chapter one

RECOVERING THE ORIGINAL COSMOPOLITAN'S CHALLENGES

1.1 The Cosmopolitan's Challenges

In January 1830, the United States Senate was debating whether to limit sales of public land in the West, and a long-simmering dispute between Northern and Southern senators boiled over. Daniel Webster of Massachusetts and Robert Hayne of South Carolina were hottest, each accusing the other of being unable to look past his own region's interest. Hayne argued that if the North would recognize the local interests of other regions, then it would support cheap Western land sales (and repeal the tariffs that were hurting the Southern economy). Webster rejected Hayne's whole way of thinking about local interests, in favor of the common good:

> On my part, I look upon all these objects [viz., roads, canals, and institutions of education in the West] as connected with the common good, fairly embraced in its objects and its terms; he, on the contrary, deems them all, if good at all, only local good. This is our difference. The interrogatory which he proceeded to put, at once explains this difference. "What interest," asks he, "has South Carolina in a canal in Ohio?"… He may well ask what interest has South Carolina in a canal in Ohio. On his system, it is true, she has no interest… On that system, Carolina has no more interest in a canal in Ohio than in Mexico.

Instead of a loose collection of states each promoting its own local interests, Webster called for "Liberty and Union, now and for ever, one and inseparable!"[1]

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[1] "Second Reply to Hayne," published version, as it is printed in Wiltse and Berolzheimer, The Papers of Daniel Webster, Speeches and Formal Writings, Volume 1: 1830-1833, 287-348, at 303 and 348. According to the transcript of the actual oration of 27 January 1830, made at Webster's request by an accomplished, retired stenographer (and printed by Wiltse and Berolzheimer, 349-393), Webster originally compared Ohio to

As broad as Webster's perspective seemed to Americans in 1830, it can look just as parochial as Hayne's—perhaps especially to someone in Mexico. Imagine that the United States Senate in 1830 had included among its members a cosmopolitan, "one who regard[ed] or treat[ed] the whole world as his country" and "[had] no national attachments or prejudices."[2] This senator could have taken the floor and attacked Webster for his "moral imagination that is expansive domestically yet comes to a screeching halt at America's borders."[3] The cosmopolitan would have envisioned what neither Webster nor Hayne could, that the Mexicans as well as the Ohioans are fellow-citizens of Carolinans.

You might scorn the idea of a cosmopolitan in the United States Senate. You might argue that cosmopolitanism is not possible for human beings because human beings must "have kith and kin and feel closer to some people than to others."[4] Or you might argue that cosmopolitanism, though possible, is problematic for a Senator because a Senator needs to serve some world-citizens (residents of the United States) in advance of others (such as Mexicans).

These are the challenges that the cosmopolitan poses and faces. This book confronts these challenges by investigating cosmopolitanism's roots in the Western philosophical tradition. By inquiring into how the challenges were first systematically encountered, I aim to put us into a better position to understand them.

1.2 The Origins of Cosmopolitanism

The ancient Greek world, it is fair to say, contained more Robert Haynes and Daniel Websters than cosmopolitans. In Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, Hayne-like isolationists were opposed by Webster-like panhellenists, and neither party faced prominent opposition from cosmopolitans.[5] But seeds of cosmopolitanism had already been sown.[6] One

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Missouri instead of Mexico. Singling out Missouri effectively jabs Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton, who was Hayne's ally in this dispute, but Webster was right to decide on reflection that his point would be better made by substituting Mexico for Missouri.

2 OED, s.v. 'cosmopolitan' and 'cosmopolite'. Later in this chapter and especially in the next, I define cosmopolitanism more precisely. Until then, the OED's vague glosses will do.

3 I borrow this phrase from actual political discourse in The New Republic; see Wright, "Trading Places."

4 Isaiah Berlin, in an interview by Gardels, "Two Concepts of Nationalism," 22.

5 The rise of panhellenism brought with it a rise of anti-cosmopolitanism, for the emphasis on shared Greekness constructed the non-Greeks as barbarians; see E. Hall, Inventing the Barbarian. Of course, the grounds on

seed was planted by literary representations of foreigners and even enemies as human beings. In the Iliad, for example, the Greek Diomedes and Lycian Glaucus stop fighting when they recognize each other as guest-friends, and in the midst of the war, Achilles hears in Priam's supplications the voice of a father like his own.[7] Hippocratic research and the anthropological inquiries typified by Herodotus' history planted other seeds, for these studies reveal common traits linking Greeks and non-Greeks. Still, there is a difference between grasping common humanity and being cosmopolitan. Cosmopolitanism flowers only when humanity is recognized as a source of value that calls into question local commitments, and it is all too easy to recognize the importance of common humanity in some limited respects while failing to challenge the dominant ethos that puts the locals first.

It is difficult to pinpoint where and when the decisive turn was first made, but cosmopolitanism became far easier after the fifth-century Sophists began to insist repeatedly on the distinction between nature (φύσις) and law or convention (νόμος).[8] Consider the way Hippias addresses the motley crew of Athenians and foreigners present at Callias' house in Plato's Protagoras:

> Gentlemen present… I regard you all as kinsmen, familiars, and fellow citizens—by nature and not by convention; for like is by nature akin to like, while

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which Greeks were distinguished from barbarians could also shift, as J. Hall, Hellenicity, argues that a cultural account of being Greek replaced an earlier, genealogical account. Moreover, the line between panhellenists who emphasized shared Hellenicity against the barbarians and civic patriots who insisted on special ties to an individual polis frequently blurred: see, e.g., Green, "The Metamorphosis of the Barbarian."

6 The best survey of the rise of cosmopolitanism in Greek thought is Baldry's The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought, but as I note in §1.4 and in later chapters, Baldry's treatment of the Stoics leaves much to be desired. For a quick survey like the one I provide in this section, see also Mewaldt, "Das Weltbürgertum in der Antike." Unlike me, Mewaldt gives the Peripatetic Theophrastus a prominent role, for he thinks that Theophrastus provides the culmination of the Aufklärung of cosmopolitanism that is rooted in the work of fifth-century Sophists. Mewaldt agrees, however, that Stoicism's realization of cosmopolitanism as Weltanschauung grows out of Cynicism's invocation of it as opposition and not out of any Peripatetic speculation.

