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I.—NOTES ON THE SECOND PART OF SPINOZA'S *ETHICS* (III.).

BY H. BARKER.

§ 6. MIND AND BODY (II, 11-15).

IN 11 Spinoza says *idea primum est, quod humanae mentis esse constituit: at non idea rei non existentis; nam tum (per* 8c) *ipsa idea non posset dici existere.* Here the use of *idea* in the singular is a first source of confusion, for the preceding part of the demonstration with its reference to ax. 3 shows that *idea* here does not mean one idea in the ordinary sense of that phrase, but *the totality* of the ideas which together make up the primary content of the mind. Now the ideas have not one object, as the use of *idea* in the singular suggests, but many objects, and of these objects some are thought of as things that do not now exist but existed in the past. Spinoza could not, of course, have denied that an existing idea may ideate a non-existing thing. What he means to deny is that the mind can be the mind of a non-existing body. But instead of using the word mind he uses the word *idea* in the singular, which he has no right to do, since def. 3 says *per ideam intelligo mentis conceptum, quem mens format.* Using *idea* in the singular he can then speak of its ideatum as *res singularis* and argue that since the mind exists its existential correlate must also exist. But in truth the mind has not one ideatum but as many ideata as it has ideas, and if we want to express the fact that these ideata form in some sense

one whole corresponding to the unity of the mind, we must speak, not of the body, which is only one ideatum among others, but of the world so far as known to the individual knower K, K's known world.

The use of one and the same word *idea* to denote sometimes *conceptus*, sometimes *mens*, is objectionable and unfortunate, for, though the human mind is not a substance in any sense that Spinoza could admit, it is nevertheless an independent entity in a sense in which the particular idea *which it thinks* is not. Spinoza may have thought of the mind as related to particular ideas in a manner comparable with that in which a larger space is related to the smaller spaces contained in it, but if so, his thought was not true, for the mind is not merely a marked off part of an indefinite and homogeneous continuum that exists all at once and unchanged, as space does, but an individual being that develops in time and is characterised by a certain unity and continuity amidst change. Again, the double use of *idea* makes it very difficult to know how to interpret II, 9, a proposition of which Spinoza makes frequent use. If *idea* there means a particular idea, the causation spoken of will be an intra-mental process, the causation of one particular idea by another;[1] but if idea means a mind—and in 11 the phrase *idea rei singularis actu existentis* does mean a mind—then the statement in 9, *idea rei singularis actu existentis Deum pro causa habet . . . quatenus alia rei singularis actu existentis idea affectus consideratur* is one to which it is difficult to attach any meaning.

Prop. 12 supplies another instance of the boldness with which Spinoza follows out his *a priori* reasonings in defiance of experience. It asserts that if the *res singularis* which is the object of the idea that constitutes the human mind is the body, then *nihil in eo corpore poterit contingere, quod a mente non percipiatur*. Now even when we allow (in accordance with 11C) for the fact that such perception is *ex parte* and inadequate, this assertion seems astounding. The proposition does not assert merely that whatever goes on in the body will, directly or indirectly, make some difference to what goes on in the mind, but that whatever goes on in the body is actually apprehended in some manner, however partial and inadequate the apprehension may be. Thus either we must say that the assertion is simply false, being in flat contradiction with experience, or we must, without any empirical warrant, enormously expand our conception of the

[1] Of course, even then, the regress cannot go on *in infinitum*, since an individual human mind has a beginning—according to our ordinary notions, whatever Spinoza may say.

mind and say that it contains innumerable ideas [1] of which there is no consciousness and has never been any consciousness, and which are in no effective continuity with the ideas of which the individual is conscious—a view which seems in conflict with the later doctrine of the *idea mentis*, and, for that matter, in conflict with the very notion of an idea as cognitive. If, however, the ideas exist as conscious ideas, then surely we must say that they exist in some *other* mind.

Joachim, expounding or inferring Spinoza's view, states it as follows (p. 131—my quotations are incomplete): "The mind of man *in God's complete knowledge* would thus be the soul-side of all the modes of Extension which constitute his body; and, as their soul-side, it would be the complete apprehension of them all. But what we call our 'mind' falls far short of this, though it may approximate to it in various degrees . . . an infinite number of the constituents of our 'mind' never *for us* enter into, or form part of, our soul-life at all. They form no part of the 'mind' of an actually existing man, either for himself or for the ordinary observer." On the last two sentences I would remark, that surely at any given time all the parts of the mind must be actually existing parts just as the parts of the body are, and, since the essential constituents of the mind are ideas, I do not see how ideas that we don't think can be constituents of our minds at all. The reference to God's complete knowledge is presumably introduced to mitigate the conflict between Spinoza's doctrine and the empirical facts, but it does not help us with II, 12, for what Spinoza says there is that a *cognitio* of whatever happens in the body is *in Deo quatenus naturam humanae mentis constituit*, and this is not God's complete knowledge, but the mind of man considered by itself and apart from anything else.[2]

In the demonstrations of 12 and 13 reference is made to 9C. Since the demonstration of this corollary is peculiarly difficult to follow, it is fortunate that Spinoza says that 12 can be understood more clearly as following from 7 S.

We have now to return to 13 and consider some of the details. As I have said, the clause which occasions difficulty is *et nihil*

[1] That the mind is composed of very many ideas is stated in II, 15, but it is not explained there that the great bulk of them are unconscious, so far as the individual is concerned.

