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Proclus' Commentary Translated by Thomas Taylor ISBN 1 898910 14 6 and 1 898910 15 4
From volume 15 of the Thomas Taylor Series, p. 195 to 239. Proclus on the Gods, prayer and perception. [64A to
79B]
It is necessary therefore, prior to all other things, that we
should know something manifest concerning prayer, what its essence
is, and what its perfection, and whence it is imparted to souls. For
the philosopher Porphyry indeed, describing those among the ancients
that admitted prayer, and those that did not, leads us from one
opinion to another, and says in short, that neither those who are
diseased according to the first kind of impiety, derive any benefit
from prayer, since they do not admit that there are Gods, nor those
who labour under the second kind, and entirely subvert providence,
granting indeed that there are Gods, but denying their providential
energies. Nor are they benefited by it, who admit indeed the
providence of the Gods, but assert that all things are produced by
them from necessity. For there is no longer any advantage to be
derived from prayer, if things of a contingent nature have not any
existence. But such as assert that the Gods providentially attend to
all things, and that many things that are generated are contingent
and may subsist otherwise, these very properly admit the necessity
of prayers, and acknowledge that they correct our life. Porphyry
also adds, that prayer especially pertains to worthy men, because it
is a contact with divinity. But the similar loves to be conjoined to
the similar: and the worthy man is most similar to the Gods. Because
likewise those who embrace virtue are in custody, and are inclosed
in the body as in a prison, they ought to request the Gods that they
may migrate from hence. Besides, since we are as children torn from
our parents, it is fit we should pray that we may return to our true
parents the Gods. Those also resemble such as are deprived of their
fathers and mothers, who do not think it requisite to pray and be
converted to the Gods. All nations likewise, that have excelled in
wisdom, have diligently applied themselves to prayer; among the
Indians the Brachmans, among the Persians the Magi, and of the
Greeks the most theological, who instituted initiatory rites and
mysteries. But the Chaldeans venerate every other divinity, and
likewise the virtue itself of the Gods, which they denominate a
Goddess; so far are they from despising sacred worship, on account
of the possession of virtue. And in addition to all this, as we are
parts of the universe it is fit that we should be in want of the
universe. For a conversion to the whole imparts salvation to every
thing. If therefore you possess virtue, you should invoke that which
antecedently comprehends all virtue. For that which is all-good,
will also be the cause to you of appropriate good. Or if you explore
a certain corporeal good, there is a power in the world which
comprehends all body. It is necessary therefore that perfection
should from thence be derived to the parts. And this is the sum of
what is said by Porphyry on this subject.
The divine Iamblichus however, does not think that a history of
this kind pertains to what is here proposed to be considered. For
Plato is not now speaking about atheistical men, but about such as
are wise, and able to converse with the Gods. Nor does he speak of
such as are dubious about the works of piety; but to such as wish to
be saved by those who are the saviours of wholes, he delivers the
power of prayer, and its admirable and supernatural perfection which
transcends all expectation.
It is fit however, that transferring what he says to what is more
usual and more known to the reader, we should render his meaning
clear, and assign arguments concerning prayer which accord with the
doctrine of Plato. From hence therefore we must begin: All beings
are the progeny of the Gods, by whom they are produced without a
medium, and in whom they are firmly established. For the progression
of things which perpetually subsist, and cohere from permanent
causes, is not alone perfected by a certain continuation, but
immediately subsists from the Gods, from whence all things are
generated, however distant they may be from the divinities. And this
is no less true, even though asserted of matter itself. For a divine
nature is not absent from any thing, but is equally present to all
things. Hence though you should assume the last of beings, in these
also you will find divinity. For The One is every where; and in
consequence of its absolute dominion, every thing receives its
nature and coherence from the Gods. As all things however proceed,
so likewise, they are not separated from the Gods, but radically
abide in them, as the causes and sustainers of their existence. For
where can they recede, since the Gods primarily comprehend all
things in their embrace? For whatever is placed as separate from the
Gods has not any kind of subsistence. But all beings are contained
by the Gods and reside in their natures, after the manner of a
circular comprehension. Hence, by a wonderful mode of subsistence,
all things proceed, and yet are not, nor indeed can be separated
from the Gods; because all offspring when torn from their parents,
immediately recur to the immense vastness of non-entity. But in a
certain respect they are established in them; and in short, proceed
in themselves, but abide in the Gods. Since however, having
proceeded, it is requisite that they should be converted and return,
imitating the evolution into light, and conversion of the Gods to
their cause, in order that these being arranged conformably to the
perfective triad, may again be contained by the Gods and the first
unities, - hence they receive from them a certain secondary
perfection, by which they may be able to convert themselves to the
goodness of the divinities, in order that being at first rooted in,
they may again through conversion be established in them, forming a
certain circle, which originates from and terminates in the Gods.
All things therefore, both abide in, and convert themselves to
the Gods, receiving this power from the divinities, together with
twofold impressions according to essence; the one, that they may
abide there, but the other that, having proceeded, they may convert
themselves [to their causes]. And these things we may survey not
only in souls, but also in inanimate natures. For what else
ingenerates in these a sympathy with other powers, but the symbols
which they are allotted by nature, some of which are allied to this,
but others to that series of Gods? For nature being supernally
suspended from the Gods, and distributed from their orders, inserts
also in bodies impressions of their alliance to the divinities. In
some indeed, inserting solar, but in others lunar impressions, and
in others again, the symbol of some other God. And these indeed,
convert themselves to the Gods; some, as to the Gods simply, but
others as to particular Gods; nature thus perfecting her progeny
according to different peculiarities of the divinities. The
Demiurgus of the universe therefore, by a much greater priority,
impressed these symbols in souls, by which they might be able to
abide in themselves, and again convert themselves to the sources of
their being. And through the symbol of unity indeed he conferred on
them stability; but through intellect, he imparted to them the power
of conversion.
But to this conversion prayer is of the greatest utility. For it
attracts to itself the beneficence of the Gods, through those
ineffable symbols which the father of souls has disseminated in
them. It likewise unites those who pray with those to whom prayer is
addressed; conjoins the intellect of the Gods with the words of
those who pray; excites the will of those who perfectly comprehend
good to the abundant communication of it; is the fabricator of
divine persuasion; and establishes in the Gods all that we possess.
To a perfect and true prayer however, there is required in the
first place, a knowledge of all the divine orders to which he who
prays approaches. For no one will accede to the Gods in a proper
manner, unless he has a knowledge of their peculiarities. Hence also
the oracle admonishes, that a fire-heated conception has the first
order in sacred worship. But in the second place, there is required
a conformation of our life with that which is divine; and this
accompanied with all purity, chastity, discipline, and order,
through which our concerns being introduced to the Gods, we shall
attract their beneficence, and our souls will become subject to
them. In the third place, contact is necessary, according to which
we touch the divine essence with the summit of our soul, and verge
to a union with it. But there is yet farther required, an
approximating adhesion: for thus the oracle calls it, when he says,
the mortal approximating to fire will possess a light from the Gods.
For this imparts to us a greater communion with, and a more manifest
participation of the light of the Gods. In the last place, union
succeeds establishing the one of the soul in The One of the Gods,
and causing our energy to become one with divine energy; according
to which we are no longer ourselves, but are absorbed as it were in
the Gods, abiding in divine light, and circularly comprehended by
it. And this is the best end of true prayer, in order that the
conversion of the soul may be conjoined with its permanency, and
that every thing which proceeds from The One of the Gods, may again
be established in The One, and the light which is in us may be
comprehended in the light of the Gods.
Prayer therefore, is no small part of the whole ascent of souls.
Nor is he who possesses virtue superior to the want of the good
which proceeds from prayer; but on the contrary the ascent of the
soul is effected through it, and together with this, piety to the
Gods, which is the summit of virtue. Nor in short, ought any other
to pray than he who is transcendently good, as the Athenian guest
[in Plato] says. For to such a one, converse with the Gods becomes
most efficacious to the attainment of a happy life. But the contrary
is naturally adapted to befal the vicious. For it is not lawful for
the pure to be touched by the impure. Hence, it is necessary that he
who generously enters on the exercise of prayer, should render the
Gods propitious to him, and should excite in himself conceptions
full of intellectual light. For the favor and benignity of more
exalted beings, is the most effectual incentive to their
communication with our natures. And it is requisite to continue
without intermission in the worship of divinity. For [according to
the oracle] the rapid Gods perfect the mortal constantly employed in
prayer. It is also necessary to observe a stable order in the
performance of divine works; to exert those virtues which purify and
elevate the soul from generation, together with faith, truth, and
love; to preserve this triad and hope of good, this immutable
reception of divine light, and segregation from every other pursuit,
that thus becoming alone, we may associate with solitary deity, and
not endeavour to conjoin ourselves with multitude to The One. For he
who attempts this, effects the very contrary, and separates himself
from the Gods. For as it is not lawful in conjunction with
non-entity to associate with being; so neither is it possible with
multitude to be conjoined with The One. Such therefore are the
particulars which ought first to be known concerning prayer; viz.
that the essence of it congregates and binds souls to the Gods, or
rather, that it unites all secondary to primary natures. For as the
great Theodorus says, all things pray except the first.
The perfection however of prayer, beginning from more common
goods, ends in divine union, and gradually accustoms the soul to
divine light. But its efficacious energy both replenishes us with
good, and causes our concerns to be common with those of the Gods.
With respect to the causes of prayer too, we may infer, that so far
as they are effective, they are the efficacious powers of the Gods,
converting and calling upwards the soul to the Gods themselves. But
that so far as they are final or perfective, they are the immaculate
goods of the soul, which they derive as the fruits of being
established in the Gods. That so far also as they are
paradigmatical, they are the primordial causes of beings, which
proceed from The Good, and are united to it, according to one
ineffable union. But that so far as they are formal, they assimilate
souls to the Gods, and give perfection to the whole of their life.
And that so far as they are material, they are the impressions or
symbols inserted by the Demiurgus in the essences of souls, in order
that they may be excited to a reminiscence of the Gods who produced
them, and whatever else exists.
