as high a degree as a battle; or a free man by the same animosity or presence of mind by which he chooses contest, chooses also flight.

Schol.—What animosity is, or what I understand by it, I have explained in Schol., Prop. lix., Part III. By danger, however, I understand every thing which can be the cause of any evil, to-wit, of grief, hatred, discord, etc.

Prop. LXX. A free man who lives among the ignorant, strives as far as possible to decline their favors.

Dem.—Every one judges from his own disposition what is good (Schol., Prop. xxxix., Part III.). Therefore, an ignorant man who confers a favor upon any one, will estimate this according to his own disposition, and if he sees it less esteemed by him to whom it is given, will be grieved (Prop. xlii., Part III.). But a free man is pleased to unite other men to himself in friendship (Prop. xxxvii. of this Part), and he bestows benefits, not which according to their affection they will esteem equally great, but he strives to lead both himself and others by a free judgment of reason, and to do only those things which he knows to be of the first importance. Therefore, a free man, that he may be subject neither to the hatred nor the appetite of the ignorant, but may obey reason alone, will endeavor, as far as possible, to decline their favors. Q. E. D.

Schol.—I say as far as possible. For, although men are ignorant, they are yet men who are able to bring human aid in necessities, than which nothing is better. And, therefore, it often happens that it is necessary to accept favor from them, and, consequently, to thank them in return, according to their dispositions. To which it may be added, that caution ought also to be had in declining favors, lest we seem to despise them, or to fear remuneration from avarice, and thus, whilst we are avoiding their hatred, may, in this way, offend them. Wherefore, in declining favors, regard must be had to a good and honorable reason.

Prop. LXXI. Free men alone are mutually most grateful.
Dem.—Free men alone are mutually most useful, and are united by the strongest necessity of friendship (Prop. xxxv. of this Part and i. of its Coroll.), and with an equal zeal of love, strive to benefit each other (Prop. xxxvii. of this Part). And, therefore (Def., Aff. xxxiv.), free men alone are mutually most grateful. Q. E. D.

Schol.—The favor which men who are governed by blind desire have to each other is often a mercenary trick or enticement, rather than a favor. Moreover, ingratitude is no affection. Still, ingratitude is base, because it shows, for the most part, that the man is affected with excessive hatred, anger, or pride, or avarice, etc. For he who, through stupidity, does not know how to compensate gifts, is not ungrateful, and, much less, he who is moved by the gifts of a mistress to serve her passion, or of a thief to conceal his thefts, or any thing of this kind. For here, on the contrary, he shows that he has a constant mind who permits himself to be corrupted by no gifts to his own or the general injury.

Prop. LXXII. A free man will never act from a covert evil purpose, but always with good faith.

Dem.—If a free man should do any thing, in as far as he is free, with a covert evil intent, he would do this from the dictate of reason (for to that extent only is he called by us free); and, therefore, to act from a covert evil intent, would be a virtue (Prop. xxiv. of this Part), and, consequently (same Prop.), it would be more advisable for every one, in order to preserve his own essence, to act from a covert evil intent, that is (as is self-evident), it would be more advisable for men to agree only in words, but to be contrary to each other in reality, which (Coroll., Prop. xxxi., of this Part) is absurd. Therefore, a free man, etc. Q. E. D.

Schol.—If, now, it is asked, “if a man could free himself by perfidy from the immediate peril of death, whether the reason of preserving his own essence should not persuade him that he should be peridious?” the answer is thus: “that if reason persuades this, then it persuadest it to all men, and, therefore, reason altogether advises that they should enter into covenant only upon a covert evil intent
to unite forces and have common law, that is, that they should, in reality, have no laws, which is absurd."

Prop. LXXVIII. A man who follows reason is more free in a state where he lives according to the common decree, than in a desert, where he obeys himself alone.

Dem.—A man who is moved by reason is not led by fear to obedience (Prop. lxiii. of this Part), but, in as far as he endeavors to preserve his own essence by the dictate of reason, that is (Schol., Prop. lxvi., of this Part), in so far he strives to live freely and to keep the method of the common life and weal (Prop. xxxvii. of this Part), and, consequently (as shown, Schol. ii., Prop. xxxvii., of this Part), desires to live according to the common decree of the state. Therefore, a man who is led by reason, desires, in order that he may live more freely, to maintain the common laws of the state. Q. E. D.

Schol.—These and like things which we have shown concerning the true liberty of man are related to fortitude, that is (Schol. Prop., lix., Part III.), to animosity and generosity. I do not think it worth while here to demonstrate separately all the properties of fortitude, and, much less, that a brave man hates no one, is angry at no one, envies, disdains, despises no man, and is by no means proud. For these things, and all things which appertain to true life and religion, are easily proved from Props. xxxvii. and xlvi. of this Part, namely, that hatred is to be overcome by love, and that every one who is governed by reason desires that the good which he seeks for himself may accrue to others also. To which it may be added, that we have noted in the Scholium of Proposition 1. of this Part, and elsewhere, that a brave man especially considers this, to wit, that all things may follow according to the necessity of the divine nature, and hence, whatever he thinks to be troublesome and evil, and whatever, moreover, seems impious, shocking, injurious, and base, arises from the circumstance that he conceives these very things in a perturbed, mutilated, and confused manner. For this cause he strives especially to conceive things as they are in themselves, and to remove the impediments of true knowledge,
as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and other things of this kind, which we have noted above. And, therefore, as far as possible, as we have said, he strives to do well, and to be happy. To what extent, however, human virtue avails in securing these ends, and what it can do, I shall demonstrate in the next Part.

APPENDIX.

What I have presented in this Part, concerning the right method of life, is not so arranged that it can be seen at a single view, but these things have been demonstrated in a fragmentary way, according as I was able most easily to deduce one from another. I here propose, therefore, to gather them up and reduce them to chapters.

Chapter I.—All our efforts or desires so follow from a necessity of our nature that they are able to be understood by it alone, as by their own proximate cause, or how far forth we are a part of nature, which can not be adequately conceived by itself without reference to other individuals.

Chap. II.—The desires which so follow from our nature that they may be understood by it alone, are those which relate to the mind, as far as this is conceived to consist of adequate ideas; but the other desires do not relate to the mind, except in so far as it conceives things inadequately; and their force and growth are to be defined not by human power, but by the power of things without us. And, therefore, the former are rightly called actions, but the latter passions. For the former always indicate our own power, and the latter on the contrary our impotence and mutilated knowledge.

Chap. III.—Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by the power of man, or by reason, are always good, but the rest may be both good and evil.

Chap. IV.—In life, therefore, it is a matter of the first utility to perfect, as far as we are able, the intellect or reason, and the highest felicity or beatitude of man consists in this alone, for beatitude is nothing else than the satisfaction of mind itself, which springs from an intuitive knowledge of God. But to perfect the intellect is also nothing else than to understand God, and the attributes
and actions of God which follow from the necessity of his nature. Wherefore, the final end of the man who is led by reason, that is, the chief desire by which he strives to govern all the rest, is that, by which he is inclined adequately to conceive himself and all things which can fall under his intelligence.

Chap. V.—Therefore no rational life is without intelligence, and things are good only in so far as they aid man to enjoy the life of the mind, which is defined as intelligence. On the contrary, the things which hinder the possibility that a man should perfect his reason and enjoy a rational life, these alone we declare to be evil.

Chap. VI.—But because all these things, of which man is the efficient cause, are necessarily good, therefore, no evil can happen to man, except from external causes, to-wit, in so far as he is a part of the totality of nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to which it is forced to accommodate itself in almost infinite ways.

Chap. VII.—It can not be that man is not a part of nature, and does not obey its common order, but if he dwells among such individuals as agree with the nature of man himself, by this fact his power of acting will be aided and promoted. But if on the other hand with such as by no means agree with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate himself to the same without a great change in himself.

Chap. VIII.—Whatever there is in nature, which we judge to be evil, or to be able to prevent us from existing and enjoying a rational life, this, it is lawful for us to remove in whatever way seems most safe. And whatever on the contrary there is which we judge good, or useful for preserving our essence, and for our enjoyment of a rational life, this it is lawful that we take for our use and use it in any way. And, absolutely, it is lawful for every one by the highest law of nature, to do that which he judges to contribute to his benefit.

