(Part 3 of 7) ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM: SOME MAJOR EXPRESSIONS
As has been noted, Islamic political fundamentalist movements are a
twentieth-century development. Not surprisingly, the majority
of these movements are of the Sunni variety. Of the 175
Islamic fundamentalist groups (mainly of the political variety) in
the Arab world as identified by Dekmejian from 1970-1995, only 32
were Shiite fundamentalists (with an additional four having both
Sunni and Shiite followers).[31]
Tracing the history of all the various Islamic fundamentalist groups
is beyond the purview of this paper. Accordingly, an analysis
of a few countries will serve as evidence of the varied manner in
which Islamic political fundamentalism has clashed with secular
Muslim governments, resulting in mounting tensions, but varying
successes, in terms of political involvement.
The ongoing legacy of The Muslim Brotherhood is evidenced in Egypt’s
central role in Sunni fundamentalism: 40 of the 175 identified
Islamic fundamentalist groups are based in Egypt. Of those 40,
three are major fundamentalist groups: Hizb al-Tahrir
al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party), Jama’at al-Muslimin (The
Society of Muslims; also known as al-Takfir wal-Hijrah) and Tanzim
al-Jihad (Jihad Organization). One figure, Sayyid Qutb, is the
dominant link between the Brotherhood and all three of these
Egyptian-based militant groups. In addition, Qutb links the
Brotherhood and Pakistan’s Jama’at-i Islami (the two earliest
expressions of Islamic political fundamentalism) and is the key to
understanding modern expressions of Sunni fundamentalism which
originated after his death.
Qutb, an Egyptian government official who was offended by the racism
and the openness between sexes he witnessed during a visit to the
United States in the late 1940s, became an ideologue and activist,
influenced by the radical teachings of Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi,
founder of the Jama’at i-Islami. Joining the Muslim
Brotherhood in 1952, Qutb led the Brotherhood’s shift from
non-violence to violence. His influence led to the attempted
assassination of Nasser in 1954, which in turn led to government
suppression of the Brotherhood, including the internment of Qutb and
other radical Brotherhood members. Influencing the Brotherhood
movement from jail, Qutb garnered support from the military wing of
the Brotherhood within and outside of Egypt, while continuing his
opposition to Nasser’s regime.
By the 1960s, Qutb had formulated a structured, albeit not fully
developed, ideology of modern society as evil and ignorant of
Islam’s divine guidance. The duty of true Muslims was to
purify the world by the internal transformation of Islamic society
and militant jihad against the non-Islamic world. He published
his views in Milestones in 1964. Qutb, echoing Mawdudi,
called for a “vanguard” of dedicated Muslims to emulate the Prophet
in separating themselves from society in order to achieve the
ultimate goal of establishing God’s sovereignty throughout the
earth. The book, along with Qutb’s martyrdom in 1966, spurred
Islamic fundamentalists to rapid growth and splintering in the
1970s.[32]
The three main Egyptian Islamic fundamentalist groups are all
influenced by Qutb and draw support from the midde and lower-middle
class (bazaar merchants, clerics, teaches, professionals and
burecrats), yet each is distinctive enough to prevent a unified
front. Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (or ILP) has focused its
attacks primarily on government structures, while al-Takfir has
charged that all who are not part of the group are
unbelievers. Both outsiders, the ILP initially sought to
quickly capture political control of Egypt, whereas al-Takfir
pursued a long-term policy of political takeover. Both groups
were suppressed by the Egyptian government in the late 1970s,
although they have not been driven out of existence. Al-Jihad,
in contrast, quietly infiltrated military, security services and
other governmental institutions. Their power was revealed in
the assassination of Anwar Sadat in October, 1981. The group’s
leaders cited the disparity between Egypt’s laws and Islamic Law,
Sadat’s peace with Israel, and government persecution against
Islamists in September 1981 (part of an effort to counter the
growing fundamentalist presence in Egypt) as the rationale for
killing Sadat. In the months that followed, the government
arrested thousands of Islamic fundamentalists, thus curtailing the
group’s effectiveness. Today, the Egyptian government
continues to suppress militant fundamentalism through government
force.[33]
In Syria, the Brotherhood’s influence is also drawn from the urban
middle to lower-middle classes, comprised of educated small
businessmen, professionals and clerics, the segment of the
population which has benefited the least from the military and rural
oriented Ba’thi party. In addition, the Brotherhood has produced a
number of splinter groups. Syrian Islamic fundamentalists
