Ethics, 2, Prop 17, Note
...to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of things. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines. I will here draw attention to the fact, in order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error. The mind does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it. If the mind, while imagining non-existent things as present to it, is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of imagination depend solely on its own nature--that is (I. Def. vii.), if this faculty of imagination be free.
TPT-2
A perusal of the sacred books will show us
that all God's
revelations to the prophets were made through
words or appearances, or a combination of the
two. These words and appearances were of two kinds;
1.- real when external to the mind of the prophet who heard or saw them,
2.- imaginary when the
imagination of the prophet was in a state which
led him distinctly to suppose that he heard or saw them.
...
We might, perhaps, suppose that the voice
with which God called Samuel was real, for in 1 Sam. iii:21, we read, "And the
Lord appeared again in Shiloh, for the Lord revealed Himself to Samuel in Shiloh
by the word of the Lord;" implying that the appearance of the Lord consisted in
His making Himself known to Samuel through a voice; in other words, that Samuel
heard the Lord speaking. But we are compelled to distinguish between the
prophecies of
Moses and those of other prophets, and
therefore must decide that this voice was imaginary, a conclusion further
supported by the voice's resemblance to the voice of Eli, which Samuel was in
the habit of hearing, and therefore might easily imagine; when thrice called by
the Lord, Samuel supposed it to have been Eli.
The voice which Abimelech heard was imaginary, for it is written, Gen. xx:6, "And God said unto him in a dream." So that the will of God was manifest to him, not in waking, but only, in sleep, that is, when the imagination is most active and uncontrolled
...Maimonides
and others do indeed maintain that these and every other instance of angelic
apparitions (e.g. to Manoah and to Abraham offering up Isaac) occurred during
sleep, for that no one with his eyes open ever could see an angel, but this is
mere nonsense. The sole object of such commentators seems to be to extort from
Scripture confirmations of Aristotelian quibbles and their own inventions, a
proceeding which I regard as the acme of absurdity.
In figures, not real but existing only in
the prophet's
imagination, God revealed to Joseph his future
lordship, and in
words and figures He revealed to Joshua that He
would fight for the Hebrews, causing to appear an angel, as it were the Captain
of the Lord's host, bearing a sword, and by this means communicating verbally.
The forsaking of Israel by Providence was portrayed to Isaiah by a vision of the
Lord, the thrice Holy, sitting on a very lofty throne, and the Hebrews, stained
with the mire of their sins, sunk as it were in uncleanness, and thus as far as
possible distant from God. The wretchedness of the people at the time was thus
revealed, while future calamities were foretold in
words. I could cite from Holy Writ many similar
examples, but I think they are sufficiently well known already.
However, we get a still more clear
confirmation of our position in Num xii:6,7, as follows: "If there be any
prophet among you, I the Lord will make myself known unto him in a vision" (i.e.
by appearances and signs, for God says of the
prophecy of
Moses that it was a vision without signs), "and
will speak unto him in a dream " (i.e. not with actual words and an actual
voice). "My servant
Moses is not so; with him will I speak mouth to
mouth, even apparently, and not in dark speeches, and the similitude of the Lord
he shall behold," i.e. looking on me as a friend and not afraid, he speaks with
me (cf. Ex xxxiii:17).
This makes it indisputable that the other prophets did not hear a real voice, and we gather as much from Deut. xxiv:10: "And there arose not a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses whom the Lord knew face to face," which must mean that the Lord spoke with none other; for not even Moses saw the Lord's face. These are the only media of communication between God and man which I find mentioned in Scripture, and therefore the only ones which may be supposed or invented. We may be able quite to comprehend that God can communicate immediately with man, for without the intervention of bodily means He communicates to our minds His essence; still, a man who can by pure intuition comprehend ideas which are neither contained in nor deducible from the foundations of our natural knowledge, must necessarily possess a mind far superior to those of his fellow men, nor do I believe that any have been so endowed save Christ. To Him the ordinances of God leading men to salvation were revealed directly without words or visions, so that God manifested Himself to the Apostles through the mind of Christ as He formerly did to Moses through the supernatural voice. In this sense the voice of Christ, like the voice which Moses heard, may be called the voice of God, and it may be said that the wisdom of God (i.e. wisdom more than human) took upon itself in Christ human nature, and that Christ was the way of salvation. I must at this juncture declare that those doctrines which certain churches put forward concerning Christ, I neither affirm nor deny, for I freely confess that I do not understand them. What I have just stated I gather from Scripture, where I never read that God appeared to Christ, or spoke to Christ, but that God was revealed to the Apostles through Christ; that Christ was the Way of Life, and that the old law was given through an angel, and not immediately by God; whence it follows that if Moses spoke with God face to face as a man speaks with his friend (i.e. by means of their two bodies) Christ communed with God mind to mind.
Thus we may conclude that no one except Christ received the revelations of God without the aid of imagination, whether in words or vision. Therefore the power of prophecy implies not a peculiarly perfect mind, but a peculiarly vivid imagination, as I will show more clearly in the next chapter...
Returning, then, to the main object of our discussion, we find that the Scriptural phrases, "The Spirit of the Lord was upon a prophet," "The Lord breathed His Spirit into men," "Men were filled with the Spirit of God, with the Holy Spirit," &c., are quite clear to us, and mean that prophets were endowed with a peculiar and extraordinary power, and devoted themselves to piety with especial constancy;[N3] that thus they perceived the mind or the thought of God, for we have shown that God's Spirit signifies in Hebrew God's mind or thought, and that the law which shows His mind and thought is called His Spirit; hence that the imagination of the prophets, inasmuch as through it were revealed the decrees of God, may equally be called the mind of God, and the prophets be said to have possessed the mind of God. On our minds also the mind of God and His eternal thoughts are impressed; but this being the same for all men is less taken into account, especially by the Hebrews, who claimed a pre-eminence, and despised other men and other men's knowledge.
We need no longer scruple to affirm
that the prophets only perceived God's
revelation by the aid of
imagination, that is, by
words and figures either real or imaginary. We
find no other means mentioned in Scripture, and therefore must not invent any.
As to the particular law of
Nature by which the communications took place,
I confess my ignorance. I might, indeed, say as others do, that they took place
by the power of
God; but this would be mere trifling, and no
better than explaining some unique specimen by a transcendental term. Everything
takes place by the power of
God.
Nature herself is the power of
God under another name, and our ignorance of
the power of
God is co-extensive with our ignorance of
Nature. It is absolute folly, therefore, to
ascribe an event to the power of God when we know not its natural cause, which
is the power of
God.
However, we are not now inquiring into
the causes of prophetic knowledge. We are only attempting, as I have said, to
examine the Scriptural documents, and to draw our conclusions from them as from
ultimate natural facts; the causes of the documents do not concern us.
As the prophets perceived the
revelations of God by the aid of
imagination, they could indisputably perceive
much that is beyond the boundary of the
intellect, for many more ideas can be
constructed from
words and figures than from the principles and
notions on which the whole fabric of
reasoned knowledge is reared.
Thus we have a clue to the fact that
the prophets perceived nearly everything in parables and allegories, and clothed
spiritual truths in bodily forms, for such is the usual method of
imagination. We need no longer wonder that
Scripture and the prophets speak so strangely and obscurely of God's Spirit or
Mind (cf. Numbers xi:17, 1 Kings xxii:21, &c.), that the Lord was seen by Micah
as sitting, by Daniel as an old man clothed in white, by Ezekiel as a fire, that
the Holy Spirit appeared to those with
Christ as a descending dove, to the apostles as
fiery tongues, to Paul on his conversion as a great light. All these expressions
are plainly in harmony with the current ideas of God and spirits.
Inasmuch as
imagination is fleeting and inconstant, we find
that the power of
prophecy did not remain with a prophet for
long, nor manifest itself frequently, but was very rare; manifesting itself only
in a few men, and in them not often...
[Note N3]: "Prophets were endowed with a peculiar and extraordinary power." Though some men enjoy gifts which nature has not bestowed on their fellows, they are not said to surpass the bounds of human nature, unless their special qualities are such as cannot be said to be deducible from the definition of human nature. For instance, a giant is a rarity, but still human. The gift of composing poetry extempore is given to very few, yet it is human. The same may, therefore, be said of the faculty possessed by some of imagining things as vividly as though they saw them before them, and this not while asleep, but while awake. But if anyone could be found who possessed other means and other foundations for knowledge, he might be said to transcend the limits of human nature.
