Chapter 19
It Is Shown that the Right Over Matters Spiritual Lies Wholly with the Sovereign, and that the Outward Forms of Religion Should Be in Accordance with Public Peace, If We Would Obey God Aright
When I said that the possessors of sovereign power have rights over
everything, and that all rights are dependent on their decree, I did not merely
mean temporal rights, but also spiritual rights; of the latter, no less than the
former, they ought to be the interpreters and the champions. I wish to draw
special attention to this point, and to discuss it fully in this chapter,
because many persons deny that the right of deciding religious questions belongs
to the sovereign power, and refuse to acknowledge it as the interpreter of
Divine right. They accordingly assume full licence to accuse and arraign it,
nay, even to excommunicate it from the Church, as Ambrosius treated the Emperor
Theodosius in old time. However, I will show later on in this chapter that they
take this means of dividing the government, and paving the way to their own ascendancy.
I wish, however, first to point out that religion acquires its force as law
solely from the decrees of the sovereign. God has no special kingdom among men
except in so far as He reigns through temporal rulers. Moreover, the rites of
religion and the outward observances of piety should be in accordance with the
public peace and well-being, and should therefore be determined by the sovereign
power alone. I speak here only of the outward observances of piety and the
external rites of religion, not of piety itself, nor of the inward worship of
God, nor the means by which the mind is inwardly led to do homage to God in
singleness of heart.
Inward worship of God and piety in itself are within
the sphere of everyone's private rights, and cannot be alienated (as I showed at the end
of Chapter 7.). What I here mean by the kingdom of God is, I think, sufficiently
clear from what has been said in Chapter 14. I there showed that a man best
fulfils Gods law who worships Him, according to His command, through acts of
justice and charity; it follows, therefore, that wherever justice and charity
have the force of law and ordinance, there is God's kingdom.
I recognize no difference between the cases where God
teaches and commands the practice of justice and charity through our natural
faculties, and those where He makes special revelations; nor is the form of the revelation of
importance so long as such practice is revealed and becomes a sovereign and
supreme law to men. If, therefore, I show that justice and charity can only
acquire the force of right and law through the rights of rulers, I shall be able
readily to arrive at the conclusion (seeing that the rights of rulers are in the
possession of the sovereign), that religion can only acquire the force of right
by means of those who have the right to command, and that God only rules among
men through the instrumentality of earthly potentates. It follows from what has
been said, that the practice of justice and charity only acquires the force of
law through the rights of the sovereign authority; for we showed in Chapter 16.
that in the state of nature reason has no more rights than desire, but that men living either by the
laws of the former or the laws of the latter, possess rights co-extensive with their powers.
For this reason we could not conceive sin to exist in
the state of nature, nor imagine God as a judge punishing man's transgressions;
but we supposed all things to happen according to the general laws of universal nature, there being no difference
between pious and impious, between him that was pure (as Solomon says) and him that was impure, because there
was no possibility either of justice or charity.
In order that the true doctrines of reason, that is (as we showed in Chapter 4.), the true
Divine doctrines might obtain absolutely the force of law and right, it was
necessary that each individual should cede his natural right, and transfer it either to society as a whole, or to a certain body of men, or to
one man. Then, and not till then, does it first dawn upon us what is justice and
what is injustice, what is equity and what is iniquity.
Justice, therefore, and absolutely all the precepts of
reason, including love towards one's neighbour, receive
the force of laws and ordinances solely through the rights of dominion, that is
(as we showed in the same chapter) solely on the decree of those who possess the
right to rule. Inasmuch as the kingdom of God consists entirely in rights
applied to justice and charity or to true religion, it follows that (as we
asserted) the kingdom of God can only exist among men through the means of the
sovereign powers; nor does it make any difference whether religion be
apprehended by our natural faculties or by revelation: the argument is sound in both cases,
inasmuch as religion is one and the same, and is equally revealed by God,
whatever be the manner in which it becomes known to men.
