SEMANTIC CHANGE AND THE SEMANTICS OF SPINOZISM, Gerrit H. Jongeneelen

Lexicon Philosophicum 11(2001)111-128.

0. Introduction

Atheism has been put forward as the secret doctrine of Spinozism in literature on Spinoza since the 17th century. It has fascinated both Spinoza's contemporaries and 20th century scholars. From a 20th century point of view the problem of Spinoza's ambiguous use of language is treated by Yovel1), who states that a subcurrent of Marrano influence is responsible for the ambiguity of Spinoza's language and his double speak. The classic on the subject of Spinoza's ambiguous use of language is Leo Strauss' 1952 publication Persecution and the art of writing, in which it is argued that persecution urged Spinoza to hide his philosophy when he was writing the TTP2). Lagrée 3) suggests a strategic language use as an explanation for the rhetorical character of Spinoza's surface language. And Manfred Walther even ascribes to Spinoza's semantics a revolutionary intention (see section 2).

By his contemporaries Spinoza was condemned for using seemingly pious language containing an essentially atheistic doctrine4). As late as in the 18th century e.g. 's-Gravesande still thought it necessary to warn his audience against the deliberately deviating semantics in the definitions of the concepts Spinoza used in his philosophy5). The same is done by Pierre Poiret (1646-1719) and many others in the seventeenth century. With a reference to E 3 expl.aff.def.20 Poiret argues, that Spinoza succeeds in hiding his atheistic feelings by replacing the ordinary significations by slightly deviating ones6).

In this paper I try to find out if Spinoza's philosophy was a cause of semantic change and could be an explanation for reactions as mentioned above. In order to do so, I will give an survey of Spinoza's semantics in section 1. In section 2 Spinozism is analysed as a cause of semantic change and in section 3, finally, some other causes of semantic change are evaluated.

1. The semantics of Spiniozism

1.1 Spinoza's semantic theory

An explicit semantic theory has never been formulated by Spinoza7). Nevertheless his works contain enough remarks on language to provide material for the composition of it. The most relevant remarks on language can be found in the Ethics, the Short Treatise, the Tractatus theologico-politicus and the Tractatus de intellectus emendatione. Starting from an originally Cartesian theory in which will and intellect are distinguished, Spinoza develops a theory on word, image and concept that would enable him to identify the will and the intellect (corolary of proposition 49 in part two of the Ethics). True concepts are selfevident. Therefore it is necessary to distinguish them well from images in the imagination and between concepts and images and the words that are used to refer to the things that are conceptualised. If intellect and will are to be identified, as it is done by Spinoza, the confusion of words, concepts and images is a major cause of wrong ideas in the mind both in thinking and acting.

I begin, therefore, by warning my Readers, first, to distinguish accurately between an idea, or concept, of the Mind, and the images of things that we imagine. And then it is necessary to distinguish between ideas and the words by which we signify things. For because many people either completely confuse these three -ideas, images and words- or do not distinguish them accurately enough, or carefully enough, they have been completely ignorant of this doctrine concerning the will. But it is quite necessary to know it, both for the sake of speculation and in order to arrange one's life wisely.8).

About the nature of self-evident concepts Spinoza argues in the same scholium that they are modes of thinking and thus do not belong to extension. Between words and self-evident concepts therefore no direct relation exists. Words are not supposed to have control over self-evident concepts.

And then, those who confuse words with the idea, or with the very affirmation that the idea involves, think that they can will something contrary to what they are aware of, when they only affirm or deny with words something contrary to what they are aware of. But these prejudices can easily be put aside by anyone who attends to the nature of thought, which does not at all involve the concept of extension. He will then understand clearly that an idea (since it is a mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of anything, nor in words. For the essence of words and of images is constituted only by corporeal motions, which do not at all involve the concept of thought9).

This passage refers to a parallel passage in the chapter on the will in the Short treatise. Although Spinoza had not yet developed his doctrine on the identification of will and intellect as far as in the Ethics, he explicitly indicates words as the principal cause of wrong ideas about the conceptualisation of self-evident concepts:

So it is never we who affirm or deny something of the thing; it is the thing itself that affirms or denies something of itself in us. Some perhaps will not grant this, because it seems to them that they can affirm or deny of the thing something other than what they are aware of. But they think this only because they have no conception of the concept which the soul has of the thing, without or apart from words10).

This negative appreciation of language is a central theme in Spinoza's remarks on language. Words do not have any function in the process of conceptualisation in the mind. The words that are used for the communication of these self-evident concepts are selected on their resembling signification11). In his explication to definition 20 of the affects in part three of the Ethics, Spinoza explains the relation between the signification of words and the concepts in the mind. Both Yovel and Poiret, be it on different grounds, judge this passage of essential importance for the understanding of Spinoza's semantics12).

I know that in their common usage these words mean something else. But my purpose is to explain the nature of things, not the meaning of words. I intend to indicate these things by words whose usual meaning is not entirely opposed to the meaning with which I wish to use them. One warning of this should suffice13).

Words have a signification of their own but Spinoza uses them for the concepts he decides to use them for. Those who accuse Spinoza of substituting ordinary significations by slightly deviating ones are not altogether mistaken in their analysis of Spinoza's semantics. In Spinoza's theory on the history of language the scientific language of the philosopher has been developed relatively late, starting from the significations words had in ordinary language. Discussing the concepts 'true' and 'false' in the Cogitata metaphysica Spinoza proposes to study the relation between these scientific concepts and the original significations of the words used for them.

To perceive these two, the true and the false rightly, we shall begin with the meaning of words, from which it will be plain that these are only extrinsic denominations of things and are not attributed to things except metaphorically. But since ordinary people first invent words, which afterwards are used by the Philosophers, it seems desirable for one seeking the original meaning of a term to ask what it first denoted among ordinary people -particularly where we lack other causes that could be used to investigate that [meaning], causes drawn from the nature of language14).

It will be evident, that a theory on language in which words do not have a necessary relation to the concepts they stand for, will be a cause of difficulties in the hermeneutics of the Holy Scripture. In the Short treatise Spinoza declares it impossible to derive any divine knowledge from words.

