Parallelism and the Syntheses
by Beth Metcalf
Parallelism
Deleuze and Guattari say (Anti-Oedipus p.326-327)
“…The body without organs is the immanent substance, in the most Spinozist sense
of the word; and the partial objects are like its ultimate attributes, which
belong to it precisely insofar as they are really distinct and cannot on this
account exclude or oppose one another….”
Therefore, they are telling us that it is by way of their Spinozism that
they find real distinction without exclusion or opposition. This is the
Univocity of real distinction that is ontologically one Substance. If we remain within conceptual
possibility that cannot find its way beyond exclusion and opposition, then we
are still caught within the forces of Representational Thought.
It is through Spinoza’s parallelism of heterogeneous
attributes that all really distinct correspondences are included without any
opposition at all. With what
Deleuze refers to as Spinoza’s “parallelism”, we find the heterogeneity which
allows us to reach the real distinction of qualified substances that are
ontologically one. With parallelism
(Expressionism in Philosophy 107) “…there is an identity of order
or correspondence between modes of different attributes.” Furthermore, (EiP109) “…the modes of
different attributes have not only the same order and the same connection, but
the same being; they are the same things…” Attributes are really
distinct, parallel series that have no causal action between them. There is no causal connection between
the modes of one attribute upon modes of another. There is identity of order and
connection between modes of different attributes. Because attributes constitute one
substance, corresponding modes differing in attribute form one
modification.
Deleuze’s Spinozist parallelism allows no dualistic
opposition of signifier/signified, subject/object, idea/thing,
form/content. Indeed, the real
distinction of parallelism allows no opposition or exclusion at all. With Spinoza’s parallelism, given a
certain qualified substance (i.e., given a certain unity of modification), modes
of different attributes have the same order and connection. But there is no causality between the
modes of different attributes.
Modes of really distinct attributes have ontological unity or identity of
being. Modes of attributes having
the same connection and order are the same modification. They are the same being---the same
thing. Since there is no dualistic
opposition, there is no need for a transcendent ground of agreement. There is only Immanence. Because attributes constitute the
essence of one Substance, corresponding modes differing in attribute form the
same unity of modification.
Modification is ontologically one being of corresponding modes differing
in attribute. (However, it should
be noted that modes having another order and connection form a different unity
of modification. They qualify
Substance in a really different multiplicity. But all really distinct multiplicities
are included in ontologically one Substance without opposition.)
The Powers in Ontological and Epistemological
Parallelism
However, Spinoza’s parallelism as described by Deleuze, is
not merely the parallel series of the attributes (Thought and Extension as the
only two we know). It is also the
parallelism of two powers. The
first is the power of existing and acting.
The second is the power of thinking and knowing. There is equality of these two powers in
parallelism. There is ontological
parallelism which is constituted by the parallelism of the attributes. It is the first power. Then, there is epistemological
parallelism which is constituted by the parallelism of both powers. Ontological parallelism is the parallel
attributes as constituting the essence of Substance. Epistemological parallelism is the
parallel powers as the attributes contain the essences of the individuating
modes.
The ontological point of view: one and the same modification
of substance is expressed by the corresponding modes of different
attributes. The epistemological
point of view: Given a mode in some
attribute there is an idea in the attribute of Thought corresponding to it. One and the same individual is expressed
by a given mode (in whatever attribute) and its corresponding idea (in the
attribute of Thought). Deleuze
says, (EiP114) “The epistemological viewpoint, then, may be stated thus: one and
the same individual is expressed by a given mode and by the corresponding
idea. But the ontological viewpoint
thus: one and the same modification is expressed by all corresponding modes
differing in attribute.”
Therefore, Deleuze sees in Spinoza not merely the parallelism of attributes (ontological parallelism), but also parallelism of two powers (epistemological parallelism). With the parallel series of powers, there is independence of the series of things and the series of ideas. Ideas do not represent things. Incorporeal ideas are attributed to corporeal things. Ideas do not refer to things, but intervene through an act of expressive transformation.
