(Part 2 of 7) INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM
“The most prolific rhetoric of fundamentalism … is reserved for
Islam, and especially for the depiction of contemporary events in
the Middle East.”[9]
It should be noted up front that many Muslims reject usage of the
Western terms “fundamentalism” and “fundamentalist,” instead
preferring the terms “Islamism” and “Islamists” when speaking of
groups advocating Islamic political law. Both the Western
roots of “fundamentalist” terminology and the extremist perception
associated with the term are reason to resist usage of the term.[10]
Nonetheless, “fundamentalism” is now a commonly-used term in
describing the ultra-conservative expressions of Islamic, Christian,
and Jewish faith groups, among others. This terminology is
useful in that it recognizes, as noted previously, that similarities
do exist among ultra-conservative expressions of various faith
groups. In addition, the term is employed across faith groups
by a growing number of religious scholars worldwide, scholars who
note the differences among faith groups while also recognizing that
opposition to modernity is an instrumental, shared element of
certain ultra-conservative expressions within a variety of faith
groups.[11]
Accordingly, for the purposes of this paper, “fundamentalist”
terminology will be employed, although with the understanding that
it is, in some respects, a contested terminology.
Although Islamic
fundamentalism is indeed a modern phenomenon, it cannot be properly
understood apart from the larger context of Islamic faith and Muslim
history. Ultimately, Islamic fundamentalism is religious in
nature, and in approaching the subject one must examine “the
dynamics of the expansion of Islam as a world religion of
salvation.”[12]
Fundamentalist Islamic
ideology is based upon two “pillars”: the conviction that
Islamic law (the sharia) is the only valid system for
regulating human life (individual, social and political), and the
conviction that a true and faithful Muslim society can only be
achieved through an Islamic state.[13]
The Prophet Muhammad is the founder and central figure of the
Islamic faith. In 610 C. E. Muhammad received his first
revelation from God. Over time, the Prophet received a number
of revelations which were transcribed into the text of the
Quran. Received and recorded as God’s direct revelation (or
Word), the Quran became the written text of Islam and the
authoritative source of law. Over the course of ensuing
generations, statements and actions attributed to Muhammad and
transmitted orally by his followers were compiled and written down
into the accepted hadith (many sayings and actions attributed
to Muhammad were disputed). The hadith revealed the
sunna (or path) that Muslims should follow in the daily
living of their lives. Taken together with the Quran and the
consensus of learned scholars within the Muslim community, they
eventually formed the sharia, Islam’s sacred law.
Muhammad developed a
small following in his hometown of Mecca, but his new religious
views eventually put him at odds with city leaders. Forced to
flee, Muhammad and his followers settled in the nearby city of
Medina in 622. He soon rose to political and military
prominence, negotiating a treaty with Mecca in 628, then breaking
the treaty and capturing Mecca in 630. For the next two years,
Muhammad expanded his power throughout the region of Arabia.[14]
After Muhammad’s death
in 632 C.E., his followers were left with the task of trying to
determine who should succeed the Prophet (Muhammad had left no
instructions in terms of successors). Initially, the struggle
was of a political nature. Abu Bakr, an early convert to Islam
and trusted advisor and close friend of Muhammad, was selected as
the first caliph (successor to Muhammad). His selection was
controversial and came at a time when the Muslim state was expanding
into southern Syria and Iraq. Tribes throughout Arabia openly
revolted against Abu Bakr, while proclaiming loyalty to
Muhammad. Near death, Abu Bakr appointed Umar b. al-Khattab as
his successor. Umar successfully expanded the Muslim empire,
quickly conquering Iraq, Iran, Syria, Palestine, Armenia and
Egypt. The conquered peoples were given the status of
dhimi (“protected peoples”) and were treated well. Umar
utilized local administrators under the rule of Muslim
governors.
Umar’s assassination
in 644 led to the appointment of Uthman b. Affan as the third
caliph. Uthman continued Umar’s expansionist policies in the
midst of growing opposition, at the same time hiring many of his own
kin as administrators, to the point of straining the treasury.
In addition, he took religious authority upon himself, burning all
copies of the Quran other than the one version he deemed the
official version. Uthman was also assassinated, and civil war
broke out under his successor Ali b. Abi Talib. Ali, who had
been part of the opposition to Uthman, refused to punish Uthman’s
murderers, in the process alienating supporters of the first three
caliphs. In the meantime, Syria appointed a rival caliph,
Muawiya, who went to war against Ali and became caliph of the entire
empire following Ali’s murder, thus ending the original reign of
caliphs (all four of whom had been related to Muhammad in some
manner) and beginning the reign of the Umayyad dynasty.
Supporters of Ali were
Shiite Muslims, who devoted themselves to preserving the house of
Ali and seeking to amend the wrong done to him. To the Shiite,
the first three caliphs were not legitimate, and the caliphate ended
with Ali, as testified by both the end of Muhammad’s lineage and the
evil acts which took place among the Umayyad dynasty.
