It seems so:

Richard [of Saint Victor] says in On the Trinity 1.4 that "there is no lack of necessary reasons for proving what is necessary." Therefore, since God's being omnipotent is necessary, it can be proved necessarily.

2 Moreover, Anselm says in On the Incarnation of the Lord, chapter 15, that Augustine wrote his books in order to show by reason what is held by faith. ⁽¹⁾

3 Moreover, Anselm says in Monologion, chapter 15, that God is "whatever it is better to be than not to be." Now such a quality is a perfection in an unqualified sense; and omnipotence is a perfection in an unqualified sense, such that it is better for God to be omnipotent than not to be omnipotent.

4 But on the contrary is the fact that philosophers were not able to show, on the basis of natural reason, that God is omnipotent, but in fact denied his omnipotence by claiming that neither the first agent nor anything else can make anything from nothing.

5 I reply that omnipotence is an active power. Now omnipotence can be understood in two ways: either properly or as generally understood.

6 If omnipotence is understood properly, it signifies an active power with respect to any possible whatsoever that is not necessary in itself and does not involve any contradiction (whether mediately or immediately), so that in virtue of that omnipotence any such possible can be produced either mediately or immediately. The point of saying "whatever is not necessary in itself" is to exclude any active power on God's part with respect to God himself; he is necessary in himself. The point of saying "whatever does not involve any contradiction" is to exclude any active power with respect to what is impossible.

7 Now understanding omnipotence in this sense, I say that it can be proved by natural reason that God is omnipotent. For it can be shown by natural reason that the first efficient cause is an active cause, whether mediately or immediately, with respect to every effect.

8 This can be shown on the basis of the essential order of causes, since if the first cause did not cause, no other cause would cause; a second cause, after all, causes only insofar as it is moved by a prior cause, since otherwise it would be a first cause.

9 Similarly, if causality in inferior causes were not traced back to the causality of the first efficient cause, there would not be a natural essential order in efficient causes.

10 So it can be shown by natural reason that God is omnipotent, having causality with respect to anything whatsoever, either mediately or immediately.

11 But this is not what Catholics means when they speak of omnipotence. In the commonly accepted sense of the word, something is called omnipotent because it can immediately, and with no other cause cooperating in its action, produce any possible whatsoever that is not necessary in itself.

12 Taking omnipotence in this sense, I say that it cannot be shown by natural reason that God is omnipotent. Here is my proof. God's omnipotence can be proved only insofar as it belongs to God in virtue of the order of causes and to the extent that it can be argued for on the basis of the order of causes. And God's omnipotence--in the sense that he could produce anything whatsoever without intermediary--cannot be argued for on the basis of the order of causes, but rather just the opposite, as is evident in all the other causes (for example, in formal and final causes: the first form cannot be immediately the form of other things, and similarly in the case of the end).

13 One might argue against this view as follows: It can be proved by natural reason that God has infinite power, as was evident above in distinction 2 (where the argument from Aristotle proving this claim was explained in a similar way). Now what has infinite power is something than which a greater cannot be thought; whereas if that infinite power were not omnipotence, a greater than it could be thought. Therefore, it can be proved by natural reason that God is omnipotent.

14 I say that it can be shown by natural reason that God has infinite power intensively, since in his own causality he contains the causality of every other cause whatsoever; and so he would indeed have infinite active power. But this infinite power is not omnipotence in the sense we are talking about now, meaning God's omnipotence for producing without intermediary any possible whatsoever. The philosophers, after all, would say that such power does not exist, since although the first cause does indeed have the power of every secondary cause, it nonetheless cannot produce every possible without a secondary cause. For the philosophers would say that a secondary cause is not posited because it adds any causality beyond that of the first cause, but rather because it concurs with the first cause as an imperfection, since owing to the perfection of the first cause its causality can extend first only to one, not to many imperfect things. For example: fire has the power to heat, and God has that power in a more excellent way. And yet (so they say) God cannot heat without an intermediary, and that is because of his perfection, since his perfection does not allow it.

15 But one might argue further against this view, as follows: Something false never follows from something true--except only apparently, and thanks to a sophistical way of arguing. Now the mistake in any paralogism can be known by natural reason. Therefore, since it is true in and of itself that God is omnipotent, it can be proved or known by natural reason that nothing false or impossible follows from God's being omnipotent. Therefore, it can be known naturally that God is omnipotent, since it can be known naturally that nothing impossible follows from his being omnipotent.

16 To this argument one must say that in this matter of drawing an impossible conclusion, a middle term might be introduced that could be just as uncertain or neutral as the antecedent. For example, the proposition "The stars are even in number and necessary"--since nothing there [in the superlunary world] is contingent--is neutral to me. Suppose it is true in and of itself. If one were then to argue that "Every star has an effect in the lower world, and the effects are not even in number; therefore, etc," I would not know whether this minor premise were true. Hence, by your argument it could be proved that every proposition that is not false can be known naturally, and thus that every true proposition that is held by faith can be known naturally: and that is false.