[2] Joachim on p. 130 seems to connect the phrase 'God, so far as he is expressed by the nature of the human mind' (which is the same as 'so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind') with *adequate* knowledge, whereas I take 11C to connect it with *inadequate* knowledge, a knowledge or perception which is ignorant of causal connections (cf. Camerer, p. 68, and see *e.g.* 28 dem.).

aliud. The proof of it is as follows : *si praeter corpus etiam aliud esset mentis objectum, quum nihil* (*per* I, 36) *existat, ex quo aliquis effectus non sequatur, deberet* (*per* II, 11) *necessario alicujus ejus effectus idea in mente nostra dari. Atqui* (*per* II, ax. 5) *nulla ejus idea datur*. What is the point of introducing the argument about a thing producing effects ? It would surely be sufficient to say that, if there were any other object, there would be a corresponding idea of it in the mind (by II, 7). Does Spinoza mean that the object would produce an idea, as an effect, in the mind ? Elwes and Robinson translate as if he did : Elwes says " there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea, which would be an effect of that other object " ; Robinson says " so müsste es notwendig . . . eine Wirkung dieses Objekts in unserer Seele geben " (nach Prop. 12—which he says is the correct reference). But to say that an object in another attribute must produce an effect in the mind would contradict the doctrine of the independence of the attributes. I take it that Spinoza must have meant that, if there were another object of mind than the body, there would have been in the mind ideas of the *affectiones* of that object as well as of the *affectiones* of the body.[1] But if so, the reference to ax. 5 (should the reference have been to ax. 4 again ?) is of no use for proving his point. For ax. 5 is quite general : it merely says that the only particular things of which we are aware are *corpora* and *modi cogitandi*, and from this it does not follow that we perceive no other body than our own. In point of fact we have, of course, ideas of other bodies. Since Spinoza uses our proposition in proving to Tschirnhaus (Ep. 66 in Bruder II = VV 64) that *Cogitatio* and *Extensio* are the only attributes we can know, it might be tempting to suppose that *et nihil aliud* means ' nothing other than body ', *i.e.* no other kind of entity, but the phrase *certus extensionis modus* (in the enunciation), the corollary and scholium, the quotation of our prop. in 19, and even the language of Ep. 66 itself, are too strongly against the supposition to allow us to entertain it.

Spinoza, as I have already suggested, must be assuming that, since sensations as sensory processes (*affectiones*) are bodily processes, perceptions or sensations as cognitive (*ideae affectionum*) must have the body for their object.

In the opening sentence of the scholium Spinoza claims that

[1] For the meaning of *effectus*, cf. ax. 1 after Lemma 3. The *modi* there spoken of are *effectus* of the two bodies. And cf. *Int. Em.*, § 21, Clare percipimus nos tale corpus sentire et nullum aliud.

we can now understood what is meant by the union of mind and body, and the commentators seem inclined to endorse his claim and to think that in his doctrine of body and mind he has made a great advance upon the other Cartesians. I cannot see that he deserves these praises. The statements that the mind is the idea of the body and the body is the one object of mind do not really throw any light upon the relationship—naturally, since they are not true. And the confusion of correspondence with cognition is simply misleading. The scholium itself supplies further evidence of confusion. If the scholium is taken along with the proposition—and in the first half Spinoza uses the language of the proposition—the argument becomes tautologous. For, if knowledge of the body constitutes the very being of the mind, it is needless to tell us that we cannot know the mind without knowing the body and that, the more there is in the body to know, the more there will be in the mind that knows it. But in the sentence that begins, *Hoc tamen in genere dico*, he is evidently thinking of the body as the organ of mind or indeed as determining it, and the stress he lays on a prior knowledge of the body as the key to an understanding of the mind then takes on a different significance. But in so arguing he is inverting the true order of inquiry. We cannot use our knowledge of the body in dealing with the mind until we have first learned how to connect the relevant parts of the body (the bodily organs) with the types of mental experience to which they are instrumental. We know in general that the eyes are the organs of vision by the experiences we have when we open or shut them, and as regards the more special qualities and defects of vision the oculist had first to learn to connect them with the structure of the eyes before he could know how to remedy the defects by artificial aids or surgical operations.

In spite of the doctrine of the independence of the attributes and the express statement in III, 2, we can hardly doubt that in this scholium, in the statements about body and the human body that intervene between this scholium and prop. 14, and in the use he makes later of physiological hypotheses, Spinoza is really thinking of the body as determining the mind. We may say, if we prefer it, that he is thinking of the mind as merely reflecting what goes on in the body, but the essential point is that he really gives a priority or predominance to the body, in spite of his professed doctrine of the complete independence and equality of the attributes. The obvious tendency of the scholium to III, 2—in spite of what the proposition itself asserts—is to

glorify the body at the expense of the mind. Joachim (p. 154) says : "As a rule, the bodily changes are most conspicuous, and mental changes are therefore most readily 'explained' as 'effects' of a chain of bodily changes. Really, they are effects of a chain of mental changes which we cannot exhibit, but of which the bodily side is clear to us. We must bear Spinoza's general position in mind, and interpret occasional obscurities and lapses simply *as lapses :* as survivals from his earlier mental history, partly caused, no doubt, by the influence of those popular notions of the relation of body and soul which in his explicit theory he has rejected." The intention of this passage is, of course, to do justice to Spinoza by not laying too much stress on verbal inconsistencies, but I question whether it does not err on the other side by not recognising that there really are at work in his mind different tendencies of thought, and that the tendency to give priority to extension is possibly more potent than the professed doctrine of the independence and equality of the attributes. The vehemence of Spinoza's antagonism to any kind of freedom of the will seems to indicate that he is only too ready to misrepresent mental facts in order to make them conform to the laws of the physical order. It would perhaps be out of place to comment on the statements of fact in the passage quoted from Joachim, since he may be merely expounding, and not endorsing, Spinoza's view. But the second sentence raises a difficulty even as exposition. Why the lack of detail on the mental side, if bodily and mental changes really correspond ? And, if the body is the mind's object, and the bodily side is clear to us, what more than the clear apprehensions of the bodily series can the mental series consist of ?

Prop. 15 connects closely with 13. The mind, being the idea of the body, is precisely as complex as the body ; there is necessarily an idea in the mind corresponding to each part of the body. This proposition, with its references to II, 7 and 8C shows again that we cannot evade the conflict between Spinoza's doctrine and the actual facts of mental experience by speaking as if the unexperienced ideas existed, not in the actual consciousness of the individual, but 'in God's complete knowledge'. Spinoza asserts, in spite of actual experience, that the mind of the individual is composed of as many actual ideas as there are actual parts of the body. Let the ideas of the parts be ever so inadequate—and that inadequacy also raises difficulties—yet there must be an actual idea for every actual part. Pollock's reference to the physiologist is not without its justification.

§ 7. External Bodies (II, 16 and 17).

In the enunciation of prop. 16, one would have expected Spinoza to say, not *Idea . . . involvere debet naturam corporis*, etc., but rather *involvere debet ideam corporis* or *ideam naturae corporis*.

