PART I
CONCERNING GOD.
D EFINITIONS. VI. By
God, I mean a being absolutely infinite--that is, a substance consisting
in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite
essentiality. A XIOMS.I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else. II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself. IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause. VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object. VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence. |
PROP. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite.
Note I.--As finite existence involves a partial negation, and infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given nature, it follows (solely from
Prop. vii.) that every substance is necessarily infinite.
Note II.--No doubt it will be difficult
for those who think about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know
them by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstrations of Prop. vii.:
for such persons make no distinction between the modifications of substances and
the substances themselves, and are ignorant of the manner in which things are
produced; hence they attribute to substances the beginning which they observe in
natural objects. Those who are ignorant of true causes, make complete
confusion--think that trees might talk just as well as men--that men might be
formed from stones as well as from seed; and imagine that any form might be
changed into any other. So, also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and
human, readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long as they
do not know how passions originate in the mind. But, if people would consider
the nature of substance, they would have no doubt about the truth of Prop. vii.
In fact, this proposition would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism.
For, by substance, would be understood that which is in itself, and is conceived
through itself--that is, something of which the conception requires not the
conception of anything else; whereas modifications exist in something external
to themselves, and a conception of them is formed by means of a conception of
the thing in which they exist. Therefore, we may have true ideas of non-existent
modifications; for, although they may have no actual existence apart from
the conceiving intellect, yet their essence is so involved in something external
to themselves that they may through it be conceived. Whereas the only truth
substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in their existence,
because they are conceived through themselves. Therefore, for a person to say
that he has a clear and distinct--that is, a true--idea of a substance, but that
he is not sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said
that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it was false (a little
consideration will make this plain); or if any one affirmed that substance is
created, it would be the same as saying that a false idea was true--in short,
the height of absurdity. It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the
existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth. And we can hence
conclude by another process of reasoning--that there is but one such substance.
I think that this may profitably be done at once; and, in order to proceed
regularly with the demonstration, we must premise:--
1. The true definition of a thing
neither involves nor expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined.
From this it follows that--
2. No definition implies or expresses a
certain number of individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the
nature of the thing defined. For instance, the definition of a triangle
expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it does not imply any
fixed number of triangles.
3. There is necessarily for each
individual existent thing a cause why it should exist.
4. This cause of existence must either
be contained in the nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be
postulated apart from such definition.
It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual things exist in
nature, there must be some cause for the existence of exactly that number,
neither more nor less. For example, if twenty men exist in the universe (for
simplicity's sake, I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have had
no predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of these twenty men,
it will not be enough to show the cause of human existence in general; we must
also show why there are exactly twenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause
must be assigned for the existence of each individual. Now this cause cannot be
contained in the actual nature of man, for the true definition of man does not
involve any consideration of the number twenty. Consequently, the cause for the
existence of these twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, must
necessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence we may lay down the
absolute rule, that everything which may consist of several individuals must
have an external cause. And, as it has been shown already that existence
appertains to the nature of substance, existence must necessarily be included in
its definition; and from its definition alone existence must be deducible. But
from its definition (as we have shown, Notes
PROP. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself.
Note.--It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in fact,
conceived as distinct--that is, one without the help of the other--yet we
cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two entities, or two different
substances. For it is the nature of substance that each of its attributes is
conceived through itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always
existed simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other; but each
expresses the reality or being of substance. It is, then, far from an absurdity
to ascribe several attributes to one substance: for nothing in nature is more
clear than that each and every entity must be conceived under some attribute,
and that its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its attributes
expressing necessity or eternity and infinity. Consequently it is abundantly
clear, that an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined as
consisting in infinite attributes each of which expresses a certain eternal and
infinite essence.
If any one now ask, by what sign shall he be able to distinguish different
substances, let him read the following propositions, which show that there is
but one substance in the universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore
such a sign would be sought for in vain.
PROP. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.
Another proof.--The potentiality of non-existence is a negation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence is a power, as is obvious. If, then, that which necessarily exists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously absurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being absolutely infinite necessarily exists also. Now we exist either in ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (see
Ax. i. and Prop. vii.) Therefore a being absolutely infinite--in other words, God (Def. vi.)--necessarily exists. Q.E.D.Note.--In this last
proof, I have purposely shown God's existence a posteriori, so that the
proof might be more easily followed, not because, from the same premises, God's
existence does not follow a priori. For, as the potentiality of existence
is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increases in the nature of
a thing, so also will it increase its strength for existence. Therefore a being
absolutely infinite, such as God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power
of existence, and hence he does absolutely exist. Perhaps there will be many who
will be unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch as they are accustomed
only to consider those things which flow from external causes. Of such things,
they see that those which quickly come to pass--that is, quickly come into
existence--quickly also disappear; whereas they regard as more difficult
of accomplishment--that is, not so easily brought into existence--those
things which they conceive as more complicated.
However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here show the
measure of truth in the proverb, "What comes quickly, goes quickly," nor discuss
whether, from the point of view of universal nature, all things are equally
easy, or otherwise: I need only remark, that I am not here speaking of things,
which come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of substances
which (by
PROP. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.
Note.--The indivisibility of substance may be more easily understood as follows. The nature of substance can only be conceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing else can be understood than finite substance, which (by
Prop. viii.) involves a manifest contradiction.PROP. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.
Note.--Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and mind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been said. But these I pass over. For all who have in anywise reflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body. Of this they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite. But meanwhile by the other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart from the divine nature, and say it was created by God. Wherefrom the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant; thus they clearly show, that they do not know the meaning of their own words. I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at any rate in my own judgment (
Coroll. Prop. vi., and Note 2, Prop. viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by anything other than itself. Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.), that besides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Hence we drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God. However, in order to explain more fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which all start from the following points:--
PROP. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by any one.
Proof.--We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from the necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing, solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved (in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be, nor be conceived; but that all things are in God. Wherefore nothing can exist outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to act. Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by any one. Q.E.D.
Corollary I.--It follows: I. That there can be no cause which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the perfection of his own nature, moves God to act.
Corollary II.--It follows: 2. That God is the sole free cause. For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature (by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole necessity of his nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the sole free cause. Q.E.D.
Note.--Others think that God is a free cause, because he can, as they
think, bring it about, that those things which we have said follow from his
nature--that is, which are in his power, should not come to pass, or should not
be produced by him. But this is the same as if they said, that God could bring
it about, that it should not follow from the nature of a triangle, that its
three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles; or that from a
given cause no effect should follow, which is absurd.
Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this proposition, that
neither intellect nor will appertain to God's nature. I know that there are many
who think that they can show, that supreme intellect and free will do appertain
to God's nature; for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can
attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in ourselves.
Further, although they conceive God as actually supremely intelligent, they yet
do not believe, that he can bring into existence everything which he actually
understands, for they think that they would thus destroy God's power. If, they
contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he would not be
able to create anything more, and this, they think, would clash with God's
omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to assert that God is indifferent to all
things, and that he creates nothing except that which he has decided, by some
absolute exercise of will, to create. However, I think I have shown sufficiently
clearly (by
Prop. xvi.), that from God's supreme power, or infinite nature, an infinite
number of things--that is, all things have necessarily flowed forth in an
infinite number of ways, or always follow from the same necessity; in the same
way as from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for eternity,
that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore the
omnipotence of God has been displayed from all eternity, and will for all
eternity remain in the same state of activity. This manner of treating the
question attributes to God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect. For,
otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands an infinite number
of creatable things, which he will never be able to create, for, if he created
all that he understands, he would, according to this showing, exhaust his
omnipotence, and render himself imperfect. Wherefore, in order to establish that
God is perfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time, that he
cannot bring to pass everything over which his power extends; this seems to be
an hypothesis most absurd, and most repugnant to God's omnipotence.
Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the will which we
attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain to the eternal essence of
God, we must take these words in some significations quite different from those
they usually bear. For intellect and will, which should constitute the essence
of God, would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human intellect and
will, in fact, would have nothing in common with them but the name; there would
be about as much correspondence between the two as there is between the Dog, the
heavenly constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks. This I will prove as
follows: If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it cannot be in nature, as
ours is generally thought to be, posterior to, or simultaneous with the things
understood, inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his casuality (Prop.
xvi. Coroll. i.). On the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is
as it is, because it exists by representation as such in the intellect of God;
Wherefore the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute God's
essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their essence and of their
existence. This seems to have been recognized by those who have asserted, that
God's intellect, God's will, and God's power, are one and the same. As,
therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely, both of their
essence and existence, it must necessarily differ from them in respect to its
essence, and in respect to its existence. For a cause differs from a thing it
causes, precisely in the quality which the latter gains from the former.
For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence, but not of his
essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and, therefore, the two men may be
entirely similar in essence, but must be different in existence; and hence if
the existence of one of them cease, the existence of the other will not
necessarily cease also; but if the essence of one could be destroyed, and be
made false, the essence of the other would be destroyed also. Wherefore, a thing
which is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of a given effect,
must differ from such effect both in respect to its essence, and also in respect
to its existence. Now the intellect of God is the cause of both the essence and
the existence of our intellect; therefore the intellect of God in so far as it
is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both
in respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in anywise agree
therewith save in name, as we said before. The reasoning would be identical, in
the case of the will, as any one can easily see.
PROP. XIX. God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.
Note.--This proposition is also evident from the manner in which (in
Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God; it is evident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God, like his essence, is an eternal truth Further (in Prop. xix. of my "Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy"), I have proved the eternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here repeat.PROP. XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.
Note.--This proposition follows more clearly from
Prop. xvi. For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their existence--in a word, God must be called the cause of all things, in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. This will be made still clearer by the following corollary.Corollary.--Individual things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears from
Prop. xv. and Def. v.PROP. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity.
Note.--As certain things must be produced immediately by God, namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which, nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it follows: --1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those things immediately produced by him. I say absolutely, not after his kind, as is usually stated. For the effects of God cannot either exist or be conceived without a cause (
Prop. xv. and Prop. xxiv., Coroll.). 2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote cause of individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing these from what he immediately produces, or rather from what follows from his absolute nature. For, by a remote cause, we understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect. But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on God, that without him they can neither be nor be conceived.PROP. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.
Note.--Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura natarans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata). I say to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that, from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other words (
Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii.) God, in so far as he is considered as a free cause.PROP. XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as will, desire, love, etc., should be referred to passive nature and not to active nature.
Note.--I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function, admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality: but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of understanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived. For we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of the act of understanding.
PROP. XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact obtained.
Note I.--As I have thus shown, more
clearly than the sun at noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling
things contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall attach to the
word contingent; but I will first explain the words necessary and impossible.