7 For Diomedes and Glaucus, see VI 212-233; for Achilles and Priam, see especially XXIV 486-487 and 507. Guest-friendship (ξενία) and guest-friends (ξεῖνοι φίλοι) are fully explored by Herman, Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City, and Herman emphasizes the way the duties of guest-friendship can conflict with duties to one's native city (116-161).

8 On the Sophists, see Guthrie, The Sophists, and Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement. Guthrie calls the νομός-φύσις distinction "the most fundamental" feature of the Sophists' outlook (21). By emphasizing the Sophists and Socratics, who are crucial to the Stoics, I do not mean to deny that there are other late fifth- and fourth-century expressions of cosmopolitanism. See especially Democritus fr. 247 DK.

> convention, which is a tyrant over human beings, forces many things contrary to nature.[9]

As the men in Callias' house would have recognized, Hippias is playfully reworking Pindar's pronouncement that law or convention (νόμος) is the king of all,[10] to appeal to a standard of nature that is independent of any conventions. But one should read not too much into Hippias' indefinite standard. For all he says, nature might mark significant distinctions between men and women or between Greeks and non-Greeks (everyone present is a Greek man).[11] Moreover, for all he says, nature might call for the satisfaction of strictly selfish desires, as Callicles declares in the Gorgias. Nevertheless, Hippias suggests the cosmopolitan potential of distinguishing between nature and convention.[12]

This potential is even more fully realized by the character Socrates in Plato's Socratic dialogues.[13] Socrates believes that ordinary Athenian politics fails to benefit people as it should (Gorg 521d6-8, with 502e2-5), and that it is in fact inimical to what is genuinely beneficial,

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[9] Plato, Prot 337c7-d3: Ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, οἱ παρόντες, ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας ἅπαντας εἶναι--φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγγενές ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται.

[10] Pindar fr. 152 Bowra: Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς. There is no agreement about what Pindar meant. Compare the interpretations of Callicles in Plato, Gorgias 484b, and Herodotus III 38, and for a brief overview, see Guthrie, The Sophists, 131-134. (For more than a brief overview, see Gigante, ΝΟΜΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ.) Pindar's phrase is also cited by the Stoic Chrysippus at the start of his work On Law: see Marcian SVF 1.314, quoted in §4.4.3.

[11] Guthrie (The Sophists, 162) and Kerferd (The Sophistic Movement, 157) admit this, although Guthrie cannot in the end resist attributing to Hippias a more cosmopolitan claim (285). If we, too, give in to this temptation, we should reject Woodruff's suggestion that Hippias' moral views "were, so far as we know, inoffensively conventional" (Plato, Hippias Major, 124).

[12] Consider also Antiphon fr. 44 DK: "…but those [laws?] of communities far away we neither know nor respect. In this way, then, we have become barbarous toward each other, when by nature we are all, both barbarians and Greeks, born to be alike in all respects. We can examine those features of nature that are necessarily in all men and are provided to all to the same degree, and in these respects none of us is distinguished as barbarian or Greek. For we all breathe the air through our mouth and through our nostrils and…" (I translate Decleva Caizzi's new text in CPF 1:184-185: τοὺς δὲ ⟨τῶν τη⟩λοῦ οἰκ⟨ούν⟩των, οὔτε ἐπι⟨στ⟩άμεθα οὔτε σέβομεν. ἐν τ⟨ο⟩ύτῳ οὖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους βεβαρβαρώμεθα, ἐπεὶ φύσει γε πάντα πάντες ὁμοίως πεφύκ⟨α⟩μεν καὶ βάρβαροι καὶ Ἕλλην⟨ες⟩ εἶναι. σκοπεῖν δ⟨ὲ⟩ παρέχει τὰ τῶν φύσει ⟨ὄντων⟩ ἀναγκαῖ⟨α ἐν⟩ πᾶσιν ἀν⟨θρώ⟩ποις, π⟨οριζόμενά⟩ τε κατὰ τ⟨ὰς αὐτὰς⟩ δυνά⟨μεις ἅπᾶσι,⟩ καὶ ἐν ⟨αὐτοῖς τού⟩τοις οὔτε β⟨άρβα⟩ρος ἀφώρι⟨σται⟩ ἡμῶν ο⟨ὐδείς,⟩ οὔτε ἕλλην. ἀναπνέομέν τε γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἀέρ⟨α⟩ ἅπαντες κατὰ τὸ στόμ⟨α κ⟩αὶ κατ⟨ὰ⟩ τὰς ῥῖνας κ⟨αὶ⟩…)

[13] My interpretation of Plato's Socrates—I make no claim about the historical Socrates—is controversial. Nothing in my account of the Stoics depends upon it, but it does explain how the Stoics saw Socrates as a cosmopolitan. Note the claims made by the Stoics Musonius (fr. 9 [That Exile is no Evil] 42,1-2 Hense = Stobaeus III 40.9 749,2-3) and Epictetus (Diss I 9.1) and by the Stoicizing Tusculan Disputations of Cicero (V 108) and De Exilio of Plutarch (600f-601a). See also my "Socrates the Cosmopolitan."

namely, virtue (Apol 31c4-32a3). So he rejects ordinary political engagement. Instead, out of love of humanity and commitment to the god, Socrates examines "anyone, whether fellow citizen or foreigner, whom I think is wise."[14] Because he believes that his examinations benefit others (Apol 36c3-5), Socrates characterizes himself as a genuine practitioner of politics (Gorg 521d6-8), and because his mission is designed to benefit foreigners as well as Athenians, it is cosmopolitan. Of course, he obeys the laws and commands of Athens and therefore serves when called upon. But Socrates does not embrace special obligations to benefit Athenians.[15] Even his decision to remain in Athens instead of wandering the world examining others is explicable on cosmopolitan grounds: he believes that Athens allows more freedom of speech for his pursuits than anywhere else (Gorg 461e1-3; cf. Apol 37c5-e2 and Meno 80b4-7).

Yet Socrates stops short of calling explicitly for a cosmopolitan turn away from his polis and his compatriots. This step was taken by another advocate of free speech (DL VI 69), the man Plato allegedly called "Socrates gone mad" (DL VI 54), Diogenes the Cynic. "When he was asked where he came from, Diogenes would say, 'I am a citizen of the world.'"[16] His answer flouts traditional expectations almost as surely as his masturbation in the public square.[17] Traditionally, a Greek identified himself in terms of the polis of his birth (his πατρίς or

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[14] Apol 23b4-6, emphasis added: καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἄν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι. For his love of humanity (φιλανθρωπία), see Eu 3d5-9. That Socrates' examinations are part of a divine mission is most clear from the Apology, but see also Eu 13d8-14c3. Though Socrates examines anyone, all of the evidence has him examining Greeks. This does not mean that he would have refused to examine a non-Greek, but he could do this only if the non-Greek had learned Greek.