Because we maintain such a community between God and man, one might rightly ask how God can make himself known to man, and whether this happens, or could happen, through spoken words, or immediately, without using any other thing to do it. We answer: not in any case by words. For then man would have to know already the meanings of those words before they were spoken to him15).

In chapter four of the Tractatus theologico-politicus this statement is repeated in the words of biblical hermeneutics. Only to Christ's mind God was able to reveal himself immediately. That is without words, because words never can be a source of divine knowledge (the self-evident concepts in the Ethics). Inasmuch as God revealed Himself to Christ, or to Christ's mind immediately, and not as to the prophets through words and symbols, we must needs suppose that Christ perceived truly what was revealed, in other words, He understood it, for a matter is understood when it is perceived simply by the mind without words or symbols16).

Theologically speaking only Christ was able to conceptualise the divine message, that was communicated to him without words. [N]or do I believe that any have been so endowed save Christ. To Him the ordinances of God leading men to salvation were revealed directly without words or visions,17)

Philosophically speaking, however, the lumen naturale can reveal the kind of knowledge that is revealed as divine knowledge to Christ to the human mind as well. Spinoza even explicitly stresses the Cartesian character of this kind of knowledge (it is clear and distinct knowledge), but does not judge it a relevant subject for treatment in the Tractatus theologico-politicus.

Seeing then that our mind subjectively contains in itself and partakes of the nature of God, and solely from this cause is enabled to form notions explaining natural phenomena and inculcating morality, it follows that we may rightly assert the nature of the human mind (in so far as it is thus conceived) to be a primary cause of Divine revelation. All that we clearly and distinctly understand is dictated to us, as I have just pointed out, by the idea and nature of God; not indeed through words, but in a way far more excellent and agreeing perfectly with the nature of the mind as all who have enjoyed intellectual certainty will doubtless attest. Here, however, my chief purpose is to speak of matters having reference to Scripture, so these few words on the light of reason will suffice18).

Why language is such an unreliable source for genuine knowledge is explained in the Tractatus de intellectus emendatione, where the psychology of the imagination is treated and in fact a summary of Spinoza's semantics is given19).

Next, since words are part of the imagination, i.e., since we feign many concepts, in accordance with the random composition of words in the memory from some disposition of the body, it is not to be doubted that words, as much as the imagination, can be the cause of many and great errors, unless we are very wary of them. Moreover they are established according to the pleasure and power of understanding of ordinary people, so that they are only signs of things as they are in the imagination, but not as they are in the intellect. This is clear from the fact that the names given to things that are only in the intellect, and not in the imagination, are often negative (for example, infinite, incorporeal, etc.), and also from the fact that they express negatively many things that are really affirmative, and conversely (for example uncreated, independent, infinite, immortal). Because the contraries of these are much more easily imagined, they occurred first in the earliest man, and they used positive names. We affirm and deny many things because the nature of words -not the nature of things- allows us to affirm them. And in our ignorance of this, we easily take something false to be true20).

In the final part of this long passage, Spinoza states the same as in the two passages above, cited from the Short treatise (KV 2/16) and the Ethics (E 2P49CISI): words are the principal cause of wrong ideas about the conceptualisation of self-evident concepts. They can make us accept as true, concepts that are not in conformity with the nature of things. Words, like images, are nothing but corporeal motions. Therefore they cannot affect the concepts of thinking and should be used with uttermost care. Spinoza finds support for this position in the history of semantics. According to Spinoza the scientific language of the philosopher has been developed relatively late, starting from the significations words had in the language of ordinary people. The theory of the Cogitata metaphysica here is extended into a theory about the use of negative names for scientific concepts in the intellect. Because ordinary people were the first users of language, the concepts words are chosen for are concepts as they are in the imagination and not as they are in the intellect. The first step away from these concepts of the imagination is the philosopher's transformation of positive names of images into negative names for concepts in the intellect21).

As can be inferred from my argument, the semantics Spinoza stuck to, does not show substantial changes: no need exists to suppose any development in it. Words and images have their domain in the imagination, whereas the conceptualisation of (self-evident) concepts is strictly restricted to the intellect. For the communication of these concepts only words are available to the intellect. But words also tend to communicate their own (ordinary language) significations existing as images in the imagination. For Spinoza therefore there is only one way to prevent those images from penetrating in the intellect and that is a dualism of intellectus and imagination and a radical language criticism, in which every possibility to infer true knowledge from words is denied. Only the intellect is judged a possible source of true knowledge.

With his statements on words/imagination and intellect Spinoza takes position in a seventeenth and eighteenth century discussion on the relation between language and mind22). According to Ricken a dualism of reason and imagination is underlying the discussion on Cartesian linguistics in seventeenth century France23). Two positions are possible in this debate: 1. of those who accept a relation between intellect and imagination (language and mind) and 2. of those who do not accept such a relation. Antoine Arnauld, the author of the Port Royal Grammaire générale et raisonnée (1660) is an advocate of the first position24), whereas Nicolas Malebranche is a supporter of position two. In a Spinozistic way Malebranche even criticises the way authors like Seneca and Montaigne even intend to affect the imagination in their writings25). In his debate with Arnauld on language as a possible access to the truths of faith, Malebranche takes a position that is very similar to Spinoza's dualism of self-evident concepts and words26).

1.2 Semantics in the Spinoza circle

Publications of two members of the inner Spinoza circle in Amsterdam, Pieter Balling (1615?-1665?) and Adriaan Koerbagh (1632-1669) testify to the influence of Spinoza's semantics.

