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Analysis, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Dec., 1973), pp. 40-48.

Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-2638%28197312%2934%3A2%3C40%3AJE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R

Analysis is currently published by The Analysis Committee.

JUDGMENTAL EMOTIONS

By ROBERT M. GORDON

I

CERTAIN psychological predicates, when immediately followed by a 'that'-clause or a similar phrase,[1] ascribe an *attitude* pro or con regarding the state of affairs specified in the 'that'-clause as well as a *belief* either that the specified state of affairs obtains or that it at least might obtain. Their power to make these ascriptions may be represented conveniently by saying that certain sentence-entailments hold. For example, the sentence 'John regrets that it is raining' entails both 'John wishes that it not be raining' and 'John believes that it is raining'. The sentence 'John is pleased that it is raining' entails 'John wishes that it be raining' as well as 'John believes that it is raining'. 'John fears that it is raining' entails 'John wishes that it not be raining'; but instead of entailing 'John believes that it is raining' it entails only 'John believes that it at least might be raining'. Similarly, 'John is hopeful that it is raining' entails 'John wishes that it be raining' and 'John believes that it at least might be raining'. More will be said about these entailments in a later section.

In some of these hybrid belief-and-attitude predicates the belief element appears to be the dominant element. To be hopeful that it is raining appears to be a type of *judgment* that it is raining, though a judgment that is motivated in part by the wish that it be raining: a kind of *wishful thinking*, more specifically a kind that is anchored to the possible. Similarly, to fear or to be afraid that it is raining appears to be a type of judgment that it is raining, though one that is motivated in part by the wish that it *not* be raining. Those of the hybrid predicates that ascribe merely the belief that the specified state of affairs is *possible* or *might* obtain all have this apparent judgmental quality. I shall try to analyse this quality by pointing to some significant ways in which 'fears', 'is hopeful', etc., behave like verbs such as 'believes', 'suspects', 'conjectures' and 'expects', which designate in a more central way modes of judgment. I shall not attempt a formal definition of either 'mode of judgment' or 'judgmental predicate'. But I believe that the verbs 'believes', 'suspects', 'conjectures' and 'expects' form a single intuitive family or constellation, which I shall signalize, without attaching much

[1] Other phrases include "gerundive nominals", usually preceded by 'of' or 'about': as in 'I regret (or: am ashamed of) having dropped the pitcher', 'She is upset about my having dropped the pitcher' and 'I am afraid of dropping the pitcher'. In this paper I deal specifically with 'that'-clauses, though much of what I say can be made to fit gerundive nominals and certain other object phrases. The term 'gerundive nominal' is due to Robert B. Lees, *The Grammar of English Nominalizations* (Bloomington, Ind.: Research Centre in Anthropology, Folklore and Linguistics, 1960).

weight to the choice of a name, as 'predicates that designate modes of judgment', or 'judgmental predicates'. ('Epistemic predicates' might have been the more natural choice, except that I mean specifically to exclude 'knows' and its congeners, for reasons that will soon be apparent.) I intend to show that 'fears', 'is hopeful', etc., bear at least some of the marks of a judgmental predicate, and thus that their place on the conceptual map is at least at the edge of that constellation.

In contrast to these expressions, hybrids such as 'regrets' and 'is pleased', which ascribe the belief that the specified state of affairs actually obtains, bear none of the distinguishing marks of a judgmental predicate. In the final section of this paper I shall attribute this to the fact that these predicates ascribe not mere belief but *knowledge* that the state of affairs obtains.

II

If someone fears or is afraid or terrified that something is so, and there comes to be strong reason to believe that it is so, we say that his "fears" have been "confirmed". When there is conclusive reason for this belief we also say that his fears have been "borne out". Under similar conditions someone's "hopes" or "worries" are said to have been confirmed or borne out. On the other hand, there are no conditions under which someone's "regrets" may be said to have been confirmed or borne out. Nor is someone's pleasure or anger either confirmed or borne out. In this respect then expressions of the 'fears' class differ from expressions of the 'regrets' class and resemble 'believes', 'suspects' and other "core" judgmental predicates. This suggests a further difference between the 'fears' and 'regrets' classes, which I shall explain at some length.