[15] As I argue in "Socrates the Cosmopolitan," the Laws' arguments in the Crito, which Socrates does not necessarily endorse (see Harte, "Conflicting Values in Plato's Crito," and Weiss, Socrates Dissatisfied), do not pretend to show that Socrates is specially obligated to benefit Athenians. There are two passages in which Socrates might acknowledge that he has special obligations to benefit Athenians. In one, he claims that the god has stationed him in Athens to awaken the city (Apol 30e2-31a2), and he recognizes obligations to obey his superiors (Apol 29b6-7). But this does not give a reason why persons in general have special obligations to benefit their compatriots, and so it does not make Socrates' position concerning persons in general any less cosmopolitan. That leaves Apology 30a3-5, where Socrates repeats his mission's aim to examine anyone, citizen or foreigner, but adds, "but more with citizens, insofar as you are nearer to me in kind [γένει]." This does suggest a general position on special obligations to compatriots, but it is not clear how much weight should be put on the passage, since the context is rhetorically slippery, the additional clause is unparalleled, and its (rather conventional) idea unexamined. If heavy weight is put on this passage, then Plato's Socrates will come out as what I call a "moderate cosmopolitan." If the passage is explained away, he is a "strict cosmopolitan." For the terminology, see §1.5 and Chapter 2 below.

[16] DL VI 63: Ἐρωτηθεὶς πόθεν εἴη. "Κοσμοπολίτης," ἔφη. The authenticity of this report—which has not, to my knowledge, been challenged—is supported by Moles, "The Cynics and Politics," 131-132. There is no doubt that antiquity associates cosmopolitanism with Diogenes the Cynic more clearly than with any other pre-Stoic thinker; for a particularly amusing example, see Lucian, Vit auct 8.

[17] Plutarch, Stoic rep 1044b; DL VI 46 and 69.

"fatherland"), and he thereby announced which institutions and which body of citizens held his allegiance. Citizens were counted on for help in defending their city from attacks, in sustaining its institutions of justice, and in contributing to its common good. By identifying himself not as a citizen of Sinope but as a citizen of the world, Diogenes denies that he owes any help to Sinope and the Sinopeans. He announces instead that he is "citiless, homeless, deprived of a fatherland."[18]

So understood, 'I am a citizen of the cosmos' is a negative claim, and one might wonder if there is any positive content to Diogenes' world-citizenship.[19] Diogenes Laertius, the third-century (CE) author of the Lives of the Philosophers, attributes many apparently positive cosmopolitan theses to Diogenes the Cynic, including the pronouncement that "the only correct political organization is the one in the cosmos."[20] But this is dubious evidence. Each of the reported theses is attested elsewhere as a Stoic doctrine, and Diogenes Laertius likely stoicizes his account of the Cynics to bolster his story of an intellectual succession from Socrates through the Cynics to the Stoics.[21] Hence, the scholars who believe that Diogenes' cosmopolitanism has positive content draw their evidence from the Cynic way of life.[22] On this view, Diogenes' rejection of what is conventional and his on-going search for "an honest man" are supposed to constitute positive cosmopolitan commitments. Unfortunately, this approach, too, encounters problems. First, it is unclear exactly how Diogenes' way of life is cosmopolitan. Why should the Cynic rejection of convention and embrace of freedom in accordance with nature count as cosmopolitanism? One might well think that the positive commitments in the Cynic's way of life are not especially cosmopolitan and that his cosmopolitanism is simply negative. This would make Diogenes nothing more than a cosmopolitan in the familiar way of many detached

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[18] DL VI 38: ἄπολις, ἄοικος, πατρίδος ἐστερημένος

[19] Most scholars think not. This view, which goes back at least to Tarn, "Alexander the Great and the Brotherhood of Man," and Dudley, A History of Cynicism, 35, is ably defended by Goulet-Cazé, "Un syllogisme stoïcien," esp. 231, and Schofield, The Idea, 141-145.

[20] DL VI 72: μόνην τε ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ.

[21] The recognition that Diogenes Laertius presents a stoicized view of the Cynics is principally due to von Fritz, Quellenuntersuchungen zu Leben und Philosophie des Diogenes von Sinope. Mansfeld, "Diogenes Laertius on Stoic Philosophy," provides an excellent discussion; cf. also Goulet-Cazé, "Le livre VI de Diogène Laërce," and Hahm, "Diogenes Laertius VII," esp. 4082-4105. Schofield, Idea, 141-145, argues that the cosmopolitan claim at DL VI 72 in particular is a Stoic doctrine read back into Diogenes, though his argument is challenged by Moles, "Cynics and Politics," 132-137.

[22] Moles uses this approach in "Cynics and Politics," "Cynic Cosmopolitanism," and "The Cynics."

intellectuals. Compare, for example, the following anecdote concerning Anaxagoras: "And finally he retired and concerned himself with the investigation of nature without paying any mind to politics. When someone asked, 'Does your fatherland mean nothing to you?,' he replied, 'Hush! My fatherland is very important to me,' as he pointed to the heavens."[23] Second, even if Diogenes' way of life does embody positive cosmopolitan commitments, he does not develop in any detail reasons that might motivate or justify them.