A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence or in respect
to its cause; for the existence of a thing necessarily follows, either from its
essence and definition, or from a given efficient cause. For similar reasons a
thing is said to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence or definition
involves a contradiction, or because no external cause is granted, which is
conditioned to produce such an effect; but a thing can in no respect be called
contingent, save in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge.
A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or does not involve
a contradiction, or of which knowing that it does not involve a contradiction,
we are still in doubt concerning the existence, because the order of causes
escapes us,--such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or
impossible. Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.
Note II.--It clearly follows from what
we have said, that things have been brought into being by God in the highest
perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a most perfect
nature. Nor does this prove any imperfection in God, for it has compelled us to
affirm his perfection. From its contrary proposition, we should clearly gather
(as I have just shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had
been brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to God a
nature different from that, which we are bound to attribute to him from the
consideration of an absolutely perfect being.
I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and will refuse to
give their minds up to contemplating it, simply because they are accustomed to
assign to God a freedom very different from that which we (
APPENDIX.
In the foregoing I have
explained the nature and properties of God. I have shown that he necessarily
exists, that he is one: that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own
nature; that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so; that all
things are in God, and so depend on him, that without him they could neither
exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all things are pre-determined by God, not
through his free will or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or
infinite power. I have further, where occasion offered, taken care to remove the
prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my demonstrations. Yet there
still remain misconceptions not a few, which might and may prove very grave
hindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have
explained it above. I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these
misconceptions before the bar of reason.
All such opinions spring from the notion commonly
entertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act, namely, with
an end in view. It is accepted as certain, that God himself directs all things
to a definite goal (for it is said that God made all things for man, and man
that he might worship him). I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking
first why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so prone to
adopt it ? secondly, I will point out its falsity; and, lastly, I will show how
it has given rise to prejudices about good and bad, right and wrong, praise and
blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like. However, this is
not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of the human mind:
it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a starting point, what ought to be
universally admitted, namely, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of
things, that all have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that
they are conscious of such desire. Herefrom it follows first, that men think
themselves free, inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires,
and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them
to wish and desire. Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for
that which is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it comes to pass that
they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of events, and when these are
learned, they are content, as having no cause for further doubt. If they cannot
learn such causes from external sources, they are compelled to turn to
considering themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them
personally to bring about the given event, and thus they necessarily judge other
natures by their own. Further, as they find in themselves and outside themselves
many means which assist them not a little in their search for what is useful,
for instance, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for yielding
food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish, etc., they come to
look on the whole of nature as a means for obtaining such conveniences. Now as
they are aware, that they found these conveniences and did not make them they
think they have cause for believing, that some other being has made them for
their use. As they look upon things as means, they cannot believe them to be
self-created; but, judging from the means which they are accustomed to prepare
for themselves, they are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the
universe endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted everything
for human use. They are bound to estimate the nature of such rulers ( having no
information on the subject) in accordance with their own nature, and therefore
they assert that the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to
bind man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honors. Hence also it
follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according to his abilities, a
different way of worshipping God, so that God might love him more than his
fellows, and direct the whole course of nature for the satisfaction of his blind
cupidity and insatiable avarice. Thus the prejudice developed into superstition,
and took deep root in the human mind; and for this reason everyone strove most
zealously to understand and explain the final causes of things; but in their
endeavor to show that nature does nothing in vain, i.e., nothing which is
useless to man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods, and
men are all mad together. Consider, I pray you, the result: among the many helps
of nature they were bound to find some hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes,
diseases, etc.: so they declared that such things happen, because the gods are
angry at some wrong done them by men, or at some fault committed in their
worship. Experience day by day protested and showed by infinite examples, that
good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of pious and impious alike; still they
would not abandon their inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to
class such contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were
ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of ignorance,
than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning and start afresh. They
therefore laid down as an axiom, that God's judgments far transcend human
understanding. Such a doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth
from the human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished another
standard of verity in considering solely the essence and properties of figures
without regard to their final causes. There are other reasons (which I need not
mention here) besides mathematics, which might have caused men's minds to be
directed to these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge of the
truth. I have now sufficiently explained my first point. There is no need to
show at length, that nature has no particular goal in view, and that final
causes are mere human figments. This, I think, is already evident enough, both
from the causes and foundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be
based, and also from
P
REFACE.PART II
OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND.
P REFACE.I NOW pass on to explaining the results, which must necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part. i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness.
D EFINITIONS.I. By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is considered as an extended thing. (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv. Coroll.) III.
By idea, I mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as
a thinking thing. IV. By
an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so far as it is considered
in itself, without relation to the object, has all the properties or
intrinsic marks of a true idea. V.
Duration is the indefinite continuance of existing. VI. Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms. VII. By particular things, I mean things which are finite and have a conditioned existence; but if several individual things concur in one action, so as to be all simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so far, as one particular thing.
A XIOMS.IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways. V. We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and modes of thought. N.B. The postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop. xiii. |
PROP. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.
Note.--This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we are able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, in proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or perfection. Therefore a being, which can think an infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite. As, therefore, from the consideration of thought alone we conceive an infinite being, thought is necessarily (
Pt. i., Def. iv. and vi.) one of the infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.PROP. III. In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his essence.
Note.--The multitude understand by the power of God the free will of God, and the right over all things that exist, which latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent. For it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to reduce them to nothing. Further, the power of God is very often likened to the power of kings. But this doctrine we have refuted (
Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Corolls. i. and ii.), and we have shown (Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity, as that by which he understands himself; in other words, as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit), that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same necessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways. We further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God's power is identical with God's essence in action; therefore it is as impossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive him as non-existent. If we might pursue the subject further, I could point out, that the power which is commonly, attributed to God is not only, human (as showing that God is conceived by, the multitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a negation of power. However, I am unwilling to go over the same ground so often. I would only beg, the reader again and again, to turn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part i. from Prop. xvi. to the end. No one will be able to follow my meaning, unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the power of God with the human power and right of kings.PROP. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.
Corollary.--Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his realized power of action-that is, whatsoever follows from the infinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter), follows without exception in the same order and connection from the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).
Note.--
Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what has been pointed out above-namely, that whatsoever can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance: consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in two ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the things understood by God are identical. For instance, a circle existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes-that is, the same things following in either case.PROP. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes are contained in the attributes of God.
Corollary.--Hence, so long as particular things do not exist, except in so far as they, are comprehended in the attributes of God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they, are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they- are said to continue, their ideas 'will also involve existence, through which they are said to continue.
Note.--
If anyone desires an example to throw more light on this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any, which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak, inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to illustrate it as far as possible. The nature of a circle is such that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another; thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle. Yet none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant that, from this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. The ideas of these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the idea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.PROP. X. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man--in other words, substance does not constitute the actual being (forma) of man.
Note.--This proposition may also be proved from
I. v., in which it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same nature; for as there may be many men, the being of substance is not that which constitutes the actual being of man. Again, the proposition is evident from the other properties of substance-namely, that substance is in its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the essence of man is constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God. For (by
the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to the essence of man. That essence therefore (by, i. 15) is something which is in God, and which without God can neither be nor be conceived, whether it be a modification (i. 25 Coroll.), or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditioned manner.
Note.--Everyone must surely admit, that
nothing can be or be conceived without God. All men agree that God is the one
and only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their existence; that
is, God is not only- the cause of things in respect to their being made (secundum
fieri), but also in respect to their being (secundum esse).
At the same time many assert, that that, without which a thing cannot be
nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing; wherefore they believe
that either the nature of God appertains to the essence of created things, or
else that created things can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more
probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. I think the cause for such
confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the proper order of philosophic
thinking. The nature of God, which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it
is prior both in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken
to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place what
they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are considering natural
phenomena, they give no attention at all to the divine nature, and, when
afterwards they apply their mind to the study of the divine nature, they are
quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid
the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are no help
towards understanding the Divine nature. So that it is hardly to be wondered at,
that these persons contradict themselves freely.
However, I pass over this point. My intention here was only to give a reason
for not saying, that that, without which a thing cannot be or be conceived,
belongs to the essence of that thing: individual things cannot be or be
conceived without God, yet God does not appertain to their essence. I said that
"I considered as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given,
the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the thing is
necessarily removed also; or that without which the thing, and which itself
without the thing can neither be nor be conceived." (
PROP. XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually existing.
Corollary.--Hence it follows, tl-iat the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and when we say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in part or inadequately.
Note.--Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate; I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the end.
PROP. XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea, which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the said occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body without being perceived by the mind.
Note.--This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly to be understood from
II. vii., which see.PROP. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else.
Note.--We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is united to the
body, but also the nature of the union between mind and body. However, no one
will be able to grasp this adequately or distinctly, unless he first has
adequate knowledge of the nature of our body. The propositions we have advanced
hitherto have been entirely general, applying not more to men than to other
individual things, all of which, though in different degrees, are animated [animata].
For of everything there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the
cause, in the same way as there is an idea of the human body; thus whatever we
have asserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be asserted of
the idea of everything else. Still, on the other hand, we cannot deny that
ideas, like objects, differ one from the other, one being more excellent than
another and containing more reality, just as the object of one idea is more
excellent than the object of another idea, and contains more reality.
Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind differs from other
things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is necessary for us to know the nature
of its object, that is, of the human body. What this nature is, I am not able
here to explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance, that I
should do so. I will only say generally, that in proportion as any given body is
more fitted than others for doing many actions or receiving many impressions at
once, so also is the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others
for forming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions of one body
depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies concur with it in action, the
more fitted is the mind of which it is the object for distinct comprehension. We
may thus recognize the superiority of one mind over others, and may further see
the cause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, and also many
kindred questions, which I will, in the following propositions, deduce from what
has been advanced. Wherefore I have thought it worth while to explain and prove
more strictly my present statements. In order to do so, I must premise a few
propositions concerning the nature of bodies.
PROP. XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.
Corollary.--The mind is able to regard as present external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even though they be no longer in existence or present.
Note.---We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case, that we regard as present things which are not. It is possible that the same result may be brought about by other causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated one possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out the true cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human body, as we feel it, exists (
Coroll. after II. xiii.). Furthermore (II. vii. Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and only implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even though he no longer exists. Further, to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of things. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines. I will here draw attention to the fact, in order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error. The mind does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it. If the mind, while imagining non-existent things as present to it, is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of imagination depend solely on its own nature--that is (I. Def. vii.), if this faculty of imagination be free.PROP. XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines any of them, it will straightway remember the others also.