Moreover, we may likewise define the modes of prayer which are
various, according to the genera and species of the Gods. For prayer
is either demiurgic, or cathartic, or vivific. And the demiurgic is
such as that which is offered for the sake of showers and winds. For
the demiurgi are the causes of the generation of these. And the
prayers of the Athenians for winds procuring serenity of weather are
addressed to these Gods. But the cathartic prayer is that which is
offered for the purpose of averting diseases originating from
pestilence, and other contagious distempers; such as we have written
in our temples. And the vivific prayer is that with which we worship
the Gods, who are the causes of vivification, on account of the
origin and maturity of fruits. Hence prayers are of a perfective
nature, because they elevate us to these orders of the Gods. And he
who considers such prayers in a different manner, fails in properly
apprehending the nature and efficacy of prayer. But again, with
reference to the things for which we pray; those prayers, which
regard the salvation of the soul; obtain the first place; those
which pertain to the good temperament of the body, the second; and
those rank in the third place, which are offered for the sake of
external concerns. And lastly, with respect to the division of the
times in which we offer up prayers, it is either according to the
seasons of the year, or the centers of the solar revolution; or we
establish multiform prayers according to other such-like
conceptions.
Tim. "But, O Socrates, all such as participate but in the least
degree of temperance, [i.e. wisdom] in the impulse to every
undertaking, whether small or great, always invoke divinity."
Do you see what kind of an hypothesis Plato refers to the
Timaeus; what kind of an auditor of it he introduces, viz. Socrates;
and what a beginning of the discussion he has described? For the
hypothesis indeed, refers to the whole fabrication of things; but
the auditor is prepared to be led to it conformably to the one
intellect and one theory of wholes. Hence also he excites Timaeus to
prayer. But the beginning of the discussion, being impelled from the
invocation of the Gods, thus imitates the progression of beings,
which first abiding in the Gods, are thus allotted a generation from
them. Since however, it is said, that "all who in the least degree
participate of temperance always invoke divinity in the impulse to
every undertaking, whether it be small or great," let us see from
what kind of conception they make this invocation of the Gods in
every thing in which they engage. For it is not probable that those
who are temperate will not make real being the scope to which they
tend. And those who establish a pure intellect as the leader of
their theory; who deposit the beautiful and the good in the
prerogatives of the soul, and not in human affairs, nor in external
fortunes; and who perceive the power of providence extending through
all beings, and harmonizing all things to the universe, so that both
the whole and the parts may subsist most beautifully, and that
nothing may be destitute of the providence which proceeds from deity
to all things; these will genuinely apprehend the science concerning
the Gods. But again, perceiving this to be the case, they will very
properly in each action, and according to each energy, call on
divinity as the co-adjutor of their impulse, introducing their
productions to the universe in conjunction with wholes, and
establishing themselves in the goodness of the Gods. For things
which appear to be small, enjoy the providence of the Gods, and are
great so far as they are suspended from them; just again, as things
which are great in their own nature, when they separate themselves
from divinity, are seen to be perfectly small, and of no worth.
These things therefore, temperance imparts to souls, not being a
certain human habit, nor approaching to what is called continence,
but a divinely inspired energy of the soul, converting herself to
herself and to divinity, perceiving the causes of all things in the
Gods, and from thence surveying both other things, and such as
proceed [into a visible subsistence], through which as auxiliaries,
we also may be able to recur to the Gods, by means of the gifts
which they insert in us. The soul also, when thus converted to
herself, finds symbols of the Gods in each even of the smallest
things, and through these renders every thing familiar and allied to
the Gods. Since however, the Gods produced the whole of our essence
and gave us a self-motive nature in order to the choice of good,
their producing power is particularly manifested in our external
energies; though when we consult, we require their providential
attention; (which the Athenians manifest by honoring Jupiter the
Counsellor) and when we choose, we are in want of their assistance;
in order that by consulting, we may discover what is advantageous;
and that in choosing, we may not through passion verge to that which
is worse; but rather, that both when acting, and when impelled, we
may perceive that the self-motive nature possesses the smallest
power, and that the whole of it is suspended from the providence of
the Gods. Hence Timaeus also says, that those who are temperate
always invoke the Gods, in the impulse to every undertaking. For in
our elections indeed, we are more able to separate providence from
that which is in our power; but we are incapable of doing this in
our impulses because in these we have less of the self-motive
energy. For that which is in our power is not so extended as the
providence of the Gods; but as we have frequently said, superior
energize prior to secondary natures, and together with and posterior
to them, and on all sides comprehend the energies of subordinate
beings. But, says the Epicurean Eurimachus, how can we avoid
proceeding to infinity, if in the impulse to every small thing, we
require prayer: for though we should pray, we shall be in want of
another prayer, and we shall no where stop? And Porphyry dissolves
the doubt as follows: that it is not said it is necessary to pray on
account of every thing, but in the impulse to everything. We are
impelled therefore to things, but we are not impelled to impulses,
so that there is not a progression to infinity. Or does not the
doubt still remain? For we are impelled to prayer, so that in this
we shall agin require prayer, and an impulse to this again to
infinity. Hence it is better to say, that he who prays respecting
any thing, prior to this, acknowledges to the Gods, that he is
allotted a power from them of conversion to them, and that to other
things indeed good is imparted through prayer, but to prayer through
itself. It does not therefore require another prayer, since it
comprehends good in itself, and procures communion with a divine
nature.
"It is necessary therefore, that we should do this, who are about
to speak in a certain respect concerning the universe, whether it
was generated, or is without generation, unless we are perfectly
unwise."
Timaeus evinces how very admirable the hypothesis is, but
elegantly preserves himself in the order of a prudent man, pursuing
the medium between irony and arrogance. For having before said, that
those who in the smallest degree participate of temperance, invoke
divinity in the impulse to every great or small undertaking, he very
much exalts his proposed subject of discussion by opposing a
discourse about the universe to a small thing. But he cautiously
says, not that he himself arrived at the summit of temperance [i.e.
of wisdom]; for this is the contrary, to the participation of
temperance in the smallest degree; but that he is not perfectly
unwise. And this he says from the hypothesis, in order that he may
have to show, that the power and science which he possesses, are
from the work itself, but not from his own discussions. His theory
therefore, will be concerning the universe, so far as it is produced
by the Gods. For the world may be multifariously surveyed; either
according to its corporeal-formed nature, or so far as it is full of
partial and total souls; or so far as it participates of intellect.
Timaeus however, considers the nature of the universe, not according
to these modes only, but particularly according to its progression
from the Demiurgus; where also physiology appears to be a certain
theology; because things which have a natural subsistence, have in a
certain respect a divine hyparxis, so far as they are generated from
the Gods. And thus this must be determined.
It is usual however to doubt, why Plato here adds in a certain
respect: for he says, "Those who are about to speak in a certain
respect concerning the universe." And the more superficial indeed of
the interpreters say, that the universe is in a certain respect
unbegotten, and in a certain respect generated. Hence the discussion
of it is very properly in a certain respect, as of that which is
unbegotten, and in a certain respect as of that which is generated.
Though Plato does not co-arrange `to pê' in a certain respect, with
the words unbegotten and generated, but with the words about to
speak. But the divine Iamblichus says that the discussion is in a
certain respect about the universe, and in a certain respect not;
for matter, as being indefinite in the world, may be variously
considered. To this interpretation however, it may be said, that
`pê' is co-arranged with something else, and not with the universe.
Will it not therefore, be better to say with our preceptor, that
words are multifariously enunciated. For the demiurgic words
proceeding from intellect are of one kind, such as the Demiurgus
utters to the junior Gods: for Plato says, "that the soul speaks,
being moved to itself." Those words which are surveyed in science,
are of another kind. And those are of another kind which are
allotted the third hypostasis from intellect, and which proceed
externally for the sake of discipline and communication with others.
Hence Timaeus knowing that those are demiurgic words which the
Demiurgus employs, but that those are scientific which he is now
about to generate, but which he pre-assumes in himself, and that he
makes use of external words for the sake of Socrates alone, on this
account he says that he shall employ words in a certain respect
about the universe. For it is one thing to use them intellectually,
another scientifically, and another, Again therefore, with respect to the words, "whether it was
generated, or is without generation," those interpreters read the
former with an aspirate, but the latter with a soft breathing, who
say that Plato speaks about the universe, so far as it was generated
from a cause, or is unbegotten, in order that surveying it as
generated, we may perceive the nature which it contains. And the
Platonic Albinus thinks, that according to Plato the world being
perpetual, has a beginning of generation, by which also it is more
redundant than being; since this indeed always is, but the world in
addition to existing always, has a beginning of generation, in order
that it may exist always, and be generated. Not that it is generated
after such a manner as to be so according to time; for in this case
it would not always exist; but in short, it has the relation of
generation, on account of its composition from things many and
dissimilar. And it is necessary to refer its hypostasis to another
cause more ancient than itself, through which always existing
primarily, the world is in a certain respect, and always is, and is
not only generated, but is also unbegotten. [This therefore is
asserted by Albinus], though Plato no where in what follows says,
that the universe is in a certain respect generated, and in a
certain respect unbegotten. Others again, read both the parts with
an aspirate, in order that Timaeus may say, he is about to speak
concerning the universe so far as it is generated, and so far as it
is unbegotten; erring in the same way as those prior to them; unless
indeed they assert that the universe was generated according to
form, but unbegotten according to its nurse [matter]. For thus also
Timaeus says, that its nurse is unbegotten, but that the world was
generated, as receiving form from divinity. But Porphyry and
Iamblichus read both the parts with a soft breathing, in order that
what is said may be whether the universe was generated or is
unbegotten. For this is to be considered, prior to all other things;
since it contributes in the highest degree to the consummation of
the whole of physiology, rightly to admit that the world was
generated or is unbegotten. For from this hypothesis we shall be
able to see what the nature is of its essence and powers, as will be
manifest to us shortly after. The discussion therefore, concerning
the universe, will be for the sake of discipline, and will proceed
from this principle, whether the world was generated, or is without
generation; and from this, other things must be woven together in a
consequent order.
"It is necessary, therefore, that invoking all the Gods and
Goddesses, we should pray that what we assert may especially be
agreeable to their divinities, and that in the ensuing discourse we
may be consistent with ourselves."
The division of male and female comprehends in itself all the
plenitudes of the divine orders. For the cause of stable power and
sameness, the supplier of being, and that which is the first
principle of conversion to all things, are comprehended in the male.