For a positive articulation and defense of living as a citizen of the world, we must turn to the philosophers who were by the end of the fourth century BCE gathering around Zeno of Citium at Athens' Stoa Poikilê (Στοὰ Ποικίλη, i.e., the Many-Colored Colonnade).[24] Zeno had spent time with the Cynic Crates and had absorbed the lessons of the Cynic life. But he and his "Stoic" followers showed a much stronger penchant for theorizing than any of the Cynics. According to the Stoics' theory, the cosmos is like a city, and living well requires living as a citizen of the cosmos. The historical importance of these claims is widely recognized, but the details of the Stoics' cosmopolitan commitments are not well understood. This book provides the first systematic account of Stoic cosmopolitanism.[25]

1.3 Approaching the Stoa

There are two main reasons why scholars have thus far left Stoic cosmopolitanism unclear. First, the textual record is difficult. Though Stoics were writing by the beginning of the third century BCE, no surviving Stoic work predates 44 BCE, when the Academic Cicero wrote On Appropriate Actions (De Officiis) as a Stoic-inspired guidebook for his son. (Cleanthes' third-century Hymn to Zeus is an exception, but the surviving text is very short (thirty-nine lines)

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[23] DL II 7: Καὶ τέλος ἀπέστη καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν θεωρίαν ἦν, οὐ φροντίζων τῶν πολιτικῶν. Ὅτε καὶ πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα· "Οὐδέν σοι μέλει τῆς πατρίδος;" "Εὐφήμει," ἔφη· "ἐμοὶ γὰρ καὶ σφόδρα μέλει τῆς πατρίδος," δείξας τὸν οὐρανόν.

[24] This is not to deny that there are cosmopolitan features to Epicurean thought. But there are three reasons to concentrate on the Stoics: (1) the earliest explicit avowal of cosmopolitanism in the Epicurean tradition is Diogenes of Oenoanda's fr. 30, col. 2.1-11 Smith (LS 22S), which dates to the second century CE; (2) the more subtle ways in which Epicureanism is cosmopolitan are most easily grasped by analogy to the explicit theorizing of the Stoics (see my "Hellenistic Cosmopolitanism"); and (3) the Stoics' versions of cosmopolitanism have exerted greater influence.

[25] I do not mean to deny that I am deep in debt to many scholars, including especially Annas, Baldry, Nussbaum, and Schofield. I say more to situate my primary claims in relation to the existing scholarship in §1.5 below and again, in still more detail, in the chapters that follow.

and riddled with lacunae.) The other extensive works of Stoic ethics date from Rome's imperial age, in the volumes of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. These are invaluable, but one can no more assume that they record original Stoic cosmopolitanism than one can assume that the Kantians Rawls, Habermas, and Korsgaard represent original Kantianism. Anyone who is interested in the original Stoic cosmopolitanism must examine the difficult evidence of Greek Stoicism.

This requires attention to the non-Stoic sources who typically record what "the Stoics" say. Most of them probably draw not on primary texts but on introductory handbooks that were produced for students and intellectuals.[26] For my purposes, five such sources loom especially large. Three provide handbook-style summaries: Cicero's comparative study of ethics, On Ends (De Finibus), includes in Book III an exposition of what "the Stoics" say; Diogenes Laertius' Lives of the Philosophers includes under the "Life of Zeno" a summary of what "the Stoics" say; and a record of what "the Stoics" say about standard ethical topics is preserved in the Anthology that Stobaeus collected for his son's education. The other most important sources, the Platonist Plutarch and the skeptic Sextus Empiricus, record Stoic views to criticize them.

This evidence is tricky. Different Stoics may well have said different things, and so reports of what "the Stoics" say must be treated warily. Moreover, the reporters are not all perfectly trustworthy, and even the sympathetic ones generally work at some remove from careful examination of primary texts. But if one remains mindful of the sources' purposes and credentials, gives special attention to the occasional testimony that picks out a particular Stoic or even a particular Stoic text, and privileges still more the fragmentary quotations of a particular Stoic, then one can sift through what "the Stoics" say and isolate particular claims of particular Stoics. There is in fact enough evidence concerning one Stoic to sustain an extended examination of his views. He is Chrysippus of Soli, the third head of the Stoic school in Athens. It is said that "there would have been no Stoa had there been no Chrysippus."[27] He is quoted prominently in Diogenes Laertius' account of the initial moves in Stoic ethics, and he is by far the most often quoted target of Plutarch's attacks.[28]

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[26] For an overview, see now Mansfeld, "The Sources."

[27] DL VII 183.

[28] Chrysippus' centrality is widely recognized, but to what degree is controversial. Von Arnim's Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta was intended to answer Usener's call for a collection of the fragments of Chrysippus (SVF 1:iii), but von Arnim sees Chrysippus everywhere in the reports of what "the Stoics" say. This extremely

So I start by focusing on Chrysippus' views, and I use three different approaches. In chapters three through five, I work through ancient evidence of what "the Stoics" say and draw upon reports of what Chrysippus in particular says to analyze what can be reasonably attributed to Chrysippus. In chapter six, I start with reports of Zeno's Republic, and I then address to what extent Chrysippus accepts the thesis of that book. Finally, in chapter seven, I take as my starting point evidence explicitly tied to Chrysippus' On Lives, and I follow that evidence to obviously related reports. The first two methods, in particular, require some discussion of other Stoics, but Chrysippus remains my principal quarry.

After discussing the Chrysippean core of what antiquity recognized as "the Stoics'" philosophy, I explore how Chrysippus' cosmopolitanism was revised in the Stoic theories that are contained in Cicero's De Officiis, Seneca's letters and "dialogues," and Marcus Aurelius' Meditations. Seneca's philosophical writing is well known as a rich source of Stoic thought, and Marcus' writing to himself is widely appreciated as a Stoic exercise. The status of Cicero's De Officiis is murkier. One difficulty is that Cicero considers himself an Academic, not a Stoic. Nevertheless, he clearly presents De Officiis as a work of primarily Stoic ethics: two books follow the plan of the second-century BCE Stoic Panaetius' De Officio and the third shows less specific, but still avowedly Stoic, inspiration.[29] Another difficulty stems from this distracting background: scholars frequently read the work for what it says about the Greek Stoics on whom Cicero is drawing. I have no quarrel with that, but I propose to read De Officiis as Cicero's own broadly Stoic theory. Cicero's brand of Academic skepticism frees him to endorse whatever seems plausible to him, and he surely endorses what he says in De Officiis, since it is, after all, a

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optimistic attitude colors much twentieth-century scholarship, including especially Bréhier, Chrysippe et l'Ancien Stoïcisme, and Christensen, An Essay on the Unity of Stoic Philosophy. Gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus, takes the contrasting approach of limiting himself to actual fragments of Chrysippus and admitting reports of what "the Stoics" say only when they "elucidate doctrines explicitly ascribed to Chrysippus" (1). My methodology is closer to Gould's, although for the purposes of exposition, as I explain in the next paragraph, I do not always start with quotations of Chrysippus. With few exceptions, I use generic doxographical reports only to attest doctrines elsewhere attributed explicitly and reliably to Chrysippus, and most of the exceptions are the standard Stoic definitions that are collected in Stobaeus II 7.5-12 and quite probably drawn primarily from Chrysippus (see Stobaeus II 7.12 116,11-18). My model here is Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy.