On
the other hand, Sunni Muslims embraced all four caliphs as orthodox,
viewing their collective reign as the golden age of Islam, while
also recognizing that all the descendants of the Arabian Quraysh
tribe (which included the Umayyad clan), despite being marked by
some periods of evil, were nonetheless legitimate caliphs.[15]
Shortly after Ali’s death, as Arab Muslims sought political
organization following decades of expansion, two rebellious
movements, the puritanical (Sunni) Kharijism and millenarian
Shi’ism, arose advocating Islam as a universal religion of
salvation. The Shi’ite millenarian rebellion of the 680s
proclaimed a coming messiah (the Mahdi), a belief later
incorporated into popular Sufism. Kharijism, on the other
hand, rejected the present world by separating itself and advocating
a rigid application of Islamic law as espoused in the Quran,
proclaiming that nominal Muslims were infidels.[16]
The tension between Sunnis and Shiites has remained to the present
time. Although the Shiites showed the earliest orthodox
tendencies, the vast majority of Muslims today are Sunni, and
fundamentalism is more common among Sunnis than Shiites.[17]
By the end of the ninth century, Islamic law was in the process of
expanding to include not only the Quran, but also the
hadith. Together, the Quran and the accepted
hadith came to comprise the authoritative Scripture for the
faith community. The establishment of the Sunni Hanbali school
of law in the same century, a reaction against rational theology,
provided the medieval archetype of later Islamic revivalism.
The Hanbalites held to the Quran as the literal, unquestioned, and
uncreated Word of God, while affirming the Tradition (or customs) of
Muhammad (Sunna, and hence Sunni) and the consensus of
the Muslim community (jama’a).[18]
The Hanbalite tradition, in turn, produced the strict Wahhabi
tradition in Arabia in the late eighteenth century. The
founder of the Wahhabi tradition was Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, a
religious scholar who formed an alliance with Muhammad bin Saud, the
first ruler of what would become Saudia Arabia, and who traveled
throughout the Muslim world and journeyed to Medina and Mecca.
Distraught by the compromises the Islamic faith had made with
popular religious practices (as expressed in the mystical faith of
Sufism), Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, seeking to revive the Islamic faith,
taught the transcendent unity of God (tawhid) and strict
obedience to the Quran.[19]
The
Wahhabis, believing that modern Islam had become corrupted and
polluted from within, were a revivalist movement which sought to
return Islam to its pure roots. In 1766, Wahhab’s doctrinal
views won recognition among the scholars of Mecca. The Wahhabi
movement became very influential, leading to the founding of other
similar movements. Properly speaking, the Wahhabi movement was
a revivalist movement based on orthodox Islamic law.[20]
Ironically, the Wahhabis ideological opposites (the more liberal
Sufi expression of the Islamic faith, based on popular spirituality)
provided the organizational model for Islamic revivalism.[21]
The Wahhabi movement was one of a number of Islamic revival and
reform movements in the eighteenth century.[22]
In the twentieth century, Wahhabi Islam would provide the
theological foundation for a political fundamentalist state.[23]
The 1857 Sepoy uprising in India, in which both Muslims and Hindus
revolted against British rule, provided the impetus for the next
ideological stepping stone in the history of Islamic
fundamentalism. The British reacted to the uprising by
persecuting Muslims. In an attempt to prevent suspected Muslim
disloyalty from getting out of hand, the British destroyed Muslim
holy sites in Delhi. The persecution, in turn, led Muslim
ulama (theologians) to found private madrasas
(colleges) over which the British state would have no control.
The first such school was located in the town of Deobandi, about 90
miles northeast of Delhi. The Deobandi schools taught adherence to
strict interpretations of Islamic law, based on the Quran and the
hadith. Intellectually, via publications and debates,
the Deobandi scholars sought to establish Islam as the one true
faith. Socially, the Deobandi school of thought rejected the
shrine elements of Islamic mysticism (Sufism) which had developed in
the ninth century as Islam sought to accommodate the faiths of
conquered lands. In the place of mysticism, the Deobandis
taught careful personal adherence to morality and piety as spelled
out in the Quran and hadith. The Deobandi tradition
thus served to provide a highly intellectual, socially structured,
and overtly evangelical scriptural foundation for an Islamic faith
which was facing growing pressure from Western influences.[24]
The shift from revivalism to fundamentalism initially took place
through the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (“The Society of Muslim
Brothers”) movement in the 1930s. Although originally based in
Egypt, the movement has exercised formidable influence throughout
the Arab world. The Muslim Brotherhood, as R. Hrair Dekmejian
notes, “more than any other organization, has been the ideological
and institutional epicenter of fundamentalism in the Arab sphere and
the Islamic world … it is impossible to comprehend contemporary
Sunni Islamism and its Arab manifestations without a firm
understanding of the origins and evolution of the brotherhood.”[25]
Founded in 1929 by Hasan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood tapped
into popular unrest against British rule, local political turmoil,
and the corrupting influence of the West. Banna, a Sufi
spiritualist, Islamic scholar, and activist leader, was the “avatar”
of modern Sunni revivalism. His movement, which was more
successful than previous revivalist movements, possessed an activist
ideology, an organizational structure, charismatic leadership, mass
following and a pragmatic orientation. The movement was based
on the Quran and the hadith, and translated doctrine into
social action at a time when Egypt was in social unrest.[26]
Initially espousing non-violence, the Brotherhood quickly became one
of Egypt’s most powerful organizations. The group was
effectively organized, made extensive use of propaganda, and
appealed to a cross-section of Egyptian society. However,
Banna’s efforts to use politics to enact Islamic law in Egypt led to
state persecution of the group by the late 1940s, which in turn led
to the assassination of the Egyptian monarch by a Muslim Brother,
for which Banna was assassinated in reprisal.