In Het Licht op de kandelaar (1662)27) Balling advocates a Cartesian concept of knowledge. Clear and distinct concepts of the things knowledge consists in, exclude every possibility of doubt28). The easiest way to communicate this knowledge would be by words communicating the concepts to the hearer in exactly the same way as they are known to the speaker29). Experience, however, has taught Balling that communication does not take place in that ideal way and this made him as critical as Spinoza towards language. Two people, using the same words and speaking the same language, often join completely contrary concepts to these words30). Semantic instability is the main cause of the imperfection of words: after some time words often have changed their significations completely31). Balling's judgement about the linguistic competence of the first inventor of language is very negative. According to Balling, he almost certainly did not have had any genuine knowledge of the concepts to be communicated by the words he invented32). The conclusion is inevitable: only a completely newly invented language would be adequate for the communication of the concepts of the things conceptualised in the mind33). Although Balling's semantic is not as far developed as Spinoza's, his language criticism was in line with Spinoza's negative appreciation of words. Like Spinoza, Cartesianism confronted Balling with the impossibility of communicating concepts in the language that was available. Besides this philosophic difficulty, the imagination of the multitude not susceptible to any adequate knowledge or philosophy at all, confronted him once more with the imperfection of words.

Spinozist semantics also influenced Petrus van Balen's (1643-1690) De verbetering der gedachten34). When we do not carefully join names to the concepts we want to express, we create a major cause of confusion35). The invention of a completely new language would be a way out, but that is no alternative for Van Balen. He therefore chooses Spinoza's solution to use words in their accepted signification for the concepts the user wants to express in them36).

The most radical consequences of Spinoza's semantics are drawn by Adriaan Koerbagh (1632-1669)37). Both his 1668 publications, Een bloemhof van allerley lieflykheyd sonder verdriet and Een ligt schynende in duystere plaatsen, are based on the Cartesian semantics of the Spinoza circle. In Bloemhof, in which Lodewijk Meyer's Nederlandsche woordenschat (1663) is used as a source, some of Meyer's purist translations were substituted by explanations taken from Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan and ideologically motivated explanations. This ideology motivated Koerbagh to treat from the Spinozist perspective of Lodewijk Meyer's Philosophia sacrae scripturae interpres (1666) all the relevant theological subjects in Ligt. Here Koerbagh took one step more than Spinoza and Meyer. Not only did he perform a philosophical interpretation of the vocabulary of theology -Ligt contains chapters on God, Religion, Bible, Hell, Miracles, Angels etc.-, but he also tried to substitute the signification usually joined to this theological vocabulary by the concepts of his philosophical interpretations and to divulgate them.

This meant a reversal of Spinoza's argument on the history of language. For Spinoza the philosopher's scientific language was a later development, that started from the signification words had in the language of ordinary people. Koerbagh, adapting Humanist ideas on the function of history to Cartesianism, postulated the identity of his Cartesian philosophical concepts and the signification words originally had in the history of the language38). As a consequence for Koerbagh language history showed a development from conceptual perfection towards imperfection, whereas for Spinoza conceptual perfection was a relatively late product of the philosopher's language cultivation. By substituting the contemporary theological signification by what he calls original philosophical concepts, Koerbagh wanted to make words give access to genuine, conceptual knowledge. Doing so he became unable to observe the dualism of language and mind of Spinoza's semantics. In addition to that, his following Arnauld's synthesis of Cartesius and Augustinus in the concepts sermo internus and sermo externus, inherited from Lodewijk Meyer39), was contrary, too, to the dualism of language in the imagination and self-evident concepts in the intellectus of Spinoza's semantics in all respects.

2. Semantic change and Spinozism

In recent publications on the effects of the reception of Spinozism, especially in the eighteenth century, the term 'semantic revolution' is used to sketch these effects. E.g. Manfred Walther in the opening sentence of his study on the effects, the identification of might and law in the TTP had on natural law.

Vollziehen sich im Denken einer Zeit und Gesellschaft tiefgreifende Umbrüche, so macht sich dies bemerkbar entweder dadurch dass eine neue Theorie mit entsprechenden neuen Begriffen sich durchsetzt, oder aber dadurch, dass bekennten und bewährten Termini eine neue nicht nur veränderte, sondern oft im Vergleich zur Tradition entgegengesetzte Bedeutung verliehen wird. Diese letztere Form nenne ich eine Semantische Revolution. Darunter verstehe ich also eine neuartige Verwendung überlieferter Begriffe dergestallt, dass die neue Verwendung inhaltlich als Kritik, Negation der traditionellen Verwendungsweise bestimmtbar ist40).

Seven years later the term occurs in a review of four of Kondylis' publications. Enlightenment rationalism and nihilism have been prepared by Spinoza deliberately,

[als er] seine Philosophie bewusst so formuliert hat, dass er sowohl einer intellektualistischen Umformulierung der religiöse Tradition als auch der Intensivierung naturwissenschaftlicher Forschung zu- und vorgearbeitet hat. Das aber heise dass er [...] das Bestehen dieser Ambivalenz selber zum Medium der Formulierung (und möglichst Aufnahme) seiner Philosophie gemacht hat;41)

In order to produce these wanted effects, especially for the semantic content of the term 'substance' a substantial transformation must be supposed,

weil seine Philosophie einerseits eine radikale Kritik an und Abrechnung mit allen bis dahin bekannten Formen von Metaphysik darstellt, weil sie sich andererseits aber bei der Umstellung von Substanz auf -wie Kondylis im Anschluss vor allem an Heinrich Rombachs Interpretation ausführt- dem Substanzbegriff an der Spitze weiterhin bedient, also auch hier eine, wie ich es genannt habe (STUDIA SPINOZANA 1(1985)), semantische Revolution in gang stezt, an deren Ende dann Metaphysik als grundlegende Form einer prima philosophia untergeht42).

And finally Walther uses the term in a sketch of the reforming power of Spinozism in his analysis of the discussion Moreau/Lagrée- Klever about the (in)compatibility of Spinoza's and Meyer's hermeneutics:

Spinozas Hermeneutik stellt also, auch in dieser Hinsicht, ein weiteres Beispiel jener 'semantischen Revolution' dar, kraft deren er mit den Mitteln der Tradition einen mit dieser Tradition ihrem Selbstverständnis nach kaum zu vereinbarenden, von innen her sprengenden philosophischen Inhalt zur Sprache bringt43).