But that which emits from itself all-various progressions and
separations, measures of life and prolific powers, is contained in
the female. Hence, Timaeus, elevating himself to all the Gods, very
properly comprehends the whole orders of them, in a division into
these genera. Such a division, likewise, is most adapted to the
proposed theory. For this universe is full of these twofold divine
genera. For heaven has to earth (that we may assume the extremes)
the order of the male to the female; because the motion of heaven
imparts productive principles and powers to every thing [sublunary];
and earth receiving the effluxions thence proceeding, is parturient
with and generates all-various animals and plants. Of the Gods also
in the heavens, some are distinguished according to the male, but
others according to the female. And of those powers that govern
generation in an unbegotten manner, some are of the former, but
others of the latter co-ordination. In short, the demiurgic choir is
abundant in the universe, and there are many rivers of life, some of
which exhibit the form of the male, but others of the female
characteristic. And what occasion is there to say much on this
subject? For from the liberated unities, both masculine and
feminine, various orders proceed into the universe. Hence, he who is
entering on the discussion of the universe, very properly invokes
the Gods and Goddesses, from both which the universe receives its
completion, and beseeches them that what he asserts may be
consistent, and particularly that it may be agreeable to their
divinities. For this is the sublimest end of theory, to run upward
to a divine intellect; and as all things are uniformly comprehended
in it, to arrange the discussion of things agreeably to this causal
comprehension. But that which is the second end, and is consequent
to this is, for the whole theory to receive its completion
conformably to human intellect and the light of science. For the
whole, the perfect, and the uniform, pre-exist in a divine
intellect; but that which is partial and falls short of divine
simplicity, subsists about a mortal intellect.
Why however, does Timaeus say, that it is necessary to pray, and
magnificently proclaim that the Gods and Goddesses should be
invoked, yet does not pray, though an opportunity for so doing
presents itself, but immediately converts himself to the proposed
discussion? We reply, it is because some things have their end
comprehended in the very will itself; but others, distribute another
energy after the will, and through action accomplish that which was
the object of the will. And a life indeed, conformable to
philosophy, depends on our will, and a deficiency in it, is contrary
to the will. [But the consequences resulting from a life conversant
with external actions, are not dependent on our will;] for the end
of them is not placed in us. We may justly, therefore, rank prayer
among the number of things which have all their perfection in the
will. For the wish to pray, is a desire of conversion to the Gods.
And this desire itself conducts the desiring soul, and conjoins it
to divinity, which is the first work of prayer. Hence it is not
proper first to wish, and afterwards to pray, but he that wishes to
pray, will at the same time have prayer as the measure of his wish,
one person indeed in a greater, but another in a less degree.
Farther still, this also is the work of a true prayer, for those
things for which we pray to be common to the Gods, both according to
powers and energies, and for us to effect them in conjunction with
the Gods. - Thus if some one should pray to the powers that amputate
matter, and obliterate the stains arising from generation, but
should himself particularly endeavour to effect this, through the
cathartic virtues; such a one in conjunction with the Gods, would
entirely accomplish a dissolution of his material bonds. This
therefore Timaeus here effects. For those things which he prays to
the Gods to accomplish, he himself completes, disposing the whole
discourse according to human intellect, but so as to be in
conformity to the intellect of the Gods.
"And such is my prayer to the Gods with reference to myself; but
as to what respects you, it is requisite to pray that you may easily
learn, and that I may be able to exhibit what I scientifically
conceive, in the clearest manner about the proposed subjects of
discussion. [According to my opinion therefore, the following
division must first be made.]"
The exhortation of the auditors, is a thing consequent to the
prayers [of Timaeus]. For it is necessary that the replenishing
source being suspended from its proper causes, should previously
excite its recipients, and convert them to itself, prior to the
plenitude which it confers; in order that becoming more adapted,
they may happily receive the intellectual conceptions which it
imparts. For thus the participation will become more perfect to
them, and the gift will be rendered more easy to the giver.
Moreover, this very circumstance of facility, is adapted to those
that imitate the whole fabrication; from which abiding and rejoicing
in itself, all things proceed to the effects which it excites.
Farther still, to produce one series, through the contact of
secondary with prior natures, adumbrates the demiurgic series, which
proceeds as far as to the last of things. For if the auditors
receive what is said conformably to the intellect of the Gods, it
will happen that the whole conference will in reality be referred to
one intellect, and one intellectual conception. Besides this also,
the self-motive nature of souls is sufficiently indicated, that
being moved by the Gods, they also move themselves, and produce from
themselves sciences. For the words, "what I scientifically
conceive," exhibit the energy which is impelled from a life whose
power is free.
According to my opinion therefore, these things are first to be
considered; that Timaeus being a Pythagorean, and preserving the
form of Pythagoric discussions, is immediately exhibited to us as
such, from the very beginning. For Socrates does not enunciatively
declare his opinions to others, but having dialectically purified
their conceptions, unfolds truth into light; who also said to them,
that he knew nothing except to make an assertion [or give a reason]
and receive one. But Timaeus, as also addressing his discourse to
men, says that he shall enunciate his own dogmas, not at all busying
himself with foreign opinions, but pursuing one path of science.
Moreover, the word îëþþà, i.e. I am of opinion, is assumed here very
aptly, and appropriately to what has been before said. For of the
whole rational soul, one part is intellect, another is dianoia, and
a third is opinion. And the first of these indeed, is conjoined to
the Gods, the second produces the sciences, and the third imparts
them to others. This man therefore, knowing these things, through
prayer adapts his own intellect to the intellect of the Gods. For
this is manifested by the words, "that what we assert may especially
be agreeable to their divinities, and that in the ensuing discourse
we may be consistent with ourselves." But through exhortations, he
excites the dianoetic part of the souls of his auditors. For the
words, what I scientifically conceive, have an indication of this
kind. The doxastic part therefore remains, which receiving a
scientific division from dianoia, delivers the streams of it to
others. This however is not ambiguous, nor divided about sensibles,
nor does the formal distinction of it consist in hypolepsis alone;
but it is filled from intellect and dianoia, surveys the demiurgic
reason, and distinguishes the nature of things. These particulars
also, are sufficiently assimilated to the paradigm of the speaker.
For there, a royal intellect precedes, according to which the
paradigm is united to intelligibles; a dianoia, containing in itself
the plenitudes of forms; and the first and uniform cause of opinion.
Hence, the paradigm contains intelligibles in intellect, but
introduces sense to the worlds, as the Oracle says; or as Plato,
"such ideas therefore, as intellect perceived to be inherent in
animal itself, so many he dianoetically saw this universe ought to
possess."
Moreover, the distinction between beings and things generated, is
consentaneous to what has been before said. For after the Gods and
Goddesses, and the ineffable peculiarity which is in them, the
separation of these two genera, i.e. of being and generation, takes
place. For being is allied to the more excellent order of divine
natures, which is always established in invariable sameness, and is
intelligible. But generation is allied to the inferior order, from
which, infinite progression, and all-various mutation, derive their
subsistence. What then is this division, and after what manner was
it produced? Was it made as if it were the section of a certain
whole into parts, or as genus is divided into species, or as the
division of one word into many significations, or as that of essence
into accidents, or vice versa, that of accident into essences; for
these are the species of division which some persons are accustomed
to applaud. It is ridiculous therefore, to divide being and
generation, either as accident into essences, or as essence into
accidents. For accident by no means pertains to perpetual being. Nor
again must they be divided as a word into its significations. For
what word is there which Plato assuming as common, divides into
perpetual being, and that which is generated; unless some one should
say that `ti', i.e. a certain thing, is thus divided by him? This
division however, is not Platonic, but is derived from the Stoic
custom. Is the division therefore, as that of a whole into parts?
But what is that whole which consists of perpetual being, and that
which is generated? Or how can paradigm and image give completion to
one composition? How likewise can perpetual being be a part of a
certain thing, since it is impartible, united, and simple? For the
impartible is not a part of any thing which does not consist of all
impartibles. But that which is generated is not impartible. Hence
there is not a common genus of perpetual being, and that which is
generated. For perpetual being precedes according to cause that
which is generated; and the former is when the latter is not. But
perpetual being not existing, which it is not lawful to suppose,
generation also would vanish. How likewise, is there one genus of
the first, and the last of things? For the division of genera into
species, takes place in the middle psychical reasons [i.e.
productive powers]. But things prior to soul, subsist in more
excellent genera; and things posterior to soul, have their essence
in co-ordinate natures. How therefore, can being itself and that
which is generated, be arranged under one genus? What also will this
genus be? For it is not being, lest that which is generated, and
which never [truly] is, should be arranged in being. Nor will being
itself be The One. Because every genus is divided by its proper
differences, and antecedently assumes the differences, either in
capacity, or in energy. But it is not lawful that The One should
have differences either in capacity, lest it should be more
imperfect than secondary natures; or in energy, lest it should have
multitude. But as it is in short demonstrated to be superior both to
power and energy, it cannot in any way whatever have differences; so
that neither will there in short, be a division of The One.
What then shall we say? Must it not be this, that Plato does not
now make any division whatever, but that he proposes to define
separately what each of these two, perpetual being, and that which
is generated, is? For it appears to me that the word `diaireteon'
has the same signification with `diakrineteon'. For since he
discourses about the world, the Demiurgus, and the paradigm of the
world, he wishes separately to define perpetual being, and
separately that which is generated, in order that through the given
definitions we may know where the world, where the Demiurgus, and
where the paradigm are to be arranged; and that we may not confound
the orders of things, but may separate them from each other, so far
as they are severally adapted to be separated. He likewise does the
very same thing in the Philebus. For inquiring concerning intellect,
pleasure and the mixed life, which is the best of these, he assumes
the genera of them, viz. bound, infinity, and that which is mingled
from bound and the infinite. For thus the order of each will become
apparent, and he will manifest the peculiarity of them from their
genera. There however, bound and infinity beginning from the Gods,
proceed through all beings of whatever kind they may be. For these
also were in intelligibles according to the stable and generative
cause of intelligibles. They were likewise in the intellectual order
according to the paternal and material principle of the intellectual
Gods. And they were in the supermundane order, according to the
demiurgic monad and vivific duad, and in the last place, according
to effective and prolific powers. Here however, being and that which
is generated, do not begin from the Gods; for the unities of the
Gods are superior to being, and prior to these The One Itself is
exempt from all beings, because the first God is one, but the other
Gods are unities. Nor are being and that which is generated things
which are participated by the Gods, in the same manner as the
unities which are posterior to the Gods, are said to be and are
participated by being. Nor do they extend as far as to the last of
things. For neither is it possible to say that matter is perpetual
being, since we are accustomed to call it non-being; nor that which
is generated, which is not able to suffer being, lest perishing by
so doing, it should entirely vanish. This therefore, will again be
asserted by us. It is however, [evident] that the division is no of
one certain thing, and that the proposed theory has necessarily,
prior to other things, the definition of these twofold genera, in
order that the discussion proceeding as if from geometrical
hypotheses to the investigation of things consequent, may discover
the nature of the universe, and the paternal and paradigmatic cause
of it. For if the universe was generated, it was generated by a
cause. There is therefore a demiurgic cause of the universe. If
there is a Demiurgus, there is also a paradigm of the world, with
reference to which he who constituted the universe fabricated. And
thus in a consequent order the discussion about these things is
introduced, and the physical theory beautifully terminates for us in
theology.
