SCIENCE IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND

Merton, Robert K. Science, Technology, and Society in Seventeenth Century England. New York: Fertig, 1970.

CHAPTER IV

PURITANISM AND CULTURAL VALUES

From the middle of the seventeenth century, science and technology claimed an increasing need of attention. No longer an errant movement finding faltering expression in occasional discoveries, science had, become accredited and organized. To this the establishment of the Royal Society bears some witness.

But all this was no spontaneous generation. It had its antecedents rooted deep in the culture which fathered it and assured its further growth; it was the child of a long period of cultural incubation. And …the specific sources of this newly expressed vitality of Science, of this new-won prestige, they must be sought among these cultural values. If it be true that science, just as any other activity, attracts followers to its ranks to the extent that it is regarded with favor by society, then the marked increase in the number of scientists which occurred during the seventeenth, century is a symptom of the changing temper of the time.

The Sociological Approach

…

In the nineteenth century, bold intellectuals berated religious opposition and saw in the outcome of this conflict the triumph of reason over superstition, whereas pacific mediators sought to establish an essential harmony between science and religion. Neither of these was a properly sociological point of view. The sociologist is, not a Defender of the Faith, religious or scientific. When he has uncovered the sentiments

crystallized in religious values and the cultural orientation which governs their expression, when he has determined the extent to which this led men toward or away from scientific pursuits or perhaps influenced .them not at all, then his task is, in its initial outlines, complete. Puritanism, evoking and shaping the sentiments which pervaded every phase of human action in this period; was the religious movement which notably incorporated dominant cultural values. As such, it provided a measuring rod for the worth of various social activities. What, then, were its relations to science? Did Puritanism, as so often we are told, involve that sort of fervid fanaticism which brooks nothing but its own religious goals? And, if so, what of the cultural implications of such an attitude? What were the consequences for the new science of the powerful motivations, which derived from Puritanism?

In short, we are concerned with the complex modes of interaction between a religious ethic and science, not as these appear to apologists of the two camps, but as they occurred in the course of actual' social development.

To this end, we must probe under the surface of theological contentions to the sentiments which give them meaning. The religious component of thought, belief, and action becomes effective only when it is reinforced by strong sentiments which lend meaning to certain forms of conduct. These sentiments find expression in word and deed alike. Words are full of equivocation and doubtless we shall find many pious utterances which are more significant for what they leave unsaid than for what they say. We are concerned with verbal responses, religious exhortations and appeals, in so far as they enable us to arrive at the motivating sentiments which give rise to these ideas and …as we shall see behavior in its turn reacts upon the sentiments, re-enforcing, moulding, at times altering them so that the whole process is one of incessant interaction.

The Protestant Ethic

Though the diversity of theological doctrines among the Protestant groups of seventeenth century England is evident in 1650, THOMAS EDWARDS enumerated 180 sect…there was a core of common values which was accepted by all (1). Sectarian differences were largely confined to matters of church ceremony and ecclesiastical organization as well as to esoteric theology (2); but all this did not materially influence the religious ethos. Anglicans, Calvinists, Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists, Quakers, and Millenarians—bickering and quarreling amongst themselves as they did-nevertheless subscribed to a substantially identical nucleus of religious and ethical questions. This common attitude of mind and mode of life may be denominated by that "word of many shades," Puritanism. Nor need we be alarmed because this usage does not coincide with the original sense of the term as referring to the reform of the Church of England in a Presbyterian manner since our interest is primarily directed toward the social and not the ecclesiastic implications of Protestantism.

Calvinism spread its roots in all the Protestant sects of the time. Though Mr. TAWNEY notes that Calvinist theology was accepted Calvin’s discipline… (3) the converse may likewise, be maintained. It is precisely Calvinism which constitutes the ideal type of that Puritanism which was confined to no single sect and which was represented in the Anglican Church almost as fully as in those groups which later broke away from it. (4) Differences in theological minutiae were brought to convergence in the actual social ethic. If later Presbyterianism differed from, Calvinist Precisianism by declaring that man is justified by good works as well as by faith, it none the less led to a sanction of persistent … as a means of salvation, while the latter exacted the same sort of behavior as establishing … a state-of-grace.

(1) G. N. CLARK, The Seventeenth Century, p. 317.

(2) JOHN TULLOCH, English Puritanism and Its Leaders (Edinburgh and London: WILLIAM BLACKWOOD, 1861), pp. 4 ff. This had been long since noted by GEORGE BERKELEY in his brochure, Historical Applications and Occasional Meditations upon Several Subjects (London, 1670, 2d ed.), pp. 101-2.

(3) R. H. TAWNEY, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: HARCOURT, BRACE & Co., 1926), p. 112.

(4) Ibid., p. 198. C.H.H. HENSON, Studies in English Religion in the Seventeenth Century (London: J. MURRAY, 1903), p. 188. "It is very noteworthy that there is no essential divergence either of principle or method between Puritans and Anglicans on the subject of moral theology."…

The conception of "meritory works" was of course also current in the Middle Ages, but—especially in the early part of that epoch—its meaning was radically different from that of the Protestant precept (5). Monastic limitations and an otherworldly orientation (in a quite different sense from that of the Calvinists) were insuperable barriers to the utilization of the concept in. active, worldly service. For both medieval Catholicism and Calvinism, this world was evil, but, whereas the prescribed solution for the one was retirement from the world into the spiritual calm of the monastery, it was incumbent on the other to conquer the temptations of this world by remaking it through ceaseless, unflinching toil. The sentiments with which the various Puritan … were imbued despite different rationalizations and theological views, led to approximately identical implications for social conduct.

Perhaps the one major Protestant variation from the Puritan ethos is afforded by Lutheranism, with its precepts of justification by faith only and its emphasis on penitent grief, but since this sect had no appreciable influence on English life, this divergence is of no importance. Again, there must be no confusion between CALVIN'S own teachings and those of the subsequent CalvinistPuritan movement (6), particularly in England, for the latter represents a marked development of the Great Reformer's conceptions, rather than a rigid maintenance of them. As we shall see, the mode of life which bore the imprint of Calvinism …was not so much adherence to the logical implications of a system of theology domination by a particular group of sentiments.

The value implicit in these doctrines which struck the deepest roots in English life were those congenial to tendencies developing independently in other compartments of culture, and, In this way Puritanism. was integrated within cultural trends which were in their incipiency. A number of studies have shown that the Protestant ethos exerted a stimulative effect upon capitalism. (7) Since science and technology play such dominant roles in modern capitalistic culture, it is possible that tangible relationship likewise exist between the development of science and Puritanism (8) Indeed MAX WEBER incidentally notes the possibility of such a connection. (9) The dominant Puritan teachings of the 'time may best be culled not from esoteric theological treatises which had no direct influence upon the social life of the period, but from the compilations of casus conscientiae, sermons, and similar exhortations directed primarily toward the actions and behavior of individuals.

(5) The importance of primarily considering the social meaning (i.e. definition) and correlated sentiments rather than the rationalized version of religious precepts is deftly summarized by FRIEDELL. "Protestantism denies justification by works and puts repentance in the heart, in mere faith, and yet at the same time it demands a practical, active Christianity and thus again comes back to a sort of sanctity of works, ... it sanctifies even profane works, thus achieving the last degree of sanctimoniousness. Catholicism accepts justification by works, but means by the latter only performances of a minor sort, and thus it arrives at …inner penitence and meditation, and which knows nothing of profane works in the ordinary sense. Thus, starting from opposite standpoints, each ends in the contrary view from that with which it began: Protestantism, opposed to works, ends in a glorification of the most worldly tasks, the state, the magistrates, the family, manual work, science, even war; the more worldly Catholicism rises to complete contempt for all these things..." EOON FRIEDELL, A Cultural of History of the Modern Age (New York.: A. A. KNOPF, 1930-31), Vol. 1, p. 259.

(6) One of the basic results of this study is the fact that the most significant influence of Puritanism upon science was largely unintended by the Puritan leaders. That CALVIN himself deprecated science only enhances the paradox that from him stemmed a vigorous movement which furthered interest in this very field.

(7) MAX WEBER. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. by T. PARSONS, (New York: CHARLES SCRIBNER'S Sons, 1930); ERNST TROELTSCH, The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches, trans. by OLIVE WYON (New York: MACMILLAN, 1931), 2 volumes; W. CUNNINGHAM, Christianity and Economic Science (London: J. MURRAY, 1911); TAWNEY, op. cit. H. LEVY, Die Grundlagen des okonomischen Liberalismus in der Geschichte der englischen Volkwirtschaft (Jena, 1912). A striking adumbration of the theories presented in these works appears in a book by WILKINS, one of the virtuosi of the seventeenth century, who was also a leading spirit in the group which founded the Royal Society. His work "On the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, interrupted by his death in 1672, he asserts that “Religion is a natural Cause of riches," and proceeds to demonstrate this fact by isolating those Protestant teachings which sanction behavior inevitably conducing to the accumulation of capital. It should be noted that his …the familiar argument that the hand of Providence aids the virtuous, simply because of their religiosity.

(8) Since the completion of this study have appeared several papers and books by DEAN DOROTHY STIMSON, OLIVE GRIFFITHS and R. F. JONES which trace, with varying degrees of detail, a positive connection between Puritanism and science. These materials will be … in a later chapter. See also ROBERT K. MERTON, “Puritanism, Pietism and Science," The Sociological Review. Vol. XXVIII (1936), pp. 1-3.

(9) Op. cit., p. 249. But WEBER goes onto say in Auf die Bedeutung [des Puritanismus] fur die Entwicklung der Technik und der empirischen Wissenschaften kommen wir nicht zu sprechen. Cf. his Religionssoziologie (Tubingen: C. B. MOHR, 1920), Vol. 1, p. 188 n.

This procedure is based upon the assumption that the set are expressions of the sentiments and values which permeated the thoughts and action of believers. Moreover, it is probable that sermons not only reflected but also reinforced the dominant sentiments of the day (10). If, as has been repeatedly noted, RICHARD BAXTER is the most representative Puritan in history," (11) we may expect to find in his. Christian Directory (12), that popular " Body of Practical Divinity and Cases of Conscience," a typical representation of the leading elements in the Puritan ethos. In this way it is possible to arrive at an understanding of the values and sentiments which lent meaning to certain of the activities, among them science and technology, of seventeenth century man. Recourse to the writings of other spiritual leaders of that day will help us to determine the extent to which this compendium of Protestant ethics and. convictions is typical.

"Glorification of God"

One formula which, largely meaningless though it be to the emancipated individual of today, became the focus of strong sentiments among Puritans is "the glorification of God" as "the-end-and-all of existence (13)."

(10) Analogous assumptions are involved in the works of such anthropologists as RADCLIFF & BROWN and MALINOWSKI and sociological writing of …PARETO among others.

(11) JOHN S. FLYNN, The Influence of Puritanism on the Political and Religious Thought of the English (New York: DUTTON, 1920), p. 135. Cf. TULLOCH, op. cit., p. 377, who writes: “Certainly, of all the men who express and represent the spiritual thought of the Puritan age, none does so more completely than RICHARD BAXTER. Cf. also WEBER, op. cit., p. 156.

(12) The edition used here was published in five volumes, London, Isis. The compendium was written in 1664-65. This work will be cited as C. D.

(13) “God must be the ultimate end of your religion: it must be intended to please and glorify him. God must be the continual motive and reason of your religion; and of all you do..." C. D., Vol. I, pp. 165-6; cp. also, Vol. II, pp. 15, 239 ff. Cf. commentary of TROELTSCH, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 585. Foremost in the Westminster Catechism (1045) was the query: “What is the chief and highest end of man: To glorify God, and fully to enjoy him for ever." This is a concrete example of the exhortation of what WEBER has called wertrational action, i.e., "durch bewussten Glauben an den ethischen, asthetischen, religiosen oder wie immer zu deutenden-unbedingten Eigenwert eines bestimmten Sichverhaltens rein als solchen und unabhangig van Erfolg." Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tubingen : MOHR, 1922), pp. 12 ff.

Familiar to Christian ears as this was—medieval Catholicism knew the phrase well—it was now clothed with new meanings and a new emphasis. …glorified but institutional co …calized his glorification in particular directions with a play of social sects. Since a wide variety of behavior, all of which is not equally desirable, may presumably be oriented toward the attainment of this goal, BAXTER proceeds upon a further definition of the most appropriate means. It is in the definition of these and other leading tenets of Protestantism rather than in the sheer phraseology (which resembles Catholicism in many respects) that the real significance of these teachings is found. One of these directions was eminently practical.

For those …whom the new faith provided strong motivations was urged the subordinate, though highly important, aim of usefulness to one's fellow-men, of utility to society; for “Though God need none of our good works, yet that which is good materially pleaseth Him, as it tendeth to His glory, and to our own and others' Benefit which He delighteth in (14) Nor need we halt here.” The idea is carried to its extreme and we are told that "public service is God’s greatest service.” (15) Thus, a social utilitarianism, having been established as one of the leading criteria of acceptable, even praiseworthy, behavior inasmuch as it is a most effective means of glorifying God—the basic and ultimate end—is imbued with a power of its own. Various activities were built up around this and other tenets of a religious system which, at the time, carried with it all the force of deep-rooted, hardly questioned convictions. In fact, since the utilitarian principle lent itself to a ready concrete application, it came to be the guiding practice. It is this definition (16) of the precept in basically utilitarian terms which allied Protestantism with the rest of the social culture.

(14) C. D., Vol. I, p. 322.

(15) C. D., Vol. I, p. 456.

(16) The motivation for this definition will become more apparent as other features of this religious system are considered. 62

A further fundamental doctrine, peculiar, however, to the Calvinists, is that of predestination: God grants salvation to some purely of His own free will, irrespective of the faults or virtues of the elect. We need only realize the Puritan's profound. anxiety. 'Concerning his spiritual grace to appreciate the desperate insistence with which he propounded the immediate question: how am I to know that I am among the elect? The Church could provide no assurance. Yet an answer was psychologically imperative; to continue the routine of daily life in the face of such uncertainty was simply unthinkable. An answer was demanded and soon came forth. Since the time …it held that election is proved by "good works" which are outward signs of an inward state of grace (17). Here again, the essential difference between Catholicism and Puritanism is in the definition of a nominally similar conception "good works" in the Protestantism of this time is basically a term to refer to achievements. Which are useful and profitable in a worldly sense; at first blush, it would appear to be sheer utilitarianism. Good works now demanded participation in mundane affairs, not withdrawal from them through flight to the monastery.

Thus, by satisfying the drive for the conviction of one's election, certitudo salutis, the Calvinist doctrine of predestination escapes any drift toward an apathetic pessimism (18).

(17) TROELTSCH, Ope cit., Vol. II, p. 590.

