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JBY Notes:

1,    The  text  is  Elwes's  Introduction,  Bk.I:Page v,   written  in  1883.

2.    Page  numbers  given  refer  to  Book I   except where otherwise
       noted.

3.    JBY added the Paragraph Numbers.

4.    [Curley's Book VIII comment or note] 
       ]Shirley's Book XIII translation variance, comment, or endnote[ 
         <Parkinson's Book XV endnote> 
       {JBY comment or endnote}        LINKS

5.   Citation abbreviations.

6.    Please  report  errors,  clarification  requests,  disagreement,
       or suggestions  to  mailto:josephb@yesselman.com?subject=Elwes's Introduction - Note 6.

7.    Other Spinoza biographies.

8.    For notes and schedule of letters see " The Letters".

Introduction
  
Original unpopularity of Spinoza's writings, their gradually increasing influence in Germany, France, Holland, and England

Authorities for the life of Spinoza: Colerus,

Birth, 1634, and education of Spinoza

His breach with the synagogue, 1656

Life near Amsterdam and at Rhijnsburg

Friendship with Simon de Vries

Removal to Voorburg and the Hague

Correspondence with Oldenburg, Leibnitz, Tschirnhausen, and

others. Publication of Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 1670

Massacre of the De Witts, 1672. Indignation and danger of Spinoza

Completion of the Ethics, 1674

Later life of Spinoza

Death and burial, February, 1677

Opera Posthuma published 1677

Sketch of Spinoza's philosophy

{Spinoza's Dictum}

{The Foundation Rock upon which Spinoza's philosophy stands: [37].
 Simply Posit: ONE—1D6.}

{Concluding Thought}

Scope of the present work

{The Highest Good is to know G-D. WHY?} 
 

Bk.II:page v - Elwes's Introduction.

[1]    A   very  few  years   ago  { before  the  1880's }   the   writings   of                      Graetz

Spinoza  were  almost unknown  in  this  country {England}.   The only

authorities  to  which  the  English  reader could be referred were the

brilliant  essays  of   Mr. Froude, (v:1)  and Mr. Matthew Arnold, (v:2),

the  graphic  but  somewhat misleading sketch in Lewes's "History of

Philosophy,"  and  the  unsatisfactory  volume  of   Dr. R. Willis  (v:3).

But in 1880  Mr. Pollock brought out his most valuable  "Spinoza, His                 EL:Feuer:11651 

Life and Philosophy," (v:4) likely long to remain the standard work on

the  subject;    Dr. Martineau  has  followed  with  a  sympathetic  and

gracefully   written  "Study of Spinoza;"  Professor  Knight  has edited

a   volume   of   Spinozistic   Essays    by  Continental   Philosophers;

page VI    Auerbach's   biographical   novel   (vi:1)  has  been  translated,

and   many   writers   have   made   contributions   to   the  subject  in

magazines and reviews.

[2]   At  first sight this stir of tardy recognition may seem less surpris-

ing  than  the  preceding  apathy,  for  history  can  show few figures

more  remarkable  than  the  solitary  thinker of Amsterdam.   But the

causes  which  kept  Spinoza  in  comparative obscurity are not very

far  to  seek.   Personally  he  shrank with almost womanly sensitive-

ness  from  anything  like  notoriety:  his  chief  work was withheld till

after  his  death,  and  then  published  anonymously;  his treatise on

Religion  was  also  put forth in secret, and he disclaims with evident

sincerity  all  desire  to  found  a  school,  or  give his name to a sect.

{ EL:L19(68):296 }

                      Bk.XIB:1992.
[3]   Again,  the  form  in which his principal work is cast is such as to                Spinozism
                            {dabbler}
repel  those  dilettante  readers,  whose  suffrage  is  necessary for a

widely-extended reputation;  none  but genuine  students would care

to  grapple  with the serried array of definitions, axioms, and proposi-

tions,  of which "The Ethics", {Bk.I}, is composed, while the display of

geometric  accuracy  flatters  the  careless  into  supposing,  that  the

 whole  structure  is  interdependent,  and that, when a single breach

has been effected, the entire fabric has been demolished.
 

[4]   The  matter,  no less than the manner, of Spinoza's writings was

such as to preclude popularity.   He genuinely shocked his contemp-         Graetz's Censure

oraries.   Advances  in  thought  are  tolerated  in  proportion as they

respond to and, as it were, kindle into flame ideas which are already

smouldering  obscurely  in  many  minds.    A  teacher  may  deepen,

modify,  transfigure  what  he  finds,  but  he must not attempt radical                Mark Twain  

reconstruction.   In  the  seventeenth  century all men's deepest con-
{religious}
victions  were  inseparably  bound  up  with anthropomorphic notions             Spinoza's Daring

of  the  Deity;  Spinoza, in attacking these latter and endeavouring to

substitute   the  conception  page VII   of   eternal   and   necessary  law,         Chain of Natural Events    
                                                                                            { and civil }
seemed  to  be  striking at the very roots of moral ^ order: hence with  

curious  irony  his  works,  which few read and still fewer understood,

became  associated  with  notions  of  monstrous  impiety,  and  their

author,  who  loved  virtue  with  single-hearted  and saintly devotion,

was  branded  as  a  railer  against  God  and a subverter of morality,

whom  it  was  a shame  even to speak of.   Those from whom juster

views  might  have  been  expected  swelled  the  popular  cry.   The
 Bk.XIB:230, 23089.
Cartesians  sought  to  confirm  their  own  precarious  reputation for

orthodoxy  by  emphatic  disavowals  of  their more daring associate.

Leibnitz,   who   had   known   Spinoza   personally,  speaks  of  him,

whether  from  jealousy  or  some  more  avowable  motive,  in  tones

of consistent depreciation.

[5]   The  torrent  of  abuse,  which poured forth from the theologians

and  their  allies,  served  to overwhelm the ethical and metaphysical

aspect  of  Spinoza's  teaching.  The philosopher was hidden behind             Spinoza's Daring

the   arch-heretic.   Throughout   almost   the  whole  of  the  century

following  his  death,  he  is  spoken  of  in terms displaying complete

misapprehension  of  his  importance  and scope.   The grossly inac-

curate  account  given  by Bayle in the "Dictionnaire Philosophique"

was  accepted  as  sufficient.   The  only  symptom  of  a  following is

found  in  the  religious  sect  of  Hattemists, which based some of its
                                                                                        Bk.XIB:229.
doctrines  on  an  imperfect  understanding  of  the  so-called  mystic

passages   in   "The  Ethics".  The  first  real  recognition  came  from

Lessing,  who  found  in  Spinoza a strength and solace he sought in

vain  elsewhere,  though  he  never accepted the system as a whole.

His  conversation  with  Jacobi  (1780),  a diligent though hostile stu-

dent  of  the  Ethics,  may  be  said  to  mark  the beginning of a new

epoch  in  the  history  of  Spinozism.    Attention  once attracted was

never   again   withdrawn,   and  received  a  powerful  impulse  from

Goethe,  who  more  than  once  confessed  his  indebtedness to the

Ethics,  which  indeed  is  abundantly page VIII  evident  throughout  his

writings.   Schleiermacher  paid  an  eloquent tribute to "the holy, the
                                                                                           Bk.III:261.
rejected  Spinoza."   Novalis celebrated him as  "the man intoxicated         Wolf, Cambridge:762
                             Bk.XIV:1:298, 2:348.
with Deity "  (der Gottvertrunkene Mann),  and Heine for once forgot               Durant13a:640

to  sneer,  as  he recounted his life.  The brilliant novelist, Auerbach,

has  not  only  translated  his complete works, but has also made his

history  the  subject  of  a  biographical  romance.    Among  German

philosophers  Kant  is,  perhaps,  the  last,  who  shows no traces of

Spinozism.    Hegel has declared, that "to be a philosopher one must

first be a Spinozist."    In recent years a new impulse has been given

to  the  study  of the  Ethics  by  their  curious  harmony  with the last
                {cosmological}
results of physiological research.                                                                              Damasio—Biological

                                                  {1883}
[6]   In  France  Spinoza has till lately been viewed as a disciple and
              Bk.III:211; Bk.XIB:23090.
perverter  of Descartes.   M. Emile Saisset prefixed to his translation         Damasio—Pineal Gland

of  the  philosopher's  chief  works  a critical introduction written from

this  standpoint.   Since  the  scientific  study  of philosophic systems

has begun among the French, M. Paul Janet has written on Spinoza

as  a  link  in  the chain of the history of thought; a new translation of

his  complete  works  has been started, and M. Renan has delivered

a  discourse on him at the bicentenary of his death celebrated at the

Hague.

[7]   In Holland there has also been a revival of interest in the illustri-

ous  Dutch  thinker.   Professors  Van  Vloten  and Land were mainly

instrumental  in  procuring  the  erection  of  a  statue  to his memory,

and  are  now  engaged  in  a  fine  edition of his works, of which the

first  volume  has  appeared (viii:1).   In  England, as before said, the

interest  in  Spinoza  has till recently been slight.   The controversial-

ists  of  the eighteenth century, with the exception of Toland, passed

him  by  as  unworthy  of  serious  study.   The first recognition of his

true   character  came  probably  from  Germany  through  Coleridge,

who in his desultory way expressed enthusiastic admiration,   page IX

and recorded his opinion (in a pencil note to a passage in Schelling),

that   the  Ethics,  the  Novum  Organum,   and  the Critique of Pure

Reason  were the three greatest works written since the introduction

of  Christianity.   The  influence  of  Spinoza  has  been traced by Mr.

Pollock   in  Wordsworth,   and  it  is  on  record that Shelley not only

contemplated  but  began  a translation of the Tractatus Theologico-

Politicus,  to  be  published  with  a  preface  by  Lord Byron,  but the

project  was  cut  short  by his death.   It is said that George Eliot left

behind   her   at   her   decease   a   MS.   translation  of  the  Ethics.

[8]   It  may  strike  those  who  are  strangers  to Spinoza as curious,

that,  notwithstanding  the  severely  abstract  nature  of  his method,

so  many  poets  and imaginative writers should be found among his

adherents.   Lessing,  Goethe,  Heine, Auerbach, Coleridge, Shelley,

George  Eliot;  most  of  these not only admired him, but studied him

deeply.     On   closer   approach   the  apparent  anomaly  vanishes.

There is about Spinoza a power and a charm, which appeals strong-

ly  to  the  poetic  sense.   He  seems  to dwell among heights, which

most  men  see  only  in  far off,  momentary glimpses.   The world of

men  is  spread  out  before him, the workings of the human heart lie

bared  to  his  gaze,  but  he  does not fall to weeping, or to laughter,

or  to  reviling: his thoughts are ever with the eternal, and something

of  the  beauty  and calm of eternal things has passed into his teach-

ing.   If  we  may, as he himself was wont to do, interpret spiritually a

Bible  legend,  we  may  say  of  him  that,  like Moses returning from

Sinai,   he   bears  in  his  presence  the  witness  that  he  has  held

communion with the Most High.

[9]   The  main  authority for the facts of Spinoza's life is a short biog-
                        Bk.XII:409; Bk.XIB:381.
raphy  by  Johannes Colerus (Kohler) (ix:1),   Lutheran  page X   pastor

at  the  Hague,  who occupied  the lodgings formerly tenanted by the

philosopher.    The  orthodox  Christian   felt  a  genuine  abhorrence
                                                              Bk.XIX:25344, 45, & 46.
for  the  doctrines,  which  he  regarded as atheistic,  but was honest

enough  to  recognize  the stainless purity of their author's character.

He   sets   forth  what  he  has  to  say  with  a  quaint  directness  in

admirable  keeping  with the outward  simplicity of the life he depicts.

[10]    Further   authentic   information   is  obtainable  from   passing

notices  in  the  works  of Leibnitz, and from Spinoza's published cor-

respondence,  though  the  editors  of  the latter have suppressed all

that  appeared  to them of merely personal interest.   There is also a

biography  attributed  to  Lucas,  physician  at the Hague (1712), but
                                          {formal or elaborate praise}
this  is  merely  a confused  panegyric,  and  is often at variance with

more  trustworthy  records.    Additional details may be gleaned from

Bayle's;  hostile  and  inaccurate article in the "Dictionnaire Philoso-

phique;"  from  S.  Kortholt's  preface to the second edition (1700) of

his  father's  book "De tribus impostoribus magnis:"  and, lastly, from
                                 Bk.XIB:142,143;Bk.XX:315-18.
the  recollections  of  Colonel  Stoupe (1673),  an officer in the Swiss

service,  who  had  met  the  philosopher  at  Utrecht,  but  does  not

contribute much to our knowledge.

[11]   Baruch  de  Spinoza  was  born  in Amsterdam Nov. 24, 1634?.

His  parents  were  Portuguese,  or possibly Spanish Jews, who had
                                                            Bk.XX:2, 3.
sought a refuge in the Netherlands from the rigours of the Inquisition

in  the  Peninsula.  Though  nothing  positive  is known of them, they

appear to have been in easy circumstances, and certainly bestowed

on  their  only son—their  other  two children being girls—a thorough

education  according  to  the  notions  of  their time and sect.   At the
                                                                           Bk.XIB:3063.
Jewish  High  School,  under  the  guidance  of  Morteira,  a  learned
                                                                            Bk.XIB:612, 16, 820, & 1326.
Talmudist,  and  possibly  of  the  brilliant page XI Manasseh Ben Israel,

who   afterwards  (1655)  was  employed  to  petition  from  Cromwell

the  readmission  of  the  Jews  to  England,  the young Spinoza was

instructed  in  the  learning  of  the  Hebrews,   the  mysteries  of  the
 Bk.XIII:342381
Talmud  and  the Cabbala,  the  text  of  the  {Hebrew Bible}, and the

commentaries  of Ibn Ezra and Maimonides.   Readers of the Tracta-

tus  Theologico-Politicus  will  be  able  to  appreciate  the use made

of  this  early  training.   Besides such severer studies,  Spinoza was,

in obedience to Rabbinical tradition, made acquainted with a manual
                        Bk.XIB:4316, 238118.
trade,  that  of  lens  polishing,  and  gained  a knowledge of French,

Italian, and German; Spanish, Portuguese, and Hebrew were almost

his  native  tongues,  but  curiously enough,  as we learn from one of
                                    {LT:L32(19):331 }
his  lately  discovered  letters, (xi:1)  he  wrote  Dutch  with  difficulty.

 Latin  was  not included in the Jewish curriculum, being tainted with

the  suspicion  of  heterodoxy,  but  Spinoza,  feeling  probably that it

was  the  key  to  much  of the world's best knowledge, set himself to

learn  it  (xi:2);  first,  with  the aid of a German master, afterwards at
                        Bk.XIB:1938—Bk.XII:414.
the  house  of Francis Van den Ende, a physician. It is probably from
                           Bk.XIB:2041.^ a Lucianist—"deploying the hermeneutics..."
the  latter  that  he gained the sound knowledge of physical science,

which  so  largely  leavened his philosophy; and, no doubt, he at this
                                        Bk.III:211.
time began the study of Descartes, whose reputation towered above

the learned world of the period.