"What that is which is always being, but is without generation,
and what that is which is generated indeed, [or consists in becoming
to be] but is never [real] being."
According to some, all beings whatever, whether they subsist
paradigmatically or iconically, are comprehended in this
distinction; but not all beings according to others. And the
interpreters contradict each other respecting this, not a little. We
however, cannot know which of these assertions it is fit to adopt,
unless we examine each of them by itself. Let us then consider from
the beginning, what power each of the words [of Plato] possesses in
itself.
In the first place, therefore, `to ti', or the what is
definitive. For we are accustomed to give `ti' an antecedent
arrangement in definitions. But it is not a genus, as the Platonic
Severus thought it was, who says that `to ti' is the genus of being
and that which is generated; and that the all is signified by it.
For thus that which is generated, and likewise perpetual being, will
be all. It was also doubted by some that preceded us, why Plato did
not demonstrate that there is such a thing as perpetual being, prior
to the enquiry what it is. For whence is the subsistence of
perpetual being evident? And it is the law in demonstrative
discussions, to consider if a thing is previous to the
investigation, what it is. In answer to this doubt it may be said,
that perhaps Timaeus did not think this was requisite to his
purpose; as the day before, it was shown by Socrates in what he said
about the soul, that the soul is unbegotten and incorruptible, and
that it philosophises through its alliance to real beings, with
which it comes into contact.
And likewise, as it was shown by him, that what is perfectly
being, and truly the object of science, is one thing; that what is
partly being, and partly non-being, is another, and on this account
is of a doxastic nature; and that what in no respect is being, and
is entirely unknown, is another. This was also granted to Timaeus by
Socrates, when he divides a line into four parts, the intelligible,
the dianoetic, the sensible, and the conjectural; where likewise
speaking about The Good he says, that it reigns in the intelligible
place, in the same manner as the sun in the visible region. And
farther still, the introduction of prayer previous to the
discussion, is a demonstration of the existence of being which
always is. For if there are Gods, it is necessary that there should
be truly existing being; for this is united to the Gods; but not
that which is generated and which perishes, but is never truly
being. Or rather prior to these things it may be said, that the
existence of something which always is, is deposited in our common
conceptions. For whence was that which is generated produced except
from perpetual being? For if this also was generated, it must have
been generated from some other being. And this must either be
perpetual being, or must likewise have been itself generated. So
that we must either proceed to infinity, or generation is in a
circle, or perpetual being has a subsistence. But it is not lawful
to proceed to infinity. For from one principle which is The One, all
things originate. Nor is generation in a circle, lest the same
things be both better and worse, causes and effects. Hence it
remains that [true] being always is. Why then, it may be said, is
not generation from The One? Because, we reply, it is absurd that
multitude should be entirely produced without being. It is necessary
therefore, that there should be truly existing being, which
primarily proceeds from The One, in order that the first principle
may not be alone the cause of the last of things, but prior to these
may be the cause of being, from which generation proceeds. After all
that has been said, however, the most true solution of the doubt is,
what Plato now assuming as an hypothesis that there is perpetual
being, defines it. But after the discussion about the fabrication of
the world, resuming this very thing, he demonstrates that perpetual
being has a subsistence. Preserving however, what pertains to
physiology, he proceeds from this hypothesis, and demonstrates such
things as are consequent to it. For science itself also is from
hypothesis, and requires that hypotheses should be assumed prior to
its demonstrations. In what he says therefore about matter, he
demonstrates not only that matter is, but also that being is. But a
little after, from one of the hypotheses, i.e. from the third,
demonstrating that there is a Demiurgus of the world, he obtains
also from this that perpetual being subsists prior to that which is
generated. And again from the fourth hypothesis he evinces, that the
Demiurgus fabricated the universe, looking to an eternal paradigm.
But in the place we have mentioned, he demonstrates that perpetual
being is itself by itself prior to generated natures. And thus much
for this particular.
With respect however, to perpetual being itself, whether does it
signify the whole intelligible world, or the Demiurgus, or the
paradigm of the universe? for it is differently assumed by different
interpreters. And if indeed, it is the whole intelligible world,
whence does the intelligible breadth begin, and where does it
proceed? But if it is the paradigm, how comes it to pass that the
Demiurgus is not perpetual being, if the paradigm is one thing, and
the Demiurgus another? And if it is the Demiurgus, whence is it that
the paradigm is not a thing of this kind? That the paradigmatic
cause, therefore, is to be arranged in perpetual being, is clearly
evident from Plato when he says, "According to which of the
paradigms did the artificer fabricate the world? Was it according to
that which subsists with invariable sameness, or according to that
which was generated?" Will it not, therefore, be better to say, that there is indeed
such an order of being, as that divine man [Iamblichus] has
delivered, and such as Plato elsewhere surveys; but that now Plato
thus denominates every eternal world? Nor is this at all wonderful.
For, at one time, the intelligible is asserted of every perpetual
and invisible nature, as when it is said that the soul also is
intelligible, as by Socrates in the Phaedo. But at another time it
is asserted of the natures that are more excellent than every
psychical essence, as the division in the Republic manifests. And at
another time, it is asserted of the first triads of being, as is
evident from what Timaeus a little after says of them. After the
same manner, therefore, being in the Sophists, indeed, manifests the
order of the one being; but here it signifies the whole eternal
world. For it is evident that being which is primarily being, is the
summit of the intelligible breadth, and the monad of all beings. For
every where, that which is primarily being in its own series, has
the highest order; since if it ranked as the second, it would not
have the same form; for it would no longer be primarily that which
it is. As therefore, virtue itself possesses the highest place in
the series of the virtues, as the equal itself in equals, and animal
itself in animals, thus also being itself which is primarily being,
is the summit of all beings, and from it all beings proceed. But
every intelligible and intellectual being, and whatever appears to
exist, has the appellation of being, yet being and perpetual being
are not the same. For the one being is beyond eternity. For eternity
participates of being. Hence all such things as participate of
eternity, have also a certain portion of being, but not all such
things as participate of being, participate likewise of eternity.
The natures therefore that exist in time, participate also of being,
so that what is primarily being is beyond the order of eternity. But
perpetual being is eternal. Hence the reasoning demonstrates the
very contrary, that every thing is rather to be assumed from
perpetual being, than the one being. For this latter is better than
the ever, as subsisting between The One and eternity, and prior to
eternity being denominated one being.
If, therefore, it be requisite that I should say what appears to
me to be the truth, Plato now precedaneously assumes every thing
which is eternally being; beginning, indeed, from the nature of
animal itself. For this is primarily eternal; but ending in partial
intellects. But the one being, he perhaps omits, in consequence of
its existing as the monad of these, and as being ineffable, and
conjoined to The One. Hence Plato will now speak in reality of every
intelligible, if that intelligible is not assumed which is occult,
is the highest, and does not depart from The One. He says,
therefore, shortly after this, that animal itself is the most
beautiful of intelligibles, in consequence of the natures prior to
this, being through excess of union, superior to a subsistence as
objects of intellect. Unless he says that animal itself is the most
beautiful of all the objects of intellect, both animal itself and
the one being existing as objects of intellect also, the latter as
being causally ever, eternity as being so according to hyparxis, and
animal itself or the eternal, as existing always, according to
participation. Hence, if these things are admitted, in that which
always exists, eternity, animal itself, and the Demiurgus will be
comprehended, and likewise the one being itself, which possesses the
occult cause of eternity. So that it is evident from this, that
perpetual being comprehends every nature prior to souls, whether it
be intelligible, or intellectual; beginning indeed from being
itself, but ending in a partial intellect, and that it does not
alone comprehend, as Iamblichus says it does, the summit of all
beings, such as the being is which is characterized by The One, or
the one being, through which all beings are said to be beings, and
to which The One Itself alone, and the principle of being [bound and
infinity] are superior. The One, therefore, is better than that
which is self-subsistent. For it is necessary that it should be
exempt from all multitude. Perpetual being, however, is
self-subsistent indeed, but possesses the power of being so through
The One. But that which is posterior to it, such as is our nature,
is self-subsistent, and at the same time derives its subsistence
from another producing cause. And the last of things proceed indeed
into existence from a more excellent cause, but are not self-
subsistent. It is not however yet time for these observations.
But with respect to perpetual being, it must not be supposed,
that it is partly being, and partly non-being; for if it were, it
would be a composite, and consisting of things of this kind, it
would be dissimilarly a composite. Nor is it at one time being, and
at another non-being; for it is said to be always being. But it is
simply and eternally being, and is unmingled with every thing
whatever it may be, that is of a contrary nature. For it appears to
me that the addition of the words, "but not having generation,"
indicates the unmingled and undefiled purity of perpetual being,
according to which it is exempt from every hypostasis which is borne
along in the images of being, and is changed by time. Not as some
assert, that perpetual being is said, for the sake of perspicuity,
to be without generation; nor according to others, that Plato was
willing to speak of it both affirmatively and negatively; but that
it is necessary perpetual being should be intellectually perceived
subsisting by itself, remote from all temporal mutation. For soul
participates of time, and the heavens are allotted a life which is
evolved according to time; but the intelligible nature alone is,
according to the whole of itself, eternal. Hence, some of the
ancients call the intelligible breadth truly existing being; the
psychical truly existing and at the same time not truly existing
being; the sensible not truly existing being; and matter, truly
non-being. After what manner, however, they made this arrangement,
we shall elsewhere investigate. But that the addition of "not having
generation," is for the sake of indicating the separate essence of
perpetual being, is I think evident from what has been said.
In the next place, with respect to that which is generated,
whether does it signify the whole world, or a material and perfectly
mutable composition? For some of the ancients explain this in one
way, and others in another. But we understand by it every corporeal
formed nature, and not the soul of the universe; so far as this
nature is of itself indeed unadorned, but is always or at a certain
time, arranged by another. For the soul of the universe is, in a
certain respect, perpetual being. Much less is intellect that which
is generated: for this is immediately perpetual being. But body
alone is that which is generated, and is truly never real being. For
body is always in want of the world-producing cause, and is always
deriving from it the representation of existence. Why then it may be
said, did not Plato add, always, and that which is generated, in the
same manner as being, or at a certain time, in order that he might
have what is generated entirely opposed to perpetual being? May we
not say that Plato devised this mode of expression, looking to the
various nature of that which is generated, and taking away from
eternal being the existence at a certain time, and the perpetuity of
a generated nature? For the wholes of such a nature are generated
always, but the parts at a certain time. And after another manner
[of considering the affair] with respect to forms, some are
inseparable from matter, and are always generated from that which is
truly always; but others are in time, and depart from matter. For
corporeity, indeed, is always generated and is always about matter;
but the form of fire, or of air, enters into and departs from
matter, becoming separated from it and perishing, through the
domination of a contrary nature. But if the perpetuity which detains
matter is always generated, it never therefore is; and if the
existence at a certain time is generated, it is never being. Every
thing however, which is generated, is either always generated, or at
a certain time. Hence, every thing which is generated, is never
[real] being.