(18) ROLAND G. USHER, in his generally excellent study. The Reconstruction of the English Church (New York and London: APPLETON, 1910), 2 volumes provides a careful summary of Puritan theology, but errs in his analysis of the practical consequences of Puritan beliefs, as is evidenced by the following “... for his future bliss, the Puritan needed but faith in Christ: he could by his human 'works' accomplish nothing: and he felt that such attempts were an insult to God and to His eternal grace." "Such a theology made man despondent, morbid, morose, introspective." Vol. I, 78-79. As a matter of fact, as we shall have occasion to see, 'the doctrine of predestination with its Puritan corollary of correction of grace though necessary labor obviated the feeling of continual [wellness] and afforded a sense of transcendent power to the individual who felt that he was one of the elect.

Those which did not accept the notion of predestination; arrived at a conclusion which in its practical consequences is identical with those of the Calvinists, since for them marks, still understood in the sense of worldly accomplishment, are equally necessary in this instance to reach a state of grace. Thus, we find abundant confirmation of MAX WEBER'S dictum that “similar ethical maxims may be correlated with very different dogmatic foundations." (19) This likewise corroborates the contention that there is substantial uniformity in the social implications of the various Protestant dogmas.

Diligence and Industry

On these diverse theological bases-predestination and justification through good works is erected the structure of an additional doctrine governing behavior: diligence in one's calling becomes a necessity (20). This principle merges into its consequences, for since systematic, methodic, and constant labor enables the attainment of success in one's profession—which is the hallmark of salvation—such achievement itself becomes a worthwhile goal. The demand for constancy in labor is justified by all the fundamental Puritan doctrines which carry with them the absolute character of a closed system of integrated sentiments and beliefs. In the first place, it is a means of glorifying God, for it is "God that calleth thee to labour." Again, it is a means of aiding the public weal (22). Thirdly, diligence in our labors necessarily entails less leisure and liberty for succumbing to the multifarious temptations, odious to the sight of God, which beset us.

(19) Protestant Ethic. p. 97.

(20) "Be diligent in your callings and spend no time in idleness, and perform your labours with holy minds to the glory of God." C. D. Vol. II. pp. 196-97.

(21) C. D. Vol. II, pp. 122-24. Cf. TAWNEY. op. cit.. p. 240.

(22) “The public welfare, or the good of the many, is to be valued above your own. Every man therefore is bound to do all the good he can to others, especially for the church and commonwealth. And this is not done by idleness, but by labour. As the bees labour to replenish their hive, so man being a sociable creature, must labour for the good of the society which he belongs to, in which , his own is contained as a part.” C. D. Vol. II, p. 580. Here is to be noted again the shift from a dominant emphasis on the glorification of God to a stress on utilitarianism.

Time must be spent solely in the way of God and not an hour must be misspent (23), in excess of sleep or of play, for this is the sign of the flesh-pleaser. Not stinting variations in the bases of appeal, the Puritan emphasis upon reason as a praiseworthy faculty is called into play. Labour is necessary for the preservation of the faculties of the mind (24).

These attitudes obviously do not at all imply monastic asceticism, ausserweltliche Askese, "far from the madding crowd's ignoble strife," but rather an intramundane asceticism, innerweltliche Askese (25). The Puritan ethic, couched in insistent terms which brooked no dispute, demanded participation in the affairs of this world. Thus, BAXTER raises the hypothetical question: “Must every man do his best to cast off all worldly and external labours, and to retire himself to a contemplative life as the most excellent?" His answer is categorical :

No: no man should do so without a special necessity or call: for there are general precepts on all that are able, that we live to the benefit of others, and prefer the common good, and as we have opportunity do good to all men... (26)

Once again there is the tendency to have the utilitarian criterion supersede that of the glorification of God, a transition which is even more marked in subsequent passages from BAXTER (27).

(23) C. D. Vol. I, p. 334; Vol. II, Chap. IV.

(24) C. D. Vol. II, p. 581. This rationalization possibly reflects the increasing esteem in which certain intellectual pursuits were coming to be held.

(25) The most lucid exposition of this point is by MAX WEBER, op. cit., especially chapter IV. Cf. also. TROELTSCH, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 604 ff; TAWNEY, op. cit., p. 240 et passim; MARGARET JAMES, Social Problems and Social Policy during the Puritan Revolution (London: ROUTLEDGE & Sons, 1930), p. 17, which is an excellently detailed study. Cf. CHRISTOPHER LOVE, The Combat between Science and Religion 54, p. 52. "God never did so order Religion that...work."

(26) C. D. Vol. II, p. 212. The extreme statement of this Puritan rationalization of secular and utilitarian activity is found in SPRAT'S Sermons. He states; so far is the True Religion from obliging all its Professors, either to withdraw wholly out of the World, or in Conscience to avoid all the usual Observances, and Manners, or even the innocent Delights of it, whilst they are in the World; that perhaps none are more capable of bringing more Benefit to Mankind, so of doing more Service to God, or exercising more Evangelical Graces, than those Men, that are of the most practical Lives, and engag'd in most secular Business." THOMAS SPRAT, Sermons on Several Occasions, pp. 18-19.

(27) E.g., C. D., Vol. II, pp. 244-5. “The work of a magistrate, a lawyer, a physician, and such like, is principally in doing good in their several callings which must not be neglected for contemplation. Some persons in the same calling, whose callings are not so urgent upon them, by any necessities of themselves or others, and who may have more vacant time, must gladly take it for the good of their souls, in the use of contemplation and other holy duties. Others that under greater necessities, urgencies, obligations, cannot be spared from the service of others, (as physicians, lawyers, etc.) must be less in contemplation and prefer the greatest good.” This dictum quite clearly…

Choice of Vocation

Since the necessity for zeal in a calling has been admirably justified by reference to unquestionable fundamental Puritan dogmas, BAXTER goes on to rank the occupations in order of desirability. They are not equally efficient means of attaining the prescribed goals nor is every individual capable of pursuing those vocations which are most desirable. The general principles to be followed in the selection of a calling of course revert to the original premises: choose that employment in which you may be most serviceable to God (28) and that which most contributes to the common weal (29); "and, ('caeteris paribus ') that calling which most conduceth to the public good is to be preferred." (30) The callings, in order of desirability, are the learned professions, though only those who have had a "special cal " should enter the ministry, agriculture, trade and the crafts (31). The presence of the learned vocation is congruent with the high esteem in which education is held by the Puritan. These, then, constitute the fundamental elements of the Puritan ethos which together defined the acceptable "way of life." It is vital to an understanding of this world-view that we do not underestimate the tremendous control that was then exercised religion over the Puritan mind.

(28) C. D., Vol. I, p. 332.

(29) C. D., Vol. III, p. 186.

(30) C. D., Vol. II, p. 584. This virtually completes the shift to a dominant emphasis on utilitarianism.

(31) C. D., Vol. II, p. 584. This conception provides a definite basis for individuals to turn to the learned professions, other than the ministry, even though this latter is the most desirable calling. That this precept exercised some influence will be seen very definitely in at least two outstanding instances, those of ROBERT BOYLE and of Sir SAMUEL MORLAND. It is doctrines of this sort which much later emerge as definitely subversive of formal religion and which make for secularization.

We would certainly be led to profound error were we to assume that religious beliefs played the perfunctory role which is generally their lot today. No doubt, then as now, particular individuals had broken away from the strong hold of religious authority, but in the main, Puritanism was a powerful social force which was not readily gansaid.

Blessed Reason

Closely related to the foregoing doctrine was another class of beliefs which pertains more directly to the social evaluation of science and technology. First among these is the tendency to laud the faculty of reason (32). The nominal basis for this attitude is manifold. Reason is praiseworthy because man, chosen of God, alone possesses it; it serves to differentiate him from the beasts of the field (33). Further, it is an admirable function since it serves to curb and restrain the appetite which provokes the "master sin," sensuality, fleshpleasing or voluptuousness (34); it limits any pernicious tendency toward idolatry.

The role of reason as a device for controlling idolatry of the flesh is sufficient to endear it to the Puritan heart, but it possesses still another exemplary characteristic; it enables man more fully to glorify God by aiding him to appreciate His works (35). Through the previously noted tendency toward relating the various elements of this religious system by a series of judgments and ending each of these elements with the sentiments centered about the system as a whole.

(32) Thus, even ROBERT BARCLAY, the leading apologist of the Quakers, the most mystical of the major seventeenth century Protestant sects, exclaims: "[I do not] at all despise reason, that noble and excellent faculty of the mind, because wicked men have abused the name of [it] ..." An Apology for the True Christian Divinity (Philadelphia, 1805), p. 76; also p. 159. [This work was originally written in 1615.] The preponderant place of rationalism in the more orthodox Puritan sects has been established by WEBER, Protestant Ethic, p. 224, et passim.

(33) C. D., Vol. II, p. 109. It is significant that this idea was specifically used as a basis for the justification of scientific study. Viz. infra.

(34) C. D., Vol. II, p. 95 ff.

(35) For a detailed discussion of this point, viz. infra.

Reason … it becomes imperative for them who would rationalize these doctrines to "prove” that reason and faith—two such highly exalted virtues of the Puritan—are not inconsistent. It is in this vein that BAXTER maintains:

Though some deluded men may tell you, that faith and reason are such enemies, that they exclude each other as to the same object, and that the less reason you have to prove the truth of the things believed, the stronger and more laudable is your faith; yet, when it cometh to the trial, you will find, that faith is no unreasonable thing, and that God requireth you to believe no more, than is your perception of the reasons why you should believe: that God doth suppose reason, when he infused faith, and useth reason in the use of faith. They that believe, and know not why, or know no sufficient reason to warrant their faith, do take a fancy, or opinion, or a dream for faith (36).

This exaltation of reason and derogation of "enthusiasm" in the original etymological sense of the term—is characteristic of the rationalistic aspect of the Puritan teachings (37). The scriptures were not intended instead of reason or any of the sciences (38), since these latter may be independent, efficacious means for glorifying God.

(36) C. D., Vol. I, p. 171.

(37) Rationalism is here not used in its customary philosophical sense as the theory that reason is a source of knowledge in itself, superior to and independent of sense perceptions, i.e., as opposed to empiricism; nor entirely in the theological sense as the doctrine which holds that religious opinions should be based on reason rather than on revelation, though it does include this latter meaning as a specific case. (Thus, BAXTER holds: "The Holy Spirit, by immediate inspiration, revealed to the apostles the doctrines of Christ, and …the Scriptures. But …"Though your religion must not be taken upon trust, there are many controverted smaller opinions that you must take on trust, until you: are capable of discerning them in their proper evidence." C. D., Vol. I, p. 100): It means rather reasonableness, conformity to reason and experience; it is a combination of rationalism and empiricism, as is quite evident from Puritan writings. This attitude of empiricorationalism is of moment, as shall be indicated, for the relation between Protestantism and science.

(38) C. D., Vol. I, p. 44. Reason is accorded a carefully circumscribed place. God is “irrational" in the sense that He cannot be measured by human reason. Rather, reason is one of the tools to be used in our tasks in this world. The intellect is to be used to aid action, the ultimate purpose of which is beyond our grasp: Cp. TROELTSCH, Social Teachings, Vol. I, p. 515.

Anticipating, we may say that the elevation of an empirico-rationalism to such a lofty plane that it is admitted—at times by theologians themselves—to be a justifiable criterion of the validity of various religious beliefs introduced the opening wedge for later processes of secularization (39). It may also be suggested that the emphasis upon reason —in the sense in which the term is used here—is no less related to the beginnings of biblical criticism (40) than to rationalization in industry and in science. Had the seventeenth century Puritan foreseen some of the consequences of his espousal of reason, he would have punctuated his repudiation of it with pious shudders.

Profitable Education

Allied with this emphasis on rationalism is the widely recognized interest of the Puritan in education. “Education and converse [conversation] have so great a power on the mind that they come next to grace, and are often the means of it." (41) But this education must be directed in specific channels; certainly not in literature or art or other similar “unprofitable studies" which are simply time-wasting self-indulgences (42).

(39) HENRY MORE, in his Brief Discourse of the True Grounds of the Certainty of Faith in Point of Religion (London, 1688), pp. 578-80, reflects this tendency. “... to take away all the certainty of sense rightly circumstantiated, is to take away all the certainty of belief in the main points of our religion. “... no revelation is from God that is repugnant to sense rightly circumstantiated.”

(40) Cf. EMILE BABHIER, “The Formation of our History of Philosophy," pp. 159 ff. in Philosophy and History, ed. by R. KLIBANSKY and J. H. PATON, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936).

(41) C. D., Vol. I, p. 86; The attitude of the Quakers is quite the same as remarked by J. S. FLYNN, op. cit., p. 159. "... the whole Society [of Friends] …work to set up free-schools in populous and in ignorant places, especially in Wales [I]; that all may be taught to read, and some may be prepared for the Universities." C. D., Vol. V, p. 431.

(42) C. D., Vol. I, p. 150 ff; Vol. II, p. 167; Vol. III, p. 202; Vol. IV, p. 4849. BAXTER's Book of Self-Denial, passim. This hostile attitude toward certain types of literature did actually result in Puritans largely eschewing this field save as it was related to expressions of Puritan sentiments. Cf. FRANS DIRK DE SORT, Puritan and Royalist Literature' in the Seventeenth Century (Delft: J. WALTMAN, 1933), Introduction. HERBERT SCHOFFLER remarks, in connection with this antipathy, that there was not a single Quaker poet of significance until late in the Enlightenment. Cf. his Protestantismus und Literatur.

Flights of fancy could scarcely be condoned unless they carried moral implications. The cleric ALEXANDER HOME warned youth against the reading of "profane sonnets and vain ballads of love, the 'fabulous feats of PALMERINE and such like reveries." This attitude is correlated with the decline of interest in certain of the arts which was noted in Chapter II. Nor is the pursuit of the scholastic philosophy approvable, for it is full of false teachings which seem to lead away from God rather than toward Him (43). Especially pernicious is this pseudo-Aristotelian philosophy because it induces error and confusion which is verisimilar by virtue of the rigorous syllogistic reasoning employed. But starting frequently from false premises it must needs come to false conclusions. Hence, in outlining a course of study for one who intends the ministry, BAXTER deliberately refrains from including any such philosophy (44). This careful direction of intellectual interests into definite fields and away from others is of moment when one considers the contemporary power of such religiously-founded attitudes. Having eliminated certain studies as inappropriate, BAXTER continues by designating those which are to be preferred.

The primary emphasis in education should be, of course, religious; but since all who seek instruction are not equally suited for the clergy one can best serve the public good by following one's individual inclination in the choice of other lawful, desirable callings (45). As already indicated, the other learned professions are next in point of desirability. In the educational curriculum, Mathematics, a part of "organical knowledge" since its uses are so fundamental and diverse, takes a prominent place. Physics, understood always as the study of God in his works, is the… his selection illustrates the rationalistic aspect and physics the empirical (47); emphasis upon these studies is significant when one remembers that the advance in these fields was more pronounced than any other.