Chap. IX.—Nothing can more agree with the nature of any thing than the remaining individuals of the same
species; and, therefore (Chap. vii.), there is nothing more useful for a man for preserving his own essence and enjoying a rational life, than a man who is governed by reason. Again, because among individual things, we know nothing which is more excellent than a man who is governed by reason, therefore in no way can any one better demonstrate how great the reach of art and talent are than in so educating men, that at length they may live under the proper empire of reason.

Chap. X.—In as far as men are governed by envy or any affection of hatred in relation to each other, to that extent they are mutually contrary, and consequently are the more to be feared, in proportion to their power, than the other individuals of nature.

Chap. XI.—Still, minds are subdued not by arms, but by love and generosity.

Chap. XII.—It is in the highest degree useful to men to join in customs, and bind themselves by bonds, by which they may the more easily reduce themselves all to one, and, absolutely, to do those things which look to the establishment of friendships.

Chap. XIII.—But, for this, art and vigilance are required. For men are fickle (since there are few who live according to the prescription of reason), and yet for the most part they are envious, and are more inclined to revenge than to pity. That every one, therefore, according to his disposition, should bear and restrain himself, lest he should imitate their affections, there is need of special force of mind. But they on the other hand, who know better how to defame and lash the vices than to teach the virtues, and who, instead of strengthening the minds of men, weaken them, these are a burden both to themselves and others. For this reason many, from too great impatience of mind, and from a false religious zeal, have chosen rather to live with the brutes than among men, as also have lads and youth, who could not bear with equanimity the reproofs of their parents, taken refuge in the army, and have preferred the horrors of war and the rule of tyranny to domestic peace in connection with paternal admonitions,
and have suffered any burden whatever to be imposed on
them, provided they might avenge themselves on their
parents.

Chap. XIV.—Although, therefore, men for the most
part manage every thing according to their own lusts, still
many more advantages than disadvantages accrue from
their common association. Wherefore, it is better to bear
their injuries with equanimity, and give heed to those
things which look toward the conciliation of harmony
and friendship.

Chap. XV.—The things which produce harmony are
the things which relate to justice, equity, and honor. For
men, to say nothing of what is unjust and iniquitous, re-
sent what is esteemed base, or when any one treats with con-
tempt the received customs of the state. But for concilia-
ting love, those things are of primary importance, which
look to religion and piety. Concerning these see Schol. i.
and ii., Prop. xxxvii., and Schol., Prop. xlvi., and Schol.,
Prop. lxxiii., Part IV.

Chap. XVI.—Harmony also, is not unfrequently pro-
duced by fear; but without good faith. Add to this that
fear springs from impotence of mind, and moreover can
not be used by reason. The same is true of pity, although
it seems to wear an appearance of piety.

Chap. XVII.—Moreover men are also subdued by
bounty, especially those who are not able to procure the
means necessary to support life. But to give aid to every
poor man would far surpass the ability or the interest of a
private person. For the wealth of a private person is alto-
gether unequal to supply this. Moreover, the ability of a
single man is too limited to render possible that he should
unite all to himself in friendship. Wherefore the care of
the poor falls upon the whole community, and looks only to
the common welfare.

Chap. XVIII. Entirely different must the care be which
is taken in receiving benefits, and in returning thanks, con-
cerning which see Schol., Prop. lxx., and Schol., Prop.
lxxi., Part IV.

Chap. XIX.—Furthermore, meretricious love, that is,
the lust of procreation, which springs from beauty, and absolutely, all love which recognizes any other cause than freedom of mind, passes easily into hatred, unless, what is worse, it is a species of delirium, and then it is promoted rather by strife than by harmony. See Coroll., Prop. xxxi., Part III.

Chap. XX.—As touching marriage, it is certain that it agrees with reason, if the desire of sexual union is produced not by beauty alone, but by the desire of procreating and wisely educating children; and, furthermore, if the love of each, both husband and wife, has not simple beauty, but especially freedom of mind, as its cause.

Chap. XXI.—Again, flattery produces concord, but through the shameful crime of servility, or through perfidy; for none are more captivated by flattery than the proud, who wish to be first, but are not.

Chap. XXII. In pusillanimity there is a false appearance of piety and religion. And although pusillanimity is contrary to pride, the pusillanimous man still approximates the proud man. See Schol., Prop. lvii., Part IV.

Chap. XXIII.—Moreover, shame promotes concord only in those things which can not be concealed. Again, because shame itself is a species of grief, it does not belong to the realm of reason.

Chap. XXIV. The other affections of grief relating to men are directly opposed to justice, equity, honor, piety, and religion; and although indignation seems to wear the appearance of equity, yet there is here a condition of life without law, where it is lawful for every one to pass judgment on the deeds of another, or to vindicate his own or another’s rights.

Chap. XXV.—Modesty, that is, the desire of pleasing men which is determined by reason, stands related to piety (as we have said in Schol. Prop. xxxvii., Part IV.). But, if it springs from affection, it is ambition, or a desire by which men, under a false image of piety, often excite discord and sedition. For, he who desires to aid his fellow men by counsel or deed, so that they may together enjoy the
highest good, will be specially studious to conciliate their love to himself; but not to draw them into admiration, so that his doctrine shall derive its name from him, and absolutely he will be cautious to give no occasion to envy. Again, in common conversation, he will avoid referring to the vices of men, and will be careful to speak only sparingly of human impotence; but will speak largely of human virtue, or power, and of the possibility of perfecting it, so that men thus moved, not by fear or aversion, but by the sole affection of joy, may endeavor to live, as much as in them lies, by the requirements of reason.

Chap. XXVI.—Aside from men, we know of no individual in nature in whose soul we are able to rejoice, and which we can unite with ourselves in friendship, or in any kind of intercourse. And, therefore, whatever there is in nature aside from men, this a regard for our own interest does not require us to preserve, but according to its various utilities teaches us to preserve, to destroy, or in any way to adapt to our use.

Chap. XXVII.—The benefit which we derive from the things which are without us, aside from the experience and knowledge which we acquire from the fact that we observe them, and may change them from their present into other forms, is chiefly the preservation of the body. And in this relation those things are especially useful, which are able so to sustain and nourish the body, that all its parts may be able rightly to perform their functions. For the better adapted the body is to be affected in the most various possible ways, and to affect in the greatest variety of ways external bodies, the better fitted is the mind for thinking (Props. xxxviii. and xxxix., Part IV.). But there seem to be very few things of this character in nature. Wherefore, for nourishing the body as is required, many aliments of different nature must be used. For the human body is composed of parts of diverse nature, which need continual and various aliments, that the whole body may be equally fitted for all the things which are able to follow from its nature, and, consequently, that the mind also may be equally fitted for conceiving the greater number of things.
Chap. XXVIII.—But, for securing these things, the powers of scarcely any one would suffice, unless men mutually assisted each other. But money presents a compendium of every thing. Whence it happens, that the image of this is wont especially to occupy the mind of the multitude; because they are able to imagine scarcely any species of joy, without the associated idea of money as its cause.

Chap. XXIX.—But this is a vice only in the case of those who seek money, not on account of poverty or for their necessities, but because they have learned those arts of gain by which they render themselves wealthy. But the body they supply according to custom; yet sparingly, because they think themselves losing so much of their property as they expend upon the preservation of the body. But those who know the true use of money, and who measure the amount of wealth by their wants alone, these live content with little.

Chap. XXX.—Since, therefore, those things are good which assist the parts of the body in discharging their office, and since joy consists in this, that the power of the man, in so far as it consists in mind and body, is aided or increased; therefore, all those things which bring joy are goods. But since, on the other hand, things do not act to this end that they bring in joy, and since their power of action is not controlled by our interest, and finally, since joy often relates especially to one part of the body, therefore, often the affections of joy (unless reason and vigilance are employed), and, consequently, also the desires which are generated by them have excess. To this may be added that from affection we may have that first which, for the present, is pleasant, and that we are not able to estimate the future results from a similar state of the soul. See Schol., Prop. xlv., and Schol., Prop. lx., Part IV.