These things, therefore, having been said, let us, recurring to
the discussion from the beginning, show whether perpetual being in
this place is asserted of all beings, or not of all. For if, indeed,
we admit that perpetual being indicates an eternal nature alone,
having the eternal according to the whole of itself, it is not
asserted of all beings. For neither the being prior to eternity, nor
the order of eternity, nor again, such things as have indeed an
eternal essence, but produce energies according to time, can be
arranged under this being. But if we assume every thing whatever
that is eternal, and which always is, either according to the whole
of itself, or partially, then soul also ranks among eternal natures,
and also that which contains in itself the causes of all things,
unically, as it is said, and universally. For the case is as
follows: one thing [i.e. being itself] is super-eternal; [another
thing is eternity;] another is simply eternal, and another is in a
certain respect eternal. With respect, however, to each of these
perpetual beings, the first is as the power and fountain of the
ever; the second, as that which is primarily always being, and the
ever itself, and not according to participation; but the third is
always, as participating of the ever, and as primarily wholly
eternal; and the fourth, is as that which is a certain respect
participates of a peculiarity of this kind. For each thing subsists
triply, either according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or
according to participation. And the one being, indeed, is being
alone according to hyparxis, but is perpetual being according to
cause. Eternity is perpetual being according to hyparxis, but being
according to participation. And the eternal is perpetual being
according to participation, but according to hyparxis is a certain
other intelligible, or intelligible and intellectual, or
intellectual [only]. And if the last of these, it is either total or
partial; and if this, it is either supermundane or mundane; and if
this, it is either divine, or is posterior to the Gods, and is each
of these either according to existence alone, or according to power
and energy, and as far as to the perpetual being of things which are
in a certain respect eternal.
Again therefore, with respect to that which is generated, if we
assume the universal, we must assume generation all-variously
changed; but if every thing generated, in whatever way it may be, we
shall find that the heavens also are generated, so far as they
partake of motion and mutation, and that soul is the first of
generated natures, so far as it lives in time, and time is
connascent with its energies. And thus ascending from beneath, we
shall end in soul as the first of things that are generated; and
descending from above, we shall again terminate our progression in
soul, as the last of eternal natures. For though a certain person
rightly says that the heavens always exist, yet their being is
always generated by something else; but soul possesses its own
essence from itself. Hence also, Socrates in the Phaedrus says, that
it is unbegotten, and at the same time self-moved, as being indeed
the principle of all generation, but generating and vivifing itself.
If therefore we say, that it is both unbegotten and generated,
eternal and not eternal, we shall speak rightly. Hence too the
Athenian guest thinks fit to call the soul indestructible, but not
eternal, because it is in a certain respect only eternal, and not
according to the whole of itself, in the same manner as truly
existing being. For it is one thing to be always, and another to be
generated always. And the heavens, indeed, are generated always; for
they do not possess being from themselves. But soul is always; for
it possesses being from itself. And every thing prior to soul is not
generated from a cause, but is from a cause. For generation is alone
in things which derive their subsistence from others. Through these
things therefore it will be manifest after what manner there is a
comprehension of all beings in the before- mentioned portions of
division, and after what manner all beings are not comprehended in
them. There is not a comprehension of all beings, because that which
is eternal only, and that which is generated only, are assumed; one
of which is prior to, but the other is posterior to soul. And there
is a comprehension of all beings, because the extremes being
assumed, it is possible from these to find the middle, which is at
one and the same time both being and that which is generated.
That these distinctions, however, of that which always is, and of
that which is generated, are necessarily made prior to all other
axioms, it is easy to learn; by observing that this is the first of
the problems which it is requisite to consider about the universe in
the beginning, i.e. whether it always was, having no beginning of
generation, or whether it was generated. For if this is the first of
the things to be investigated, then what that is which is generated,
and what that is which is eternal, have very properly the first
order in the axioms. For the other axioms follow these, just as the
remaining problems follow the problem respecting the generation of
the world. And if it be requisite that resuming the discussion about
the hypotheses, I should more fully explain what appears to me on
the subject, Plato in the same manner as geometricians, employs
definitions and hypotheses prior to demonstrations, through which he
frames demonstrations, and antecedently assumes the principles of
the whole of physiology. For as the principles of music are
different from the principles of medicine, and in a similar manner
there are different principles of arithmetic and mechanics; thus
also there are certain principles of the whole of physiology, which
Plato now delivers to us; [and these are as follow:] Truly existing
being is that which may be comprehended by intelligence in
conjunction with reason. That which is generated is to be
apprehended by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense. Every
thing generated, is generated by a cause. That which does not derive
its subsistence from a cause, is not generated. That of which the
paradigm is eternal being, is necessarily beautiful. That, of which
the paradigm is generated, is not beautiful. Let the universe be
called heaven or the world. For from these principles he produces
all that follows. And it appears to me, that on this account he
shows what perpetual being is, and also what that is which is
generated, but does not show us that each of them is. For the
geometrician informs us what a point is, and what a line is, prior
to his demonstrations, but he by no means teaches us that each of
these is. For how can he be a geometrician, if he discusses his own
principles? After the same manner also, the physiologist says what
perpetual being is, for the sake of the demonstrations he is about
to make, but he by no means shows that it is; for in so doing, he
would go beyond physiology. But since, as we have before observed,
Timaeus does not resemble other physiologists, being a Pythagorean
physiologist, and Plato exhibits in this dialogue the highest
science, hence he afterwards very divinely proves that truly
existing being is. For his present purpose, however, it is
sufficient for him to admit that it is, preserving the boundaries of
physiology. He appears also to investigate the definition of
perpetual being and of that which is generated, in order that he may
discover the causes which give completion to the universe, viz. form
and matter: for that which is generated is in want of these. He
assumes, however, the third hypothesis, in order that he may
discover the producing cause; but the fourth, that he may be able to
infer that the universe was generated according to a paradigmatic
cause; and the fifth, which is concerning the name of the universe,
in order that he may investigate the participation of The Good and
the ineffable by the world, as will be shown in what follows.
It appears also to me, that Aristotle in his Physics, imitating
Plato, assumes one hypothesis, when he says, it is supposed by us
with respect to things which have a natural subsistence, that either
all or some of them are moved. For it is entirely necessary that
there should be motion, if the discussion of the physical theory is
to proceed with success; since nature is a principle of motion. But
in his treatise On the Heavens, prior to every thing else, he
assumes those hypotheses concerning which Plotinus says, that
Aristotle will find no difficulty in his discussion if his
hypotheses about the fifth body are admitted, meaning these five;
that the motion is simple of a simple body; that a simple body has a
certain simple motion according to nature; that there are two simple
motions; that one motion is contrary to one; and that the thing
which has not a contrary, has not that which can corrupt it. From
which hypotheses, he frames his demonstrations concerning the fifth
body. Aristotle, however, shows that the universe is unbegotten,
from the hypotheses; but Plato that it is generated. Whether
therefore, they are discordant or not, will shortly after be
manifest to us. And this, indeed, will again be considered.
Why, however, does Plato, who is accustomed to employ, when
speaking of intelligibles, the term `auto' itself, and `oper' that
which, now assume neither of these, but rather prefers the term
`aei' always, as connascent with being. For this also is attended
with a doubt, through what cause he employs the third of these
terms, i.e. always, as better adapted to signify the nature of truly
existing being. In answer to this it may be said, that the term
itself manifests the simplicity of intelligibles, a subsistence
according to hyparxis, and an existence which is primary, which is
asserted conformably to the peculiarity, according to which
intelligibles are primarily that which they are, and fill secondary
natures with the participation of themselves. But the term that
which is, indicates purity, the unmingled, and the not being filled
with a contrary nature. And the ever manifests the eternal, the
immutable, and the invariable, according to hypostasis. Thus for
instance, when we say the beautiful itself, and the just itself, we
survey beauty which is not so by the participation of the beautiful,
and justice which is not so by the participation of the just; but
that which is primarily beautiful, and that which is primarily just.
But when we say that which is beautiful we mean that which is not
mingled with deformity, nor contaminated by its contrary, such as is
material beauty, which is situated in deformity, and is itself
replete with its subject nature. And when we use the term ever or
always we indicate beauty which is not at one time beautiful, and at
another not, but which is eternally beautiful. So that the first of
these terms manifests the simplicity of intelligibles, and the
supplying all other things from themselves. For such is the
beautiful itself, by which all beautiful things are beautiful, and
the equal itself, by which all equal things are equal, and in a
similar manner in other things of this kind. But the second of these
terms, indicates onlyness and purity, the unmingled and the
undefiled. For the that which is this, i.e. it is something which is
not various, and which does not attract to itself any thing of a
foreign nature. And the ever manifests immutability, for the ever is
this. Yet it does not simply indicate immutability, but a permanency
in eternity. For a temporal ever is one thing, and an eternal ever,
another; the latter being every thing collectively and at once; but
the former being co-extended with the whole continuity of time, and
being infinite. And the latter subsisting in the now, but the
former, in interval, the interval being unceasing, and always in
generation, or becoming to be. The term therefore itself, is derived
to beings from the paradigm. For that is the cause of simplicity to
beings, and of imparting to other things that which it primarily
possesses. But the term that which is, is derived from the one
being. For that is primarily exempt from non-being, and privation;
because it is primarily being, and all things subsist in it occultly
and indivisibly. And the term ever, is derived from eternity. For as
the one being is the supplier of existence, so eternity imparts
perpetuity to intelligibles. Hence, if Plato had been speaking about
participants and things participated, and for this purpose had
required being, he would have inquired what being itself is. And if
he had been discussing things unmingled, and things that are
mingled, he would have used the term that which is. But since he
discourses about generation and the unbegotten, and for this purpose
requires these definitions, he very properly inquires what that is
which is always being. For this distinguishes the eternal from that
which is temporal, in the same manner as the unbegotten
distinguishes eternity. Hence also the nature of animal itself,
which is comprehensive of all intelligible animals, is eternal; but
time was generated together with heaven, as Plato says in the course
of the dialogue.
Moreover, though perpetual being is said to proceed from a cause,
yet it must not be asserted that it is generated according to all
causes, but that it is according to them.