Thus, in order that the religion revealed by the
prophets might have the force of law among the Jews, it was necessary that every
man of them should yield up his natural right, and that all should, with one accord,
agree that they would only obey such commands as God should reveal to them
through the prophets. Just as we have shown to take place in a democracy, where men with one consent agree to live
according to the dictates of reason. Although the Hebrews furthermore transferred
their right to God, they were able to do so rather in theory than in practice,
for, as a matter of fact (as we pointed out above) they absolutely retained the
right of dominion till they transferred it to Moses, who in his turn became absolute king, so that it
was only through him that God reigned over the Hebrews. For this reason (namely,
that religion only acquires the force of law by means of the sovereign power) Moses was not able to punish those who, before the
covenant, and consequently while still in possession of their rights, violated the Sabbath (Exod. xvi:27), but was
able to do so after the covenant (Numb. xv:36), because everyone had then
yielded up his natural rights, and the ordinance of the Sabbath had
received the force of law.
Lastly, for the same reason, after the destruction of
the Hebrew dominion, revealed religion ceased to have the force of law; for we
cannot doubt that as soon as the Jews transferred their right to the king of Babylon, the kingdom of God and
the Divine right forthwith ceased. For the covenant wherewith they promised to
obey all the utterances of God was abrogated; God's kingdom, which was based
thereupon, also ceased. The Hebrews could no longer abide thereby, inasmuch as
their rights no longer belonged to them but to the king of
Babylon, whom (as we showed in Chapter 16.) they were bound to obey in all
things. Jeremiah (chap. xxix:7) expressly admonishes them of this fact: "And
seek the peace of the city, whither I have caused you to be carried away
captives, and pray unto the Lord for it; for in the peace thereof shall ye have
peace." Now, they could not seek the peace of the City as having a share in its
government, but only as slaves, being, as they were,
captives; by obedience in all things, with a view to avoiding seditions, and by
observing all the laws of the country, however different from their own. It is
thus abundantly evident that religion among the Hebrews only acquired the form
of law through the right of the sovereign rule; when that rule was destroyed, it
could no longer be received as the law of a particular kingdom, but only as the
universal precept of reason. I say of reason, for the universal religion had
not yet become known by revelation. We may therefore draw the general
conclusion that religion, whether revealed through our natural faculties or
through prophets, receives the force of a command solely through the decrees of
the holders of sovereign power; and, further, that God has no special kingdom
among men, except in so far as He reigns through earthly potentates.
We may now see in a clearer light what was stated in
Chapter 4., namely, that all the decrees of God involve eternal truth and necessity, so that we cannot conceive
God as a prince or legislator giving laws to mankind. For this reason the Divine
precepts, whether revealed through our natural faculties, or through prophets,
do not receive immediately from God the force of a command, but only from those,
or through the mediation of those, who possess the right of ruling and
legislating. It is only through these latter means that God rules among men, and
directs human affairs with justice and equity.
This conclusion is supported by experience, for we
find traces of Divine justice only in places where just men bear sway; elsewhere
the same lot (to repeat, again Solomon's words) befalls the just and the unjust, the
pure and the impure: a state of things which causes Divine Providence to be
doubted by many who think that God immediately reigns among men, and directs all
nature for their benefit.
As, then, both reason and experience tell us that the Divine right is
entirely dependent on the decrees of secular rulers, it follows that secular
rulers are its proper interpreters. How this is so we shall now see, for it is
time to show that the outward observances of religion, and all the external
practices of piety should be brought into accordance with the public peace and
well-being if we would obey God rightly. When this has been shown we shall
easily understand how the sovereign rulers are the proper interpreters of
religion and piety.
It is certain that duties towards one's country are
the highest that man can fulfil; for, if government be taken away, no good thing can last, all
falls into dispute, anger and anarchy reign unchecked amid universal fear.
Consequently there can be no duty towards our neighbour which would not become
an offence if it involved injury to the whole state, nor can there be any offence against our duty
towards our neighbour, or anything but loyalty in what we do for the sake of
preserving the state. For instance: it is in the abstract my duty when my neighbour quarrels with me and
wishes to take my cloak, to give him my coat also; but if it be thought that
such conduct is hurtful to the maintenance of the state, I ought to bring him to trial, even at the risk
of his being condemned to death.
For this reason Manlius Torquatus is held up to
honour, inasmuch as the public welfare outweighed with him his duty towards his
children. This being so, it follows that the public welfare is the sovereign law
to which all others, Divine and human, should be made to conform.