became more militant in the 1970s, turning to armed jihad by
1976. Numerous attacks on the government structure took place
in ensuing years, leading to government efforts to suppress the
fundamentalist groups. The Syrian government crushed an
uprising of fundamentalists in Hama in 1983, leading to a period of
decline for fundamentalists, who were unable to win the Sunni
population to their cause. Despite ongoing repression,
fundamentalism remains an ongoing threat in Syria.[34]
Algeria has also witnessed the growth of a strong fundamentalist
presence. A combination of agricultural crisis, unemployment,
rampant inflation, shortages in housing and basic goods, declining
revenues from the oil and gas industry, and growing foreign debt led
to social unrest and class cleavage. Militant fundamentalist
demonstrations resulted, and despite the governments attempt to
crack down on fundamentalist groups, mass rioting, led by
fundamentalists, took place in 1988. After a bloody government
reprisal against the rioters, the Algerian president began a process
of democratization. The fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front
then won major electoral victories in 1990 and 1991, only to have
the election results cancelled by the military, and thousands of
fundamentalists sent to prison. In the aftermath, the movement
went underground. Islamic fundamentalism continues to exist in
a variety of sometimes competing movements, and has been
responsible, along with the Algerian government, for a period of
violent civil war in the past decade.[35]
Turkey provides an example of the influence of Islamic
fundamentalism in an avowed secular state. From the 1950s
through the 1970s, Turkey was a multi-party state, experiencing
military coups in 1960 and 1970. Long-standing political
unrest and instability led to a political coup in 1980, with the
military regime giving way to a democratic, parliamentary government
in 1982. In the ensuing years, the military has remained a
powerful force within the parliamentarian structure, as Turkey has
continued a program of modernization and remains on friendly terms
with the West. Although the democratic political structure and
relative freedom within Turkish society has allowed Islamic
fundamentalism to flourish, the government and military have kept
fundamentalist groups in political check. The main
fundamentalist group, Turkish Hezbollah, has been responsible for
hundreds of murders in recent decades. In January 2001, the
Turkish government raided the organization, arresting scores of
militants, and killing the group’s leader, Huseyin Velioglu.
The raid, which led to the discovery of the corpses of hundreds of
Hezbollah victims, dealt a significant setback to the militant
group.[36]
Perhaps the most vivid example of Islamic fundamentalism within
recent years is that of Afghanistan. In 1978, the People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power in a military
coup. Allying with the Soviet Union, the PDPA began shaping
Afghanistan along Marxist lines. With Islam thus threatened,
the mujahideen, a loose alliance of Afghan nationalists,
rebelled and took over many of the rural areas of the country.
In response, the Soviet Union invaded in 1979 in an effort to shore
up the PDPA, a move which swung popular support to the mujahideen
even as millions of Afghans fled to neighboring Pakistan and
Iran. The Pakistan government supported the refugee
mujahideen with arms and military training, as did many other
countries hostile to the Soviet Union, including the United
States. Many Islamic fundamentalist groups were among the
mujahideen factions, including Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin
Laden.
When the Soviet Union finally withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989,
leaving the PDPA in power, the mujahideen did not stop
fighting. In 1992 they captured the capital of Kabul and
overthrew the PDPA, only to lapse into infighting among the various
factions. In 1996 the Taliban, having emerged as the strongest
faction, seized control of Kabul. Although initially hailed by
both the Afghan populace and the United States, who had hopes for a
return of stability to the country, the Taliban, allied with bin
Laden, soon forced their concept of Islamic fundamentalism upon
Afghanistan. The result was a period of severe oppression as
the Taliban, with their religious police, punished citizens who
engaged in un-Islamic activities such as television, movies, music,
kite-flying and chess. Men were forced to wear beards of
proper length, and women were curtailed from public life and were
severely punished if not properly clothed or accompanied by a male
relative when in public. Punishment of offenders in the form
of death was not uncommon.
The reign of the Taliban, however, proved short-lived. On
September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda operatives hijacked four U.S.
commercial planes, crashing two of them into the Twin Towers of New
York City’s World Trade Center and one into the U.S. Pentagon.