Note.--We now clearly see what Memory is. It is simply a certain association of ideas involving the nature of things outside the human body, which association arises in the mind according to the order and association of the modifications (affectiones) of the human body. I say, first, it is an association of those ideas only, which involve the nature of things outside the human body: not of ideas which answer to the nature of the said things: ideas of the modifications of the human body are, strictly speaking (
II. xvi.), those which involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies. I say, secondly, that this association arises according to the order and association of the modifications of the human body, in order to distinguish it from that association of ideas, which arises from the order of the intellect, whereby the mind perceives things through their primary causes, and which is in all men the same. And hence we can further clearly understand, why the mind from the thought of one thing, should straightway arrive at the thought of another thing, which has no similarity with the first; for instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple), a Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple, which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question, nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the man has often been affected by these two things; that is, that the man has often heard the word pomum, while he was looking at the fruit; similarly every man will go on from one thought to another, according as his habit has ordered the images of things in his body. For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the tracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought of war, &c.; while a countryman will proceed from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plough, a field, &c. Thus every man will follow this or that train of thought, according as he has been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images of things in this or that manner.PROP. XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind is united to the body.
Note.--This proposition is comprehended much more clearly from what we said in the
note to II. vii. We there showed that the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II. xiii.), are one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension; wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely, thought. The idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are in God by the same necessity and follow from him from the same power of thinking. Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the distinctive quality (forma) of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of thought without reference to the object; if a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to infinity. But I will treat of this hereafter.PROP. XXVIII. The idea of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.
Note.--The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in itself alone, clear and distinct; as also is the case with the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred to the mind only, as everyone may easily see.
PROP. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind.
Corollary.--Hence it follows that the human mind, when it perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself, of its own body, and of external bodies. For the mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of body (
II. xxiii.). It only perceives its own body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications, and only perceives external bodies through the same means; thus, in so far as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate knowledge of itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body (II. xxvii.), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and note.) Q.E.D.Note.--I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common order of nature; that is, whenever it is determined from without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to regard this or that; not at such times as it is determined from within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once, to understand their points of agreement, difference, and contrast. Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it regards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.
PROP. XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.
Note I.--I have thus set forth the cause of those notions, which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our ratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this method of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at all. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are ill-founded. Again we should discern whence the notions called secondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on which they are founded, and other points of interest connected with these questions. But I have decided to pass over the subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by too great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being, Thing, Something. These terms arose from the fact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in
II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time; if this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused; if this number of images, which the body is capable of forming distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become entirely confused one with another. This being so, it is evident (from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll. and xviii.) that the human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body can form images simultaneously. When the images become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of Being, Thing, &c. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from other analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to consider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms represent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man, horse, dog, &c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the human mind, that the powers of imagination breakdown, not indeed utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of particular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to imagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however, bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other attribute, will form a different general image of man, for instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases, everyone will form general images of things according to the habit of his body.Note II.--From all that has been said above it is clear, that we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:--(1.) From particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses (
II. xxix. Coroll.); I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. (2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things (II. xviii. note). I shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination. (3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (II. xxxviii. Coroll., xxxix. and Coroll. and xl.); this I call reason and knowledge of the second kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we will call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I will illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example. Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the product by the first; either because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from a master without any proof, or because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property of proportionals.PROP. XLIII. He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived.
Note.--I explained in the
note to II. xxi. what is meant by the idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing proposition is in itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has a true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest certainty. For to have a true idea is only another expression for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible. No one, indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of thinking--namely, the very act of understanding. And who, I ask, can know that he understands anything, unless he do first understand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure of a thing, unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, what can there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a standard of truth? Even as light displays both itself and darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.PROP. XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary.
Corollary I.--Hence it follows, that it is only through our imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the future or the past, as contingent.
Note.--How this way of looking at things arises, I will briefly explain. We have shown above (
II. xvii. and Coroll.) that the mind always regards things as present to itself, even though they be not in existence, until some causes arise which exclude their existence and presence. Further (II. xviii.), we showed that, if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway remember the other--that is, it will regard both as present to itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence and presence. Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than others, some more quickly, some at equal speed. Thus, let us suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that today he again sees Peter in the morning. It is evident, from II. Prop. xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other words, he will imagine a complete day; and, together with his imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he will imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon--that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to a future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past time. If it should at any time happen, that on some other evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for the child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them, not both together. His imagination will therefore waver; and, with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first one, then the other--that is, he will imagine them in the future, neither of them as certain, but both as contingent. This wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in relation to time past or time present: consequently, we may imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time present, past, or future.Corollary II.--It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity (sub quâdam æternitatis specie).
PROP. XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.
Note.--By existence I do not here mean duration--that is, existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a certain form of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal necessity of God's nature (
I. xvi.). I am speaking, I repeat, of the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are in God. For although each particular thing be conditioned by another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv. Coroll.).PROP. XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.
Note.--Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the eternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God, and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the
note to II. xl., and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to speak in Part V. Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as they have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the name God with images of things that they are in the habit of seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they are, men, and continually affected by external bodies. Many errors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we do not apply names to things rightly. For instance, when a man says that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that assigned by mathematicians. So again, when men make mistakes in calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and another on the paper. If we could see into their minds, they do not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because we think, that they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the paper. If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in error, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear. Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret the meaning of others. For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider mistaken and absurd in their opponents.PROP. XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another cause, and so on to infinity.
Note.--In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c. Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract or general terms, such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things. Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to this or that idea, or this or that volition, as "lapidity" to this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul. The cause which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in the
Appendix to Part I. But, before I proceed further, I would here remark that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean the faculty, not the desire. I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing. After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general notions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular instances on which they are based, we must inquire whether volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things. We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves. On which subject see the following proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest the idea of pictures should suggest itself. For by ideas I do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought.PROP. XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves.
Corollary.--Will and understanding are one and the same.
Note.--We have thus removed the cause which is commonly assigned for error. For we have shown above, that falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas which are fragmentary and confused. Wherefore, a false idea, inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain, but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause his imagination to waver (see
II. xliv. note). Thus, although the man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say that he is certain. For by certainty we mean something positive (II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and more understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely, tranquillizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid us. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.
2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which are not in our own power, and do not follow from our nature. For it shows us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the eternal decree of God by, the same necessity, as it follows from the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two right angles.
3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to be angry, with any. Further, as it tells us that each should be content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any womanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by the guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as I will show in
Part III. 4. Lastly, this doctrine
confers no small advantage on the commonwealth; for it teaches how citizens
should be governed and led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may
freely do whatsoever things are best.
I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this note, and I
thus bring, the second part of my treatise to a close. I think I have therein
explained the nature and properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and,
considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient clearness. I have
laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many excellent conclusions of the
highest utility and most necessary to be known, as will, in what follows, be
partly made plain.
PART III
ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS.
MOST
writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of
matters outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature's general
laws. They appear to conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom
within a kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows
nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions, and that he
is determined solely by himself. They attribute human infirmities and
fickleness, not to the power of nature in general, but to some mysterious
flaw in the nature of man, which accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise,
or, as usually happens, abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness
of the human mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is
looked upon as a seer. Still there has been no lack of very excellent men
(to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted), who have
written many noteworthy things concerning the right way of life, and have
given much sage advice to mankind. But no one, so far as I know, has defined
the nature and strength of the emotions, and the power of the mind against
them for their restraint. |
D
EFINITIONS.I. By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived. By an inadequate or partial cause, I mean a cause through which, by itself, its effect cannot be understood.
II. I say that we act when anything takes place, either within us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; that is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature something takes place within us or externally to us, which can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something when that something takes place within us, or follows from our nature externally, we being only the partial cause.
III.
By emotion I mean the modifications of the body, whereby the active
power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained, and
also the ideas of such modifications.
N.B. If we can be the adequate cause of any of these modifications, I
then call the emotion an activity, otherwise I call it a passion, or state
wherein the mind is passive.
P
OSTULATES. I.
The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its power of activity is
increased or diminished, and also in other ways which do not render its power of
activity either greater or less.
N.B. This postulate or axiom rests on
II. The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless, retain the impressions or traces of objects (cf.
II. Post. v.), and, consequently, the same images of things (see note II. xvii.).
PROP. II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind determine body to motion or rest or any state different from these, if such there be.
Note.--This
is made more clear by what was said in the
note to II. vii., namely, that mind and
body are one and the same thing, conceived first under the attribute of
thought, secondly, under the attribute of extension. Thus it follows that
the order or concatenation of things is identical, whether nature be
conceived under the one attribute or the other; consequently the order of
states of activity and passivity in our body, is simultaneous in nature with
the order of states of activity and passivity in the mind. The same
conclusion is evident from the manner in which we proved
II. xii. |
PROP. IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this endeavour it is conscious.
Note.--This
endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is called will, when
referred to the mind and body in conjunction it is called appetite;
it is, in fact, nothing else but man's essence, from the nature of which
necessarily follow all those results which tend to its preservation; and
which man has thus been determined to perform. |
PROP. XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind. Note.--Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes, and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes to a state of lesser perfection. These passive states of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain. By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection. By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection. Further, the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call stimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas), the emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy. But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and suffering are attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affected than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are alike affected. What I mean by desire I have explained in the note to Prop. ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no other primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other emotions arise from these three. But, before I go further, I should like here to explain at greater length Prop. x. of this part, in order that we may clearly, understand how one idea is contrary to another. In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the idea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves the existence of body, so long as the body itself exists. Again, it follows from what we pointed out in the Coroll. to II. viii., that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Lastly, we showed (II. xvii. xviii. and note) that the power of the mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends on the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body. Whence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body. Now the cause, why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the mind itself (III. iv.), nor again the fact that the body ceases to exist. For (by II. vi.) the cause, why the mind affirms the existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist; therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but (II. xvii.) this result follows from another idea, which excludes the present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind, and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the essence of our mind. |
PROP. XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the first-named things. Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the mind shrinks from conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of itself and of the body. Note.--From what has been said we may, clearly understand the nature of Love and Hate. Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea, of an external cause: Hate is nothing else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. We further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have, and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred. But I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter. |
PROP. XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain, or desire. Corollary.--Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate it. Note.--Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us; merely, as the phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy. We should refer to the same category those objects, which affect us pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other objects which affect us in the same way. This I will show in the next Prop. I am aware that certain authors, who were the first to introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to signify thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known or manifest qualities. |
PROP. XVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same time we shall love it. Note.--This disposition of the mind, which arises from two contrary emotions, is called vacillation; it stands to the emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination (II. xliv. note); vacillation and doubt do not differ one from the other, except as greater differs from less. But we must bear in mind that I have deduced this vacillation from causes, which give rise through themselves to one of the emotions, and to the other accidentally. I have done this, in order that they might be more easily deduced from what went before; but I do not deny that vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an object, which is the efficient cause of both emotions. The human body is composed (II. Post. i.) of a variety of individual parts of different nature, and may therefore (Ax. i. after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) be affected in a variety of different ways by one and the same body; and contrariwise, as one and the same thing can be affected in many ways, it can also in many different ways affect one and the same part of the body. Hence we can easily conceive, that one and the same object may be the cause of many and conflicting emotions. |
PROP. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing present. Note I.--I call a thing past or future, according as we either have been or shall be affected thereby. For instance, according as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has recreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us, or will harm us. For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its existence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.) the body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way as if the thing were actually present. However, as it generally happens that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so long as they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in doubt about its issue (II. xliv. note); it follows that the emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other things, until men become assured of the issue. Note II.--From what has just been said, we understand what is meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and Disappointment. Hope is nothing else but an inconstant pleasure, arising from the image of something future or past, whereof we do not yet know the issue. Fear, on the other hand, is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something concerning which we are in doubt. If the element of doubt be removed from these emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fear becomes Despair. In other words, Pleasure or Pain arising from the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared. Again, Joy is Pleasure arising from the image of something past whereof we doubted the issue. Disappointment is the Pain opposed to Joy. |
PROP. XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards that thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred towards it.