[12]   Colerus  relates  that  Van  den  Ende  had  a  daughter,  Clara

Maria,  who  instructed  her  father's pupils in Latin and music during

his  absence.    "She  was none of the  page XII  most beautiful, but she
                        Bk.XII:414.
had  a  great  deal  of wit," and as the story runs displayed her saga-

city  by  rejecting  the  proffered  love  of  Spinoza for the sake of his
  Bk.XX:108, 1848, 195, 293.
fellow-pupil  Kerkering,  who  was able to enhance his attractions by

the  gift  of a costly pearl necklace.   It is certain that Van den Ende's

daughter  and  Kerkering  were  married  in 1671, but the tradition of

the  previous  love  affair  accords  ill  with ascertained dates.   Clara
                  Bk.XIB:220, 22174—Bk.XII:414.
Maria  was  only  seven  years  old  when  Spinoza  left  her  father's

house, and sixteen when he left the neighbourhood.

[13]   Meanwhile  the  brilliant  Jewish student was overtaken by that

mental  crisis,  which has come over so many lesser men before and

since.   The  creed  of  his fathers was found unequal to the strain of

his own wider knowledge and changed spiritual needs.  The Hebrew

faith with its immemorial antiquity, its unbroken traditions, its myriads

of  martyrs,  could  appeal to an authority which no other religion has

equalled,  and  Spinoza,  as  we  know  from  a passage in one of his
 { EL:L74(76):417 }
letters (xii:1),  felt  the claim  to  the  full.   We  may  be  sure that the

gentle  and  reserved  youth  was  in  no haste to obtrude his altered

views,  but  the  time  arrived  when  they  could  no  longer  be  with

honesty  concealed.  The  Jewish  doctors  were  exasperated at the

defection  of  their  most  promising pupil, and endeavoured to retain
                                                               {Bk.XII:416—From Colerus}
him  in  their  communion  by  the  offer  of a yearly pension of 1,000

florins.   Such overtures were of course rejected.   Sterner measures

were then resorted to.   It is even related, on excellent authority, that

Spinoza's  life  was  attempted  as  he  was  coming  out of the Portu-

guese  synagogue.   Be this as it may,  he fled from Amsterdam, and
                           Bk.XIB:2454, 55, 2961; Bk.XX:2306.                                                           { Will Durant - scroll
was  (1656)  formally excommunicated and anathematized according            down about 10%
                                                                                                                   to III Excommunication }
to the rites of the Jewish church.   Bk.XIB:2246, 48—Bk.XII:416, 425.

[14]  Thus  isolated from his kindred, he sought more congenial soci-
                                                               Bk.XIB:22988, 253.
ety  among  the  dissenting community of Collegiants,  page XIII  a  body

of  men  who  without  priests  or set forms of worship carried out the

precepts of simple piety.    He passed some time in the house of one
                       Bk.XX:146 {map}.
of that body, not far from Amsterdam, on the Ouwerkerk road, and in

1660  or  the following year removed with his friend to the head quar-

ters of the sect at Rhijnsburg, near Leyden, where the memory of his

sojourn  is  still  preserved in the name "Spinoza Lane."   His separa-

tion  from  Judaism  was  marked  by  his  substituting  for  his  name
                                                                                       Bk.XII:415.
Baruch the Latin equivalent Benedict, but he never received baptism

or  formally  joined  any  Christian  sect.   Only  once  again does his

family  come  into  the  record  of  his life.   On the death of his father,
   Bk.XIB:22071—Bk.XII:422.
his  sisters  endeavoured  to  deprive  him  of  his share of the inheri-

tance  on  the  ground  that  he  was an outcast and heretic. Spinoza

resisted their claim by law, but on gaining his suit yielded up to them

all they had demanded except one bed.

[15]   Skill  in  polishing  lenses  gave  him  sufficient  money  for  his

scanty  needs,  and  he  acquired  a reputation as an optician before

he  became  known  as  a  philosopher.   It  was  in this capacity that

he   was   consulted   by   Leibnitz (xiii:1).    His  only  contribution  to

the  science  was  a  short  treatise  on  the  rainbow, printed posthu-

mously  in  1687.   This  was  long  regarded  as lost, but has, in our

own   time,   been   recovered   and   reprinted   by  Dr.  Van  Vloten.

[16]   Spinoza also drew,  for amusement, portraits of his friends with
                                                                                         Bk.XII:418.
ink or charcoal.   Colerus possessed "a whole book of such draughts,

amongst  which  there  were  some  heads  of  several  considerable

persons,  who  were  known  to  him,  or  had  occasion  to visit him,"

and  also  a  portrait  of  the  philosopher  himself  in  the costume of

Masaniello.

[17]   So  remarkable  a  man  could  hardly  remain obscure, and we

have  no  reason  to  suppose  that Spinoza shrank from social inter-

course.   Though  in  the  last  years  of his life his page XIV habits were
                                                                            Bk.XX:349.
somewhat  solitary,  this  may  be  set down to failing health, poverty,

and  the  pressure of uncompleted work.   He was never a professed

ascetic,  and  probably,  in  the  earlier  years  of his separation from

Judaism,  was  the  centre  of  an  admiring and affectionate circle of

friends.   In  his  letters he frequently states that visitors leave him no

time  for  correspondence,  and the tone, in which he was addressed

by   comparative   strangers,  shows  that  he  enjoyed  considerable

reputation  and  respect.   Before  the  appearance  of  the Tractatus

Theologico-Politicus,  he  had  published  nothing which could shock

the  susceptibilities  of  Christians,  and  he  was known to be a com-
                      Bk.XX:170—eudaimonia.
plete  master  of  Cartesianism  then  regarded as the consummation

and  crown  of  learning.   It  is  recorded that a society of young men

used  to hold meetings in Amsterdam for the discussion of philosoph-

ical   problems,   and  that  Spinoza  contributed  papers  as  material

for  their  debates (xiv:1).   Possibly the MS. treatise " On God, Man,
               { Blessedness—Elwes's translation }
and  his  Well-Being,"  which  has been  re-discovered  in  two Dutch                    Wolf
     { ^ For translation and commentary by Curley see Bk.VIII:46 }
copies during our own time, may be referred to this period.  It is of no
                              { ^ 1883 }
philosophic value compared with the Ethics, but is interesting histori-

cally  as throwing light on the growth of Spinoza's mind and his early

relations to Cartesianism.

[18]   Oblivion  has  long  since  settled  down  over this little band of

questioners,  but  a  touching  record  has  been preserved of one of
                        Bk.XX:213, 261, 262.
their  number,  Simon de Vries, who figures in Spinoza's correspond-

ence.   He  had  often,  we are told,  wished to bestow gifts of money

on  his  friend  and  master,  but  these  had  always  been  declined.

During  the  illness  which  preceded  his  early  death, he expressed

a  desire to make the philosopher his heir.   This again was declined,

and  he  was  prevailed  on  by  Spinoza  to  reduce the bequest to a

small  annuity,  and  to  leave  the  bulk  of  his  property  page XV  to his

family.   When  he  had  passed  away  his  brother fixed the pension

at  600  florins, but Spinoza declared the sum excessive, and refused

to  accept  more  than  300 florins, which were punctually paid him till

his death.

[19]  Besides this instruction by correspondence, for which he seems

to  have  demanded  no  payment  ("mischief,"  as  one  of his biogra-

phers  puts it,  "could  be had from him for nothing"), Spinoza at least

in  one  instance received into his house a private pupil (xv:1) gener-

ally identified with one Albert Burgh, who became a convert to Rome

in  1675,  and  took that occasion to admonish his ex-tutor in a strain

of  contemptuous  pity (xv:2).   Probably  to  this  youth were dictated

"The   principles   of   Cartesianism   geometrically   demonstrated,"

which  Spinoza  was induced by his friends to publish, with the addi-
                                                                                      { E5:L29(12):317 }
tion  of  some metaphysical reflections, in 1663 (xv:3).  Lewis Meyer,                Letter:3320[34]
          Bk.XX:171, 172, 403.
a  physician  of  Amsterdam, and one of Spinoza's intimates, saw the

book  through  the press,  and  supplied  a  preface.   Its author does

not  appear  to  have  attached any importance to the treatise, which

he  regarded  merely  as  likely  to  pave the way for the reception of

more  original  work.   It  is  interesting  as an example of the method

afterwards  employed in the Ethics, used to support propositions not

accepted by their expounder.   It also shows that Spinoza thoroughly

understood the system he rejected.

Note[20]
[20]   In  the  same year the philosopher removed from Rhijnsburg to
 Bk.XIB:4419, 20—TL:L30(17):325, Neff.
Voorburg,  a  suburb  of  the Hague, and in 1670 to the Hague itself,
     ^ Bk.XIB:605—Bk.XII:418.
where  he  lived till his death in 1677, lodging first in the house (after-

wards  tenanted  by  Colerus)  of  the widow Van Velden, and subse-

quently  with  Van  der  Spijk,  page XVI   a  painter.  He  was very likely

led  to  leave  Rhijnsburg  by  his  increasing reputation and a desire

for  educated  society.   By  this  time  he was well known in Holland,
                                                    Bk.XIB:21; Bk.XX:407.
and  counted  among  his  friends, John de Witt,  who is said to have

consulted  him  on affairs of state.   Nor was his fame confined to his
                         Bk.XIB:5137—Bk.XIII:185.
native  country.   Henry  Oldenburg,  the  first  secretary of the newly-
                                          ^ Bk.XX:404.
established Royal Society of England,  had visited him at Rhijnsburg,

introduced  possibly  by Huyghens, and had invited him to carry on a
     {LT:L01(01):275 }
correspondence (xvi:1), in terms of affectionate intimacy.  Oldenburg

was rather active-minded than able,  never really understood or sym-

pathized  with  Spinoza's  standpoint,  and  was  thoroughly shocked
                  { EL:L19(68):296 }
(xvi:2)  at the appearance of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, but

he was the intimate friend of Robert Boyle,  and kept his correspond-

ent  acquainted  with  the  progress  of science in England.  Later on
           Bk.XIB:239123.
(1671),  Leibnitz  consulted Spinoza on a question of practical optics

(xvi:3),  and  in 1676, Ludwig von Tschirnhausen, a Bohemian noble-

man,   known   in  the history  of  mathematical  science,  contributed

some pertinent criticisms on the Ethics,  then circulated in MS (xvi:4).

[21]  Amusing testimonies to Spinoza's reputation are afforded by the
                                      { LT:L31(18):327 }
volunteered effusions of Blyenbergh (xvi:5), and the artless question-

ings of the believer in ghosts (xvi:6).

[22]   In  1670,   the  Tractatus Theologico-Politicus   was  published

anonymously,   with   the  name  of  a  fictitious  printer  at  Hamburg.
                                                                {Bk.XIB:143, 257.}
It   naturally   produced   a   storm   of   angry   controversy.    It  was,

in 1674,  formally prohibited by the States-General, and, as a matter

of course, was placed on the Index by the Romish Church.   Perhaps

few  books  have  been  page XVII  more often "refuted," or less seriously

damaged  by  the  ordeal.   Its  author  displayed  his disinclination to

disturb the faith of the unlearned by preventing during his lifetime the             EL:L19(68):296

appearance of the book in the vernacular.

        Bk.XIB:136.
[23]   In 1672,  men's  thoughts were for a time diverted from theologi-
                                          Bk.XX:106, 292.
cal  controversy  by  the French invasion  of the Netherlands, and the
                                                                            Bk.XIB:1383.
consequent  outbreak  of domestic faction.   The  shameful massacre

of  the  brothers  De Witt  by   an infatuated mob brought Spinoza into

close  and  painful  contact  with  the  passions  seething  round  him.
                                                                                          Bk.XIB:1385.
For  once  his  philosophic  calm  was  broken:  he  was only by force

prevented  from  rushing  forth  into  the  streets  at the peril of his life,

and proclaiming his abhorrence of the crime.

[24]    Shortly   afterwards,  when  the  head-quarters  of  the  French
                                                                         Bk.XIB:141—Bk.XII:422, 423.
army  were at Utrecht,  Spinoza was sent for by the Prince de Conde,

who  wished  to  make his acquaintance.   On his arrival at the camp,

however,  he  found  that the Prince was absent; and, after waiting a

few  days,  returned  home  without  having  seen  him.   The philoso-

pher's   French   entertainers   held   out  hopes  of   a  pension  from
                           Bk.XIB:141—Bk.XII:423.
Louis XIV.,  if  a book  were  dedicated  to  that  monarch;  but   these

overtures were declined.

                    Bk.XIB:14212—Bk.XII:423.
[25]   On his arrival at the Hague,  Spinoza was exposed to consider-

able  danger from the excited populace, who suspected him of being
 Bk.XIB:14516—Bk.XII:37.
a spy.   The  calm,  which  had  failed him on the murder of his friend,

remained  unruffled  by  the  peril  threatening  himself.    He  told his

landlord,  who  was  in  dread  of the house being sacked, that, if the

mob  showed  any  signs  of  violence, he would go out and speak to

them  in  person,  though  they  should serve him as they had served
                                                    Bk.XII:424.
the  unhappy  De Witts.  "I  am  a  good republican,"  he Added, "and

have  never  had  any  aim  but  the  welfare  and  good of the State."                Bk.XIB:142. 

                                           L53, 54:373     Bk.XIB:146—Bk.XII:424.
[26]   In 1673,  Spinoza was offered by the Elector Palatine,  page XVIII

Charles Lewis (xviii:1),  a  professorship of philosophy at Heidelberg,

but  declined it (xviii:2), on the plea that teaching would interfere with

his  original  work,   and  that  doctrinal  restrictions,  however  slight,

would prove irksome.

[27]   In the following year {1674}, the Ethics were finished and circu-

lated  in  MS. among their author's friends.   Spinoza made a journey

to  Amsterdam  for  the  purpose  of publishing them, but changed his

intention  on  learning  that  they  would  probably meet with a stormy

reception  {EL:L19:296, EL:L20:297}.  Perhaps  failing  health strengthened

his  natural  desire for peace, and considerations of personal renown

never had any weight with him.

[28]   To   this   closing  period  belong  the  details  as  to  Spinoza's
                                         {Bk.XII:409}
manner of life collected by Colerus. They are  best given in the biog-

rapher's  simple  words,  as  rendered  in  the  contemporary English
                                                        Bk.XX:26356—Bk.XII:419.
version:  "It  is  scarce  credible  how  sober and frugal he was.   Not

that  he  was  reduced  to  so  great  a  poverty,  as not to be able to

spend  more,  if  he  had  been willing.   He had friends enough, who

offered  him  their  purses, and  all manner of assistance; but he was
                                                                     {Bk.XII:419}
naturally  very  sober,  and  would   be satisfied with little."   His food

apparently cost him but a few pence a day, and he drank hardly any

wine.   "He was often invited to eat with his friends, but chose rather

to  live  upon  what  he  had  at  home,  though it were never so little,

than  to  sit down to a good table at the expense of another man. . . .