A semantic revolution takes place in a period of far reaching social and scientific changes, when the alternative articulation in new theories is not followed. Spinoza's deliberate use of a traditional theological vocabulary for the transmission of a new set of concepts and his substitution of the signification of this traditional vocabulary by these new concepts, can be judged, according to Walther, a cause of the semantic revolution that took place in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and finally would effectuate the destruction of the metaphysics underlying this theological vocabulary and in the case of Spinoza of all metaphysics. It will be clear, that Walther uses the term 'semantic revolution' in a broad, metaphorical way. A semantic revolution is an instance of the way scientific revolutions take place44). For his ideas on 'semantic revolution' Walther may have found support in Yovel's analysis of Spinoza's strategic use of equivocation and double language and his Marrano way of speaking and thinking45). The relation between Spinoza's strategic choice of the vocabulary of theology and his semantics, may throw a new light on the semantic revolution caused by Spinozism.

The fact that his contemporaries accused Spinoza of using a traditional vocabulary for a completely new set of significations, proves that for them no semantic revolution had been accomplished yet. The traditional significations were still in use and from a linguistic point of view there is no reason to suppose that they ever were to be substituted by the concepts Spinoza had used them for. What Spinoza's critics wanted to say, was that the concepts he wanted to communicate, could not be understood in a direct way from the significations of the words he used for them. These concepts had to be deduced from Spinoza's philosophy and could not be understood without understanding this philosophy. And that, according to Spinoza's critics, was not possible without becoming an atheist. Spinoza's philosophical system was much more dangerous for theology than his ambiguous use of language, because it turned out to be much more attractive for the religious personality than the salvation regular religion was able to offer.

Besides the linguistic consideration, that the development of semantics is an autonomous process, Spinoza's deductive philosophical system makes it improbable, that a semantic revolution could have taken place by substituting the usual significations by the philosophical concepts of the intellectus. Philosophers who wanted to dispose of a language for the new concepts of their philosophies, could not make use of existing natural languages, but used to invent new, artificial languages46). A theory on the linguistic sign in which some concepts can be substituted by other ones, is more characteristic for empiricism than for rationalism. Although empiricist influences are not altogether absent in Spinozism, a deductive interpretation does seem more in conformity with Cartesianism and the dualism of intellectus and imaginatio in Spinoza's semantics than an empiricist one.

This deductivism also influenced the relativism in Spinoza's ordinary language semantics. Words do not have absolute signification that are equal for every language user, but the signification of words in ordinary language is to be deduced from the world picture (imaginatio) of the language users in the same way as Spinoza's conceptual semantics have to be deduced from his philosophy. This results in as many semantic systems as there are language users or world pictures.

And in this way each of us will pass from one thought to another, as each one's association has ordered the images of things in the body. For example, a soldier, having seen traces of a horse in the sand, will immediately pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and from that to the thought of war, etc. But a Farmer will pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plow, and then to that of a field, etc. And so each one, according as he has been accustomed to join and connect the image of things in this or that way, will pass from one thought to another47).

In ordinary language semantics, multiplication and individualisation of semantic systems happens much more frequently than semantic unification by making concepts replace the usual significations. On the social level of languages semantic revolutions therefore do not take place48). On the level of the individual semantic sytems semantic revolutions are possible, as can be demonstrated by the case of Friedrich Nietzsche49).

The way Spinozism influenced eighteenth century science and semantics does not deviate from the mainstream Cartesian influence. The next section shows how Dutch Renaissance linguistic terminology kept its significations unchanged in spite of the changes that took place in the underlying conceptual systems of linguistics during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

3. Semantics and scientific change: the case of linguistics

The changes Dutch society underwent after 1650 only in the long term affected semantics. The scientific and cultural changes, taking place, were not depending on semantic change. Only after a rather long period the conceptual changes that were produced by the changes Dutch society underwent, produced semantic changes.

How slowly conceptual change did affect semantics can be demonstrated on the history of seventeenth and eighteenth century linguistic terminology. Before the first printed Dutch grammar of the vernacular, the Twe-spraack (1584), no Dutch linguistic terminology did exist. Like most of the early vernacular grammars in Europe, the Twe-spraack borrowed and translated its terminology from late-classical Latin linguistics50). Uncertainty both about the form and the content of the translated purist grammatical terminology induced the grammarians to clarify it by putting the corresponding Latin terms in marginal notes, as it was usually done in Dutch translations. Cartesianism put an end to this tradition of humanistic trivium grammars in the second half of the seventeenth century. The close relation between the Latin tradition and the purist vocabulary became looser, as Cartesian influence grew, not only in linguistics, but also in philosophy and other sciences. The use of Latin marginal notes lost its function as the vocabulary became more related to the conceptual semantics of Cartesianism and the use of marginal notes became an empty tradition51). An example of how a traditional scientific vocabulary is adapted to the concepts of new theories is given in the table below. It contains the terminology of the cases in some seventeenth and eighteenth century grammars.52)

As can be read from it, the linguistic terminology of the Twe-spraack became the standard in Dutch grammar and did not change substantially after its codification. This terminological consistency of Dutch grammar does not mean, however, that linguistic theory did not develop after the Twe-spraack. The grammars Van Heule published in 1625 and 1633 and Kók 1649 all belong to the same humanist tradition of trivium grammars as the Twe-spraack and share the same adapted late-classical linguistic theory. After the publication of A.L. Kók Ont-werp no complete Dutch grammar was published until the first Enlightenment grammars appeared after 1700. Although Arnold Moonen used an adaptation of the mid-seventeenth century grammatical theory of the High German J.G. Schottel, it did not necessitate him to adapt the inherited grammatical terminology to this new theoretical framework. The first attempt to adapt linguistic terminology to new theoretical insights was undertaken by Lambert ten Kate in a historical grammar of the German languages. But even in Ten Kate's adaptation the significations of the original Latin terminology were maintained53). This was not the case with Kornelis Elzevier. Elzevier substituted the purist terminology of the Twe-Spraack by names, that gave a more adequate expression to the semantically defined syntactic functions the cases had obtained in late eighteenth century grammar54). Linguistic innovations so induced Elzevier to the introduce a new linguistic terminology.