TPT-3
...we find stated in Scripture, in proof of God's great mercy to the Jews, that God would not hear Balaam, and that He changed the cursing to blessing (see Deut. xxiii:6, Josh. xxiv:10, Neh. xiii:2). Wherefore he was without doubt most acceptable to God, for the speeches and cursings of the wicked move God not at all. As then he was a true prophet, and nevertheless Joshua calls him a soothsayer or augur, it is certain that this title had an honourable signification, and that those whom the Gentiles called augurs and soothsayers were true prophets, while those whom Scripture often accuses and condemns were false soothsayers, who deceived the Gentiles as false prophets deceived the Jews; indeed, this is made evident from other passages in the Bible, whence we conclude that the gift of prophecy was not peculiar to the Jews, but common to all nations.
...
When the prophets, in speaking of this election which regards only true virtue, mixed up much concerning sacrifices and ceremonies, and the rebuilding of the temple and city, they wished by such figurative expressions, after the manner and nature of prophecy, to expound matters spiritual, so as at the same time to show to the Jews, whose prophets they were, the true restoration of the state and of the temple to be expected about the time of Cyrus
TPT-4
Hence the
affirmations and the
negations of God always involve necessity or
truth; so that, for example, if God said to Adam that He did not wish him to eat
of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, it would have involved a
contradiction that Adam should have been able to eat of it, and would therefore
have been impossible that he should have so eaten, for the Divine command would
have involved an
eternal necessity and truth. But since
Scripture nevertheless narrates that God did give this command to Adam, and yet
that none the less Adam ate of the tree, we must perforce say that God revealed
to Adam the evil which would surely follow if he should eat of the tree, but did
not disclose that such evil would of necessity come to pass. Thus it was that
Adam took the
revelation to be not an
eternal and necessary truth, but a
law - that is, an ordinance followed by gain or
loss, not depending necessarily on the nature of the act performed, but solely
on the will and absolute power of some potentate, so that the
revelation in question was solely in relation
to Adam, and solely through his lack of knowledge a law, and God was, as it
were, a lawgiver and potentate. From the same cause, namely, from lack of
knowledge, the Decalogue in relation to the Hebrews was a law, for since they
knew not the
existence of God as an
eternal truth, they must have taken as a law
that which was revealed to them in the Decalogue, namely, that God exists, and
that God only should be worshipped. But if God had spoken to them without the
intervention of any bodily means, immediately they would have perceived it not
as a law, but as an
eternal truth.
What we have said about the Israelites and
Adam, applies also to all the prophets who wrote laws in God's name - they did
not adequately conceive God's decrees as
eternal truths. For instance, we must say of
Moses that from
revelation, from the basis of what was revealed
to him, he perceived the method by which the Israelitish nation could best be
united in a particular territory, and could form a body politic or
state, and further that he perceived the method
by which that nation could best be constrained to obedience; but he did not
perceive, nor was it revealed to him, that this method was absolutely the best,
nor that the obedience of the people in a certain strip of territory would
necessarily imply the end he had in view. Wherefore he perceived these things
not as
eternal truths, but as precepts and ordinances,
and he ordained them as laws of God, and thus it came to be that he conceived
God as a ruler, a legislator, a king, as merciful, just, &c., whereas such
qualities are simply attributes of human nature, and utterly alien from the
nature of the Deity. Thus much we may affirm of the prophets who wrote laws in
the name of God; but we must not affirm it of
Christ, for Christ, although He too seems to
have written laws in the name of God, must be taken to have had a clear and
adequate perception, for
Christ was not so much a prophet as the
mouthpiece of God. For God made
revelations to mankind through
Christ as He had before done through angels -
that is, a created voice, visions, &c. It would be as unreasonable to say that
God had accommodated his
revelations to the opinions of
Christ as that He had before accommodated them
to the opinions of angels (that is, of a created voice or visions) as matters to
be revealed to the prophets, a wholly absurd hypothesis. Moreover,
Christ was sent to teach not only the Jews but
the whole human race, and therefore it was not enough that His mind should be
accommodated to the opinions the Jews alone, but also to the opinion and
fundamental teaching common to the whole human race - in other words, to
ideas universal and true. Inasmuch as God
revealed Himself to
Christ, or to Christ's mind immediately, and
not as to the prophets through
words and symbols, we must needs suppose that
Christ perceived truly what was revealed, in
other words, He understood it, for a matter is
understood when it is perceived simply by the
mind without
words or symbols.
Christ, then, perceived (truly and adequately)
what was revealed, and if He ever proclaimed such
revelations as laws, He did so because of the
ignorance and obstinacy of the people, acting in this respect the part of God;
inasmuch as He accommodated Himself to the comprehension of the people, and
though He spoke somewhat more clearly than the other prophets, yet He taught
what was revealed obscurely, and generally through parables, especially when He
was speaking to those to whom it was not yet given to understand the kingdom of
heaven. (See Matt. xiii:10, &c.) To those to whom it was given to understand the
mysteries of heaven, He doubtless taught His doctrines as
eternal truths, and did not lay them down as
laws, thus freeing the minds of His hearers from the bondage of that law which
He further confirmed and established. Paul apparently points to this more than
once (e.g. Rom. vii:6, and iii:28), though he never himself seems to wish to
speak openly, but, to quote his own words (Rom. iii:6, and vi:19), "merely
humanly." This he expressly states when he calls God just, and it was doubtless
in concession to human weakness that he attributes mercy, grace, anger, and
similar qualities to God, adapting his language to the popular mind, or, as he
puts it (1 Cor. iii:1, 2), to carnal men. In Rom. ix:18, he teaches
undisguisedly that God's auger and mercy depend not on the actions of men, but
on God's own nature or will; further, that no one is justified by the works of
the law, but only by faith, which he seems to identify with the full assent of
the soul; lastly, that no one is blessed unless he have in him the mind of
Christ (Rom. viii:9), whereby he perceives the
laws of God as
eternal truths. We conclude, therefore, that
God is described as a lawgiver or prince, and styled just, merciful, &c., merely
in concession to popular understanding, and the imperfection of popular
knowledge; that in reality God acts and directs all things simply by the
necessity of His nature and perfection, and that His decrees and volitions are
eternal truths, and always involve necessity.
So much for the first point which I wished to explain and demonstrate.
Passing on to the second point, let us search the sacred pages for their teaching concerning the light of nature and this Divine law. The first doctrine we find in the history of the first man, where it is narrated that God commanded Adam not to eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; this seems to mean that God commanded Adam to do and to seek after righteousness because it was good, not because the contrary was evil: that is, to seek the good for its own sake, not from fear of evil. We have seen that he who acts rightly from the true knowledge and love of right, acts with freedom and constancy, whereas he who acts from fear of evil, is under the constraint of evil, and acts in bondage under external control. So that this commandment of God to Adam comprehends the whole Divine natural law, and absolutely agrees with the dictates of the light of nature; nay, it would be easy to explain on this basis the whole history or allegory of the first man. But I prefer to pass over the subject in silence, because, in the first place, I cannot be absolutely certain that my explanation would be in accordance with the intention of the sacred writer; and, secondly, because many do not admit that this history is an allegory, maintaining it to be a simple narrative of facts.
...
Thus we see that Scripture literally approves of the light of natural reason and the natural Divine law
TPT-5
All Scripture was written primarily for an
entire people, and secondarily for the whole human race; therefore its contents
must necessarily be adapted as far as possible to the understanding of the
masses, and proved only by examples drawn from experience. We will explain
ourselves more clearly. The chief speculative doctrines taught in Scripture are
the
existence of God, or a Being Who made all
things, and Who directs and sustains the world with consummate wisdom;
furthermore, that God takes the greatest thought for men, or such of them as
live piously and honourably, while He punishes, with various penalties, those
who do evil, separating them from the good. All this is proved in Scripture
entirely through experience-that is, through the narratives there related. No
definitions of doctrine are given, but all the sayings and reasonings are
adapted to the understanding of the masses. Although experience can give no
clear knowledge of these things, nor explain the nature of God, nor how He
directs and sustains all things, it can nevertheless teach and enlighten men
sufficiently to impress obedience and devotion on their minds.
It is now, I think, sufficiently clear
what persons are bound to believe in the Scripture narratives, and in what
degree they are so bound, for it evidently follows from what has been said that
the knowledge of and belief in them is particularly necessary to the masses
whose
intellect is not capable of perceiving things
clearly and distinctly. Further, he who denies them because he does not believe
that God exists or takes thought for men and the world, may be accounted
impious; but a man who is ignorant of them, and nevertheless knows by natural
reason that God exists, as we have said, and
has a true plan of life, is altogether blessed - yes, more blessed than the
common herd of believers, because besides true opinions he possesses also a true
and distinct conception. Lastly, he who is ignorant of the Scriptures and knows
nothing by the light of
reason, though he may not be impious or
rebellious, is yet less than human and almost brutal, having none of God's
gifts.
TPT-6
...
