. . . . . . • Biopolitics: Between Terri Schiavo and
Guantanamo • |
Now we finally learned what we all suspected: the
numerous reports and testimonies about the Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib prisons
were a trap to distract the attention of the public from the true secret: in the
last days, big media reported that the CIA operates secret detention facilities
beyond the reach of the law and outside official oversight at bases in two
eastern European countries and some other Asian countries. The CIA has not even
acknowledged the existence of these "black sites" with "ghost prisoners": to do
so could open the U.S. government to legal challenges, since the prisoners are
there submitted to "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" (the US newspeak for
torture). The original idea was to hide and interrogate the two dozen or so al
Qaeda leaders believed to be responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks, or who posed
an imminent threat; but as the CIA began apprehending more people whose
intelligence value and links to terrorism were less certain, the original
standard for consigning suspects to the invisible universe was lowered or
ignored.
What is effectively going on here? In a debate about the fate of
Guantanamo prisoners on NBC about a year ago, one of the weird arguments for the
ethico-legal acceptability of their status was that "they are those who were
missed by the bombs": since they were the target of the US bombing and
accidentally survived it, and since this bombing was part of a legitimate
military operation, one cannot condemn their fate when they were taken prisoners
after the combat - whatever their situation, it is better, less severe, than
being dead... This reasoning tells more than it intends to say: it puts the
prisoner almost literally into the position of living dead, those who are in a
way already dead (their right to live forfeited by being legitimate targets of
murderous bombings), so that they are now cases of what Giorgio Agamben calls
homo sacer, the one who can be killed with impunity since, in the eyes of
the law, his life no longer counts.
There is a vague similarity between
their situation and the - legally problematic - premise of the movie Double
Jeopardy: if you were condemned for killing A and you later, after serving
your term and being released, discover that A is still alive, you can now kill
him with impunity since you cannot be condemned two times for the same act. In
psychoanalytic term, this killing would clearly display the temporal structure
of masochist perversion: the succession is inverted, you are first punished and
thus gain the right to commit the crime. If the Guantanamo prisoners are located
in the space "between the two deaths," occupying the position of homo
sacer, legally dead (deprived of a determinate legal status) while
biologically still alive, the US authorities which treat them in this way are
also in a kind of in-between legal status which forms the counterpart to homo
sacer: acting as a legal power, their acts are no longer covered and constrained
by the law - they operate in an empty space that is still within the domain of
the law.
The exemplary economic strategy of today's capitalism is
outsourcing - giving over the "dirty" process of material production (but also
publicity, design, accountancy...) to another company via a subcontract. In this
way, one can easily avoid ecological and health rules: the production is done
in, say, Indonesia where the ecological and health regulations are much lower
than in the West, and the Western global company which owns the logo can claim
that it is not responsible for the violations of another company. Are we not
getting something homologous with regard to torture? Is torture also not being
"outsourced," left to the Third World allies of the US which can do it without
worrying about legal problems or public protest? Was such outsourcing not
explicitly advocated by Jonathan Alter in Newsweek immediately after
9/11? After stating that "we can't legalize torture; it's contrary to American
values," he nonetheless concludes that "we'll have to think about transferring
some suspects to our less squeamish allies, even if that's hypocritical. Nobody
said this was going to be pretty." 1 This is how, today, the
First World democracy more and more functions: by way of "outsourcing" its dirty
underside to other countries... We can see how this debate about the need to
apply torture was by no means academic: today, Americans even do not trust their
allies to do the job properly; the "less squeamish" partner is the disavowed
part of the US government itself - a quite logical result, once we recall how
the CIA taught the Latino American and Third World American military allies the
practice of torture for decades. And, insofar as the predominant skeptical
liberal attitude can also be characterized as the one of "outsourced beliefs"
(we let the primitive others, "fundamentalists," do their believing for us),
does the rise of new religious fundamentalisms in our own societies not signal
how the same distrust towards the Third World countries: not only are they not
able to do our torturing for us, they even can no longer do our believing for
us...
However, the two procedures can also co-exist: US government
agencies running the "war on terror" follow a secret program known as
"extraordinary rendition": the policy of seizing suspicious individuals without
even the semblance of due process and sending them off to be interrogated by
allied regimes known to practice torture. 2 Another mode of
co-existence are also the CIA "black sites," located in foreign countries, but
operated by CIA.