The demonstration starts with saying that, when our body is affected by an external body, the *affectio* depends upon the natures both of the affecting and the affected bodies—which, of course, is obvious. Spinoza then infers that the *idea affectionis* necessarily involves the natures of both bodies, and refers us to I, ax. 4, which says that the cognition of an effect depends upon a cognition of the cause. We have already seen that there is an ambiguity in the application of this axiom, and here there is a similar ambiguity in the present inference. An effect, *known as an effect*, of course implies a knowledge of the cause, and similarly here the idea of an affection, *as an affection by an external body*, of course implies ideas of the affecting and affected bodies. But it is possible to be aware of a bodily state without connecting it with the action of any external body, *e.g.* a person might be ill without knowing anything about the cause and might then learn from the doctor that the illness must have been due to some external infection. Now Spinoza told us in 13 that the body is the only (immediate ?) object of the mind. Therefore in this proposition he is surely guilty of a most serious omission. He ought to have shown (i) why we are led to refer a state of our own body to the action of an external body at all, and (ii) how, when we know only our own body, we can know anything about the nature of the external body. An answer of some sort might perhaps be given to these questions. In answer to (i) we might say that, when something happens in the body which is not to be accounted for by anything in the preceding bodily state, it must be attributed to an external cause, and as regards (ii) we might perhaps be able to infer vaguely from the nature of the effect that the cause must have been of such and such a kind, although any precise knowledge of the nature of the cause would imply a knowledge of external bodies which could not be assumed without a logical circle.

Now in our proposition and the first corollary Spinoza shows no consciousness of these difficulties at all. One who read them without reference to 13 would naturally suppose that Spinoza thought that we can perceive our own body and external bodies equally, and can perceive the former being affected by the latter. True, he says in C 2 that the ideas we have of external bodies *magis nostri corporis constitutionem, quam corporum externorum*

naturam indicant, but the examples (in I Appendix) to which he refers us, seem to show that the corollary means, not that we do not perceive the external bodies themselves, but that we do not sufficiently distinguish between qualities which belong to the bodies themselves and descriptions used by us which merely express the ways in which we feel about the bodies.

To maintain consistency with 13 Spinoza would be bound to hold that our knowledge of external bodies is wholly inferential. Did he hold this ? Prop. 26 would seem at first sight to assert it plainly, for it says, *Mens humana nullum corpus externum ut actu existens percipit, nisi per ideas affectionum sui corporis.* But when we read the demonstration the first sentence makes only the obvious and harmless assertion that, unless the external body affected our body in some way, the mind could not be aware of the existence of the external body ; and the second sentence refers us back to our present proposition, 16. But 16, as we have seen, simply assumes, without any explanation, that we have ideas of our own body as being affected by other bodies.

Joachim (p. 158) speaks of the inferential character of our ideas of external bodies, but the passage is not altogether clear, and I am not sure that he distinguishes sufficiently between the things that Spinoza ought to have said and the things he does say. I will quote a few sentences. " No doubt the idea, which gives us an external body as actually existent, involves an inference. It is primarily the idea of a state of our own body, and only secondarily an idea of an external body, *viz.* only in so far as the idea of the cause is involved in that of the effect." But " the inference . . . is not recognised by the mind in the state of imagination, and is in any case very inadequately performed. In ' imagination ' we ' picture ' states of our own body and interpret them as external bodies acting upon or modifying our own body." The language of the first two sentences seems to me not to express correctly what Spinoza says in 16. The ' idea which gives us ' is of course an *idea affectionis*. Now, when Spinoza says this idea ' involves ' the natures of both bodies, I don't think he means that it is primarily the idea of the one and secondarily (or inferentially) the idea of the other ; I think he means that the *idea affectionis* necessarily *includes* ideas of both bodies, *i.e.* cannot be thought without thinking these ideas. This is certainly the meaning of *involvere* as explained in the demonstration of II, 49, where he says that the assertion that the 3 angles of a triangle = 2 right angles involves the idea of a triangle. Morever, our C1 with its *una cum* does not suggest any inference. In the last sentence of the quotation,

the statement that " in imagination we picture states of our body and interpret *them* as external bodies acting upon our body " is to me unintelligible.

A passage[1] in Camerer (pp. 72-3) dealing with the *ideae affectionum*, and taking us over to prop. 17, may usefully be quoted here. These *ideae*, he says, " bestehen darin, dass ' solange der menschliche Körper in einem bestimmten Zustand sich befindet, auch der menschliche Geist diesen Zustand schaut, das heisst, dass er einen äusseren Körper als wirklich existerend oder als gegenwärtig schaut '. Den Zustand seines eigenen Körpers also, wie er durch die Einwirkung eines äusseren Körpers hervorgebracht worden ist, erkennt der menschliche Geist dadurch, dass er jenen äusseren Körper, der dem menschlichen Körper seine Spuren eingedrückt hat, als gegenwärtig schaut, dass er ihn vor sich sieht. Die Thätigkeit des menschlichen Geistes, vermöge deren dieser die Ideen von den Abdrücken oder Abbildungen der äusseren Körper im menschlichen Körper gewinnt, nennt Spinoza das Gestalten von Bildern, die Imagination." In the first sentence the phrase ' in einem bestimmten Zustand ', used in translating a sentence of 17 dem., is not sufficiently precise, for Spinoza's *sic affectum est* means the state of being affected by an external body. The second sentence is difficult. It says that the mind knows the Zustand of its own body ' dadurch dass er jenen äusseren Körper . . . als gegenwärtig schaut '. How can the mind be said to know a state of its *own* body by perceiving an *external* body as present to it ? Does Spinoza say this ? Again, it would seem as if the Zustand was distinguished from the Spuren, although these also are *affectiones*. This ambiguity is present in our proposition itself. In the demonstration Spinoza says *tam diu mens humana hanc corporis affectionem contemplabitur*, but in the scholium he says *corporis humani affectiones, quarum ideae corpora externa velut nobis praesentia repraesentant, rerum imagines vocabimus, tametsi rerum figuras non referunt.* Now the mind does not perceive the *imagines*, which (II, 48) may be *in fundo oculi* or *in medio cerebro*, yet in the sentence just quoted he speaks of the *imagines* as being *affectiones quarum ideae corpora externa velut nobis praesentia repraesentant.* Thus he is using the terms *affectiones* and *ideae affectionum* in two quite distinct senses. The *affectiones* (with which we are here concerned) may be perceived or unperceived ; and in the former case they are objects, in the latter physiological correlates, of the *ideae affectionum*. And we see