Chap. XXXI.—But superstition, on the contrary, seems to determine that to be good which brings grief; and that, on the other hand, evil, which brings joy. But, as I have already said (Schol., Prop. xlv., Part IV.), none but an envious man is rejoiced at my impotence and my disadvantage. For the greater the joy by which we are affected, to
the greater perfection do we pass; and, consequently, the
more do we partake of the divine nature; and the joy can
never be evil which a real regard for our own interest gov-
erns. But he who, on the other hand, is led by fear, and
does good that he may avoid evil, is not governed by rea-
son. See Prop. lxxiii., Part IV.

Chap. XXXII.—But human power is very limited, and
is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes;
and we have not, therefore, an absolute power of adapting
the things without us to our use. But still those things
which befall us, contrary to that which a regard to our in-
terest demands, we may bear with equanimity, if we are
conscious that we have discharged our duty; and that the
power which we have was not able to extend itself so far
as to enable us to avoid these things; and that we are a
part of the totality of nature, whose order we follow. If
we clearly and distinctly understand this, that part of us
which is defined as Intelligence, that is, the better part of
us, will entirely acquiesce in this, and will strive to per-
severe in this acquiescence. For, in so far as we are intel-
ligent, we are able to desire nothing except that which is
necessary, and absolutely can acquiesce only in the truth.
Therefore, in as far as we rightly understand these things,
to that extent the effort of the better part of us accords
with the order of universal nature.
PART FIFTH.

CONCERNING THE POWER OF THE INTELLECT,
OR CONCERNING HUMAN LIBERTY.

Preface.

I pass at length to the remaining Part of Ethics, which is concerning the mode or way which conducts to Liberty. In this, therefore, I treat concerning the power of reason, showing what reason itself avails against the affections, and again, what liberty of mind or beatitude is, from which we shall see how superior a wise man is to an ignorant one. But how and in what way the intellect must be perfected, and again, by what art the body must be cared for, that it may be able rightly to discharge its office, does not belong here; the latter appertains to medicine, and the former to logic. Here, therefore, as I have said, I shall treat solely concerning the power of the mind, or the power of reason, and, above all, I shall show how great and what kind of empire it has over the affections for restraining and moderating them. For, that we have not an absolute dominion over them, we have already demonstrated above. Still the Stoics thought that they depend absolutely upon our will, and that we are able to rule them absolutely. However, they were forced by a contrary experience, though not by their principles, to admit that no small practice and zeal are required in order to restrain and control them. This a certain one endeavored to show, if my memory is correct, by the example of two dogs, the one a house dog, the other a hunter: to wit, because, by practice, he was able at length to bring it to pass that the house dog would become accustomed to hunt, and the hunter, on the contrary, to abstain from chasing the hares. This opinion is favored not a little by Des Cartes. For he maintained that the soul or mind is specially attached to a certain part of
the brain, called the pineal gland, by whose aid the mind perceives all the motions which are excited in the body and external objects. This gland the mind is able to move variously by its simple will. This gland, he maintains, remains so suspended in the midst of the brain that it can be moved by the slightest motion of the animal spirits. Again, he thinks that this gland is suspended in the midst of the brain in as many different ways as the ways in which the animal spirits impinge upon it; and, moreover, that as many different traces are imprinted upon it as the different external objects propel the animal spirits themselves against the same; whence it comes to pass that if the gland afterward, by the will of the soul moving it in a different way, is suspended in this or that manner, in which it has once been suspended by the spirits having been agitated in this or that way, then the gland itself will propel and determine the animal spirits themselves in the same way as before they had been repelled by a similar suspension of the gland. Moreover, he thinks that every volition of the mind has been attached by nature to each particular motion of the gland; *e.g.*, if any one has a wish to view a remote object, this volition will cause the pupil to be dilated. But, if he is thinking concerning dilating the pupil only, it will accomplish nothing to have a wish of this thing, because nature has joined the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the spirits toward the optic nerve in a manner answering to dilating or contracting the pupil, not with the volition to dilate or contract the same, but with the wish to see objects remote or near. Finally, he thinks that, although every motion of this gland seems to be connected by nature with our individual thoughts from the beginning of life, they may still be connected by habit with others; which he attempts to prove (Art. 50, Part I., de Pass. Animae). From these things he argues that no soul is so imbecile that it is not able, when rightly directed, to acquire absolute power over its passions. For these, as they are defined by him, are "perceptions, or sensations, or motions of the soul which are specially related to it, and which are produced, preserved, and strengthened"
By some motion of the spirits” (see Art. xxvii., Part I., Pass. Anim.). But since we are able to join each motion of the gland, and consequently of the spirits to any volition; and the determination of the will depends solely upon our power; if, then, we determine our will by distinct and firm judgments, according to which we wish to direct the actions of our life, and join the movements of the passions which we wish to have, to these judgments, we shall acquire an absolute empire over our passions. Such is the sentiment of this most illustrious man, as far as I can conjecture from his language; a judgment which I should scarcely have believed to have been proposed by so great a man, had it been less acute. Indeed, I can not sufficiently wonder, that a philosopher, who had firmly determined not to deduce any thing from principles which were not self-evident, and to affirm nothing except he clearly and distinctly perceived it; and who had so often reprehended the scholastics because they wished to explain obscure things by occult qualities, should adopt a hypothesis more occult than any occult quality. What, I ask, does he understand by the union of mind and body? What clear and distinct conception has he of a thought most closely united to a certain particle of quantity? I could heartily wish that he had explained this union by its own proximate cause. But he had conceived the mind as so distinct from the body, that he was able to assign no particular cause either of this union, or of the mind itself; but it was necessary for him to recur to the cause of the whole universe, that is, to God. Again, I could greatly wish to know how many degrees of motion the mind is able to impart to this pineal gland, and with how great force it can hold it suspended. For I am ignorant whether this gland is moved more slowly or rapidly by the mind, than by the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we have closely joined to firm judgments, can not be again disjoined from the same by corporeal causes; from which it would follow that, although the mind had firmly proposed to go against danger, and had joined to this determination the motion of audacity, nevertheless, the danger
being seen, the gland is so suspended, that the mind is able to think of nothing but flight. And, indeed, since no relation of volition to motion is given, so also is no comparison given between the power, or forces of the mind and body; and consequently the powers of the latter can not be determined by those of the former. Add to this, that this gland is not found so situated in the center of the brain, that it can be moved so easily and in so many ways; and that not all the nerves extend to the cavities of the brain. Finally, I omit all things which he asserts concerning the will and its freedom, since I have sufficiently and superabundantly shown them to be false. Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by intelligence alone, the remedies of the affections, which I believe all experience, but do not accurately observe, nor clearly see, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the mind, and from this shall deduce all those things which look to its beatitude.

**Axioms.**

I. If in the same subject two contrary actions are excited, a change must necessarily take place, either in both or in one alone, until they cease to be contrary.

II. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, in as far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of the cause itself. This axiom is evident from Prop. vii., Part III.

**Propositions.**

**Proposition I.** Precisely as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and connected in the mind, exactly in the same way are the affections of the body, or the images of things arranged and connected in the body.

*Demonstration.*—The order and connection of ideas is the same (Prop. vii., Part II.) as the order and connection of things, and, *vice versa*, the order and connection of things is the same (Coroll., Props. vi. and vii., Part II.) as the order and connection of ideas. Wherefore, as the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place according to the order and connection of the affections of the
body (Prop. xviii., Part II.), so, vice versa (Prop. ii., Part III.), the order and connection of the affections of the body takes place just as the thoughts and ideas of things are arranged and connected in the mind. Q. E. D.

Prop. II. If we remove the agitation of mind, or the affection springing from the thought of an external cause, and attach it to other thoughts, then love or hatred toward the external cause, as also the fluctuations of mind which spring from these affections, will be destroyed.

Dem.—For that which constitutes the form of love or hatred is joy or grief, with the concomitant idea of the external cause (Defs., Aff., vi. and vii.). This, therefore, being taken away, the form of love or of hatred is taken away with it; and, therefore, these affections, and those which spring from them, are destroyed. Q. E. D.

Prop. III. Affection, which is passion, ceases to be passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.