Now, it is the function of the sovereign only to
decide what is necessary for the public welfare and the safety of the state, and to give orders accordingly; therefore it is
also the function of the sovereign only to decide the limits of our duty towards
our neighbour - in other words, to determine how we should obey God. We can now
clearly understand how the sovereign is the interpreter of religion, and
further, that no one can obey God rightly, if the practices of his piety do not
conform to the public welfare; or, consequently, if he does not implicitly obey
all the commands of the sovereign. For as by God's command we are bound to do
our duty to all men without exception, and to do no man an injury, we are also
bound not to help one man at another's loss, still less at a loss to the whole
state. Now, no private citizen can know what is good
for the state, except he learn it through the sovereign power, who alone has the
right to transact public business: therefore no one can rightly practise piety
or obedience to God, unless he obey the sovereign power's commands in all
things. This proposition is confirmed by the facts of experience. For if the
sovereign adjudge a man to be worthy of death or an enemy, whether he be a
citizen or a foreigner, a private individual or a separate ruler, no subject is
allowed to give him assistance. So also though the Jews were bidden to love
their fellow-citizens as themselves (Levit. xix:17, 18), they were nevertheless
bound, if a man offended against the law, to point him out to the judge (Levit.
v:1, and Deut. xiii:8, 9), and, if he should be condemned to death, to slay him
(Deut. xvii:7).
Further, in order that the Hebrews might preserve the
liberty they had gained, and might retain absolute sway over the territory they
had conquered, it was necessary, as we showed in Chapter 17., that their
religion should be adapted to their particular government, and that they should separate themselves
from the rest of the nations: wherefore it was commanded to them, "Love thy
neighbour and hate thine enemy" (Matt. v:43), but after they had lost their
dominion and had gone into captivity in Babylon, Jeremiah bid them take thought
for the safety of the state into which they had been led captive; and Christ when He saw that they would be spread over the
whole world, told them to do their duty by all men without exception; all of
which instances show that religion has always been made to conform to the public
welfare. Perhaps someone will ask: By what right, then, did the disciples of Christ, being private citizens, preach a new religion?
I answer that they did so by the right of the power which they had received from
Christ against unclean spirits (see Matt. x:1). I have
already stated in Chapter 16, that all are bound to obey a tyrant, unless they have received from God through
undoubted revelation a promise of aid against him; so let no one
take example from the Apostles unless he too has the power of working miracles. The point is brought out more clearly by Christ's command to His disciples, "Fear not those who
kill the body" (Matt. x:28). If this command were imposed on everyone, governments would be founded in vain, and Solomon's
words (Prov. xxiv:21), "My son, fear God and the king," would be impious, which
they certainly are not; we must therefore admit that the authority which Christ gave to His disciples was given to them only,
and must not be taken as an example for others.
I do not pause to consider the arguments of those who wish to separate secular rights from spiritual rights, placing the former under the control of the sovereign, and the latter under the control of the universal Church; such pretensions are too frivolous to merit refutation. I cannot however, pass over in silence the fact that such persons are woefully deceived when they seek to support their seditious opinions (I ask pardon for the somewhat harsh epithet) by the example of the Jewish high priest, who, in ancient times, had the right of administering the sacred offices. Did not the high priests receive their right by the decree of Moses (who, as I have shown, retained the sole right to rule), and could they not by the same means be deprived of it? Moses himself chose not only Aaron, but also his son Eleazar, and his grandson Phineas, and bestowed on them the right of administering the office of high priest. This right was retained by the high priests afterwards, but none the less were they delegates of Moses - that is, of the sovereign power. Moses, as we have shown, left no successor to his dominion, but so distributed his prerogatives, that those who came after him seemed, as it were, regents who administer the government when a king is absent but not dead.
In the second commonwealth the high priests held their
right absolutely, after they had obtained the rights of principality in
addition. Wherefore the rights of the high priesthood always depended on the
edict of the sovereign, and the high priests did not possess them till they
became sovereigns also. Rights in matters spiritual always remained under the
control of the kings absolutely (as I will show at the end of this chapter),
except in the single particular that they were not allowed to administer in
person the sacred duties in the Temple, inasmuch as they were not of the family
of Aaron, and were therefore considered unclean, a reservation which would have
no force in a Christian community.