17 I therefore say that it is by faith alone that we hold God to be omnipotent in this sense.

18 Still, our intellect can show this more probably than it can many other truths about God. Nevertheless, this cannot be demonstrated by natural reason; for if it could be, we could prove that God created the world, that he produces nothing necessarily, that he could produce without intermediary anything that is, and many other truths that we hold by faith.

19 To the first argument one must reply that there is a difference between having a necessary reason and having an demonstrative argument that reaches its conclusion in an evident way. For a mediate proposition (if it is used as a premise) is not evident for a proof unless the immediate proposition on which it depends is evident. Hence, there cannot be an evident argument from such a necessary mediate proposition unless the immediate proposition is evident. For example, as I said at the beginning of this book, if someone knew that "some figure has three sides," this proposition would never be per se nota for him, and he would never be able to prove any conclusion from it in an evident way, unless he knew the immediate proposition on which it depends, namely that "a triangle has three sides." Hence, many arguments are made about the Trinity--necesary arguments in which there is no failure in the argumentation--but they are not demonstrations that make the conclusion certain and evident, because the immediate propositions on which they depend are not known in an evident way. So it is in the matter at hand: the arguments by which God's omnipotence is proved are persuasions; they do not make for evident conclusions any more than they would if they concerned contingents.

20 The reply to the second argument proceeds on the same basis.

21 As for the third argument, one must say that the fact that omnipotence is a "perfection in an unqualified sense" is a matter of belief; it is not per se notum to us. It follows that the proposition "the first cause can do through itself whatever it can do in conjunction with a secondary cause" is also merely a matter of faith.

[Distinction 43, quaestio unica: "Does the fact that it is impossible for something to be made arise first from the impossibility of the makeable thing or from something on the part of God as Maker?"]

1 Regarding distinction 43 I ask whether the fact that it is impossible for something to be made arises first from the impossibility of the makeable thing or from something on the part of God as Maker.

Arguments that it is from something on God's part:

Suppose something cannot be made: I ask, why can't it? If because it does not have the power to be made, than I argue as follows: it would have the power to be made if God gave it that power. So the reason it does not have that power is that God did not give it.

2 This is confirmed by an argument of the Master in distinction 44, where he argues that God cannot make a better universe than he in fact made. For if the universe cannot be better, this is not because it is supremely good, since it is a creature. If, however, this is because it is not capable of any greater good, then it can be better if it is made capable of a greater good--and God can make it so. Therefore, the fact that the universe cannot be made better derives wholly from God.

3 On the contrary, Anselm says in On the Fall of the Devil that a bad angel does not have grace because he did not receive it; and it was because he did not receive it that God did not give it, and not vice versa.

4 Some ⁽²⁾ say that anything predicated of God either refers to a pure perfection or does not. If it does, then it is predicated of God in himself and not merely in relation to a creature. And so, since active power is a pure perfection, it is in God absolutely and not merely in relation to creatures.

5 Hence they posit an ordering. First, active power is considered with respect to the subject in which it exists; and in this way it is a pure perfection in God with no relation to anything else. Second, passive power is considered in the creature in itself. Third, passive power is considered in relation to God. Fourth comes a relation of the active power in God to the creature, and so taken, active power does not imply any dignity on God's part, since nothing that is in God in relation to creatures implies dignity. This is proved on the basis of Anselm's Monologion, chapter 15, which says that nothing that is predicated with respect to a creature implies any perfection in God, since if the creature did not exist, God would be no less perfect.

6 Thus, according to them, omnipotence is an absolute attribute, and God is said to be omnipotent from all eternity, and not because of any relation to creatures.

7 On this basis their claim that a relation on the part of the cause does not precede a relation of the effect to the cause becomes evident. And this confirms what was said above [in d. 35] about God's relation to creatures.

8 In what way, then, is something called impossible? They say that the ordering of privations and imperfections is not like the ordering of perfections. And so, although something is called possible because God first has the active power to produce it, the ordering for a privation and imperfection is different. It is not the case that something is called "impossible to be made" because God cannot make it, but rather the reverse: God cannot make it because something else cannot be made. Thus, because of this imperfection there is first of all a non-power on the part of the creature, and then second comes a relation of non-power to God, and third a negative relation of God to the creature, and on the basis of that relation God is said to be unable to make the creature.

9 And they have Anselm (in the passage cited above) on their side, as well as the argument that "in contradictories the implication holds in themselves, and not in the same order" [Topics 2.22, 113^b15-26]. Thus, if "God can do this" entails "this is possible," then "this is not possible" will entail "God cannot do this"; the order of implication is reversed.

10 But although they say this in one place where they first wrote on these matters, there is another passage later where they explicitly say the opposite. For they say that it is not because something cannot be made that God cannot make it, but rather it is because God cannot make it that something cannot be made. Just as the inference from "God cannot make it" to "it cannot be made" works in the affirmative, so also (they say) it works in the negative. In this way they destroy both their own earlier claim and the argument that could be offered in support of it.

11 Whether this second discussion was meant to supersede the earlier one or not (if not, they are simply contradicting themselves), the second view is false, and less true than the earlier view. For it is utterly foolish to say that negation and privation are in God first and then, in virtue of that, in the creature.