(43) Cf. observation of MAX WEBER, Protestant Ethic, p. 249.

(44) C. D., Vol. IV, pp. 577-8. Cf. WEBER, Religionssoziologie, Vol. I, p. 564. "Nicht selten betrachtete daher die Religiositat die rein empirische, auch naturwissenschaftliche Forschungals besser mit ihren Interessen vereinbar als die Philosophie. So vor allem der asketische Protestantismus."

(45) C. D., Vol. II, p. 212 ff.

(46) C. D., Vol. IV, p. 577.

(47) It is this same convergence which characterizes the growth of modern science. The unrelieved rationalism of the Scholastics was insufficient; the unimaginative and incomplete empiricism of FRANCIS BACON could prove no better. But the interaction of abstract reasoning with experiment and observation, typified by the conjunction of mathematics and physics was the key to …this development; … scientific one, it was not wholly unrelated to the society to which it occurred. The coincidence of these converging movements in the realms of both religion and science was not fortuitous, as we shall see.

A knowledge of many languages is also desirable since it facilitates the acquisition of further learning—it is esteemed not as an attainment desirable in itself, but as a means for attaining a further knowledge of things. The pure linguist, who did not apply his faculties to increasing man's knowledge, was too close to the inadmissible status of the contemplative monk. This attitude was also repeatedly maintained by the scientists of the period.

In his "directions for young Students, for the most profitable ordering of their studying Thoughts," the Reverend Mr. BAXTER skillfully steers a safe course, twixt the Scylla of utter conformity to intellectual tradition and the Charybdis of radical divergence from antecedent scientific conceptions (48). The test for the acceptance or rejection of theories is to be empirical submission of the theses, to the relevant sensory experience, "for it is not science, but human belief, else, whoever you take it from." (49) BAXTER would not dismiss rationalism beyond recall, but he would subordinate it; it is not 'to be preferable,' but rather ancillary, to the study of irreducible and stubborn facts. Here is evidenced the revolt against scholasticism, against rationalism (in the philosophical sense) which is so characteristic of two of the major movements of the century: the Protestant-Reformist and the scientific.

(48) The following quotation differs significantly from the rigidity of traditionalism manifest in the writings of medieval theologians and, in great part of CALVIN himself. "Avoid both extremes, of them that study no more, but to know what others have written and held before them; and of them that little regard the discoveries of others: learn all of your teachers and authors that they can teach you; but make all your own, and see things in their proper evidence..." C. D., Vol. II, p. 246-7. The context emphasizes the empiricist bent.

(49) C. D., Vol. IV, p. 579.

At this point a distinction must be drawn between medieval and seventeenth century rationalism. The impress of rationalism was marked throughout the latter Middle Ages; it was an essential of scholasticism. As Professor WHITEHEAD has shown (50), this engendered a habit of orderly thought which remained long after the scholastic philosophy had been repudiated. HOOKER, in his Ecclesiastical Polity, however, criticised the Puritans for their failure to subordinate themselves completely to such rationalism. With the Puritans, who fully exemplify a mercantile and scientific age, the term reason takes on a new connotation: the rational consideration of empirical data. Logic is reduced to a subsidiary role. It is occasionally a useful element in thought, but the test of reality comes not from scholastic logic, which adds nothing to knowledge and may perpetuate falsehood, but from the observation of facts. It was this accent, coupled with an “irrational" faith in the efficacy and utility of science, which characterizes both Puritanism and modern science (51).

Physics: God in His Works

Education in general having been deemed a good work, the logically-minded BAXTER goes on to provide a rationale for the emphasis on scientific and empirical studies. Again, there is the reversion to the fundamental aim of all life as the basis for action: the study of natural phenomena is an effective means for promoting the glory of God (52).

(50) A. N. WHITBOW, …Modern World (New York: MACMILLAN…)

(51) CJ. WALTER PAGEL, “Religious Motives in the Medical Biology of the xvii Century," Bulletin of the Institute of the History of Medicine, Vol. III (1935), pp. 97-128, who contrasts the preponderance of rationalism in medieval science with the “empirical implications" of seventeenth century science and religion.

(52) “The great means of promoting love to God is duly to behold Him in His appearances to man, in the ways of Nature, Grace and Glory. First, therefore, learn to understand and improve his appearances in Nature, and to see the Creator in all His works, and by the knowledge and love of them to be raised to the knowledge and love of Him." C. D., Vol. I, p. 375. This argument for the justification of science is characteristic of all the Protestant sects. Thus GILBERT, Lord Bishop of Sarum … in A Sermon Preached at The Funeral of the Honorable ROBERT BOYLE (London: 1692), p. 14, repeats: “... the viewing of the works of God even in a general survey, gives insensibly a greatness to the Soul. But the more extended and exact, the more minute and severe, the Enquiry be, the Soul grows to be thereby the more inlarged by the variety of Observation that is made, either on the great Orbs and Wheels that have their first motion, as well as their Law of Moving, from the Author of all; or on the Composition of Bodies, ..." It is of course true that this same view—that the study of natural phenomena discovers the glory of God revealed in His handiwork—became fairly common toward the latter part of the Middle Ages. In Islam, the same notion was also widespread. AVERROES held that the noblest worship which can be paid to God lies in the knowledge of His works. But the experimental method, while faintly present, was not sufficiently cultivated to make for what is called modem science. In medieval Europe this neoPlatonic conception of God revealed in Nature was coupled with the doctrine of the complete subservience of these studies to the infallible teachings of the Bible (which were not interpreted by the individual in the light of his reason and experience but… allied with a similarly sanctioned emphasis on observation and experiment, it could at best lead to fruitless rationalistic discussions, largely divorced from empirical study. Seldom did religious leaders carry this point further and suggest that the scientist was, better able to glorify God than were others; and hence the complete sanction of scientific work was in no wise comparable to that of the later Puritan teachings. It was the conjunction of these prerequisite factors, empiricism, rationalism and positive evaluation of science, in the postReformist teachings which was associated with the spread, and indirectly, with the advance of science.

The study of Nature in a “convincing, scientifical way" furthers a full appreciation of the Creator's power, so that the natural scientist must needs be better equipped than the casual observer to glorify Him. In this direct fashion, religion sanctioned science and raised the social estimation of those who pursued scientific investigation, with the associated intensification and spread of interest in such pursuits.

A further basis for the sanctification of science was found in the second major tenet of the Puritan ethos: the utilitarian principle. The linkage is apparent. “Knowledge is to be valued according to its usefulness," (53) since anything which tends "to sweeten the lives of mortals," to facilitate their material well-being, is good in the sight of God (54). The religiously assigned value of science is hence immeasurably increased in view of the fact that the scientific study of nature tends to enlarge man's dominion over it.

(53) C. D., Vol. I, p. 13.

(54) GILBERT BURNET, Ope cit., pp. IS-18.

Science is thought of as a powerful technologic tool and as such deserves to be highly esteemed. Now, as has been indicated, there was a constant tendency for the to-the-greater-glory-of-God principle to recede as a guiding tenet of actual behavior and for utilitarian considerations to become ever more prominent. Or, to put it in another way, activity which was clearly useful in a practical sense was increasingly held to glorify God most effectively. In view of this process, it may readily be seen that the social utility of both science and technology proved to be one of the most effective arguments for the positive estimation of such pursuits, an argument which was irrelevant to the medieval religious leaders who felt the futility of worldly interests of this sort. Indeed, considerations of mundane utility were simply foreign to medieval teachings. In contrast, Puritanism tends ever more and more to emphasize the value of reshaping this world. Consequently, science, as at least in part the handmaid of socio-economic utility, is positively sanctioned (55).

The Medieval Contrast

The monastic asceticism and the feeling of the impermanence and relative worthlessness of matter which was characteristic of the Middle Ages could obviously not lead to an interest in disciplines which were primarily concerned with this world of use. The early Church Fathers, such as EUSEBIOS, ST. AMBROSE and LACTANTIUS, consistently proposed the chiliastic doctrine of the New Testament that this earth was soon to be destroyed, that there were to be new heavens and a new earth, and treated he physical sciences with contumely and contempt (56).

(55) Cf. A. C. MCGIFFERT, The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas (New York: The MACMILLAN Company, 1922), Chapter 3.

(56) A. D. WHITE, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology, 2 volumes New York: APPLETON, 1901), Vol. I, pp. 375 ff. This attitude exemplifies what H. O. TAYLOR called the basic, principle of patristic faith: that the will of God is the one cause of all things and that this will is unsearchable, is "secret." Cf. The Medieval Mind, Vol. I, p. 74. See also F. W. BUSSELL, Religious Thought and Heresy in the Middle Ages (London: ROBERT SCOTT, 1918), pp. 715-17. CALVIN'S point of view, which closely resembled this, was submerged by the implications of his other tenets, which led to directly opposed developments.

The investigation of natural phenomena seemed purposeless. As AMBROSE held in his Hexameron [V. I. I, p. 6], “To discuss the nature and position of the earth does not help us in our hope of life to come. It is enough to know what Scripture says, that 'He hung up the earth upon nothing.'"

When this belief had lost something of its force, when the conviction of the imminent end of the earth was not so intense, science came to be regarded with dread since it was "black magic," representing an unlawful alliance with Satan (57). Writing in ,the late twelfth century, RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR asks rhetorically: "'What is all science, but a picture without life, a phantom without movement or feeling?" And BONAVENTURA in the following century warns that "the tree of science cheats many of the tree of life or exposes them to the severest pains of purgatory." It is quite true that some of the great Reformers, in particular LUTHER, were similarly antagonistic to natural science and humanist art, but the religious movements which stemmed from these charismatic leaders grew away from this antagonism and vigorously espoused a favorable attitude (58).

One essential difference between the medieval and postReformation type of personality, in which religion was the focal element, is clearly brought out by SPRANGER'S ideal types of the "transcendental mystic" and the "immanent mystic." The first finds rest only in a super-sensuous world. For such a being science is without value since it does not answer the ultimate questions; all his energies are concentrated on preparing his soul for inner vision. The immanent mystic, on the other hand, applies his religious beliefs in a totally different fashion. Life and action become positively valued precisely because they are indications of God. This type of individual possesses a sort of cosmic enthusiasm, for since God is present in every aspect of life, none should be slighted.

(57) WHITE, Op. cit., Vol., I, p. 383.

(58) For this reason, it is necessary to insist upon the distinction between the teachings of the Reformers themselves and their subsequent development in the Puritan and similar movements. Of course, this does not deny that occasionally principles were adopted without any pronounced change. Cf. F. VON BEZOLD, "Staat und Gesellschaft des Reformations-Zeitalters" in Staat und Gesellschaft der nerleren Zeit (Berlin: B. G. TEUBNER, 190B), p. 81, et passim.

Science as the study of His works thus becomes highly regarded (59). This type of attitude so characteristic of Post-Reformation religious leaders during a period when religion was still a singularly powerful social force may well have been congenial to the development of science. This is not to imply that the discoveries of NEWTON, BOYLE or other scientists can be directly attributed to the sanction of science by religion. Specific discoveries and inventions belong to the internal history of science and are largely independent of factors other than the purely scientific. But the fact that science became socially acceptable, in short, that it became a laudable rather than an unsavory occupation, could not but help direct talents into scientific pursuits which at other times would have found expression in other fields. Nor is there any implication that religion was the primary factor, the independent variable, so to speak, and science the dependent. Religious conceptions were, as we shall see more clearly, definitely integrated with sentiments basic to the contemporary science and philosophy: there was throughout a reciprocal interaction. But the fact is that religion still constituted a most effective social force and as such it exerted a considerable influence upon. contemporary action and the allocation of contemporary interests. In the values of that society, the ideals and goals of religion loomed large and science was regarded as an efficient means for the attainment of these aims. As SPRANGER has indicated, values from other zones—in this instance, the realm of science—become religious when they are related to the final meaning of life, and consequently they embody a religious emphasis over and above their original value … This statement, however, should not be generalized, for it applies only when religion is clearly a preeminent social value. The realization of the fact provides definite limits on the generalizability of the processes noted in this study, for obviously the influence of religion upon science necessarily varies with the degree of social control which religion manifests in a given society.

(59) EDUARD SPRANGER, Types of Men, trans. by P. J. W. PIGORS. (Halle: M. NIEMEYER, 1928), pp. 213-16.

(60) Ibid., p. 285.

The picture which our study has thus far afforded is characteristic of an historical epoch; it cannot be extended, without appropriate modifications, to a period such as the present where religious ideals are in a sense subordinated to others, particularly those of science and the industrial world. But all these are considerations which may best be dealt with in other connections.

Science: Handmaid of Utility

Social utility, an aim prescribed by religion, has been used to sanction science, viewed, in this case, as a handmaid of technology (61). BAXTER points out, further, that scientific and technologic discoveries and inventions increase man's felicity signally, for they enable their originators to arrive at an abundant conviction of their state of grace.

Grace will become more notable and discernible [if you persevere and succeed in your labours]... For the very exercise of love to God and man, and of a heavenly mind and holy life, hath a sensible pleasure in itself, and delighteth the person who is so employed: as if a man were to take the comfort of his learning and wisdom, one way is by the discerning his learning and wisdom which he hath, in reading and meditating on some excellent books, and making discoveries of some mysterious excellencies in arts and sciences, which, delight him more by the very acting, than a bare conclusion of his own learning in the general, would do. What delight had the inventors of the sea-chart and magnetic attraction, and of printing, and of guns, in their inventions. What pleasure had GALILEO in his telescopes, in finding out the inequalities and shady parts of the moon, the Medicean planets, the 62 adjuncts of Saturn, the changes of Venus, the stars of the Milky Way, etc…”

These sentiments basic to these views would have been [simply impossible] to the intellectual amalgam of science and theology presented by an AQUINAS.

(61) We do not wish to confuse the development of science and of technology -they are not identical though they coincided at many points. But the fact is that the religious evaluations were generally concerned with both, and in much the same fashion. At this point, then, they may be considered jointly.

(62) C. D., Vol. V, p. 535.

To regard with high esteem scientific discoveries attained empirically and without reference to Scriptural or other sacred authority would have been almost as heretical as making the discoveries themselves (63). As Professor HAKINS has observed, the scientific spirit of Christian Europe in the Middle Ages was not liberated from the respect for authority which was characteristic of that epoch (64), whereas Puritan authority was enunciating the very doctrines which furthered interest in science and, ultimately, lack of concern with religion itself.

The contrast between BAXTER'S statement and, say, that of PETER DAMIAN, the noted chancellor of POPE GREGORY VII, who declared that all worldly sciences are absurdities and fooleries is perhaps sufficient to account significantly for the social interest in science in the seventeenth century and, relatively speaking, its almost complete absence in the eleventh. This does not imply a complete cessation of interest in science during the eleventh or any other century of the period so popularly and erroneously called the Dark Ages.