But perhaps someone will insist that we
find many things in Scripture which seem in nowise explicable by natural causes,
as for instance, that the sins of men and their prayers can be the cause of rain
and of the earth's fertility, or that faith can heal the blind, and so on. But I
think I have already made sufficient answer: I have shown that Scripture does
not explain things by their secondary causes, but only narrates them in the
order and the style which has most power to move men, and especially uneducated
men, to devotion; and therefore it speaks inaccurately of God and of events,
seeing that its object is not to convince the reason, but to attract and lay
hold of the
imagination. If the Bible were to describe the
destruction of an empire in the style of political historians, the masses would
remain unstirred, whereas the contrary is the case when it adopts the method of
poetic description, and refers all things immediately to God. When, therefore,
the Bible says that the earth is barren because of men's sins, or that the blind
were healed by faith, we ought to take no more notice than when it says that God
is angry at men's sins, that He is sad, that He repents of the good He has
promised and done; or that on seeing a sign he remembers something He had
promised, and other similar expressions, which are either thrown out poetically
or related according to the opinion and prejudices of the writer.
...
In the time of Joshua the Hebrews held the ordinary opinion that the sun moves with a daily motion, and that the earth remains at rest; to this preconceived opinion they adapted the miracle which occurred during their battle with the five kings. They did not simply relate that that day was longer than usual, but asserted that the sun and moon stood still, or ceased from their motion - a statement which would be of great service to them at that time in convincing and proving by experience to the Gentiles, who worshipped the sun, that the sun was under the control of another deity who could compel it to change its daily course. Thus, partly through religious motives, partly through preconceived opinions, they conceived of and related the occurrence as something quite different from what really happened
Thus in order to interpret the Scriptural miracles and understand from the narration of them how they really happened, it is necessary to know the opinions of those who first related them, and have recorded them for us in writing, and to distinguish such opinions from the actual impression made upon their senses, otherwise we shall confound opinions and judgments with the actual miracle as it really occurred: nay, further, we shall confound actual events with symbolical and imaginary ones. For many things are narrated in Scripture as real, and were believed to be real, which were in fact only symbolical and imaginary. As, for instance, that God came down from heaven (Exod. xix:28, Deut. v:28), and that Mount Sinai smoked because God descended upon it surrounded with fire; or, again that Elijah ascended into heaven in a chariot of fire, with horses of fire; all these things were assuredly merely symbols adapted to the opinions of those who have handed them down to us as they were represented to them, namely, as real. All who have any education know that God has no right hand nor left; that He is not moved nor at rest, nor in a particular place, but that He is absolutely infinite and contains in Himself all perfections.
These things, I repeat, are known to
whoever judges of things by the perception of pure
reason, and not according as his
imagination is affected by his outward senses.
Following the example of the masses who imagine a bodily Deity, holding a royal
court with a throne on the convexity of heaven, above the stars, which are
believed to be not very, far off from the earth.
To these and similar
opinions very many narrations in Scripture are
adapted, and should not, therefore, be mistaken by philosophers for realities.
TPT-7
...
Ambition and unscrupulousness have waxed
so powerful, that religion is thought to consist, not so much in respecting the
writings of the Holy Ghost, as in defending human commentaries, so that religion
is no longer identified with charity, but with spreading discord and propagating
insensate hatred disguised under the name of zeal for the Lord, and eager ardour.
To these evils we must add superstition, which teaches men to despise reason and nature, and only to admire and venerate that which is repugnant to both: whence it is not wonderful that for the sake of increasing the admiration and veneration felt for Scripture, men strive to explain it so as to make it appear to contradict, as far as possible, both one and the other: thus they dream that most profound mysteries lie hid in the Bible, and weary themselves out in the investigation of these absurdities, to the neglect of what is useful. Every result of their diseased imagination they attribute to the Holy Ghost, and strive to defend with the utmost zeal and passion; for it is an observed fact that men employ their reason to defend conclusions arrived at by reason, but conclusions arrived at by the passions are defended by the passions
TPT-11
...
All the arguments employed by Moses in the five books are to be understood in a similar manner; they are not drawn from the armoury of reason, but are merely, modes of expression calculated to instill with efficacy, and present vividly to the imagination the commands of God.
...
TPT- 12
Those who look upon the Bible as a message
sent down by God from Heaven to men, will doubtless cry out that I have
committed the sin against the Holy Ghost because I have asserted that the Word
of God is faulty, mutilated, tampered with, and inconsistent; that we possess it
only in fragments, and that the original of the covenant which God made with the
Jews has been lost. However, I have no doubt that a little reflection will cause
them to desist from their uproar: for not only reason but the expressed opinions
of prophets and apostles openly proclaim that God's
eternal Word and covenant, no less than
true religion, is Divinely inscribed in human
hearts, that is, in the
human mind, and that this is the true original
of God's covenant, stamped with His own seal, namely, the idea of Himself, as it
were, with the image of His Godhood.
Religion was imparted to the early
Hebrews as a law written down, because they were at that time in the condition
of children, but afterwards
Moses (Deut. xxx:6) and Jeremiah (xxxi:33)
predicted a time coming when the Lord should write His law in their hearts. Thus
only the Jews, and amongst them chiefly the Sadducees, struggled for the law
written on tablets; least of all need those who bear it inscribed on their
hearts join in the contest. Those, therefore, who reflect, will find nothing in
what I have written repugnant either to the Word of God or to
true religion and faith, or calculated to
weaken either one or the other: contrariwise, they will see that I have
strengthened religion, as I showed at the end of Chapter 10.; indeed, had it not
been so, I should certainly have decided to hold my peace, nay, I would even
have asserted as a way out of all difficulties that the Bible contains the most
profound hidden mysteries; however, as this doctrine has given rise to gross
superstition and other pernicious results
spoken of at the beginning of Chapter 5., I have thought such a course
unnecessary, especially as religion stands in no need of
superstitious adornments, but is, on the
contrary, deprived by such trappings of some of her splendour.
TPT-13
In the second chapter of this treatise we
pointed out that the prophets were gifted with extraordinary powers of
imagination, but not of
understanding; also that God only revealed to
them such things as are very simple - not
philosophic mysteries, - and that He adapted
His communications to their previous opinions. We further showed in Chap. 5.
that Scripture only transmits and teaches truths which can readily be
comprehended by all; not deducing and concatenating its conclusions from
definitions and axioms, but narrating quite simply, and confirming its
statements, with a view to inspiring belief, by an appeal to experience as
exemplified in miracles and history, and setting forth its truths in the style
and phraseology which would most appeal to the popular mind (cf. Chap. 6., third
division).
...
Now, though everyone, as we have said, is
now quite able to see this truth for himself, I should nevertheless wish,
considering that the whole of Religion depends thereon, to explain the entire
question more accurately and clearly. To this end I must first prove that the
intellectual or accurate knowledge of God is
not a gift, bestowed upon all good men like obedience; and, further, that the
knowledge of God, required by Him through His prophets from everyone without
exception, as needful to be known, is simply a knowledge of His Divine justice
and charity. Both these points are easily proved from Scripture. The first
plainly follows from Exodus vi:2, where God, in order to show the singular grace
bestowed upon
Moses, says to him: "And I appeared unto
Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob by the name of El Sadai (A. V. God
Almighty); but by my name Jehovah was I not known to them" - for the better
understanding of which passage I may remark that El Sadai, in Hebrew, signifies
the God who suffices, in that He gives to every man that which suffices for him;
and, although Sadai is often used by itself, to signify God, we cannot doubt
that the word El (God) is everywhere understood. Furthermore, we must note that
Jehovah is the only word found in Scripture with the meaning of the absolute
essence of God, without reference to created things. The Jews maintain, for this
reason, that this is, strictly speaking, the only name of God; that the rest of
the words used are merely titles; and, in truth, the other names of God, whether
they be substantives or adjectives, are merely attributive, and belong to Him,
in so far as He is conceived of in relation to created things, or manifested
through them. Thus El, or Eloah, signifies powerful, as is well known, and only
applies to God in respect to His supremacy, as when we call Paul an apostle; the
faculties of his power are set forth in an accompanying adjective, as El, great,
awful, just, merciful, &c., or else all are understood at once by the use of El
in the plural number, with a singular signification, an expression frequently
adopted in Scripture.
Now, as God tells
Moses that He was not known to the patriarchs
by the name of Jehovah, it follows that they were not cognizant of any attribute
of God which expresses His absolute essence, but only of His deeds and promises
that is, of His power, as manifested in visible things. God does not thus speak
to
Moses in order to accuse the patriarchs of
infidelity, but, on the contrary, as a means of extolling their belief and
faith, inasmuch as, though they possessed no extraordinary knowledge of God
(such as
Moses had), they yet accepted His promises as
fixed and certain; whereas Moses, though his thoughts about God were more
exalted, nevertheless doubted about the Divine promises, and complained to God
that, instead of the promised deliverance, the prospects of the Israelites had
darkened.