Just as there was no causality between modes differing in
attributes (in ontological parallelism), so also there is no causal connection
between ideas and things (in epistemological parallelism). There is equality of attributes and
equality of powers. There is no
causality between different attributes or between different powers, but there is
equality of being. Just as there is
identity of being between corresponding modes of different attributes, so also
there is identity of being between the form of things and objective adequacy of
ideas. (Eip117) “…what follows
formally (that is to say, in this or that attribute) from God’s infinite nature
[ontological parallelism], is the same as what follows objectively from the idea
of God [epistemological parallelism].”
The modification of substance is the same being as the individuating
ideas. That is, the univocity of
attributes constitutes the modification of substance and contains the
individuation of the modes. The two
powers, like the attributes, are really distinct and ontologically one. Attributes are univocal forms in the two
powers of parallelism. Attributes
are common forms that constitute the modifications of substance and contain the
individuations of modes. Attributes
are common forms in the two powers of parallelism. But it is because the attributes
are common forms that now the modifications of Substance can be really different
from the individuation of the modes.
Epistemological parallelism says that, to every mode in
whatever attribute there will correspond an idea in the attribute of
Thought. (EiP120) “The idea of God
thus represents all formally or really distinct attributes, to the extent that a
distinct soul or idea corresponds to each.
The same attributes that are formally distinguished in God [ontological
parallelism] are objectively distinguished in the idea of God [epistemological
parallelism]. But this idea is
nonetheless absolutely unitary [ontologically one], like the substance
constituted by all the attributes.”
Therefore, the powers are, like the attributes, really distinct and
ontologically one. There is
identity of being between objects and ideas. (EiP117) “One and the same thing is
formal in the attribute on which it depends within the power of existing and
acting, and objective in the idea of God on which it depends within the power of
thinking. A mode of an attribute
and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two ways,
under two powers.”
Deleuze says (EiP124-5) that the first privilege of the
attribute of Thought is that it contains modes formally that represent the
attributes taken objectively. There
is an objective distinction between ideas that equals the real formal
distinction between attributes.
Therefore, the distinction between the ideas of epistemological
parallelism will not merely be an objective distinction. Rather, this distinction will be
both objective and formal. Since
every mode, in whatever attribute, is represented by an idea in the attribute of
Thought, the objective ideas will have formal distinction. “Given a substantial modification, it
will be expressed only once in each of the other attributes, but an infinity of
times in infinite understanding, and, therefore, in the attribute of
Thought. And each idea that
expresses it in Thought will represent a mode of one particular attribute,
rather than of some other. So that
there will be as great a distinction between ideas as between attributes
themselves or modes of different attributes: they will have “no [causal]
connection.” There will thus be an
objective distinction between ideas, equivalent to the real formal distinction
between attributes, or modes differing in attribute. Furthermore, this distinction between
ideas will itself be objective and formal, insofar as it is brought into
relation with the formal being of the ideas themselves. Thought will thus contain modes which,
while belonging to the same attribute, are nevertheless distinguished not
modally, but formally or really.”
We can see that the ideas disjoin or divide the connections of the modes.
And, this modal division is not merely an objective distinction. When a mode divides, it changes in
nature (i.e., formally and really).
As Deleuze says, (Difference & Repetition 237) “An intensive
quantity [a modal essence] may be divided, but not without changing its
nature.” This is the interaction
between the two powers. With the
disjunction of the modes that were connected, there is change in the nature—a
change in connection. Is this not
the basis for interaction between the two repetitions that Deleuze describes in
D&R23-4?
The First Two Syntheses of
Actualization
With parallelism we must distinguish between the powers and
their equality and the attributes and their equality. Ontological parallelism is the equality
of attributes. Epistemological
parallelism is the equality of powers.