[29] For Books One and Two, see, e.g., De Officiis II 60, and for Book Three, see III 20 with I 9-10 and III 7-12.

letter of advice to his son.[30] Moreover, the work has sufficient integrity and interest as a broadly Stoic study to warrant this individual reading.[31]

In sum, I investigate cosmopolitanism in four Stoic theories. I select these four because each presents a unique and interesting cosmopolitanism, and I relegate other Stoics to brief comparisons in passing. A more comprehensive survey would require too much repetition (as in the case of Epictetus) or groundless speculation (as in the case of Panaetius).[32] I also resist the temptation to generalize about the development of Stoicism. Traditionally, scholars have been seduced by this temptation. At least since Schmekel's Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa (1892), it has been standard to divide the history of Stoicism into three periods: "Early" (the founding generation through the crystallization in Chrysippus' works), "Middle" (an innovative phase marked especially by Panaetius and Posidonius but perhaps inaugurated earlier), and "Late" (Roman recapitulations of predominantly ethical themes from "Early" Stoicism).[33] This taxonomy is not without its uses, but it is nevertheless a fiction of modern scholarship. Other classifications of the Stoics are possible, and enshrining just one inhibits fresh approaches and

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30 Cicero, Off III 20 and I 1-4.

31 It would also be desirable to relate De Officiis to Cicero's other writings, but in this book I offer only a few programmatic remarks on this topic (§8.6). My primary goal is to illuminate Stoic cosmopolitanisms and not Ciceronian thought more generally.

32 I cannot fully justify this claim except by discussing the other Stoics in some detail, but some readers might be persuaded by the quick and programmatic claims I do make about them. The Index of Names indicates where these claims are.

33 In his monumental, three-volume study Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtliche Entwicklung (first published under a slightly different title in 1844-1852), Zeller divides "post-Aristotelian philosophy" into three parts, but because the third was devoted to Neoplatonism, he cuts Stoicism only into two, separating the early Stoics (discussed in the section later translated as The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics) from the "eclectic" Stoics (discussed in the section later translated as A History of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy). On this account, Panaetius stands at the head of the eclectic period, as the founder of Roman Stoicism (A History of Eclecticism, 39, 203-204). By contrast, Schmekel insists that there is a significant difference between the Stoicism of Panaetius and the Stoicism of the Imperial Age, and he is supported by Bonhöffer's contemporaneous studies of the Imperial Stoic Epictetus (Epictet und die Stoa [1890] and Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet [1894]), in which Bonhöffer argues that the Discourses essentially agree with the Stoicism of the third century BCE. Eventually—though not by the time of Arnold, Roman Stoicism (1911), and Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean (1910)—the new tripartite periodization of the Stoa that results from the work of Schmekel and Bonhöffer took the field, and it even left its mark on the last editions of Zeller's schoolbook, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy. There are few dissenters, but see Inwood, "Rules and Reasoning in Stoic Ethics," 99-100, and Long, Epictetus, 18-20. At first glance, Sedley, "The School, from Zeno to Arius Didymus," provides a recent defense of the old orthodoxy, albeit in the more complicated form of five stages in place of three. But with one exception, Sedley's stages represent changes in the institutional arrangements and not doctrinal development, and even with the exception—a "Platonizing" stage comparable to the old "Middle Stoicism"—Sedley is appropriately cautious about individual differences and various continuities.

encourages lazy projections where the evidence is scanty. I take each Stoic on his own terms and search carefully for Stoic cosmopolitanisms.[34]

1.4 Minding the Reasons

A second reason why Stoic cosmopolitanism has been insufficiently understood is that scholars have been too quick to explain it by reference to political events instead of philosophical reasons. There are two main approaches of this sort, and neither satisfies.

The first traditional explanation of Stoic cosmopolitanism, which dates back at least to Hegel, refers ethical thought in the so-called Hellenistic Age to the collapse of the traditional polis-centered life in the wake of Alexander the Great's conquests.[35] On this view, Stoics (and Epicureans), without the polis to anchor ethical life, had to focus inward and share their life with the world generally instead of the local community.[36] This general approach has sometimes been

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[34] Anyone who takes each Stoic on his own terms has to face the question of what makes them all Stoics, and it is not easy to articulate a core of commitments shared by all the individual Stoics. One might focus on the claims that the end is living in agreement with nature, that only virtue is good, that knowledge is got by experience, and that the cosmos is providentially ordered. But even these claims will raise problems for some Stoics, including Marcus (see chapter ten). Nor is this difficulty evaded by supposing that Stoics should be defined primarily by their way of life (for which view, see Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life and What is Ancient Philosophy?). A way of life manifests commitments that can be made explicit, and the question is, what commitments do all the practitioners of the Stoic way of life share? Nor, again, is the difficulty fully evaded by supposing that Stoics should be defined by loyalty to the founding Stoic, Zeno of Citium (for which view, see Sedley, "Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World" and "The School, from Zeno to Arius Didymus"). Even if few Stoics wanted to contradict anything Zeno says, his terse writings were open to a wide range of interpretations, and different Stoics no doubt had different reasons for their allegiance. Perhaps only the fundamental ethical commitments are essential: Stoics believe that the goal is living in agreement with nature and that only virtue is good. But this erases the line between Stoics and Cynics. I conclude, tentatively, that there is no set of commitments that is both necessary and sufficient to define a Stoic; perhaps a Stoic must manifest the fundamental ethical commitments that Stoicism shares with Cynicism, and must also show a propensity to theorize in the tradition that stems from Zeno of Citium.

[35] The label 'Hellenistic' is not Hegel's, though. The nineteenth-century German historian Droysen invented the term to define the Greek-speaking world from the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE to the victory of Octavian at Actium in 31 BCE. So understood, the "Hellenistic Age" is the period between the collapse of the Macedonian Empire and the birth of the Roman one. It is another convenient fiction of modern scholarship.