He was very careful to cast up his accounts every quarter;  which he

did,  that  he  might  spend neither more nor less than what he could

spend  every  year.   And  he  would say sometimes to the people of

the  house,  that  he was like the serpent, who forms a circle with his
         Bk.XIB:14724—Bk.XII:419.
tail  in his mouth, to denote that he had nothing left at the year's end.

He  added,  that  he  designed  to  lay  up no more money than what
                                                                    {Bk.XII:419. }
would  be  necessary  for  him  to  have a decent burying. . .  page XIX

He  was  of  a middle size; he had good features in his face, the skin

somewhat black;  black curled hair; long eye brows, and of the same

colour,  so  that  one  might  easily  know  by  his  looks  that he was

descended  from  Portuguese  Jews. . . . If  he  was very frugal in his

way  of  living,  his conversation was also very sweet and easy.   He

knew admirably well how to be master of his passions: he was never

seen  very  melancholy,  nor  very  merry. . . . He  was  besides very

courteous  and  obliging.   He  would  very  often  discourse  with his
                                            {Bk.XII:420. }
landlady,  especially  when  she  lay  in,  and  with  the people of the

house,  when  they  happened to be sick or afflicted: he never failed,

then,  to  comfort  them, and exhort them to bear with patience those

evils  which  God  assigned  to them as a lot.   He put the children in

mind  of  going  often to church, and taught them to be obedient and

dutiful  to  their  parents.    When the people of the house came from

church,  he  would  often ask them what they, had learned, and what

they   remembered   of   the  sermon.   He  had  a  great  esteem  for
  Bk.XIB:237111, 112—Bk.XII:420.
Dr. Cordes,  my  predecessor, who was a learned and good-natured

man,  and  of  an  exemplary  life, which gave occasion to Spinoza to

praise  him  very  often: nay, he went sometimes to hear him preach.

. . It  happened  one  day  that  his  landlady  asked  him whether he  

believed  she  could  be  saved  in  the religion  she  professed.   He             J. Thomas Cook

answered:  'Your  religion  is  a very good one; you need not look for                Mark Twain

another,  nor doubt that you may be saved in it,  provided, whilst you
                        {Bk.XII:421.}
apply  yourself  to piety,  you  live at the same time a peaceable and

quiet life."

[29]   His amusements were very simple:  talking on ordinary matters
                                                                             Bk.XX:26357—Bk.XII:421.
with  the  people  of  the  house;  smoking  now  and  again a pipe of

tobacco;  watching  the habits and quarrels of insects; making obser-
                         Bk.XIB:252154.
vations  with  a  microscope—such  were  his  pastimes  in the hours

which  he  could  spare from his philosophy.   But the greater part of

his  day  was  taken  up  with  severe  mental  work  in his own room.

Sometimes  page XX  he  would  become  so  absorbed,  that  he would

remain  alone for two or three days together, his meals being carried

up to him.

[30]   Spinoza  had never been robust, and had for more than twenty
                                   {pulmonary tuberculosis; consumption}
years  been  suffering  from  phthisis,  a malady which, at any rate in

those  days,  never  allowed  its  victims  to  escape.   The end came
         Bk.XX:349.
quite  suddenly  and  quietly,  in  February, 1677.   On  Saturday, the

20th,   after  the  landlord  and  his  wife  had  returned  from  church,

Spinoza  spent  some  time  with  them  in conversation, and smoked

a  pipe  of  tobacco,  but went to bed early.   Apparently, he had pre-
                                                                   { E5:L29(12):317 }
viously  sent  for  his friend and physician, Lewis Meyer, who arrived

on  Sunday  morning.   On  the  21st,  Spinoza, came down as usual,

and  partook  of  some  food  at  the  mid-day meal.   In the afternoon,

the physician stayed alone with his patient,  the rest going to church.

But when the landlord and his wife returned,  they were startled with

the   news  that  the  philosopher  had  expired  about  three  o'clock.

Lewis Meyer returned to Amsterdam that same evening.

[31]   Thus  passed away all that was mortal of Spinoza.   If we have

read  his  character  aright,  his  last  hours  were comforted with  the

thought,  not  so much that he had raised for himself an imperishable              Perpetuation 

monument,  as  that  he  had  pointed  out  to mankind a sure path to

happiness  and  peace,  {PcM}.   Perhaps,  with  this glorious vision,

there mingled  the  more  tender  feeling, that, among the simple folk

with  whom  he  lived,  his  memory  would  for  a  few  brief years be

cherished with reverence and love.

[32]   The  funeral  took place on the 25th February, "being attended

by  many  illustrious  persons,  and  followed  by  six coaches."   The

estate left behind him by the philosopher was very scanty.  Rebekah
                        Bk.XIB:22071—Bk.XII:442.                           Bk.XX:351.
de  Spinoza,  sister  of  the  deceased,  put in a claim as his heir; but

abandoned  it on finding that, after the payment of expenses, little or

nothing would remain.

page XXI
[33]    The  MSS.,  which  were  found  in  Spinoza's  desk,  were,  in
                                                                    Bk.XIB:4522, 23—Bk.XII:441.
accordance  with  his  wishes,  forwarded  to  John Rieuwertz, a pub-
                                                     Bk.XIB:198;Bk.XX:349.^
lisher  of  Amsterdam, and were that same year brought out by Lewis
 Bk.XIB:2019.
Meyer,  and  another  of  the  philosopher's  friends,  under  the  title,

"B. D. S. Opera Posthuma."  They  consisted  of  the  Ethics, a selec-           Image of Title Page 

tion  of  Letters, a compendium of Hebrew grammar, and two uncom-

pleted  treatises,  one  on politics, the other (styled  "An Essay on the

Improvement  of  the  Understanding," )   on   logical   method.    The                       Wolf 

last-named   had   been  begun  several  years  previously,  but  had

apparently  been  added to from time to time. It develops some of the

doctrines  indicated  in  the Ethics,  and  serves  in  some  sort as an

introduction to the larger work. 
 

                        B. D. S.  Opera Posthuma Title Page
                              published in November 1677
                        {Used with the kind permission of Ulrich Harsch  
                                     from his Geometrico Demonstrata}

[34]   In  considering  Spinoza's  system  of philosophy, it must not be

forgotten  that  the  problem of the universe seemed much simpler in
                                                     {How much more so in 2005!}
his day {1670's}, than it does in  our  own {1880's}. Men had not then

recognized,  that knowledge is "a world whose margin fades for ever

and for ever as we move."    They believed that truth was something

definite,  which  might  be  grasped  by  the  aid  of a clear head, dili-

gence,  and a sound method.   Hence a tone of confidence breathed

through  their  inquiries, which has since died away, and a complete-

ness  was  aimed  at,  which is now seen to be unattainable, {except

pragmatically}. But the products of human thought are often valuable

in  ways  undreamt  of  by  those who fashioned them, and long after
                                                                   {hypothesis}
their  original  use has become obsolete.   A system, obviously inade-

quate  and  defective  as  a whole, may yet enshrine ideas which the

world is the richer for possessing {and evolving}.

[35]   This   distinction   between   the   framework   and  the  central

thoughts  is  especially  necessary  in  the  study  of  Spinoza; for the

form in which his work is cast would seem to lay stress on their inter-

dependence.   It  has  often  been  said, that the geometrical method

was  adopted,  because  it  was  page XXII  believed  to  insure absolute

freedom  from  error.  But examination shows this to be a misconcep-

tion.   Spinoza,  who  had  purged  his mind of so many illusions, can

hardly  have succumbed to the notion, that his Ethics was a flawless

mass  of  irrefragable  truth.   He  adopted  his  method  because  he

believed,   that   he  thus  reduced  argument  to  its  simplest  terms,

and  laid  himself  least open to the reductions of rhetoric or passion.

"It  is  the  part  of  a wise man," he says, "not to bewail nor to deride,             Spinoza's Dictum

but to understand."   Human nature obeys fixed laws no less than do

the figures of geometry.   "I will, therefore, write about human beings,

as  though  I  were  concerned  with  lines,  and  planes,  and solids."                    Triangles

[36]  As  no  system  is  entirely  true,  so  also  no system is entirely

original.    Each  must  in  great  measure  be  the  recombination  of
                                                {The same applies to Religion and Holidays.}
elements  supplied by its predecessors.   Spinozism forms no excep-

tion  to  this  rule;  many  of  its  leading  conceptions  may be traced
                                                                Bk.III:211.
in the writings of Jewish Rabbis and of Descartes.

[37]   The biography  of  the  philosopher  supplies  us  in  some sort                 Spinozism

with  the  genesis  of  his system.   His youth had been passed in the            Wolfson:2:221
                           {Endnote [37]}
study   of   Hebrew  learning,  of  metaphysical  speculations  on  the               Hampshire:203
  
nature  of  the  Deity.   He  was  then  confronted  with  the  scientific                Hampshire:28
                                                                      {for me, Spinoza and Einstein}
aspect  of  the  world  as  revealed  by  Descartes.  At  first  the  two                Dialectics
                                          EL:Endnote Bk.III:211 ^
visions   seemed  antagonistic,   but,   as   he  gazed,  their  outlines           Philosophy/Religion
  {Theistic - Spinozistic Theistic Synthesized, Paradigm Shift, ST:Note 4}                                                               Rosenberg:26
blended   and   commingled ^,  he found himself in the presence  not           {Read "Gifts of
                                {James}                                                 {organically, IP28, 29}                     the Jews" Pg. 156}
of  two,   but  of  ONE;  the  universe  unfolded  itself ^ to  him as the
                                                                                {ONE—1D6}
necessary  result  of  the  Perfect  and  Eternal  G-D.                                         Schorsch
 

From "Jews, God and History", ISBN 0451628667, Pg. 339.  {Thanks to Tim Bagwell.} 

The nineteenth-century Jewish Enlightenment  was like a beam 
of light refracted through a prism into a spectral band of brilliant 
intellectual  colors  spread  across Western Europe.  The prism 
through which Jewish thought was refracted was a Jew born in            Torah
Amsterdam  in 1632,  a  Jew  so  modern in his thinking that the 
second  half of the twentieth century has not yet caught up with 
him.  Excommunicated  by the Jews in the seventeenth century,            Damasio:32626 
abhorred  by  the  Christians in the eighteenth century, acknow- 
ledged "great" in  the  nineteenth  century,  Baruch Spinoza will 
perhaps not be fully understood even in the twenty-first century. 
But  perhaps  by  then  Spinoza's  philosophy will have become 
the basis of a world religion for neomodern man.                             Universal Religion

[38]   Other  influences,  no  doubt, played a part in shaping his con-

victions;  we know, for instance, that he was a student of Bacon and

of  Hobbes,  and  almost  certainly of Giordano Bruno, but these two
                                                    Bk.XIB:23398.
elements,  the  Jewish  and  the  Cartesian, are the main sources of                 Other sources 

his  system,  though  it  cannot  properly be called the mere develop-
                                                     Bk.III:211.
ment  of  either.   From page XXIII   Descartes, as Mr. Pollock points out,

he  derived  his  notions  of  physical science and his doctrine of the

conservation of motion.

[39]   In  the  fragment  on  the  Improvement  of  the  Understanding,

Spinoza  sets  forth the causes which prompted him to turn to philos-

ophy (xxiii:1).   It  is  worthy  of  note that they are not speculative but
                                                       Bk.III:211.
practical.   He  did  not  seek, like Descartes, "to walk with certainty,"
                     {pleasure}
but to find a happiness {better PcM}, beyond the reach of change for

himself  and  his  fellow  men.   With  a  fervour  that  reminds  one of

Christian  fleeing  from   the  City  of  Destruction,  he  dilates on  the

vanity  of  men's ordinary ambitions,  riches, fame, and the pleasures

of  sense,  and  on  the  necessity  of  looking  for some more worthy

object  for  their  desires.   Such  an object he finds in the knowledge

of  truth,  as  obtainable  through  clear and distinct  ideas, bearing in

themselves the evidence of their own veracity.

[40]   Spinoza  conceived  as  a  vast  unity  all  existence  actual and

possible;  indeed,  between  actual  and  possible  he  recognizes no

distinction,  for,  if  a  thing does not exist, there must be some cause

which  prevents  its  existing,  or  in other words renders it impossible.

This  unity  he  terms  indifferently Substance  or  G-D,   and the first

part  of  the  Ethics  is  devoted  to  expounding  its  Nature.                           E1:D.VI:45, Love of G-D.

[41]   Being the sum of existence, it is necessarily infinite (for there is

nothing external to itself to make it finite),  and it can be the cause of

an infinite number of results.   It must necessarily operate in absolute

freedom,  for there is nothing by which it can be controlled;  but none

the  less  necessarily  it must operate in accordance with eternal and

immutable laws, fulfilling the perfection of its own Nature.

[42]   Substance  consists  in,   or  rather  displays  itself  through  an

infinite  number  of  Attributes,  but  of  these  only two,  page XXIV Exten-

sion  and  Thought,  are  knowable  by us; therefore, the rest may be

left out of account in our inquiries.   These Attributes are not different
                                                                              {Substance}                                         {Three blind men
things,  but  different  aspects  of  the  same  thing (Spinoza does not             and the elephant.}

make  it  clear, whether the difference is intrinsic or due to the percip-

ient);  thus  Extension and Thought  are  not  parallel and interacting,

but  identical,  and  both acting in one order and connection.   Hence

all  questions  of  the dependence of mind on body, or body on mind,              Pineal Gland.

are  done  away  with  at  a  stroke.    Every manifestation of either is

but  a  manifestation  of  the  other,   seen  under  a  different  aspect.

[43]   Attributes  are  again  subdivided,  or rather display themselves

through  an  infinite  number of Modes; some eternal and universal in
                                                                                               {mental}
respect of each Attribute (such as motion and the sum of all psychical

facts);  others having no eternal and necessary existence,  but acting

and reacting on one another in ceaseless flux, according to fixed and

definite  laws.   These  latter  have been compared in relation to their

Attributes  to  waves  in  relation  to the sea; or again they may be lik-

ened  to  the  myriad  hues  which play over the iridescent surface of

a  bubble;  each  is  the  necessary  result  of that which went before,

and  is  the  necessary precursor of that which will come after; all are
  { affections }
modifications of the underlying film.   The phenomenal world is made

up  of  an  infinite  number  of  these  Modes.   It  is  manifest that the

Modes  of  one  Attribute  cannot  be acted upon by the Modes of an-

other  Attribute,  for  each  may  be  expressed  in  terms of the other;

within  the  limits  of  each Attribute the variation in the Modes follows

an  absolutely  necessary  order.   When  the  first  is  given,  the rest

follow  as  inevitably,  as  from  the  nature of a triangle it follows, that

its  three  angles  are  equal  to  two  right angles.  Nature is uniform,
                          {, miracle,}
and  no  infringement  of  her laws is conceivable without a reduction

to chaos.