The continuity of scientific development was unbroken, but was a most tenuous thread in Western Europe until at least the twelfth century. Thereafter, science, as a phase of social activity, became increasingly significant, but it could not bloom and prosper for two reasons: the first, intrinsic to the nature of science, and the other, social in character. To a certain degree, a fixed order must prevail in the appearance of scientific discoveries; each discovery must await certain prerequisite developments (65).

(63) Contrast the attitude of Pope ALEXANDER III, who in 1163, in connection with the Council of Tours, forbade the study of physics to all ecclesiastics, which in that age meant the prohibition of scientific studies to the only persons who were even moderately equipped to pursue them. "What the Pope lessly forbade was,” in the words of the papal bull, “the study of physics … of the world.” C. D., Vol. I, p. 386. Second, rational explanation of natural phenomena may have been simply an application of Franciscan discipline, but it seems also to have been animated by a dislike of his originality of theory. In 1278, the Franciscans condemned BACON'S teachings as containing "suspected novelties." Likewise, the Dominicans interdicted the study of medicine, natural philosophy and chemistry. Such attitudes of religious authorities could scarce have provided a fruitful social soil for the development of science. Cf. LECKY, History of Rationalism, Vol. I, p. 301.

(64) CHARLES H. HASKINS, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928), pp. 336-37.

(65) Cf. W. F. OGBURN, Social Change (New York: Viking Press, 1932), GILFILLAN, Sociology of Invention (Chicago: FOLLETT Pub. Co. 1935).

The converse of this does not follow with the ineluctability which some cultural sociologists would have us believe—a discovery does not necessarily follow upon the existence of its "constituent elements" (as is well attested by the history of science.) In this sense, we may talk of the time not being ripe for a far-reaching, swift-moving, wide-sweeping development until the seventeenth century (66).

The other factor was the absence of the requisite cultural animus of regarding scientific activity as highly desirable. Occasional "great intellectual sky-rockets" there were to light the world of science, but little in the way of concerted scientific effort viewed with favor by the chief agents of social control; the tendency was, rather, to look benevolently at theological activity and to turn one's back to scientific endeavors, Of course, this statement is but approximate. The tenets of medieval Europe were never as consistently applied and unchallenged as one is at times prone to believe. There were divergences from the dominant tendencies, but those few of the intellectual elite who ran counter to the trend were too much the exception to direct social attention into scientific channels,

The seventeenth century brought the prerequisite factors to convergence: an adequate accumulation of scientific knowledge to cope with the initial problems at hand, the maturation of the experimental method, a consistent provision of "intellectual genius adequate for the greatness of its occasions" and a complex of social attitudes which, for varying reasons, religious, economically utilitarian and idealistic, was favorable to scientific interests.

The specific developments, it should again be emphasized, were not directly dependent upon this social evaluation of science as it focused official interest, but it is manifest that … to science, it possesses an ongoing dynamic of its own… advance more rapidly than when derogated (67). These social attitudes, positive or negative, are a function of a complex of social trends, which are more or less interdependent: economic, political, religious, philosophic, scientific and the like.

(66) ALFRED VIERKANDT, Die Stetigkeit im Kulturwandel (Leipzig: DUNCKER & HUMBLOT, 1908), pp. 123-4 et passim.

(67) As BACON observed, "it is nothing strange if a thing [science] not held in honour does not prosper." Novum Organum. Vol. I, Aph. XCI.

At various times, the dominant ideals and sentiments of a society are chiefly expressed in one or another of these fields, and it is they which largely determine the social attitudes toward other spheres (68). When, as was apparently the case during the seventeenth century, utilitarian norms are dominant, other activities are, evaluated in respect of their apparent accordance with these ideals and, in this sense, may be said to be dependent upon them. Generalizations concerning these social processes are, then, relative to the specific social context; they are not timeless, universal, irrespective of social values and social structure, The social values inherent in the Puritan ethos were such as to lead to an approbation of science because of a basically utilitarian orientation, couched in religious terms and furthered by religious authority. Scientific investigation, viewed from the rationalized Puritan system of ethics, seemed to possess those qualities characteristic of activities which are effective means for the attainment of the accepted goals. The possibility that science, as a means toward a religious end, would later break away from such religious supports and in a measure tend to delimit the realm of theologic control, was seemingly unrealized (69). The apparent conflicts between 'theology and science' which arose when scientific findings seemed to disprove various contentions of orthodox theologians occurred later with each extension of scientific inquiry to realms which were hitherto regarded as "sacred." But this is simply another example of the frequently observed fact that the Reformers did not anticipate the full actual consequences of their teachings, consequences which did not coincide with their expectations (70).

(68) Cf. MAX SCHELER, Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens (Miinchen und Leipzig: DUNCKER & HUMBLOT, 1924), pp. 31 ff.

(69) There were a few far-sighted exceptions, foremost among whom was JOSEPH GLANVILL.

(70) Cf. R. K. MERTON, "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action." American Sociological Review, Vol. I (1936), 894-904.

CHAPTER V

MOTIVE FORCES OF THE NEW SCIENCE

What we call the Protestant ethic was at once a direct expression of dominant values and an independent source of new motivation. It not only led men into particular paths of activity; it exerted a constant pressure for unswerving devotion to this activity. Its ascetic imperatives established a broad base for scientific inquiry, dignifying, exalting, consecrating such inquiry: the scientist had hitherto found the search for truth its own reward, he now had further grounds for disinterested zeal in this pursuit. And society, once dubious of the merits of those who devoted themselves to the “petty, insignificant details of a boundless Nature," largely relinquished its doubts.

The Puritan Spur to Science

As we have seen, the capital elements of the Puritan ethic were related to the general climate of sentiment and belief. In a sense, these tenets and convictions have been accentuated through a biassed selection, but this sort of bias is common to all positive inquiries. Theories which attempt to account for certain phenomena require … but not all are actually pertinent to the …of the problem, is necessary. Among the cultural variables which invariably influence the development of science are the dominant values and sentiments. At least, this is our working hypothesis. In this particular period, religion in large part made articulate much of the prevailing value-complex. For this reason, we must consider the scope and bearing of the contemporary religious convictions, since these may have been related, in one way or another, to the upsurge of science. But not all of these convictions were relevant. A certain degree of selection is there fore necessary for the purpose of abstracting those elements which had such a perceivable relation.

Puritanism attests to the theorem that non-logical notions with a transcendental reference may nevertheless exercise a considerable influence upon practical behavior. If the fancies of an inscrutable deity do not lend themselves to scientific investigation, human action predicated upon a particular conception of this deity does. It was precisely Puritanism which built a new bridge between the transcendental and human actions, thus, supplying a […] science. To be sure, Puritan doctrines rested ultimately upon an esoteric theological base but these were translated into the familiar and cogent language of the laity. Puritan principles undoubtedly represent to some extent an accommodation to the current scientific and intellectual advance. Puritans had to find some meaningful place for these activities within their view of life. But to dismiss the relationship between Puritanism and science with this formula would indeed be superficial. Clearly, the psychological implications of the Puritan system of values independently conduced to an espousal of science, and we would grossly simplify the facts to accord with a preestablished, thesis if we failed to note the convergence of these two movements. Moreover, the changing class structure of the time reinforced the Puritan sentiments favoring science. Since a large proportion of Puritans came from the rising class of bourgeoisie, of merchants (1). They manifested their increasing power in at least three ways. First, in their positive regard for both science and technology which reflected and promised to enhance this power. Equally notable, their increasing […] from their growing social and economic importance. A third manifestation was their hostility toward the existing class structure which limited and hampered their participation in political control; an antagonism which found its climax in the Revolution. Yet we cannot readily assume that the bourgeoisie were Puritans solely because the Puritan ethic appealed to bourgeois sentiments.

(1) Cf. TROELTSCH, Social Teachings, Vol. II, p. 681; ROLAND USHER, The Reconstruction of the English Church, especially Vol. II which contains a statistical study of the social origins of Puritan ministers.

The converse was perhaps even more important, as WEBER has shown. Puritan sentiments and beliefs prompting rational, tireless industry were such as to aid economic success. The same considerations apply equally to the close connection between Puritanism and science: the religious movement partly "adapted" itself to the growing prestige of science but it initially involved deep-seated sentiments which inspired its followers to a profound and consistent interest in the pursuit of science.

The Puritan doctrines were nothing if not lucid: If they provided motivation for the contemporary scientists, this should be evident from their words and deeds. Not that scientists, any more than other mortals, are necessarily aware of the sentiments which invest with meaning their way of life. None the less, the observer may often, though not too readily perhaps, uncover these tacit valuations and bring them to light. Such a procedure should enable' us to determine whether the putative consequences of the Puritan ethic truly proved effective. Moreover, it will disclose the extent to which all this was perceived by the very persons whom it most concerned. Accordingly, we shall examine the works of the natural philosopher who "undoubtedly did more than anyone of his time to make Science a part of the intellectual equipment of educated men," ROBERT BOYLE (2). His investigations in physics, chemistry and 'physiology,' to mention only the chief fields of achievement of this omnifarious experimentalist, were epochal. Add to this the fact that he was one of the individuals who attempted explicitly to establish the place of science in the scale of cultural values and his importance for our particular problem becomes manifest. But BOYLE was not alone. Equally significant were JEAN R[…]LER- termed, a bit effusively; who was perhaps as eminent in zoology as was RAY in botany; JOHN WILKINS, one of the leading spirits in the "invisible college" which developed into the Royal Society; OUGHTRED, BARROW, GREW, WALLIS, NEWTON; but a complete list, would comprise a Scientific Register of the time.

(2) J. F. FULTON, "ROBERT BOYLE and his Influence on Thought in the Seventeenth Century," Isis, xviii (1932), pp. 77-102. The range of BOYLE'S prolific writings is shown in Professor FULTON'S exemplary bibliography.

Further materials for our purpose are provided by the Royal Society which, arising about the middle of the century, provoked and stimulated scientific advance more than any other immediate factor. In this instance we are particularly fortunate in possessing a contemporary account, written under the constant supervision of the members of the Society in order that it might be representative of the motives and aims of that group. This is THOMAS SPRAT'S widely-read History of the Royal-Society of London, published in 1667, after it had been examined by WILKINS and other representatives of the Society (3). From these works, then, and from the writings of other scientists of the period, we may glean the chief motive forces of the new science.

To the "Glory of the Great Author of Nature"

Once science has become firmly institutionalized, its attractions, quite apart from any economic benefits it may bestow, are those of all elaborated and established social activities. These attractions are essentially two-fold: generally prized opportunities of engaging in socially approved patterns of association with one's fellows and the consequent creation of cultural products which are esteemed by the group. Such group-sanctioned conduct usually continues unchallenged, with the questioning of its reason for being. Institutionalized values are conceived as self-evident and require no vindication.

But all this is changed in periods of sharp transition. New patterns of conducts must be just, if they are to take hold and become the foci of social sentiments. A new social order presupposes a new scheme of values. And so it was with the new science. Unaided, this force, which had already [gripped man's mind], science could claim only a bare modicum of attention and loyalty. But in partnership with a powerful social movement which induced an intense devotion to the active exercise of designated functions, science was launched in full career.

(3) Cf. CHARLES L. SONNICHSEN, The Life and Works of Thomas Sprat (Harvard University unpublished doctoral dissertation,1931), p. 131 ff., where substantial evidence of the fact that the History was representative of the views of the Society is presented. As we shall see, the statements in SPRAT'S book concerning the aims of the Society bear distinct similarity on every score to BOYLE's characterizations of the motives and aims of scientists in general. Ibid., p. 167. This similarity is evidence of the dominance of the ethos which included these attitudes.

A clear manifestation of this process is not wanting. The Protestant ethic had pervaded the realm of science and had left its indelible stamp upon the attitude of scientists toward their work. Expressing his motives, anticipating possible objections, facing actual censure, the scientist found motive, sanction and authority alike in the Puritan teachings. Such a dominant force as religion in those days was not and perhaps could not be compartmentalized and delimited. Thus in BOYLE'S highlycommended apologia of science, we read:

... it will be no venture to suppose that at least in the Creating of the Sublunary World, and the more conspicuous Stars, two of God's principal ends were, the Manifestation of His own Glory, and the Good of Men (4).

... it will not be perhaps difficult for you .[POROPHILUS]: to discern, that those who labour to deter men from sedulous Enquiries into Nature, do (though I grant, designlessly) take a Course which tends to defeat God of both those mention'd Ends (5).

(4) ROBERT BOYLE, Some Considerations Touching the Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy (Oxford, 1664, 2nd ed.), p. 22.

(5) Ibid., p. 27. This allusion to contemporary opposition to science refers to that of some zealous divines. Generally speaking, strictures on science arose from four primary sources. First, there were disgruntled individuals such as ROBERT CROSSE, an upholder of pseudo-Aristotelianism, who held that the Royal Society' was a Jesuitical conspiracy against society and religion, and HENRY STUBBB, professional-literary "bravo" and Galenical physician who entered the fray for reasons of personal and professional aggrandizement. These exaggerated gestures of antagonism had […] influence, and are not at all indicative of the place held by science and men of science in the latter part of the century. See A. E. SWILLEY, “The Revival of Science in the Seventeenth Century" in Vanuxem Lectures (Princeton University Press: 1914); F. GREENBLAT, Joseph Gill (Columbia University Press, 1900) p. 18 The second source of opposition was literary. For example, SHADWELL in his comedy "The Virtuoso." (1676) and BUTLER, in his "Elephant in the Moon" and "Hudibras" ridiculed the pursuits of certain "scientists," but these literary satires were criticism of exaggerated scientism and dilletantism, rather than of the significant scientific works of the day. Cf. The Record of the Royal Society (Oxford University Press, 1912), pp. 45 ii. A third source of opposition, and by far the most important, was found among those churchmen who felt that the theologic foundations of their beliefs were being undermined by scientific investigations. But theology and religion must not be confused. Orthodox, dogmatic theologians then, as ever, opposed any activity which might lead to the contravention of their dogmas. But the implications of religion, particularly of the religious ethic, were quite contrariwise. It is this ethic, following with equal ineluctability from diverse theologic bases, which in its consequences was of far greater social

This is the motif which recurs in constant measure in the very writings which often contain considerable scientific contributions: these worldly activities and scientific achievements manifest the Glory of God and enhance the Good of Man. The juxtaposition of the spiritual and the material is characteristic and significant. This culture rested securely on a substratum of utilitarian norms which identified the useful and the true. Puritanism itself. had imputed a threefold utility to science. Natural philosophy was instrumental first, in establishing practical proofs of the scientist's state of grace; second, in enlarging control of nature and third, in glorifying God. Science was enlisted in the service of individual, society and deity. That these were adequate grounds could not be denied. They comprised not merely a claim to legitimacy, they afforded incentives which can not be readily overestimated. One need but look through the personal correspondence of seventeenth century scientists to realize this (6).