12 Moreover, there is an argument against that view: Nothing is impossible in an unqualified sense unless being is repugnant to it. Now being is not repugnant to anything first because some other thing does not have a relation to it. Rather, the first reason why being is repugnant to something is intrinsic: it comes from a formal incompatibility between its constituents. For it is because one constituent is formally incompatible with another that they cannot constitute one thing, and being is repugnant to it because the incompossibility of its constituents. So if it is impossible for something to be made, this will be because the parts that would have to constitute that thing are formally incompatible, not because of some relation to it [on the part of some extrinsic thing]. So it is not right to way that something cannot be made because God cannot make it.

13 Furthermore, there is an argument against the first view: In exact causes, ⁽³⁾ if the affirmative is the cause of the affirmative, the negation will also be the cause of the negation, as is clear from Posterior Analytics 1. For example, if having lungs is the cause of breathing, not having lungs will also be the cause of not breathing. For while it is true that in contradictories the inference always holds in themselves, nonetheless, in exact causes, the negation will be the cause of the negation just as the affirmative is the cause of the affirmative. Therefore, if they are right in saying that the exact cause of a creature's passive power with respect to being made is the fact that God has active power, then by the same token the cause of a creature's being impossible to be made will be the fact that God cannot make it. And that is the opposite of what he says in this second discussion.

14 Furthermore, the active power of which we are speaking now is an active power in God by which God can produce something in existence, not in his intellect. Therefore, an operation in accordance with this power is not an intellectual operation; rather, God is producing something by an operation that is not intellection. According to them, this is the first power that he has with respect to the creature, so the first possibility of a thing is not in intelligible being. This is false: instead, a thing is produced in intelligible being before it is produced in real being. Moreover, it would follow from their view that there is a real relation in God to a creature, since this relations precedes any operation of his intellect.

15 I therefore say that we call something "impossible to be made," not because God cannot make it or because of some divine cannot, but rather because of a can: for that which cannot exist in reality is imagined as something composed of mutually incompatible parts that do not and cannot make a unity (such as a chimera and the like). Now God can produce those parts, such as a human head and a lion's tail and the like. Therefore, it is because God can produce such parts, which involve a formal incompossibility, that the whole cannot be made. So we must not say that something of that sort cannot be made because God cannot make it, but rather that the whole cannot be made because God can make such parts, which involve a formal contradiction.

16 Hence, the first extrinsic reason why something of that sort cannot be made is the power of God by which things are first produced in intelligible being; the first formal reason, however, is the formal contradiction of the parts out of which one imagines it is composed.

17 From this it becomes evident that God's power is not the exact cause why something can be made or produced; accompanying it there must be the absence of a formal incompatibility of parts. And so, although I agree with the conclusion of the view discussed above, I do not completely go along with the argument offered in support of it, since the first divine divine operation is of the intellect itself, by which things are produced first in intelligible being, not the active power by which something is produced outside the divine mind.

18 Hence, no divine perfection implies a relation to something external to God. When we say of God that he creates from all eternity and has active power from all eternity, this is all understood as referring to the basis of a relation, as when we say that this thing, insofar as it is white, is similar and is related [by similarity to another white thing].

19 Hence, things are first produced in known being, and afterwards they are presented to the will and produced in willed being, and thus in existence.

20 In reply to the argument, one must say this: it is not the case that something (say, a chimera) does not have the capacity to exist because God did not give it that capacity. Rather, God's power is not the exact cause of, as has been said.

[Distinction 44, quaestio unica: "Can God produce things otherwise than as he foreordained?"]

1 Regarding distinction 44 I ask whether God can produce things otherwise than as he foreordained.

It seems that he cannot: for if he could, he could produce them in an inordinate way.

2 On the contrary: things can be otherwise than as God foreordained them, since this does not involve a contradiction. Therefore, etc.

3 It must be said that when there is an agent that acts in conformity with law and right reason, if he is not limited and obligated by that law, but rather the law itself is subject to his will, he can act otherwise through his absolute power. But if that law were not subject to his will, he would not be able to do anything through his absolute power other than what he could do through his ordinate power in accordance with that law. But if that law is subject to his will, he can indeed do through his absolute power what he cannot do through his ordinate power in accordance with that law. If, however, he were to act in that way, it would ordinate according to some other law. For example, suppose someone (a king, for instance) were so free that he could make a law and change it. In such a case, he can act otherwise in violation of that law through his absolute power, since can change the law and establish another.

4 This is how things stand with God's action. His intellect, as prior to his will, does not establish any law. Instead, it first presents the law to his will. His will, however, accepts the law that is thus presented to it, and only then is the law established. But since the opposite of what has been established is still possible, God can change the law and act otherwise. For example, he has established it as law that no one is to receive glory without having first received grace. Now in acting in an ordinate way according to this law, he is acting according to his ordinate power, and he cannot act otherwise unless he ordains and establishes another law. And he can do just that, since he contingently willed for it to be the law that every sinner be damned. Hence, in doing the opposite he establishes another law according to which he is still acting in an ordinate way.