A superstitious man, John, enters the forest one evening, terrified that he will inadvertently step on a pine cone. His equally superstitious but dauntless companion Jim walks without heed. Not far into the forest, Jim waits for his cautious friend to catch up, when, lo! he discovers to his horror that his foot rests on an all-too-familiar object. He very much regrets that he has stepped on a pine cone.

Interested in their reasons, we listen for a response of this sort: 'Well, stepping on a pine cone is fourteen years' bad luck, don't you know?' or 'I believe that stepping on a pine cone brings down a witch's curse'. Our story would not be implausible if either man were to offer either of these as a reason, John for being terrified that he will step on a pine cone and Jim for regretting that he has stepped on a pine cone.

Such a response would be helpful in explaining why each man feels as he does because it explains why it *matters* to each man whether he steps on a pine cone or not: it explains his strange *attitude* toward his stepping, or having stepped, on one. In particular, it gives John's

reason for wishing not to step on a pine cone, and it gives Jim's reason for wishing not to have stepped on a pine cone. Thus it explains the essentially similar attitudinal components of their otherwise diverse feelings.

A distinctly different kind of response would be open to John, however. He might say, e.g., 'I am terrified that I will step on a pine cone, because my eyesight is not very good'; or '. . . because there are lots of them lying around at this time of the year'; or '. . . because a friend of mine stepped on one last week'. Such a response would be especially appropriate if John thought it was not his attitude we wanted explained, but something else: *viz.*, his belief that he would, or at least might, step on a pine cone. I shall say, therefore, that a response of this sort cites a *judgmental* reason as opposed to an *attitudinal* reason. Were John terrified of stepping on a *rattlesnake* instead, such a response would probably be the more appropriate one, since we would probably regard his attitude as needing no explanation at all. At least, if his attitudinal reason were simply the fact that rattlers, when surprised, tend to give a venomous sting which is bad for the health, he would have no need to mention it. But it would remain a reason of his, nonetheless; just as, in the pine cone instance the fact of John's poor eyesight or the abundance of pine cones may well be reasons of his for being terrified that he will step on a pine cone, though mention of them would hardly diminish our curiosity.

Jim, it should be remarked, cannot have a judgmental reason for *regretting* that he has stepped on a pine cone. He has, of course, better reason for believing that he has stepped on one than merely the abundance of pine cones or the condition of his eyesight: he actually saw his foot resting on a pine cone. But if, when asked, 'Why do you regret having stepped on a pine cone?' he were to say, 'Because I could see my foot resting on one', he would be giving a response, but not an answer. Nor can we attribute the oddity of his response wholly to the fact that it is his strange attitude, rather than his belief, that wants explanation. Had he stepped on a rattlesnake instead, such a response would again have been odd: 'I regret that I have stepped on a rattlesnake, because I could see my foot resting on one'.

In my story I spoke of John as being terrified, rather than merely fearing or being afraid that he would step on a pine cone, in order to insure that my point did not depend on any of the variant uses to which 'fears' and 'is afraid' lend themselves. The verbs 'fears' and 'is afraid' may be used, in their first-person forms, to make a formally polite preface to an assertion: e.g., as in, 'I am afraid that my wife is not at home'. In addition, 'fears' and 'is afraid' are sometimes used, usually again in the first person and with a distinctive falling intonation, to suggest resignation to a fact: e.g., in saying, 'I'm afraid that we're lost'.

In such uses it should come as no surprise that the speaker is apt to follow up his assertion by citing what appear to be reasons for believing. But my story could not have traded on such belief-implying uses, since 'is terrified' does not have such uses: one cannot, for example, suggest resignation to a fact by saying, 'I'm terrified that we're lost'.

As the following pairs of sentences illustrate, if one is *worried* that something is so or *hopeful* that something is so, one may again have reasons of two kinds:

Tom is worried that his wife was on the two o'clock flight, because that's the one that was hijacked (attitudinal).
Tom is worried that his wife was on the two o'clock flight, because she had said she'd be arriving early in the evening (judgmental).
We are hopeful that someone will meet us at the station, because we haven't the money for a taxi (attitudinal).
We are hopeful that someone will meet us at the station, because it is customary to do so in these parts (judgmental).