I understand the two powers in Spinoza’s ontological and epistemological
parallelism to be that upon which Deleuze bases his first two syntheses. In Difference & Repetition,
Deleuze applies these two syntheses to the constitution of time. The first synthesis is an ontological
parallelism. It is the contractile
passive synthesis of habits that we are, drawing difference from
repetition. It is ontological
form. The second synthesis is an
epistemological parallelism. It is
the passive synthesis of the Idea in Memory. Therefore, this is not a synthesis of
successive instants on a homogeneous line of time. It is the heterogeneity of parallel
syntheses or powers.
Also, in Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari describe
the syntheses. The first
connective synthesis is the production and interruption of flows. Connection, as we have seen, is the
first ontological synthesis of Spinoza’s parallelism. (EiP109) “…the modes of different
attributes have not only the same order and the same connection, but the same
being; they are the same things…”
The second disjunctive synthesis as described in
Anti-Oedipus is the distributive viewpoint. It is the individuating disjunction of
the modes that were connected in the first synthesis. The modifications of the first synthesis
are disjoined by the ideas of the second synthesis. Isn’t this Spinoza’s epistemological
parallelism? Given a mode in some
attribute, there is an idea in the attribute of Thought corresponding to
it. One and the same individual is
expressed by a given mode (in whatever attribute) and its corresponding idea (in
the attribute of Thought).
Ideas of the second synthesis disjoin corresponding modes in different
attributes, because each of these modes is represented by an idea in the
attribute of Thought.
Therefore, I believe that this description of the first two
syntheses (in Anti-Oedipus) can be understood by way of Deleuze and
Guattari’s Spinozism. The first
connective synthesis is ontological parallelism. This is the pure, formal expression of
the attributes in parallel as they produce and interrupt flows. There is the same order and connection
between modes of different attributes, but there is no necessitating causality
of the flows between them. There is
expressive quasi-causality of flows.
The second synthesis of disjunctive recording can be seen to be Spinoza’s
epistemological parallelism. It is
the disjunction of the modifications of Substance that we found in the first
synthesis. But through the
conjunction of intensities, disjunction reacts on the connections and
reconstitutes them with real difference.
We see that there is no mediation in this process. Connection is immediately disjunction
and conjunction.
Therefore, I understand Deleuze’s ‘first synthesis’ to be
Spinoza’s ontological parallelism.
It qualifies Substance in a multiplicity of ways. This is the first synthesis of real
distinction. I understand that
which Deleuze calls the ‘second synthesis’ to be Spinoza’s epistemological
parallelism. It is the numerical
distinction of the individuated modes.
It is the individuation of the modes also affected in a multiplicity of
ways. There are, then, two
multiplicities. One is the
formal-real distinction of the modifications of Substance. (However, it should be noted that within
a given unity of modification, there is no real distinction.) The other distributes the
numerical-individuating distinction of the modes. (However, it should be noted that when a
mode divides, it changes in nature.
That is, there is real distinction.) The two parallelisms (ontological and
epistemological) are the two syntheses or multiplicities that interpenetrate
endlessly. The first two syntheses
interact in the process of the actualization of existing modes.
The Third Synthesis of
Counter-Actualization
If the two powers in parallel show us the Spinozist basis for
Deleuze’s first two syntheses, can we also find in Spinoza the basis for what
Deleuze and Guattari, in Anti-Oedipus, call the third conjunctive
synthesis of Eternal Return?
Deleuze does tell us that he sees the eternal return in Spinozism. (D&R304) “All that Spinozism needed
to do for the univocal to become an object of pure affirmation was to make
substance turn around the modes – in other words, to realize univocity in the
form of repetition in the eternal return.”