JOHN WILKINS proclaimed the experimental study of Nature to be a most effective means of begetting in men a veneration for God (7). FRANCIS WILLUGHBY, probably the most eminent zoologist of the time, was prevailed upon to publish his works which, his excessive modesty led him to deem unworthy of publication-only when RAY insisted that it was a means of glorifying God (8). And RAY's panegyric of those who honor Him by studying His works, was so well received that five large editions were issued in some twenty years (9).

…than the abstruse theologic doctrines which rarely penetrated to the […] of the people. Professor R. F. JONES suggests a fourth source. After the Restoration, ardent royalists impugned science, and particularly the Royal Society. …of the close connection between these Baconianists and the Puritans. This suggests that contemporaries recognized the strong Puritan espousal of the new experimental science, as indeed they did. See JONES' excellent study, Ancients and Moderns (St. Louis: Washington University Studies, 1936), pp. 191-92, 224.

(6) See, for example, the letters of WILLIAM OUGHTRED in Correspondence of Scientific Men of the Seventeenth Century, S. J. RIGAUD, ed., pp. XXXIV, et passim. Or see the letters of JOHN RAY in the Correspondence of John Ray, EDWIN LANKESTER, ed. (London, 1848), pp. 389, 395, 402, et passim.

(7) Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (London, 1710, 6th ed.), pp. 236 ff.

(8) See EDWIN LANKESTER, (ed.), Memorials of John Ray (London, 1846), p. 14 n.

(9) JOHN RAY, Wisdom of God (London: 1891), pp. 126-29, et passim. Striking illustrations of the extent to which RAY had assimilated the Puritan sentiments are to be found throughout his correspondence. For example, he writes in a letter to JAMES PETIVER (April 4, 1701): "I am glad your business increases so as to require more attendance, and take up more of your time, which cannot be better employed than in the works of your proper callings. What time you have to spare you will do well to spend, as you are doing, in the inquisition and contemplation of the works of God and nature." - The Correspondence of John Ray, p. 390.

Many "emancipated souls" of the present day, accustomed to a radical cleavage between religion and science and largely convinced of the relative social unimportance of religion for the modern Western world, are apt to generalize this state of affairs. To them, these recurrent pious phrases signify Machiavellian tactics or calculating hypocrisy or at best merely customary usage, but nothing of deep-rooted motivating convictions. This evidence of extreme piety leads to the charge that qui nimium probat nihil probate. But such an interpretation is possible only upon the basis of an unwarranted extension of twentieth century beliefs and attitudes to seventeenth century society. Though it always serves to inflate the ego of the iconoclast and sometimes to extol the social images of his own day, "debunking" may often supplant truth with error. As a case in point, it is difficult to believe that BOYLE who manifested his piety by expending considerable sums to have the Bible translated into foreign tongues as well as in less material ways, was simply rendering lip service to Protestant beliefs. As Professor G. N. CLARK properly notes in this connection:

There is always a difficulty in estimating the degree to which what we call religion enters into anything which was said in the seventeenth century in religious language. It is not solved by discounting all theological terms and treating them merely as common form. On the contrary, it is more often necessary to remind ourselves that these words were then seldom used without their accompaniment of meaning, and that their use did generally imply a heightened intensity of feeling. This sense of the closeness of God and the Devil to every act and fact of daily life is an integral part of the character of the century (10).

In various ways, then, general religious ideas were translated into concrete policy: This was no […] Puritanism transfused ascetic vigor into, activities which, in their, own right, could not as yet achieve self-sufficiency.

(10) The Seventeenth Century, p. 323.

It so redefined the relations between the divine and the mundane as to move science to the front rank of social values. As it happened, this was at the immediate expense of literary, and ultimately, of religious pursuits. For if the Calvinist God is irrational in the sense that He cannot be directly grasped by the cultivated intellect, He can yet be glorified by a clear-sighted, meticulous study of His natural works (11). Nor was this simply a compromise with science. Puritanism differed from Catholicism, which had gradually to come to tolerate science, in demanding, not merely condoning its pursuit. An "elastic concept," (12) the Catholic and Protestant definitions of which differed so fundamentally as to produce entirely opposed consequences, the "glorification of God" thus came to be, in Puritan hands, the "fructification of science."

Comfort of Mankind

But Protestantism had afforded further grounds for the cultivation of science. The second dominant tenet in the Puritan ethos, it will be remembered, designated social welfare, the good of the many, as a goal ever to be held in mind. Here again, the contemporary scientists adopted an objective which carried with it, in addition to its own obvious merits, a cluster of religious sentiments. Science was to be fostered and nurtured as leading to the improvement of man's lot on earth by facilitating technologic invention. The Royal Society, we are told by worthy historians does not intend to stop at some particular benefit, but "goes to the root of all noble inventions." (13) Further, those merits which sciences bring within immediate gain are not to be condemned, for ignoble.

(11) Cf. TROBLTSCH, Social Teachings, Vol. II, p. 585.

(12) The changing definitions of nominally identical concepts comprise a fruitful field for sociological research. Such students of the sociology of knowledge 88 MANNHEIM and historians of ideas (LOVEJOY, BOAS, CRANE) have contributed significant studies of such developments.

(13) THOMAS SPRAT, The History of the Royal-Society of London, pp. 78-79. (14) Ibid., pp. 25, 351 ff.

BACON had declared "the experiments of Light ultimately conduce" to a "whole […] of inventions useful to the wealth and state of man (14).

This power of science to better the material condition of man, he continues, is, apart from its purely mundane value, a good in the light of the Evangelical Doctrine of Salvation by Jesus Christ.

Boyle, in his last will and testament, echoes the same attitude, petitioning the Fellows of the Society in this wise: cc Wishing them also a happy success in their laudable Attempts, to discover the true Nature of the Works of God; and praying that they and all other Searchers into Physical Truths, may Cordially refer their Attainments to the Glory of the Great Author of Nature, and to the Comfort of Mankind." (15) "Experimental science was to BOYLE, as to BACON, itself a religious task." (16)

Earlier in the century, this keynote had been sounded in the resonant eloquence of that "veritable apostle of the learned societies," FRANCIS BACON. Himself the initiator of no scientific discoveries; unable to appreciate the importance of his great contemporaries, GILBERT, KEPLER and GALILEO; naively believing in the possibility of a scientific method that "places all wits and understandings nearly on a level"; a radical empiricist holding mathematics to be of no use in science; he was, nevertheless, highly successful in being one of the principal propagandists in favor of positive social evaluation of science and of the disclaim of sterile scholasticism. As one would expect from the son of a "learned, eloquent and religious woman, full of puritanic fervor" who was admittedly influenced by his mother's attitudes (17), he speaks in the Advancement of Learning of the true end of scientific activity as the " glory of the Creator and the relief of man's estate." (18)

(16) E. A. BURTT, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (New York: HARCOURT, BRACE & Co., 1927), p. 188.

(17) Cf. MARY STURT, Francis Bacon (London: K. PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & Co., 1932), pp. 6 ff. It is true, as Professor M. M. KNAPPBN has pointed out to the writer, that BACON supplied JAMES with his legal arguments against the Puritans. But this should not be confused with BACON'S tacit acceptance of many of the non-political phases of Puritanism. For the congeniality of BACON'S philosophy, see R. F. JONES' Ancients and Moderns: A Study of the Background of the Battle of the Books, p. 92 ff.

(18) In the Novum Organum, Book I, LXXXIX, science is characterized as the handmaid of religion since it serves to display God's power. This is not, of course, a novel contention.

Since, as is quite clear from many official and private documents, the Baconian teachings constituted the basic principles on which the Royal Society was patterned, it is not strange that in the charter of the Society, the same sentiment is expressed (19). THOMAS SYDENHAM, the zealous Puritan (20), likewise had a profound admiration for BACON. And, like BACON, he was prone to exaggerate the importance of empiricism to the very point of excluding theoretical interpretation entirely. "Pure intellectual curiosity seemed to him, perhaps partly owing to the Puritan strain in his character, of little importance. He valued knowledge only either for its ethical value, as showing forth the glory of the Creator or for its practical value, as promoting the welfare: of man." (21) Empiricism characteristically dominated SYDENHAM'S approach to medicine which set above all the value of clinical observation, the" repeated, constant observation of particulars."

It is of some interest that the greatest clinical observers of this century, MAYERNE and SYDENHAM, were of Puritan stock. Throughout there. was the same point to point correlation been the principles of Puritanism, and the avowed attributes, goals and results of scientific investigation. Such was the contention of the protagonists of science at that time. If Puritanism demands systematic, methodic labor, constant diligence in one's calling, what, asks SPRAT, more active and industrious and systematic than the Art of Experiment, which can never be finish'd by the perpetual labours of anyone man; nay, scarce the successive force of the greatest Assembly?" (22).

(19) In the second Charter, which […] the Great Seal on April 22, 16 […] the Society is governable, "while that the subjects are to be applied to further promoting by the authority of experimentation the science of natural things and of useful arts, to the glory of God the Creator, and the advantage of the human race." The Record of the Royal Society, p. 15. Note the increased emphasis upon utilitarianism.

(20) See JOSEPH F. PAYNE, Thomas Sydenham (New York: LONGMANS, GREEN & Co., 1900), pp. 7-8, passim, where abundant evidence of SYDENHAM'S sternly Puritan background is presented. "We cannot appreciate his whole character and career without remembering that he was imbued with the intense earnestness of the Puritans, and was quite prepared, in opposition to authority of any kind, to be called, if necessary, a rebel"

(21) Ibid., p. 234.

(22) Ibid., pp. 341-42.

Here employment enough for the most indefatigable industry since even those hidden treasures of Nature which are farthest from view may be uncovered by pains and patience (23). Does the Puritan eschew idleness because it conduces to sinful thoughts (or interferes with the pursuit of one's vocation)? "What room can there be for low, and little things in a mind so usefully and successfully employ'd [as in natural philosophy]?" (24) Are plays and playbooks pernicious and flesh-pleasing (and subversive of more serious pursuits)? (25) Then it is the “fittest season for Experiments to arise, to teach us a Wisdom, which springs from the depths of Knowledge, to shake off the shadows, and to scatter the mists [of the spiritual distractions brought on by the Theatre]." (26) And finally, is a life of earnest activity within the world to be preferred to monastic asceticism? Then recognize the fact that the study of natural philosophy "fits us not so well for the secrecy of a Closet: It makes us serviceable to the World." (27) In short, science embodies patterns of behavior which are congenial to Puritan tastes. Above all, it embraces two highly prized values: utilitarianism and empiricism (28).

In a sense this explicit coincidence between Puritan tenets and the eminently desirable qualities of science as a calling which was suggested by the historian of the Royal Society is casuistry. No doubt it is partly an express attempt to fit the scientist qua pious layman into the framework of the prevailing moral and social values.

(23) RAY, Wisdom of God, p. 125.

(24) SERAT, op. cit., PPA 344-45.

(25) BAXTER […] Vol. I, p. 1511 Vol. II, p. […] BAR the Quaker apologist, who specifically suggests “geometrical” and "mathematicai experiments" as innocent divertissements to be sought instead of pernicious plays. An Apology, pp. 554-55.

(26) SPRAT, Op. cit., p. 362.

(27) Ibid., pp. 365-66.

(28) SPRAT perspicaciously suggests that monastic ascetism induced by religious scruples was partially responsible for the lack of empiricism of the Schoolmen. "But what sorry kinds of Philosophy must they [the Schoolmen] needs produce, when it was a part of their Religion, to separate themselves, as much as they could, from the converse of mankind? when they were so farr from being able to discover the secrets of Nature, that they scarce had opportunity, to behold enough of its common works" Ibid., p. 19.

Since both the constitutional position and the personal authority of the clergy were much more important then than now, it probably constituted a bid for religious and social sanction. Science, no less than literature and politics, was still to some extent, subject to approval by the clergy (29).

But this is not the entire explanation. 'Present-day discussions of "rationalization" and "derivations" have been wont to becloud certain fundamental issues. It is true that the "reasons" were adduced to justify one's actions often do not account satisfactorily for this behavior. It is also an acceptable hypothesis that ideologies seldom give rise to action and that both the ideology and action are rather the product of common sentiments and values upon which they in turn react. But these ideas can not be ignored for two reasons. They provide clues for detecting the basic values which motivate conduct. Such sign posts can be profitably neglected. Of even greater importance is the role of ideas in directing action into particular channels. It is the dominating system of ideas which determines the choice between alternative modes of action which are equally compatible with the underlying sentiments. Without such guidance and direction non-logical action would become, within the limits of the valuesystem, random (30). In the seventeenth century, the frequent recourse of scientists to religious vindication suggests first of all that religion was a sufficiently powerful social force to be invoked in support of an activity which was intrinsically less acceptable at the time, also leads the observer to the peculiarly effective religious orientation which could invest scientific pursuits with all manner of values and could thus serve to direct the interests of believers into the channels of science. The efforts of SPRAT, WILKINS, BOYLE or RAY to justify their interest in science represent simply […] but […] attempt to justify the ways of science to God.

(29) HENSON, Op. cit., p. 209.

(30) Operationally, there is often a thin, uncertain line between "derivations" and "residues" (PARETO). Constant elements in the speech reactions associated , with action manifest deep-rooted, effective sentiments. Speaking elliptically, these constant elements may be held to provide motivations for behavior, whereas the variable elements are simply post facto justifications. But, in practice, it is at times exceedingly difficult to discriminate between the two. Once aware of the strong emotional charge which certain religious convictions carried at the 'time, we may find it justifiable to treat these as residues rather than derivations.

The Reformation had transferred the burden of individual. salvation from the Church to the individual, and it is this "overwhelming and crushing sense of the responsibility for his own soul" which accounts in part for both the acute longing for religious justification (31) and the intense pursuit of one's calling. If science were not demonstrably a "lawful" and desirable calling, it dare not claim the attention of those who felt themselves" ever in the Great Taskmaster's eye." It is to this intensity of feeling that such apologias were due.