The fourth crashed in rural Pennsylvania as passengers struggled
with the hijackers. The attacks killed nearly 3000 people, and
the United States quickly launched a counter-attack, invading
Afghanistan and installing a new government on December 22, 2001.[37]
Lebanon is another Arab country with a strong opposition
fundamentalist presence. Since the 1970s, both Sunni and
Shiite fundamentalists (such as the Islamic Unity Movement, the
Islamic Association, and Amal and Ummat Hizb Allah) have been
competing for political supremacy, fueled by opposition to the West
and to Israel, as well as Lebanon’s religious establishment and
government.[38]
Iran provides the sole example of the political triumph of Shiite
fundamentalism. The Islamic revolution of 1979, led by the
influential Islamic theologian Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and
fueled to a significant degree by restless young people, provided a
model for how Islamic fundamentalism could takeover government
structures. Khomeini’s widely disseminated speeches against
the Shah and advocating Islamic law helped pave the way for the
revolution. The new regime immediately banned alcohol,
repressed women, and implemented the death penalty for adultery, all
the while voicing open hatred of the West. By the end of the
1980s, however, revolutionary fervor was waning as Iranian
businessman tired of isolation from the West. Although Islamic
law yet governs Iran, the country has made various overtures to the
West, and the current president of Iran defeated the conservative
religious establishment in the last election.[39]
Saudi Arabia provides an example of a country governed by Islamic
Law (sharia law). Long influenced by scriptural
fundamentalism of the Wahabbi tradition, the Saudi government in
recent decades has nonetheless faced opposition from many Muslims
from both the right and left of the political spectrum. In a
country in which women are openly repressed and crimes are dealt
with according to a strict interpretation of the Quran, the Saudi
ruling royal family has nonetheless maintained ties with the Western
world for their own economic benefit and that of the country.
Accordingly, many militant fundamentalists (both Shiite and Sunni),
opposed to all Western influences, have long agitated for stricter
application of Islamic law. The ruling family has responded in
recent years by making some concessions to militant fundamentalists,
but the Gulf wars have served to heighten the tension between the
government and militant fundamentalist factions.[40]
Sudan’s distinction lies in being the first country to be governed
by Muslim Brotherhood Islamic fundamentalism. The Brotherhood
pursued a policy of gradualism in the 1970s, while Sudan struggled
with socialism. The gradualist policy paid off in the
next decade, leading to a period of significant political influence
in the 1980s as Brotherhood leaders, including Dr. Hasan al-Turabi,
formerly imprisoned by the government, were released and given
cabinet positions. In 1989 a coup d’etat led to Turabi
emerging as Sudan’s supreme ideologue and de factor ruler.
Shraria law was imposed on the country, and Turabi began an ethnic
cleansing campaign against non-Muslims. A strict Islamic
state, Sudan’s government has been a haven for Islamic terrorists.[41]
Many other countries have been dealing with a growing Islamic
political fundamentalist presence since the 1970s.[42]
Two examples in the non-Arab world are Malaysia and Indonesia.
Since the 1980s, Malaysia has become an increasingly Islamic nation
as Muslims have proliferated within a society which is open to a
variety of beliefs. Although Islam is now recognized as the
official state religion, the state itself is secular, and the
constitution provides religious tolerance. Within this
political paradigm, the influence of fundamentalist Muslims,
initially finding expression in student activists during political
and social crisis in the 1970s, is growing in significance.[43]
Indonesia, on the other hand, has the largest Muslim population of
any country, yet is not an Islamic nation. Islamic
fundamentalists, although increasing in influence somewhat, have
been hampered by a wide diversity of Islamic faith traditions that
are a result of long-standing religious syncretism.[44]
The current conflicts in the Arab world are magnifying the Islamic
fundamentalist influence throughout the world. As such, a
closer examination of Islamic fundamentalist responses to modern
science, western society and the secular state is in order.
[32]
Voll, “Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World.” 368-374.
Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Indianapolis: American Trust,
1990). Ahmad S. Moussali, Historical Dictionary of Islamic
Fundamentalist Movements in the Arab World, Iran and Turkey (Lanham,
Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc.), 240-242.
[35]
Ibid., 205-208. Hugh Roberts, “From Radical Mission to
Equivocal Ambition: The Expansion and Manipulation of Algerian
Islamism, 1979-1992,” in Accounting for Fundamentalisms, The
Fundamentalism Project, Volume 4, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott
Appleby (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994),
428-489.
[36]
Anat Lapidot, “Islamic Activism in Turkey Since the 1980 Military
Takeover,” in Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle
East, eds. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Efraim Inbar (London and
Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1997), 62-74. Kushner,
Encyclopedia of Terrorism, 368-369.
[37]
Kushner, 20-24, 71-74, 246-247, 357-359.
[39]
Hito, 142-226. Nikki R. Keddie and Farrah Monian, “Militancy
and Religion in Contemporary Iran,” in Fundamentalisms and the
State, The Fundamentalism Project, Volume 3, eds. Martin Marty
and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press, 1993), 511-538.
[40]
Ibid., 130-151. Hito, 108-141.
[42]
Maddy-Weitzman and Inbar, Religious Radicalism. Pipes,
In the Path of God, 203-278.
[43]
Manning Nash, “Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia and Indonesia,” in
Fundamentalisms Observed, The Fundamentalism Project, Volume
1, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 691-715, 724-734.
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