According to Deleuze’s Spinozism, we perceive other bodies
only as they affect our own. My
subjectivity is only the idea of my own body or mind as perceiving external
effects. However, these effects are
never adequate ideas. The
inadequate ideas of these affections involve their own cause, but do not express
it. The ideas I have of these
external perceptions are therefore signs of my imagination. They are not adequate expressions of the
power of knowing. They are
inadequate impressions from external objects. This is Spinoza’s first kind of
knowledge. I take this first kind
of knowledge to be a reference to the Representational thinking Spinoza found in
Descartes. However, since these
inadequate impressions involve their cause, these affections can help us know
what is common to external bodies and our own. Joyful affections indicate to us a
“common notion” which is adequate, because it belongs to the idea of the
external body and our own. We can
form an idea of what is common to the affecting body and our own. This adequate idea is the ‘common
notion’ of Spinoza’s second kind of knowledge. It is a form common to several
actualized bodies, or existing modes.
It is found in the actualizations of Univocity.
Therefore, an adequate idea is a common notion of bodies in
the second kind of knowledge.
However, when we reach Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge, (EiP300)
“Attributes are still common forms; what has changed is the sense of the word
“common.” Common no longer means
more general, that is, applicable to several existing modes….Common means
univocal: attributes are univocal, or common to God whose singular essence they
constitute, and to the modes whose particular essences they contain….Ideas of
the third kind are defined by their singular nature; they represent God’s
essence and give us knowledge of particular essences as these are contained in
God himself.” Therefore, the
‘common notions’ of the second kind of knowledge, give us the adequate idea of
relations common to several actualized existing modes. But the ‘common notions’ of the third
kind of knowledge are the conjunction of singular, intensive essences. (See my article ‘Ethics and Common
Notions’.) Isn’t this conjunction
of intensive singularities, in Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge, the basis for
the third synthesis of eternal return?
Isn’t this the counter-actualization of Univocity?
I believe we can understand the conjunctive third synthesis
through an understanding of Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge where (EiP300) “An
attribute is no longer understood merely as a common property of all the
existing modes corresponding to it, but as what constitutes the
singular essence of divine substance, as what contains all the
particular essences of its modes.”
Are these univocal singular essences of the third kind of knowledge the
conjunctions of the third synthesis that Deleuze and Guattari describe in
Anti-Oedipus? Aren’t
intensive conjunctions the third synthesis of eternal return of
counter-actualization? As we reach
these conjunctive singular intensities, we enter into new affective becomings.
This third (conjunctive) synthesis
(AO87) “…express[es] those nondecomposable distances always enveloped in the
intensities that divide into one another while changing their form.” (AO88) “The conjunctive synthesis can
therefore be expressed: “So I am the king!
So the kingdom belongs to me!” But this me is merely the
residual subject that sweeps the circle and concludes a self from its
oscillations on the circle.” This
is the third synthesis of consummation of which Deleuze and Guattari say (AO19)
“…attraction and repulsion produce intense nervous states that
fill up the body without organs to varying degrees—states through which
Schreber-the-subject passes, becoming a woman and many other things as well,
following an endless circle of eternal return.” The Eternal Return is intensity that
resonates across all disjunction.
Conclusion
Anti-Oedipus p. 110, "In the first place a partial and nonspecific use of the connective syntheses was found to be in opposition to the Oedipal use, itself global and specific....In the second place, an inclusive or nonrestrictive use of the disjunctive syntheses is in opposition to their Oedipal, exclusive, restrictive use....in the third place, a nomadic and polyvocal use of the conjunctive syntheses is opposed to the segregative and biunivocal use made of them...." In Logic of Sense, the Twenty-Fourth Series, Deleuze says that the whole question is to know how disjunction becomes a synthesis. With Representational thought, disjunction is not really a synthesis. It is merely a regulative analysis separating and excluding non-convergent series. It is merely the analysis of conceptual identity. However, with Univocity, disjunction becomes a real synthesis. All disjunctive ramifications are included. This means that connections now include divergent series that take on the appearance of continuous variation, but never presuppose a conceptual continuity. Conjunctions fill the body without organs to degrees of intensity. Univocity opens all the forms so that there can be no opposition or exclusion.