Rationalism and Empiricism

The exaltation of the faculty of reason in the Puritan ethos—based partly on the conception of rationality as a curbing device of the passions—inevitably led to a sympathetic attitude toward those activities which demand the constant application of rigorous reasoning (32). But again, in contrast to medieval rationalism, reason is deemed subservient and auxiliary to empiricism. SPRAT is quick to indicate the preeminent adequacy of science in this respect (33). It is on this point probably that Puritanism and the scientific temper are in most salient agreement, for the combination of rationalism and empiricism which is so pronounced in the Puritan ethic forms the essence of the spirit of modern science. Puritanism was suffused with the rationalism of Platonism, derived largely through an appropriate modification of AUGUSTINE'S teachings. But it did not stop there. Associated with the designated necessity of dealing successfully with the practical affairs of life within this world-a derivation from the peculiar twist afforded largely by the Calvinist doctrine of predestination and certitudo salutis through successful worldly activity- was an emphasis upon empiricism. These two currents brought to converge through the ineluctable logic of an internally consistent system of theology were so associated with the other attitudes of the time as to prepare the way for the acceptance of a similar coalescence in natural science. The Puritan insistence upon empiricism and the experimental approach, was intimately connected with the identification of contemplation with idleness, of the expenditure of physical energy and the handling of material objects with industry (34). Experiment was the scientific expression of the practical, active and methodical bents of the Puritan. This is not to say, of course, that experiment was derived in any sense from Puritanism. But it serves to account for the ardent support of the new experimental science by those who had their eyes turned toward the other world and their feet firmly planted on this. Moreover, as TROELTSCH has suggested, Calvinism which abolished the absolute goodness of the Godhead tended to an emphasis on the individual and the empirical, the practically untrammelled and utilitarian judgment of all things. He finds in the influence of this spirit a most important factor of the empirical and positivist tendencies of Anglo-Saxon thought (35). A blunt Puritan, NOAH BIGGS, evidences this attitude in his sharp attack on the universities of his day.

(31) USHER, op. at., Vol. I, p. IS.

(32) It must be remembered that the use of reason was lauded by the Puritans partly because it served to differentiate man from beast. The extent to which this idea seeped into the thought of contemporary scientists may be indicated by a statement made by BoYLE. "So much admirable workmanship as God -hath_i splayed-in..the- -un WeISe,.. ..was- never- m can t-for--eyes.-that-wifully. ;;Close emselves, and aftrom ltwith the Dot judging it with the IJpeculaLW.gj:;,&asts -_,J}U__.jfJ.Y' _fM;rJJ(;, ldFt,w.nrif_Jut; ;.will_17W_F must4tui!Y.:_:#1 itua1!-_!_ BoYLB, Works (BIRCH ed.), Vol. III, p. 62_

(33) 'Who ought to be esteem'd the most carnally minded? The Enthusiast, that pollutes his Religion, with his Passions? or the Experimenter, that"will not use it [reason] to flatter and obey his own desires, but to subdue them.". SPRAT, op. at., p. 361. BAXTER, it will be remembered, in a fashi6n representative of the Puritans, had decried the invasion of .. enthusiasm" into religion. Reason must maintain its authority in the c{)mmand and government of your thoughts." C. D., V_l. II, p. 199 et passim. In like spirit, those who, at WILKINS' lodgings, laid the !foundations of the Roy_ Society" were invincibly arm'd against all the inchantments of Enthusiasm." SPRAT, p. 53.

(34) This observation constitutes one of the many contributions of Professor JONES' valuable book, Ancients and Moderns. Cj. chap. 5, esp. pp. 112-13. The derivation of this emphasis upon empiricism was not suffi.cently clarified in my paper on "Puritanism, Pietism and Science," The [English] Sociological Revie_, Vol. XXVIII (1936), pp. I-3°. bs) ERNST TROELTSCH, Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus jar die Entstehu.ng tier modernen Welt (MUnchen: R. OLDENBOt1RG, 1911), 'pp. 80-81.

SCIENCE IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND

of Experiments? enC9uragements to a new world of Knowledge, promoting, completing, and actuating some new Inventions? where have we constant reading upon either quick or dead Anatomies, or an ocular demonstration of Herbs? Where a Review of the old Experiments and Traditions, and casting out the rubbish that has pestered the Temple of Knowledge? (36)

It was a common practice for Puritans to couple their intense scorn for a " jejeune Peripatetick Philosophy" with extravagant admiration for" mechanicall knowledge," which _ubstitute? fact for fanta_. From every direction, elements of the Puritan ethic converged to reinforce this set of attitudes. Active experimentation embodied all the select virtues and precluded all the baneful vices. It represented a revolt against that Aristotelianism which was traditionally bound up with Catholicism; it supplanted passive contemplation with active manipulation; it promised practical utilities instead of sterile figments; it established in indubitable fashion the glories of His creation. Small wonder that the Puritan transvaluation of values carried with it the consistent endorsement of experimentalism (37).

Empiricism and rationalism were canonized, beatified, so to speak. It may very well be that the Puritan ethos did not directly influence the method of science and that this was simply a parallel development in the internal history of science, but it becomes evident that, through the psychological sanction of certain modes of thought and conduct, this complex of attitudes made an empirically founded science commendable rather than, as in the mediaeval period, reprehensible or at best acceptable on sufferance. In short, Puritanism altered social orientations. It led to the setting up of a new vocational hierarchy, based on criteria which inevitably bestowed prestige upon the natural philosopher.

As Professor SPEIER has well said, "There are no activities which are 'honorable in themselves and are held excellent in all social structures." (38) And one of the consequences of puritanism was the reshaping of the social structure in such fashion as to bring esteem to science. This could not but have influenced the direction of some talents into scientific fields which otherwise would have devoted to callings which were, in another social context, more highly honored.

The Shift to Science

As the full import of the Puritan ethic manifested itself-even after the politicaI' failure of the Revolution which should not be erroneously identified with the collapse of Puritan influence upon social attitudes-the sciences became foci of social interest. Their ,- new fashionableness contrasts with their previous state of comparative obscurity (39):" This was not without itS> effects. "ir,:""'; any, who hitherto might have turned to theology or rhetoric or philology, were directed, through the subtle, largely unperceived and newly-arisen predisposition of society, into scientific channels. Thus, THOMAS WILLIS, whose Cerehri Anatome was probably the most complete and accurate account of the nervous system up - to 1!hat time and whose name is immortalized in the j; circle of WILLIS," "was originally destined to theology, but n consequence of the ,!_avorable conditions of that age for _eological science, he turned._his attention'to medicine." (4°) No less indicative of a shift of interest is the lament of ISAAC BARRow, when he was Professor of Greek at Cambridge: " I sit onesome as an Attic owl, who has been thrust out of the companion lasseS' in Natural- "p.mlo_h!:!1re-: r him, for, as is well known, in 1663, he left this chair to accept .'iln:r _"i"nfride'btea.to -Professor-1bNFS (Mil:.. p-. "ro _ _:::::::':: .1I.!::zt::z::::t::::.I:_::z -'1""!-J:";4!_" p_ {T .nnttnn. Reformist Parliament of the time.

(37) DURV, in a"Lettre du sieur Jean Dury touchant l'etat present de la religWn en Angleterre (London, 1658), writes of the Independents, "lIs ne croient que ce qu'ils voient." Quoted by GEORGES AseoL!, La Grande-Bretagne devant l'opinion fran;aise au XVIIe siecle (Paris: Librairie Universitaire J. GAMBER, 1930), Vol. I, p. 407; " I am an enemy of their philosophy that vilify sense I" wrote BAXTER. And, on the practical side, JOHN WILKINS affirms that" our best and most Divine Knowledge is intended for Action; and those may justly be counted barren studies, which do not conduce to Practice as their proper End." Mathematical Magick, p. 2.

(38) HANs SPEIER, "Honor and Social Structure," Social Research, Vol. II (1935), p. 79.

(39) Cf. SPRAT, History..., p. 4°3.

(40) BAAS, Outlines of the History of Medicine, p. 492.

(41) Quoted by HERMANN HETTNER, Geschichte der englischen Literatur (Braunschweig, 1894), 16-17.

96 SCIENCE IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND

the newly-established Lucasian Professorship of Mathematics, in which he was NEWTON'S predecessor. The science-loving amateur, so prominent a feature of the /latter part of the century, is another evidence of the effect of this new attitude. Nobles and wealthy commoners turned to science, not as a means of livelihood, but as an object of devoted interest. Particularly for these individuals were direct utilitarian benefits of an economic nature a wholly negligible consideration. Science afforded them an opportunity of devoting their energies to a highly honored task; an imperative duty as the comforts of unrelieved idleness vanished from the new scale of values (42).

In the history of science the most famous of these amateurs is of course ROBER_ BOYLE, but perhaps the best index of their importance is to be found in their role in the formation of the Royal Society (43).' Of those who, in that" wonderful pacifick year," 1660, constituted themselves into a definite association, a considerable num_er-among them LORD BROUNCKER, BOYLE, LoRD BRUCE, SIR ROBERT MORAY, Dr. WILKINS, Dr. PETTY and ABRAHAM HILL-were amateurs of this type. Hardly less assiduous were the efforts of such virtuosi as LORD WILLUGHBY, JOHN EVELYN, SAMUEL HARTLIB, FRANCIS POTTER and WILLIAM - MOLINEUX.

This social emphasis on science had a peculiarly fruitful effect, probably because of the general state of scientific development. The methods and objects of investigation were frequently not at many removes from daily experience, and could hence be understood not only_by the especially equipped but !IT a lar_e number of persons with comEaratively- little technical e__ (44). To be sure, dilettantish interest in science seldom enriched its

(42) 'I'hi8 is clearly brought out by WILLIAM DERHAM's estimate of thCt vIrtu_ and zoologist, WILLUGHBY. "... he prosecuted. his design with - Klc:&r application as if he had to get his bread thereby; all of which I mention... for an example to persons of great estate and quality that they may be excited to answer the ends for which God gives them estates, leisure, parts and gifts, or a good genius; which was not to exercise themselves in vain or sinful follies, but to be employed for the glory and in the service of the infinite Creator, and in doing good offices in the world." Memorials of John Ray, collSisfing of his Life by Dr. DERHAM, EDWIN LANKESTER (ed.) (London, 1846), pp. 34-35.

(43) MARTHA ORNSTEIN, The R6le of the Scientific Societies in the Seventeenth Century, p. 91 if.

(44) Ibid., p. 53.

R. K. MERTON

fruits directly, but it did serve to establish it more firmly as a socially estimable pursuit. And this same function was performed no less ably by Puritanism. The fact that science today is largely ';_" and probably completely divorced from religious sanctions is itself of interest as an example of the process of secularization. Having grown away from its religious moorings, science has in turn become a dominant social value to which other values are subordinated. Today it is much more common to subject J the most diverse beliefs to the sanctions presumably afforded by science than to those yielded by religion; the increasing reference to scientific authority in contemporary advertisements and the eulogistic connotation of the very world" scientific" _,are perhaps not too far-fetched illustrations of the enhanced prestige of science (45).

The Process of Secularization

The beginnings of such secularization, faintly perceptible in the latter Middle Ages (46), were, in one sense, emerging more fully

(45) As Professor C. BoUGLE remarks, " Science has decidedly advanced to the first rank in the table of values," Th£ Evolution of Values (New York: HENRY HOLT & Co., 1926), p. 201.

(46) G. R. OWST, in his e>..emplary study based upon new documentary evidence, Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England (Cambridge U_versity Press, 1933), pp. 188-89 if; pp. 554-57, et passim, presents a painstaking analysis ,o_ medieval homilies, then so effective for the determination of the outlook of 'the folk" and notes this adumbrated tendency. As we have indicated it was the or"_ spokesmen of the medieval Church themselves who bade men to consider the "t""___ work of God's hand in the multifarious appearances of Nature, and this was indeed a powerful justificatory principle for scientific pursuits. Associated with this, however, was the odium th£ologicum of secularized knowledge, but it was--, too m_ch to e_pect th_ perm_ent ab_yance of conce_d effo:u beca'-lSe _ nf t-h",- ""A""",_"'" """Mihit-i", nf t-hA +J..Anln,n..,.", h " i,., ,"" i'n t'nmh"i' t'hi.. threatened secularizanon of'Knowleage, wHiCh became alarmingly noticeaDle with the great University movement of the twelfth century, that the Mendicant Orders were established. But" the very Mendicant preaching originally designed to steer a safe middle course in the moral and mental instruction of " lay-folk was itself helping unconsciously to create a fresh crisis, in which such

secularization would become at last inevitable." OWST, p. 189, It was with the advent of the post-Reformation religious ethic, which burst the last bonds of inhibitive control of natural philosophy and which created for it a role, then acceptable to scientists and religionists alike, of subserviency to ultimate religious goals and of autonomy within the scope of its investigations, that secularization

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became as explicit and pronoun,ced as it had hitherto been implicit and subdued. The Reformist tenets did not arise full-blown; they did not in their implications represent a radical break with the past, but, through a shift and intensification of emphasis, helped effect a change which, though prepared by along history of antecedent tendencies, seemed saltatory. As OWST suggestS, the Lollard teachings remind us " of the honoured place which Work has continued to hold in Protestant faith and practice. Its subsequet!.t achievements, alike in science and-industI:¥r... _ben . _..r'tnry--31!lnrkA ' are finall}':.disc;QY!!!_nance<L...E!'O_e ___ again our kinship with the past. The gulf of the Reformation is thus bridged once more and the spiritual continuity of our history maintained in the face of all such inevitable changes." Ibid., p. 557. ,

(47) There is so admirable an accord and correspondency between the findings of natural science and supernatural divinity, says BAXTER', that the former" greatly advantageth us" in the belief of the latter. C. D., Vol. I, pp. 172-74. This illustrates the incipient tendency of theology to become in a sense the handmaid of science since religious concepts become dependent upon the type of universe

!"hich man can kno\\-. Cf. PAUL R. ANDERSON, Science in Defense of Liberal Religion (New York: PuTNAM, 1933), p. 191 First Folio.

(48) LECKY, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 7. See also, A. C. MCGIFFERT, The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas, p. 18 et passim.

are likely once again to substitute authority for reason in an effort to eme'rge victorious from the conflict. In one direction, then, Puritanism led inevitably to the elimination of religious restriction on scientific work. This was the distinctly modern element of Puritan beliefs. But this did not involve the relaxation of religious discipline over conduct; quite the converse. Compromise with the world was intolerable. It must be conquered and controlled through direct action and this ascetic compulsion was exercised in every area of life. I tis, therefore, . a grievous error t_ portray the Puritan espousal of science as simply an "accommodation" to the intellectual environment of the age

(49). i Such secularized elements there were, especially with the passage of time, hut these were far less significant than the unyielding constraint for devotion to the thrice-blessed calling of natural philosopher. Paradoxically but inevitably, then, this religious ethic, based d_ rigid theological foundations, furthered the development of the very scientific disciplines which later seem to confute orthodox theology. The articulation of these several ideas, each the focus of strong sentiments, into a system which was all the more forceful precisely because it was psychologically rather than logically coherent, led to a long' cpain of consequences not least of which was the substantial destruction of this very system itself. Though the corresponding religious ethic, as we shall see, does not necessarily lose its effectiveness as a social force immediately upon the undermining of its theological foundations, it tends to do so in time. This sketch of the influence of science in the processes of secularization should serve to make intelligible the diverse, J.1ite.,opro__d ro1e_, which .rcligio.n :m.d. t.h_oIQ_ m_ .RIg in. their elations to science.

in the Puritan ethos. But the Puritan was not simply the last of the medievalists or the first of the moderns. He was both. It was in the system of Puritan values, as we have seen, that reason

,; -.::..\;} ! and experience began to be considered as independent means of ascertaining even religious truth. Faith which is unquestioning and not "rationally weighed," proclaimed BAXTER, is not faith, but a dream or fancy. or opinion. In effect this grants to _cience _ power _hich may ultin:ately limit that of reli_ion. ThIs unhesitant assIgnment of a vIrtual hegemony to SCIence

,c \ is based on the explicit assumption of the unity of knowledge, experiential and supersensuous, so that the testimony of science must perforce corroborate religious convictions (47).