                                                                              < E1:Parkinson:26844 >
[44]   Hence  it  follows,  that  a  thing  can  only  be called contingent
                                                                                       Bk.III:229^
page XXV  in  relation  to  our  knowledge.    To  an  infinite  intelligence

such a term would be unmeaning.

[45]   Hence also it follows,  that the world cannot have been created

for  any  purpose  other  than  that  which  it  fulfils by being what it is.

To  say  that  it  has  been  created  for  the  good  of man, or for any                 No Ends

similar end, is to indulge in grotesque anthropomorphism.

[46]   Among the Modes of thought may be reckoned the human mind,

among  the  Modes  of  extension may be reckoned the human body;

taken together they constitute the Mode man.

[47]     The  nature  of  mind  forms  the  subject  of  the  second  part

of  the Ethics.   Man's mind is the idea of man's body,  the conscious-      Meme Evolution, Mysticism.

ness  of  bodily  states.   Now bodily states are the result, not only of        Autonomic Nervous System

the  body  itself,  but  also  of  all things affecting the body; hence the

human  mind takes cognizance, not only of the human body, but also

of  the  external  world,  in  so  far  as  it  affects the human body.   Its

capacity for varied perceptions is in proportion to the body's capacity
                      {emotions}
for receiving impressions. {E2:VII:86.}

[48]   The  succession  of  ideas  of bodily states cannot be arbitrarily

controlled  by  the  mind  taken  as  a  power  apart,  though the mind,

as  the  aggregate  of  past  states,  may  be a more or less important

factor  in  the  direction  of  its  course.     We can, in popular phrase,

direct  our thoughts at will, but the will, which we speak of as sponta-              Mark Twain

neous, is really determined by laws as fixed and necessary, as those

which regulate the properties of a triangle or a circle.   The illusion of

freedom, in the sense of uncaused volition, results from the fact, that

men  are  conscious  of  their actions, but unconscious of the causes
                                                                  {no praise, no blame}
whereby  those  actions have been determined. The chain of causes

becomes,  so  to  speak,  incandescent at  a particular point, and men

assume  that  only  at  that  point  does  it  start  into existence.  They

ignore the links which still remain in obscurity.

page XXVI
[49]    If  mind  be  simply,  the  mirror  of  bodily  states,  how can we

account  for  memory?   When  the mind  has  been  affected  by two

things  in  close  conjunction,  the recurrence of one re-awakens into

life  the  idea  of  the  other.  To  take  an  illustration,  mind  is  like a

traveller  revisiting  his  former  home,  for  whom  each feature of the

landscape  recalls  associations  of  the  past.     From  the  interplay,

of associations are woven memory and imagination.

[50]   Ideas  may  be  either  adequate  or inadequate, in other words

either  distinct  or  confused;  both  kinds  are  subject  to  the  law of

causation. Falsity is merely a negative conception. All adequate ideas

are  necessarily  true,  and  bear  in themselves the evidence of their

own veracity.   The mind accurately reflects existence, and if an idea

be  due  to the mental association of two different factors, the joining,

so  to  speak, may, with due care, be discerned. General notions and

abstract  terms  arise from the incapacity of the mind to retain in com-

pleteness  more  than a certain number of mental images; it therefore

groups  together  points  of  resemblance, and considers the abstrac-

tions thus formed as units.

[51]   There  are  three  kinds  of  knowledge:  opinion, rational know-

ledge, and  intuitive knowledge.   The first alone is the cause of error;

the  second  consists  in  adequate  ideas  of  particular properties of

things,  and  in general notions; the third proceeds from an adequate

idea   of   some   attribute   of  G-D  to  the  adequate  knowledge  of

particular things.

[52]     The  reason  does  not  regard  things  as  contingent,  but  as

necessary, considering them under the form of eternity, as part of the

Nature  of  G-D.   The will has no existence apart from particular acts                  Mark Twain

of  volition,  and  since  acts  of  volition are ideas, the will is identical                      2P49

with the understanding.

[53]   The  third  part  of  the Ethics  is  devoted  to the consideration

of  the  emotions.

[54]    In  so  far  as  it  has  adequate ideas,   i.e.,  is  purely  rational,

page XXVII  the  mind  maybe  said to be active; in so far as it has inade-

quate   ideas,   it   is  passive,   and  therefore  subject  to  emotions.
 
         {E3:IV:136}
[55]    Nothing  can  be  destroyed  from  within,   for  all change must
                                                                             {E3:VI:136}
come from without.   In other words, everything endeavours to persist
                                                           {Why not? I think it is.}
in  its  own  being.    This endeavour must not be associated with the
        Darwinism +1+2
"struggle for existence"  familiar  to students  of evolutionary theories,

though   the   suggestion   is  tempting;   it  is  simply  the  result  of  a

thing  being  what  it  is.  When  it  is  spoken  of  in  reference  to the
                                                                      <Bk.XV:278113onE3:IX(3)N:137.>
human mind  only, it is equivalent to the will; in reference to the whole

man,  it  may  be  called  appetite.  Appetite is thus identified with life;
                              < Bk.XV:278114 on E3:IX(4):137 >
desire  is defined as appetite, with consciousness thereof.  All objects

of  our  desire  owe  their choice-worthiness simply to the fact that we

desire them: we do not desire a thing, because it is intrinsically good,

but  we  deem  a thing good, because we desire it.  Every thing which
                                                           {E3:GN(2)n }
adds to  he bodily or mental powers of activity is pleasure; everything

which detracts from them is pain.

[56] From these three fundamentals—desire, pleasure, pain—Spinoza

deduces  the entire list of human emotions.  Love is pleasure, accom-

panied by the idea of an external cause; hatred is pain, accompanied

by  the idea of an external cause.     Pleasure or pain may be excited

by anything, incidentally, if not directly.  There is no need to proceed

further  with  the  working  out  of  the  theory,  but we may remark, in

passing,  the  extraordinary  fineness  of  perception and sureness of
                                                          { or here }
touch,  with  which it is accomplished; here, if nowhere else, Spinoza   

remains  unsurpassed  (xxvii:1).    Almost  page XXVIII  all  the   emotions           Damasio's Bk. XXVI

arise  from  the  passive  condition  of  the  mind,  but  there is also a

pleasure  arising  from  the  mind's  contemplation  of  its  own power.

This is the source of virtue, and is purely active.

[57]   In  the  fourth  part  of  the Ethics,  Spinoza  treats  of man in so

far  as  he  is  subject  to  the  emotions,  prefixing  a  few remarks on

the   meaning   of  the  terms  perfect  and  imperfect,  good  and  evil.

A  thing  can  only  be  called perfect in reference to the known inten-

tion of its author.   We style "good" that which we know with certainty

to be useful to us: we style "evil" that which we know will hinder us in

the  attainment of good.   By, "useful," we mean that which will aid us

to approach gradually the ideal we have set before ourselves.    Man,

being a part only of Nature, must be subject to emotions, because he

must  encounter  circumstances  of which he is not the sole and suffi-

cient  cause.   Emotion  can  only  be  conquered by another emotion

stronger than itself,  hence knowledge will only lift us above the sway

of  passions,  in  so  far  as it is itself  "touched with emotion."   Every

man necessarily,  and therefore rightly, seeks his own interest, which

is  thus  identical  with  virtue; but his own interest does not lie in sel-

fishness,  for  man  is  always in need of external help, and nothing is

more  useful  to  him than his fellow-men; hence individual well-being

is best promoted by harmonious social effort.     The reasonable man

will  desire  nothing  for himself,  which  he  does  not desire for other

men;  therefore  he  will  be  just,  faithful,  and honourable. {E2:II:192. }

[58]   The  code  of  morals  worked  out  on  these  lines bears many

resemblances  to  Stoicism,   though  it  is  improbable  that  Spinoza

was   consciously   imitating.    The   doctrine   that  rational  emotion,

rather than pure reason,  is necessary for subduing the evil passions,

is entirely his own.

                                                                      {       peace-of-mind        }
[59]     The means whereby man may gain mastery over his passions,

are  set  forth  in  the  first portion of the fifth part page XXIX of the Ethics.

They  depend  on  the  definition  of passion as a confused idea.  As

soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of a passion,  it changes its

character,  and ceases to be a passion.  Now it is possible,  with due

care,  to form a distinct idea of every bodily state;  hence a true know-

ledge  of  the  passions  is  the  best  remedy against them.   While we

contemplate  the world as a necessary result of the perfect Nature of
       { Isaac Bashevis Singer }   
G-D,  feeling of joy  will arise in our hearts, accompanied by the idea                  Mysticism
       { better, °PcM  ^ }                       {         Cash Value            }
of G-D as its cause.  This  is the intellectual love of G-D,  which is the
      { better, °PcM }
highest happiness man can know. It seeks for no special love from G-D            G-D at 100% °P
                                                                         {miracle}
in return, for such would imply a change in the Nature of the Deity.  It

rises above all fear of change through envy or jealousy, and increases

in  proportion  as  it  is  seen  to  be participated in by our fellow-men.
 
                        {E5:XXI-XLII:259}
[60]   The  concluding propositions  of  the Ethics  have  given rise to
             {dispute}
more  controversy  than  any  other  part of the system.   Some critics

have   maintained  that  Spinoza  is  indulging  in  vague  generalities

without  any  definite  meaning,  others  have  supposed  that the lan-

guage  is  intentionally obscure.   Others,  again,  see  in them a doc-

trine of personal immortality, and, taking them in conjunction with the               Bk.XIV:2:3112    

somewhat  transcendental  form  of  the  expressions  concerning the
                                                                                            Bk.XIB:229.
love  of  G-D,  have  claimed  the  author  of  the  Ethics  as a Mystic.

All  these suggestions are reductions to the absurd, the last not least

so.   Spinoza  may  have  been  not  unwilling  to show that his creed

could be expressed in exalted language as well as the current theology
                        EL:xxix:1A-Love
 but   his   "intellectual love"   has   no   more  in  common  with  the

ecstatic  enthusiasm  of  cloistered saints, than his "G-D" has in com-

mon  with the Divinity of Romanist peasants, or his "eternity" with the
                                                                             (xxix:1)    { xxix:1A }
paradise  of  Mahomet.   But   to  return  to  the  doctrine  in  dispute .
                                  { E5:XXIII:259 }                           { ^E5:Endnote20:20N}
"The  human  mind,"  says Spinoza, "cannot be wholly destroyed with

the  body,   but  page XXX  somewhat  of  it  remains,  which  is  eternal."              Durant:746:[1a]

The  eternity  thus  predicated  cannot mean indefinite persistence in

time, for eternity is not commensurable with time.  It must mean some

special  kind  of existence; it is, in fact, defined as a mode of thinking.

Now,  the mind consists of adequate and inadequate ideas;  in so far

as  it  is composed  of the former, it is part of the infinite mind of G-D,

which  broods,  as  it were, over the extended universe as its expres-

sion  in  terms  of  thought.   As  such,  it  is  necessarily eternal, and,

since  knowledge  implies  self-consciousness,  it  knows  that it is so.

Inadequate ideas will pass away with the body, because they are the

result  of  conditions,  which  are  merely  temporary, and inseparably
                                                           {triangles}
connected  with  the  body,  but  adequate  ideas  will not pass away,

inasmuch as they are part of the mind of the Eternal.    Knowledge of

the  third  or  intuitive kind is the source of our highest perfection and

blessedness;  even  as  it  forms  part  of  the infinite mind of G-D, so

also  does  the joy with which it is accompanied—the intellectual love

of  G-D—form  part  of  the  infinite  intellectual  love, wherewith G-D

regards Himself.

[61]   Spinoza concludes with the admonition, that morality rests on a

basis  quite  independent  of  the  acceptance  of  the  mind's Eternity.

Virtue  is  its  own reward,  and needs no other.  This doctrine, which

appears, as it were, perfunctorily in so many systems of morals, is by

Spinoza  insisted  on with almost passionate earnestness; few things

seem  to  have  moved  him  to  more scornful denial than the popular

creed,  that supernatural rewards and punishments are necessary as
                                                              Bk.XX:247.
incentives to virtue. "I see in what mud this man sticks,"  he exclaims

in  answer  to  some  such statement. "He is one of those who would

follow after his own lusts, if he were not restrained by the fear of hell.

He  abstains page XXXI  from  evil  actions  and  fulfils  God's commands

like  a  slave  against  his  will,  and  for  his  bondage  he expects to

be   rewarded   by   God   with   gifts   far   more   to   his  taste  than
                  (EL:L49(43):365—"and greater in proportion to his dislike to goodness.")
Divine love,  and  great  in  proportion  to his original dislike of virtue."

Again,  at  the  close  of  the  Ethics,  he  draws  an  ironical picture of

the  pious  coming  before  God  at  the  Judgment, and looking to be

endowed  with incalculable blessings in recompense for the grievous

burden of their piety.   For him,  who is truly wise, Blessedness is not                    5P42:270

the  reward  of  virtue,  but  virtue itself.  "And though the way thereto

be  steep,  yet it may be found—all things excellent are as difficult, as            Concluding Thought

they are rare."

[62]    Such,   in  rough  outline,  is  the  philosophy  of  Spinoza;  few

systems  have  been  more variously interpreted. Its author has been
                                                    Bk.XIB:230, 231.
reviled   or   exalted   as  Atheist,  Pantheist,  Monotheist, Materialist,
 Bk.XIB:229.    Bk.XIX:25344, 45, & 46.^                ^ Bk.XVIII:32—Bk.XIV:II:39.
Mystic,  in  fact,  under almost every name in the philosophic vocabu-

lary.   But  such  off-hand  classification is based on hasty reading of

isolated  passages,  rather  than  on  sound  knowledge of the whole.

We  shall  act  more wisely, and more in the spirit of the master, if, as

Professor Land advises, "we call him simply Spinoza, and endeavour

to learn from himself what he sought and what he found."

                                                                                               Books 1 & 2
[63]   The two remaining works,  translated in these volumes, may be

yet more briefly considered.  They present no special difficulties, and

are easily read in their entirety.

[64]    The Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, {BkII}, is an  eloquent  plea

for  religious liberty.   True religion  is shown to consist in the practice

of  simple  piety, and to be quite independent of philosophical specu-

lations.   The  elaborate  systems  of  dogmas framed by theologians

are based on superstition, resulting from fear.