4. Conclusion

The Dutch purist tradition that was part of the cultural context in which Spinoza wrote, proved to be very sensitive in finding expression for conceptual innovations. Spinoza's writing style in which a traditional terminology was used to cover a completely new conceptual system, was conflicting with this Dutch tradition and therefore provoked heavy reactions. In many cases these reactions were the sign of a profound understanding of Spinoza's philosophy and not without influence on those who performed them. A semantic revolution in the linguistic sense has not been effectuated by Spinoza's use of language. Spinozism was part of the Cartesian scientific revolution and as such even affected eighteenth century Dutch linguistics.

Notes

1)YIRMIYAHU YOVEL, Spinoza: the psychology of the multitude and the uses of language, in <<Studia Spinozana>>, 1, 1985, pp.305-333, based on the material for YIRMIYAHU YOVEL, Spinoza and other Heretics. I The Marrano of reason. II The adventures of immanence. Princeton 1989.

2)LEO STRAUSS, Persecution and the art of writing, Westport 1976. - On Strauss see JACQUES MOUTAUX, Exotérisme en philosophie: Leo Strauss et l'interprétation du TTP, in Spinoza au XXe siècle, ed. OLIVIER BLOCH, Paris 1993, pp.421-443. - OMERO PROIETTI, Teshuvah per via obliqua. L'antispinozismo di Leo Strauss, in <<Studia Spinozana>> 11, 1995, pp.81-110.

3)JACQUELINE LAGRÉE, Spinoza et le vocabulaire stoïcien dans le Traité théologico-politique, in PINA TOTARO, Spinoziana, Firenze 1997, pp.91-105.

4)See e.g. HEINE SIEBRAND, Spinoza and the Netherlanders. An inquiry into the early reception of his philosophy of religion, Assen 1988. For Italy see G. TOTARO, Perfectio e realitas nell'Opera di Spinoza, in <<Lexicon Philosophicum>>, 3, 1988, pp.71-113, p.108n114.

5)WILLEM JACOB 'S GRAVESANDE, Oratio de vera, et numquam vituperata, philosophia of September 25th, 1734, in Welzijn, wijsbegeerte en wetenschap. Uitgegeven, ingeleid en van aantekeningen voorzien door C. DE PATER, Baarn 1988, p.62: "Zijn definities zijn zo geraffineerd, dat het niet meteen duidelijk is dat hij zich niet aan de gangbare betekenis van de gebruikte woorden houdt."

6)PETRUS POIRET, Cogitationum rationalium de Deo, anima et malo libri quatuor ... Editio altera, Amsterdam 1685 (1677), p.80: "Ad hoc enim debuerunt ita subdole & virsute sensus atheisticos verbis vulgaribus jungere, ut pauci illico eam contrarii vel diversi sensus substitutionem adverterent, maxime cum operam dederunt ut novus ille sensus quantum fieri posset eo modo proneretur qui ab ordinario (ob homonymiam vocum) non videretur abhorrere. Haec est clavis intelligentiae scriptorum Spinozae, sine qua ex iis vix carpies quicquam; ..."

7)On Spinoza's theory of language see DAVID SAVAN, Spinoza and language, in Spinoza. A collection of critical essays. Edited by MAJORIE GRENE, New York 1973, pp.60-72. - G.H.R. PARKINSON: Language and knowledge in Spinoza, ivi, pp.73-100. - MARCELO DASCAL, Spinoza. Pensamento e linguagem, in <<Revista latinoamericana de filosofia>>, 3, 1977, pp.223-236. - ANTONY J. KLIJNSMIT, Spinoza on 'the imperfection of words', Amsterdam 1989, (Cahiers voor taalkunde 1). - MARILENA DE SOUZA CHAUÍ, Da realidade sem mistérios ao mistério do mundo (Espinoza, Voltaire, Merleau-Ponty). 1983. - STUART HAMPSHIRE, Spinoza, Hammondsworth 1951, pp.18-25. - VINCENZO BRUNELLI, Religione e dottrina del linguaggio in Spinoza, in <<Verifiche>>, 6, 1977, pp.755-787. - MARCELO DASCAL, Leibniz and Spinoza. Language and cognition, in <<Studia Spinozana>>, 6, 1990, pp.103-145. - E. GIANCOTTI BOSCHERINI, Che cosa ha veramente detto Spinoza, Roma 1972 pp.65-67. - But especially LAURENT BOVE: La théorie du language chez Spinoza, in <<L'enseignement philosophique>>, 4 , 1991, pp.16-33.

8)E 2P49CISI; SPINOZA, Opera, im Auftrag der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften hrsg. von CARL GEBHARDT, Heidelberg 1925, Vol 2 pp.131-132 Lectoresque moneo, ut accurate distinguant inter ideam, sive Mentis conceptum, et inter imagines rerum, quas imaginamur. Deinde necesse est, ut distinguant inter ideas et verba, quibus res significamus. Nam quia haec tria, imagines scilicet, verba et ideae a multis vel plane confunduntur, vel non satis accurate, vel denique non satis caute distinguuntur, ideo hanc de voluntate doctrinam, scitu prorsus necessariam, tam ad speculationem, quam ad vitam sapienter instituendam, plane ignorarunt. English translation: SPINOZA, The collected works of Spinoza. Edited and translated by EDWIN CURLEY, Princeton 1985, Vol I pp.485-486.

9)    E 2P49CISI GEBHARDT II p.132 Deinde, qui verba confundunt cum idea, vel cum ipsa affirmatione, quam idea involvit, putant se posse contra id, quod sentiunt, velle: quando aliquid solis verbis contra id, quod sentiunt, affirmant, aut negant. Haec autem praejudicia exuere facile is poterit, qui ad naturam cogitionis attendit, quae extensionis conceptum minime involvit; atque adeo clare intelligit, ideam (quandoquidem modus cogitandi est) neque in rei alicujus imagine neque in verbis consistere. Verborum namque, et imaginum essentia a solis motibus corporeis constituitur, qui cogitationis conceptum minime involvunt. English translation: CURLEY p.486.