[36] See Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy (2:234-235, 274-276), and Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, 16-18. Most authors of twentieth-century introductory texts emphasize this explanation, sometimes exclusively. In addition to the thirteenth edition of Zeller's Outlines, 20 and 207-208, see Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, 114-116; Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics, 32; MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, 100; and Sinclair, A History of Greek Political Thought, 261. As the reference to Hegel might have suggested, this was not always a purely reductive story. So, for example, Mewaldt ("Das Weltbürgertum in der Antike," 182-183) says, "The penetration of Greeks at that time [viz., in the wake of Alexander the Great] into unknown reaches also widened the view of the spirit, and so there remains a reasonable question whether a cosmopolitan striving was not always in the Greek spirit and merely awakened and unfolded at that time by

embellished with the ancient hypothesis that Alexander himself ushered more concrete cosmopolitanism into the Hellenistic mind, or with the supposition that the rise of the Roman empire cultivated thoughts of "the unity of mankind."[37]

Explanations of this sort are suspect. First, although life surely changed in the wake of Alexander's conquests, there was still considerable local autonomy and a considerable field for local political engagement in the Greek world of the third through first centuries BCE.[38] Moreover, as I have noted (§1.2), several of the changes in ethical thought that are supposed to mark the Hellenistic Age began long before Alexander the Great altered the political landscape (and independently of the Romans' imperial charge).[39]

But even if traditional explanations of this sort were more plausible than they are, still they would give at most part of the truth. There is no doubt that the development and dissemination of Stoic cosmopolitanism were deeply conditioned by its time and place, and that Stoic cosmopolitanism was well suited to its time and place. Nevertheless, the Stoics had reasons for their view, and to understand precisely what Stoic cosmopolitanism is, one must plumb these reasons, for they partly constitute the view itself.

A second traditional way of explaining Stoic cosmopolitanism by reference to political events is to examine what politically engaged Stoics actually did. Several scholars have tried to make inferences from, say, Seneca's work with Nero or Marcus' reign as emperor. But inferring

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outside events." Recently, there has been more explicit resistance to the old tendency; see especially Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 2-4. The old tendency and the recent change are part of a more general trend in the study of Stoicism over the past two hundred years; for an overview, see Ierodiakonou, "The Study of Stoicism."

[37] The first corollary, familiar from Plutarch's De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute, is the pet of Tarn, who offered it first in "Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind," developed it in response to criticisms (of Fisch, "Alexander and the Stoics") in "Alexander, Cynics and Stoics," and finally crystallized it in an appendix to his monumental Alexander the Great (2:399-449). For the second corollary, see Baldry, The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought, and compare the view that the Roman conquest completed what the philosophers had begun, as developed in the nineteenth century by Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City.

[38] How considerable? There is a dispute, of course. For a pessimistic answer, see Green, Alexander to Actium, esp. xx-xxi. Contrast Habicht, Athens from Alexander to Antony, 4: "Nothing justifies the occasional claim that political participation by Athenian citizens declined in the Hellenistic age." This broad dispute papers over many complexities, for the field of play for political engagement in the Hellenistic Age is not the same in every polis nor at every time. But the essential point is that there is no neat correlation between the opportunity to effect local political change and cosmopolitanism. As Stephen Menn reminds me, this conclusion can be reached by reflecting more skeptically on the question of political independence before the Hellenistic Age, as well: many poleis had very limited or no independence on account of the hegemonic Athenian or Spartan league or the Persian or Macedonian king.

[39] On the general point, see Green, Alexander to Actium, 56. Against Tarn's particular corollary, see Badian, "Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind," and Baldry, The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought, 113-127. Against Baldry's alternative corollary, see the review by Murray, 369.

general philosophical commitments from a philosopher's actions in specific circumstances is fraught with peril. The philosopher might be a hypocrite, or the circumstances might be exceptional. More generally, because there are indefinitely many descriptions of any deed—indefinitely many features of the circumstances that the agent might find salient and motivating—one can often only guess about what an agent intended to do. Thus, it is not surprising that difficulties have plagued recent discussions of the connection between Seneca's writings and his life or between Marcus' Meditations and his reign.[40]

Still, even if one could infer doctrines from deeds, there is a point to approaching the doctrines on their own terms. Ideas born in one age are worth considering in another, but no idea can be fully considered until one knows the reasons for it. Whatever success one has in uncovering Stoic doctrines in the record of Stoic deeds, the search for Stoic reasons requires focus on their texts instead of their actions.

I am therefore at cross-purposes with much past discussion of Stoic cosmopolitanism. I want to know the Stoics' reasons, both because I want a fuller articulation of the Stoic doctrines and because I want to evaluate the Stoic reasons, to shed light on our encounters with cosmopolitanism. I do not explain why it is sensible to look to the ancient Stoics to illuminate our encounters by articulating how Stoicism has influenced us, that is, how Stoic thought seeped into Western traditions and has been regularly reinvigorated both explicitly and implicitly.[41] Instead, I investigate Stoic cosmopolitanism, and in a final chapter, I relate the results of my investigation to contemporary philosophical concerns. My justification for proceeding in this way is exhausted by the results it achieves.

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[40] For the former, see Griffin, Seneca; she calls the difficulty of connecting the details of Seneca's life to his philosophical corpus "the Seneca problem." For the latter, see the conflicting interpretations of Noyen, "Divus Marcus" and "Marcus Aurelius, The Greatest Practician of Stoicism," and Stanton, "Marcus Aurelius, Emperor and Philosopher," esp. 570-575; a properly skeptical conclusion is drawn by Hendrickx, "Once Again." For general discussion of this issue, see Griffin, "Philosophy, Politics, and Politicians at Rome."

[41] The influence is difficult to overstate for several reasons. Stoicism came to be a kind of civic religion in Rome (Brunt, "Stoicism and the Principate," 7; Griffin, "Philosophy, Politics, and Politicians at Rome," 36-37), had an enormous impact on Christian thought (Colish, The Stoic Tradition; Spanneut, Le Stoïcisme des pères de l'Eglise; Verbeke, The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought), and inspired particular fascination among Renaissance and early modern readers (Spanneut, Permanence du stoicisme, 213-342). The afterlife of Stoic cosmopolitanism in particular is partly explored by Heater, World Citizenship and Government, who surveys the idea of the world-state. See also forthcoming studies by Kleingeld (Citizens of the World, concerning late-eighteenth century German thought) and Nussbaum (The Cosmopolitan Tradition, a broad, episodic survey).