For it is `di o', that on account of which, and `pros o', that
with relation to which, and `uph ou', that by which.
For perpetual being is self-subsistent, and is not generated by
itself,
lest not existing at a certain time, it should be generated. For
that which is generated, when it is becoming to be is not. Nor is it
generated with relation to itself, lest it should be a composite.
Nor on account of itself, lest it should be imperfect. But that
which is generated is suspended from another thing, and has its
progression from other causes; and such is every corporeal-formed
nature. After what manner however, is that which is generated never
being, concerning which Plato speaks clearly in the Sophista? Not
that it is non-being, but that it is never truly being. Now,
however, it is said to be never at any time being, because being has
a prior arrangement in an eternal nature; but that which is
generated, is never that which always is. If, therefore, existence,
so far as it is being, is unreceptive of non-existence, it is
evident that what is generated, since it has the being which is in
it, of whatever kind it may be, mingled with non-being, is never at
any time being, so as to be genuinely being; and being which
subsists by itself, since this pertains to real existence alone,
which has not in a certain respect non- existence in conjunction
with existence, at one and the same time being and not being.
"The former of these, indeed, is comprehended by intelligence in
conjunction with reason, since it always subsists with invariable
sameness. But the latter is perceived by opinion, in conjunction
with irrational sense, since it is generated and corrupted, and
never truly is."
**lacuna** To these it happens, that they err in many other
respects, and that they comprehend in the definitions the things
defined. For what perpetual being is, which the first definition
assumes is explained, and is said to be that which always subsists
with invariable sameness; and this the second definition assumes,
saying it is that which is generated and corrupted, but never truly
is. This, however, is to accuse both themselves and Plato of
unskilfulness in dialectic. But others dividing the sentence, show
that in each of the colons there are definition, and the thing
defined. For in the former colon, the words, "that which is
comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason," are a
definition; but the words, "since it always subsists with invariable
sameness," are the thing defined. And in the second colon, the
words, "is perceived by opinion in conjunction with irrational
sense," are given as a definition; but the remaining part of the
sentence, is the thing defined. To these men it will be found our
preceptor has well replied. For by a little transposition of the
words, the whole will be immediately apparent as follows: That which
always subsists with invariable sameness, is comprehended by
intelligence in conjunction with reason: but that which is generated
and corrupted, and never truly is, is perceived by opinion, in
conjunction with irrational sense. For these things are consequent
to what was before said, "what is that which is always being but is
without generation;" and "what is that which is generated, but is
never [real] being;" that which always subsists with invariable
sameness, signifying the same thing as, that which is without
generation; and that which is generated, but is never [real] being,
having the same signification as, that which never truly is, though
they are more obscurely announced. And through the addition of truly
Plato indicates that so far indeed as it is generated, it is not;
but that so far as it brings with it an image of being, so far it is
not generated. For in the definitions, he renders the things defined
more clear through the additions. Thus, one of the definitions says,
"which is always being," in order that by the term always we may not
understand temporal perpetuity, but the eternal. For this is all at
once, and subsists with invariable sameness. But temporal
perpetuity, is co-extended with the infinity of time. Thus, too, the
other definition has, "that which is generated," and together with
it also says, "and is corrupted," in order that we may not
understand by generations simply progressions, which are also
ascribed to the Gods who are beyond being, but progressions which
are co-ordinate with destruction. The assigned definitions,
therefore, are such as follow: Perpetual being, is that which is
comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason. That which
is generated is perceived by opinion in conjunction with irrational
sense.
For these definitions, however, it is usual to accuse Plato, in
the first place, indeed, that he does not assume genus, as the rules
of definitions require. In the next place, that he does not manifest
what the nature is of the things defined, but distinguishes them by
our knowledge. It is necessary, however, prior to this habitude, to
consider things themselves by themselves. But [in defence of Plato]
we shall demonstrate the very contrary, viz. that those who are
accustomed thus to doubt perfectly err. For what kind of genus has a
place in being, which comprehends every intelligible essence? For if
essence has no genus prior to itself, nor definition, since it is
most generic, what can you say respecting being which is
comprehensive of every essence, and of all powers and energies?
Neither, therefore, is being the genus of eternal being: for if it
was, it would not be simply being, but a certain being. Nor is non-
being the genus of eternal being lest we should ignorantly make
eternal non-being. For every where genera are predicated of species.
Hence, there is not a genus of being. Besides, is not a definition
derived from knowledge adapted to theory, and to the proposed
definitions? For if, as we said before, Plato wished to use these
axioms and hypotheses in the demonstrations which he intended to
make, it was necessary that they should be known and manifest to us.
If, indeed, he had exhorted us to investigate the nature of things,
itself in itself, he would have ignorantly filled the whole of his
doctrine definitions with obscurity. But as he wished to make known
through definitions being and that which is generated, he produced
the demonstrations through things that are known, and clearly
represents to us the peculiarity of them, in order that being
excited and perfected, we may more manifestly survey what each of
them is. For since every thing gnostic, is either the thing known
itself, or perceives, or possesses the thing known; for intellect,
indeed, is the intelligible, but sense perceives what is sensible,
and dianoia possesses in itself the dianoetic object; and as we are
not naturally adapted to become the intelligible, but know it
through the power in us which is conjoined with it; this being the
case, we require this power, and through this the nature of being is
known to us. After this manner, therefore, we answer the doubts.
It is requisite, however, to observe how Plato proposing to
himself the problems, renders each of them manifest, both
affirmatively and negatively. But giving an answer to each, in
perpetual being, indeed, he assumes the affirmative alone, but in
that which is generated, the negative, adding to it also, "and which
is destroyed." He, also, explains the words, "but which is never
being," through the assumption of, "never truly is." For since being
is characterized by existence alone, but that which is generated by
non-existence, he assumes the one, alone defining it, and says,
subsisting invariably the same; but he assumes the other together
with negation, yet not with negation alone, because definitions
respect affirmations, and signify that which in each thing is
inherent. It is not, however, wonderful, if he not only says "which
is generated," but also, "and corrupted." For as he adds to being,
the words "subsisting with invariable sameness," and not only says,
it is always; so likewise to that which is generated he adds, "and
corrupted." For this so far as it is generated, is different from
perpetual being; but so far as it is corrupted, it differs from that
which is invariably the same. For that which is generated, so far as
it is generated and corrupted, is incapable of connecting itself;
since if it were, it would also be able to produce itself. Assuming
therefore each by itself, i.e. being and that which is generated, he
assumes the former as that which is above generation, but the
latter, as that which is not indestructible. So that when the
representation of being accedes to that which is generated, it is
able after a certain manner to abide in a condition of always
becoming to be.
Let us however, consider each of the words by itself, through
which he composes the propositions; and in the first place, let us
see in how many ways intelligence subsists, and collect by a
reasoning process the other progressions of it. The first
intelligence therefore, is the intelligible, which passes into the
same with the intelligible, and is not any thing different from it.
This also is essential intelligence, and essence itself, because
every thing in the intelligible subsists after this manner, viz.
essentially and intelligibly. The second intelligence is that which
conjoins intellect with the intelligible, possessing a peculiarity
which is connective and collective of the extremes, and existing as
life and power, filling indeed intellect from the intelligible, but
establishing it in the intelligible. The third is the conjoined
intelligence in a divine intellect itself, being the energy of
intellect, through which it comprehends the intelligible it
contains, and according to which it intellectually perceives, and is
what it is. For this intelligence is energy, and intelligence
itself, but is not intelligible intelligence. Nor does it exist as
power, but (as we have said,) as energy, and intellectual
intelligence. The intelligence of partial intellects has the fourth
order. For each of these possesses this and entirely contains in
itself a certain conjoined intelligible and intelligence. Or rather
each has all these partially, viz. intellect, intelligence, and the
intelligible, through which also it is conjoined to total
intellects, intellectually perceives each of these, and likewise the
whole intelligible world. The fifth intelligence is that of the
rational soul. For as the rational soul is called intellect, thus
also the knowledge of it is intelligence, and transitive
intelligence, and has time connascent with itself. But the sixth
intelligence, if you are willing also to connumerate this, is
phantastic knowledge, or the knowledge of the imagination, which by
some is denominated intelligence; and the phantasy is called by them
passive intellect, because it knows such things as it does know,
inwardly, and accompanied with resemblances and figures. For it is
common to all intelligence to have the objects of its knowledge
inward. For in this also intelligence differs from sense. In one
order however, intelligence is the thing known itself. In another it
ranks as the second, but sees that which is first totally. In
another it is partially the thing known, but sees wholes also
through that which is partial. In another it sees indeed wholes, but
at the same time partially and not at once. And in another, the
vision is accompanied with passion. So many therefore, are the
differences of intelligence.
Now, however, phantastic intelligence must not be assumed; since
this is not naturally adapted to know truly existing being. For it
is indefinite, because it knows the object of its perception
accompanied with figure and morphe. But perpetual being is
unfigured. And in short, no irrational knowledge is able to survey
being itself, since neither is adapted to perceive that which is
universal. Nor must the intelligence in the rational soul be
assumed. For it does not possess the at-once- collected, and that
which is co-ordinate with eternal natures; but it proceeds according
to time. No must we assume total intellections; for these are exempt
from our knowledge. But Timaeus co-arranges intelligence with
reason. The intelligence, therefore, of a partial intellect, must
now be assumed. For it is in conjunction with this, that we some
time or other perceive real being. For a sense is in the second duad
below the rational soul, so intelligence is in the duad above it.
For a partial intellect is proximately established above our
essence, elevating and perfecting it, to which we are converted when
purified through philosophy, and when we conjoin our own
intellectual power with the intelligence of this intellect. But what
this partial intellect is, and that it is not as one to one rational
soul, but is participated through souls which always energize
according to it, through which also partial souls sometimes
participate of intellectual light, we have elsewhere distinctly and
copiously discussed. Now, however, thus much must be assumed, that
it is participated indeed by all other proximate daemoniacal souls,
but illuminates ours, when we convert ourselves to it, and render
the reason which is in us intellectual. And as in the Phaedrus Plato
calls this the governor of the soul, and says that it alone
intellectually perceives real being, but that the soul perceives it
together with this intellect, when she is nourished by intellect and
science; thus also it must be said that this intelligence is prior
to soul, and is truly intelligence [mentioned by Plato] but that it
is participated by soul when reason energizes intellectually. Hence
Plato says in the following part of this dialogue, that intellect is
indeed in the Gods, but that a certain small genus [of men]
participates of it. And it seems that in what he says unfolding the
knowledge of perpetual being, he first calls it intelligence; but
that we may not apprehend it to be that alone, he adds to
intelligence reason, distinguishing by a transitive energy the
latter from the former. So that when reason intellectually perceives
perpetual being, as reason indeed, it energizes transitively, but as
perceiving intellectually, with simplicity; understanding each thing
as simple at once, yet not all things at once, but passing from some
to others. It transitively however perceives intellectually every
thing which it perceives as one thing, and as simple.