Dem.—Affection, which is passion, is a confused idea (general Def. Aff.). If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of the affection itself, this idea, in as far as it relates to the mind, is distinguished from the affection itself only by reason (Prop. xxii., Part II., with its Schol.); and, therefore (Prop. iii., Part III.), the affection will cease to be passion. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—The affection, therefore, is the more in our power, and the mind suffers the less from it, the better it is known to us.

Prop. IV. There is no affection of the body, of which we are not able to form some clear and distinct conception.

Dem.—Things which are common to all, can be conceived only adequately (Prop. xxxviii., Part II.). And, therefore (Prop. xii., and Lem. ii. after Schol., Prop. xiii., Part II.), there is no affection of body, of which we are not able to form a clear and distinct conception. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence it follows, that there is no affection, of which we are not able to form a clear and distinct conception. For an affection is an idea of an affection of the body (general Def. Aff.), which, therefore (Prop. preceding), must involve some clear and distinct conception.
POWER OF THE INTELLECT.

Schol.—Since there is nothing from which some effect does not follow (Prop. xxxvi., Part I.), and since whatever follows from an idea in us which is adequate, that, in its totality, we clearly and distinctly understand (Prop. xl., Part II.); hence it follows, that every one has the power of understanding himself and his affections, if not absolutely, at least in part, clearly and distinctly, and, consequently, of effecting that he should suffer from them less. Special attention, therefore, should be given to this that we may know, as far as is possible, every affection clearly and distinctly, that thus the mind from the affection may be determined to think those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and in which it entirely acquiesces; and, therefore, that the affection itself may be separated from the thought of the external cause, and be joined to true thoughts. From which it may come to pass, that not only love, hatred, etc., may be destroyed (Prop. ii. of this Part), but also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to arise from such an affection, can not fall into excess (Prop. lxii., Part IV.). For it is first of all to be observed, that the appetite is one and the same by which a man is said both to act and to suffer—e. g., when we show that it is so ordered by human nature, that every one should desire that others should live according to his disposition (Schol., Prop. xxxxi., Part III.), which appetite, in the man who is not governed by reason, is passion, and is called ambition, and does not differ much from pride; and on the contrary in the man, who lives in accordance with the dictates of reason, is action, or virtue, which is called piety (Schol. i., Prop. xxxvii., Part IV., and Dem. ii. of the same Prop.). And in this way all the appetites or desires are passions in so far only as they spring from inadequate ideas; and the same may be reckoned to virtue, when they are excited or produced by adequate ideas. For all desires, by which we are determined to do anything, can arise from adequate as well as from inadequate ideas (Prop. lix., Part IV.). And (to return from my digression), than this remedy of the affections, which consists in the true cognition of them, nothing more excellent, which depends upon our own
power, can be devised, since there is no other power of mind save that of thinking and forming adequate ideas, as we have before shown. (Prop. iii., Part III.)

Prop. V. An affection toward a thing which we imagine simply, and neither as necessary, nor possible, nor contingent, is, other things being equal, the greatest of all.

Dem.—An affection toward a thing which we imagine to be free, is greater than toward a necessary thing (Prop. xlix., Part III.); and, consequently, greater than toward that which we imagine as possible or contingent (Prop xi., Part IV.). But to imagine any thing as free can be nothing else than that we imagine a thing simply, whilst we are ignorant of the causes by which it has been determined to action (for proof, see Schol., Prop. xxxv., Part II.). Therefore, the affection toward a thing which we imagine simply is greater, other things being equal, than toward a necessary, possible, or contingent thing, and, consequently, the greatest. Q. E. D.

Prop. VI. In so far as the mind understands all things as necessary, to that extent it has greater power over the affections, or it suffers less from them.

Dem.—The mind understands that all things are necessary (Prop. xxix., Part I.), and are determined to exist and to operate by an infinite connection of causes (Prop. xxviii., Part I.). And, therefore (Prop. preceding), to that extent, it brings it to pass, that it suffers less from the affections which arise from them, and (Prop. xlviii., Part III.) it is less affected toward them. Q. E. D.

Schol.—The more this knowledge, to wit, that things are necessary, is employed about individual things which we imagine more distinctly and vividly, the greater is this power of the mind over the affections, which also experience attests. For we see the grief concerning a good which has perished to be mitigated, as soon as the man who has lost it considers that this good could in no way have been preserved. So, also, we see that no one pities an infant because it does not know how to speak, walk, reason, and because, in short, it lives so many years, as it were, ignorant of itself. But if most were born adult, and only
here and there one as an infant, then every one would pity infants; because he would then regard infancy itself not as a natural and necessary thing, but as a vice or fault of nature. And we might note many other things of this character.

Prop. VII. Affections which spring from or are excited by reason, if regard is had to time, are more powerful than those which relate to individual things which are contemplated as absent.

Dem.—We do not contemplate an absent thing with the affection with which we imagine the same thing; but with this, namely, that the body is moved by another affection which excludes the existence of the same thing (Prop. xvii., Part II.). Wherefore the affection, which relates to the thing which we contemplate as absent, is not of such a nature that it surpasses the other actions and powers of the man (Prop. vi., Part IV.); but, on the contrary, is of such a nature, that it can be in some measure coerced by those affections which exclude the existence of its external cause (Prop. ix., Part IV.). But an affection, which springs from reason, relates necessarily to the common properties of things (see Def. of Reason, in Schol. ii., Prop. xl., Part II.), which we always contemplate as present (for there can be nothing which excludes their present existence), and which we always imagine in the same way (Prop. xxxviii., Part II.). Wherefore, such an affection always remains the same, and, consequently (Ax. i. of this Part), affections, which are contrary to the same, and which are not cherished by their own external causes, must accommodate themselves more and more to the same, until they are no longer contrary, and to this extent an affection which springs from reason is the more potent. Q. E. D.

Prop. VIII. The greater the number of concurring causes from which any affection springs, the greater is it.

Dem.—A large number of concurring causes is more powerful than if the causes were fewer (Prop. vii., Part III.), and therefore (Prop. v., Part IV.), the greater the number of concurrent causes by which any affection is excited, the stronger is it. Q. E. D.
Schol.—This Proposition is also evident from Axiom ii. of this Part.

Prop. IX. An affection, which arises from many and different causes, which the mind contemplates in connection with the affection itself, is less harmful, and we suffer less from it, and we are less affected toward any one cause than another equally great affection, which is referable to one single cause, or to fewer causes.

Dem.—To this extent only is an affection evil or harmful, in so far as the mind is rendered by it less able to think (Prop. xxvi. and xxvii., Part IV.); and therefore that affection by which the mind is determined to contemplate at once a larger number of objects is less harmful than another equally great affection which so detains the mind by the sole power of one object, or by the contemplation of fewer objects, that it can not think of others. This was the first point. Again, because the essence of the mind, that is (Prop. vii., Part III.), its power, consists in thought alone (Prop. xi., Part III.); therefore the mind, by the affection, through which it is determined to contemplate many things at once, suffers less than from an equally great affection, which holds the mind in the contemplation of one single object or of fewer objects. This was the second point. Finally, this affection (Prop. xlviii., Part III.), in as far as it is referable to several external causes, is also less towards each one. Q. E. D.

Prop. X. As long as we are not assailed by affections which are contrary to our nature, so long we have the power of arranging and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the understanding.

Dem.—Affections which are contrary to our nature, that is (Prop. xxx., Part IV.), which are evil, are evil in so far as they prevent the mind from understanding (Prop. xxxvii., Part IV.). As long, therefore, as we are not assailed by affections which are contrary to our nature, so long the power of the mind, by which it endeavors to understand things (Prop. xxvi., Part IV.), is not impeded; and therefore so long it has the power of forming clear and distinct ideas, and of deducing others from them (see Schol. ii.,
Prop. xl., and Schol., Prop. xlvi., Part II.); and consequently (Prop. i. of this Part), so long we have the power of arranging and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect. Q. E. D.