10)    KV 2/16 no 5-6 BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZA, Korte verhandeling van God, de mensch en deszelvs welstand. Breve trattato su Dio, l'uomo e il suo bene. Introduzione, edizione, traduzione e commento di Filippo Mignini, L'Aquila 1986 pp.274-276: alzo dat wy het nooyt en zyn, die van de zaak iet bevestigen of ontkennen, maar de zaak selfs is het, die iets van zigh in ons bevestigt of ontkent. Dit en zullen eenige mogelyk niet toestaan, om dat haar toescheynt, wel iets anders van de zaak te konnen bevestigen of ontkennen, als haar van de zaake bewust is. Doch dit komt maar, om dat zy geen begrip hebben van het Concept 't welk de ziele heeft van de zaak, zonder of buyten de woorden. English translation: CURLEY p.124. The notiones cummunes, introduced to characterize the concepts, knowledge of the second kind consists of and also the only possible stepping stone to this (intuitive) self-evident knowledge of the third kind (E 5P28), did not figure in Spinoza before the Ethics (Gilles Deleuze, L'idée d'expression dans la philosophie de Spinoza, Paris 1968, p.271: "Les notion communes sont une des découvertes fondamentales de l'Ethique."). In Spinoza's semantics a central role is to be attributed to the epistemology of the second kind of knowledge and thus to the notiones communes. Notiones communes are distinguished from more traditional concepts like termini transcendentales (ens, res, aliquid), used to comprehend confusedly imagined bodies under one attribute, and notiones universales (homo, equus, canis), used as predicates for many particular things of the same kind (E 2P40S1). In the notiones communes a denotation of what is common to several particulars is conceptualized by reason, without any relation to time, 'sub quadam aeternitatis specie' (E 2P44DC2). Unlike termini transcendentales and notiones universales, notiones communes at least partly derive their content from the eternal and infinite essence of God (E 2P46; E 2P47). The clear and distinct ideas that are defined as notiones communes, are self-evident and effectuate, that will and intellect are one and the same and that the human will is not free (E 2P48).

11) The way in which the individual associates sounds with images, does not make them beforehand the most obvious means for expressing the notiones communes. Nevertheless Spinoza does not abstain from using words, nor does he propagate the introduction of an artificial language, like several other 17th century philosophers had done. He even did not want to substitute philosophical notiones communes for ordinary meanings of words, but used words in their accepted meanings, if these were not entirely opposed to the concepts he wanted to express in them. In order to be able to use words in an adequate way, Spinoza had to reach some insight in the accepted meanings by investigating the histories of these words in the language of ordinary people, before philosophers took possession of them.

12)POIRET 1685 p.80 "Haec est clavis intelligentiae scriptorum Spinozae, sine qua ex iis vix carpies quicquam;" YOVEL pp.318-319 "a succinct and crucially important remark" "it applies to the Ethics throughout and has the role of a major statement".

13)E 3 affectuum definitiones 20 expl. GEBHARDT II p.191: Haec nomina <sc. affectuum> ex communi usu aliquid significare scio. Sed meum institutum non est, verborum significationem, sed rerum naturam explicare, easque iis vocabulis indicare quorum significatio, quam ex usu habent, a significatione, qua eadem usurpare volo, non omnino abhorret, quod semel monuisse sufficiat. English translation: CURLEY p.535-536.

14)CM 2/6 CURLEY p.312.

15)KV 2/24 no.9-10 MIGNINI p.330: De wyle wy dan een zoodanig een gemeenschap tusschen God en de mensche stellen, zoo zoude men met recht moogen vraagen, hoe zich dan God aan de mensche kan bekend maaken, en of zulks geschied off geschiede zoude konnen door gesprooken woorden, off onmiddelyk, zonder eenig ander dink te gebruyken, door 't welk hy het zoude doen? Wy antwoorden: door woorden altyd niet: want als dan most de mensch al vooren geweten hebben de beteikenisse van die woorden eer ze tot hem gesprooken wierden. English translation: CURLEY p.144.

16)TTP 4 GEBHARDT III p.64-65: Et sane ex hoc, quod Deus Christo, sive ejus menti sese immediate revelaverit, & non ut prophetis, per verba, & imagines, nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam quod Christus res revelatas vere percipit, sive intellexit; tum enim res intelligitur, cum ipsa pura mente extra verba & imagines percipitur Translation: BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, A theologico-political treatise and a Political treatise. Translated from the Latin with an introduction by R.H.M. ELWES, New York sa (1951), p.64.

17)TTP 1 GEBHARDT III p.21 ll.3-6: Quare non credo ullum alium ad tantam perfectionem supra alios pervenisse, praeter Christum, cui Dei placita, quae homines ad salutem ducunt, sine verbis, aut visionibus, sed immediate revelata sunt: Translation: ELWES p.18-19.

18)TTP 1 GEBHARDT III p.16 ll.10-19: Cum itaque mens nostra ex hoc solo, quod Dei Naturam objective in se continet, & de eadem participat, potentiam habeat ad formandas quasdam notiones rerum naturam explicantes, & vitae usum docentes, merito mentis naturam, quatenus talis concipitur, primam divinae revelationis causam statuere possumus; ea enim omnia, quae clare, & distincte intelligimus, Dei idea (ut modo indicavimus), & natura nobis dictat, non quidem verbis, sed modo longe excellentiore, & qui cum natura mentis optime convenit, ut unusquisque, qui certitudinem intellectus gustavit, apud se, sine dubio expertus est. Verum quoniam meum institutum praecipue est, de iis tantum loqui, quae solam Scripturam spectant, sufficit de lumine naturali haec pauca dixisse. Translation: ELWES p.14.

19)Cf. DON GARRET, Truth and ideas of imagination in the TIE, in <<Studia Spinozana>>, 2, 1986, pp.61-92.