[65]   The  Bible  is examined by a method, which anticipates in great

measure  the  procedure of modern rationalists {1880's}, and  page XXXII

the  theory  of  its verbal  inspiration  is shown to be untenable.   The

Hebrew prophets were distinguished not by superior wisdom,  but by

superior  virtue,  and  they  set  forth  their  higher moral ideals in lan-

guage,  which  they  thought  would best commend it to the multitude

whom they  addressed.  For anthropomorphic notions of the Deity as

a  heavenly  King  and Judge, who displays His power by miraculous

interventions,  is  substituted the conception set forth in the Ethics of

an  Infinite Being,  fulfilling  in  the uniformity of natural law the perfec-

tion  of  His  own Nature.   Men's thoughts cannot really be constrain-

ed by commands;  therefore, it is wisest, so long as their actions con-

form to morality, to allow them absolute liberty to think what they like,

and say what they think.

                   Bk.XIB:25.
[66]  The Political Treatise  {Bk.II:283}  was the latest work of Spinoza's
                       {L(84):357 }
life,  and  remains  unfinished.   Though  it  bears  abundant evidence
                                 Bk.III:211.
of  the  influence of  Hobbes,  it  differs  from him in several important           Hampshire:179 

points.   The  theory  of  sovereignty  is  the same in both writers, but

Spinoza  introduces  considerable qualifications.   Supreme power is

ideally  absolute,  but  its  rights  must,  in  practice,  be limited by the

endurance  of  its  subjects.    Thus governments are founded on the

common consent, and for the convenience of the governed, who are,

in the last resort, the arbiters of their continuance.

[67]    Spinoza,  like  Hobbes,  peremptorily  sets  aside  all  claims of          Hampshire:179 
   {Where there are multiple Religions but not where there is a Universal Religion.}
religious  organizations  to act independently of, or as superior to the

civil  power.   Both  reject  as  outside  the sphere of practical politics

the case of a special revelation to an individual.   In all matters affect-            Din Medinah Din 

ing conduct the State must be supreme.

[68]  It remains to say a few words about the present version.  I alone

am responsible for the contents of these volumes, with the exception

of  the Political Treatise,  which  has  been  translated  for me by my

friend  Mr.  A. H. Gosset,  page XXXIII  Fellow  of  New  College,  Oxford,

who  has  also,  in  my  absence  from England, kindly seen the work

through  the  press.  I  have  throughout  followed Bruder's {1843 Latin}

text  (xxxiii:1)  {xxxiii:J4 , xxxiii:J5},  correcting  a  few  obvious misprints.

The  additional letters  given  in  Professor Van  Vloten's Supplement

(xxxiii:2), have been inserted in their due order.

[69]   This  may  claim  to  be  the  first  version  (xxxiii:3) of  Spinoza's

works  offered  to  the  English  reader;  for,  though Dr. R. Willis has

gone  over  most  of  the  ground  before,  he  laboured under the dis-

advantages  of  a  very  imperfect  acquaintance  with Latin, and very

loose notions of accuracy. The Tractatus Theologico-Politicus xxxiii:J6

had  been  previously  translated  in  1689.     Mr. Pollock  describes

this  early  version  as "pretty accurate,  but of no great literary merit."

[70]   Whatever  my  own  shortcomings,   I  have  never  consciously

eluded  a  difficulty  by  a  paraphrase.     Clearness  has  throughout

been  aimed  at  in  preference  to  elegance.     Though  the  precise

meaning  of  some  of  the  philosophical  terms  (e.g. idea)  varies in

different  passages,  I  have,  as  far  as  possible,    given  a  uniform

rendering,  not venturing  to  attempt  greater  subtlety  than  I  found.

I  have  abstained  from  notes;  for,  if  given  on  an adequate scale,

they  would  have  unduly  swelled  the  bulk of the work.   Moreover,

excellent commentaries are readily accessible.
 

                                                                     R. H. M. ELWES, 1883.

[End] 
 
 

R. H. M. ELWES'S  ENDNOTES

page v
v:1     "Short Studies in Great Subjects,"  first series,  art.  "Spinoza."

v:2      "Essays in Criticism,"  art.  "Spinoza and the Bible."

v:3       "Benedict de Spinoza; his Life, Correspondence, and Ethics."
            1870.

v:4        But  in  1880  Mr.  Pollock  brought  out  his  most  valuable
            "Spinoza, his Life and Philosophy, Book XII."  {Ordering Books}  
            I  take  this  early opportunity of recording my deep obligations 
            to  Mr.  Pollock's  book.    I have made free use of it,  together 
            with  Dr.  Martineau's,  in  compiling  this  introduction.    In the 
            passages which Mr. Pollock has incidentally translated, I have 
            been  glad to be able to refer to the versions of so distinguish- 
            ed  a  scholar. 

page vi
vi:1      "Spinoza: ein Denkerleben."  1855.

page viii
viii:1    "B. de Spinoza, Opera. I."  The Hague,  1882.

page ix
ix:1      The main authority for the facts of Spinoza's life  is a short
            biography by Johannes Colerus (Kohler) Lutheran.               The Life of B. De Spinosa
            Originally  written in Dutch (1706).  Translated the same year           Bk.XIV:1:3231
            into French and English,  and afterwards (1723) into German. 
            The  English  version  is reprinted  in  Mr.  Pollock's  book  as  
            an appendix A, Page 409.   Page 438—"Of the last Sickness,
            and Death of Spinosa" is reprinted herein. 

page xi
xi:1      Neff L32(19):331 {Spinoza to Blyenbergh -- Spinoza answers with his
               usual  courtesy  the  question  propounded  by  Blyenbergh  in L31(18):327.}
                                                                                  Bk.XIB:250.

xi:2       A translator has special opportunities for observing the extent 
            of  Spinoza's  knowledge  of Latin.   His sentences are gram- 
            matical and his meaning almost always clear. But his vocabu- 
            lary is restricted;  his style is wanting in flexibility, and seldom 
            idiomatic; in fact, the niceties of scholarship are wanting.   He 
            reminds  one  of  a  clever workman who accomplishes much 
            with simple tools. 

page xii
xii:1     Neff EL:L74(76):414 { in answer to EL:L73(67):410.} 
           Spinoza To Albert Burgh.  Spinoza laments the step taken 
            by  his  pupil,  conversion to Catholicism, and answers his 
            arguments.  The Hague, end of 1675. 
           { Bk.XIII:43103 } 

page xiii
xiii:1    L51(45):370.   Leibnitz to Spinoza;  Re: Optics.
           L52(46):371.  Spinoza to Leibnitz;  Reply. ??

page xiv                            {Bk.XIB:14414—Bk.XII:421. }
xiv:1    L26(8):309; Simon De Vries to Spinoza.
              Simon de Vries,  a  diligent  student  of  Spinoza's writings and
            philosophy,  describes a club formed for the study of Spinoza's
            MS.  containing  some of the matter afterwards worked into the
            Ethics,   and   asks   questions   about   the   difficulties   felt by
            members  of  the  club.

              NeffL27(9):313; Spinoza to Simon De Vries.
              Spinoza  deprecates  his  correspondent's  jealousy  of  Albert
           Burgh;  and  answers  that  distinction must be made between
           different  kinds  of  definitions.   He explains his opinions more
           precisely.

page xv
xv:1     L26(8):309; NeffL27(9):313. Same as above.

xv:2      "Spinoza  at  least  in  one instance received into his house a
             private  pupil  generally identified with one Albert Burgh, who
             became  a  convert  to Rome in 1675, and took that occasion
             to  admonish  his  ex-tutor  in  a  strain of contemptuous pity."
             {EL:L73(68):410. }

xv:3     The full title is, "Renati des Cartes Principiorum partes I.et11.                       Letter:3320[34
            more  geometrico  demonstratae per Benedictum de Spinoza
            Amstelodamensem.    Accesserant  ejusdem  cogitata  meta-
            physica. Amsterdam", 1663.

page xvi
xvi:1    L01(01):275,  sqq.      Oldenburgh  and Spinoza correspondence;
                                                carried  on  from  Letter  I  to  Letter XXV.a.
 
                      Neff EL:L2(2):275. Defines "G-D" and "attribute" and sends definitions,
                      axioms, and first four propositions of Book I of Ethics.  Some errors
                      of Bacon and Descartes discussed.  Bk.III:211.

                Footnote  from:  http://www.dircon.co.uk/meta4/spinoza/
                Henry Oldenburg  (1628-1678)  Founder member of the Royal Society
                and  the consul for Bremen in London under the Commonwealth.  Also
                corresponded  with  Leibniz.  (Spinoza  corresponded  with Oldenburg
                until the end of his life but met him only once.)

xvi:2     But  Tschirnhausen  seems  to  have brought Oldenburg and
            Boyle  to  a  better  mind.  {TL:65(63):396.}

xvi:3     L51(45):370.  See xiii:1

xvi:4     L61(57):389, sqq.

xvi:5     L31(18):327, sqq.

xvi:6     L55(51):375, sqq.

page xviii
xviii:1    L53(47):373.

page xviii
xviii:2    L54(48):374.

page xxiii
xxiii:1   These  observations are not offered as a complete exposition
            of  Spinozism,  but  merely as an indication of its general drift.

page xxvii
xxvii:1  It  may  be  worth  while  to cite the often-quoted testimony of
            the   distinguished   physiologist,   Johannes  Muller:— "With
            regard  to  the  relations of the passions to one another apart
            from  their  physiological  conditions,  it  is  impossible to give            Damasio's Bk. XXVI
            any  better  account  than  that  which Spinoza has laid down
            with   unsurpassed  mastery."- Physiologie  des  Menschen,
            ii. 543.   He follows up this praise by quoting the propositions
            in question in extenso.

page xxix
xxix:1  The  explanation here  indicated  is  based  on  that  given  by
          Mr. Pollock, "Spinoza" &c., ch. ix., pg. 288, to which the reader
           is  referred  for  a  masterly  exposition  of  the  question.

                                                  Bk.XIB:11651;Bk.XVIII:357.
         { From Bk.XII:288—-Pollock on Eternity of the Mind.
                                        Wolfson, De Dijn, Curley, Parkinson.
                                        EL:[60]:xxix; E5:XX(20):259. }

We  are  now  on  the threshold of the singular and difficult part of 
Spinoza's  exposition.  I  shall  begin by stating as clearly as I can 
what  I  conceive his meaning to have been.  Next I shall point out 
what I believe to be the historical ancestry of his doctrine.  Then I 
shall  give  the  leading  points  of  the argument in Spinoza's own 
words, or as nearly so as may be, and at the same time exhibit in 
detail,  for  any  reader who cares to follow me so far, the manner 
in which I justify my interpretation. 

Whatever  is  known  as  part  of the necessary  order of Nature, 
in  other  words  exactly  or  scientifically,  is  said by Spinoza  to 
be  known  ‘under  the  form  of  eternity.'   And  this is eminently 
true    of    the    immediate    knowledge    which    he   calls  the 
third kind.    Now  in  every  act  of  knowledge  the  mind  is  ( in 
Spinoza's  technical sense)  the idea of a certain state of its own 
body;  and  if  we  regard  this  as  a  knowledge  of its own body 
(which  I  shall  show  that  Spinoza  does),  the  mind  in contem- 
plating  things as necessary knows its own body ‘under the form 
of eternity.'  But the knowing mind has a consciousness or know- 
 ledge of itself which exactly corresponds to its knowledge of the 
body;  in  Spinoza's  language, it is the idea of itself as well as of 
the body. Therefore in all exact knowledge the mind knows itself 
‘under  the  form of eternity:'  that is to say, in every such act it is 
eternal, and knows itself as eternal.  This eternity is not a persis- 
 tence  in  time  after the dissolution of the body, for it is not com- 
mensurable  with  time  at  all.  And  there  is  associated with it a 
state  or  quality of  perfection called the intellectual  love of G-D. 
This  is  not  an emotion,  since the emotion of pleasure involves 
transition  to greater perfection, and therefore a finite time;   but it 
is  related  to  the  emotion  of  love  as  the eternity of the mind is 
related  to  its  existence  in  time  in a particular act of knowledge. 
The  intellectual  love  of  man  for  G-D is part of the infinite intel- 
lectual  love wherewith G-D loves himself; and the mind, together 
with  whatsoever  it  knows  'under the form of eternity,' is a link in 
an  infinite  chain  of  eternal  beings,  which all together make up 
the  infinite  mind  of  G-D."    { xxix:1 }  

{ xxix:1A  From Bk.XIV:2:3084—-Wolfson on Eternity of the Mind.
                                                   Pollock, De Dijn, Curley, Parkinson.
                                                   EL:[60]:xxix; E5:XX(20):259.}

Thus  also  those  who  conceive  immortality  to  accrue to the ac-          E5:Wolfson:2:311ff 
quired  intellect by reason of its being in possession of knowledge 
explain  eternal bliss  to  consist  in  the  pleasure  experienced by 
the  immortal souls in their continuous possession of perfect know- 
ledge.  This  kind  of pleasure is also that which Aristotle attributes 
to  god,  a  pleasure  which  consists  in being forever in a state of 
actuality  and  in  the  actual  possession  of  the  object of thought. 
The  same  kind  of answer is also given here by Spinoza.  He has 
already   explained   that  pleasure  which  is  related  to  the  mind 
in  so  far  as  we  act  does  not  consist in a transition to a greater 
perfection  but  rather  in  the  mind's  contemplation of itself and of 
its own power of acting.  Of  the  same nature, he now says, is the 
pleasure   associated   with   the   intellectual  love   of G-D.   It  is 
sui generis; and he calls it by the traditional name of Blessedness 
(beatitudo).  Unlike  ordinary  pleasure,  there  is  no transition to a 
greater perfection in it,  for  "if pleasure consists in a transition to a 
greater  perfection,  blessedness  must  indeed consist in this, that 
the mind is endowed with perfection itself."   { xxix:1A }  

page xxxiii
xxxiii:1  "B.  de  Spinosa  Opera  quae  Supersunt  Omnia," ed. C. H.
             Leipzig (Tauchnitz), 1843. {xxxiii:J4 , xxxiiiJ5}

xxxiii:2  "Ad B. D. S. Opera quae Supersunt Omnia Supplementum."
             Amsterdam, 1862.

xxxiii:3   While  these  volumes  were  passing  through  the press, a
             translation   of   the  Ethics   appeared   by   Mr.  Hale  White
             (Trubner and Co.).  TheTractatus Politicus was translated in
             1854  by W. Maccall, but the book has become so rare as to
             be practically inaccessible.

From Pollock's Book XII, Page 438. 

        Colerus - Of the last Sickness, and Death of Spinosa. 

THERE has been so many various and false Reports about the Death of Spinoza, that 'tis a wonder how some understanding Men came to acquaint the Publick with it upon Hear- says, without taking care to be better informed of what they published. One may find page 439 a Pattern of those falsehoods in the Menagiana, Printed at Amsterdam in 1695, where the Author expresses himself thus:

"I have been told that Spinoza died of the fear he was in, of being committed to the Bastille. He came into France at the desire of two Persons of Quality, who had a mind to see him. Mr. de Pompone had notice of it, and being a Minister, very zealous for Religion, he did not think fit to permit that Spinosa shou'd live in France, where he might do a great deal of Mischief; and in order to prevent it, he resolv'd to send him to the Bastille. Spinosa having had notice of it, made his escape in a Fryar's Habit; but I will not warrant this last Circumstance. That which is certain, is, that I have been told by several people, that he was a little Man, and of a yellowish complexion, and that he had an ill Look, and bore a Character of Reprobation in his Face."

