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Having just argued that angels are pure forms, and have no
matter whatsoever (not even "spiritual matter" which Franciscan theologians,
like St. Bonaventure, posited), Aquinas goes on to explain that angels
nevertheless have some composition. Thus, they are not altogether simple beings.
This is important for him to explain because traditionally only God is
completely simple, i.e. the Being without any composition at all. For the
Christian theologians of the Middle Ages, God is properly understood to be
simple and the only simple being, because everything that is composite depends
on what it is composed of. God does not depend on anything, but everything other
than Him depends on Him.
This is true, unless, perhaps, there is something whose quiddity is its very
act of existing. This thing would have to be unique and primary, since it would
be impossible for anything to be multiplied except by the addition of some
difference, as the nature genus is multiplied into species; or by a form
being received in diverse matters, as the nature species is multiplied in
dfferent individuals; or by one being absolute, and the other being received in
something. For example, if there were a certain "separated" heat it would be
distinct, in virtue of its very separation, from the heat which is not
separated.
If, however, something is posited which is simply its own act of existing,
such that it would be subsistent existence itself, this existence cannot recieve
the addition of a difference, because then it would not be simply an act of
existing, but an act of existing plus this certain form. Even less would it
receive the addition of matter, because then it would not be subsistent
existence but material existence. Hence, there remains only one such thing that
is its own act of existing. Accordingly, in anything other than it, the act of
existing must necessarily be other than its quiddity or nature or form. Hence
among the intelligences (angels), their acts of existing must be other that
their forms. Therefore, it is said that intelligences are (composed as) forms
and acts of existing.
Whatever belongs to something is either caused by the principles of its
nature, like risibility in man, or accrues to it from some extrinsic principle,
like the light in the air which is caused by the sun. It is impossible that the
act of existing itself be caused by the form or quiddity -- and by "caused" I
mean as by an efficient cause -- for then something would be the cause of itself
and produce itself in existence which is impossible. It is therefore necessary
that everything whose act of existing is other than its nature have its act of
existing from another. And because everything which exists through another is
reduced to that which exists through itself, as to a first cause, there must be
something which causes all things to exist, inasmuch as it is subsistent
existence alone. Otherwise we would proceed to infinity in causes, since
everything which is not a subsistent act of existing has a cause for its act of
existing, as we have just said. It is evident, therefore, that an intelligence
is form and an act of existing, and that it has its act of existing from the
First Being which is (simply) existence only; and this it the First Cause, God.
Adapted from Selected Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,
Robert P. Goodwin, trans., (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).
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On Being and Essence, Ch. 4 (excerpt)
Although substances
of this kind (separate intelligences or angels) are simple forms without matter,
nonetheless they are not in every way simple as pure acts are. They do have an
admixture of potency, which is evident in the following way. Whatever is
extraneous to the concept of an essence or quiddity comes to it from beyond
itself, and forms a compsition with the essence since no essence can be
understood without those things which are its parts. On the other hand, every
essence or quiddity can be understood without its act of existing being
undersood. I can understand what a man or phoenix is, and yet not know whether
or not it exists in reality. Therefore, it is evident that the act of existing
is other than essence or quiddity.
Copyright © 1996-1999 Joseph M. Magee, Ph.D.
- Last Updated 11/3/99