Note.--Prop.
xxi. explains to us the nature of Pity, which we may define as
pain arising from another's hurt. What term we can use for pleasure
arising from another's gain, I know not. |
PROP. XXIII. He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel pain. Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred. Note.--This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and without any mental conflict. For (as I am about to show in Prop. xxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to himself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like manner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary circumstances. But here we are regarding hatred only. |
PROP. XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If we conceive that he painfully affects the said object, we shall feel love towards him. Note.--These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable to envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's hurt, and to grieve at another's advantage. |
PROP. XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and, contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably. Note.--Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and, contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. This feeling is called pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to conceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines his own power of action. Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself. Again, the pleasure which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called over-esteem. Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man is called disdain. |
PROP. XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion, to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion (affectus). Note I.--This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to pain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we conceive that others have the like desire. Corollary I.--If we conceive that anyone, whom we have hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him. If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him. Corollary II.--We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because its misery affects us painfully. Corollary III.--We seek to free from misery, as far as we can, a thing which we pity. Note II.--This will or appetite for doing good, which arises from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is called benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from compassion. Concerning love or hate towards him who has done good or harm to something, which we conceive to be like ourselves, see III. xxii. note.
|
PROP. XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men* to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from. Note.--This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely in order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other cases it is generally called kindliness. Furthermore I give the name of praise to the pleasure, with which we conceive the action of another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us; but of blame to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action. * N.B. By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men whom we regard without any particular emotion. [Spinoza] |
PROP. XXX. If anyone has done something which he conceives as affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he will regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain. Note.--As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain in question will be a species of love and hatred. But, as the terms love and hatred are used in reference to external objects, we will employ other names for the emotions now under discussion: pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause we will style Honour, and the emotion contrary thereto we will style Shame: I mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man's belief, that he is being praised or blamed: otherwise pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause is called self-complacency, and its contrary pain is called repentance. Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Coroll.) that the pleasure, wherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may exist solely in his own imagination, and as (III. xxv.) everyone endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives will affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all, when in reality he may be an annoyance to all. |
PROP. XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love, &c. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from something that we love, we shall undergo vacillation of soul. Corollary.--From the foregoing, and also from III. xxviii. it follows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to cause others to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself hates: as the poet says: "As lovers let us share every hope and every fear: ironhearted were he who should love what the other leaves." [Ovid, Amores, II. xix. 4, 5.] Note.--This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes and dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really ambition (see III. xxix. note); wherefore we see that everyone by nature desires (appetere), that the rest of mankind should live according to his own individual disposition: when such a desire is equally present in all, everyone stands in everyone else's way, and in wishing to be loved or praised by all, all become mutually hateful. |
PROP. XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour to bring it about that the man in question shall not gain possession thereof. Note.--We thus see that man's nature is generally so constituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his own love for the goods in their possession. Further, we see that from the same property of human nature, whence it follows that men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and ambitious. Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shall find that she entirely confirms what we have said; more especially if we turn our attention to the first years of our life. We find that children, whose body is continually, as it were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others laughing or crying; moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate whatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves whatever they conceive as delighting others: inasmuch as the images of things are, as we have said, modifications of the human body, or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by external causes to act in this or that manner. |
PROP. XXXV. If anyone conceives, that an object of his love joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards the loved object and with envy towards his rival.
Note.--This
hatred towards an object of love joined with envy is called Jealousy,
which accordingly is nothing else but a wavering of the disposition arising
from combined love and hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is
envied. Further, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater, in
proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont to derive
from the reciprocated love of the said object; and also in proportion to the
feelings he had previously entertained towards his rival. If he had hated
him, he will forthwith hate the object of his love, because he conceives it
is pleasurably affected by one whom he himself hates: and also because he is
compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image of him whom
he hates. This condition generally comes into play in the case of love for a
woman: for he who thinks, that a woman whom he loves prostitutes herself to
another, will feel pain, not only, because his own desire is restrained, but
also because, being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with
the parts of shame and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks from
her. |
PROP. XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the same law, seek to benefit him. Note.--By good I here mean every kind of pleasure, and all that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our longings, whatsoever they may be. By evil, I mean every, kind of pain, especially that which frustrates our longings. For I have shown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because we deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because we desire it: consequently we deem evil that which we shrink from; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions, judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better, what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst. Thus a miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of money the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as glory, and fears nothing so much as shame. To an envious man nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing more painful than another's success. So every man, according to his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or useless. The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is called timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as future by encountering a lesser evil (III. xxviii.). But if the evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness. Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose, fear becomes consternation, especially if both the evils feared be very great. |
PROP. XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate that other in return. Note.--He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred will (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame; but this case (III. xxv.) rarely happens. This reciprocation of hatred may also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to injure the object of our hate (III. xxxix.). He therefore who conceives that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause of some evil or pain; thus he will be affected with pain or fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause; in other words, he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy, as I said above. Corollary I.--He who conceives, that one whom he loves hates him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. For, in so far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is determined to hate his enemy in return. But, by the hypothesis, he nevertheless loves him: wherefore he will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. Corollary II.--If a man conceives that one, whom he has hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in kind. |
PROP. XLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love that other in return. (Cf. III. xv. Coroll., and III. xvi.) Note.--If he believes that he has given just cause for the love, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note); this is what most often happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its contrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated by another. (See note to preceding proposition.) This reciprocal love, and consequently the desire of benefiting him who loves us (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to benefit us, is called gratitude or thankfulness. It thus appears that men are much more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits. Corollary.--He who imagines, that he is loved by one whom he hates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. This is proved in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding proposition. Note.--If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will endeavour to injure him who loves him; this emotion is called cruelty, especially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary cause for hatred. |
PROP. XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes into love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not preceded it. Note.--Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate anything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying this greater pleasure; that is, no one will desire that he should be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor long to be ill for the sake of getting well. For everyone will always endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as far as he can. If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a man should desire to hate someone, in order that he might love him the more thereafter, he will always desire to hate him. For the strength of the love is in proportion to the strength of the hatred, wherefore the man would desire, that the hatred be continually increased more and more, and, for a similar reason, he would desire to become more and more ill, in order that he might take a greater pleasure in being restored to health: in such a case he would always endeavour to be ill, which (III. vi.) is absurd. |
PROP. XLVI. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or nation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation whereto he belongs. PROP. XLVII. Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is destroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by a certain pain in us. Note.--This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary to II. xvii. Whenever we remember anything, even if it does not actually exist, we regard it only as present, and the body is affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far as the remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined to regard it with pain; this determination, while the image of the thing in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance of other things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not destroyed: hence a man only feels pleasure in so far as the said determination is checked: for this reason the joy arising from the injury done to what we hate is repeated, every time we remember that object of hatred. For, as we have said, when the image of the thing in question is aroused, inasmuch as it involves the thing's existence, it determines the man to regard the thing with the same pain as he was wont to do, when it actually did exist. However, since he has joined to the image of the thing other images, which exclude its existence, this determination to pain is forthwith checked, and the man rejoices afresh as often as the repetition takes place. This is the cause of men's pleasure in recalling past evils, and delight in narrating dangers from which they have escaped. For when men conceive a danger, they conceive it as still future, and are determined to fear it; this determination is checked afresh by the idea of freedom, which became associated with the idea of the danger when they escaped therefrom: this renders them secure afresh: therefore they rejoice afresh. |
PROP. XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity. Note.--Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves to be free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards anything else: to this consideration we must add the imitation of emotions treated of in III. xxvii. xxxiv. xl. and xliii. |
PROP. L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or fear. Note.--Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or fear are called good or evil omens. Now, in so far as such omens are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions of hope and fear given in IIII. xviii. note) the causes also of pleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them with love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as means towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles, or causes of that which we fear. It follows, further, from III. xxv., that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily in that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which we fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above or below their true value. Hence there have arisen superstitions, whereby men are everywhere assailed. However, I do not think it worth while to point out here the vacillations springing from hope and fear; it follows from the definition of these emotions, that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear without hope, as I will duly explain in the proper place. Further, in so far as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love or hatred; thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we have said concerning love and hatred. |
PROP. LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same object, and the same man may be differently affected at different times by the same object.
Note.--We
thus see that it is possible, that what one man loves another may hate, and
that what one man fears another may not fear; or, again, that one and the
same man may love what he once hated, or may be bold where he once was
timid, and so on. Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what
is good, what bad, what better, and what worse (III.
xxxix. note), it follows that men's judgments may vary no less
than their emotions,* hence when we compare some with others, we distinguish
them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and style some intrepid,
others timid, others by some other epithet. For instance, I shall call a man
intrepid, if he despises an evil which I am accustomed to fear; if I
further take into consideration, that, in his desire to injure his enemies
and to benefit those whom he loves, he is not restrained by the fear of an
evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call him daring.
Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears an evil which I am
accustomed to despise; and if I further take into consideration that his
desire is restrained by the fear of an evil, which is not sufficient to
restrain me, I shall say that he is cowardly; and in like manner will
everyone pass judgment. * This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine intellect, as I have shown II. xiii. note. [Spinoza] |
PROP. LII. An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction with others, and which we do not conceive to have any property that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so long, as an object which we conceive to have some property peculiar to itself.
Note.--This
mental modification, or imagination of a particular thing, in so far as it
is alone in the mind, is called Wonder; but if it be excited by an
object of fear, it is called Consternation, because wonder at an evil
keeps a man so engrossed in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no
power to think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil. If,
however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, industry, or anything of
that sort, inasmuch as the said man is thereby regarded as far surpassing
ourselves, wonder is called Veneration; otherwise, if a man's anger,
envy, &c., be what we wonder at, the emotion is called Horror. Again,
if it be the prudence, industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we
wonder at, our love will on this account be the greater (III.
xii.), and when joined to wonder or veneration is called
Devotion. We may in like manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and
the other emotions, as associated with wonder; and we should thus be able to
deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in ordinary
speech. Whence it is evident, that the names of the emotions have been
applied in accordance rather with their ordinary manifestations than with an
accurate knowledge of their nature. |
PROP. LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels pain thereat. Corollary.--This pain is more and more fostered, if a man conceives that he is blamed by others; this may be proved in the same way as the corollary to III. liii.