We cannot, therefore, doubt that the daily sacred
rites (whose performance does not require a particular genealogy but only a
special mode of life, and from which the holders of sovereign power are not
excluded as unclean) are under the sole control of the sovereign power; no one,
save by the authority or concession of such sovereign, has the right or power of
administering them, of choosing others to administer them, of defining or
strengthening the foundations of the Church and her doctrines; of judging on
questions of morality or acts of piety; of receiving anyone into the Church or
excommunicating him therefrom, or, lastly, of providing for the poor.
These doctrines are proved to be not only true (as we
have already pointed out), but also of primary necessity for the preservation of
religion and the state. We all know what weight spiritual right and
authority carries in the popular mind: how everyone hangs on the lips, as it
were, of those who possess it. We may even say that those who wield such
authority have the most complete sway over the popular mind.
Whosoever, therefore, wishes to take this right away
from the sovereign power, is desirous of dividing the dominion; from such
division, contentions, and strife will necessarily spring up, as they did of old
between the Jewish kings and high priests, and will defy all attempts to allay
them. Nay, further, he who strives to deprive the sovereign power of such
authority, is aiming (as we have said), at gaining dominion for himself. What is
left for the sovereign power to decide on, if this right be denied him?
Certainly nothing concerning either war or peace, if he has to ask another man's
opinion as to whether what he believes to be beneficial would be pious or
impious. Everything would depend on the verdict of him who had the right of
deciding and judging what was pious or impious, right or wrong.
When such a right was bestowed on the Pope of Rome
absolutely, he gradually acquired complete control over the kings, till at last
he himself mounted to the summits of dominion; however much monarchs, and especially the German emperors, strove to
curtail his authority, were it only by a hairsbreadth, they effected nothing,
but on the contrary by their very endeavours largely increased it. That which no
monarch could accomplish with fire and sword,
ecclesiastics could bring about with a stroke of the pen; whereby we may easily
see the force and power at the command of the Church, and also how necessary it
is for sovereigns to reserve such prerogatives for themselves.
If we reflect on what was said in the last chapter we
shall see that such reservation conduced not a little to the increase of
religion and piety; for we observed that the prophets themselves, though gifted
with Divine efficacy, being merely private citizens, rather irritated than
reformed the people by their freedom of warning, reproof, and denunciation,
whereas the kings by warnings and punishments easily bent men to their will.
Furthermore, the kings themselves, not possessing the right in question
absolutely, very often fell away from religion and took with them nearly the
whole people. The same thing has often happened from the same cause in Christian
states.
Perhaps I shall be asked, "But if the holders of
sovereign power choose to be wicked, who will be the rightful champion of piety?
Should the sovereigns still be its interpreters? "I meet them with the counter-
question, "But if ecclesiastics (who are also human, and private citizens, and
who ought to mind only their own affairs), or if others whom it is proposed to
entrust with spiritual authority, choose to be wicked, should they still be
considered as piety's rightful interpreters?" It is quite certain that when
sovereigns wish to follow their own pleasure, whether they have control over
spiritual matters or not, the whole state, spiritual and secular, will go to ruin, and it
will go much faster if private citizens seditiously assume the championship of
the Divine rights.
Thus we see that not only is nothing gained by denying
such rights to sovereigns, but on the contrary, great evil ensues. For (as
happened with the Jewish kings who did not possess such rights absolutely)
rulers are thus driven into wickedness, and the injury and loss to the state become certain and inevitable, instead of
uncertain and possible. Whether we look to the abstract truth, or the security of states, or the
increase of piety, we are compelled to maintain that the Divine right, or the
right of control over spiritual matters, depends absolutely on the decree of the
sovereign, who is its legitimate interpreter and champion. Therefore the true
ministers of God's word are those who teach piety to the people in obedience to
the authority of the sovereign rulers by whose decree it has been brought into
conformity with the public welfare.