As the patriarchs did not know the
distinctive name of God, and as God mentions the fact to
Moses, in praise of their faith and
single-heartedness, and in contrast to the extraordinary grace granted to Moses,
it follows, as we stated at first, that men are not bound by, decree to have
knowledge of the attributes of God, such knowledge being only granted to a few
of the faithful: it is hardly worth while to quote further examples from
Scripture, for everyone must recognize that knowledge of God is not equal among
all good men. Moreover, a man cannot be ordered to be wise any more than he can
be ordered to live and exist. Men, women, and children are all alike able to
obey by, commandment, but not to be wise. If any tell us that it is not
necessary to understand the Divine attributes, but that we must believe them
simply without proof, he is plainly trifling. For what is invisible and can only
be perceived by the mind, cannot be apprehended by any other means than proofs;
if these are absent the object remains ungrasped; the repetition of what has
been heard on such subjects no more indicates or attains to their meaning than
the words of a parrot or a puppet speaking without sense or signification.
...
We have thus seen that
Moses, Jeremiah, and John sum up in a very
short compass the knowledge of
God needful for all, and that they state it to
consist in exactly what we said, namely, that
God is supremely just, and supremely merciful -
in other words, the one perfect pattern of the true life. We may add that
Scripture nowhere gives an express definition of
God, and does not point out any other of His
attributes which should be apprehended save these, nor does it in set terms
praise any others. Wherefore we may draw the general conclusion that an
intellectual knowledge of
God, which takes cognizance of His nature in so
far as it actually is, and which cannot by any manner of living be imitated by
mankind or followed as an example, has no bearing whatever on true rules of
conduct, on faith, or on revealed religion; consequently that men may be in
complete error on the subject without incurring the charge of sinfulness. We
need now no longer wonder that God adapted Himself to the existing opinions and
imaginations of the prophets, or that the
faithful held different ideas of
God, as we showed in Chap. 2.; or, again, that
the sacred books speak very inaccurately of
God, attributing to Him hands, feet, eyes,
ears, a mind, and motion from one place to another; or that they ascribe to Him
emotions, such as jealousy, mercy, &c., or, lastly, that they describe Him as a
Judge in heaven sitting on a royal throne with
Christ on His right hand. Such expressions are
adapted to the understanding of the multitude, it being the object of the Bible
to make men not learned but obedient.
...
God has required nothing from man but a knowledge of His Divine justice and charity, and that not as necessary to scientific accuracy, but to obedience.
TPT-14
...
Furthermore, faith is not affected,
whether we hold that God is omnipresent essentially or potentially; that He
directs all things by absolute fiat, or by the necessity of His nature; that He
dictates laws like a prince, or that He sets them forth as
eternal truths; that man obeys Him by virtue of
free will, or by virtue of the necessity of the Divine decree; lastly, that the
reward of the good and the punishment of the wicked is natural or supernatural:
these and such like questions have no bearing on faith, except in so far as they
are used as means to give us license to sin more, or to obey God less. I will go
further, and maintain that every man is bound to adapt these dogmas to his own
way of thinking, and to interpret them according as he feels that he can give
them his fullest and most unhesitating assent, so that he may the more easily
obey God with his whole heart.
...
The best faith is not necessarily
possessed by him who displays the best reasons, but by him who displays the best
fruits of justice and charity. How salutary and necessary this doctrine is for a
state, in order that men may dwell together in peace and concord; and how many
and how great causes of disturbance and crime are thereby cut off, I leave
everyone to judge for himself!
TPT-15
It remains for me to show that between faith or theology, and philosophy, there is no connection, nor affinity. I think no one will dispute the fact who has knowledge of the aim and foundations of the two subjects, for they are as wide apart as the poles.
Philosophy has no end in view save truth:
faith, as we have abundantly proved, looks for nothing but obedience and piety.
Again,
philosophy is based on axioms which must be
sought from nature alone: faith is based on history and language, and must be
sought for only in Scripture and
revelation, as we showed in Chap. 7. Faith,
therefore, allows the greatest latitude in
philosophic speculation, allowing us without
blame to think what we like about anything, and only condemning, as heretics and
schismatics, those who teach opinions which tend to produce obstinacy, hatred,
strife, and anger; while, on the other hand, only considering as faithful those
who persuade us, as far as their reason and faculties will permit, to follow
justice and charity.
...
The sphere of reason is, as we have said, truth and wisdom; the sphere of theology, is piety and obedience. The power of reason does not extend so far as to determine for us that men may be blessed through simple obedience, without understanding. Theology, tells us nothing else, enjoins on us no command save obedience, and has neither the will nor the power to oppose reason: she defines the dogmas of faith (as we pointed out in the last chapter) only in so far as they may be necessary, for obedience, and leaves reason to determine their precise truth: for reason is the light of the mind, and without her all things are dreams and phantoms.
...
By theology, I here mean, strictly speaking, revelation, in so far as it indicates the object aimed at by Scripture namely, the scheme and manner of obedience, or the true dogmas of piety and faith. This may truly be called the Word of God, which does not consist in a certain number of books (see Chap. 12.). Theology thus understood, if we regard its precepts or rules of life, will be found in accordance with reason; and, if we look to its aim and object, will be seen to be in nowise repugnant thereto, wherefore it is universal to all men.
...
Now the certainty of the prophets consisted (as we pointed out) in these elements:-
(I.) A distinct and vivid
imagination.
(II.) A sign.
(III.) Lastly, and chiefly, a mind turned to what is just and good. It was based
on no other reasons than these, and consequently they cannot prove their
authority by any other reasons, either to the multitude whom they addressed
orally, nor to us whom they address in writing.
The first of these reasons, namely, the vivid imagination, could be valid only for the prophets; therefore, our certainty concerning revelation must, and ought to be, based on the remaining two - namely, the sign and the teaching. Such is the express doctrine of Moses, for (in Deut. xviii.) he bids the people obey the prophet who should give a true sign in the name of the Lord, but if he should predict falsely, even though it were in the name of the Lord, he should be put to death, as should also he who strives to lead away the people from the true religion, though he confirm his authority with signs and portents. We may compare with the above Deut. xiii. Whence it follows that a true prophet could be distinguished from a false one, both by his doctrine and by the miracles he wrought, for Moses declares such an one to be a true prophet, and bids the people trust him without fear of deceit. He condemns as false, and worthy, of death, those who predict anything falsely even in the name of the Lord, or who preach false gods, even though their miracles
...as we see that they confirmed their teaching with signs and wonders, we become persuaded that they did not speak at random, nor run riot in their prophecies. We are further strengthened in our conclusion by the fact that the morality they teach is in evident agreement with reason, for it is no accidental coincidence that the Word of God which we find in the prophets coincides with the Word of God written in our hearts.
We are further strengthened in our
conclusion by the fact that the morality they teach is in evident agreement with
reason, for it is no accidental coincidence
that the Word of God which we find in the prophets coincides with the Word of
God written in our hearts. We may, I say, conclude this from the sacred books as
certainly as did the Jews of old from the living voice of the prophets: for we
showed in Chap. 12. that Scripture has come down to us intact in respect to its
doctrine and main narratives.
Therefore this whole basis of
theology and Scripture, though it does not
admit of mathematical proof, may yet be accepted with the approval of our
judgment. It would be folly to refuse to accept what is confirmed by such ample
prophetic testimony, and what has proved such a comfort to those whose
reason is comparatively weak, and such a
benefit to the state; a doctrine, moreover, which we may believe in without the
slightest peril or hurt, and should reject simply because it cannot be
mathematically proved: it is as though we should admit nothing as true, or as a
wise rule of life, which could ever, in any possible way, be called in question;
or as though most of our actions were not full of uncertainty and hazards.
OIU
Reflection shows that all modes of perception or knowledge may be reduced to four:---
1. Perception arising from hearsay or from some sign which everyone may name as he please.
2. Perception arising from mere experience --- that is, form experience not yet classified by the intellect, and only so called because the given event has happened to take place, and we have no contradictory fact to set against it, so that it therefore remains unassailed in our minds.
3. Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when from some effect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general proposition that some property is always present.
4. Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge of its proximate cause.
All these kinds of perception I will illustrate by examples. By hearsay I know the day of my birth, my parentage, and other matters about which I have never felt any doubt. By mere experience I know that I shall die, for this I can affirm from having seen that others like myself have died, though all did not live for the same period, or die by the same disease. I know by mere experience that oil has the property of feeding fire, and water of extinguishing it. In the same way I know that a dog is a barking animal, man a rational animal, and in fact nearly all the practical knowledge of life.