The
following decades witnessed escalating clashes between the
increasingly violent Brotherhood (as well as the many new
fundamentalist groups it spawned) and Islamic secular states.
Israel’s victory in the 1967 war was a crucial event. Islamic
fundamentalists proclaimed that the Arab world lost the war because
of a lack of religious faith, and fundamentalist calls for the
imposition of shariah (Islamic) law found even greater
reception in the Arab world. Anwar al-Sadat, who ascended to
the Egyptian presidency in 1970, sought to co-opt the rising
fundamentalist tide through the 1971 establishment of Islam as the
official religion of the Egyptian state, and sharia law as a
source of legislation (in 1980, sharia law was made the main
source of legislation). Nonetheless, Sadat’s openness to the
West and Israel, as evidenced by the 1979 Camp David Accord with
United States President Carter Israeli Prime Minister Begin,
resulting in peace with Israel, was scorned by the multiplying
Islamic fundamentalist organizations. In September 1981,
realizing that he had underestimated Islamic fundamentalists, Sadat
led the government in taking direct control of all mosques and
arresting thousands of militants. One month later he was dead,
assassinated by members of the Islamic fundamentalist group Tanzim
al-Jihad. Since Sadat’s assassination, a variety of Islamic
fundamentalist movements in Egypt have increasingly turned to
violence against the state, unacceptable social conduct, and even
one another.[27]
A parallel transition from scriptural fundamentalism to political
fundamentalism took place in South Asia via the Jama’at-i Islami
(Islamic Party), founded by the Deobandi-trained Sayyid Abu’l-A’la
Mawdudi (1903-1979) in 1941. Concerned with the decline of
Muslim power in India in the early twentieth century, Mawdudi
determined that diversity, in the form of interfaith mixing and a
growing liberalization of Muslim faith, had weakened Islam.
The answer was to sever social and political ties with Hindus and
other non-Muslims and take up arms against non-Muslims.
Mawdudi looked to the Quran for a scriptural rationale for his
militant views:
“Fight in the cause of
God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for God
loveth not transgressors. And slay them wherever ye catch
them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out; for
tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter; but fight them not
at the sacred mosque, unless they (first) fight you there; but if
they fight you, slay them. Such is the reward of those who
suppress faith. But if they cease, God is Oft-forgiving, most
Merciful. And fight them on until there is no more tumult or
oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God; but if they
cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practice
oppression.” (s. 2:190-193)
Mawdudi also found parallel justification in the
hadith.
The
Jama’at-i Islami was thus formed as a political movement to
transform society via strict Islamic ideology, considering itself as
the “vanguard” of an Islamic revolution. Yet within two
decades of its founding, the party became more pragmatic in
approach, advocating a constitution for Pakistan that included a
commitment to democracy and individual rights. However, faced
with Communist encroachments in Pakistan in the late 1960s, the
Jama’at-i Islami eventually abandoned cooperative efforts and sought
to establish a strict Islamic state identity in opposition to the
Bhutto regime. Ultimately failing in this regard, and losing
significant grassroots political support in the process, the party
fell back to trying to accommodate both ideology and
pragmatism. The rebirth of democracy in Pakistan in 1988 has
since forced the Jama’at-i Islami to recognize the importance of
further compromise if the party is to have a meaningful voice in the
political structure of Pakistan.[28]
In short, by the 1980s the legacy of Islamic revivalism, as
expressed in Wahabbi Islam and the Deobandi madrasa
tradition, had found firm fruition in a milieu of political
fundamentalist organizations which were actively seeking to impose
sharia law in states throughout the Arab world and beyond, a
subject which will command our later attention.