[1] Which Joachim may be partly following.

once more that Pollock's statement about the ambiguous use of *idea* is justified. Camerer himself, if I understand him rightly, achieves consistency by identifying the *affectiones* exclusively with the *imagines*—in which case the phrase *affectionem contemplari* cannot have its natural meaning—and regarding the *ideae affectionum* as ideas of external bodies produced spontaneously by *Cogitatio* when the *imagines* are reproduced in the body. Possibly he had in view only the ordinary case of vision, where we simply see external bodies without being aware of any affection of our own body. But I see no reason to suppose that Spinoza had this case alone in view. He may quite well have had in view the cases, *e.g.* of seeing a fire and feeling its heat, or of seeing a friend and hearing his voice as contrasted with thinking about him after he has gone. Some of the phrases he uses certainly suggest awareness of the *affectio* itself, *e.g. affectionem contemplari, corpus affici sentimus, corpus prout ipsum sentimus, percipere* applied in 16 C 1 equally to external bodies and our own body, and, of course, the *objectum est corpus* of 13. Oddly enough Camerer appeals (p. 74) to 13 as providing an assurance that 'die Bilder im Geist den Bildern im Körper genau entsprechen'. If the 'Bilder im Körper' are the *imagines* which *rerum figuras non referunt*, the exact correspondence must be that of an idea to its physiological condition; yet one would hardly take this meaning from the immediately succeeding statement that 'die Ideen in der Form des Denkens darstellen und wiedergeben, was im Körper körperlich sich vollzieht'. This latter statement would rather suggest such a case as thinking one had cut one's finger when one had actually done it.

Some of the above difficulties may be partly due to the fact that Spinoza gives no sufficient *psychological* account of the nature of, and differences between, perception, memory, and imagination; he prefers to rely on physiological hypotheses of a conjectural kind. These are of no interest for us, except in so far as they seem plainly to imply that mental process is determined by bodily process. To say that x merely corresponds to, and is not determined by, y (as Spinoza insists in III, 2 is the case with mind and body) is idle, if what happens in y is used to account for what happens in x.

The scholium to 17 is interesting because it contains the passage which Pollock uses (pp. 124-125 and 182-183) in explaining his criticism of the double use of the word *idea*. But the confusion is really greater than might appear from Pollock's reference to it. The word *idea* in the phrase *idea Petri* is used to mean (α) *mens Petri*, (β) *conceptus* (*Petri*) *in mente Pauli* (γ) this same

conceptus or *mentis imaginatio* regarded as the *idea* which corresponds to, or expresses, the *image* of Peter in Paul's body or brain. Now if we take α on the one hand and $\beta\gamma$ on the other, the word *idea* is being used to denote facts which are not of the same dimension at all, as I have pointed out already. According to Spinoza's own definition an *idea* is a *mentis conceptus quem mens format;* the mind, therefore, cannot be an idea in this sense. Again, if we take β on the one hand and $\alpha\gamma$ on the other, what we have in view in β is the the cognitive relation, whereas what we have in view in $\alpha\gamma$ is the existential relation between mind and body, or again between a particular mental process and its physiological correlate. Also it certainly seems as if Spinoza was thinking of the mind's 'imaginations' as determined by processes going on in the body. The *ideae affectionum*, then, are ideas which (1) know or represent external bodies as well as our own body, (2) correspond to the *imagines* in our own body and somehow express them, and (3) are apparently determined by them. It seems unlikely that Spinoza would have used the one word *idea* so freely, if he had clearly recognized these complications.

§ 8. The Mind's Knowledge of Body and of Itself (II, 19 and 23).

Prop. 19 presents a peculiar difficulty. There appears to be a glaring verbal contradiction between statements which occur within a few lines of each other. The reader cannot fail to find it a stumbling-block, yet Spinoza shows no consciousness of its presence. The enunciation (abbreviated) says *Mens humana ipsum humanum corpus non cognoscit . . . nisi per ideas affectionum, i.e.* the mind knows the body but only through the ideas of the *affectiones*. The first sentence of the demonstration speaks of the mind as the idea or *cognitio* of the body. We are then told that the knowledge of the body is *in Deo, quatenus plurimarum rerum ideis affectus est*, for the body will be known (by the *intellectus infinitus*) in its dependence upon other bodies. But what about *Deus, quatenus naturam humanae mentis constituit?* We expect to be told how a knowledge of the body is *in Deo* considered in that way, but instead of that we are told that *in Deo* so considered, *i.e.* in the human mind, there is *no* knowledge of the body, *mens humana corpus humanum non cognoscit*, and not a word of qualification is added. Yet the demonstration goes on to argue that the *ideae affectionum* are *in Deo quatenus humanae mentis naturam constituit, i.e.* that the

human mind perceives the *affectiones*, and to that extent perceives the body. The word '*percipit*' is used here, but '*cognoscit*' is used in the enunciation, as it is in the statement which says '*non cognoscit*'.

The simplest explanation would be to suppose that something has been omitted from the text after the words *non cognoscit, viz.* some qualifying phrase, and the reference to 11C suggests the phrase *nisi ex parte sive inadequate*,[1] and with this agrees the statement at the end of 13 S that of our body we have *non nisi admodum confusam cognitionem.* But a difficulty in the way of this solution is that our proposition is quoted in 23, and there again it is said without any qualification that *mens humana ipsum corpus non cognoscit, hoc est, cognitio corporis humani ad Deum non refertur, quatenus essentiam mentis humanae constituit.* Is Spinoza, then, using the word *cognoscere* sometimes in a looser, sometimes in a stricter, sense in the same proposition without a word of explanation? This too would surely be strange.