We deduce one thing from another as follows: when we clearly perceive that we feel a certain body and no other, we thence clearly infer that the mind is united to the body, and that their union is the cause of the given sensation; but we cannot thence absolutely understand the nature of the sensation and the union. Or, after I have become acquainted with the nature of vision,a nd know that it has the property of making one and the same thing appear smaller when far off than when near, I can infer that the sun is larger than it appears, and can draw other conclusions of the same kind.
Lastly, a thing may be perceived solely through its essence; when, from the fact of knowing something, I know what it is to know that thing, or when, from knowing the essence of the mind, I know that it is united to the body. By the same kind of knowledge we know that two and three make five, or that two lines each parallel to a third, are parallel to one another, &c. The things which I have been able to know by this kind of knowledge are as yet very few.
In order that the whole matter may be put in a clearer light, I will make use of a single illustration as follows. Three numbers are given --- it is required to find a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen will at once tell us that they know what is required to find the fourth number, for they have not yet forgotten the rule which was given to them arbitrarily without proof by their masters; others construct a universal axiom from their experience with simple numbers, where the fourth number is self-evident, as in the case of 2, 4, 3, 6; here it is evident that if the second number be multiplied by the third, and the product divided by the first, the quotient is 6; when they see that by this process the number is produced which they knew beforehand to be the proportional, they infer that the process always holds good for finding a fourth number proportional. Mathematicians, however, know by the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, what numbers are proportionals, namely, from the nature and property of proportion it follows that the product of the first and fourth will be equal to the product of the second and third: still they do not see the adequate proportionality of the given numbers, or, if they do see it, they see it not by virtue of Euclid's proposition, but intuitively, without going through any process.
...
As to the first mode, it is evident that from hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain, and, moreover, can give us no insight into the essence of a thing, as is manifest in our illustration; now one can only arrive at knowledge of a thing through knowledge of its essence, as will hereafter appear. We may, therefore, clearly conclude that the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its character. For simple hearsay cannot affect anyone whose understanding does not, so to speak, meet it half way.
The second mode of perception cannot be said to give us the idea of the proportion of which we are in search. Moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite, for we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its means, except accidental properties, which are never clearly understood, unless the essence of the things in question be known first. Wherefore this mode also must be rejected.
Of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner that it gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it enables us to draw conclusions without risk of error; yet it is not by itself sufficient to put us in possession of the perfection we aim at.
The fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of a thing without danger of error. This mode, therefore, must be the one which we chiefly employ. How, then, should we avail ourselves of it so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with the least delay concerning things previously unknown? I will proceed to explain.
...
Let us then make a beginning with the first part of the method, which is, as we have said, to distinguish and separate the true idea from other perceptions, and to keep the mind from confusing with true ideas those which are false, fictitious, and doubtful. I intend to dwell on this point at length, partly to keep a distinction so necessary before the reader's mind, and also because there are some who doubt of true ideas, through not having attended to the distinction between a true perception and all others. Such persons are like men who, while they are awake, doubt not that they are awake, but afterwards in a dream, as often happens, thinking that they are surely awake, and then finding that they were in error, become doubtful even of being awake. This state of mind arises through neglect of the distinction between sleeping and waking.
Meanwhile, I give warning that I shall not here give the essence of every perception, and explain it through its proximate cause. Such work lies in the province of philosophy. I shall confine myself to what concerns method --- that is, to the character of fictitious, false and doubtful perceptions, and the means of freeing ourselves therefrom. Let us then first inquire into the nature of a fictitious idea.
Every perception has for its object either a thing considered as existing, or solely the essence of a thing. Now ``fiction'' is chiefly occupied with things considered as existing. I will, therefore, consider these first ---- I mean cases where only the existence of an object is feigned, and the thing thus feigned is understood, or assumed to be understood. For instance, I feign that Peter, whom I know to have gone home, is gone to see me, or something of that kind. With what is such an idea concerned? It is concerned with things possible, and not with things necessary or impossible. I call a thing impossible when its existence would imply a contradiction; necessary, when its non-existence would imply a contradiction; possible, when neither its existence nor its non-existence imply a contradiction, but when the necessity or impossibility of its nature depends on causes unknown to us, while we feign that it exists. If the necessity or impossibility of its existence depending on external causes were known to us, we could not form any fictitious hypotheses about it; whence it follows that if there be a God, or omniscient Being, such an one cannot form fictitious hypotheses. For, as regards ourselves, when I know that I exist, I cannot hypothesize that I exist or do not exist, any more than I can hypothesize an elephant that can go through the eye of a needle; nor when I know the nature of God, can I hypothesize that He exists or does not exist. The same thing must be said of the Chimæra, whereof the nature implies a contradiction. From these considerations, it is plain, as I have already stated, that fiction cannot be concerned with eternal truths
But before proceeding further, I must remark, in passing, that the difference between the essence of one thing and the essence of another thing is the same as that which exists between the reality or existence of one thing and the reality or existence of another; therefore, if we wished to conceive the existence, for example, of Adam, simply by means of existence in general, it would be the same as if, in order to conceive his existence, we went back to the nature of being, so as to define Adam as a being. Thus, the more existence is conceived generally, the more is it conceived confusedly, and the more easily can it be ascribed to a given object. Contrariwise, the more it is conceived particularly, the more is it understood clearly, and the less liable is it to be ascribed, through negligence of Nature's order, to anything save its proper object. This is worthy of remark.
We now proceed to consider those cases which are commonly called fictions, though we clearly understood that the thing is not as we imagine it. For instance, I know that the earth is round, but nothing prevents my telling people that it is a hemisphere, and that it is like a half apple carved in relief on a dish; or, that the sun moves round the earth, and so on. However, examination will show us that there is nothing here inconsistent with what has been said, provided we first admit that we may have made mistakes, and be now conscious of them; and, further, that we can hypothesize, or at least suppose, that others are under the same mistake as ourselves, or can, like us, fall under it. We can, I repeat, thus hypothesize so long as we see no impossibility. Thus, when I tell anyone that the earth is not round, &c., I merely recall the error which I perhaps made myself, or which I might have fallen into, and afterwards I hypothesize that the person to whom I tell it, is still, or may still fall under the same mistake. This I say, I can feign so long as I do not perceive any impossibility or necessity; if I truly understood either one or the other I should not be able to feign, and I should be reduced to saying that I had made the attempt.
It remains for us to consider hypotheses made in problems, which sometimes involve impossibilities. For instance, when we say --- let us assume that this burning candle is not burning, or, let us assume that it burns in some imaginary space, or where there are no physical objects. Such assumptions are freely made, though the last is clearly seen to be impossible. But, though this be so, there is no fiction in the case. For, in the first case, I have merely recalled to memory another candle not burning, or conceived the candle before me as without a flame, and then I understand as applying to the latter, leaving its flame out of the question, all that I think of the former. In the second case, I have merely to abstract my thoughts from the objects surrounding the candle, for the mind to devote itself to the contemplation of the candle singly looked at in itself only; I can then draw the conclusion that the candle contains in itself no causes for its own destruction, so that if there were no physical objects the candle, and even the flame, would remain unchangeable, and so on. Thus there is here no fiction, but true and bare assertions.
Let us now pass on to the fictions concerned with essences only, or with some reality or existence simultaneously. Of these we must specially observe that in proportion as the mind's understanding is smaller, and its experience multiplex, so will its power of coining fictions be larger, whereas as its understanding increases, its capacity for entertaining fictitious ideas becomes less. For instance, in the same way as we are unable, while we are thinking, to feign that we are thinking or not thinking, so, also, when we know the nature of body we cannot imagine an infinite fly; or, when we know the nature of the soul, we cannot imagine it as square, though anything may be expressed verbally. But, as we said above, the less men know of nature the more easily can they coin fictitious ideas, such as trees speaking, men instantly changed into stones, or into fountains, ghosts appearing in mirrors, something issuing from nothing, even gods changed into beasts and men, and infinite other absurdities of the same kind.
Some persons think, perhaps, that fiction is limited by fiction, and not by understanding; in other words, after I have formed some fictitious idea, and have affirmed of my own free will that it exists under a certain form in nature, I am thereby precluded from thinking of it under any other form. For instance, when I have feigned (to repeat their argument) that the nature of body is of a certain kind, and have of my own free will desired to convince myself that it actually exists under this form, I am no longer able to hypothesize that a fly, for example, is infinite; so, when I have hypothesized the essence of the soul, I am not able to think of it as square, &c. But these arguments demand further inquiry. First, their upholders must either grant or deny that we can understand anything. If they grant it, then necessarily the same must be said of understanding, as is said of fiction. If they deny it, let us, who know that we do know something, see what they mean. They assert that the soul can be conscious of, and perceive in a variety of ways, not itself nor things which exist, but only things which are neither in itself nor anywhere else, in other words, that the soul can, by its unaided power, create sensations or ideas unconnected with things. In fact, they regard the soul as a sort of god. Further, they assert that we or our soul have such freedom that we can constrain ourselves, or our soul, or even our soul's freedom. For, after it has formed a fictitious idea, and has given its assent thereto, it cannot think or feign it in any other manner, but is constrained by the first fictitious idea to keep all its other thoughts in harmony therewith. Our opponents are thus driven to admit, in support of their fiction, the absurdities which I have just enumerated; and which are not worthy of rational refutation.