Note.--This
pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness, is called humility;
the pleasure, which springs from the contemplation of ourselves, is called
self-love or self-complacency. And inasmuch as this feeling is
renewed as often as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power of
activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own exploits,
and displaying the force both of his body and mind, and also that, for this
reason, men are troublesome one to another. Again, it follows that men are
naturally envious (III.
xxiv. note, and
III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the
shortcomings of their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues. For
whenever a man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure (III.
liii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and
he conceives them more distinctly--that is (III.
xl. note), in proportion as he can distinguish them from others,
and regard them as something special. Therefore, a man will take most
pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some quality which
he denies to others. But, if that which he affirms of himself be
attributable to the idea of man or animals in general, he will not be so
greatly pleased: he will, on the contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that
his own actions fall short when compared with those of others. This pain (III.
xxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrong
construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he can,
embellishing his own. Corollary.--No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his equal. Note.--When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii., we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude, &c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore, no more envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions for being courageous. |
PROP. LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected. Note.--Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last proposition, must be very, numerous, the chief are luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition, being merely species of love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions in a manner varying according to the object, with which they are concerned. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition, &c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking, venery, riches, and fame. Furthermore, these emotions, in so far as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries. For temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive states, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the last-named emotions. However, I cannot here explain the remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are as numerous as the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary. It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to determine the strength of the emotions, and the mind's power over them, to have a general definition of each emotion. It is sufficient, I repeat, to understand the general properties of the emotions and the mind, to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the mind's power in moderating and checking the emotions. Thus, though there is a great difference between various emotions of love, hatred, or desire, for instance between love felt towards children, and love felt towards a wife, there is no need for us to take cognizance of such differences, or to track out further the nature and origin of the emotions. |
PROP. LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of the one individual differs from the essence of the other. Note.--Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals which are called irrational (for after learning the origin of mind we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's emotions, to the extent that brute nature differs from human nature. Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of procreation; but the desire of the former is equine, the desire of the latter is human. So also the lusts and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to the several natures. Thus, although each individual lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the essence of another. Lastly, it follows from the foregoing proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a philosopher, as I just mention here by the way. Thus far I have treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he is passive. It remains to add a few words on those attributable to him in so far as he is active. |
PROP. LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active. |
DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS. I. Desire
is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived, as determined to
a particular activity by some given modification of itself.
II. Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection.
III. Pain
is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection.
IV. Wonder
is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein the mind comes to
a stand, because the particular concept in question has no connection with
other concepts (cf.
III. lii. and
note).
V. Contempt
is the conception of anything which touches the mind so little, that its
presence leads the mind to imagine those qualities which are not in it
rather than such as are in it (cf.
III. lii. note).
VI. Love
is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
VII. Hatred
is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
VIII. Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.
IX. Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).
X. Devotion
is love towards one whom we admire.
XI. Derision
is pleasure arising from our conceiving the presence of a quality, which we
despise, in an object which we hate.
XII. Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue.
XIII. Fear
is an inconstant pain arising from the idea, of something past or future,
whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue (cf.
III. xviii. note).
XIV. Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
XV. Despair
is pain arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all
cause of doubt has been removed.
XVI. Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue beyond our hope.
XVII. Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.
XVIII. Pity
is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has befallen someone else
whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf.
III. xxii. note, and
III. xxvii. note).
XIX. Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.
XX. Indignation
is hatred towards one who has done evil to another.
XXI. Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the love we bear him.
XXII. Disparagement
is thinking too meanly of anyone, because we hate him.
XXIII. Envy
is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be pained by another's good
fortune, and to rejoice in another's evil fortune.
XXIV. Sympathy
(misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a man to feel
pleasure at another's good fortune, and pain at another's evil fortune.
XXV. Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action.
XXVI. Humility
is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own weakness of body or
mind.
XXVII. Repentance
is pain accompanied by the idea of some action, which we believe we have
performed by the free decision of our mind.
XXVIII. Pride
is thinking too highly of one's self from self-love.
XXIX. Self-abasement
is thinking too meanly of one's self by reason of pain.
XXX. Honour (gloria) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.
XXXI. Shame
is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe
to be blamed by others.
XXXII. Regret
is the desire or appetite to possess something, kept alive by the
remembrance of the said thing, and at the same time constrained by the
remembrance of other things which exclude the existence of it.
XXXIII. Emulation
is the desire of something, engendered in us by our conception that others
have the same desire.
XXXIV. Thankfulness or Gratitude is the desire or zeal springing from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us. Cf. III. xxxix. note and xl.
XXXV. Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity. Cf. III. xxvii. note.
XXXVI. Anger is the desire, whereby through hatred we are induced to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix.
XXXVII. Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has injured us. (See III. xl. Coroll. ii. and note.)
XXXVIII. Cruelty
or savageness is the desire, whereby a man is impelled to injure one
whom we love or pity.
XXXIX. Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we dread, by undergoing a lesser evil. Cf. III. xxxix, note.
XL. Daring is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.
XLI. Cowardice
is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by the fear of some danger
which his equals dare to encounter.
XLII. Consternation
is attributed to one, whose desire of avoiding evil is checked by amazement
at the evil which he fears.
XLIII. Courtesy or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is the desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining from that which should displease them.
XLIV. Ambition
is the immoderate desire of power.
XLV. Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of living sumptuously.
XLVI. Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking.
XLVII. Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.
XLVIII. Lust is desire and love in the
matter of sexual intercourse.
GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS. Emotion, which
is called a passivity of the soul is a confused idea, whereby the mind
affirms concerning its body, or any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi
vis) greater or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind
is determined to think of one thing rather than another. |
PROP. LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or pain.
Note.--All
actions following from emotion, which are attributable to the mind in virtue
of its understanding, I set down to strength of character (fortitudo),
which I divide into courage (animositas) and highmindedness
(generositas). By courage I mean the desire whereby every
man strives to preserve his own being in accordance solely with the dictates
of reason. By highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every
man endeavours, solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to
unite them to himself in friendship. Those actions, therefore, which
have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to courage, those
which aim at the good of others I set down to highmindedness. Thus
temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind in danger, &c., are varieties of
courage; courtesy, mercy, &c., are varieties of highmindedness. |
GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS.
Emotion,
which is called a passivity of the soul is a confused idea, whereby the mind
affirms concerning its body, or any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi
vis) greater or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is
determined to think of one thing rather than another.
Explanation.--I say, first, that emotion or passion of the soul is
a confused idea. For we have shown that the mind is only passive, in so far
as it has inadequate or confused ideas. (III.
iii.) I say, further, whereby the mind affirms concerning
its body or any part thereof a force for existence greater than before. For
all the ideas of bodies, which we possess, denote rather the actual disposition
of our own body (II.
xvi. Coroll. ii.) than the nature of an external body. But the
idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the
disposition of the body, or of some part thereof, which is possessed by the
body, or some part thereof, because its power of action or force for existence
is increased or diminished, helped or hindered. But it must be noted that, when
I say a greater or less force for existence than before, I do not mean
that the mind compares the present with the past disposition of the body, but
that the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion affirms something of
the body, which, in fact, involves more or less of reality than before.
And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact (II.
xi.,
xiii.), that it
affirms the actual existence of its own body, and inasmuch as we understand by
perfection the very essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to
greater or less perfection, when it happens to affirm concerning its own body,
or any part thereof, something involving more or less reality than before.
When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind is increased or
diminished, I merely meant that the mind had formed of its own body, or of some
part thereof, an idea involving more or less of reality, than it had already
affirmed concerning its own body. For the excellence of ideas, and the actual
power of thinking are measured by the excellence of the object. Lastly, I have
added by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing
rather than another, so that, besides the nature of pleasure and pain, which
the first part of the definition explains, I might also express the nature of
desire.
PART IV
OF HUMAN BONDAGE OR THE STRENGTH OF THE EMOTIONS.
P
REFACE.HUMAN infirmity in moderating
and checking the emotions I name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his
emotions, he is not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much
so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better for him, to
follow that which is worse. Why this is so, and what is good or evil in the
emotions, I propose to show in this part of my treatise. But, before I begin, it
would be well to make a few prefatory observations on perfection and
imperfection, good and evil.
When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has brought it to
perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect, not only by himself, but by
everyone who rightly knows, or thinks that he knows, the intention and aim of
its author. For instance, suppose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not
yet completed), and knows that the aim of the author of that work is to build a
house, he will call the work imperfect; he will, on the other hand, call it
perfect, as soon as he sees that it is carried through to the end, which its
author had purposed for it. But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has
never seen before, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he
plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect. Such seems to be
the primary meaning of these terms.
But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out types of houses,
buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain types to others, it came about,
that each man called perfect that which he saw agree with the general idea he
had formed of the thing in question, and called imperfect that which he saw
agree less with his own preconceived type, even though it had evidently been
completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer. This seems to be the
only reason for calling natural phenomena, which, indeed, are not made with
human hands, perfect or imperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of
things natural, no less than of things artificial, and such ideas they hold as
types, believing that Nature (who they think does nothing without an object) has
them in view, and has set them as types before herself. Therefore, when they
behold something in Nature, which does not wholly conform to the preconceived
type which they have formed of the thing in question, they say that Nature has
fallen short or has blundered, and has left her work incomplete. Thus we see
that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect or imperfect rather from
their own prejudices, than from true knowledge of what they pronounce upon.
Now we showed in the
DEFINITIONS.
I. By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us.
II.
By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in
the attainment of any good.
(Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the end.)
III. Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while regarding their essence only, we find nothing therein, which necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.
IV.
Particular things I call possible in so far as, while regarding the
causes whereby they must be produced, we know not, whether such causes be
determined for producing them.
(In
I. xxxiii. note i., I drew no distinction
between possible and contingent, because there was in that place no need to
distinguish them accurately.)
V. By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in different directions, though they are of the same kind, such as luxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and are contraries, not by nature, but by accident.
VI. What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future, present, and past, I explained in
III. xviii., notes i. and ii., which see.VII. By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a desire.
VIII. By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that is (
III. vii.), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a man's nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.AXIOM.
There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is not another more powerful and strong. Whatsoever thing be given, there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.
PROP. I. No positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being true.