Two of the commentators expound the proposition, and their expositions imply that, in reading the proposition, the reader has himself to supply the qualification required to avoid the contradiction. Camerer (p. 68) says "der menschliche Geist erkennt den menschlichen Körper nicht (an sich)". Here 'an sich' is used apparently as the contrast to *per ideas affectionum*, but what Spinoza opposes to *per ideas affectionum* is '*per plurimarum rerum singularium ideas*'. The German phrase 'an sich' seems to me to suggest a quite wrong idea. Robinson also uses the phrase 'an sich' but at the important point in demonstration gives a different explanation (p. 325): "Gott hat die Idee oder Erkenntnis des menschlichen Körpers, sofern er von vielen andern Ideen affiziert ist, nicht aber sofern er bloss die Natur der menschlichen Seele ausmacht . . . Daher erkennt die menschliche Seele (auf diesem direkten Wege) den menschlichen Körper nicht (sofern sie nämlich sinnlich erkennt, sofern sie imaginiert)". This may be what was in Spinoza's mind—though 'direkt' seems hardly the right word: it is what one would have expected him to say, but the trouble is that he does not say it, never gives even a hint of it.

The same kind of difficulty recurs in prop. 23. In the enunciation and at the end of the demonstration it is said that the mind does possess a certain *cognitio* of itself, *viz.* through the

[1] Cf. the reference to 11 C at the end of 24. What is denied there is not *cognitio* in general, but *adaequata cognitio.*

ideae affectionum, yet in the middle of the demonstration we are told without any qualification—for *eatenus* there means merely that the human mind is being considered in itself and not as known to the *intellectus infinitus—mens humana se ipsam non cognoscit.*

§ 9. *Idea ideae* (II, 20 and 21).

There seems to be a considerable amount of agreement among the commentators in thinking that the doctrine of the *idea ideae* or *idea mentis* is Spinoza's equivalent for self-consciousness and is important for him as securing the unity and continuity of the mind. I cannot see myself how it can serve this purpose, for there can be no more unity and continuity in the *idea mentis* than there was in *mens* itself, for the *idea mentis* is simply a reflective awareness of what is in the mind; in other words, reflective knowledge can only become aware of, not create, any unity or continuity there is in the mind. I question also whether it is not misleading to identify the *idea ideae* with our notion of self-consciousness. Camerer (p. 55) goes so far as to say: "Das Selbstbewusstsein besteht für Spinoza darin, dass eine Idee selbst wieder Object einer Idee wird; ausserdem wäre jene Idee eine bewusstlose". This last statement is surely either ambiguous or wrong; a 'bewusstlose Idee' seems a contradiction in terms. It may be doubted whether Spinoza had any carefully thought-out conception of the self, or had the psychological problem of self-consciousness before his mind at all.

He is not content to take reflective knowledge as an empirical fact but gives an *a priori* deduction of it. This deduction seems to be open to two criticisms. (1) He argues that, *cogitatio* being an attribute, there must necessarily be *in Deo* an idea of it and all its modes (by II, 3). But this argument seems to overlook the fact that *cogitatio* is itself the idea of the *other* attributes which are its objects, *i.e.* it has no independent content of its own which could be the object of another idea. We are back, of course, at the false separation of *idea* from *ideatum*. (2) Even if we put aside this objection, yet *in Deo* as omniscient or infinite intellect there can be no *reflective* knowledge, for there is no need or room for it. *We* reflect on the operations of our mind and on the relations among its contents, because our mind is finite, acquires its contents gradually, never has them all before it at once, and has to reflect in order to take stock of itself. But none of this can be attributed to the infinite intellect, to which all truth is eternally manifest: its knowledge must be completely

direct. And once more we have the difficulty of seeing how, in view of this difference between the human and the infinite intellect, the former can be a part of the latter.

At the end of 21 S he refers to what he takes to be an empirical fact and had already stated in *Int. Em.* § 34, *viz.* that when we know any object we also know that we know it, and know that we know that we know it, and so on *in infinitum.* This infinite series must surely be dismissed as being, not a fact, but a mere absurdity.[1] It is easy to go on expanding the verbal formula that we know, that we know, that we know and so on, but to these repetitions no real thought, no real distinction of stages, corresponds; we could distinguish one stage from another only by counting the number of times the word 'know' recurs in the verbal formula. But the fundamental error goes back to the very beginning of the series, to the first repetition of the word 'know'. Spinoza seems to think that the whole series of 'knowings' can take place in relation to the one original and self-same object. But he apparently fails to see that we can distinguish one knowing from another only by reference to their respective objects. We cannot distinguish even the second knowing from the first, unless we can make some distinction between their objects. Nor would it be of any use to answer that the object of the second knowing is the object of the first knowing + the knowing of it, for (1) an *object* is, as such, a *known* object; you cannot separate the knowing from it and still have it as object; (2) the knowing is not a second object that can be known apart from its own object; it is not anything added to the *known object*, hence, if we have nothing more than the first object before us, we have no means of distinguishing the second knowing from the first. The fact is, of course, that reflective knowledge consists, not in a senseless repetition of indistinguishable knowings in relation to one single object, but in the recognition of relations between the original object and other contents of mind. How, *e.g.*, do I know that I know Euclid, I, 47? Because I remember the figure, the construction, the general method of proof. The second knowing must always bring something additional to confirm the first, otherwise the assertion 'I know that I know' would be indistinguishable from a mere repetition such as, 'Yes, I do know'.

Spinoza's error is shown again in 21 S when he says *mentis idea et ipsa mens una eademque est res, quae sub uno eodemque*

[1] Although, strangely enough, a psychologist of so high standing as Ward seems to give some countenance to it (*Psych. Princ.*, p. 372 n.).

attributo, nempe cogitationis, concipitur, for this leaves us with no means of distinguishing between two ideas which are after all one and the same idea. Nor can he really help himself by saying that the *idea ideae* is the *forma ideae, quatenus haec ut modus cogitandi absque relatione ad objectum consideratur*, for an idea *absque relatione ad objectum* is nothing at all, not an idea of anything, and therefore not an idea. Any such *idea mentis* as actually exists in the mind of a reflective human being, any self-consciousness, is not, and cannot be, simply identified with the mind, and in fact the word mind in this connection is necessarily being used ambiguously, for mind as a whole includes (α) direct activities and knowledge, (β) reflection upon these, but when we speak of *idea mentis, i.e.* β, *mens* must then mean α only. In a human being β gives only a partial and imperfect knowledge of α: the distinction between α and β is in fact only a special case of the distinction between knowledge and the things it knows. On the other hand, if we are thinking of the *idea mentis* as it exists *in Deo*, in the perfect knowledge of the *intellectus infinitus*, then there is no difference at all between *mens* and the *idea mentis*, for there is no way of distinguishing between the object of perfect knowledge and the thing itself.