While leaving such persons in their error, we will take care to derive from our argument with them a truth serviceable for our purpose, namely, that the mind, in paying attention to a thing hypothetical or false, so as to meditate upon it and understand it, and derive the proper conclusions in due order therefrom, will readily discover its falsity; and if the thing hypothetical be in its nature true, and the mind pays attention to it, so as to understand it, and deduce the truths which are derivable from it, the mind will proceed with an uninterrupted series of apt conclusions; in the same way as it would at once discover (as we showed just now) the absurdity of a false hypothesis, and of the conclusions drawn from it.
We need, therefore, be in no fear of forming hypotheses, so long as we have a clear and distinct perception of what is involved. For, if we were to assert, haply, that men are suddenly turned into beasts, the statement would be extremely general, so general that there would be no conception, that is, no idea or connection of subject and predicate, in our mind. If there were such a conception we should at the same time be aware of the means and the causes whereby the event took place. Moreover, we pay no attention to the nature of the subject and the predicate. Now, if the first idea be not fictitious, and if all the other ideas be deduced therefrom, our hurry to form fictitious ideas will gradually subside. Further, as a fictitious idea cannot be clear and distinct, but is necessarily confused, and as all confusion arises from the fact that the mind has only partial knowledge of a thing either simple or complex, and does not distinguish between the known and the unknown, and, again, that it directs its attention promiscuously to all parts of an object at once without making distinctions, it follows, first, that if the idea be of something very simple, it must necessarily be clear and distinct. For a very simple object cannot be known in part, it must either be known altogether or not at all. Secondly, it follows that if a complex object be divided by thought into a number of simple component parts, and if each be regarded separately, all confusion will disappear. Thirdly, it follows that fiction cannot be simple, but is made up of the blending of several confused ideas of diverse objects or actions existent in nature, or rather is composed of attention directed to all such ideas at once, and unaccompanied by any mental assent.
Now a fiction that was simple would be clear and distinct, and therefore true, also a fiction composed only of distinct ideas would be clear and distinct, and therefore true. For instance, when we know the nature of the circle and the square, it is impossible for us to blend together these two figures, and to hypothesize a square circle, any more than a square soul, or things of that kind. Let us shortly come to our conclusion, and again repeat that we need have no fear of confusing with true ideas that which is only a fiction. As for the first sort of fiction of which we have already spoken, when a thing is clearly conceived, we saw that if the existence of a that thing is in itself an eternal truth, fiction can have no part in it; but if the existence of the thing conceived be not an eternal truth, we have only to be careful that such existence be compared to the thing's essence, and to consider the order of nature. As for the second sort of fiction, which we stated to be the result of simultaneously directing the attention, without the assent of the intellect, to different confused ideas representing different things and actions existing in nature, we have seen that an absolutely simple thing cannot be feigned, but must be understood, and that a complex thing is in the same case if we regard separately the simple parts whereof it is composed; we shall not even be able to hypothesize any untrue action concerning such objects, for we shall be obliged to consider at the same time the causes and manner of such action.
These matters being thus understood, let us pass on to consider the false idea, observing the objects with which it is concerned, and the means of guarding ourselves from falling into false perceptions. Neither of these tasks will present much difficulty, after our inquiry concerning fictitious ideas. The false idea only differs from the fictitious idea in the fact of implying a mental assent --- that is, as we have already remarked, while the representations are occurring, there are no causes present to us, wherefrom, as in fiction, we can conclude that such representations do not arise from external objects: in fact, it is much the same as dreaming with our eyes open, or while awake. Thus, a false idea is concerned with, or (to speak more correctly) is attributable to, the existence of a thing whereof the essence is known, or the essence itself, in the same way as a fictitious idea. If attributable to the existence of the thing, it is corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea under similar circumstances. If attributable to the essence, it is likewise corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea. For if the nature of the thing known implies necessary existence, we cannot possible be in error with regard to its existence; but if the nature of the thing be not an eternal truth, like its essence, but contrariwise the necessity or impossibility of its existence depends on external causes, then we must follow the same course as we adopted in the case of fiction, for it is corrected in the same manner. As for false ideas concerned with essences, or even with actions, such perceptions are necessarily always confused, being compounded of different confused perceptions of things existing in nature, as, for instance, when men are persuaded that deities are present in woods, in statues, in brute beasts, and the like; that there are bodies which, by their composition alone, give rise to intellect; that corpses reason, walk about, and speak; that God is deceived, and so on. But ideas which are clear and distinct can never be false: for ideas of things clearly and distinctly conceived are either very simple themselves, or are compounded from very simple ideas, that is, are deduced therefrom. The impossibility of a very simple idea being false is evident to everyone who understands the nature of truth or understanding and of falsehood.
As regards that which constitutes the reality of truth, it is certain that a true idea is distinguished from a false one, not so much by its extrinsic object as by its intrinsic nature. If an architect conceives a building properly constructed, though such a building may never have existed, and amy never exist, nevertheless the idea is true; and the idea remains the same, whether it be put into execution or not. On the other hand, if anyone asserts, for instance, that Peter exists, without knowing whether Peter really exists or not, the assertion, as far as its asserter is concerned, is false, or not true, even though Peter actually does exist. The assertion that Peter exists is true only with regard to him who knows for certain that Peter does exist. Whence it follows that there is in ideas something real, whereby the true are distinguished from the false. This reality must be inquired into, if we are to find the best standard of truth (we have said that we ought to determine our thoughts by the given standard of a true idea, and that method is reflective knowledge), and to know the properties of our understanding. Neither must we say that the difference between true and false arises from the fact, that true knowledge consists in knowing things through their primary causes, wherein it is totally different from false knowledge, as I have just explained it: for thought is said to be true, if it involves subjectively the essence of any principle which has no cause, and is known through itself and in itself. Wherefore the reality (forma) of true thought must exist in the thought itself, without reference to other thoughts; it does not acknowledge the object as its cause, but must depend on the actual power and nature of the understanding. For, if we suppose that the understanding has perceived some new entity which has never existed, as some conceive the understanding of God before He created thing (a perception which certainly could not arise from any object), and has legitimately deduced other thoughts from said perception, all such thoughts would be true, without being determined by any external object; they would depend solely on the power and nature of the understanding. Thus, that which constitutes the reality of a true thought must be sought in the thought itself, and deduced from the nature of the understanding. In order to pursue our investigation, let us confront ourselves with some true idea, whose object we know for certain to be dependent on our power of thinking, and to have nothing corresponding to it in nature. With an idea of this kind before us, we shall, as appears from what has just been said, be more easily able to carry on the research we have in view. For instance, in order to form the conception of a sphere, I invent a cause at my pleasure --- namely, a semicircle revolving round its center, and thus producing a sphere. This is indisputably a true idea; and, although we know that no sphere in nature has ever actually been so formed, the perception remains true, and is the easiest manner of conceiving a sphere. We must observe that this perception asserts the rotation of a semicircle --- which assertion would be false, if it were not associated with the conception of a sphere, or of a cause determining a motion of the kind, or absolutely, if the assertion were isolated. The mind would then only tend to the affirmation of the sole motion of a semicircle, which is not contained in the conception of a semicircle, and does not arise from the conception of any cause capable of producing such motion.
Thus falsity consists only in this, that something is affirmed of a thing, which is not contained in the conception we have formed of that thing, as motion or rest of a semicircle. Whence it follows that simple ideas cannot be other than true --- e.g., the simple idea of a semicircle, of motion, of rest, of quantity, &c.
Whatsoever affirmation such ideas contain is equal to the concept formed, and does not extend further. Wherefore we may form as many simple ideas as we please, without any fear of error. It only remains for us to inquire by what power our mind can form true ideas, and how far such power extends. It is certain that such power cannot extend itself infinitely. For when we affirm somewhat of a thing,. which is not contained in the concept we have formed of that thing, such an affirmation shows a defect of our perception, or that we have formed fragmentary or mutilated ideas. Thus we have seen that the notion of a semicircle is false when it is isolated in the mind, but true when it is associated with the concept of a sphere, or of some cause determining such a motion. But if it be the nature of a thinking being, as seems, prima facie, to be the case, to form true or adequate thoughts, it is plain that inadequate ideas arise in us only because we are parts of a thinking being, whose thoughts --- some in their entirety, others in fragments only --- constitute our mind.