Note.--This proposition is more clearly understood from
II. xvi. Coroll. ii. For imagination is an idea, which indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external body; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly; whence it comes to pass, that the mind is said to err. For instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it is distant from us about two hundred feet; in this judgment we err, so long as we are in ignorance of its true distance; when its true distance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination; or, in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explains the nature of that luminary, in so far as the body is affected thereby: wherefore, though we know the real distance, we shall still nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us. For, as we said in II. xxxv. note, we do not imagine the sun to be so near us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the body is affected thereby. Thus, when the rays of the sun falling on the surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine the sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of its real position; and similarly other imaginations, wherein the mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition of the body, or that its power of activity is increased or diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at its presence. It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an evil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the contrary also happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will certainly come, and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings; thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth, in virtue of its being true, but because other imaginations, stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the present existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II. xvii.
PROP. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive the cause to be with us. Note.--When I said above in III. xviii. that we are affected by the image of what is past or future with the same emotion as if the thing conceived were present, I expressly stated, that this is only true in so far as we look solely to the image of the thing in question itself; for the thing's nature is unchanged, whether we have conceived it or not; I did not deny that the image becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us other things which exclude the present existence of the future object: I did not expressly call attention to the fact, because I purposed to treat of the strength of the emotions in this part of my work. Corollary.--The image of something past or future, that, is, of a thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time future, to the exclusion of time present, is, when other conditions are equal, weaker than the image of something present; consequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future is less intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion felt towards something present. |
PROP. XVII. Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire for things that are present. Note.--I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved by opinion more readily than by, true reason, why it is that the true knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul, and often yields to every kind of passion. This state of things gave rise to the exclamation of the poet:-- "The better path I
gaze at and approve, Ecclesiastes seems to have had
the same thought in his mind, when he says, "He who increaseth knowledge
increaseth sorrow." I have not written the above with the object of drawing
the conclusion, that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or that a
wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his emotions, but because it
is necessary to know the power and the infirmity of our nature, before we
can determine what reason can do in restraining the emotions, and what is
beyond her power. I have said, that in the present part I shall merely treat
of human infirmity. The power of reason over the emotions I have settled to
treat separately. |
PROP. XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is, other conditions being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain.
Note.--In these few remarks I have explained the causes of human
infirmity and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide by the precepts of
reason. It now remains for me to show what course is marked out for us by
reason, which of the emotions are in harmony with the rules of human reason,
and which of them are contrary thereto. But, before I begin to prove my
propositions in detailed geometrical fashion, it is advisable to sketch them
briefly in advance, so that everyone may more readily grasp my meaning. |
PROP. XX. The more every man endeavours, and is able to seek what is useful to him--in other words, to preserve his own being--the more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, in proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power. Note.--No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or preserving his own being, unless he be overcome by causes external and foreign to his nature. No one, I say, from the necessity of his own nature, or otherwise than under compulsion from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills himself: which latter may be done in a variety of ways. A man, for instance, kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists round his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a sword, and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart; or, again, he may be compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant's command, to open his own veins--that is, to escape a greater evil by incurring a lesser; or, lastly, latent external causes may so disorder his imagination, and so affect his body, that it may assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof the idea cannot exist in the mind (III. x.) But that a man, from the necessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become non-existent, is as impossible as that something should be made out of nothing, as everyone will see for himself, after a little reflection. |
PROP. XXXII. In so far as men are a prey to passion, they cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony. Note.--This is also self-evident; for, if we say that white and black only agree in the fact that neither is red, we absolutely affirm that they do not agree in any respect. So, if we say, that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that both are finite--wanting in power, not existing by the necessity of their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causes--we should certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in no respect alike; therefore, things which agree only in negation, or in qualities which neither possess, really agree in no respect.
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PROP. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are passions, they can be contrary one to another. Note.--I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives that Peter possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from this it seems, at first sight, to follow, that these two men, through both loving the same thing, and, consequently, through agreement of their respective natures, stand in one another's way; if this were so, Props. xxx. and xxxi. of this Part would be untrue. But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we shall see that the discrepancy vanishes. For the two men are not in one another's way in virtue of the agreement of their natures, that is, through both loving the same thing, but in virtue of one differing from the other. For, in so far as each loves the same thing, the love of each is fostered thereby (III. xxxi.), that is (Def . of Emotions, vii.) the pleasure of each is fostered thereby. Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are at variance through both loving the same thing, and through the agreement in their natures. The cause for their opposition lies, as I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to differ. For we assume that Peter has the idea of the loved object as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea of the loved object as lost. Hence the one man will be affected with pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus they will be at variance one with another. We can easily show in like manner, that all other causes of hatred depend solely on differences, and not on the agreement between in men's natures. |
PROP. XXXV. In so far only as men live in obedience to reason, do they always necessarily agree in nature. Corollary I.--There is no individual thing in nature, which is more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. For that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony with his nature (IV. xxxi. Coroll); that is, obviously, man. But man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature, when he lives in obedience to reason (III. Def. ii.), and to this extent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of another man (by the last Prop.); wherefore among individual things nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. Q.E.D. Corollary II.--As every man seeks most that which is useful to him, so are men most useful one to another. For the more a man seeks what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself, the more is he endowed with virtue ( IV. xx.), or, what is the same thing (IV. Def. viii.), the more is he endowed with power to act according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live in obedience to reason. But men are most in natural harmony, when they live in obedience to reason (by the last Prop.); therefore (by the foregoing Coroll.) men will be most useful one to another, when each seeks most that which is useful to him. Q.E.D.Note.--What we have just shown is attested by experience so conspicuously, that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone: "Man is to man a God." Yet it rarely happens that men live in obedience to reason, for things are so ordered among them, that they are generally envious and troublesome one to another. Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, so that the definition of man as a social animal has met with general assent; in fact, men do derive from social life much more convenience than injury. Let satirists then laugh their fill at human affairs, let theologians rail, and let misanthropes praise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity, let them heap contempt on men and praises on beasts; when all is said, they will find that men can provide for their wants much more easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can they escape from the dangers that on every side beset them: not to say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is, to study the actions of men than the actions of beasts. But I will treat of this more at length elsewhere.
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PROP. XXXVI. The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein. Note.--Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of those who follow after virtue were not common to all? Would it not then follow, as above (IV. xxxiv.), that men living in obedience to reason, that is (IV. xxxv.), men in so far as they agree in nature, would be at variance one with another? To such an inquiry I make answer, that it follows not accidentally but from the very nature of reason, that man's highest good is common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of man, in so far as defined by reason; and that a man could neither be, nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure in this highest good. For it belongs to the essence of the human mind (II. xlvii.), to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. |
PROP. XXXVII. The good which every man, who follows after virtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men, and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge of God.
Note I.--He who, guided by emotion
only endeavours to cause others to love what he loves himself, and to make
the rest of the world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by
impulse, and is, therefore, hateful, especially to those who take delight in
something different, and accordingly study and, by similar impulse,
endeavour, to make men live in accordance with what pleases themselves.
Again, as the highest good sought by men under the guidance of emotion is
often such, that it can only be possessed by a single individual, it follows
that those who love it are not consistent in their intentions, but, while
they delight to sing its praises, fear to be believed. But he, who
endeavours to lead men by reason, does not act by impulse but courteously
and kindly, and his intention is always consistent. Again, whatsoever we
desire and do, whereof we are the cause in so far as we possess the idea of
God, or know God, I set down to Religion. The desire of well-doing,
which is engendered by, a life according to reason, I call piety.
Further, the desire, whereby a man living according to reason is bound to
associate others with himself in friendship, I call honour [Honestas];
by honourable I mean that which is praised by men living according to
reason, and by base I mean that which is repugnant to the gaining of
friendship. I have also shown in addition what are the foundations of a
state; and the difference between true virtue and infirmity may be readily
gathered from what I have said; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but
living in accordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else but man's
allowing himself to be led by things which are external to himself, and to
be by them determined to act in a manner demanded by the general disposition
of things rather than by his own nature considered solely in itself. Note II.--In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain praise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. xxix. note: the time has now come to treat of the remaining terms. But I must first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature and in society. Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and, consequently, by sovereign natural right performs those actions which follow from the necessity of his own nature; therefore by sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is bad, takes care of his own advantage according to his own disposition (IV. xix. and xx.), avenges the wrongs done to him (III. xl. Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which he loves and to destroy that which he hates (III. xxviii.). Now, if men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain in possession of this his right, without any injury, being done to his neighbour (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.). But seeing that they are a prey to their emotions, which far surpass human power or virtue (IV. vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and being at variance one with another (IV. xxxiii. xxxiv.), stand in need of mutual help (IV. xxxv. note). Wherefore, in order that men may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is necessary that they should forego their natural right, and, for the sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injure their fellow-men. The way in which this end can be attained, so that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV. iv. Corll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV. vii. and III. xxxix. It is there shown, that an emotion can only be restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to itself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of incurring a greater injury themselves. On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps in its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging injury, and pronouncing on good and evil; and provided it also possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in restraining emotion, but by threats (IV. xvii. note). Such a society established with laws and the power of preserving itself is called a State, while those who live under its protection are called citizens. We may readily understand that there is in the state of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced good or bad; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself. In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it can only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on by common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State authority. Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is therefore punished by the right of the State only. Obedience, on the other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages which a State provides. Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent master of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be said to belong to one man rather than another: all things are common to all. Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no wish to render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of that which belongs to him; in other words, there is nothing in the state of nature answering to justice and injustice. Such ideas are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common consent what belongs to one man and what to another. From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes which display the nature of the mind. But I have said enough. |
PROP. XXXIX. Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body mutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes a change in such proportion is bad. Note.--The extent to which such causes can injure or be of service to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part. But I would here remark that I consider that a body undergoes death, when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually among its several parts is changed. For I do not venture to deny that a human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally different from its own. There is no reason, which compels me to maintain that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse; nay, experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion. It sometimes happens, that a man undergoes such changes, that I should hardly call him the same. As I have heard tell of a certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, and though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his past life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he had written to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for a grown-up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue. If this instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he can only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy of other men. However, I prefer to leave such questions undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for raising new issues. |
PROP. XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive. Note.--Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived more easily than it can be observed. For the emotions, whereby we are daily assailed, are generally referred to some part of the body which is affected more than the rest; hence the emotions are generally excessive, and so fix the mind in the contemplation of one object, that it is unable to think of others; and although men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions--and very few are found who are always assailed by one and the same--yet there are cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately fixed. We sometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that, although it be not present, they think they have it before them; when this is the case with a man who is not asleep, we say he is delirious or mad; nor are those persons who are inflamed with love, and who dream all night and all day about nothing but their mistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for they are made objects of ridicule. But when a miser thinks of nothing but gain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but glory, they are not reckoned to be mad, because they are generally harmful, and are thought worthy of being hated. But, in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, &c., are species of madness, though they may not be reckoned among diseases. |
PROP. XLV. Hatred can never be good. Corollary I.--Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and other emotions attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are bad; this is evident from III. xxxix. and IV. xxxvii. Corollary II.--Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is base, and in a State unjust. This also is evident from III. xxxix., and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in IV. xxxvii. note.Note.--Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to be bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference. For laughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleasure; therefore, so long as it be not excessive, it is in itself good (IV. xli.). Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim and gloomy superstition. For why is it more lawful to satiate one's hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason, and have convinced myself as follows: No deity, nor anyone else, save the envious, takes Pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort, nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like, which are signs of infirmity of spirit; on the contrary, the greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the perfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more must we necessarily partake of the divine nature. Therefore, to make use of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible (not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is the part of a wise man. I say it is the part of a wise man to refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres, and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to his neighbour. For the human body is composed of very numerous parts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need of fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from the necessity of its own nature; and, consequently, so that the mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things simultaneously. This way of life, then, agrees best with our principles, and also with general practice; therefore, if there be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is the best, and in every way to be commended. There is no need for me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail. |
PROP. XLVI. He, who lives under the guidance of reason, endeavours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness, for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, &c., towards him. Note.--He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is assuredly wretched. But he, who strives to conquer hatred with love, fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands many as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune's aid. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but through increase in their powers; all these consequences follow so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding, that I have no need to prove them in detail. |
PROP. XLVII. Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in, themselves good. Note.--We may add, that these emotions show defective knowledge and an absence of power in the mind; for the same reason confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are signs of a want of mental power. For although confidence and joy are pleasurable emotions, they nevertheless imply a preceding pain, namely, hope and fear. Wherefore the more we endeavour to be guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour to free ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate fortune, directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom. |
PROP. L. Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason, is in itself bad and useless. Note.--He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor will he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of human virtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to rejoice. We may add, that he, who is easily touched with compassion, and is moved by another's sorrow or tears, often does something which he afterwards regrets; partly because we can never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partly because we are easily deceived by false tears. I am in this place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of reason. He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by compassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for (III. xxvii.) he seems unlike a man. |
PROP. LI. Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree therewith and arise therefrom. Another Proof.--He, who lives under the guidance of reason, desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV. xxxvii.); wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow his own endeavour to do good is aided; in other words, he will feel pleasure (III. xi. note) accompanied by the idea of the benefactor. Therefore he approves of him. Q.E.D. Note.--Indignation as we defined it ( Def. of the Emotions, xx.) is necessarily evil (IV. xlv.); we may, however, remark that, when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace punishes a citizen who has injured another, it should not be said to be indignant with the criminal, for it is not incited by hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense of duty to punish him.