This con_ction of the mutually co_firmatory nature of rc:ason and revelatlO_ afforded a _urther. basI_ ,f?r the favorabl_ at_Itude toward expenmental studIes, whIch, - It IS assumed, will sImply

reinforce basic theological dogmas. The active pursuit of science, thus freely sanctioned by unsuspecting religionists, however, created a new tone and habit of thought-to use LECKY'S phrase

which is the" supreme arbiter of the opinions of successive periods." (48) As a consequence of this change, ecclesiastics, no longer able to appeal to commonly accepted teachings of science which seem rather to contravene various theological doctrines,

(49) This assumption is the one fundamental shortcoming of OLIVE GRIFFITH'S otherwise excellent' monograph, Religion and Learning: A Study in Presbyterian Thought from 1662 to the Foundation of the Unitarian Movement (Cambridge University Press, 1935). Her treatment unwarrantedly presupposes throughout that religious convictions are intrinsically static and change only through external pressures, whereas it is the contention of the present analysis that such changes are, in great part, the outcome of inherent tendencies which are gradually realized " in the course of time. See my review of Dr. GRIFFITH'S work in Isis, XXVI (1936), 237-39.

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A religion-understood here, as throughout this essay, as those ethical and moral beliefs and practices which constitute a system _f faith and worship, that is, as a religious ethic-may indirectly promote the cultivation of science, although specific scientific discoveries are at the same time vehemently attacked by theologians, who suspect their possibly subversive nature. Precisely because this pattern of interlocking and contradictory forces is so often unanalyzed, it is imperative that we distinguish clearly between the intentions and aims of religious leaders and the (frequently unforeseen) consequences of their teachings (so). Once this pattern is clearly understood, it is not surprising or inconsistent that LUTHER particularly, and MELANCHTHON less strongly, execrated the cosmology of COPERNICUS. In magisterial mood, LUTHER berates the Copernican theory: "Der Narr will die ganze Kunst Astronomiae umkehren. Aber wie die heilige Schrift anzeigt, so hiess Josua die Sonne still stehen, und nicht das Erdreich." (51) Likewise, CALVIN frowned upon the' acceptance of numerous scientific discoveries of his day, whereas the religious ethic which stemmed from him inevitably inspired the pursuit of natur_l science (52).

(50) As Mr. TAWNEY put it, " So little do those who shoot the arrows of the spirit know where they will light." Religion and the Rise of Capital.ism, p. 277. But CALVIN could also say: " Dieu a ressuscite les sciences humaines qui sont propres et utiles a la conduite de nostre vie, et, en servant a nostre utilite, peuvent Bussi servir a sa gloire." Cf. OTTO RODEWALD, Johannes Calvins Gedanken iiber Er:dehung Bunde (Westphalia: ZIEGEMEYER & Co., 1911), pp. 37 ff. .

(51) Quoted by DOROTHY STIMSON, The Gradual Acceptance of the Copernican TJieory (New York, 1917), p. 39. As Dean STIMSON suggests (p. 99), such denunciations were less influential than those of the Catholic clergy, largely because of the Protestant doctrine of the right to individual interpretation. This was one effective source of secularization.

(52) In view of this analysis, it is surprising to note the state_ent credited ; to MAX WEBER, that the opposition of the Protestant Refonners is sufficient J reason for not linking Protestantism with scientific advance. See WirtschaftsI geschichte (MUnchen: .DUNCKER & HUMBLOT, 1924), p. 31+ This remark ; is especially unanticipated since it does not at all accord with WEBER'S discussion of the. same point in his other works. Cf. Gesammelte Aufstitze zur Rel_tfionsi soziologie (TUbingen : ]. C. B. MOHR, 1922), Vol. I, pp. 564, 141; Wissenschaft au B_f (Munchen : DUNCKER & HUMBLOT, 1921), pp. 19-20. The explanation may be that the first is not WEBER'S statement, since the Wirtschaftsgeschichte was compiled from classroom notes by two of his students, who may have neglected to make the required distinctions. It is unlikely that WEBER' would have made the elementary t.rror of confusing the opposition to scientific discoveries of the

R. K. MERTON t

_: This failure to foresee some of the most fundamental social effects of their teachings was not solely the result of the -_\'"' Reformers' ignorance. I t was rather an outcome of that type

14 " of non-logical thought which deals primarily with the motives ,__ _;" rather than the probable results of behavior. Righteousness of motive is the basic concern; other considerations, including

" ,j_" that of the probability of attaining the end, are precluded. Action enjoined by a dominant set of values must be performed. But, with the complex interaction which society constitutes, the effects

. of action ramify. They are not restricted to the specific area in ' ; '! which the values werb originally centered, occurring in inter ". f related fields specifically ignored at the outset. Yet it is precisely

""" . ill because these fields are in fact interrelated that the further consequences in adjacent areas react upon the basic system of values. It is this usually unlooked-for reaction which constitutes

:._ a most important factor in the process of secularization, of the _._ transformation or breakdown of value-systems. This is the _f essential paradox of social action-the" realization H of. values

may lead to their renunciation. We may paraphrase G<ETHE and speak of " Die Kraft, die stets das Cute will, und stets das Bose schafft." (53) ,

Insofar as the attitudes of the theologians dominate over the, in effect, subversive religious ethic-as did CALVIN'S authority largely in Geneva until the first part of the eighteenth century t' ' scientific development may be greatly impeded. For this reason, . it is of no small importance to discriminate between the early r and late periods of Calvinism. The implications of these dogmas 'f_ found expression only with the passage of time. But upon .,. <t"'" the relaxation of this hostile influence and with the influx of an ethic, stemming from it and yet. cli.ffi:ring significantly.1 science

Refonners with the unforeseen consequences of the Protestant ethic, "partIcularly since he expressly warns against the failure of such discrimination in his Religionssoziologie. Nor would he have been apt to identify the attitudes of the Refonners themselves with those of their followers as the Protestant movement developed. See further the comment of ThOELTSCH (op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 879-80), to the effect that although CALVIN was himself antagonistic to some scientific discoveries, the consequence of his doctrine was to provide a fennent of opinion directly favorable to the espousal of science. (53) See ROBERT K. MERTON, .. The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action," American Sociological Review, Vol. I (1936), 894-904.

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takes on new life, as indeed was the case in Geneva-Jrom about the middle of the eighteenth century

(54). This development was particularly retarded in Geneva because there the authority resting in CALVIN himself, rather than in the implications of his religious system, was not soon dissipated.

The Integration of Religion and Science

It is thus to the migious ethos, not the theolo,gy..l that we must turn if we are to understand the integration of science and religion in seventeenth century England.

Perhaps the most directly effective belief in this ethos for the sanction of natural science held that the study of nature enables a fuller appreciation of His works and thus leads us to admire and praise the Power, Wisdom and Goodness of God manifested in His creation. Though this conception was not unknown to medieval thinkers, the consequences deduced from it were entirely different. For example, ARNALDUS of VILLANOVA, in studying the products of the Divine \Vorkshop, adheres strictly to the medieval scholastic ideal of determining the properties of phenomena from tables (in which, according to the canons of logic, all combinations of chance were set forth) (55). But in the seventeenth century, the contemporary emphasis upon empiricism led to the invC:?stigation of nature primarily through experience (56). This difference in interpretation of substantially the same doctrine can only be understood in the light of the different values permeating the two cultures. Cloistered contemplation was forsaken; active experimentation was introduced. life ltoyal__<::!_ty w__ orinesITinaDte_ inrpurtanre;-botIf _m _e-propagation of this new point of view and in its actual application.

(54) See ALPHONSE DE CANDOLI.B, Histoire des sciem:es et des savants depuis deux necles (Geneva-Basel: H. GEORG, 1885), pp. 335-36.

(55) WALTER PAGEL, "Religious Motives in the Medical Biology of the XVIIth Century," Bulletin of the Institute of the History of Medicine, Vol. III (1935), II2.

(56) Ibid., pp. 214-15. It is not maintained, of course, that this empiricist bent derived solely from Puritanism. As we shall see, at least one other source was economic and technological. But Puritanism did contribute an added force to this development which has often been overlooked.

R. K. MERTON 1°3

These achievements gain added stature by contrast with the lethargy of the English _niversities. It is well known that the universities were the seats of conservatism and virtual neglect of science, rather than the nurseries of the new philosophy. It was the learned society which effected the association and social interaction of scientists with such signal results. The Philosophical Transactions and similar journals largely did away with the previously prevailing and unsatisfactory mode of communicating new scientific ideas through personal correspondence. Associated with the popularity of science was the new tendency to write even scientific works in the vernacular-so especial a characteristic of BOYLE-Or, in any case, to have English translations of the esoteric Latin and Greek. It was this type f cumulative interaction between science and society which was

d_stined to mould a climate of opinion in which science stood high ,in public esteem, long after its religious justification had been 'forgotten. '

But in the seventeenth century, this justification was -of sterling Tri:_rtance, not only in preparing the social atmosphere for a (.. welcome acceptanc,e of scientific contributions, but also in providing an ultimate aim for many of the scientists of the period. For a BARROW, BOYLE or WILKINS, a RAy or NEHEMIAH GREW, science Jound its rationale in the end and all of existence-His glorifi

cation and the Good of Man. Thus, from BOYLE: the knowledge of the ,Works °l-Qod- proportions our Admiration of them, ey participating and disclosing'- .so much of the inexhausted Perfections of their Author, that the further we contemplate them, the more Footsteps and Impressions we discover of the Perfections of their Creator; and our utmost Science can but give us a juster vtneration of his Omniscience (57). continues in this vein. ""_'.;. 0011 _lovmg, "iiS._eserves;: iO:.'15e-_1iOnou_1_

our Faculties, and consequently to be glorified and acknowledged by the acts of Reason, as well as by those of Faith, there must be sure a great Disparity betwixt that general, confus'd, and lazy Idea we commonly have of his Power and Wisdom, and the distinct, rational and affecting notions of those Attribute_ which are form'd by an attentive inspection of those Creatures in which they are most legible, and which were made chiefly for that very end." p. 53. Cf. RAY, Wisdom of God, p. 132; WILKINS, Natural Religion, p. 236 ff; ISAAC BARROW, Opuscula, Vol. IV, pp. 88 ff. Cf. :NEHEMIAH GREW, Cosmologia Sacra (London, 1701), who points out that God is cc the Original, and Ultimate End" and that H we are bound to study His works." pp. 64, 124. SPRAT, 'speaking for the

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RAY carries this conception to its logical conclusion, for if Nature is the manifestation of His power, then nothing in Nature is too mean for scientific study (58). The universe and the insect, the macrocosm and microcosm alike, are indications of H divine Reason, running like a Golden Vein, through the whole Leaden Mine of Brutal Nature."

On such bases as these, then, was religion invoked as a sanctioning power of science. But it is necessary to place this and the similar connections previously noted in a proper perspective.

This is imperative if we are to correct an unavoidable implication of this discussion, namely, that religion was the independent and science the dependent variable during this period, although as was remarked at the out_et, this is not in the least our intention.

The integration of the Puritan ethic with the accelerated development of science seems undeniable, but this is simply to maintain that they were elements of a culture which was largely centered

J about the values of utilitarianism and empiricism (59). It is perhaps not too much to say, with LECKY, that the acceptance of every great change of belief depends less upon the intrinsic force of its doctrines or the personal capabilities of its proponents Royal Society, explicitly defines the place of science in the means-end schema of life. cc It cannot be deny'd, but it lies in the Natural Philosophers hands, best to advance that part of Divinity (knowledge] : which though it fills not the mind, with such tender, and_powerful contemplations, as that which shews us Man's Redemption by a Mediator, yet it is, by no means to be pass'd by unregarded : but is an excellent ,ground to establish the other." History..., p: 83; also pp. 132-33, et passim.

(58) Op. cit., p. 13°. U If Man ought to reflect upon his Creator the glory of all his Works, then ought he to take notice of them all, and not to think anything unworthy of his Cognizance. And truly the Wisdom, Art and Power of' Almighty .God, shines forth as ¥isibly in the. S.tnu:tw:e ot: the Bod_ of the minutest Insect, as in that of a Horse or Elephant... Let us not then esteem any thing" contemptible or inconsiderable, or below our nQ.tice takiPg; for this is to derogate from the Wisdom and Art of the Creator, and to confes_ our selves unworthy of those Endowments of Knowledge and Understanding which he hath bestowed upon us." MAX WEBER remarks this same attitude of SWAMMERDAM, whom he quotes as saying: Ie ich bringe Ihnen hiex: den Nachweis der Vorsehung Gottes in dt.r Anatomie einer Laus." Wissenschaft au Beruf, p. . 19. This constant tendency or" leading scientists themselves to relate their studies to dominantly religious ideas gives proof that religion as a social force was considerable and that its high estimation of any activity was of moment.

(59) See ERNST TROELTSCH, Die Bedeutung des ProtestantUmus far die Entstehung der odernen Welt, p. 80 fr., for a most lucid exposition 'of this point.

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than upon the previous social changes which are seen-a posteriori, . it is true-to have brought the new doctrines into congruence ,:\;,. with the dominant values of the period. The reanimation of

..; i'_ancient learning; the hesit_nt, but perceptibly defined, instauration of science; the groping, yet persistent, intensification of economic _. tendencies; the revolt against scholasticism ;-all helped bring to a focus the social situation in which the Protestant beliefs and r' scientific interests found acc_ptance (60). But to realize this '_"" is simply to recognize that both Puritanism and science were _ components of a vastly complicated system of mutually dependent factors. If some comprehensible order is to be attained, a fraction of this complex situation must be substituted for the whole; . .. a defensible procedure only if this provisional formulation is not ".i"confused with a "complete explanation." ,.' The integration of religious values and many of those basic . c, .to the contemporary scientists' activity is not fully evidenced by the fact that so many of the leading scientists and. mathemati ,ians of the day-for example, OUGHTRED, BARROW, WILKiNS, _ARD, RAY, GREW, etc.-were also clerics. Such_ service in ;" 'the church may have been-though other evidence leads us '__, to doubt it in these instances-a matter of economic consideration _1nce the __erical life provided a fairly adequate income and/ample "" leisure for the pursuit of science. Moreover, it must be remembered that every person appointed to a college fellowship had o be in holy orders. Hence such" external" considerations, re at best suggestive, not convincing. They are clearly less

ignificant than those disclosed by a study or the lives of the, r,outstanding scientists. BOYLE, though he never took orders, ".yvas deeply religious: not only did he devote large sums for the

", " ."'Ptranslation of the.Bihle and establish the BOYLE lectures in theology, t he learne_ Gree_, Hebrew_ ?yriac and Chaldee _h_ he might read the Scrfptures_ III the orIgInal! (61) For a sImIlar reason.