After the definition of intelligence however, let us see what
reason is, and how it is connascent with intelligence. In the
Theaetetus therefore, `logos', reason, is said to have a threefold
subsistence; for it is either enunciative, or a discursive
procession through the elements [of speech]; or that which exhibits
the differences of each thing with respect to others. All these
significations however, are conversant with compositions and
divisions, and are unadapted to the comprehension of eternal being.
For the similar is naturally adapted to be apprehended by the
similar. But eternal being is simple and indivisible, and is exempt
from every thing which is contrary to these. Again, after another
manner, one kind of reason is said to be doxastic, another
scientific, and another intellectual. For since there are in us
opinion, dianoia, and intellect; but I call intellect here, the
summit of dianoia; and since the whole of our essence is reason, in
each of these reason must be differently surveyed. Opinion however,
is not naturally adapted to be united to the intelligence of
intellect in energy: for on the contrary it is conjoined to
irrational knowledge. Nor is dianoia, so far as it proceeds into
multitude and division, able to recur to intellect; but on the
contrary through the variety of its discursive energies, it is
separated from intellectual impartibility. It remains, therefore,
that the summit of the soul, and that in it which has most the form
of The One, is established in the intelligence of a partial
intellect, being through alliance united to it. Hence this is the
reason which intellectually perceives the intelligibles co-ordinate
to our nature, and the energy of which Socrates in the Republic says
is intelligence; just as dianoia is the knowledge of things which
subsist between intelligibles and the objects of opinion. If,
however, intelligence is the energy of this reason, it will be a
certain intellect. Plato in the following part of this dialogue
says, that this reason in the same manner as science, is ingenerated
in the soul, when it is moved about the intelligible. But that
science has a more various energy, apprehending some things through
others, and intellect a more simple energy, intuitively surveying
beings themselves. This highest therefore, and most impartible
portion of our nature, Plato now denominates reason, as unfolding to
us intellect, and an intelligible nature. For when the soul abandons
phantasy and opinion, and various and indefinite knowledge, but
recurs to its own impartibility, according to which it is rooted in
a partial intellect, and having run back to this, conjoins the
energy of itself with the intelligence of that intellect, then it
intellectually perceives eternal being together with it, its energy
being both one, and twofold, and both sameness and separation being
inherent in its intellections. For then the intelligence of the soul
becomes more collected, and nearer to eternal things, in order that
it may apprehend the intelligible together with intellect, and that
the reason which is in us may like a less light, energize in
conjunction with one that is greater. For our reason in conjunction
with intelligence, sees the intelligible; but the intelligence of
intellect always sees it, and always is; and conjoins reason to it,
when reason acquires the form of intellect.
After what manner however, is truly existing being comprehended
by a partial intellect, or by reason? For this is still more
admirable. May we not say, that though the intelligible itself
cannot be comprehended by intellect and reason, because it is
superior to all comprehension, and comprehends all things exemptly,
yet intellect possessing its own intelligible, is also on this
account said to comprehend the whole [of an intelligible nature].
But reason through the intellect which is co-ordinate to itself,
receiving the conceptions of real beings, is thus through these said
to comprehend being. Perhaps also it signifies, that reason running
round the intelligible, and energizing and being moved as about a
centre, thus surveys it; intelligence indeed knowing it
intransitively and impartibly, but reason dancing as it were round
the essence of it in a circle, and evolving the united hypostasis in
it of all things.
In the next place, let us direct our attention to opinion, and
consider what it is. That it is therefore the boundary of the whole
rational life, and that it is conjoined to the summit of the
irrational life, is frequently acknowledged. But we shall now unfold
such things as are the peculiarities of the Platonic doctrine; and
which are as follow: That the doxastic part comprehends the reasons
[or productive principles] of sensibles; that it is this also which
knows the essences of them; and that it knows the `oti', or that a
thing is, but is ignorant of the cause of it. For since dianoia
knows at one and the same time both the essences and the causes of
sensibles, but sense knows neither of these; for it is clearly shown
in the Theaetetus that sense does not know the essence of a thing,
and that it is perfectly ignorant of the cause of the objects of its
knowledge; it is necessary that opinion being arranged between sense
and dianoia, should know the essences of sensibles, through the
reasons which it contains, but should be ignorant of the causes of
them. For thus right opinion will differ from science in this, that
it alone knows that a thing is, science being able to survey
likewise the cause of it. But sense adheres to opinion, being also
itself a medium between the instrument of sense and opinion. For the
instrument of sense apprehends sensibles accompanied with passion.
Hence also it is corrupted through the excess of sensibles. But
opinion possesses knowledge undefiled with passion. Sense however
participates in a certain respect of passion, but has also something
gnostic, so far as it is established in the doxastic part, is
illuminated by it, and partakes of the form of reason, since it is
in itself irrational. In this, therefore, the series of gnostic
powers is terminated, of which indeed intelligence is the leader,
which is above reason, and is without transition. But reason has the
second order which is the intelligence of our soul, transitively
coming into contact with real beings. Opinion has the third order,
being a knowledge of sensibles conformable to reason. And sense has
the fourth order, being an irrational knowledge of sensibles. For
dianoia, being a medium between intelligence and opinion, is gnostic
of middle forms, which require a more obscure apprehension than that
of intelligence, but a clearer perception than that of opinion; as
Socrates said on the preceding day, when he defined the different
kinds of knowledge by the objects of knowledge.
It must be said, therefore, that opinion is according to reason,
because it possesses gnostic reasons of the essences of things, but
that it is otherwise irrational, as being ignorant of causes. For
Socrates in the Banquet, speaking of it says, "since it is an
irrational thing, how can it be science?" But it must be admitted
that sense is entirely irrational. For in short, since each of the
senses knows the passion produced about the animal by the object of
sense, hence intelligence is an intransitive, but dianoia and reason
a transitive knowledge; opinion a knowledge in conjunction with
reason but without the assignation of cause; sense an irrational
knowledge of passions; and the instrument of sense passion only.
Thus, for instance, when an apple is presented to us, the sight
indeed knows that it is red from the passion about the eye, the
smell that it is fragrant from the passion about the nostrils, the
taste that it is sweet, and the touch that it is smooth. What then
is it which says that the thing presented to us is an apple? For it
is not any one of the partial senses; since each of these knows one
certain thing only about the apple, and not the whole of it; nor
does even the common sense know this. For this alone distinguishes
the differences of the passions; but it does not know that the thing
which possesses an essence of such a kind is the whole thing. Hence,
it is evident that there is a certain power superior to the senses,
which knowing the whole prior to the things which are as it were
parts, and surveying the form of it, is impartibly connective of
these many powers. This power, therefore, Plato calls opinion, and
on this account, he denominates that which is sensible doxastic.
Farther still, since the senses frequently announce various
passions, and not such as things of this kind are in themselves,
what is it in us which judges and says, that the sight is deceived
when it asserts that the sun is but a foot in diameter, and that the
taste which pronounces honey to be bitter, is the taste of those
that are diseased? For it is entirely evident that in these, and all
such-like particulars, the senses announce indeed their own
passions, and are not perfectly deceived. For they say what the
passion is about the instruments of sense, and it is a thing of such
a kind as they assert it to be; but that which says what the cause
is of the passion, and forms a judgement of it, is something
different from sense.
Hence, there is a certain power of the soul superior to sense,
which no longer knows sensibles through an instrument but through
itself, and
corrects the grossness of sensible information. And this power
indeed which is reason as with reference to sense, is irrational as
with reference to the knowledge of truly existing beings. But sense
is simply irrational. On this account, Plato in the Republic calling
this power opinion, shows that it is a medium between knowledge and
ignorance: for it is indeed a rational knowledge, but it is mingled
with irrationality, knowing sensibles in conjunction with sense. But
sense is alone irrational, as Timaeus also denominates it; in the
first place, because it is also inherent in irrational animals, and
is characteristic of every irrational life; for by these things,
what is said in the Theaetetus distinguishes it from science. In the
second place, because in contradistinction to all the parts of the
irrational soul, it is disobedient to reason. For the irascible and
epithymetic parts, are obedient to reason and its mandates, and
receive from it erudition. But sense though it should hear reason
ten thousand times asserting that the sun is greater than the earth,
yet would still see it to be a foot in diameter, and would not
otherwise announce it to us. In the third place, because neither
does it [accurately] know that which it knows. For it is not
naturally adapted to see the essence of it. For it does not know
what a white thing is, but it knows through passion that it is
white. It likewise is not separated from the instrument of sense,
and is therefore on this account irrational. For thus in the
Gorgias, irrational knowledge is defined to be not scientific, but
conjectural. In the fourth place, sense is alone irrational, because
it is the boundary of the whole series of knowledge, possesses an
essence most remote from reason and intellect, pertains to
externals, and effects its apprehension of things through body. For
all these particulars demonstrate its irrationality.
Every thing generated therefore is apprehended by opinion in
conjunction with sense; the latter announcing passions, but the
former producing from itself the reasons of them, and knowing the
essences of sensibles. And as reason when in contact with
intelligence sees the intelligible, thus also opinion co-arranged
with sense, knows that which is generated. For since the soul is of
a middle essence it gives completion to a subsistence between
intellect and irrationality. For by its summit it is present with
intellect, but by its ultimate part it verges to sense. Hence also
Timaeus in the former conjunction, arranges intelligence prior to
reason, as being more excellent; but in the second he places opinion
before sense. For there indeed, reason is posterior to intelligence,
as being a less intellect; but here opinion is prior to sense, as
being rational sense. Opinion however, and reason circumscribe the
whole breadth of the rational essence. But intellect is our king,
and sense our messenger, says the great Plotinus. Reason indeed,
together with intellect, sees the intelligible; but by itself it
surveys reasons or forms that have a middle subsistence. And opinion
in conjunction with sense, sees that which is generated; but by
itself it contemplates all the forms it contains, concerning which
we have elsewhere spoken, have shown how these forms subsist, how
the place of them is the doxastic part of the soul, and that the
intelligible is apprehended by reason, but by opinion, the
intelligible is seen as a doxastic object. For the object of its
knowledge is external to, and not within it, as the intelligible is
within reason. Hence the object is not comprehended by it, but is
called opinable and not sensible; because opinion knows indeed the
essences of things, but sense does not. Hence too, it receives the
appellation of a clearer knowledge, which knows what a thing is, but
not alone that it is, which latter we say is the employment of
sense; and in consequence of this Timaeus very properly calls that
which is generated the object of opinion. For this is Pythagoric;
since Parmenides also considered the discussion of sensibles, as a
discussion according to opinion; sensibles being in their own nature
perceptible by this power of the soul. Hence it is not proper to
call that which is generated sensible alone, because sense is not
gnostic of any essence, nor the object of opinion, without the
addition of sense.