The proliferation of Islamic political fundamentalism, in turn, has
been characterized by certain behavioral characteristics, ranging
from passive to militant. The following characteristics are
indicative of modern Islamic fundamentalism:
Characteristics of Individualistic Passive
Fundamentalism
1. Regular
mosque attendance (five times a day).
2. Strict Observance of the Five Pillars of Islam:
a. Profession of faith (shahadah)
b. Prayers (salat)
c. Fasting (sawm)
d. Almsgiving (sakat)
e. Pilgrimage (hajj)
3. Strict adherence to Quranic prohibitions (such as
abstaining from alcohol and
sexual immorality)
4. Regular religious meditation, reading of the Quran,
and reading of other
Islamic literature.
5. Participation in religious group activities within
and without the mosque.
6. Participation in neighborhood self-help and mutual
assistance societies
7. Growing full beards (lihya) and thin moustaches as a
sign of devotion and
piety.
8. Wearing distinctive clothing (including a facial and
head veil for women)
Characteristics of Individualistic Activist
Fundamentalism
1. Pursuit of passive characteristics listed above with
great rigor.
2. Tendency to live together in specific neighborhoods,
sometimes in physical
and social isolation from passive fundamentalists.
3. Frequenting of specific mosques that cater to
activist agendas.
4. Engagement in acts of “purifying” violence directed
against sinful
institutions,
including nightclubs, movie theatres, and governments.
Manifestations of Collective Islamic
Fundamentalism
1. Mosque building (both private and government
sponsored).
2. Radio-television programming (provides religious
instruction).
3. Observance of holidays (observed with great religious
fervor).
4. Mosque attendance (faithful devotion).
5. The press (increase in religious instruction in
newspapers).
6. Illumination of mosques (elaborate lighting at
nighttime).
7. Religious literature (an unprecedented increase in
printing copies of the Quran
and books on Islamic history and religion.
8. Displays of copies of the Quran (in public
places).
9. Religious slogans (increasingly displayed in public
places).[29]
Finally, terrorist activity against Western government and society
has become a vivid expression of Islamic political fundamentalism in
recent years.[30]
[9]
Bassam Tibi, “The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists: Attitudes
toward Modern Science and Technology,” in Fundamentalisms and
Society, The Fundamentalism Project, Volume 2, eds. Martin Marty
and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press, 1993), 73.
[10]
Gabriel Ben-Dor, “The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism,” in
Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East, eds. Bruce
Maddy-Weitzman and Efraim Inbar (London and Portland, Oregon: Frank
Cass, 1997), 241.
[11]
In recent decades, scholarly literature on religious fundamentalisms
has mushroomed. Although the purpose of this paper is neither
to survey nor list such literature, the massive The
Fundamentalism Project, referenced throughout this essay, is
indicative of the understanding by scholars of the appropriateness
of fundamentalist terminology.
[13]
Guazzone, Laura, ed., The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of
Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World (Berkshire,
UK: Ithaca Press, 1995), 10.
[14]
Karen Armstrong, Islam: A Short History (New York: Random
House Modern Library, 2002). Daniel Pipes, In the Path of
God: Islam and Political Power (New York: Basic Books Inc.,
1983), 36-37, 72-74.
[15]
Armstrong, Islam. Emmanuel Sivan and Menachem Friedman,
eds., Religious Radicalism in the Middle East (Albany, New
York: State University of New York, 1990), 39-47. P.M. Holt,
Ann K.S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis, The Cambridge History of
Islam (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1970). Fred
M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1981).
[16]
Arjomand, 179. Dilip Hiro, Holy Wars: The Rise of Islamic
Fundamentalism (New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, Inc.,
1989), 2-25.
[17]
John O. Voll, “Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World,” in
Fundamentalisms Observed, The Fundamentalism Project, Volume
1, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 345-402.
[22]
John O. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern
World (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994),
24-83.
[23]
R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islamic Revolution: Fundamentalism in the
Arab World (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press,
1995), 130-151.
[24]
Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India:
1860-1900 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1982), 87-260. Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, A
Concise History of India (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2002), 99-114.
[27]
Ibid., 77-84. Hiro, 60-107. Gehad Auda, “The
‘Normalization’ of the Islamic Movement in Egypt from the 1970s to
the Early 1980s,” in Accounting for Fundamentalisms, The
Fundamentalism Project, Volume 4, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott
Appleby (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994),
374-412.
[28]
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution:
The Jama’at i-Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley and Los Angeles,
California: University of California Press, 1994) and Mawdudi and
the Making of Islamic Revivalism (New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996). T. N. Madan, “From Orthodoxy to
Fundamentalism: A Thousand Years of Islam in South Asia,” in
Fundamentalisms Comprehended, The Fundamentalism Project,
Volume 5, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 288-320.
[30]
Harvey W. Kushner, Encyclopedia of Terrorism (Thousand Oaks,
California: Sage Publications, 2003).
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