Schol.—By this power of rightly ordering and connecting the affections of the body, we are able to bring it to pass that we may not be easily excited by evil affections. For (Prop. vii. of this Part) greater power is required for restraining affections arranged and connected according to the order of the intellect, than those which are uncertain or wavering. The best we can do, therefore, as long as we have not a perfect knowledge of our affections, is to conceive the right method of life, or certain principles of life; to commit them to memory, and constantly to apply them to the particular occasions frequently meeting us in life, that so our imagination may be widely affected by them, and that we may always have them at hand. For example, we have placed it among our principles of life (Prop. xlvi., Part IV., with its Schol.), that we are to overcome hatred by love or generosity; but that we are not to requite it by reciprocal hatred. But that we may always have this prescription of reason at hand, where it will be needed, the ordinary injuries of men are to be considered, and often reflected upon, and also by what means they may be best removed through generosity. For we shall thus associate an image of the injury with the imagination of this prescription, and (Prop. xviii., Part II.), it will always be at hand, when an injury is inflicted upon us. For if we always kept in mind the ground of our true interest, and of the good which follows from mutual friendship and common association, and moreover, that from the right method of life the highest satisfaction springs (Prop. lvii., Part IV.), and that men, like other things, act from the necessity of nature: then injury, or the hatred which commonly arises from it, will occupy a very small place in our imagination, and will be easily overcome. Or, if the anger which is accustomed to spring from the greatest injuries is not so easily overcome, still it will be overcome, although not
without mental fluctuation, in far less time than if we had not possessed these premeditated lessons; as is clear from Props. vi., vii., and viii. of this Part. Concerning animosity to the end of laying aside fear, we must reflect in the same manner. Namely, the common perils of life are to be enumerated, and often imagined, and the way in which by presence of mind and fortitude, they can be best avoided and overcome. But it is to be observed that in arranging our thoughts and images, we must always attend (Coroll., Prop. lxiii., Part IV., and Prop. lix., Part III.), to those things which are good in every thing, that thus we may be always determined to action by the affection of joy. E. g., if any one sees that he is too eagerly pursuing glory, let him think concerning the right use of it, and to what end it is to be pursued, and by what means it can be acquired; but not of the abuse of it and vanity, and the inconstancy of men, and other things of this kind, of which no one thinks, but from a disease of the mind. For by such thoughts the ambitious especially most of all afflict themselves when they despair of attaining the honor which they court; and wish to appear wise, whilst they are vomiting anger. Wherefore, it is certain that they are most desirous of glory who cry out most concerning the abuse of it, and concerning the vanity of the world. Nor is this peculiar to the ambitious, but is common to all, to whom fortune is adverse, and who are impotent of mind. For a poor man, who is also avaricious does not cease to talk concerning the abuse of money and the vices of the rich; by which he accomplishes nothing but to afflict himself, and to show others that he is chagrined, not only at his own poverty, but by the wealth of others. Thus, also, those who have been badly treated by a mistress, think of nothing but the inconstancy, the deceit, and the other traditional frailties of the sex, all of which they at once deliver over to oblivion as soon as they are again accepted by their mistress. Therefore, he who seeks to govern his affections and appetites by the sole love of liberty should strive, as far as possible, to know the virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with
the joy which springs from a true knowledge of them; but by no means to contemplate the vices of men, and to depreciate men, and to delight in a false appearance of liberty. And he who has carefully observed these things (for they are not difficult), and will practice them, will verily, in a short time, be able for the most part to direct his actions by the empire of reason.

Prop. XI. The greater the number of things to which any image relates, the more frequently does it occur, or the oftener does it present itself, and the more does it occupy the mind.

Dem.—For the greater the number of things to which an image or an affection relates, the more causes are there by which it can be excited and assisted, all which the mind (by the hypothesis) contemplates together with the affection itself; and, therefore, more frequent is the affection, or the oftener it springs up, and (Prop. viii. of this Part) the more it occupies the mind. Q. E. D.

Prop. XII. The images of things are united more easily to images which relate to things which we clearly and distinctly understand, than to others.

Dem.—The things which we clearly and distinctly understand, are either the common properties of things, or the things which are deduced from them (Def. of Reason, in Schol. ii., Prop. xi., Part II.) ; and, consequently (preceeding Prop.), are oftener excited in us; and, therefore, it may more easily come to pass, that we should contemplate other things together with these, more readily than we do with others; and consequently (Prop. xviii., Part II.), that we more easily unite them with these than with others. Q. E. D.

Prop. XIII. The greater the number of other things with which any image is joined, the more often does it present itself.

Dem.—For the greater the number of other things with which any image is associated, the greater (Prop. xviii., Part II.) is the number of causes by which it can be excited. Q. E. D.

Prop. XIV. The mind is able to bring it to pass, that all the affections of the body, or the images of things, should stand related to the idea of God.
Dem. — There is no affection of the body of which the mind is not able to form some clear and distinct conception (Prop. iv. of this Part). And therefore it is able to effect (Prop. xv., Part I.), that all should stand related to the idea of God. Q. E. D.

Prop. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself, and his affections, loves God, and the more, the more he understands himself and his affections.

Dem. — He, who clearly and distinctly understands himself, and his affections, rejoices (Prop. iii., Part III.), and that with the concomitant idea of God (Prop. preceding). And, therefore (Def. Aff. vi.), he loves God, and (for the same reason) the more, the more he understands himself, and his affections. Q. E. D.

Prop. XVI. This love toward God ought chiefly to occupy the soul.

Dem. — For this love is associated with all the affections of the body (Prop. xiv. of this Part), by all which it is favored (Prop. xv. of this Part). And, therefore (Prop. xi. of this Part), it must chiefly occupy the mind. Q. E. D.

Prop. XVII. God is devoid of passions, and is moved by no affection of joy or grief.

Dem. — All ideas, in as far as they relate to God, are true (Prop. xxxii., Part II.); that is (Def. iv., Part II.), adequate; and, therefore (Gen. Def. Aff.), God is devoid of passions. Again, God can pass neither to a greater nor to a less perfection (Coroll. ii., Prop. xx., Part I.); and, therefore (Def. Aff. ii. and iii.), is moved by no affection of joy or grief. Q. E. D.

Coroll. — Properly speaking, God loves or hates no man. For God (Prop. preceding) is moved by no affection of joy or grief, and consequently (Def. Aff., vi. and vii.) he loves or hates no man.

Prop. XVIII. No man is able to hate God.

Dem. — The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (Prop. xlvi. and lxvii., Part II.). And, therefore, in so far as we contemplate God, to that extent we act (Prop. iii., Part III.); and consequently (Prop. lix., Part III.), there can be no grief with the concomitant idea of
God; that is (Def. Aff. vii.), no man is able to hate God. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Love toward God can not be turned into hatred.

Schol.—But it may be objected, that as we understand God to be the cause of all things, for this very reason we consider God to be the cause of grief. I reply to this, that in as far as we understand the causes of grief, to that extent (Prop. iii. of this Part) it ceases to be passion; that is (Prop. lix, Part III.), it ceases to be grief; and, therefore, as far as we understand God to be the cause of grief, to that extent we rejoice.

Prop. XIX. He who loves God, can not put forth an effort, that God should love him in return.

Dem.—If a man should put forth this effort, he would desire (Coroll., Prop. xvii., of this Part) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and consequently (Prop. xix., Part III.), would desire to be grieved; which (Prop. xxviii., Part III.) is absurd. Therefore, he who loves God, etc. Q. E. D.

Prop. XX. This love toward God can not be corrupted by an affection either of envy or jealousy; but is the more increased, the greater the number of men, whom we imagine to be united to God by the same bond of love.

Dem.—This love toward God is the highest good which we can seek under the dictate of reason (Prop. xxviii., Part IV.), and is common to all men (Prop. xxxvi., Part IV.), and we desire that all may enjoy it (Prop. xxxvii., Part IV.). And, therefore (Def. Aff. xxiii.), it can not be corrupted by the affection of envy, nor again (Prop. xviii., of this Part, and Def. of jealousy, Schol., Prop. xxxv., Part III.) by the affection of jealousy; but on the contrary (Prop. xxxi., Part III.), it must increase the more, the more men we imagine to rejoice in it. Q. E. D.