Here however, Aristotle particularly blames the second assertion
of Timaeus. For where is it [universally] true that what is
perceived by opinion in conjunction with sense is generated and
corrupted? For heaven is unbegotten and indestructible, though it is
perceived by opinion in conjunction with sense. And Timaeus, in the
course of this dialogue, inquires whether the whole heaven was
generated. At present, therefore, it must be said by us, that
generation and corruption subsist according to analogy in the
heavens, not only according to the motions and mutations of figures,
but also because a celestial body is not produced by itself, but
alone subsists from another cause. Hence it is generated as having
the cause of its subsistence suspended from another thing different
from itself. Since, however, it not only subsists from, but is
connected by another, not being able to connect itself, and is
corrupted according to its own proper reason, on this account it
assumes generation co-ordinately with corruption. For truly existing
and eternal beings generate themselves, and are connected by
themselves, whence also they are said to be in their own nature
unbegotten and indestructible. If, however, truly existing being is
unbegotten , and therefore subsists from itself, that which does not
subsist from itself will not be truly unbegotten. And if that which
is truly indestructible is naturally adapted to connect itself, that
which is not naturally adapted to connect itself will not be truly
indestructible. Heaven, however, but I mean by heaven the
corporeal-formed nature of it alone, is neither adapted to produce
nor to connect itself. For every thing of this kind which produces
and connects itself, is impartible. Hence it is neither truly
unbegotten nor truly indestructible, but so far as pertains to its
corporeal nature, it is generated and made. Farther still, as
Aristotle himself says, and clearly and generously demonstrates, no
finite body possesses an infinite power. But the celestial body is
finite, and therefore does not possess an infinite power. The
indestructible, however, so far as indestructible, possesses an
infinite power. Hence body, so far as body, is not indestructible.
So that from the reasoning of Aristotle it is demonstrated to be a
thing of this kind. But after what manner the heaven is unbegotten
and perpetual, will be manifest to us shortly after. Now, however,
this alone is evident from what has been said, that every thing
corporeal, is of itself, or in its own nature generated and
corrupted, but never truly is, as Plato also says in the Politicus.
For he there observes "that to subsist always invariably the same,
alone pertains to the most divine of all things. But the nature of
body is not of this order. That, however, which we denominate heaven
or the world, possesses indeed many blessed prerogatives from its
generator; but, as it partakes of body, it is impossible that it
should be entirely free from mutation." We have shown, therefore,
how the heaven falls under the above-mentioned distinctions.
If however, the daemoniacal Aristotle, should again doubt
respecting what it said of eternal being, not enduring to say that
every thing which always is, is comprehended by intelligence in
conjunction with reason; since the most divine of visible objects
always exist; we think it fit, that he should not confound the
eternal, and that which subsists through the whole of time. For he
also distinguishes eternity from time; and attributes the former
indeed to intellect, but the latter to heaven, and the motion of
heaven. That always-existing being, therefore, the eternal, is a
thing of such a kind as Timaeus defines it to be. The most divine,
however, of visible objects, are after another manner perpetual, and
not according to an eternal permanency. But they are produced in the
whole of time from their causes, and the whole of their existence is
in becoming to be. This also is said by Aristotle, that eternity is
connascent with intelligibles, possessing and comprehending in
itself infinite time; and therefore the eternal is truly
intelligible. If, however, that which always is, signifies the
eternal, why is it necessary to refer the nature of heaven to this
perpetual being, and why should we not say that it is always
generated, or becoming to be, as being co-extended with the
perpetuity of time? So that we shall thus dissolve the objections
from his arguments, which he urges against these definitions. Since,
however, we have replied to this inquiry, we shall dismiss it; for
it will be spoken of hereafter.
But, in short, the opinion of Plato concerning criteria, may from
these things be assumed. For different persons admitting a different
criterion, some asserting that it is sense, as the Protagoreans,
others opinion, as he who said,
Opinion is in all things fram'd;
(Xenophon fr. 34, 4d.)
others that it is reason, and others that it is intellect; Plato
divides the essence of the criteria conformably to things
themselves, attributing intellect to intelligibles, dianoia to
dianoetic objects, opinion to doxastic objects, and sense to
sensibles. You must not however fancy that the criteria are on this
account divulsed according to him from each other. For the soul is
both one and a multitude. If, therefore, the soul which judges is
both one and a multitude, the judicial power will also be both
uniform and multiform. Some one therefore may say, what is this one
power? We reply, reason. For this, when it proceeds to the survey of
intelligibles, uses both itself and intelligence; not that
intelligence indeed is the instrument, and reason that which uses
it, as the Platonic Severus thought, considering intelligence as
inferior to reason, but that intelligence is the light of reason,
perfecting and elevating it, and illuminating its gnostic power.
But when it forms a judgement of middle reasons, it alone uses
dianoia and itself, and through this is converted to itself. When
also it decides on objects of opinion, it moves opinion; but in
judging of objects of imagination, it excites the phantasy, and in
judging of sensibles, sense. For when it considers the sensible
essence of forms, such as is every sensible object, it uses opinion
as the co-adjutor of its speculation. For in this the reasons of
sensibles subsist. But when it directs its attention to the position
or figure of a certain thing, as for instance, to the manner in
which the earth is posited, which has in its summit a habitude to
the heavens, it then excites the phantasy, in order that it may
survey the object of its inquiry accompanied with interval and
morphe, as it is. And when it considers an eclipse, it employs sense
as an adjutor in its observations. At one time also, it admits the
judgements of the second powers; but at another, it blames the
errors which they frequently happen to commit on account of the
instruments. Concerning the criteria therefore, thus much may
suffice for the present; for we have discussed these things more
copiously in our Commentaries on the Theaetetus. From what has been
said, however, the great accuracy of the before-mentioned
definitions is evident.
But if you are willing, we will also survey the same thing
according to another method. I say, therefore, that the nature which
is primarily perpetual being, is that which is eternal according to
all things, viz. according to essence, power, and energy. And that
the nature which is simply generated, is that which receives all its
essence, power and energy in time. For it is necessary that the
former should be wholly eternal, but the latter wholly temporal. And
that the former should be at once every thing in a self-subsistent
manner, but that the latter should have its hypostasis suspended
elsewhere than from itself, and consisting in an extension of
existence. Since these, however, are the extremes, the media are,
things which in a certain respect participate of a portion of being,
and in a certain respect communicate with generation. But again,
there are two natures which participate of neither of these, one in
consequence of being superior, but the other through being inferior
to them. For matter is neither being, nor that which is generated.
For it is neither comprehended by intelligence, nor is sensible. And
this also is true of The One, as Parmenides demonstrates of both
these, of the latter in the first, and of the former in the fifth
hypothesis. Perpetual being, therefore, is the whole of the
intelligible, and the whole of the intellectual genus, every
supermundane intellect, every intellect participated by divine
souls, and every intellect which is called partial, and is
participated by angels, and daemons; and by partial souls, through
angels and daemons as media. And as far as to this, perpetual being
extends. For every intellect energizes eternally, and is measured in
the whole of itself by eternity. But that which is generated, is
every thing which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, and
which in conception is surveyed prior to the production of the
world; likewise every thing which is properly generated and
corrupted, heaven, and all these sensible and visible natures.
Timaeus also defines that which is simply generated, and that which
is simply perpetual being, to be these. But the intermediate natures
are those which communicate with both these; and on each side of
them are the natures which participate of neither of these. Hence
Timaeus proposes both of them affirmatively and negatively, as for
instance, perpetual being, and without generation, and again, that
which is generated, and is never real being, in order that through
the affirmations he may separate them from things which are the
recipients of neither, but that through the negations they may be
distinguished from things which in a certain respect participate of
both.
As these, therefore, are the extremes, viz. every
intelligible and intellectual essence, and every sensible essence,
let us direct our attention to the intermediate nature. For Timaeus
calls both time and the soul generated. And it is evident that
these, as not being sensible, are in a certain respect beings, and
in a certain respect generated, but perfectly neither of these.
Porphyry, therefore, rightly observes, that Plato now defines the
extremes, viz. that which is primarily being, and that which is
alone generated, and that he omits the media; such for instance as,
that which is at one and the same time being and a generated nature,
or that which is both generated and being; of which being and
generated are adapted to the nature of souls, but vice versa that
which is generated and being, are allied to the summit of generated
natures. Such as this, however, is the nature of the universe which
vivifies the universe. For this nature so far as it is divisible
about bodies, is generated, but so far as it is entirely
incorporeal, is unbegotten. But it is absurd to say that matter is
both generated and being. For thus it would be superior to generated
sensible natures, since these are generated alone, but matter would
also participate of being. And if you are willing separately to
assume that which is alone perpetual being, and that which is alone
generated, by taking away from one of the definitions intellect, and
from the other sense; you will produce the definition of the medium.
For this is known by reason and opinion. For reason knows both
itself and opinion, and opinion knows itself and reason; the former
indeed both in conjunction with cause; but the latter both, without
cause. For in this reason and opinion differ from each other.
Opinion also is known by reason, and reason by opinion. And the
whole [rational] soul subsists through both these which are media.
Thus too, by assuming the worse of the two upward terms, viz.
reason, and making it to be spurious reason, and of the two downward
terms sense, and making it to be insensible sense, you will then
have the manner in which Plato thought matter may be known, viz. by
spurious reason, and insensible sense. Assuming likewise analogously
in each, that which is the better of the two, and making it to be
spurious according to that which is more excellent, you will have
the manner in which The One is known, viz. by a spurious intellect,
and spurious opinion. Hence it is not properly simple, and is not
known from cause. It is known therefore by a spurious knowledge,
because it is known in a superior manner according to each. For
opinion does not know from cause, and The One is not known from
cause, but from not having a cause. And intellect knows that which
is simple; but a spurious intellect knows The One, because it is
superior to intellectual perception. The superior therefore, here,
is spurious as with reference to intellect, as The One also is more
excellent than that which is simple, such as that is which is
intelligible to truly existing intellect, and to which intellect is
allied and is not spurious. It perceives therefore, The One, by that
in itself which is not intellect. But this is The One in it,
according to which also it is a God.
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