§ 10. Truth and Error—Finite and Infinite Intellect (II, 32-36).

It is unfortunate that the examples which Spinoza uses to illustrate his doctrine of error are all, as stated by himself, open to objection. There are two in 35 S and another in IV, 1 S, where 35 S is referred to. The first is that men erroneously think themselves free, and do so because they are ignorant of the causes that determine their actions. This statement may be met by a simple denial. Men think themselves free because they are aware of the plain distinction between action (or movement) under compulsion (as when a man under arrest is marched to the police office by policemen) and action (proper) in which a man does what he himself wills to do. And since a man usually has some reason for doing what he wills to do, he is not ignorant of the cause of his action. The second example is that we 'imagine' the sun to be only about 200 feet distant from us. How Spinoza could make this statement is beyond me, for everybody surely has often seen the sun setting at the far horizon. If a person ignorant of the true distance of the sun were asked, say at midday, how far away he thought the sun to be, I should think he would answer in some such way as this, 'I can't really say, it

looks a long way off, but there is no means of judging how far'. And if, apart from astronomy, we have *no* definite ideas about the sun's distance, we can hardly be in error about it. This example also, then, is not of much use to us. And the additional one given in IV, 1 S is, in itself, not much better. When the sun is reflected in water, *eundem perinde, ac si in aqua esset, imaginamur; tametsi verum ejus locum noverimus.* If we know the reflection to be a reflection of the sun, we surely cannot even 'imagine' it as the sun itself. But from the context Spinoza presumably means that, even although we know that the real sun is in the sky, we do not cease to *see* a 'reflected sun'. And this is also his point at the end of 17 S, to which we are here referred, *viz.* that the *mentis imaginatio* considered in itself contains nothing erroneous.

The enunciation of prop. 33 says: *Nihil in ideis positivum est, propter quod falsae dicuntur.* The demonstration depends on 32, which will be more conveniently discussed later, but we may usefully consider the assertion in the enunciation by itself for a moment. What we should rather have expected Spinoza to say is that there is nothing *in the reality* which can justify what is false in the false idea; the false idea is false precisely because it asserts what does *not* hold good in reality, *e.g.* asserts something to exist which does not exist. But surely the assertion of what is false, the thought that the non-existent thing does exist, is something positive. The idea cannot surely be called false on account of something that is not in it, on account of something that it does not assert. And, if so, we must also reject the assertion of prop. 35 (proved by means of 33) that falsity *consists* in a privation of knowledge. Falsity may be *due to and explained by* a privation of knowledge in this sense, that, if the knowledge had been present, the error would have been prevented, but the falsity *consists* in the positive assertion or thought which was not prevented. It would seem, then, that Spinoza's doctrine of error is not satisfactory, in so far as (1) it does not take sufficient account of the positive assertion or thought which makes the idea erroneous, and therefore (2) fails to give a complete explanation of error; for it will hardly do to say that the error occurred merely because it was not prevented. It may be said in reply that he does try to explain the psychical fact of the *mentis imaginatio* considered merely in itself. But then he himself tells us that in the *imaginatio* considered in itself there is no error. The error consists in a wrong assertion based on the *imaginatio*, a wrong interpretation, and he does not account for that. The interpretation asserts something to exist which does

not in reality exist, and Spinoza does not deal at all with the ancient puzzle, how we can think τὸ μὴ ὄν.

Falsity or error is, of course, a defect or vice in an idea, but Spinoza much more frequently uses another term to characterise the defectiveness of defective ideas, *viz.* inadequacy. How are the two terms related to each other? In a letter to Tschirnhaus (Bruder II, Ep. 64 = VV 60) Spinoza himself says that there is no difference between a true and an adequate idea, except that when we characterise the idea as true we are thinking of its agreement with its ideatum. Presumably a corresponding statement would apply to a false and an inadequate idea. And it seems obvious enough that, on the one hand, a false idea cannot be adequate, and, on the other, an inadequate idea cannot be true, if, at any rate, it professes to be adequate. Spinoza, of course, introduced the definition of an adequate idea in II, because, in view of the complete independence of the attributes he wished to insist that there is a wholly internal criterion of the truth of an idea, *viz.* its clearness and distinctness, its self-evidencing quality. But, as we have seen, he does not really escape the external reference of ideas, for (1) they know their ideata, (2) they correspond to their ideata in the respect that the order and connection of ideas is the same as that of their ideata.

What, then, is the internal mark or character of inadequacy in an idea? Since adequacy is shown by clearness and distinctness, we should expect inadequacy to be shown by confusion, and this is the expression which Spinoza most frequently uses as an equivalent for inadequacy, but it is not the only one. In 11C inadequacy is equated—in the phrase *rem ex parte sive inadaequate percipere*—with partiality or incompleteness; and, from the corollary itself and the use made of it, the incompleteness would seem to consist in this, that a thing known only *ex parte* is a thing not known in relation to its cause or ground.[1] For, as ax. 6 of I tells us, knowledge of an effect depends upon knowledge of its cause, or, as Spinoza says in II, 28, when speaking of the *affectiones*, things not known in terms of their causes are like *consequentiae absque praemissis*. Are we, then, to regard 'incompleteness' and 'confusion' as equivalent? Spinoza himself seems to do so, for, *e.g.*, after the phrase just quoted from

[1] As Busolt (p. 35) puts it: "Kein Einzelding ist durch sich selbst da . . . sein Dasein und sein Wesen hängt von andern Dingen ab. Der Körper ist nur ein Glied . . . in dem unendlichen Causalnexus, welcher den Zusammenhang der Natur der Dinge ausdrückt . . . Nur als Glied dieser unendlichen Reihe von Ursachen und Wirkungen wird ein Einzelding in adaequater Weise begriffen."