(60) LECKY, op. at., Vol. I, p. 6; SOMBART, Quintessence..., pp. 269 fr.

(61) BOYLE was Governor of the Corporation for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England, established by Parliament in 1649. On the deep and sincere '. religiosity of BOYLE, ct. GILBERT BURNET, Lives and Characters (London, 1833), " pp. 351-60, for an account by a contemporary and friend; W. WHEWELL, 1&' Bridgewater Treatise (London, 1852), p. 273. See H. T. BUCKLE, History of Civilization in England (New York: BONI, 1925), p. 210. '

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NEHEMIAH GREW, the estimable botanist, study Hebrew, as he states in his Cosmologia Sacra. NAPIER and NEWTON assiduously pursued theological studies and,for the latter, science was in part highly valued because it revealed the divine power (62).

Religion, then, was a prime, consideration and as such its teachings were endowed with a power which stands forth with striking emphasis. Moreover, there is no need of entering into the matter of the motivations of individual scientists to trace this influence for such indicarions are really supererogatory for our study. Irrespective of the possibility of tracing its direct influence upon specific individuals, it is apparent that the religious ethic, considered as a social force, so consecrated science as to make it a highly respected and laudable focus of attention.

It is this social animus which facilitated the development of science by removing the incubus of derogatory social attitudes and instilling favorable ones instead. I t is precisely this social

(62) Cf. LoUIS T. MORE. Isaac NeflJton: A Biography (New York: CHARLES SCRIBNER'S Sons, 1934). p. 134; EDWIN A. BUR'IT, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, pp. 281-83. Of some interest is the attitude towards NEWTON'S work in theology displayed by PARETO and LoMBROSO. The former states that it_a___ars in__ible, .t!1ough J.Jhat th_ __a!..N_oN coul_ E.a_v_. written a book on the Apocalypse. TTaite..., Vol. I, p. 354. CESARE LoMBROSO is much more enreme. cc NEWTON himself can scarcely be said to have been sane when he demeaned -his..intellect to the interpretation of the Apocalypse." The Man of Gemw-(_don-=SCOIT, 1891), p. 324. PARETO and LoMBROSO might have cavilled similarly concerning JOHN NAPIER, the inventor of logarithms, who likewise deemed the writing of a bool_.on the Apocalypse of greater importance than his work in mathematics. Cf. A,THUR - SCHuSnm -a_d ARTHUR E. SHIPLEY, Britain's Heritage of Science, pp. 6 fl. These declarations of astonishment and dismay over the cc inconsistencies i, of seventeenth century scientists __£t both the nonlogical linkages in human conduct and the particular value-co_te-xt of the aae. Once"' these are- taken into accoUIit".

NEWTON!$ -ciiYerse- inteFests

appear quite compatible wiffiin the g:ven social context. It is significant that the in£l_ence of Puritan attitudes can be seen in the- instances of BARROW and his successor NEWTON. Cf. BARROW'S Of Industry, pp. 2 fl., where, in typically Puritan 'terms, he exalts the serious and steady application of mind in the prosecution of reasonable designs for the accomplishment of some considerable good. Time must. be employed usefully_ and games, gaming, theatre-going, poetry, etc. must be eschewed. Ng'/VTON likewise had a contempt for the " merely beautiful U and preferred the strictly" usefuL" His library represents an U almost puritanical selection "-there are no books of humor and practically none of literature, while' in poetry there is represented only the Puritan bard. MILTON. Cf. R. DE VILLAMIL, Newton: the Man (London; G. D. KNOX, 1931). pp. 10-16.

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influence which would seldom be noticed by the individual I_'" scientists upon whom it impinged (63). Yet since religion directly _ exalted science, since religion was a dominant social force, since ;:_;' science was obviously held in higher social esteem during the ,ii' _ g_ latter part of the century, we must infer that religion played an important role in this changed attitude, particularly because of so ii.t. ""_ much external corroborative evidence. This minimum of infer _.:o: ence is inescapable.

Community of Tacit Assumptions in Science and Puritanism.

Up to this point we have b_en concerned, in the main, with the directly felt sanction of scie_ce by the Protestant. ethic. Now, while this was of great importance, there was still another relationship which, subtle and difficult of apprehension though it be, 'Was perhaps of equal' significance. Purita_sm was one element ii" the preparation of a set of largely implicit assumptions which.

made for the ready acceptance - of the characteristic scientific temper of the seventeenth and subsequent centuries. It is not simply that Protestantism promoted free inquiry, libre examen, or decried monastic ascetism. These oft-mentioned characteristics uch only the bare surface of the relationship. It has become manifest. that in each age there is a system of cience which rests upon a set of assumptions, usually implicit " ld seldom, if ever, questioned by most of the scientific workers

f the time (64). The basic assumption in modern science, j;',!at is, in the type of scientific work which becoming pronounced 11 the seventeenth century has since continued, " is a widespread,

pstincdve conviction in the- -e:xi$tence of an .f}rder of Thing$'f ,.Qh

(63) The difficulty of an individual clearly perceiving the influence of cial forces upon his own behavior is expounded by EDUARD SPRANGER. _:It is possible to understand... a historical character better than he does himself. p'artly because he has not made himself the object of theoretic reflection... and ii:(!,"i1i _ecause he is unaware of all the facts which are necessary to the understanding , of oneself." Types of Men, p. 367.

(64) WHITEHEAD. Science and the Modern World, chapter I; A. E. HEATH in ISAAC NEWTON: A Memorial Volume, edited for the Mathematical Association by W. J. GREENSTREET (London: G. BELL, 1929), p. 133; E. A. BUR'IT, The Physical Foundations of Modern Physical Science.

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and, in particular, of an Order of Nature." (6sf"'--This belief, this faith, for at' least since HUME it must be recognized as such, is, simply H impervious to the demand for a consistent ratio_ality." (66

In the systems of scientific thought of GALILEO, of NEWTON and of their successors, the testimony of experiment is the ultimate criterion of truth, but as has been suggested, the very notion of experiment is ruled out without the prior assumption that Nature constitutes an i,ntelligible order, that when appropriate questjons are asked, she will answer, so to speak. Hence this assumption is final and absolute (67)' Now, as Professor WHITEHEAD has so well indicated, this" faith in the possibility of science, generated antecedently to th_ development of modem scientific theory, is, an unconscious derivative from medieval theology." (68) But this conviction, prerequisite condition of modern science though it is, was not sufficient to induce, its development. What , . was needed was a constant interest in searching for this order "1 of nature in an empirical and rational fashion, i.e., an active interest in this world and in its occurrences phis a specifically empirical approach. With Protestantism religion provided this interest -it actually imposed obligations of intense 'concentration on secular activity with an emphasis on experience and reason as bases for action and belief. The good works which for the, sects influenced by _ Calvinism provided conviction of grace -are not to be confused with the Catholic conception of " good works." In the Puritan case it involved the notion of a transcendental god and an orientation to the" other world," it is true, but it also demanded a mastery over this world through a study of its processes; while in the Catholic instance, _t demanded mplete absorpiion-;=save for an .unIJanTs1lab1e. nnrumum,'r;; tI1e-s1!pef' - sensuous, in an intuitive love .,p{ g,Qd.' It is just at this point that the Protestant emphasis upon reason

(65) WHITEHEAD, op. cit., p. 5.

(66. lbid.,p. 6.

(67) Cf. E. A. BURTT in ISAAC NEWTON: A Memorial Volume, p. 139. For a classic exposition of this scientific faith, see ISAAC NEWTON'S Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy,. in the Principia (ANDREW MOTTE, trans.) (London, 1803). Vol. II, p. 160 if.

(68) See WHITEHEAD, op. cit., p. 19 and preceding for a discussion of this development.

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and experience is of prime importance. In the Protestant system of religion, there is the unchallenged axiom, gloria Dei, and, as we have seen, the scheme of behavior which was non_logically

"linked with this principle tends to assume a utilitarian tinge.

Virtually all conceptions other than this are subject to, nay, "demand, the examination of reason and experience. Even the Bible as final and complete authority was subject to the interpretation of the individual upon these bases, for though the Bible is infallible, the" meaning" of its content must be sought, as will be remembered from BAXTER'S discussion of this point. The similarity between the approach and intellectual ._:_attitude implicit in the religious and scientific systems is of more

:han passing interest. This religious point of view could not y_li-!!",,!llou.ld + an atti_ude of., looking at the wor!4 of, sensuous <phenomena which was highly conducive to the willing acceptance and, indeed, preparation for, the same attitude .in science. A ila_ity of this sort is noted by a recent commentator on CALVIN'S

Die Gedanken werden objektiviert ood zueinem objektiven Lehrsystem aufgebaut. Es bekommt geradezu ein naturwissenschaftliches Geprlige; es ist Jlar, leicht fassbar und formulierbar, wie alles, was der ausser_n Welt angehort, 'klarer zu gestalten ist als das, was im Tiefsten sich abspielt (69).

The conviction in immutable law is as pronounced in the octrine' of predestination as in scientific investigation: "the mmutable law is there and must be acknowledged" ( das .. __anderlich Gesetz ist da und muss anerkannt werden) (70). he, similarity betwe_n this conceE_ and the __,_cientific approach so clearly drawn by HERMANN WEBER:

e-hehJ.:6..¥On'-Cie_riidestina_ riefsten R'prn,.. g,..trnfFp.n. 7.\ 1- /ileinr mann sie als Faktum im Sinne eines' naturwissenschaftlichen Faktums

(69) HERMANN WEBER, Die Theologie Calvins (Berlin: ELSNER, 1930), p. 23. .-(70) Ibid., p. 29. The significance of the doctrine of God's foreknowledge _r the reinforcement of the belief in natural law is remarked by BUCKLE, oj>. at., p. 482. It is significant that the first writer who maintained that even lotteries are governed by purely natural laws was a Puritan minister, THOMAS GATAKER, in his curious little book, On the Nature and Use of Different Kinds of Lots (London, 1619). This assumption, which ran over the barriers of religious .. differences, is not unrelated to the later development of H political arithmetic .. by GRAUNT, PErrY and HALLEY.

110 SCIENCE IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND

begreift, nur dass das oberste Prinzip, das auch jedem naturWissenschaftlichen Erscheinungskomplex zugrunde liegt, die im tiefsten erlebte gloria dei ist (71).

!f The willingness of the J>rotestant leaders to have' reason and experience" test" all religious beliefs, save the basic assumption, which just as in science, is simply accepted as a matter of faith, is in part grounded upon the previously mentioned conviction of the inherent consistency, congruence and mutually confirmatory nature of all knowledge, sensuous and super-sensory. It would seem, then, that there is, to some extent, a community of assumptions in Protestantism and science: in both there is the unquestioned basic assumption upon which the entire system is built by the utilization of reason and experience. Within each conteXt there is rationality, t__)Ugh the bases be naive and

non-rational (72):_ The significance of this fundamental similarity is profound though it could: hardly have bee_. consciously recogruzedby those whom it influenced: religion hadt for'whatever

reaS'OtUi_> adopted a cast of thought which wasf-' essentially that of sciecce.so that'there was a reinforcement of the typically scientific a_tudes" of the period. This society was. permeated with attitudes toward natural phenomena which, were derived from both science and religion and which unwittingly enhanced the I continued prevalence of conceptions characteristic of the new science.

The " Crucial Experiment,"

But it is not sufficient verification of ourhypoth_sis to 'indicate ht...iavorabJe social-attitudes cto_sdenl'.e _i.ndnl'.Ad h¥-j:beccRr._Mst9.nt ethic. Nor, yet again, to indicate that the consciously felt motivation of many eminent seventeenth century scientists was

(71) Ibid., p. 31. See WHITEHEAD, op. cit., Chapter I, for a statement of similar characteristics of modem science.

(72) A modem logician has aptly remarked that the social sciences' must locate the irrational (rather, non-logical) sources of both rational and irrational thought. Cf. RUDOLF CARNAP, " LOgic," in Factors Determining Human Behavior (Harvard Tercentenary Publications, 1937),' p. 118. Certainly Puritanism was not C( the source" of modem science, but apparently it acted to stimulate 8uch thought. Cf. WALTER PAGEL'S simibfr comparison' of the C( irrationality and empiricism" of seventeenth cen_ religion and science. ()p. tit., p. 112.

R. K. MERTON

111

provided by this ethic. Nor, still further, that the cast of thought which is characteristic of modern science, namely, the combination of empiricism and rationalism and the faith in the validity of one basic postulate, an apprehensible order in Nature, bears an other than fortuitous congruence with the attitudes involved in Protestantism. All these facts can but provide formidable evidence of a certain probability of the connection we are tracing. The most significant test of our hypothesis, the e,xperimentum crucis, as it were, is to be found by translating the Protestant ethic into action and noting to what extent, if at all, actual behavior coincides with that to be expected if these beliefs proved truly effective (73). If these doctrines were not infused with the motive power of sentiment, if they "were not deep-abiding nvictions which derived their force from the, prevalent demand or conviction of personal salvation, then behavior will differ om pious affirmations.,,) If, on the, other;; hand, the Protestant thic_ involved an-c_ attitudinal;_ set,_; favorable to;.. science. and

:chnologyJiin s_ many ways,' the__we,} should. find amongst its adherents a greater propensity for those fields" of endeavor than one would expect on the basis of their' repr_sentation in the total population. Moreover, if, as has been' frequently suggested (74), the impression made by these ethical teachings has lasted ong after much of their theological basis has been largely isavowed (75), then even after the seventeenth century, this" onnection of Protestantism and science should subsist to some "egree." The fol1owing chapter, then, will be devoted to further plpirical data which may. provide an experiential test of our ,ypothesis.

(73) Compare PARETO'S discussion of the methodological value of dealing with virtual movements," Traite de sociologie genbale, Vol. I, pp. 58-59. LBCKY, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 21

(74) Cf. GEORGIA .HARKNESS, JOHN CALVIN: The Man and His Ethics (New ork: Holt, 1931), p. 7, which is a highly competent study of the influence of the Calvinist ethic upon society: As TR_ELTSCH puts it: cc The present- _ day world does not live by logical consistency, any more than any other; spiritual forces can exercise a domuAnt influence even where they are avowedly repudiated." Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus, p. 22.

(75) Two recent novels-GEORGE SANTAYANA'S The Last PUritatl and JOHN MARQUAND'S TIw Late GEORGE APLEy-portray the persistence of these patterns behavior among present day, families, with a Puritan tradition.