Schol.—In the same way we are able to show, that there is no affection which is directly opposed to this love, and by which this love itself may be destroyed; and therefore we are able to conclude, that this love to God is the most constant of all the affections, and that, as far as it relates to the body, it can be destroyed only with the body itself.
But what its nature is, in so far as it relates to the mind, we shall see hereafter. But in these all the remedies of the affections, or all that which the mind considered in itself alone is able to do in controlling the affections, are comprehended. From these things it is obvious, that the mind's power over the affections consists: I. In the knowledge of the affections (Schol., Prop. iv., of this Part); II. In the fact, that it separates the affections from the thought of the external cause which we indistinctly imagine (Prop. ii., with Schol., and Prop. iv., of this Part); III. In the time in which the affections, which relate to the thing which we understand, overcome those which relate to things which we conceive indistinctly, or imperfectly (Prop. vii. of this Part); IV. In the multitude of causes by which affections, which relate to the common properties of things, or to God, are strengthened (Props. ix. and xi. of this Part); V. In the order in which the mind is able to arrange and mutually to connect its own affections (Schol., Prop. x.; and, again, Props. xii., xiii., xiv., of this Part). But, that this power of the mind over the affections may be better understood, it should be especially noted, that we call affections great, when we compare the affection of one man with the affection of another, and see that one is more assailed than another by the same affection; or when we compare with each other the affections of the same man, and find that the same man is more affected or moved by one affection than another. For (Prop. v., Part IV.) the power of any affection is defined by the power of the external cause compared with our own. But the power of the mind is defined by knowledge alone; but impotence, or passion, is judged by the want of knowledge alone, that is, by the circumstance through which ideas are called inadequate. From this it follows, that that mind suffers most the greatest part of which inadequate ideas constitute; so that it is distinguished rather by that which it suffers, than by that which it does. And, on the other hand, it follows, that that does most the greatest part of which adequate ideas constitute; so that, although the latter may have as many inadequate ideas as the former, still it is rather distin-
guished by those which are attributed to human virtue, than by those which convict it of human impotence. Again, it is to be observed, that anxieties and misfortune derive their origin for the most part from too great love for a thing which is subject to changes, and of which we may not be able to become possessors. For, no one is solicitous and anxious concerning any thing save that which he loves; and injuries, suspicions, and hostilities, etc., do not arise, save from love for things of which no one is able in reality to become the possessor. From these things, therefore, we easily conceive what clear and distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge (see Schol., Prop. xlvii., Part II), the foundation of which is the knowledge of God itself, is able to accomplish in regard to the affections. If, namely, it does not absolutely destroy them, in so far as they are passions (Prop. iii., with Schol., Prop. iv., of this Part), it at least effects that they should constitute the smallest part of the mind (Prop. xiv. of this Part). Again, it produces love toward an immutable and eternal thing (Prop. xv. of this Part), of which we are in reality partakers (Prop. xlv., Part II), and which, therefore, can be corrupted by none of the faults which exist in common love; but which is always able to be greater and greater (Prop. xv. of this Part), to occupy the largest part of the mind (Prop. xvi. of this Part), and widely to affect it. I have thus disposed of all the points which respect this present life. For, as I said in the beginning of this scholium, every one will be able easily to see that, in these few words, I have embraced all the remedies of the affections, who attends to what I have said in this scholium, and at the same time to the definition of the mind and its affections, and, finally, to Props. i. and iii. of Part III.

Now then, it is time that I should pass to the things which appertain to the duration of the mind, without relation to the body.

Prop. XXI. The mind is able to imagine nothing, and to remember nothing of past things, save during the existence of the body.

Dem.—The mind does not express the actual existence
of the body, nor conceive even the affections of the body as actual, save whilst the body lasts (Coroll., Prop. viii., Part II.); and, consequently (Prop. xxvi., Part II.), it conceives no body as actually existing, save whilst its own body lasts. And hence it is able to imagine nothing (see definition Imagination in Schol., Prop. xvii., in Part II.), nor to remember past things, save whilst the body lasts. (Definition of Memory, in Schol., Prop. xviii., Part II.) Q. E. D.

Prop. XXII. In God, nevertheless, there is necessarily given an idea, which expresses the essence of this and that human body, under the species of eternity.

Dem.—God is not only the cause of the existence of this and that human body, but also of its essence (Prop. xxv., Part I.); which, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the essence itself of God (Ax. iv., Part I.), and that by a certain eternal necessity (Prop. xvi., Part I.), which concepion indeed must necessarily be given in God. (Prop. iii., Part II.) Q. E. D.

Prop. XXIII. The human mind can not be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something remains which is eternal.

Dem.—In God is necessarily given the conception, or idea, which expresses the essence of the human body (Prop. preceding); which idea, therefore, is necessarily something which pertains to the essence of the human mind (Prop. xiii., Part II.). But, to the human mind, we attribute no duration which can be defined by time, except in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained by duration and can be defined by time; that is (Coroll., Prop. viii., Part II.), we do not attribute to it duration, except whilst the body endures. Still, since this is something which, by a certain eternal necessity, is conceived of through the very essence of God (Prop. preceding), this something, which pertains to the essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Q. E. D.

Schol.—As we have said, this idea, which expresses the essence of the body, under the species of eternity, is a certain mode of thinking which pertains to the essence of the mind, and which is necessarily eternal. Still, it can not
possibly be, that we should remember that we existed before the body, since there can be no traces of it in the body, nor can eternity be defined by time, nor have any relation to time. But, still, it is our feeling and experience that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things which it conceives by understanding, not less than those which it has in memory. For the eyes of the mind, with which it sees and observes things, are themselves demonstrations. Therefore, although we do not remember our existence before the body, we feel nevertheless that our mind, in as far as it involves the essence of the body under the species of eternity, is eternal, and that this existence of it can not be defined by times, or explained by duration. Our mind, therefore, can be said to endure, and its existence to be defined by a certain time, only in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body, and to that extent only has it the power of determining the existence of things by time, and of conceiving them under duration.

Prop. XXIV. The more we understand individual things, the more we understand God.

Dem.—This is evident from Coroll., Prop. xxv., Part I.

Prop. XXV. The highest effort of the mind, and the highest virtue, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.

Dem.—The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things (see its Def., Schol. ii., Prop. xl., Part II.); and the more things we know in this way, the more (by Prop. preceding) we know God. And therefore (Prop. xxviii., Part IV.) the highest virtue of the mind, that is (Def. viii., Part IV.) the power or nature of the mind, or (Prop. vii., Part III.) its highest effort, is to understand things with the third kind of knowledge. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXVI. The better fitted the mind is for understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, the more it desires to understand things by this same kind of knowledge.

Dem.—This is evident. For in as far as we conceive mind to be fitted to understand things by this kind of knowledge, in so far we conceive it to be determined to
understand things by this kind of knowledge; and consequently (Def. Aff. i.) the better fitted the mind is for this, the more does it desire it. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXVII. From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest satisfaction of mind which can be given.

Dem.—The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (Prop. xxviii., Part IV.), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge (Prop. xxv. of this Part); which virtue indeed is the greater, the more the mind knows things with this kind of knowledge (Prop. xxiv. of this Part). And therefore he who knows things with this kind of knowledge, is passing to the highest human perfection, and consequently (Def. Aff. ii.) is affected with the highest joy, and that (Prop. xliii., Part II.) with the concomitant idea of himself and of his virtue; and therefore (Def. Aff. xxv.) from this kind of knowledge, the highest satisfaction which can be given arises. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXVIII. The effort or desire of knowing things with the third kind of knowledge, can not arise from the first, but may indeed from the second kind of knowledge.

Dem.—This Proposition is self-evident. For whatever we understand clearly and distinctly, this we understand either by itself, or by another which is conceived by itself; that is, ideas which in us are clear and distinct, or which relate to the third kind of knowledge (see Schol. ii., Prop. xl., Part II.), can not follow from mutilated and confused ideas which (by the same Schol.) relate to the first kind of knowledge, but from adequate ideas, or (by same Schol.) from the second and third kind of knowledge. And therefore (Def. Aff. i.) the desire of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge can not arise from the first, but may indeed from the second. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXIX. Whatever the mind understands under the species of eternity, it understands this, not because it conceives the present actual existence of the body, but because it conceives the essence of the body under the species of eternity.