Among the many vectors that determine (or overdetermine) the course of history, this book privileges philosophical argument, but it is nevertheless a history.[42] I seek to engage the Stoics' claims and arguments as ancient perspectives, and this requires being true to the past in which the Stoics lived.

1.5 Overview

My history uncovers three ways in which Stoicism can be called "cosmopolitan." All three are especially clear in Chrysippus' work, and so my fullest account of them—especially the first two—concentrates on him.

First, Stoicism can be called cosmopolitan insofar as it invokes citizenship in the cosmos as a metaphor for the good human life. I examine Chrysippus' use of this metaphor in chapters three through five. In chapters three and four, I explain the leading concepts of Chrysippus' ethics—including impulse, value, appropriateness, goodness, virtue, passion, justice, and law—and I show how they relate to the central goal of living in agreement with the cosmos and to the metaphor of living as a citizen of the cosmos. I then consider the metaphor directly in chapter five, where I isolate and analyze Chrysippus' claim that the cosmos is like a polis. I conclude, in effect, that Chrysippus' use of the metaphor deserves comparison with Kant's talk of the Kingdom of Ends: just as Kant's ideal agent lives as a citizen in the Kingdom of Ends, attuned to humanity as the unconditional source of value, Chrysippus' ideal agent lives as a citizen of the cosmos, attuned to the rational order of cosmic nature as the unconditional source of value. But I also note that many Stoics do not fully embrace Chrysippus' use of the metaphor. A less robust appeal to the metaphor reappears in the later chapters on Cicero's De Officiis, Seneca, and Marcus.[43]

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[42] Some historians are admirably explicit about embracing overdetermination. See, e.g., Novick, That Noble Dream, 9. The point bears comparison with talk of different levels of explanation in science; see, e.g., Wimsatt, "Robustness, Reliability, and Overdetermination."

[43] Many scholars have recognized citizenship in the cosmos as a metaphor for living in agreement with the cosmos. This is the default view of the traditional readings according to which Hellenistic ethics cannot center on the polis (§1.4), though the metaphor is often left very vague. Recently, Schofield (Idea, chp. 3) has offered a more careful analysis of the central claim that the cosmos is like a polis. I build on Schofield's work in chapter five, but I also use chapters three and four to reassess the metaphor. This involves two main steps. First, I confront recent attempts (by Annas and Engberg-Pedersen) to show that Chrysippean ethics does not depend upon living in agreement with the cosmos, and I provide a new interpretation of exactly why Chrysippus believes that we should live in agreement with the cosmos. Second, I connect the ideal of living in agreement

Even in its most robust, Chrysippean sense, however, the metaphor of cosmic citizenship is only a metaphor, and not much reason to call Stoicism cosmopolitan. More reason is provided by the substantive demands that the Stoics place on citizens of the cosmos, for the Stoics require what I call "cosmopolitan concern." That is, they believe that every human being is equally worthy of some ethical concern. This thought is indeterminate in two ways: it says nothing about what exactly the concern requires, and it says nothing about whether some human beings (friends, family, compatriots) might deserve special concern beyond the equal concern that all human beings deserve. Still, the thought presents a philosophical challenge, because it is difficult to say why one should show cosmopolitan concern. Many philosophers prefer to take this for granted, something we recognize "intuitively" as an ethical requirement, but nothing we can argue for. In fact, Cicero (in De Officiis), Seneca, and Marcus generally take cosmopolitan concern for granted in just this way. But Chrysippus provides an argument, and another goal of chapters three and four is to examine its two broad steps. Chrysippus argues, first, that we should live in agreement with the rational order of the cosmos and, second, that living in agreement with the rational order of the cosmos requires cosmopolitan concern. This argument invokes a cosmology that is widely rejected today, and for that reason it might seem unpromising. In fact, some scholars who want to defend Chrysippus argue that his ethical theory does not, despite appearances, depend on his cosmology. But I offer a fresh account of why Chrysippus appeals to his account of the cosmos, and I argue that his general strategy is plausible. In doing this, I uncover a reasonable way of motivating the general commitment to cosmopolitan concern.[44]

The primary goal of the book, however, is to characterize more precisely the Stoic understanding of cosmopolitan concern. This is not easy. Different Stoics disagree about what cosmopolitan concern requires, and more importantly, every Stoic recognizes that its requirements depend on the circumstances.[45] For example, in chapter four, I show that some

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with the cosmos to a broad range of Chrysippus' ethical ideas in order to demonstrate how deeply the metaphor runs.

[44] In chapter four, I work in well-tilled soil. I do not simply repeat what has been said, however, for I am more optimistic about the evidence for the grounds of cosmopolitan concern (see §4.4) and more cautious in refusing to over-specify cosmopolitan concern (see note 46 below and §4.3).

[45] See, for example, the disputes between Antipater of Tarsus and Diogenes of Babylon that Cicero discusses in Book Three of De Officiis. Scholars disagree about these disputes (contrast, e.g., Annas, "Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy and Private Property" and Schofield, "Morality and the Law"), but no one denies that they signal disagreement among Stoics about the scope of our obligations to other human beings.

Stoics, probably including Chrysippus, believe that in one particular circumstance—a case of shipwreck involving two survivors and only enough resources to sustain one of them—one should count each person's interests exactly equally. But I do not dwell on this particular specification of cosmopolitan concern because it is tied to an unusual set of circumstances and therefore does not permit any broadly informative generalization.[46]

Instead, to articulate a broadly informative account of the Stoic's cosmopolitan concern, I show how Stoicism considers the scope of our ordinary obligations to help others.[47] Debate about this issue continues today. In the debate, a cosmopolitan maintains, at minimum, that we should help other human beings as such, at least in certain, common circumstances. Some people deny this minimal commitment on the grounds that we should conserve our efforts and resources to help family, friends, and compatriots. But much of the debate is among the cosmopolitans themselves, concerning how much help we should give to humans as such (as opposed to what we should give to family, friends, and compatriots) and concerning the grounds for our special responsibilities to family, friends, and compatriots. I focus on one slice of this debate, the choice between benefiting compatriots and benefiting other human beings, and I show how the Stoics examine this choice when they discuss the broad question of what kind of career one should take up. Chrysippus, Cicero (in De Officiis), Seneca, and Marcus insist that one should seek to help human beings as such, but they disagree about whether we should help compatriots as such. Their disagreement stands at or near the head of the longstanding debate, and their shared insistence makes them cosmopolitans in the sense that is most important to this book.