[2]
There is not one word of truth in this Account; for it is certain, that Spinosa was never in France: And tho some Persons of great note endeavoured to have him there, (Probably on the Occasion of his visit to the French camp in 1672.) as he himself confest to his Landlords, yet he assured them, at the same time, that he hoped he wou'd never be so great a Fool as to do such a thing. One may also easily judge from what I shall say hereafter, that it is altogether false that he died of Fear. Wherefore I shall set down the Circumstances of his Death without partiality, and I shall advance nothing without proving it; which I can the more easily do, because he died, and was buried here at the Hague.

[3]
Spinosa was a Man of a very weak Constitution, unhealthy and lean, and had been troubled with a Pthysick above twenty years, which oblig'd him to keep a strict course of Dyet, and to be extreamly sober in his Meat and Drink. Nevertheless, his Landlord, and the people of the House did not believe that he was so near his end, even a little while before he died, and they had not the least thought of it. For the 22nd (It should be 20th, Colerus corrects himself afterwards, ad fin.) of February, which happen'd to be then the Saturday before the last week of the Carnaval, his Landlord and his Wife went to the Sermon which is preach'd in our Church, to dispose every Body to receive the Communion, which is administred the next day according to a Custom established amongst us. The Landlord being come from Church at four a Clock, or thereabouts, Spinosa went down Stairs, and had a pretty long Conversation with him, which did particularly run upon the Sermon; and having taken a Pipe of page 440 Tobacco, he retired into his Chamber, which was forwards, and went to Bed betimes. Upon Sunday Morning before Church-time, he went down Stairs again, and discoursed with his Landlord and his Wife. He had sent for a Physitian from Amsterdam, whose Name I shall only express by these two Letters, L. M. That Phisitian ordered 'em to boil an old Cock immediately, that Spinosa might take some Broth about noon, which he did, and eat some of the Meat with a good Stomach, when his Landlord and his Wife came from Church. In the afternoon the Physitian L. M. staid alone with Spinosa, the people of the House being returned to Church. But as they were coming from Church, they were very much surprized to hear, that Spinosa had expired about three a Clock, in the presence of that Physitian, who that very Evening returned to Amsterdam by the Night-boat, without taking any care of the Deceased. He was more willing to dispense himself from that Duty, because immediately after the Death of Spinosa he had taken a Ducatoon and a little Money, which the Deceased had left upon the Table, and a Knife with a Silver Handle; and so retired with his Booty.

[4]
The particularities of his Sickness and Death have been variously reported, and have occasioned several Contestations. 'Tis said, 1st, That during his Sickness he took the necessary Precautions to avoid being visited by those whose Sight wou'd have been troublesome to him. 2dly, That he spoke once and even several times these words, O G-D have mercy upon me miserable Sinner. 3dly, That they heard him often sigh, when he pronounced the Name of G-D. Which gave occasion to those, who were present, to ask him, whether he believed, at last, the Existence of a G-D, whose judgment he had great Reason to fear after his death? And that he answered 'em, that he had dropt that word {fear} out of Custom. 'Tis said, 4thly, That he kept by him some Juice of Mandrake ready at hand which he made use of, when he perceived he was a dying, that he drew the Curtains of his Bed afterwards, and then lost his Senses, fell into a profound Sleep, and departed this Life in that manner. 5thly, That he had given express orders to let no Body come into his Room, when he shou'd be near his End: And likewise, that finding he was a dying, he call'd for his Landlady, and desired her to suffer no Minister to come to him; because he was willing to die peaceably and without disputing, &c.

[5]
I have carefully enquired into the truth of all those things, and ask'd several times his Landlord and his Landlady, who are alive page 441 still, what they knew of it: But they answered me, at all times, that they knew nothing of it, and were perswaded that all those Circumstances were meer Lies. For he never forbad them to admit any body into his Room, that had a mind to see him. Besides, when he was a dying, there was no body in his Chamber but the Physitian of Amsterdam, whom I have mentioned. No body heard the words, which 'tis said, he spoke, O Gad, have mercy upon me miserable Sinner: Nor is it likely that they shou'd come out of his mouth, seeing he did not think he was so near his Death, and the people of the House had not the least suspicion of it. He did not keep his Bed during his sickness; for the very day that he died, he went down Stairs, as I have observed: He lay forwards (Sa chambre étoit celle de devant.) in a Bed made according to the fashion of the Country, which they call Bedstead. His Landlady, and the people of the house know nothing of his ordering to send away the Ministers, that shou'd come to see him, or of his invocating the Name of G-D during his Sickness. Nay, they believe the contrary, because ever since he began to be in a languishing condition, he always exprest, in all his sufferings, a truly Stoical constancy; even so as to reprove others, when they happened to complain, and to shew in their Sicknesses little Courage or too great a Sensibility.

[6]
Lastly, as for the Juice of Mandrake, which, 'tis said, he made use of when he was a dying, which made him lose his Senses; it is also a circumstance altogether unknown to the people of the House. And yet they us'd to prepare every thing he wanted for his Meat and Drink, and the Remedies which he took from time to time. Nor is that Drug mention'd in the Apothecary's Bill, who was the same to whom the Physitian of Amsterdam sent for the Remedies, which Spinosa wanted the last days of his Life.

[7]
Spinosa being dead, his Landlord took care of his Burial. John Rieuwertz, a Printer at Amsterdam, desired him to do it, and promised him, at the same time, that he shou'd be paid for all the charges he should be at, and past his word for it. The Letter which he wrote to him upon that Subject is dated from Amsterdam the 6th of March 1678 (A mistake of the French version for 1677? cp. p. 422 above.). He does not forget to speak of that Friend of Schiedam, whom I have mentioned, who to shew how dear and precious the memory of Spinosa was to him, paid exactly to Vander Spyck, all that he cou'd pretend from his late Lodger. The Money page 442 was at the same time remitted to him, as Rieuwertz himself had received it by the order of his Friend.

[8]
As they were making everything ready for the Burial of Spinosa, one Schroder, an Apothecary, made a Protestation against it, pretending to be paid for some Medicines wherewith he had furnished the Deceased during his Sickness. His Bill amounted to sixteen Florins and two pence. I find in it some Tincture of Saffron, some Balsam, some Powders, etc. but there is no Opium nor Mandrake mentioned therein. The Protestation was immediately taken off, and the Bill paid by Mr. Vander Spyck.

[9]
The dead Body was carried to the Grave in the New Church upon the Spuy, the 25th of February, being attended by many Illustrious persons and followed by six Coaches. The Burial being over, the particular Friends or Neighbours, were treated with some Bottles of Wine, according to the custom of the Country, in the House where the Deceased lodged.

[10]
I shall observe by the bye, that the Barber of Spinosa brought in after his Death, a Bill exprest in these words: "Mr Spinosa, of "Blessed Memory, (Fr. 'Mr. Spinosa de bienheureuse mémoire:' in original 'Spinoza Zaliger,'.) owes to Abraham Kevvel, for having shaved him "the last Quarter, the summ of one Florin and eighteen Pence. The Man, who invited his Friends to his Burial, two Ironmongers, and the Mercer, who furnished the Mourning Gloves, made him the same Complement in their Bills.

[11]
If they had known what were the Principles of Spinosa in point of Religion; 'tis likely that they would not have made use of the word Blessed: Or perhaps they used that word according to Custom, which permits, sometimes, the abuse of such Expressions, even with respect to those, who die in despair, or in a final Impenitence.

[12]
Spinosa being buried, his Landlord caused the Inventory of his Goods to be made. The Notary he made use of, brought in a Bill, in this form: William van Hove, Notary, far having made the Inventory of the Goods and Effects of the late Sieur Benedict de Spinosa. His Bill amounts to seventeen Florins and eight pence, which he acknowledges to have received the 14th of November, 1677.

[13]
Rebekah of Spinosa, Sister of the Deceased, declared her self his Heir. But because she refused to pay, in the first place, the charges of the Burial, and some Debts wherewith the Succession was clogged; Mr. Vander Spyck sent to her at Amsterdam, and summoned her to do it, by Robert Schmeding, who carried his Letter page 443 of Attorny drawn up and signed by Libertus Loef the 30th of March, 1677. But, before she paid any thing, she had a mind to know, whether the Debts and Charges being paid, she might get something by her Brother's Inheritance. Whilst she was deliberating about it, Vander Spyck was authoriz'd by Law, to make a publick Sale of the Goods in question; which was executed; and the Money arising from the sale being deposited in the usual place, the Sister of Spinosa made an Attachment of it. But perceiving that after the payment of the Charges and Debts, there wou'd be little or nothing at all left, she desisted from her pretentions. The Attorny, John Lukkats, who served Vander Spyck in that Affair, brought him a Bill of thirty three Florins and sixteen pence, for which he gave his Receipt the 1st of June, 1678. The Sale of the said Goods was made here (at the Hague) the 4th of November, 1677, by Rykus van Stralen, a sworn Cryer, as it appears by his Account, bearing the same Date.

[14]
One needs only cast one's Eyes upon that Account, to perceive that it was the Inventory of a true Philosopher: It contains only some small Books, some Cuts, some pieces of polished Glass, some Instruments to polish them, &c.

[15]
It appears likewise, by his Cloaths, how good a Husband he was. A Camlet Cloak, and a pair of Breeches were sold for twenty one Florins and fourteen pence, another grey Cloak, twelve Florins and fourteen pence, four Sheets, six Florins and eight pence, seven Shirts, nine Florins and six pence, one Bed fiveteen Florins, nineteen Bands, one Florin and eleven pence, five Handkerchiefs, twelve pence, two red Curtains, a Counter-pain, and a little Blanket, six Florins: And all his Plate, consisted of one Pair of Silver-Buckles, which were sold, two Florins. The whole Sale of the Goods amounted to four hundred Florins and thirteen Pence; and the charges of the Sale being deducted, there remained three hundred ninety Florins and fourteen pence.

[16]
These are all the particulars I cou'd learn about the Life and Death of Spinosa: He was forty four years, two months and twenty seven days old, when he died; which happen'd the 21st of February, 1677, and he was buried the 25th of the same month.

FINIS.
 
 

JBY  ENDNOTES:
 

Bk.XIB:11651—From Feuer's Bk.XIB:Page 283.     Wolfson's Ending.

51.    Historical  scholarship  tends  often  to  forget  the  complex 
emotional  strains  in a great thinker's work.  The spirits of revolu- 
tion  and resignation, of defiance and acquiescence dwelled side 
by  side  in  Spinoza's  thought.  The  conflicts  of  his  time  were 
mirrored  in  his  own  emotional  struggles; his greatness was his 
effort to bring some unifying clarity to otherwise discordant drives. 
It  is  an error to portray Spinoza as either a revolutionist or a con- 
servative.  He was neither exclusively, as he was both in different 
strands  of  his  personality  and  thought.   Pollock,  for  instance, 
depicted  Spinoza  as a model Tory: "I submit that any view which 
would  make  out  Spinoza  to  be  a progressive social reformer is 
clearly ruled out by Spinoza himself,"  whereas Professor Wolfson, 
writing in the midst of America's depression and the resurgence of 
radical  ideas,  affirmed:  "Made  of  sterner  stuff  and  living a few 
centuries  later,  Spinoza would have perhaps demanded the over- 
throw of the old order with its effete institutions so as to build upon          E5:Effete
its  ruins a new society of a new generation raised on his new phil- 
osophy.  He  would  then  perhaps  have  become  one  of the first 
apostles  of  rebellion."  In  a  different  mood,  however,  Professor 
Wolfson  later  declares  that  Spinoza  "would have become a sub- 
stantial,  respectable  and  public-spirited  burgher  and  a  pillar of        Rationalizers
society." 

[20]Note
From  Tammo Bakker's "In Spinoza's Rijnsburg"

For three years, from 1660 to 1663, Baruch de Spinoza stayed there at  
the house of the surgeon Herman Hoomans after having been expelled 
from  the  Sephardi  community  in  Amsterdam.  At  that time Rijnsburg 
situated  on an old arm of the river Rhine from which it derives its name, 
was  the  centre of a movement of Liberal Protestants who called them- 
selves   "Collegiants".   It  was  through  these  Collegiants  with  whom 
Spinoza  had  been  in  touch,  that he received the address of surgeon 
Hoomans,  in  whose  house  he wrote some of his famous works.  The 
house  was  bought  by  the Spinoza Society in 1899 and turned into a 
modest  Spinoza  Museum.  The avenue;  and  Rijnsburg  even  has  a 
building Society called "Spinoza". 

Quoted  from   "The Divine Philosophy of Baruch de Spinoza"
with  the  kind  permission  of  the  Endeavor Academy.

Another  translation  is  given  in  Bk.XII:18  and  in  Wolf's  Introduction.

From: Ethel Jean Saltz <nietgal@airmail.net>  The  source is a photo
of   the  original  which  is  at  the  Jewish  Portuguese  Community in
Amsterdam.    Bk.XX:12112.

The Excommunication of Baruch de Spinoza.                     Bk.XX:116ff.

After  the  judgment  of  the  Angels,  and  with  that of the Saints, we 
excommunicate,  expel  and  curse  and  damn  Baruch  de Espinoza 
with  the  consent  of  God,  Blessed  be  He,  and  with  the  consent 
of  all  the  Holy  Congregation,  in  front  of  the  holy Scrolls with the 
six-hundred-and-thirteen  precepts  which  are  written  therein,  with 
the  excommunication  with  which  Joshua  banned Jericho, with the 
curse  with  which  Elisha  cursed  the  boys,  and with all the curses
which  are  written  in  the  Law.  Cursed be he by day and cursed be   Bk.XX:127,129, 13040.  
he  by  night;  cursed  be  he  when  he  lies down, and cursed be he 
when  he  rises  up;  cursed  be he when he goes out, and cursed be 
he  when  he comes in.  The Lord will not pardon him; the anger and 
wrath  of  the  Lord will rage against this man, and bring upon him all 
the  curses  which  are  written  in the Book of the Law, and the Lord 
will  destroy  his  name  from  under  the  Heavens,  and the Lord will 
separate  him  to  his  injury  from  all  the  tribes  of Israel with all the 
curses  of  the  firmament,  which  are  written in the Book of the Law. 
But  you  who  cleave  unto  the  Lord  God are all alive this day.  We 
order  that  nobody  should  communicate with him orally or in writing, 
or  show  him  any  favor,  or  stay  with  him  under the same roof, or 
within  four  ells  of him, or read anything composed or written by him. 