20)TIE 88-89; GEBHARDT II 32-33: Deinde cum verba sint pars imaginationis, hoc est, quod prout vage ex aliqua dispositione corporis componuntur in memoria, multos conceptus fingamus, ideo non dubitandum, quin etiam verba aeque, ac imaginatio, possint esse causa multorum magnorumque errorum, nisi magnopere ab ipsis caveamus. Adde quod sint constituta ad libitum, et captum vulgi; adeo ut non sint nisi signa rerum, prout sint in imaginatione, non autem prout suNt in intellectu; quod clare patet ex eo, quod omnibus iis, quae tantum sunt in intellectu, et non in imaginatione, nomina imposuerunt saepe negativa, uti sunt incorporeum, infinitum, etc. et etiam multa, quae sunt revera affirmativa, negative exprimunt, et contra, uti sunt increatum, independens, infinitum, immortale, etc. quia nimirum horum contraria multo facilius imaginamur; ideoque prius primis hominibus occurrerunt, et nomina positiva usurparunt. Multa affirmamus, et negamus, quia natura verborum id affirmare et negare patitur, non vero rerum natura; ideoque hac ignorantia facile aliquid falsum pro vero sumeremus. English translation: CURLEY p.38.

21)On this point Spinoza's semantics show similarity with Nikolaus von Kues' (1401-1464) theory on the linguistic sign: Qui videt, quomodo negationes, quae mentis visum in quidditatem dirigunt, sunt priores affirmationibus, ille videt omne nomen significare tale quid. Nam corpus non significat quidditatem, quae incorporalis est, sed talem scilicet corpoream; sic terra terrestrem et sol solarem et ita de omnibus. Nomina igitur omnia ex aliquo sensibili signo impositionem habent signivicativam, quae signa sequuntur rerum quidditatem. Mens autem ipsam anterioriter contemplans vocabulum negat esse proprium ipsius, quam videt quidditatem. NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera omnia 13. Directio speculantis seu de non aliud. Ediderunt LUDOVICUS BAUR et PAULUS WILPERT, Lipsiae 1944, pp.63-64. - Cf. THEO VAN VELTHOVEN, Gottesschau und menschliche Kreativität Studien zur Erkenntnistheorie des Nikolaus von Kues, Leiden 1977, p.212 n75. - For Cusanus' influence on 17th century Dutch mathematicians, see FRITZ NAGEL, Nicolaus Cusanus und die Entstehung der exakten Wissenschaften, Münster 1984, (Buchreihe der Cusanus-Gesellschaft 9).

22)Cf. ULRICH RICKEN, Sprache, Anthropologie, Philosophie in der französischen Aufklärung. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Verhälnisses von Sprachtheorie und Weltanschauung, Berlin 1984.

23)RICKEN, p.13.

24)RICKEN p.33.

25)RICKEN, p.57.

26)RICKEN, pp.59-60. The Port Royal identification of the Cartesian dualism of language and mind with the Augustinian dualism of sermo internus and sermo externus might be an explanation for the differences between Arnauld (Port Royal) and Malebranche (Spinoza). On Port Royal and sermo internus / sermo externus see PIETER A. VERBURG, Taal en functionaliteit. Een historisch-critische studie over de opvattingen aangaande de functies der taal vanaf de prae-humanistische philologie van Orléans tot de rationalistische linguistiek van Bopp, Wagenigen 1951, p.41 and pp.327-332. - English translation: Language and its functions, Amsterdam 1998, (Studies in the history of the language sciences 84) - MARIJKE J. VAN DER WAL, De taaltheorie van Johannes Kinker, Leiden 1977, p.4. - VIVIAN SALMON, The study of language in 17th century England, Amsterdam 1979, pp.63-87, p.64.

27)Edition by W.N.A. KLEVER, De spinozistische prediking van Pieter Balling. Uitgave van 'Het licht op de kandelaar' met biografische inleiding en commentaar, in <<Doopsgezinde bijdragen>>, 14, 1988, pp.55-85.

28)Het Licht (dan zeggen wy) is een klare en onderscheidene kennisse van waarheit, in het verstant van een ygelijck mensch, door welk hy zodanich overtuigt is, van het zijn, en hoedanich zijn der zaken, dat het voor hem onmogelijk is, daar aan te konnen twijffelen." KLEVER p.68 (9).

29)Zo dan de zaken, wel en behoorlijk, door de woorden, zouden verstaan werden, dat most geschieden, door zoodanige, die bequaam waren, de zaken zelven, den genen die ze voor quamen, in te drukken; en dan waar het genoech, om onze gedachten, zoo wy die begrepen, aan andere bekent te maken, maar [l. met] zulke te gebruiken. KLEVER p.66 (1).

30)KLEVER p.66 (2): nochtans verscheidene, ja ook wel tegen een stridende gedachten. 31)    KLEVER p.66 (2): dewijl men weet, in wat voor een veranderinge, de talen geduiriglijk zijn: ook zodanich; dat de woorden, van hun vorige beteikenisse, gehelijk wel verwisselen konnen.

32)KLEVER p.66 (2) men zoud' moeten geloven, dat hy of zeer weinich, of geen kennisse van de zaken, die daar door beteikent willen worden, gehadt hadde.

33)Zoo dat dan, indien men door woorden, en redenen iemandt de zaaken zelven, beter zoude willen indrucken, men van noden hadde, niewe woorden, en by gevolgh een heele niewe taal te vinden. Doch dat zou't werk, dat zou den arbeidt zijn. KLEVER p.66 (2).

34)PETRUS VAN BALEN, De verbetering der gedachten. Uitgegeven, ingeleid en van aantekeningen voorzien door M.J. VAN DEN HOVEN, Baarn 1988. Van Balen possibly knew Balling's Het licht op de kandelaar p.51n6.

35)Alsoo spruiten de meeste dwaalingen hier uit, datmen de Namen niet net past op de saken, die door de selve moesten uitgedrukt zijn. VAN BALEN p.89.

36)Dog, om dat we met veele menschen te doen hebben, en elke bysondere taal te onderscheiden, geen kleine moeite en verwarring soude geven; is 't noodwendig en min pynlik, de beteekenis van de woorden soo te vatten, gelyk se in gebruik zijn, en daar aan onse denkbeelden te hechten. VAN BALEN p.90.