But there is another point to be considered, which was not worth raising in the case of fiction, but which give rise to complete deception --- namely, that certain things presented to the imagination also exist in the understanding --- in other words, are conceived clearly and distinctly. Hence, so long as we do not separate that which is distinct from that which is confused, certainty, or the true idea, becomes mixed with indistinct ideas. For instance, certain Stoics heard, perhaps, the term ``soul,'' and also that the soul is immortal, yet imagined it only confusedly; they imaged, also, and understood that very subtle bodies penetrate all others, and are penetrated by none. By combining these ideas, and being at the same time certain of the truth of the axiom, they forthwith became convinced that the mind consists of very subtle bodies; that these very subtle bodies cannot be divided &c. But we are freed from mistakes of this kind, so long as we endeavor to examine all our perceptions by the standard of the given true idea. We must take care, as has been said, to separate such perceptions from all those which arise from hearsay or unclassified experience.
...
Thus, then, we have distinguished between a true idea and other perceptions, and shown that ideas fictitious, false, and the rest, originate in the imagination --- that is, in certain sensations fortuitous (so to speak) and disconnected, arising not from the power of the mind, but from external causes, according as the body, sleeping or waking, receives various motions.
But one may take any view one likes of the imagination so long as one acknowledges that it is different from the understanding, and that the soul is passive with regard to it. The view taken is immaterial, if we know that the imagination is something indefinite, with regard to which the soul is passive, and that we can by some means or other free ourselves therefrom with the help of the understanding. Let no one then be astonished that before proving the existence of body, and other necessary things, I speak of imagination of body, and of its composition. The view taken is, I repeat, immaterial, so long as we know that imagination is something indefinite, &c. As regards as a true idea, we have shown that it is simple or compounded of simple ideas; that it shows how and why something is or has been made; and that its subjective effects in the soul correspond to the actual reality of its object. This conclusion is identical with the saying of the ancients, that true science proceeds from cause to effect; though the ancients, so far as I know, never formed the conception put forward here that the soul acts according to fixed laws, and is as it were an immaterial automaton. Hence, as far as is possible at the outset, we have acquired a knowledge of our understanding, and such a standard of a true idea that we need no longer fear confounding truth with falsehood and fiction. Neither shall we wonder why we understand some things which in nowise fall within the scope of the imagination, while other things are in the imagination but wholly opposed to the understanding, or others, again, which agree therewith. We now know that the operations, whereby the effects of imagination are produced, take place under other laws quite different from the laws of the understanding, and that the mind is entirely passive with regard to them. Whence we may also see how easily men may fall into grave errors through not distinguishing accurately between the imagination and the understanding; such as believing that extension must be localized, that it must be finite, that its parts are really distinct one from the other, that it is the primary and single foundation of all things, that it occupies more space at one time than at another, and other similar doctrines, all entirely opposed to truth, as we shall duly show.
Again, since words are a part of the imagination --- that is, since we form many conceptions in accordance with confused arrangements of words in the memory, dependent on particular bodily conditions, --- there is no doubt that words may, equally with the imagination, be the cause of many and great errors, unless we keep strictly on our guard. Moreover, words are formed according to popular fancy and intelligence, and are, therefore, signs of things as existing in the imagination, not as existing in the understanding. This is evident from the fact that to all such things as exist only in the understanding, not in the imagination, negative names are often given, such as incorporeal, infinite, &c. So, also, many conceptions really affirmative are expressed negatively, and vice versa, such as uncreate, independent, infinite, immortal, &c., inasmuch as their contraries are much more easily imagined, and, therefore, occurred first to men, and usurped positive names. Many things we affirm and deny, because the nature of words allows us to do so, though the nature of things does not. While we remain unaware of this fact, we may easily mistake falsehood for truth.
Let us also beware of another great cause of confusion, which prevents the understanding from reflecting on itself. Sometimes, while making no distinction between the imagination and the intellect, we think that what we more readily imagine is clearer to us; and also we think that what we imagine we understand. Thus, we put first that which should be last: the true order of progression is reversed, and no legitimate conclusion is drawn.
Now, in order at length to pass on to the second part of this method, I shall first set forth the object aimed at, and next the means for its attainment. The object aimed at is the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas, such as are produced by the pure intellect, and not by chance physical motions. In order that all ideas may be reduced to unity, we shall endeavor so to associate and arrange them that our mind may, as far as possible, reflect subjectively the reality of nature, both as a whole and as parts.
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Ethics 1
PROP. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.
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If any one asks me the further question, Why are we naturally so prone to divide
quantity? I answer, that quantity is conceived by us in two ways; in the
abstract and superficially, as we imagine it; or as substance, as we conceive it
solely by the intellect. If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented in
our imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall find that it is
finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but if we regard it as it is
represented in our intellect, and conceive it as substance, which it is very
difficult to do, we shall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is
infinite, one, and indivisible. This will be plain enough to all, who make a
distinction between the intellect and the imagination, especially if it be
remembered, that matter is everywhere the same, that its parts are not
distinguishable, except in so far as we conceive matter as diversely modified,
whence its parts are distinguished, not really, but modally. For instance,
water, in so far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts to be
separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is extended substance;
from this point of view it is neither separated nor divisible. Further, water,
in so far as it is water, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it is
substance, it is neither produced nor corrupted.
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A
PPENDIX.
Everything which conduces to health
and the worship of God they have called good, everything which hinders
these objects they have styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not
understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any way, but merely
imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their imagination for understanding,
such persons firmly believe that there is an order in things, being
really ignorant both of things and their own nature. When phenomena are of such
a kind, that the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of
imagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we say that they are
well-ordered; if the contrary, that they are ill-ordered or
confused. Further, as things which are easily imagined are more pleasing to
us, men prefer order to confusion--as though there were any order in nature,
except in relation to our imagination--and say that God has created all things
in order; thus, without knowing it, attributing imagination to God, unless,
indeed, they would have it that God foresaw human imagination, and arranged
everything, so that it should be most easily imagined. If this be their theory
they would not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an infinite number
of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, and very many others which
confound its weakness. But enough has been said on this subject. The other
abstract notions are nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is
differently affected, though they are considered by the ignorant as the chief
attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that everything was created for
the sake of themselves; and, according as they are affected by it, style it good
or bad, healthy or rotten and corrupt. For instance, if the motion whose objects
we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health, the objects causing it
are styled beautiful; if a contrary motion be excited, they are styled
ugly.
Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are styled fragrant or
fetid; it through our taste, sweet or bitter, full-flavored or insipid, if
through our touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, etc.
Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise, sound, or
harmony. In this last case, there are men lunatic enough to believe that even
God himself takes pleasure in harmony; and philosophers are not lacking who have
persuaded themselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to
harmony--all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone judges of things
according to the state of his brain, or rather mistakes for things the forms of
his imagination. We need no longer wonder that there have arisen all the
controversies we have witnessed and finally skepticism: for, although human
bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they differ; so that what
seems good to one seems bad to another; what seems well ordered to one seems
confused to another; what is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on. I
need not further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the subject
at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well known. It is commonly
said: "So many men, so many minds; everyone is wise in his own way; brains
differ as completely as palates." All of which proverbs show, that men judge of
things according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than
understand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as mathematics
attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I have urged.
We have
now perceived, that all the explanations commonly given of nature are mere modes
of imagining, and do not indicate the true nature of anything, but only the
constitution of the imagination; and, although they have names, as though they
were entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them entities
imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all arguments against us drawn from
such abstractions are easily rebutted.
Many argue in this way. If all things follow from a necessity
of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there so many imperfections in
nature? such, for instance, as things corrupt to the point of putridity,
loathsome deformity, confusion, evil, sin, etc. But these reasoners are, as I
have said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be reckoned only
from their own nature and power; things are not more or less perfect, according
as they delight or offend human senses, or according as they are serviceable or
repugnant to mankind. To those who ask why God did not so create all men, that
they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but this: because
matter was not lacking to him for the creation of every degree of perfection
from highest to lowest; or, more strictly, because the laws of his nature are so
vast, as to suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite
intelligence, as I have shown in
Prop. xvi.
Ethics 2
PROP. XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.
Proof.--This proposition is self-evident, for so long as the human body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human mind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body--that is (by the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as actually existing, and this idea involves the nature of the external body. In other words, it will have the idea which does not exclude, but postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the external body; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will regard the external body as actually existing, until it is affected, &c. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--The mind is able to regard as present external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even though they be no longer in existence or present.
Proof.--When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they change the surface of the last named (Post. v.); hence (Ax. ii., after Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in a different manner from that which they followed before such change; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled towards those surfaces by external bodies; consequently, they will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again take cognizance--that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again regard the external body as present, and will do so, as often as the fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces by their own spontaneous motion. Wherefore, although the external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated. Q.E.D.