On the other hand, expressions of the 'regrets' class, followed by a 'that'-clause, permit only attitudinal reasons. To show this I have assembled the following pairs of sentences. In the first sentence of each pair we have an expression of the 'fears' class: note that it comports quite comfortably with a judgmental reason. In the second (starred) sentence of each pair, we have an expression of the 'regrets' class: note that, by contrast, it rejects a judgmental reason. Either we strain to read the 'because'-clause as citing, implausibly, an *attitudinal* reason, or we find the sentence as a whole unintelligible.

He is worried that he missed the last train of the day, because the ticket window is closed.
*He is upset that he missed the last train of the day, because the ticket window is closed.
We are hopeful that someone will meet us at the station, because it is customary to do so in these parts.
*We are grateful that someone will meet us at the station, because it is customary to do so in these parts.
He is terrified that there are ghosts in the attic, because he heard a strange wailing sound last night.
*He is horrified that there are ghosts in the attic, because he heard a strange wailing sound last night.

III

From what has been said, we should expect that something may qualify in either of two ways as a reason for fearing that something is so, but in only one way as a reason for regretting that something is so.

Any of the examples given in the preceding section may be used to illustrate this; but I prefer to introduce one more, in order to clarify certain points.

Imagine that a man is about to play "Russian roulette". Since the pistol to be used has six chambers only one of which is loaded, he may not *believe* that the pistol will go off when he pulls the trigger, and he might, perhaps reasonably, believe that it will not go off. Yet we should not be surprised to find him *afraid* that the pistol will go off. His reasons might plausibly be, first, simply the fact that *one of the six chambers is loaded*—and thus the pistol *may* go off when he pulls the trigger. And second, the fact that *the pistol is pointed at him*—which is why its going off *matters* so much to him.

I think we must agree that these are indeed *reasons for being afraid* that the pistol will go off. We might also agree that these are good and sufficient reasons: that he *has reason to be afraid* that the pistol will go off. (Note that he has reason to be afraid that the pistol will go off, only if he has *both* reason to believe that it may, or at least might, and reason to wish that it would not.) The point I wish to emphasize, and which the grotesque example was designed to bring out, is that a reason for being afraid that something is so need not also be a reason for believing that it is so. The fact that exactly one of the six chambers of a pistol is loaded is not, by itself, a reason for believing that the pistol will go off when the trigger is pulled; it is, if anything, a reason for believing that the pistol will *not* go off. (With one's life at stake, of course, it may be wise to be conservative: to act just as one would act if one believed that the pistol would go off.) A reason for being afraid that something is so may sometimes be no more than a reason for believing that it *might* be so, i.e., for believing it *possible* that it is so. I should explain that I understand a person to believe it possible that something is so, just in case he believes that it might be so, *for all that he can say for certain*; and thus, just in case he is not entirely certain that it is *not* so; or, what I believe comes again to the same thing, just in case he has even the slightest doubt that it is not so.

We can summarize by saying that a reason for fearing (etc.) that something is so is either a judgmental reason or an attitudinal reason. Something is a judgmental reason for fearing (etc.) that *p*, *only if* it is a reason for believing it at least possible that *p*. Something is an attitudinal reason for fearing (etc.) that *p*, *only if* it is a reason for wishing it not to be the case that *p*. Apart from 'fears' and its congeners, the only predicates that allow judgmental reasons are 'believes', 'suspects', and other "core" members of the constellation of predicates that designate modes of judgment; and predicates that designate speech acts with which a judgment may be expressed: e.g., 'states', 'maintains', 'claims', as well as 'says' and 'writes'.

At best, however, the predicates 'fears', 'is hopeful', etc, can only be considered quasi-judgmental. I do not see how a person who believes that *p* might at the same time "judge" that not-*p*—leaving aside the possibility of having inconsistent beliefs. One cannot, for instance, suspect or conjecture that *p* if at the same time one believes that not-*p*. But, as we have seen, it is possible for one to fear that *p* or to be hopeful that *p* even though, at the same time, one believes that not-*p*. It is possible for one person to be hopeful that it will rain today while another is afraid that it will not, even though both *believe* that it will not rain and neither is *more certain* of this than the other. I can see no room for saying, in such a case, that they are making opposite judgments as to whether or not it will rain.