Dem.—As far as the mind conceives the present existence of its own body, so far it conceives of duration, which can be determined by time, and to this extent only has it power
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to conceive things with relation to time (Prop. xxi. of this Part, and Prop. xxvi., Part II.). But eternity can not be explained by duration (Def. viii., Part I., and its Exp.). Therefore the mind to this extent has not the power of conceiving things under the species of eternity; but because it belongs to the nature of reason to conceive things under the species of eternity (Coroll. ii., Prop. xlv., Part II.); and it pertains also to the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the species of eternity (Prop. xxiii. of this Part); and besides these two nothing else pertains to the essence of the mind (Prop. xiii., Part II.). Therefore this power of conceiving things under the species of eternity, pertains to the mind, only in as far as it conceives the essence of the body under the species of eternity. Q. E. D.

Schol.—Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways, either in as far as we conceive them to exist with relation to a certain time and place, or in as far as we conceive them to be contained in God, and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. But what things in this second way we conceive as true or real, these we conceive under the species of eternity, and the ideas of these involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we have shown in Proposition xiv., Part II., whose Scholium also see.

Prop. XXX. Our mind, as far as it knows itself and its body, under the species of eternity, so far has necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows itself to be in God, and to be conceived by God.

Dem.—Eternity is the very essence of God, as far as this involves necessary existence (Def. viii., Part I.). To conceive things therefore under the species of eternity, is to conceive things, as far as they are conceived through the essence of God, as real entities, or as far as through the essence of God they involve existence. And therefore our mind, as far as it conceives itself and the body under the species of eternity, to that extent necessarily has a knowledge of God, and knows, etc. Q. E. D.

Prop. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends upon
the mind, as upon a real cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.

Dem.—The mind conceives nothing under the species of eternity, except in so far as it conceives the essence of its own body under the species of eternity (Prop. xxix. of this Part); that is (Props. xxi. and xxiii. of this Part), except in as far as it is eternal. And therefore (Prop. preceding), in as far as it is eternal, it has a knowledge of God, which, indeed, is a knowledge necessarily adequate (Prop. xlvi., Part II.), and hence the mind, as far as it is eternal, is fitted to know all those things which are able to follow from this given knowledge of God (Prop. xl., Part II.); that is, to know things by the third kind of knowledge (Def. of this, see in Schol. ii., Prop. xl., Part II.), of which therefore the mind (Def. i., Part III.), as far as it is eternal, is the adequate, or real cause. Q. E. D.

Schol.—The stronger, therefore, any one is in this kind of knowledge, the better is he conscious of himself and of God; that is, the more perfect is he, and the happier, which will be still more clearly evident from what follows. But it is here to be observed that, although we are now certain, that the mind is eternal, as far as it conceives things under the species of eternity, still, in order that the things which we wish to demonstrate may be more easily explained, and better understood, we will consider it, as if it were now beginning to be, and were now beginning to understand things under the species of eternity, as we have hitherto done. This we can do without any danger of error, provided we take care not to infer any thing save from clear premises.

Prop. XXXII. Whatever we understand with the third kind of knowledge, in that we delight, and that indeed with the concomitant idea of God, as the cause.

Dem.—From this kind of knowledge springs the highest satisfaction of mind, which is possible; that is (Def. Aff. xxv.), joy, and this with the concomitant idea of oneself (Prop. xxvii. of this Part), and consequently also (Prop. xxx. of this Part) with the concomitant idea of God, as cause. Q. E. D.
Coroll.—From the third kind of knowledge arises necessarily the intellectual love of God. For from this kind of knowledge arises (Prop. preceding) joy, with the concomitant idea of God, as the cause; that is (Def. Aff. vi.), the love of God, not as we imagine him as present (Prop. xxix. of this Part); but in so far as we understand God to be eternal, and that is what I call the intellectual love of God.

Prop. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.

Dem.—For the third kind of knowledge (Prop. xxxi. of this Part, and Ax. iii., Part I.) is eternal; and therefore (same Ax., Part I.) the love which arises from the same is also necessarily eternal. Q. E. D.

Schol.—Although this love to God has had no beginning (Prop. preceding), it nevertheless has all the perfections of love, just as if it had arisen, as we have supposed in the Corollary of the preceding Proposition. Nor is there here any difference, save that the mind has had eternally these same perfections, which we have feigned to be just now added to it, and that too, with the concomitant idea of God as the eternal cause. For if joy consists in the transition to a greater perfection, beatitude must consist in this, that the mind is endowed with perfection itself.

Prop. XXXIV. The mind is subject to affections, which are referable to passions, only whilst the body lasts.

Dem.—Imagination is the idea, by which the mind contemplates any thing as present (see Def., Schol., Prop. xvii., Part II.) which nevertheless indicates rather the present constitution of the human body than the nature of the external thing (Coroll. ii., Prop. xvi., Part II.). Imagination therefore is an affection (Gen. Def. Aff.), in as far as it indicates the present constitution of the body; and therefore (Prop. xxi. of this Part) the mind is subject to affections, which are referable to the passions only whilst the body endures. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence, it follows that no love except intellectual love is eternal.

Schol.—If we attend to the common opinion of men we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of
their mind; but that they confound the same with duration, and attribute it to imagination or memory, which they believe to remain after death.

Prop. XXXV. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.

Dem.—God is absolutely infinite (Def. vi., Part I.); that is (Def. vi., Part II.), the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection, and this (Prop. iii., Part II.), with the concomitant idea of himself, that is (Prop. xi., and Ax. i., Part I.) with the idea of his own cause, and that is what, in Coroll., Prop. xxxii., of this Part, we have called intellectual love.

Prop. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind to God is itself the love of God, by which God loves himself, not in as far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained by the essence of the human mind, considered under the species of eternity; that is, the mind's intellectual love to God is a part of the infinite love, with which God loves himself.

Dem.—This love of the mind must be referred to the actions of the mind (Coroll., Prop. xxxii., of this Part, and Prop. iii., Part III.), which hence is the action by which the mind contemplates itself, with the concomitant idea of God as the cause (Prop. xxxii. of this Part, and its Coroll.); that is (Coroll., Prop. xxv., Part I., and Coroll., Prop. xi., Part II.), action, by which God, in as far as he can be explained by the human mind, contemplates himself with the concomitant idea of himself. And, therefore (Prop. preceding), this love of the mind is a part of the infinite love, with which God loves himself. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence it follows, in as far as God loves himself, he loves men, and consequently that the love of God to men, and the mind's intellectual love to God, is one and the same.

Schol.—From these things we clearly understand in what thing our salvation, or beatitude, or liberty consists, namely, in constant and eternal love to God, or in the love of God to men. And this love, or beatitude, in the sacred Scriptures is called glory, and not unworthy. For whether this love is referred to God or to the mind, it can properly be called satisfaction of mind, which (Def. Aff. xxv. and xxx.) is
not distinguished from glory. For in as far as it relates to God it is joy (Prop. xxxv. of this Part), if we may still use this word, with the concomitant idea of himself, as also in as far as it relates to the mind (Prop. xxvii. of this Part). Again, because the essence of our mind consists in knowledge alone, whose beginning and foundation is God (Prop. xv., Part I., and Schol., Prop. xlvii., Part II.), it hence becomes clear to us how and in what manner our mind, as to its essence and existence follows from the divine nature, and constantly depends upon God; which I have thought it worth while here to note, that I might show by this example, how much the knowledge of particular things, which I have called intuitive, or the third kind of knowledge (Schol. ii., Prop. xli., Part II.), prevails and is more powerful, than the general knowledge, which I have said to be of the second kind. For although in the first Part, I have shown generally, that all things (and consequently the human mind also) depend upon God, as to their essence and existence, yet that demonstration, although it is legitimate and placed beyond the chance of doubt, does not so influence our mind, as when this same thing is inferred from the very essence of every individual thing, which we have said depends upon God.

Prop. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which is able to destroy it.

Dem.—This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the mind, in as far as it, as an eternal verity, is considered through the nature of God (Props. xxxiii. and xxix. of this Part). If, therefore, there were any thing which could be contrary to this love, this would be contrary to the truth, and consequently that which could destroy this love would bring it to pass, that that which is true should be false, which (as is self-evident) is absurd. Therefore, there is nothing in nature, etc. Q. E. D.

Schol.—The Axiom of the Fourth Part respects individual things, as far as they are considered in relation to time and place, concerning which, I presume, no one entertains doubt.