37)For recent information on Koerbagh see ROBERTO BORDOLI, Ragione en srittura tra Descartes en Spinoza. Saggio sulla Philosophia S. Sacrae Scipturae Interpres di Lodewijk Meyer e sulla sua recezione, Milano 1997, pp.87-91. - ROBERTO BORDOLI: Account of a curious traveller on Libertijn milieu of Amsterdam, in <<Studia Spinozana>>, 10, 1994, pp.175-182, p.176. - GERRIT H. JONGENEELEN, La philosophie politique d'Adrien Koerbagh, in <<Cahiers Spinoza>>, 6, 1991, pp.247-268.

38)On Leibniz' critisism of Koerbagh on this point see GERRIT H. JONGENEELEN, Adriaan Koerbagh. Een voorloper van de verlichting? in <<Documentatieblad van de werkgroep Sassen>>, 5, 1994, pp.27-34.

39)Het ligt p.25-26. - On sermo internus and sermo externus in Meyer cf. JACQUELINE LAGRËE, Sens et verité, Philosophie et théogie chez L. Meyer et Spinoza, <<Studia Spinozana>>, 4, 1988, pp.75-91, p.79.

40)MANFRED WALTHER, Die Transformation des Naturrechts in der Rechtsphilosophie Spinozas, in <<Studia Spinozana>>, 1, 1985, pp.73-104, p.73.

41) <<Studia Spinozana>>, 8, 1992, pp.367-382, p.373.

42) WALTHER p.380.

43)MANFRED WALTHER, Biblische Hermeneutik und historische Erklärung. Lodewijk Meyer und Benedikt de Spinoza über Norm, Methode und Ergebnis wissenschaftlicher Bibelauslegung, in <<Studia Spinozana>>, 11, 1995, pp.227-300, p.293.

44)Cf. THOMAS S. KUHN, The structure of scientific revolutions, Chicago 1970.

45)YIRMIYAHU YOVEL, Spinoza and other Heretics. I The Marrano of reason. II The adventures of immanence, Princeton 1989. Prepublished as YIRMIYAHU YOVEL, Spinoza: the psychology of the multitude and the uses of language, <<Studia Spinozana>>, 1, 1985, pp.305-333. - The term 'semantic revolution' occurs on p.330.

46)JOHN WILKINS, An essay towards a real character, and a philosophical language, 1668. - GEORGE DELGARNO, Ars signorum, 1661. - G.W. LEIBNIZ, De arte combinatoria. - Cf. VIVIAN SALMON, The study of language in 17th century England, Amsterdam 1979, pp.129-156 (Language-planning in seventeenth century England: its context and aims). - JAMES KNOWLSON, Universal language schemes in England and France 1600-1800, Toronto and Buffalo 1975.

47)E 2P18SI GEBHARDT II p.107 et sic unusquisque ex una in aliam cogitationem incidet, prout rerum imagines uniuscuiusque consuetudo in corpore ordinavit. Nam miles ex.gr. visis in arena equi vestigiis statim ex cogitatione equi in cogitationem equitis, et inde in cogitationem belli, etc. incidet. At Rusticus ex cogitatione equi in cogitationem aratri, agri etc. incidet, et sic unusquisque, prout rerum imagines consuevit hoc, vel alio modo jungere, et concatenare, ex una in hanc, vel in aliam incidet cogitationem. English translation: CURLEY p.466.

48)Cf. R.J.G. DE BONTH, "De Aristarch van 't Y". De 'grammatica' uit Balyhazar Huydecopers Proeve van taal en dichkunde (1730), Maastricht 1998.

49)Cf. ROBERT SNEL, Het hermetisch universum. Nietzsches verhouding tot Spinoza en de moderne ontologie, Delft 1989 (Mededelingen vanwege het Spinozahuis 60). - YIRMIYAHU YOVEL, Nietzsche and Spinoza: amor fati and amor dei, in YIRMIYAHU YOVEL (ed.), Nietzsche as affirmative thinker. Papers presented at the fifth Jerusalem philosophical encounter, April 1983, Dordrecht 1986, pp.183-203 (=Spinoza and other heretics, II, pp.104-135.

50)G.R.W. DIBBETS, De woordsoorten in de Nederlandse triviumgrammatica, Amsterdam 1995. - E. RUIJSENDAAL, Terminografische index op de oudste Nederlandse grammaticale werken, Amsterdam 1989. - For Italy see: BRUNO MIGLIORINI, Storia della lingua italiana, Firenze 1988.

51)G. CRAPULLI AND E. GIANCOTTI BOSCHERINI, Ricerche lessicali su opere di Descartes e Spinoza, Roma 1971, p.29: tra le note marginali figurano termini inestistenti nel testo latino. - PIET STEENBAKKERS, Purisme et gloses marginales dans la traduction néerlandaise de 1677 de l'Ethica, in PINA TOTARO, Spinoziana. Ricerche di terminologia filosofica e critica testuale, Firenze 1997, pp.233-248 expectedly reaches the same conclusion.

52)YIRMIYAHU YOVEL, Spinoza: the psychology of the multitude and the uses of language, in <<Studia Spinozana>>, 1, 1985, pp.305-333, based on the material for YIRMIYAHU YOVEL, Spinoza and other Heretics. I The Marrano of reason. II The adventures of immanence. Princeton 1989.      LEO STRAUSS, Persecution and the art of writing, Westport 1976. - On Strauss see JACQUES MOUTAUX, Exotérisme en philosophie: Leo Strauss et l'interprétion du TTP, in Spinoza au XXe siècle, ed. OLIVIER BLOCH, Paris 1993, pp.421-443.

53)noemen<nominare; telen<generare; geven<dare; aanklagen<accusare; afnemen<afferre; roepen<vocare.

54)werker: who acts; eigenaer: who possesses; ontvanger: who receives; lyder: whom is acted upon; toehoorder: who is called; derver: whom is taken from.