So what about the "realistic" counter-argument: the war
on terror IS dirty, one is put in situations where life of thousands depends on
informations we can get from our prisoners; consequently, as Alan Dershowitz put
it: “I'm not in favor of torture, but if you're going to have it, it should damn
well have court approval." The underlying logic - "Since we are in any case
doing it, better to legalize it and thus prevent excesses!" - is extremely
dangerous: it gives legitimacy to torture and thus opens up the space for MORE
illicit torture. Against the liberal "honesty" of Derschowitz, one should
therefore paradoxically stick to the apparent "hypocrisy": OK, one can well
imagine that, in a singular situation, confronted with the proverbial "prisoner
who knows" and whose words can save thousands, one would recourse to torture -
however, even (or, rather, precisely) in such a case, it is absolutely crucial
that one does NOT elevate this desperate choice into a universal principle;
following the unavoidable brutal urgency of the moment, one should simply DO IT.
Only in this way, in the very inability or prohibition to elevate what we had to
do into a universal principle, one retains the sense of guilt, the awareness of
the inadmissibility of what we did.
In March 2005, the US were in the
grip of the Terri Schiavo case: she suffered brain damage in 1990 when her heart
stopped briefly from a chemical imbalance believed to have been brought on by an
eating disorder; court-appointed doctors claimed she is in a persistent
vegetative state with no hope of recovery. While her husband wanted her
disconnected to die in peace, her parents argued that she could get better and
that she would never have wanted to be cut off from food and water. The case
reached the top level of the US government and judicial bodies, with the Supreme
Court and President involved, the Congress passing fast-track resolutions, etc.
The absurdity of the situation, when put in the wider context, is breath-taking:
with tens of millions dying of AIDS and hunger all around the world, the public
opinion in the US focused on a single case of prolonging the run of NAKED LIFE,
of a persistent vegetative state reduced of all specifically human
characteristics. THIS is the truth of what the Catholic Church means what its
representatives talk about the "culture of life" as opposed to the "culture of
death" of contemporary nihilistic hedonism. What we encounter here is
effectively a kind of Hegelian infinite judgment which asserts the speculative
identity of the highest and the lowest: the Life of the Spirit, divine spiritual
dimension and the life reduced to inert vegetation... These are the two extremes
we find ourselves today with regard to human rights: one the one hand those
"missed by the bombs" (mentally and physically full human beings, but deprived
of rights), on the other hand a human being reduced to bare vegetative life, but
this bare life protected by the entire state apparatus. What legitimizes such
biopolitics is the mobilization of the fantasmatic dimension of the
potential/invisible threat: it is the invisible (and for that very reason
all-powerful and omni-present) threat of the Enemy that legitimizes the
permanent state of emergency of the existing Power (Fascists invoked the threat
of the Jewish conspiracy, Stalinists the threat of the class enemy - up to
today's "war on terror," of course). This invisible threat of the Enemy
legitimizes the logic of the preemptive strike: precisely because the threat is
virtual, it is too late to wait for its actualization, one has to strike in
advance, before it will be too late... In other words, the omni-present
invisible threat of Terror legitimizes the all too visible protective measures
of defense (which pose the only TRUE threat to democracy and human rights, of
course). If the classic power functioned as the threat which was operative
precisely by way of never actualizing itself, by way of remaining a threatening
GESTURE (and this functioning reached its climax in the Cold War, with the
threat of the mutual nuclear destruction which HAD to remain a threat), with the
war on terror, the invisible threat causes the incessant actualization - not of
itself, but - of the measures against itself. The nuclear strike had to remain
the threat of a strike, while the threat of the terrorist strike triggers the
endless series of strikes against potential terrorists... The power which
presents itself as being all the time under threat, living in mortal danger, and
thus merely defending itself, is the most dangerous kind of power, the very
model of the Nietzschean ressentiment and moralistic hypocrisy - and,
effectively, was it not Nietzsche himself who, more than a century ago, provided
the best analysis of the false moral premises of today's "war on terror"?
"No government admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather the army is supposed to server for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much does our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus all states are now ranged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because as I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests." 3
Notes:
1 Jonathan Alter, "Time to
Think about Torture," Newsweek, November 5 2001, p. 45.
2 Bob Herbert,
"Outsourcing torture," International Herald Tribune, February 12-13 2005,
p. 4.
3
Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe, Vol. 2,
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1980, p. 678.
Slavoj Zizek's Bibliography
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