Note.---We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case, that we regard as present things which are not. It is possible that the same result may be brought about by other causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated one possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out the true cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human body, as we feel it, exists (
Coroll. after II. xiii.). Furthermore (II. vii. Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and only implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even though he no longer exists. Further, to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of things. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines. I will here draw attention to the fact, in order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error. The mind does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it. If the mind, while imagining non-existent things as present to it, is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of imagination depend solely on its own nature--that is (I. Def. vii.), if this faculty of imagination be free....
Note I.--I have thus set forth the cause of those notions, which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our ratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this method of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at all. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are ill-founded. Again we should discern whence the notions called secondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on which they are founded, and other points of interest connected with these questions. But I have decided to pass over the subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by too great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being, Thing, Something. These terms arose from the fact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in
II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time; if this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused; if this number of images, which the body is capable of forming distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become entirely confused one with another. This being so, it is evident (from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll. and xviii.) that the human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body can form images simultaneously. When the images become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of Being, Thing, &c. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from other analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to consider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms represent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man, horse, dog, &c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the human mind, that the powers of imagination breakdown, not indeed utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of particular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to imagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however, bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other attribute, will form a different general image of man, for instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases, everyone will form general images of things according to the habit of his body.
Note II.--From
all that has been said above it is clear, that we, in many cases, perceive and
form our general notions:--(1.) From particular things represented to our
intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses (II.
xxix. Coroll.); I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of
knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. (2.) From symbols, e.g.,
from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form
certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things
(II.
xviii. note). I shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge
of the first kind, opinion, or imagination. (3.) From the fact
that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of
things (II.
xxxviii. Coroll.,
xxxix. and
Coroll. and
xl.); this I call reason and knowledge of the second kind.
Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a
third kind of knowledge, which we will call intuition. This kind of knowledge
proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of
God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I will illustrate all
three kinds of knowledge by a single example. Three numbers are given for
finding a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is to the first.
Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the
product by the first; either because they have not forgotten the rule which they
received from a master without any proof, or because they have often made trial
of it with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth
proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general
property of proportionals.
But with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For instance, one,
two, three, being given, everyone can see that the fourth proportional is six;
and this is much clearer, because we infer the fourth number from an intuitive
grasping of the ratio, which the first bears to the second.
PROP. XLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.
Proof.--To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the foregoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate and confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only source of falsity (II. xxxv.). Furthermore, we assigned to the second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II. xxxiv.).
Q.E.D.
PROP. XLII. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the, false
.Proof.--
This proposition is self-evident. He, who knows how to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea of true and false. That is (II. xl., note ii.), he must know the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.PROP. XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary.
Proof.--It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly (II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in themselves--that is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as necessary. Q.E.D.
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Corollary I.--Hence it follows, that it is only through our imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the future or the past, as contingent.
Note.--How this way of looking at things arises, I will briefly explain. We have shown above (II. xvii. and Coroll.) that the mind always regards things as present to itself, even though they be not in existence, until some causes arise which exclude their existence and presence. Further (II. xviii.), we showed that, if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway remember the other--that is, it will regard both as present to itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence and presence. Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than others, some more quickly, some at equal speed. Thus, let us suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that today he again sees Peter in the morning. It is evident, from II. Prop. xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other words, he will imagine a complete day; and, together with his imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he will imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon--that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to a future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past time. If it should at any time happen, that on some other evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for the child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them, not both together. His imagination will therefore waver; and, with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first one, then the other--that is, he will imagine them in the future, neither of them as certain, but both as contingent. This wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in relation to time past or time present: consequently, we may imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time present, past, or future
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To the second objection I reply by denying,
that we have a free power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that
anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that he does not
perceive the matter in question adequately. Suspension of judgment is,
therefore, strictly speaking, a perception, and not free will. In order to
illustrate the point, let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceiving
nothing else. Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the horse (II.
xvii. Coroll.), and the boy does not perceive anything which would exclude
the existence of the horse, he will necessarily regard the horse as present: he
will not be able to doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof.
We have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams; and I do not
suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that, while he is dreaming, he
has the free power of suspending his judgment concerning the things in his
dream, and bringing, it about that he should not dream those things, which he
dreams that he sees; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we
suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.
Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as actual perception
extends--that is, I grant that the mind's imaginations, regarded in themselves,
do not involve error (II.
xvii., note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of perception,
make any affirmation. For what is the perception of a winged horse, save
affirming that a horse has wings? If the mind could perceive nothing else but
the winged horse, it would regard the same as present to itself: it would have
no reasons for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless the
imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which precludes the existence
of the said horse, or unless the mind perceives that the idea which it possesses
of a winged horse is inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny
the existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the subject.
Ethics 4
...
PROP. I. No positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being true.
Proof.--Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas involve (II. xxxv.), nor have they any positive quality on account of which they are called false (II. xxxiii.); contrariwise, in so far as they are referred to God, they are true (II. xxxii.). Wherefore, if the positive quality possessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being true, a true idea would then be removed by itself, which (III. iv.) is absurd. Therefore, no positive quality possessed by a false idea, &c. Q.E.D.
Note.--This proposition is more clearly understood from II. xvi. Coroll. ii. For imagination is an idea, which indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external body; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly; whence it comes to pass, that the mind is said to err. For instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it is distant from us about two hundred feet; in this judgment we err, so long as we are in ignorance of its true distance; when its true distance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination; or, in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explains the nature of that luminary, in so far as the body is affected thereby: wherefore, though we know the real distance, we shall still nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us. For, as we said in II. xxxv. note, we do not imagine the sun to be so near us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the body is affected thereby. Thus, when the rays of the sun falling on the surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine the sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of its real position; and similarly other imaginations, wherein the mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition of the body, or that its power of activity is increased or diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at its presence. It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an evil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the contrary also happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will certainly come, and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings; thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth, in virtue of its being true, but because other imaginations, stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the present existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II. xvii.
PROP. II. We are only passive, in so far as we are part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.
Proof.--We are said to be passive, when something arises in us, whereof we are only a partial cause (III. Def. ii.), that is (III. Def. i.), something which cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature. We are passive therefore, in so far as we are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts. Q.E.D.
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PROP. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive the cause to be with us.
Proof.--Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the mind regards a thing as present (II. xvii. note), but which indicates the disposition of the mind rather than the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii).
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PROP. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the dictates of reason, it is a affected equally, whether the idea be of a thing future, past, or present.
Proof.--Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II. xliv. Coroll. ii.), and is therefore affected with the same certitude (II. xliii. and note). Wherefore, whether the thing be present, past, or future, the mind conceives it under the same necessity and is affected with the same certitude; and whether the idea be of something, present, past, or future, it will in all cases be equally true (II. xli.); that is, it will always possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II. Def. iv.); therefore, in so far as the mind conceives things under the dictates of reason, it is affected in the same manner, whether the idea be of a thing future, past, or present. Q.E.D.
Note.--If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present; and the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it conceived as future; consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of evil in the future, as we shall presently show. However, we can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (II. xxxi.); and the periods of their existence (II. xliv. note) we can only determine by imagination, which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the present. Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order of things and the connection of causes, with a view to determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather imaginary than real. Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the present time. (Cf. IV. xvi.)
Ethics 5
PROP. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what is past, while the body endures.
Proof.--The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as actual, except while the body endures (II. viii Coroll.); and, consequently (II. xxvi.), it does not imagine any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures. Thus it cannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II. xvii. note), or remember things past, except while the body endures (see definition of Memory, II. xviii. note). Q.E.D.
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PROP. XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject to those emotions which are attributable to passions.
Proof.--Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind contemplates a thing as present (II. xvii. note); yet this idea indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.). Therefore emotion (see general Def. of the Emotions) is imagination, in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body; therefore (V. xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures, subject to emotions which are attributable to passions. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--Hence it follows that no love save intellectual love is eternal.
Note.--If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after death.
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PROP. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.
Proof.--The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.); therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the part of it that endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.), and, consequently (by the last Prop.), the greater will be the part that is not touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in other words, evil (IV. xxx.). Thus, in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, &c. Q.E.D.
Note.--Hence we understand that point which I touched on in IV. xxxix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part; namely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and, consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more. Again, since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it follows that the human mind can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which we have shown to perish with the body (V. xxi.) should be of little importance when compared with the part which endures. But I will soon treat of the subject at greater length
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PROP. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice versa, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.
Proof.--In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it possesses more of reality (II. Def. vi.), and, consequently (III. iii. and note), it is to that extent more active and less passive. This demonstration may be reversed, and thus prove that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more perfect. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--Hence it follows that the part of the mind which endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind (V. xiii. xxix.) the understanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.); the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V. xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III. iii. and general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it great or small, is more perfect than the latter.