Prop. XXXVIII. The more things the mind understands by
the second and third kind of knowledge, the less does it suffer from affections which are evil, and the less it fears death.

Dem.—The essence of the mind consists in knowledge (Prop. xi., Part II.). The more things, therefore, the mind knows by the second and third kind of knowledge, the greater the part of it remaining (Props. xxix. and xxiii. of this Part), and consequently (Prop. preceding) the greater the part of it not touched by affections, which are contrary to our nature, that is (Prop. xxx., Part IV.), which are evil. The more things, therefore, the mind knows by the second and third kind of knowledge, the greater the part of it remaining unharmed, and consequently the less it suffers from affections, etc. Q. E. D.

Schol.—Hence we understand that which I touched in Schol., Prop. xxxix., Part IV., and which I have promised to explain in this Part; namely, that death is the less injurious, the more clear and distinct the knowledge of the mind is, and consequently, the more the mind loves God. Again, because (Prop. xxvii. of this Part) from the third kind of knowledge, the highest satisfaction arises which is possible, it follows that the human mind can be of such a nature, that that which we have shown to perish with the body (Prop. xxi. of this Part) shall be of no consequence in relation to that which remains. But of this more at large hereafter.

Prop. XXXIX. He who has a body adapted to the greatest number of things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal.

Dem.—He who has a body fitted to do the most things is least assailed by affections which are evil (Prop. xxxviii., Part IV.), that is (Prop. xxx., Part IV.), by affections, which are contrary to our nature; and, therefore (Prop. x. of this Part), has the power of arranging and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect, and consequently of causing (Prop. xiv. of this Part) that all the affections of the body should relate to the idea of God, from which it will come to pass (Prop. xv. of this Part), that he is affected with love to God, which (Prop. xvi. of this Part) must occupy or constitute the greatest
part of the mind, and hence (Prop. xxxiii. of this Part), he has a mind, the greatest part of which is eternal. Q. E. D.

Schol.—Because human bodies are adapted to very many things, it is not to be doubted but that they are capable of being of such a nature that they may stand related to mind, which have a great knowledge of themselves and of God, and the greatest or principal part of which is eternal, and therefore that they may scarcely fear death. But that these things may be more clearly understood, it is here to be observed, that we live in a constant change, and that as we change for the better, or for the worse, we are thereby called happy or unhappy. For one who passes from an infant or a boy into a corpse is called unfortunate, and on the contrary it is ascribed to felicity when we have been able to pass through the whole period of life, having a sane mind in a healthy body. And in fact, he who has a body, as an infant or a boy, adapted to very few things, and for the most part dependent upon external causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, has almost no consciousness of itself, of God, or of things; and, on the contrary, he who has a body fitted to very many things, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is very conscious of itself, of God, and of things. In this life, therefore, we should chiefly strive that the body of infancy, as far as its nature permits and conduces to it, may be changed into another which is adapted to very many things, and which stands related to a mind which is conscious of itself, of God, and of things; and thus that every thing which relates to its imagination or memory may be of scarcely any account in comparison with the intellect, as I have already said in the Scholium of the preceding Proposition.

Prop. XL. The more of perfection any individual thing has, the more it acts and the less it suffers; and, conversely, the more it acts, the more perfect is it.

Dem.—The more perfect every individual thing is, the more of reality it has (Def. vi., Part II.), and consequently (Prop. iii., Part III., with its Schol.), the more it acts and the less it suffers; which demonstration, indeed, the order
being inverted, proceeds in the same manner; from which it follows that a thing, on the other hand, is the more perfect the more it acts. Q. E. D.

Coroll.—Hence it follows that the part of the mind which remains, however great it may be, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind (Props. xxiii. and xxix. of this Part) is the intellect by which alone we are said to act (Prop. iii., Part III.), but that which we have proved to perish is the imagination itself (Prop. xxi. of this Part) by which alone we are said to suffer (Prop. iii., Part III., and Gen. Def., Aff.); and therefore (Prop. preceding), the former, however great this may be, is more perfect than the latter. Q. E. D.

Schol.—These are matters which I had purposed to present concerning the mind, in as far as it is considered without reference to the existence of the body. From these things, and also from Prop. xxi., Part I., and others, it is apparent that our mind, as far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this again by another, and so on without end; so that all together constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God.

Prop. XLI. Although we might be ignorant that our mind is eternal, we ought still to regard piety and religion, and absolutely all things which in the fourth part we have shown appertain to animosity and generosity, as of the first value.

Dem.—The first and only foundation of virtue or of the right mode of living (Coroll., Prop. xxi. and Prop. xxiv., Part. IV.), is to seek one’s own interest. But for determining what reason dictates as useful, we have had no regards to the eternity of the mind, a matter with which we have at last become acquainted in this Fifth Part. Although, therefore, at that time, we were ignorant that the mind is eternal, still we held as of the first importance, the things which we showed appertain to animosity and generosity. Therefore, even if we were now ignorant of this very thing, we ought still to regard the same prescriptions of reason as of the first importance. Q. E. D.

Schol.—The common persuasion of the multitude seems
to be different. For many seem to believe that they are free in so far as it is possible for them to obey lust, and that they yield their rights, in so far as they are required to live by the prescription of a divine law. Piety, therefore, and religion, and absolutely all things which appertain to fortitude of mind, they seem to consider as burdens, which they hope after death to lay aside, and to receive the reward of their slavery, to-wit, of their piety and religion. And not from this hope alone, but also and especially from fear, lest, namely, they may be visited after death with terrible punishments, they are induced to live according to the prescription of the divine law, as far as their weakness and their impotent mind permits. And unless men had this hope and fear, and if on the contrary they believed, that minds perished with the body, and that there remained no longer life, to the wretches who were worn out with the burden of piety, they would return to their disposition, and would desire that all things should be regulated by lust, and would rather obey fortune than themselves. These things seem to me not less absurd than if any one for the reason that he does not believe that he is able to nourish his body with good food to all eternity, should prefer to satiate himself with poisonous and deadly drugs, or because he sees that mind is not immortal or eternal, should, therefore, prefer to be a mad man, and to live without reason. These things are so absurd that they scarcely deserve to be considered.

Prop. XLII. Salvation is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; we do not rejoice in it, because we restrain our lusts; but on the contrary because we rejoice in it, we are able to restrain our lusts.

Dem.—Salvation consists in love to God (Prop. xxxvi. of this Part, and its Schol.), which love indeed springs from the third kind of knowledge (Coroll., Prop. xxxii. of this Part). And, therefore, this love (Props. iii. and lix., Part III.) must relate to the mind, in as far as it acts, and hence (Def. viiii., Part IV.) is virtue itself. This is the first point. Again, the more the mind delights in this divine love, or in salvation, the more it understands (Prop. xxxii.
of this Part), that is (Coroll., Prop. iii. of this Part), the
greater power it has over the affections, and (Prop. xxxviii.
of this Part) the less it suffers from the affections, which
are evil. And, therefore, from the fact that the mind de-
lights in this divine love, or in salvation, it has the power
of restraining lusts. And because the human power for
restraining the affections consists in intellect alone, there-
fore no one delights in salvation, because he restrains the
affections; but on the contrary, the power of restraining
lusts springs from salvation itself. Q. E. D.

Schol.—With these views I have accomplished every
thing, which I had purposed to prove concerning the power
of the mind over the affections, and concerning the fre-
dom of the mind. From these things it is apparent how
great is the wise man's power; how superior he is to the
ignorant man who is moved by lust alone. For the igno-
rant man is agitated in many ways, aside from external
causes, and never possesses true satisfaction of mind; more-
over he lives, not knowing himself, or God, or things, and
as soon as he ceases to suffer, he ceases also to be. Whilst
on the contrary the wise man, in as far as he is considered
such, is scarcely moved in mind, but being conscious of
himself, of God, and of things, by a certain eternal neces-
sity, never ceases to be, but is always possessed of true
satisfaction of mind. If now the way which I have shown
to lead to this, seems to be arduous, it can nevertheless be
found. And, indeed, it must be difficult, because it is so
rarely found. For how could it be possible, if salvation
were an easy matter, and could be found without great ef-
fort, that it should be neglected by almost all. But all
illustrious things are as difficult as they are rare.
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