There remains for me to point out the cause for the
frequent disputes on the subject of these spiritual rights in Christian states;
whereas the Hebrews, so far as I know, never, had any doubts about the matter.
It seems monstrous that a question so plain and vitally important should thus
have remained undecided, and that the secular rulers could never obtain the
prerogative without controversy, nay, nor without great danger of sedition and
injury to religion. If no cause for this state of things were forthcoming, I
could easily persuade myself that all I have said in this chapter is mere
theorizing, or akind of speculative reasoning which can never be of any
practical use. However, when we reflect on the beginnings of Christianity the
cause at once becomes manifest. The Christian religion was not taught at first
by kings, but by private persons, who, against the wishes of those in power,
whose subjects they, were, were for a long time accustomed to hold meetings in
secret churches, to institute and perform sacred rites, and on their own
authority to settle and decide on their affairs without regard to the state. When, after the lapse of many years, the
religion was taken up by the authorities, the ecclesiastics were obliged to
teach it to the emperors themselves as they had defined it: wherefore they
easily gained recognition as its teachers and interpreters, and the church
pastors were looked upon as vicars of God. The ecclesiastics took good care that
the Christian kings should not assume their authority, by prohibiting marriage
to the chief ministers of religion and to its highest interpreter. They
furthermore elected their purpose by multiplying the dogmas of religion to such
an extent and so blending them with philosophy that their chief interpreter was
bound to be a skilled philosopher and theologian, and to have leisure for a host
of idle speculations: conditions which could only be fulfilled by a private
individual with much time on his hands.
Among the Hebrews things were very differently
arranged: for their Church began at the same time as their dominion, and Moses, their absolute ruler, taught religion to the
people, arranged their sacred rites, and chose their spiritual ministers. Thus
the royal authority carried very great weight with the people, and the kings
kept a firm hold on their spiritual prerogatives.
Although, after the death of Moses, no one held absolute sway, yet the power of
deciding both in matters spiritual and matters temporal was in the hands of the
secular chief, as I have already pointed out. Further, in order that it might be
taught religion and piety, the people was bound to consult the supreme judge no
less than the high priest (Deut. xvii:9, 11). Lastly, though the kings had not
as much power as Moses, nearly the whole arrangement and choice of the
sacred ministry depended on their decision. Thus David arranged the whole
service of the Temple (see 1 Chron. xxviii:11, 12, &c.); from all the
Levites he chose twenty-four thousand for the sacred psalms; six thousand of
these formed the body from which were chosen the judges and proctors, four
thousand were porters, and four thousand to play on instruments (see 1 Chron.
xxiii:4, 5). He further divided them into companies (of whom he chose the
chiefs), so that each in rotation, at the allotted time, might perform the
sacred rites. The priests he also divided into as many companies; I will not go
through the whole catalogue, but refer the reader to 2 Chron. viii:13, where it
is stated, "Then Solomon offered burnt offerings to the Lord ..... after a
certain rate every day, offering according to the commandments of Moses;" and in verse 14, "And he appointed, according
to the order of David his father, the courses of the priests to their service
...... for so had David the man of God commanded." Lastly, the historian bears
witness in verse 15: "And they departed not from the commandment of the king
unto the priests and Levites concerning any matter, or concerning the
treasuries."
From these and other histories of the kings it is
abundantly evident, that the whole practice of religion and the sacred ministry
depended entirely on the commands of the king.
When I said above that the kings had not the same right as Moses to elect the high priest, to consult God without intermediaries, and to condemn the prophets who prophesied during their reign; I said so simply because the prophets could, in virtue of their mission, choose a new king and give absolution for regicide, not because they could call a king who offended against the law to judgment, or could rightly act against him [N33].
Wherefore if there had been no prophets who, in virtue of a special revelation, could give absolution for regicide, the kings would have possessed absolute rights over all matters both spiritual and temporal. Consequently the rulers of modern times, who have no prophets and would not rightly be bound in any case to receive them (for they are not subject to Jewish law), have absolute possession of the spiritual prerogative, although they are not celibates, and they will always retain it, if they will refuse to allow religious dogmas to be unduly multiplied or confounded with philosophy.
[Note N33]: I must here bespeak special attention for what was said in
Chap. 16. concerning rights.