PROP. LII. Self-approval may arise from reason, and that which arises from reason is the highest possible. Note.--Self-approval is in reality the highest object for which we can hope. For (as we showed in IV. xxv.) no one endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior object, and, as this approval is more and more fostered and strengthened by praise (III. liii. Coroll.), and on the contrary (III. lv. Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life under disgrace is almost unendurable. |
PROP. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm. Note.--As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these two emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and Fear, bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had better sin in that direction. For, if all men who are a prey to emotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing, and would fear nothing; how then could they be joined and linked together in bonds of union? The crowd plays the tyrant, when it is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence. Indeed those who are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than others to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to become free and to enjoy the life of the blessed. |
PROP. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit. Corollary.--Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions. Note.--Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride; for the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a painful emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful (IV. xviii.). |
PROP. LVII. The proud man delights in the company of flatterers and parasites, but hates the company of the high-minded.
Note.--It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the evil
results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a prey to all the emotions,
though to none of them less than to love and pity. I cannot, however, pass
over in silence the fact, that a man may be called proud from his
underestimation of other people; and, therefore, pride in this sense may be
defined as pleasure arising from the false opinion, whereby a man may
consider himself superior to his fellows. The dejection, which is the
opposite quality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising from
the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior to his fellows.
Such being the case, we can easily see that a, proud man is necessarily
envious (III.
xli. note), and only takes pleasure in the
company, who fool his weak mind to the top of his bent, and make him insane
instead of merely foolish. |
PROP. LVIII. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may arise therefrom.
Note.--Empty honour, as it is styled, is self-approval, fostered
only by the good opinion of the populace; when this good opinion ceases
there ceases also the self-approval, in other words, the highest object of
each man's love (IV.
lii. note); consequently, he whose honour is
rooted in popular approval must, day by day, anxiously strive, act, and
scheme in order to retain his reputation. For the populace is variable and
inconstant, so that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers
away. Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and readily
represses the fame of others. The object of the strife being estimated as
the greatest of all goods, each combatant is seized with a fierce desire to
put down his rivals in every possible way, till he who at last comes out
victorious is more proud of having done harm to others than of having done
good to himself. This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being nothing.
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PROP. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive, we can be determined without emotion by reason. Note.--An example will put this point in a clearer light. The action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body. If, then, a man, moved by anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm, this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one and the same action can be associated with various mental images of things; therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and distinct ideas. Hence it is evident that every desire which springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become useless, if men could be guided by reason. Let us now see why desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is called by us blind.
PROP. LX. Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is not attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts thereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole. Note.--As pleasure is generally (IV. xliv. note) attributed to one part of the body, we generally desire to preserve our being without taking into consideration our health as a whole: to which it may be added, that the desires which have most hold over us (IV. ix.) take account of the present and not of the future.
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PROP. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the dictates of reason, it is a affected equally, whether the idea be of a thing future, past, or present. Note.--If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present; and the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it conceived as future; consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of evil in the future, as we shall presently show. However, we can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (II. xxxi.); and the periods of their existence (II. xliv. note) we can only determine by imagination, which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the present. Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order of things and the connection of causes, with a view to determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather imaginary than real. Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the present time. (Cf. IV. xvi.)
PROP. LXIII. He who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason. Note.--Superstitious persons, who know better how to rail at vice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by reason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow-men. Corollary.--Under desire which springs from reason, we seek good directly, and shun evil indirectly. Note.--This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick and a healthy man. The sick man through fear of death eats what he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takes pleasure in his food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out of life, than if he were in fear of death, and desired directly to avoid it. So a judge, who condemns a criminal to death, not from hatred or anger but from love of the public well-being, is guided solely by reason. |
PROP. LXVI. We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, and we may seek- a lesser evil in the present in preference to a greater evil in the future. Corollary.--We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present, because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future. This Corollary is related to the foregoing Proposition as the Corollary to IV. lxv. is related to the said IV. lxv. Note.--If these statements be compared with what we have pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part up to Prop. xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a man, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is led by reason. The former, whether he will or no, performs actions whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master and only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importance in life, and therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call the former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few observations. |
PROP. LXVIII. If men were born free, they would, so long as they remained free, form no conception of good and evil.
Note.--It is evident, from
IV. iv., that the hypothesis of this Proposition
is false and inconceivable, except in so far as we look solely to the nature
of man, or rather to God; not in so far as the latter is infinite, but only
in so far as he is the cause of man's existence.
PROP. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great, when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them. Corollary.--The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat. Note.--What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby, I explained in ( III. lix. note). By danger I mean everything, which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord, &c.
PROP. LXX. The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them. Note.--I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant, yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human aid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is often necessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repay such favours in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution in declining favours, lest we should have the appearance of despising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it. Thus, in declining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility and courtesy.
PROP. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to another. Note.--The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire have for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement, rather than pure goodwill. Moreover, ingratitude is not an emotion. Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, &c. He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits, is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by the gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal his thefts, or by any similar persons. Contrariwise, such an one shows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be corrupted, to his own or the general hurt. |
PROP. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in solitude, where he is independent. Note.--These and similar observations, which we have made on man's true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note). I do not think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of strength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud. These propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and religion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii. and xlvi.; namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself. We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV. l., and in other places; namely, that the strong man has ever first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious, horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe. Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar emotions, which I have mentioned above. Thus he endeavours, as we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on his way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of attaining to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in the following Part. |
A PPENDIX.W HAT I have said in this Part concerning the right way of life has not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view, but has been set forth piece-meal, according as I thought each Proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it. I propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them under leading heads.I. All our endeavours or desires so follow from the necessity of our nature, that they can be understood either through it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our being a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceived through itself without other individuals. II. Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner, that they can be understood through it alone, are those which are referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined not by the power of man, but by the us: wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter passions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter, on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge. III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by man's power or reason, are always good. The rest may be either good or bad. IV. Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone man's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God's attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of his nature. Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, the ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his intelligence. V. Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational life: and things are only good, in so far as they aid man in his enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by intelligence. Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man's perfecting of his reason, and capability to enjoy the rational life, are alone called evil. VI. As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are necessarily good, no evil can befall man except through external causes; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to conform to in almost infinite ways. VII. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of nature, or that he should not follow her general order; but if he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with his own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered, whereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little in harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate himself to them without undergoing a great change himself. VIII. Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the rational life, we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems safest to us; on the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be good or useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the rational life, we may appropriate to our use and employ as we think best. Everyone without exception may, by sovereign right of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest. IX. Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any given thing than other individuals of the same species; therefore (cf. vii.) for man in the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful than his fellow-man who is led by reason. Further, as we know not anything among individual things which is more excellent than a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of his skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at last to live under the dominion of their own reason. X. In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of hatred, one towards another, they are at variance, and are therefore to be feared in proportion, as they are more powerful than their fellows. XI. Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and high-mindedness. XII. It is before all things useful to men to associate their ways of life, to bind themselves together with such bonds as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity, and generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship. XIII. But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness. For men are diverse (seeing that those who live under the guidance of reason are few), yet are they are generally envious and more prone to revenge than to sympathy. No small force of character is therefore required to take everyone as he is, and to restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others. But those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at vice than in instilling virtue, and who break rather than strengthen men's dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and others. Thus many from too great impatience of spirit, or from misguided religious zeal, have preferred to live among brutes rather than among men; as boys or youths, who cannot peaceably endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers and choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their father: suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as they may spite their parents. XIV. Therefore, although men are generally governed in everything by their own lusts, yet their association in common brings many more advantages than drawbacks. Wherefore it is better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us, and to strive to promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and friendship. XV. Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are attributable to justice, equity, and honourable living. For men brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what is reckoned disgraceful, or that a man should slight the received customs of their society. For winning love those qualities are especially necessary, which have regard to religion and piety (cf. IV. xxxvii. notes, i. ii.; xlvi. note; and lxxiii. note). XVI. Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but such harmony is insecure. Further, fear arises from infirmity of spirit, and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason: the same is true of compassion, though this latter seems to bear a certain resemblance to piety. XVII. Men are also gained over by liberality, especially such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain life. However, to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the power and the advantage of any private person. For the riches of any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call. Again, an individual man's resources of character are too limited for him to be able to make all men his friends. Hence providing for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, and has regard only to the general advantage. XVIII. In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our duty must be wholly different (cf. IV. lxx. note; lxxi. note). XIX. Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of generation arising from bodily beauty, and generally every sort of love, which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause, readily passes into hate; unless indeed, what is worse, it is a species of madness; and then it promotes discord rather than harmony (cf. III. xxxi. Coroll.). XX. As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in harmony with reason, if the desire for physical union be not engendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to beget children and to train them up wisely; and moreover, if the love of both, to wit, of the man and of the woman, is not caused by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul. XXI. Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by means of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery. None are more readily taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to be first, but are not. XXII. There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety and religion. Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet is he that abases himself most akin to the proud (IV. lvii. note). XXIII. Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such matters as cannot be hid. Further, as shame is a species of pain, it does not concern the exercise of reason. XXIV. The remaining emotions of pain towards men are directly opposed to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion; and, although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance to equity, yet is life but lawless, where every man may pass judgment on another's deeds, and vindicate his own or other men's rights. XXV. Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire of pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable to piety (as we said in IV. xxxvii. note i.). But, if it spring from emotion, it is ambition, or the desire whereby, men, under the false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords and seditions. For he who desires to aid his fellows either in word or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest good, he, I say, will before all things strive to win them over with love: not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called after his name, nor to give any cause for envy. Further, in his conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: but he will dwell at length on human virtue or power, and the way whereby it may be perfected. Thus will men be stirred not by fear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to reason. XXVI. Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we may. XXVII. The advantage which we derive from things external to us, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from observing them, and from recombining their elements in different forms, is principally the preservation of the body; from this point of view, those things are most useful which can so feed and nourish the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil their functions. For, in proportion as the body is capable of being affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external bodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind capable of thinking (IV. xxxviii. xxxix.). But there seem to be very few things of this kind in nature; wherefore for the due nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature. For the human body is composed of very many parts of different nature, which stand in continual need of varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything that can follow from its own nature, and consequently that the mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions. XXVIII. Now for providing these nourishments the strength of each individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one another mutual aid. But money has furnished us with a token for everything: hence it is with the notion of money, that the mind of the multitude is chiefly engrossed: nay, it can hardly conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the idea of money as cause. XXIX. This result is the fault only of those, who seek money, not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants, but because they have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring themselves to great splendour. Certainly they nourish their bodies, according to custom, but scantily, believing that they lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of their body. But they who know the true use of money, and who fix the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs live content with little. XXX. As, therefore, those things are good which assist the various parts of the body, and enable them to perform their functions; and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid to, man's power, in so far as he is composed of mind and body; it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good. But seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit our advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred to one part of the body more than to the other parts; therefore most emotions of pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at hand), and consequently the desires arising therefrom, may become excessive. Moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most regard to what is agreeable in the present, nor can we estimate what is future with emotions equally vivid. (IV. xliv. note, and lx. note.) XXXI. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure. However, as we said above (IV. xlv. note), none but the envious take delight in my infirmity and trouble. For the greater the pleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection whereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated by a true regard for our advantage. But contrariwise he, who is led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by reason. XXXII. But human power is extremely limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; we have not, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those things which are without us. Nevertheless, we shall bear with an equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims of our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have done our duty, and that the power which we possess is not sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely; remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding of this, that part of our nature which is defined by intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence will endeavour to persist. For, in so far as we are intelligent beings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary, nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding of these things, the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is in harmony with the order of nature as a whole. |
PART V
ON THE POWER OF THE UNDERSTANDING, OR OF HUMAN FREEDOM.
P REFACE. |
A
XIOMS.I. If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a change must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of the two, and continue until they cease to be contrary.
II.
The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, in so far as its
essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause.
(This axiom is evident from
AT length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is concerned with the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant. It is no part of my design to point out the method and means whereby the understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the body may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of its functions. The latter question lies in the province of Medicine, the former in the province of Logic. Here, therefore, I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation. That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have already shown. Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely govern them. But these philosophers were compelled, by the protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess, that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them: and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house-dog and the other a hunting-dog. For by long training it could be brought about, that the house-dog should become accustomed to hunt, and the hunting-dog to cease from running after hares. To this opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained, that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of the animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal spirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many different marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it; whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends the gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and determining them to the condition wherein they were, when repulsed before by a similar position of the gland. He further asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature to a certain given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever anyone desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition causes the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result, inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with the wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to look at remote or very near objects. Lastly, he maintained that, although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life, yet it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions del l'âme, I. 50. He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power over its passions. For passions as defined by him are "perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression) are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement of the spirits." (Passions del l'âme, I. 27.) But, seeing that we can join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits, to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely on our own powers; if, therefore, we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an absolute dominion over our passions. Such is the doctrine of this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his own words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man. Indeed, I am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted, that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from self-evident premises, and would affirm nothing which he did not clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which occult qualities are commonplace. What does he understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like him to explain this union through its proximate cause. What clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended matter? What clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended matter? But he had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body, that he could not assign any particular cause of the union between the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God. Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness, yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything except running away. In truth, as there is no common standard of volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body; consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other. We may also add, that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain. Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have abundantly proved that his premisses are false. Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness.
PROP. IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. Corollary.--Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the general Def. of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception. Note.--Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by an effect ( I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly understand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate (II. xl.), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it about, that he should become less subject to them. To attain this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive (IV. lxi.). For it must be especially remarked, that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted, that everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own fashion (III. xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is called piety (IV. xxxvii note i. and second proof). In like manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV. lix.). Than this remedy for the emotions (to return to the point from which I started), which consists in a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within our power, can be devised. For the mind has no other power save that of thinking and of forming, adequate ideas, as we have shown above (III. iii.). |
PROP. VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as necessary. Note.--The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, as experience also testifies. For we see, that the pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any means have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly, because it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness. Whereas, if most people were born full-grown and only one here and there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants; because infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature; and we may note several other instances of the same sort. |
PROP. X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to the intellectual order. Note.--By this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by evil emotions. For (V. vii.) a greater force is needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and associated according to the intellectual order, than when they are uncertain and unsettled. The best we can do, therefore, so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts, to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith to the particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that it may be always ready to our hand. For instance, we have laid down among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and note), that hatred should be overcome with love or high-mindedness, and not required with hatred in return. Now, that this precept of reason may be always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and in what manner and way they may be best warded off by high-mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready for use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.). If we keep also in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships; further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result of the right way of life (IV. lii.), and that men, no less than everything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and will be easily overcome; or, if the anger which springs from a grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As is indeed evident from V. vi. vii. viii. We should, in the same way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them. But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions we should always bear in mind that which is good in every individual thing (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.), in order that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of pleasure. For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain it. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving vent to their anger would fain appear wise. Wherefore it is certain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of honour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily covet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common to all who are ill-used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit. For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches. So, again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion, directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart. Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wise desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will diligently observe and practice these precepts (which indeed are not difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for the most part, to direct his actions according to the commandments of reason.
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PROP. XVIII. No one can hate God. Corollary.--Love towards God cannot be turned into hate. Note.--It may be objected that, as we understand God as the cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause of pain. But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a passion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore, in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to that extent feel pleasure. |
PROP. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to God by the same bond of love.
Note.--We can in the same way, show, that there is no emotion
directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be destroyed;
therefore we may conclude, that this love towards God is the most constant
of all the emotions, and that, in so far as it is referred to the body, it
cannot be destroyed, unless the body be destroyed also. As to its nature, in
so far as it is referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire. |
PROP. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.
Note.--This idea, which expresses the essence of the body under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is necessarily eternal. Yet it is not possible that we should remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in terms of time, or have any relation to time. But, notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no less than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of the mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than proofs. Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or explained through duration. Thus our mind can only be said to endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus far only has it the power of determining the existence of things by time, and conceiving them under the category of duration.
PROP. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity. Note.--Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and following from the necessity of the divine nature. Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in II. xlv. and note, which see. |
PROP. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal. Note.--In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of himself and of God; in other words, he will be more perfect and blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel. But we must here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more readily explained and better understood, we will consider the mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have done hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, so long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our premisses are plain. |
PROP. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal. Note.--Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing Prop.) no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of love, just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll. of the last Prop. Nor is there here any difference, except that the mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea of God as eternal cause. If pleasure consists in the transition to a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the mind being endowed with perfection itself |
PROP. XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject to those emotions which are attributable to passions. Corollary.--Hence it follows that no love save intellectual love is eternal. Note.--If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after death. |
PROP. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself. Corollary.--Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are identical.
Note.--From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein our
salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in the constant and
eternal love towards God, or in God's love towards men. This love or
blessedness is, in the Bible, called Glory and not undeservedly. For whether
this love be referred to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called
acquiescence of spirit, which
Def. of the Emotions, xxv. and
xxx.) is not really distinguished from glory. In so far
as it is referred to God, it is (V.
xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term,
accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is referred to the
mind, it is the same (V.
xxvii.).
PROP. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away. Note.--The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular things, in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given time and place: of this, I think, no one can doubt. |
PROP. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death. Note.--Hence we understand that point which I touched on in IV. xxxix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part; namely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and, consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more. Again, since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it follows that the human mind can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which we have shown to perish with the body (V. xxi.) should be of little importance when compared with the part which endures. But I will soon treat of the subject at greater length. |
PROP. XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal.
Note.--Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number of
activities, there is no doubt but that they may be of such a nature, that
they may be referred to minds possessing a great knowledge of themselves and
of God, and whereof the greatest or chief part is eternal, and, therefore,
that they should scarcely fear death. But, in order that this may be
understood more clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state
of perpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the better or
the worse, we are called happy or unhappy.
PROP. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice versa, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect. Corollary.--Hence it follows that the part of the mind which endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind ( V. xiii. xxix.) the understanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.); the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V. xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III. iii. and general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it great or small, is more perfect than the latter.Note.--Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set forth concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded without relation to the body; whence, as also from I. xxi. and other places, it is plain that our mind, in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to infinity; so that all taken together at once constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God.
PROP. XLI. Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we should still consider as of primary importance piety and religion, and generally all things which, in Part IV., we showed to be attributable to courage and high-mindedness.
Note.--The general belief of the multitude seems to be different.
Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so far as they may obey
their lusts, and that they cede their rights, in so far as they are bound to
live according to the commandments of the divine law. They therefore believe
that piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to firmness of
mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to lay aside, and to
receive the reward for their bondage, that is, for their piety, and
religion; it is not only by this hope, but also, and chiefly, by the fear of
being horribly punished after death, that they are induced to live according
to the divine commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will
carry them. |
PROP. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself ; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our lusts. Note.--I have thus completed all I wished to set forth touching the mind's power over the emotions and the mind's freedom. Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various ways by external causes without ever gaining, the true acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be. Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit. If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it be possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare. |