{ See also State ban.    Bk.XIB:1981, Damasio:32626}

{Three reasons for the excommunication of Spinoza are:     Bk.XX:129. 

1.   Spinoza  violated Aben  Ezra's  dictum  of "silence."   This violation
      is  seditious  in  that  it  tends  to  break down a functioning society.
      It  takes  an  existing  faith  away  without quickly replacing it with a     Mark Twain's "Little Story"
      new  faith;  only evolution can do this peaceably. This resistance to
      change is the society's stability.  

      Another example of the "silence" violation: inquisitorial denunciation
      of Galileo in 1632. Bk.XVII:194.  

      Spinoza is  like a  soldier  violating  an  order,  but in so doing wins
      the  battle.  Should he be condemned or commended? The answer
      is, I think, both—but unfortunately, you can't have it both ways.  

2.   The  Jewish  Authorities  feared  the  wrath  of the ruling Calvinist         Damasio:32626
      Christians against the Jewish community.  I  say  this because the              Hampshire:204
      Jewish  Authorities did   ".... endeavour(ed)  to retain him  in  their                         Wolf
      communion  by  the  offer  of  a  yearly  pension  of 1,000 florins ,"
      if he would not set forth or teach his ideas publicly. }                Bk.XIB:9; Bk.XII:416; Bk.XX:129.

       The Jewish Authorities also wanted, as did the ruling Calvinist Christians,
      to protect their communities against an attack on their faith in a transcen-
      dent anthropomorphic God by an abstract indwelling imminent G-D.    Mark Twain's "Little Story"

3.  Graetz's Censure of Spinoza. 
     From Heinrich Graetz's "History of the Jews, Vol. V", Chapter IV - Spinoza and the Rabbis.
    The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1895, Pages 92-109.  
    {I have changed Graetz's spelling of God in accordance with Note 4. 
      I strongly recommend study of Paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 for the understanding of Spinoza.}

[1]  Whoever in the community of Amsterdam could compose verses in Spanish, Portuguese, or Latin, sang or bewailed the martyrdom of the two Bernals. Was Spinoza's view correct that all these martyrs, and the thousands of Jewish victims still hounded by the Inquisition, pursued a delusion? Could the representatives of Judaism allow unreproved, in their immediate neighborhood, the promulgation of the idea that Judaism is merely an antiquated error?

[2]  The college of Rabbis, in which sat the two chief Chachams, Saul Morteira and Isaac Aboab—Manasseh ben Israel was then living in London—had ascertained the fact of Spinoza s change of opinion, and had collected evidence. It was not easy to accuse him of apostasy, as he did not proclaim his thoughts aloud in the market-place, as Uriel da Costa had announced his breach with Judaism. Besides, he led a quiet, self-contained life, and associated little with men. His avoidance of the synagogue, the first thing probably to attract notice, could not form the subject of a Rabbinical accusation. It is possible that, as is related, two of his fellow-students (one, perhaps, the sly Isaac Naar) thrust themselves upon him, drew him out, and accused him of unbelief, and contempt for Judaism. Spinoza was summoned, tried, and admonished to return to his former course of life. The court of rabbis did not at first proceed with severity against him, for he was a favorite of his teacher, and beloved in the community on account of his modest bearing and moral behavior. By virtue of the firmness of his character Spinoza probably made no sort of
page 93 concession, but insisted upon freedom of thought and conduct. Without doubt he was, in consequence, laid under the lesser excommunication, that is, close intercourse with him was forbidden for thirty days. This probably caused less pain to Spinoza, who, self-centred, found sufficient resource in his rich world of thought, than to the superficial Da Costa. Also, he was not without Christian friends, and he, therefore, made no alteration in his manner of life. This firmness was naturally construed as obstinacy and defiance. But the rabbinate, as well as the secular authorities of the community did not wish to exert the rigor of the Rabbinical law against him, in order not to drive him to an extreme measure,
i. e., into the arms of the Church. What harm might not the conversion to Christianity of so remarkable a youth entail in a newly-founded community, consisting of Jews with Christian reminiscences! What impression would it make on the Marranos in Spain and Portugal? Perhaps the scandal caused by Da Costa's excommunication, still fresh in men's memories, may have rendered a repetition impracticable. The rabbis, therefore, privately offered Spinoza, through his friends, a yearly pension of a thousand gulden on condition that he take no hostile step against Judaism, and show himself from time to time in the synagogue. But Spinoza, though young, was of so determined a character, that money could not entice him to abandon his convictions or to act the hypocrite. He insisted that he would not give up freedom of inquiry and thought. He continued to impart to Jewish youths doctrines undermining Judaism. So the tension between him and the representatives of Judaism became daily greater; both sides were right, or imagined they were. A fanatic in Amsterdam thought that he could put an end to this breach by a dagger-stroke aimed at the dangerous apostate. He waylaid Spinoza at the exit from the theatre, and struck at the philosopher with Page 94 his murderous weapon. But the latter observed the hostile movement in time, and avoided the blow, so that only his coat was damaged. Spinoza left Amsterdam to avoid the danger of assassination, and betook himself to the house of a friend, likewise persecuted by the dominant Calvinistic Church, an adherent of the sect of the Rhynsburgians, or Collectants, who dwelt in a village between Amsterdam and Ouderkerk. Reconciliation between Spinoza and the synagogue was no longer to be thought of. The rabbis and the secular authorities of the community pronounced the greater excommunication upon him, proclaiming it in the Portuguese language on a Thursday, Ab 6th (July 24th), 1656, shortly before the fast in memory of the destruction of Jerusalem. The sentence was pronounced solemnly in the synagogue from the pulpit before the open Ark. The sentence was as follows:

"The council has long had notice of the evil opinions and actions of Baruch d'Espinosa, and these are daily increasing in spite of efforts to reclaim him. In particular, he teaches and proclaims dreadful heresy, of which credible witnesses are present, who have made their depositions in presence ot the accused."


[3]  All this, they continued, had been proved in the presence of the elders, and the council had resolved to place him under the ban, and excommunicate him. {The fear of Jewish
religious leaders in Amsterdam.}

[4]  The usual curses were pronounced upon him in presence of scrolls of the Law, and finally the council forbade anyone to have intercourse with him, verbally or by writing, to do him any service, to abide under the same roof with him, or to come within the space of four cubits' {6+/- feet} distance from him, or to read his writings. Contrary to wont, the ban against Spinoza was stringently enforced, to keep young people from his heresies.

[5]  Spinoza was away from Amsterdam, when the ban was hurled against him. He is said to have received the news with indifference, and to have remarked that he was now compelled to do what he page 95 would otherwise have done without compulsion. His philosophic nature, which loved solitude, could easily dispense with intercourse with relatives and former friends. Yet the matter did not end for him there. The representative body of the Portuguese {Jewish} community appealed to the municipal authorities to effect his perpetual banishment from Amsterdam. The magistrates referred the question, really a theological one, to the clergy, and the latter are said to have proposed his withdrawal from Amsterdam for some months. Most probably this procedure prompted him to elaborate a justificatory pamphlet to show the civil authorities that he was no violator or transgressor of the laws of the state, but that he had exercised his just rights, when he reflected on the religion of his forefathers and religion generally, and thought out new views. The chain of reasoning suggested to Spinoza in the preparation of his defense caused him doubtless to give wider extension and bearing to this question. It gave him the opportunity to treat of freedom of thought and inquiry generally, and so to lay the foundation of the first of his suggestive writings, which have conferred upon him literary immortality. In the village to which he had withdrawn, 1656-60, and later in Rhynsburg, where he also spent several years, I660-64, Spinoza occupied himself (while polishing lenses, which handicraft he had learned to secure his moderate subsistence) with the Cartesian philosophy and the elaboration of the work entitled "The Theologico-Political Treatise." His prime object was to spread the conviction that freedom of thought can be permitted without prejudice to religion and the peace of the state; furthermore, that it must be permitted, for if it were forbidden, religion and peace could not exist in the state.

[6]  The apology for freedom of thought had been rendered harder rather than easier for Spinoza, by the subsidiary ideas {new in Spinoza} with which he crossed the main page 96 lines of his system. He could not philosophically find the source of law, and transferred its origin to might {Spinoza transferred it to enlightened self-interest!}. Neither God, nor man's conscience, according to Spinoza, is the fountain of the eternal law which rules and civilizes mankind {but G-D is}; it springs from the whole lower {sic} natural world. He made men to a certain extent "like the fishes of the sea, like creeping things, which have no master." Large fish have the right, not only to drink water, but also to devour smaller fish, because they have the power to do so; the sphere of right of the individual man extends as far as his sphere of might. This natural right does not recognize the difference between good and evil, virtue and vice, submission and force. {The above, I believe, shows a complete mis-understanding of Spinoza.} But because such unlimited assertion on the part of each must lead to a perpetual state of war of all against all, men have tacitly, from fear, or hope, or reason {enlightened self-interest}, given up their unlimited privileges to a collective body, the state. Out of two evils—on the one hand, the full possession of their sphere of right and might, tending to mutual destruction, and its alienation, on the other—men have chosen the latter as the lesser evil. The state, whether represented by a supreme authority elected for the purpose, such as the Dutch States General, or by a despot, is the full possessor of the rights of all, because of the power of all. Every one is bound by his own interest to unconditional obedience, even if he should be commanded to deprive others of life; resistance is not only punishable, but contrary to reason. This supreme power is not controlled by any law. Whether exercised by an individual, as in a monarchy, or by several, as in a republic, it is justified in doing everything, and can do no wrong. But the state has supreme right not merely over actions of a civil nature, but also over spiritual and religious views; it could not exist, if everyone were at liberty to attack it under the pretext of religion. The government alone has the right to control religious affairs, and page 97 to define belief, unbelief, orthodoxy, and heresy. What a tyrannical conclusion! As this theory of Spinoza fails to recognize moral law, so it ignores steadfast fidelity. As soon as the government grows weak, it no longer has claim to obedience; everyone may renounce and resist it, to submit himself to the incoming power. According to this theory of civil and religious despotism, no one may have an opinion about the laws of the state, otherwise he is a rebel. Spinoza's theory almost does away with freedom, even of thought and opinion. Whoever speaks against a state ordinance in a fault-finding spirit, or to throw odium upon the government, or seeks to repeal a law against its express wish, should be regarded as a disturber of the public peace. Only through a sophistical quibble {Mean words. Graetz is correct for today's States made-up of contesting Scriptural Theological Religions; but conjecture as for Spinoza who wanted a to-be World State based on a Universal Religion—Constitution. Spinoza, the First Secular Jew? by Yirmiyahu Yovel.} was Spinoza able to save freedom of thought and free expression of opinion. Every man has this right by nature, the only one which he has not transferred to the state, because it is essentially inalienable. It must be conceded to everyone to think and judge in opposition to the opinion of the government, even to speak and teach, provided this be done with reason and reflection, without fraud, anger, or malice, and without the intention of causing a revolution.  

[7]  On this weak basis, supported by a few other secondary considerations, Spinoza justified his conflict with Judaism and his philosophical attacks upon the sacred writings recognized by the Dutch States. He thought that he had succeeded in justifying himself before the magistrates sufficiently by his defense of freedom of thought. In the formulation of this apology it was apparent that he was not indifferent to the treatment which he had experienced from the college of rabbis. Spinoza was so filled with displeasure, if not with hatred, of Jews and Judaism {read Burgh to Spinoza, Letter 73; and Spinoza to Burgh, Letter 74}, that his otherwise clear judgment was biased. He, like Da Costa, called the rabbis nothing but page 98 Pharisees, and imputed to them ambitious and degraded motives, while they wished only to secure their treasured beliefs against attacks. Prouder even than his contemporaries, the French and English philosophers, of freedom of thought, for centuries repressed by the church, and now soaring aloft the more powerfully, Spinoza summoned theology, in particular, ancient Judaism before the throne of reason, examined its dogmas and archives, and pronounced sentence of condemnation upon his mother-faith. He had erected a tower of thought in his brain from which, as it were, he wished to storm heaven. Spinoza's philosophy is like a fine net, laid before our eyes, mesh by mesh, by which the human understanding is unexpectedly ensnared, so that half voluntarily, half compulsorily, it surrenders. {How can Graetz say the foregoing if he says the following!} Spinoza recognized, as no thinker before, those universal laws, immutable as iron, which are apparent in the development of the most insignificant grain of seed no less than in the revolution of the heavenly bodies, in the precision of mathematical thought as in the apparent irregularity of human passions. Whilst these laws work with constant uniformity, and produce the same causes and the same phenomena in endless succession, the instruments of law are perishable things, creatures of a day, which rise, and vanish to give place to others: here eternity, there temporality; on the one side necessity, on the other chance; here reality, there delusive appearances. These and other enigmas Spinoza sought to solve with the penetration that betrays the son of the Talmud, and with logical consecutiveness and masterly arrangement, for which Aristotle might have envied him.  
 