28 he adds *hoc est* (*ut per se notum*) *ideae confusae*, and he couples together *confusa et mutilata cognitio* in 28 C, and speaks of ideas as *inadaequatae sive mutilatae et confusae* in 35. Busolt (p. 37) takes the opposite view : " Irrthum ist nicht Unvollständigkeit, sondern Widerspruch in der Vorstellung ". But this is hardly Spinoza's way of putting the matter, and the various considerations which Busolt advances in the context in support of his statement do not seem to me to justify it. He says : " Wenn man sich der unvollständigen Vorstellung als solcher bewusst ist, so irrt man sich nicht ". But the knowledge that *imaginationes* are inadequate belongs to a higher kind of knowledge than *imaginatio* itself, *viz.* to the knowledge expounded in some of the propositions of II. Next, he refers to the statement in 17 S that the *imaginationes* regarded merely in themselves contain nothing erroneous. But then it is only when the *imaginationes* are taken as cognitions of external realities that the question of error arises at all. Finally, he says that it is only when the *imaginationes* are taken as cognitions of existing things at a time when the things have ceased to exist, that there is a ' falsche Vorstellung ', and I suppose he would say that there is then ' Widerspruch in der Vorstellung '. But what Spinoza himself says in 17 S is that the error lies in the fact that the mind is without the idea that would prevent it from taking the *imaginationes* as cognitions of existing things ; in other words, the error consists, as 35 says, in a *privatio cognitionis*. In 11 C Spinoza is not explaining error but only thinking of inadequacy as consisting in an ignorance of causes, but in 35 S error itself is imputed to an ignorance of causes. Thus I think we must regard Spinoza as holding that the partial or incomplete character of ' imaginative ' knowledge necessarily involves it in falsity.

It would seem, then, that we have to interpret Spinoza's statement in 35 that *falsitas* consists in a *privatio cognitionis*, not in the sense that what looks like error is only partial knowledge, but in the opposite sense that knowledge that is only partial necessarily involves error or misrepresentation of the reality, *i.e.* the false idea does not merely omit some features contained in its ideatum, but, owing to the lack of fuller knowledge, misrepresents and falsifies its ideatum. And the examples in 35 S (freedom and the sun's distance) bear this interpretation out, for they seem clearly meant to be examples of ideas that are in conflict with fact. They are ideas which could only exist in a mind ignorant of the actual facts, and in that sense their falsity depends upon a privation of knowledge, but they are ideas which do not correspond to, but misrepresent, their ideata. In the

case of the sun's distance, the sun, according to Spinoza, looks quite near, but it is to our ignorance of the true distance and of the cause of the near appearance, and not to this appearance itself, that he imputes the error. The ignorance or privation of knowledge is held responsible for the error; the near appearance is innocent, for it remains even after we know the true distance.

However much, then, Spinoza may insist that error depends on a privation of knowledge, so that, given the knowledge, error would disappear and cease to exist, yet, so long as the privation continues the error will continue, and the false idea will be a real idea existing in its falsity. There can, of course, be no false ideas in the *intellectus infinitus*, for in that intellect there is no privation of knowledge. How, then, is the human intellect with its many false ideas related to the *intellectus infinitus* in which there are no false ideas? Spinoza's utterances on the subject are *prima facie* not consistent. In 11 C he says without any qualification that the human mind is part of the *intellectus infinitus*, but in 43 S, although he refers to 11 C, he inserts a qualification; our mind, *quatenus res vere percipit*, is part of the *intellectus infinitus*. But is our mind, then, so far as it does *not* perceive things truly but has false ideas, *not* part of the intellectus infinitus? Some real difference between the human mind and the *intellectus infinitus* as existents there must surely be, if the one contains false ideas and the other does not. But if the human mind were, as respects any part of it, outside the *intellectus infinitus*, the latter would not be infinite in Spinoza's sense of the term. We must be careful here not to confuse our present difficulty with a more general difficulty about the application of the notions of part and whole to the relation between the finite and the infinite. There is on Spinoza's view no difficulty in saying that *true* ideas are parts of the *intellectus infinitus*. Spinoza does not hold that no truth short of the whole truth can be in itself completely true; his view about truth is not Bradley's. The *intellectus infinitus* can have ideas that are true of their specific objects in the same way as its knowledge as a whole is true of reality as a whole, and the human mind can attain to some of these true and adequate ideas. It is the existence of false ideas in the human mind that seems to make it impossible that that mind should be part of the *intellectus infinitus*.

It would seem that there are only two possible solutions of our difficulty, and neither of them is such as Spinoza, in view of other parts of his doctrine, could easily accept. Either the human mind and the *intellectus infinitus* are distinct psychical existents, and in that case infinite is being used in the sense of omniscient

but *not* in the sense of *in suo genere infinitus ;* or the *intellectus infinitus* is not a psychical existent at all, but an expression signifying the totality of truth.

The foregoing difficulty arises within *Cogitatio* taken by itself, but there is the further difficulty of a conflict with the fundamental doctrine of the correspondence of the order and connection within the attributes as stated in II, 7. False ideas misrepresent their ideata, whereas according to II, 7 the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. How, then, is the existence of false ideas possible ?

Prop. 32, which we have so far passed over, makes a startling and puzzling assertion. After reading a whole series of propositions about inadequate ideas it is startling to be told that *all* ideas, *quatenus ad Deum referuntur*, are *true*. How can inadequate and false ideas be made adequate and true by being referred *ad Deum ?* We have just been urging that only true ideas can be so referred. Pollock (p. 183) says roundly : " The proposition amounts to saying that every mental state is in one sense *true*, inasmuch as it really exists ". Similarly Busolt (p. 37) says of *imaginationes* that they " involviren an sich noch keinen Irrthum, denn sie sind als Bilder [1] etwas Wirkliches, also die Ideen von ihnen als solchen wahr ". To say, however, that Spinoza in this proposition is simply equating the truth of ideas with the existence of mental states seems too rough and ready a way of disposing of the proposition, and in any case does not solve the difficulty how false mental states come to exist at all, if II, 7 is true. Important as the proposition obviously is, Spinoza himself, certainly, gives us little help in understanding it. The demonstration occupies three lines, and there is no further explanation. The first words of the demonstration are *Omnes ideae quae in Deo sunt*, a phrase which might suggest that there are some ideas which are not *in Deo*. But this cannot be Spinoza's meaning, for, as he says in prop. 36, *Ideae omnes in Deo sunt* (*per* I, 15)—naturally, since they have nowhere else to be. He then goes on *et, quatenus ad Deum referuntur, sunt verae* (*per* 32). Here a distinction is apparently drawn between the phrases *in Deo* and *quatenus ad Deum referuntur*, and *in Deo* is the wider expression, but in 32 the two phrases must be used as equivalent. Why, then, are all ideas, *quatenus ad Deum referuntur*, said to be true ? We are referred both in 32 and 36 to 7 C, which says in effect that ideas as produced by the *Res*