I develop my case for calling Stoicism cosmopolitan in this third sense in three stages. First, I clarify the relevant question, and I sketch a range of possible answers. Then I analyze the

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[46] Annas (Morality) argues that "the Stoics are the first ethical theorists clearly to commit themselves to the thesis that morality requires impartiality to all others from the moral point of view" (265). But she does not settle exactly what impartiality requires, as Irwin points out ("Happiness, Virtue, and Morality," 168-172), and she links the ideal of impartiality more often to the modern metaphor "a moral point of view" than to the Stoics' own talk of a cosmopolis. (See also Inwood's review, 661-664.) I delimit impartiality more narrowly to explain the shipwreck case, and I seek an account of cosmopolitan concern that is relevant to less unusual circumstances.

[47] Especially in For Love of Country and Cultivating Humanity, Nussbaum suggests this sort of account, and she has done more than anyone to publicize the importance of Stoic cosmopolitanism. But she concentrates more on developing current practical implications of a general cosmopolitan ideal than on analyzing precisely what the Stoics meant. My concern, by contrast, is to analyze the details of the Stoic positions, though I hope that my analysis clarifies how we might realize the cosmopolitan ideal today. My analyses in chapters seven through ten go significantly beyond the existing scholarship.

answers given by Chrysippus, Cicero (in De Officiis), Seneca, and Marcus. Finally, I extract from my analysis challenges for those who are interested in the same question today. Because this part of my project is unprecedented and introduces some surprising conclusions, I want to say a bit more about each of these three stages.

Chapter two serves as stage one: it is where I clarify my terms by offering a broad taxonomy of positions available to Stoics and current philosophers. The heart of the taxonomy is a distinction between strict cosmopolitans, who recognize obligations to benefit human beings as such and deny obligations to benefit compatriots as such, and moderate cosmopolitans, who recognize both kinds of obligations. To explain my taxonomy, I explore some of its implications, and in particular, I argue that cosmopolitanism is not inconsistent with serving compatriots more than foreigners. This is perhaps obvious in moderate cosmopolitanism, according to which one is obligated not just to help human beings as such but also to provide special service to compatriots as such. But I argue that in many circumstances even a strict cosmopolitan, who denies that we have special obligations to help compatriots as such, can without inconsistency choose activity that gives extra help to compatriots.

In chapter seven, I argue that Chrysippus exploits exactly this possibility: in his account of what sort of life a person should prefer to live, he advocates being a strict cosmopolitan engaged in ordinary, local politics. This conclusion may cause surprise. First, Chrysippus' ethics generally seems apolitical. As I show in chapters three though five, the remarkably high-minded way in which Chrysippus develops his metaphor of cosmic citizenship seems to deny all motivation for engagement in real politics, and as I show in chapter six, Chrysippus' picture of ideal politics also stands at a substantial remove from ordinary political work.[48] Yet I demonstrate in chapter seven that Chrysippus embraces standard political service for the sake of helping other human beings as such. A second cause for surprise is my claim that Chrysippus is strict about his cosmopolitanism. No evidence decisively records that Chrysippus rejects obligations to compatriots as such, and there are even texts to suggest the contrary. Nevertheless, I argue that no good evidence assigns to Chrysippus recognition of obligations to compatriots, and I argue that the best explanation of the reliable evidence attributes strict

[48] My account of the cosmopolitan's ideal politics in chapter six builds upon a significant literature, and especially upon studies by Baldry ("Zeno's Ideal State") and Schofield (Idea and "Zeno of Citium's Anti-utopianism"). But I find some different implications, especially by yoking my account of the cosmopolitan's ideal politics to a study of his ordinary politics (in chapter seven).

cosmopolitanism to him. Although other interpretations are also plausible, I conclude that Chrysippus is closer to the Cynics than to conventionally patriotic morality.

In chapters eight and nine, I argue that Cicero (in De Officiis) and Seneca are both moderate cosmopolitans, though they disagree about the extent of our obligations to help foreigners. In De Officiis, Cicero argues that we should not substantially help any foreigners but should keep our resources to benefit family, friends, and compatriots. At first glance, this looks like a strictly patriotic, anti-cosmopolitan position, but Cicero also emphasizes that we should benefit human beings as such. If this is not empty rhetoric, then Cicero must assume that the only way to benefit human beings as such is to benefit family, friends, and compatriots. With that assumption, Cicero is committed to a version of moderate cosmopolitanism that I call strictly patriotic cosmopolitanism. I articulate this position, explain how it differs from strict patriotism, and extract from De Officiis Cicero's reason for adopting it. Then I turn to Seneca, whose moderate cosmopolitanism is more familiar. Seneca is simply torn between his duties to help compatriots as such and his duties to help human beings as such. This, I suspect, is what most scholars would assume is the default Stoic position, since it is a position not far from "common sense." If I am right, however, it is the position of only one of the four Stoicisms I focus on.

Chapter ten concerns Marcus Aurelius' Meditations, which, I argue, offers a strict cosmopolitanism like Chrysippus'. One more time my interpretation might surprise, for there are passages that are naturally read as evidence that Marcus recognizes obligations to Romans. But I argue for alternative readings of these passages to sustain a superior explanation of the text as a whole. My case depends in part on some passages that are in tension with the idea of special obligations to compatriots. But I also argue that Marcus' general philosophical approach embraces the especially Cynical kind of Stoicism associated with Ariston of Chios. If I am right, then Marcus is even closer to the Cynics than Chrysippus, and it is reasonable to conclude that he rejects patriotic obligations.

In chapter eleven, I pass on to the third stage of my consideration of the Stoics' cosmopolitan approach to helping others, and I summarize how my analysis of Chrysippus, Cicero's De Officiis, Seneca, and Marcus poses some questions for the current debate about our competing obligations to fellow-citizens and foreigners. I draw on my account of Chrysippus and Marcus to challenge those who deny that we should benefit human beings as such, and I use

the difficulties that face Cicero (in De Officiis) and Seneca to question those who insist that we have special obligations to compatriots. The underlying challenge posed by Stoic cosmopolitanism is quite simple. Contemporary anti-cosmopolitans and more moderate advocates of patriotic obligations argue that strict cosmopolitanism is not a real possibility for us, but the Stoics demonstrate that cosmopolitanism is possible.