In spite of this, if farmer A is hopeful that it will rain whereas farmer B is afraid it will not, it would not be surprising to find certain differences in the ways A and B feel and act. If B were to set out pipes in preparation for irrigating the land, whereas A did not, this could be explained by the fact that B is afraid it will not rain whereas A is hopeful it will. The same fact would also explain why A might "feel good" while B might "feel bad": it is as if A were already sampling the satisfaction that would come from *knowing* it will rain, while B is sampling the dissatisfaction that would come from knowing it will not rain. Such differences in feeling and action would be explainable if A believed it would rain and B believed it would not; yet we have been assuming, rather, that both believe that it will not rain and that neither is more certain of this than the other. Thus the predicates we have been considering appear to have an explanatory function which in important respects parallels that of "core" judgmental predicates. This functional resemblance might help to explain why fears, hopes and worries are said to be confirmed or borne out and why there are judgmental reasons for fearing, being hopeful or being worried that something is so.

A puzzle that is easier to pin down is this. 'S regrets that *p*' (with such replacements as convention permits)[1] entails, not merely 'S believes it at least possible that *p*', but 'S believes that *p*'. One might therefore have expected 'regrets' to bear at least those marks of a judgmental predicate as are possessed by 'fears'. But in fact it bears neither of the marks I have mentioned. I shall try to account for this in the next and final part of the paper.

IV

Each of the following expressions, when followed by a 'that'-clause, accepts attitudinal reasons but fails to accept judgmental reasons:

[1] This is to be implicit hereafter; hence, I shall be free to treat sentence-frames as sentences, e.g., as possible terms of an entailment-relation.

regrets	is disgusted	is pleased
is angry	is embarrassed	is proud
is annoyed	is furious	is resentful
is ashamed	is glad	is sad
is delighted	is grateful	is sorry
is disappointed	is horrified	is unhappy
is dismayed	is indignant	is upset

In addition, for each of these "verbs", 'S verbs that *p*' entails 'S believes that *p*'. Why, then, do these not bear either of the marks of a judgmental predicate, unlike their cousins of the 'fears' class?

For each of the above-listed expressions, 'S verbs that *p*' entails not merely 'S believes that *p*', but 'S knows that *p*'. (Hence, not only 'believes', but 'believes with conviction', or whatever mode of judgment is required by 'knows'.) This can be shown by an argument I have presented in an earlier paper;[1] a similar argument will be sketched very briefly below. If this is so, then it should not be surprising that these expressions fail to have the marks of a judgmental predicate. For 'knows' is not a judgmental predicate.

First, I shall take it for granted here that, in strict usage at least, each of the above-listed expressions entails the truth of its immediately following 'that'-clause: that is, 'S verbs that *p*' entails '*p*' (i.e., the sentence comprising the word-string which follows 'that' in the entailing sentence). But those who honour this entailment in their speech must also honour the entailment of 'S knows that *p*'. In lieu of a formal argument, consider the following dialogue in a photographic studio:

> 'We were absolutely delighted that your little girl came to have us do her portrait. Now we've done everyone in your family. Here, we made this extra eight-by-ten as a special bonus for you.'
>
> (Looking at photo:) 'That's not her.'
>
> 'Oh? We were so sure, we didn't ask her name!'
>
> (Pointing to one of the photos displayed on the wall:) 'But that's her. She wears her hair in an afro these days.'
>
> (*Sotto voce*, 'That hippy?' Aloud:) 'Well, as I said, we were delighted that your daughter came in for a portrait.'

This valiant recovery falls flat. Having once admitted his mistake, the photographer is unable to repair his story by noting that he was, after all, right in believing that the customer's little girl had come in for a portrait. Right for the wrong reason is not enough: he couldn't have been delighted that the customer's little girl came in for a portrait.