{I strongly recommend study of Paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 for the understanding of Spinoza. Follow links.} 
[8]  The whole universe, all individual things, and their active powers are, according to Spinoza, not merely from G-D, but of G-D; they constitute the infinite succession of forms in which G-D reveals Himself, through which He eternally works page 99 according to His eternal Nature—the soul, as it were, of thinking bodies, the body of the soul extended in space. G-D is the indwelling, not the external efficient cause of all things; all is in G-D and moves in G-D. G-D as creator and generator of all things is generative or self-producing Nature. The whole of nature is animate, and ideas, as bodies, move in eternity on lines running parallel to or intersecting one another. Though the fullness of things which have proceeded from G-D and which exist in Him, are not of an eternal, but of a perishable nature, yet they are not limited or defined by chance, but by the necessity of the Divine Nature, each in its own way existing or acting within its smaller or larger sphere. The eternal and constant Nature of G-D works in them through the eternal laws communicated to them. Things could, therefore, not be constituted otherwise than they are; for they are the manifestations, entering into existence in an eternal stream, of G-D in the intimate connection of thought and extension. {This paragraph shows a profound knowledge of Spinoza.}

[9]  What is man's place in this logical system? How is he to act and work? Even he, with all his greatness and littleness, his strength and weakness, his heaven-aspiring mind, and his body subject to the need of sustenance, is nothing more than a form of existence (Modus) of G-D. Man after man, generation after generation, springs up and perishes, flows away like a drop in a perpetual stream, but his Nature, the laws by which he moves bodily and mentally in the peculiar connection of mind and matter, reflect the Divine Being. Especially the human mind, or rather the various modes of thought, the feelings and conceptions of all men, form the eternal reason of G-D. But man is as little free as things, as the stone which rolls down from the mountain; he has to obey the causes which influence him from within and without. Each of his actions is the product of an infinite series of causes and effects {Chain of Natural Events}, which page 100 he can scarcely discern, much less control and alter at will. The good man and the bad, the martyr who sacrifices himself for a noble object, as well as the execrable villain and the murderer, are all like clay in the hands of G-D; they act, the one well, the other ill, compelled by their inner nature. They all act from rigid necessity. No man can reproach G-D for having given him a weak nature or a clouded intellect, as it would be irrational if a circle should complain that G-D has not given it the nature and properties of the sphere. It is not the lot of every man to be strong-minded, and it lies as little in his power to have a sound mind as a sound body. {Beautiful. This paragraph also shows a profound knowledge of Spinoza.}

[10]  On one side man is, to a certain extent, free, or rather some men of special mental endowments can free themselves a little from the pressure exercised upon them. Man is a slave chiefly through his passions. Love {need}, hate, anger, thirst for glory, avarice, make him the slave of the external world. These passions spring from the perplexity of the soul, which thinks it can control things, but wears itself out, so to speak, against their obstinate resistance, and suffers pain thereby. The better the soul succeeds in comprehending the succession of causes and effects and the necessity of phenomena in the plan of the universe, the better able is it to change pain into a sense of comfort {PcM}. Through higher insight, man, if he allows himself to be led by reason, can acquire strength of soul, and feel increased love to G-D, that is, to the eternal whole. On the one hand, this secures nobility of mind to aid men and to win them by mildness and benevolence; and creates, on the other, satisfaction, joy, and happiness. He who is gifted with highest knowledge lives in G-D, and G-D in him. Knowledge is virtue, as ignorance is, to a certain extent, vice. Whilst the wise man, or strictly speaking, the philosopher, thanks to his higher insight and his love of G-D, enjoys tranquillity of soul, the man of clouded page101 intellect, who abandons himself to the madness of his passions, must dispense with this joyousness, and often perishes in consequence. The highest virtue, according to Spinoza's system, is self-renunciation through knowledge, keeping in a state of passiveness, coming as little as possible in contact with the crushing machinery of forces—avoiding them if they come near, or submitting to them if their wild career overthrows the individual. But as he who is beset by desires deserves no blame, so no praise is due the wise man who practices self-renunciation; both follow the law of their nature. Higher knowledge and wisdom cannot be attained if the conditions are wanting, namely, a mind susceptible of knowledge and truth, which one can neither give himself, nor throw off. Man has thus no final aim, any more than the eternal substance. {Beautiful; shows a profound knowledge of Spinoza.}

{How Graetz can believe what he says in what follows, I cannot understand; unless he is applying the caution
 that is needed when changing a Religion that is implied in Mark Twain's "Little Story." Perhaps I do understand.  It is a matter that Graetz and Spinoza have different world views. See JBYnote1.} 

[11]  Spinoza's moral doctrines—ethics in the narrower sense—are just as unfruitful as his political theories. In either case, he recognizes submission as the only rational course.

[12]  With this conception of G-D and moral action, it cannot surprise us that Judaism found no favor in Spinoza's eyes. Judaism lays down directly opposite principles— beckons man to a high, self-reliant task, and proclaims aloud the progress of mankind in simple service of God, holiness, and victory over violence, the sword, and degrading war. This progress has been furthered in many ways by Judaism in the course of ages. Wanting, as Spinoza was, in apprehension of historical events, more wonderful than the phenomena of nature, and unable as he therefore was to accord to Judaism special importance, he misconceived it still further through his bitterness against the Amsterdam college of rabbis, who pardonably enough, had excommunicated him. Spinoza transferred his bitterness against the community to the whole Jewish race and to Judaism. As has been already said, he called the rabbis page 102 Pharisees in his "Theologico-Political Treatise" and in letters to his friends, and gave the most invidious meaning to this word. To Christianity, on the contrary, Spinoza conceded great excellencies; he regarded Judaism with displeasure, therefore, detected deficiencies and absurdities everywhere, while he cast a benevolent eye upon Christianity, and overlooked its weaknesses. Spinoza, therefore, with all the instinct for truth which characterized him, formed a conception of Judaism which, in some degree just, was, in many points, perverse and defective. Clear as his mind was in metaphysical inquiries, it was dark and confused on historical ground. To depreciate Judaism, Spinoza declared that the books of Holy Scripture contain scribes' errors, interpolations, and disfigurements, and are not, as a rule, the work of the authors to whom they are ascribed—not even the Pentateuch, the original source of Judaism. Ezra, perhaps, first collected and arranged it after the Babylonian exile. The genuine writings of Moses are no longer extant, not even the Ten Commandments being in their original form. Nevertheless, Spinoza accepted every word in the Bible as a kind of revelation, and designated all persons who figure in it as prophets. He conceded, on the ground of Scripture, that the revelation of the prophets was authenticated by visible signs. Nevertheless, he very much underrated this revelation. Moses, the prophets, and all the higher personages of the Bible had only a confused notion of God, nature, and living beings; they were not philosophers, they did not avail themselves of the natural light of reason. Jesus stood higher; he taught not only a nation, but the whole of mankind on rational grounds. The Apostles, too, were to be set higher than the prophets, since they introduced a natural method of instruction, and worked not merely through signs, but also through rational conviction. As though the main effort of the page 103 Apostles, to which their whole zeal was devoted, viz., to reach belief in the miraculous resurrection of Jesus, were consistent with reason! It was only Spinoza's bitterness against Jews which caused him to depreciate their spiritual property and overrate Christianity. His sober intellect, penetrating to the eternal connection of things and events, could not accept miracles, but those of the New Testament he judged mildly.

[13]  In spite of his condemnatory verdict on Judaism, he was struck by two phenomena, which he did not fully understand, and which, therefore, he judged only superficially according to his system. These were the moral greatness of the prophets, and the superiority of the Israelite state, which in a measure depend on each other. Without understanding the political organization, in which natural and moral laws, necessity and freedom work together, Spinoza explains the origin of the Jewish state, that is, of Judaism, in the following manner: When the Israelites, after deliverance from slavery in Egypt, were free from all political bondage, and restored to their natural rights, they willingly chose God as their Lord, and transferred their rights to Him alone by formal contract and alliance. That there be no appearance of fraud on the divine side, God permitted them to recognize His marvelous power, by virtue of which He had hitherto preserved, and promised in future to preserve them, that is, He revealed Himself to them in His glory on Sinai; thus God became the King of Israel and the state a theocracy. Religious opinions and truths, therefore, had a legal character in this state, religion and civic right coincided. Whoever revolted from religion forfeited his rights as a citizen, and whoever died for religion was a patriot. Pure democratic equality, the right of all to entreat God and interpret the laws, prevailed. among the Israelites. But when, in the overpowering bewilderment of the revelation from Sinai, page 104 they voluntarily asked Moses to receive the laws from God and to interpret them, they renounced their equality, and transferred their rights to Moses. Moses from that time became God's representative. Hence, he promulgated laws suited to the condition of the people at that time, and introduced ceremonies to remind them always of the Law and keep them from willfulness, so that in accordance with a definite precept they should plough, sow, eat, clothe themselves, in a word, do everything according to the precepts of the Law. Above all, he provided that they might not act from childish or slavish fear, but from reverence for God. He bound them by benefits, and promised them earthly prosperity—all through the power and by the command of God. Moses was vested with spiritual and civil power, and authorized to transmit both. He preferred to transfer the civil power to his disciple Joshua in full, but not as a heritage, and the spiritual power to his brother Aaron as a heritage, but limited by the civil ruler, and not accompanied by a grant of territory. After the death of Moses the Jewish state was neither a monarchy, nor an aristocracy, nor a democracy; it remained a theocracy. The family of the high-priest was God's interpreter, and the civil power, after Joshua's death, fell to single tribes or their chiefs.

[14]  This constitution offered many advantages. The civil rulers could not turn the law to their own advantage, nor oppress the people, for the Law was the province of the sacerdotal order—the sons of Aaron and the Levites. Besides, the people were made acquainted with the Law through the prescribed reading at the close of the Sabbatical year, and would not have passed over with indifference any willful transgression of the law of the state. The army was composed of native militia, while foreigners, that is, mercenaries, were excluded. Thus the rulers were prevented from oppressing page 105 the people or waging war arbitrarily. The tribes were united by religion, and the oppression of one tribe by its ruler would have been punished by the rest. The princes were not placed at the head through rank or privilege of blood, but through capacity and merit. Finally, the institution of prophets proved very wholesome. Since the constitution was theocratical, every one of blameless life was able through certain signs to represent himself as a prophet like Moses, draw the oppressed people to him in the name of God, and oppose the tyranny of the rulers. This peculiar constitution produced in the heart of the Israelites an especial patriotism, which was at the same time a religion, so that no one would betray it, leave God's kingdom, or swear allegiance to a foreigner. This love, coupled with hatred against other nations, and fostered by daily worship of God, became second nature to the Israelites. It strengthened them to endure everything for their country with steadfastness and courage. This constitution offered a further advantage, because the land was equally divided, and no one could be permanently deprived of his portion through poverty, as restitution had to be made in the year of jubilee.

[15]  Hence, there was little poverty, or such only as was endurable, for the love of one's neighbor had to be exercised with the greatest conscientiousness to keep the favor of God, the King. Finally, a large space was accorded to gladness. Thrice a year and on other occasions the people were to assemble at festivals, not to revel in sensual enjoyments, but to accustom themselves to follow God gladly; for there is no more effectual means of guiding the hearts of men than the joy which arises from love and admiration.

[16]  After Spinoza had depicted Israel's theocracy quite as a pattern for all states, he was apparently startled at having imparted so much light to the page 106 picture, and he looked around for shade. Instead of answering in a purely historical manner the questions, whence it came that the Hebrews were so often subdued, and why their state was entirely destroyed; instead of indicating that these wholesome laws remained a never realized ideal, Spinoza suggests a sophistic solution. Because God did not wish to make Israel's dominion lasting, he gave bad laws and statutes. Spinoza supports this view by a verse which he misunderstood. These bad laws, rebellion against the sacerdotal state, coupled with bad morals, produced discontent, revolt, and insurrection. At last matters went so far, that instead of the Divine King, the Israelites chose a human one, and instead of the temple, a court. Monarchy, however, only increased the disorder; it could not endure the state within the state, the high-priesthood, and lowered the dignity of the latter by the introduction of strange worship. The prophets could avail nothing, because they only declaimed against the tyrants, but could not remove the cause of the evils. All things combined brought on the destruction of the divine state. With its destruction by the Babylonian king, the natural rights of the Israelites were transferred to the conqueror, and they were bound to obey him and his successors, as they had obeyed God. All the laws of Judaism, nay, the whole of Judaism, was thereby abolished, and no longer had any significance. This was the result of Spinoza's inquiry in his "Theologico-Political Treatise." Judaism had a brilliant past, God concluded an alliance with the people, showed to them His exalted power, and gave them excellent laws; but He did not intend Israel's preëminence to be permanent, therefore He also gave bad laws. Consequently, Judaism reached its end more than two thousand years ago, and yet it continued its existence! Wonderful! Spinoza found the history of Israel and the constitution of the state page 107 excellent during the barbarism of the period of the Judges, while the brilliant epochs of David and Solomon and of King Uzziah remained inexplicable to him. And, above all, the era of the second Temple, the Maccabean epoch, when the Jewish nation rose from shameful degradation to a brilliant height, and brought the heathen world itself to worship the one God and adopt a moral life, remained to Spinoza an insoluble riddle. This shows that his whole demonstration and his analysis (schematism) cannot stand the test of criticism, but rests on false assumptions.

[17]  Spinoza might have brought Judaism into extreme peril; for he not only furnished its opponents with the weapons of reason to combat Judaism more effectually, but also conceded to every state and magistrate the right to suppress it and use force against its followers, to which they ought meekly to submit. The funeral piles of the Inquisition for Marranos were, according to Spinoza's system, doubly justified; citizens have no right on rational grounds to resist the recognized religion of the state, and it is folly to profess Judaism and to sacrifice oneself for it. But a peculiar trait of Spinoza's character stood Judaism m good stead. He loved peace and quiet too well to become a propagandist for his critical principles. "To be peaceable and peaceful" was his ideal; avoidance of conflict and opposition was at once his strength and his weakness. To his life's end he led an ideally-philosophical life; for food, clothing, and shelter, he needed only so much as he could earn with his handicraft of polishing lenses, which his friends disposed of. He struggled against accepting a pension, customarily bestowed on learned men at that time, even from his sincere and rich admirers, Simon de Vries and the grand pensionary
De Witt, that he might not fall into dependence, constraint, and disquiet. By reason of this invincible desire for philosophic calm and freedom from care, he would page 108 not decide in favor of either of the political parties, then setting the States General in feverish agitation. Not even the exciting murder of his friend John de Witt was able to hurry him into partisanship. Spinoza bewailed his high and noble friend, but did not defend his honor, to clear it of suspicion. When the most highly cultivated German prince of his time, Count-Palatine Karl Ludwig, who cherished a certain affection for Jews, offered him, "the Protestant Jew," as he was still called, the chair of philosophy in the University of Heidelberg under very favorable conditions, Spinoza declined the offer. He did not conceal his reason: he would not surrender his quietude. From this predominant tendency, or, rather, from fear of disturbance and inconveniences and from apprehension of calling enemies down upon him, or of coming into collision with the state, he refused to publish his speculations for a long time. When at last he resolved, on the pressure of friends, to send "The Theologico-Political Treatise" to press, he did not put his name to the work, which made an epoch in literature, and even caused a false place of publication, viz., Hamburg, to be printed on the title-page, in order to obliterate every trace of its real authorship. He almost denied his offspring, to avoid being disturbed.

[18]  As might have been foreseen, the appearance of "The Theologico-Political Treatise" (1670), made an extraordinary stir. No one had written so distinctly and incisively concerning the relation of religion to philosophy and the power of the state, and, above all, had so sharply condemned the clergy. The ministers of all denominations were extraordinarily excited against this "godless" book, as it was called, which disparaged revealed religion. Spinoza's influential friends were not able to protect it; it was condemned by a decree of the States General, and forbidden to be sold—which only caused it to be read more eagerly. But Spinoza was the more page 109 reluctant to publish his other writings, especially his philosophical system. With all his strength of character, he did not belong to those bold spirits, who undertake to be the pioneers of truth, who usher it into the world with loud voice, and win it adherents, unconcerned as to whether they may have to endure bloody or bloodless martyrdom. In the unselfishness of Spinoza's character and system there lurked an element of selfishness, namely, the desire to be disturbed as little as possible in the attainment of knowledge, in the happiness of contemplation, and in reflection upon the universe and the chain of causes and effects which prevail in it. A challenge to action, effort, and resistance to opposition lay neither in Spinoza's temper, nor in his philosophy.

[19]  In this apparently harmless feature lay also the reason that his most powerful and vehemently conducted attacks upon Judaism made no deep impression, and called forth no great commotion in the Jewish world. .... {Schorsch}
{Graetz and Spinoza have different world views. See JBYnote1.}