[1] = *imagines ?* (Busolt does not keep the distinction between *imagines* and *imaginationes* clear.) Strictly the *imaginationes* are neither true nor false.

Cogitans have the same *ordo et connexio* as their *essentiae formales*, and therefore (as 32 says) agree entirely with these their ideata, and so are true.

The expression which in 36 is contrasted with *quatenus ad Deum referuntur* is *quatenus ad singularem alicujus mentem referuntur*, and as so referred ideas may be inadequate and confused. In what sense are such ideas nevertheless *in Deo?* From 11 C we may infer that it is *quatenus* [*Deus*] *per naturam humanae mentis explicatur, sive humanae mentis essentiam constituit;* and the *humana mens* here is of course the same as the *singularis mens* of 36, that is to say, it is the mind of the individual man, taken by itself, and apart from its place and connections within the *intellectus infinitus*.

Prop. 34 tells us further that there may be ideas which are adequate and true even in us, *i.e. in Deo quatenus nostrae mentis essentiam constituit*.

To sum up what we learn from props. 32, 34 and 36:—all ideas are *in Deo* in a wide sense of that phrase; but they may be (α) *in Deo* and referred *ad Deum* without qualification, or (β) *in Deo* and referred *ad Deum, quatenus tantum humanae mentis essentiam constituit*. When ideas are considered as referred in one or other or both of these ways, it is asserted: (1) that all ideas are adequate and true when referred in manner α, (2) that some ideas are adequate and true both when referred in manner α and when referred in manner β, and (3) that other ideas are adequate and true when referred in manner α but not when referred in manner β.

Two difficulties are raised by this summary of results:—first, as regards the double reference in 3, according to which the same ideas are true in one way and false in another; and, second, as regards the inconsistency of (1), proved as it is by 7 C, with the existence of any false ideas whatsoever.

The two parts of (3) are not openly contradictory, for there is a distinction in the mode of reference of the ideas. But is the distinction between *Deus* unqualified and *Deus* qualified, which professes to be only a distinction between two ways of regarding *Deus*, anything more than a slight disguise for the fact that *Deus* qualified is not *Deus* but man? We are back, of course, at our previous difficulty about the *intellectus infinitus*. Does the *Res Cogitans* exist in two ways, as *intellectus infinitus* knowing everything adequately, and as finite minds knowing many things inadequately; as at once one and infinite with the characteristics of an infinite mind, and also as many finite minds with the characteristics of finite minds? To put the difficulty in another

way, the ideas which are inadequate in man must surely undergo a change in order to become adequate in the *intellectus infinitus;* and the change will not consist in the mere filling up of that lack of knowledge in which the privation consisted; it requires also the giving up of that erroneous part of the idea which the knowledge would have prevented from coming into existence. Or, conversely, ideas which are adequate in the *intellectus infinitus* must undergo a change in order to have a place as inadequate ideas in the mind of man, a change which implies not merely a diminution but a distortion. In other words, the ideas which are adequate in one reference and inadequate in another are not the same ideas.

The first of the 3 assertions, when taken along with its proof by means of 7 C, raises the difficulty of reconciling the existence of inadequate ideas with the exact correspondence of ideas and things. If, as 7 C and 32 say, the *Res Cogitans* produces all ideas in such a way that they correspond exactly with their ideata and so are true, how can inadequate and false ideas come into existence? If ideas agree with their ideata and are true, they cannot be confused and inadequate. If they are confused and inadequate, they cannot agree with their ideata and be true. Or are we to say that there is confusion in the ideata, in the things themselves?

Camerer seems in one passage (p. 90) to be prepared to adopt this heroic solution: "Auch die inadaequaten und confusen Ideen . . . der vollkommen richtige Ausdruck der Vorgänge sind, welche in ihnen vorgestellt werden, und auch das, dass sie im menschlichen Geist verworren und verstümmelt vorkommen, ist der getreue Ausdruck für das, was bei den Affectionen des menschlichen Körpers mit diesem vorgeht". The *imaginationes* are confused because in the *affectiones* "die Natur des menschlichen Körpers mit der Natur äusseren Körper sich confundirt". But it is impossible to take this 'Confundirung' seriously. The external bodies act upon our body in perfectly definite ways. In an earlier passage (p. 80) Camerer himself had spoken of the confusion as being one of knowledges not of bodies: "in den Ideen von den Affectionen des Körpers ist eine Kenntniss von äusseren Körper gemischt mit einer solchen von dem menschlichen Körper". The confusion is in our minds, not in *Extensio*. As Spinoza says in a letter to Oldenburg (Bruder II, Ep. 15 = VV 33): *Res non nisi respective ad nostram imaginationem possunt dici . . . ordinatae aut confusae.*

But if this solution will not do, we have to ask again, If there is no confusion in *Extensio*, how comes it that there is confusion

in the *corresponding* ideas in *Cogitatio?* Spinoza says in 43 S that in props. 19 to 35 he has explained the causes of *falsitas*, but he did not explain how he reconciled the operation of these causes with the doctrine of the correspondence of ideas and things. I do not see how any solution of the difficulty is possible for Spinoza at all. Just as formerly the cognitive relation and the relation of correspondence were confused, so now they seem, so far as inadequate ideas are concerned, to have well nigh lost connection with each other. The *imaginationes* do not know the *imagines* at all, and they do not know in any adequate way those causal interactions between bodies of which the *imagines* are the effect.