[1] 'Emotions and Knowledge', *Journal of Philosophy*, LXVI, No. 13 (July 3, 1969), esp. 411–412.

Without trying to close loopholes, I hope to have made at least plausible the assumption that, for the same reasons the photographer falls short of *being delighted* that the little girl came in, he falls short of *knowing* that she came in. Similar arguments could be mounted, of course, for 'regrets', 'is angry' and the other expressions on the list.

Such arguments may be shored up by the more usual sort of argument for an entailment. There is a contradictory ring to each of the following sentences:

> We were delighted that your little girl came in for a portrait, though we didn't know that she had.
> Jim regrets that he has stepped on a pine cone, though he doesn't know that he has.

(In sounding these out, it may be advisable to stress the word 'know', so as to bring out an implied contrast with 'merely believe'. Without that stress 'doesn't know' may suggest the absence even of belief—which would confuse the issue.)

The hypothesis that, for the expressions listed, 'S verbs that *p*' entails 'S knows that *p*', gains some support, finally, from its ability to explain why these expressions do not bear the marks of a judgmental predicate. First, we do not say that someone's knowledge is or has been "confirmed" or "borne out"—unless this is glossed, 'It is confirmed that he knows . . .', as in, 'His knowledge of the enemy's location was confirmed by the tremor in his voice'. And, second, one does not have reasons, much less judgmental reasons, for knowing that something is so. Certain things may qualify as reasons for knowing, e.g., the marital status of a job applicant—that is, for knowing what his or her status is, whether single, married, divorced, or widowed. But these would not be reasons for knowing, specifically, e.g., *that the applicant is widowed.*

These are more than niceties of idiomatic English. One cannot speak of knowledge as "confirmed" or "borne out", because knowledge can never be said to be "false" or "mistaken", without contradiction; whereas only what was once thought questionable, and therefore possibly false or mistaken, can be said to be "confirmed" or "borne out". The fact that there are no reasons for knowing that something is so is due again to central features of the concept of knowledge. Without calling on a full-fledged theory of what it is to know that something is so, we can give at least this superficial explanation. If there are reasons for knowing, e.g., that it is raining, then there must be reasons, not merely for believing that it is raining, but for having the *true* belief that it is raining. But if there are reasons for this, then it is possible to deliberate whether to have "the true belief that it is raining" or not. But this is

not a possible topic of deliberation: if one thinks it a true belief that it is raining, then one already believes that it is raining, and there is nothing left to deliberate about.

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ON SEEING *EVERYTHING* UPSIDE DOWN

By LORIN BROWNING

N. G. E. HARRIS in a recent contribution to this journal (33.1, 28–31) argues that Quine's puzzle 'whether our neighbour may not systematically see everything upside down' is capable of empirical resolution. I wish to suggest that Harris has not provided a method for solving Quine's riddle.

Harris argues

> If I consider my own visual field I am aware of the contents of that field having position relative to felt parts of my body such as my eyelids. . . . Since we can assume, for the sake of argument, that Jones's experiences differ from mine only in his seeing everything inverted and any differences consequent on this, we can assume that Jones also experiences relationships between the positions of objects in his visual field and his eyelids, and that he can report on them. (P. 28.)

Since 'coherent claims that something is upside down are always made (often tacitly) with respect to some frame of reference external to that of which the claim is made' (p. 29), Harris holds that the position of objects in Jones's visual field relative to the external frame of reference of his lower eyelids could, on occasion, serve as a clue to whether Jones sees everything inverted. I wish to argue that it is not Quine's riddle for which Harris is providing a solution, for Harris has failed to consider the methods by which Jones could experience 'relationships between objects in his visual field and his eyelids'.

Let us suppose, contrary to fact, that Jones can see his lower eyelids. Then if everything is seen upside down by Jones the perception of his lower eyelids will also be included in his inverted visual field. There will be no external frame of reference to which Jones can appeal in order to test the claim that everything is being seen inverted.

Let us suppose what is not contrary to fact, that Jones can see his lips. Since the lower eyelids are determined by their relationship to the mouth (of which the lips are a part) and since the lips are included in Jones's upside down visual field, there will be no external standard to which appeal may be made.