(Part 6 of 7) ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM: RESPONSES TO THE SECULAR STATE
The larger goal of Islamic political fundamentalism is to overthrow
secular states and impose theocratic political law. Only under
theocratic law can the dangers of Western science and society
effectively be eliminated. Only under theocratic law can the
sovereignty of God be extended into that realm of existence which is
now controlled by the “ignorant.”
The Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 provided a model of how
Islamic fundamentalists could achieve national political dominance.
Against the backdrop of rapid modernization on the one hand
and a repressive state on the other, the masses in Iran, incited to
action by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a fundamentalist Islamic
cleric, revolted against Prime Minster Bakhtiar. When the
military declared neutrality, Khomeini assumed leadership of the
nation, installing a theocratic government based on his
interpretation of Shi’ite jurisprudence.[61]
The manner in which Shi’ite law was imposed into state governance
provides insight into the ongoing struggles between advocates of
strict Islamic political law and advocates of secular rule.
In theory, Iran has been ruled by a constitutional monarchy for most
of the twentieth century. Constitutionalism, however, was a
political product of Western Europe. Thus when
constitutionalism arrived in the Muslim world in the late nineteenth
century, the concept underwent modifications which made it
compatible with the Islamic faith. In Iran, the result was a
constitutional monarchy more in name than in practice. By the
late twentieth century, however, Islamic fundamentalists throughout
the Muslim world, including Khomeini, were convinced that state
constitutions were too accommodating of other faiths and were thus
diluting the purity and power of the Islamic faith.
Iran’s new constitution as crafted by Khomeini dealt with this
problem by radically breaking with all other modern
constitutions. Entitled “The Fundamental Law,” it is an
ideological and thoroughly Islamic document based on the “Mandate of
the Jurist,” Khomeini’s belief that a religious jurist has the right
to establish the governance of a nation-state and demand allegiance
of other religious jurists. The constitution defines the
purpose of the nation-state in terms of imposing the worldview of
Islam, restricts the civil liberties of individuals, assigns
sovereignty and legislative powers to the One God as interpreted by
clerical jurists, and establishes social order based on a strict
understanding of Shi’ite basic articles of faith.[62]
Islamic fundamentalist have met with varying political successes in
other nations. As previously mentioned, Saudi Arabia with its
Wahhabi revivalist heritage has long been ruled by a version of
sharia law, while at the same time welcoming Western
influence and the material benefits thus afforded to the ruling
royal family. In addition, Afghanistan, under Taliban rule
from 1996 to 2001, was governed by a mixture of sharia law
and local tribal customs which sought to eradicate all Western
influence and enforced strict Islamic law upon Afghan society in an
effort to tightly control social behavior.[63]
Within many other countries, fundamentalist pressure on government
structures has increased signficantly in the decades following the
1967 Arab-Israeli War. In Pakistan in 1977 General Zia, a
devout Sunni, seized control of the country and immediately invoked
an Islamization program to establish Islam as the official ideology
and identity of Pakistan. His larger purposes were to
legitimize his military dictatorship and quell calls for
democracy. In so doing, he made alliances with Sunni clerics
and fundamentalist groups, including the Jama’at-i-Islami.
Although Zia sought to establish an Islamic constitution in
Pakistan, he was ultimately unable to do so without destabilizing
his regime, and thus settled for an informal common law system based
upon Islamic law. In the 1980s, Pakistan’s government
encouraged the military training of seminarians (“taliban”), who in
turn created an Islamic state in neighboring Afghanistan following
the Soviet withdrawal from that nation. Today, Pakistan is
still a harbor for Islamic fundamentalists, although the aftermath
of the September 11, 2001 attacks on America’s World Trade Center
has led President Musharraf to increasingly crack down on Islamic
fundamentalists involved in terrorism.[64]
In Sudan, the Muslim Brotherhood has championed the imposition of
sharia law since the country’s independence in 1956.
Despite independence, civil war between Muslims in the North and
non-Muslims in the South raged on into the seventies.
Accordingly, political upheavals and attempted coups kept the issue
of sharia law on the back burner. By the 1970s, Hassan
al-Turabi, a local Muslim Brotherhood leader and high-profile
spokesperson for the fundamentalist cause, had secured a prominent
role in Sudanese politics. At the same time, the long running
civil war came to an end, marked by the implementation, under
President Jafar al-Numayri, of the 1973 Sudanese Constitution which
recognized the rights of Islam, Christianity, and traditional
religions, and forbad the usage of religion as a constitutional
means of limiting citizens’ rights. However, ten years later
Numayri did an about-face and began pursuing a policy of
Islamization in an effort to co-opt the growing influence of
fundamentalists. The tactic split fundamentalists in Sudan,
with many supporting Numayri, who one year later, in 1984,
proclaimed himself to be the nation’s Imam (supreme religious
leader and authority). Numayri’s hastily implemented
Islamization program had his own version of sharia penal law
as its centerpiece. The hybrid sharia law code soon
became unpopular and led to his downfall in 1985. Since that
time, fundamentalists have continued to play a powerful role in the
government. The Sudanese legal system is a combination of
English common law and Islamic law, with the later being imposed on
all residents of the northern states since 1991.[65]
In other countries, Islamic fundamentalism has been historically
active, but as of yet unable to achieve significant political
gain. Egypt epitomizes the difficulties that fundamentalists
face in their campaign to implement their radical agenda into
government structures. Despite the fact that the Muslim
Brotherhood originated in Egypt over seventy years ago, only in the
past decade have Egyptian fundamentalists gained enough influence in
parliament to raise the issue of sharia law on the national
level.[66]
[62]
Said Amir Arjomand, “Shi’ite Jurisprudence and Constitution Making
in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” in Fundamentalisms and the
State, The Fundamentalism Project, Volume 3, eds. Martin Marty
and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press, 1993), 88-109. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “The Fundamentalist
Impact on Law, Politics, and Constitutions in Iran, Pakistan, and
the Sudan,” in Fundamentalisms and the State, The
Fundamentalism Project, Volume 3, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott
Appleby (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1993),
110-123.
[64]
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “The Fundamentalist Impact on Law, Politics,
and Constitutions in Iran, Pakistan, and the Sudan,” in
Fundamentalisms and the State, The Fundamentalism Project,
Volume 3, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 123-132.
[66]
Abdel Azim Ramadan, “Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The
Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups,” in
Fundamentalism and the State, The Fundamentalism Project,
Volume 3, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1993),
152-183. |