This might be enough, but in order to make myself better understood, I will add that I think there were an infinity of possible ways of creating the world according to the different plans which God might have formed and that each possible world depends upon certain principal plans or designs of God that are his own; that is to say, upon certain primary free decrees conceived sub ratione possibilitatis, or upon certain laws of the general order of this possible universe with which they agree and whose concept they determine. At the same time, they determine the concepts of all individual substances which ought to enter into this same universe. Everything, therefore, is in order even including miracles, although these latter are contrary to certain subordinate regulations or laws of nature. Thus, all human events cannot fail to happen as they have actually happened, supposing that the choice of Adam was made. But this is so, not so much because of the concept of the individual Adam, although this concept involves them, but because of the purposes of God, which also enter into this individual concept of Adam and determine the concept of the whole universe. These purposes determine, consequently, as well the concept of Adam as the concepts of all the other individual substances of this universe, because each individual substance expresses the whole universe, of which it is a part according to a certain relation, through the connection which there is between all things, and this connection is owing to the connection of the resolutions or plans of God.

I find that you bring forward another objection, Monsieur, which does not depend upon the consequences, apparently contradicting freedom, as was the objection which I just met, but which depends upon the matter itself and upon the idea which we have of an individual substance. Because, since I have the idea of an individual substance, that is to say of myself, it seems to you that we must seek what is meant by an individual concept in this idea and not in the way in which God conceives of individuals; and just as I have only to consult the specific concept of the sphere in order to decide if the number of feet in the diameter is not determined by this concept, in the same way you say I find clearly in the individual concept which I have of myself that I will be myself, in either case whether I make or do not make the journey which I intend.

In order to make my reply clear, I agree that the connection of events, although it is certain, is not necessary, and that I am at liberty either to make or not to make the journey, for, although it is involved in my concept that I will make it, it is also involved that I will make it freely. And there is nothing in me of all that can be conceived sub ratione generalitatis, whether of essence or of specific or incomplete concepts from which it can be deduced that I will make it necessarily. While, on the other hand, from the fact that I am a man, the conclusion can be drawn that I am capable of thinking, and consequently, if I do not make this journey, this will be against no eternal or necessary truth. Still, since it is certain that I will make it there must be indeed some connection between the me which is the subject, and the carrying out of the journey, which is the predicate. The concept of the predicate is always in the subject of a true proposition. There is, therefore, an omission, if I do make it, which will destroy my individual or complete concept, or which would destroy what God conceives or conceived in regard to me even before resolving to create me. For this concept involves, sub ratione possibilitatis, the existences or the truths of fact or the decrees of God upon which the facts depend.

I agree, also, that in order to determine the concept of an individual substance it is good to consult that which I have of myself, as we must consult a specific concept of a sphere in order to determine its properties. Nevertheless, there is between the two cases a great difference, for the concept of myself in particular and of any other individual substance is infinitely more extensive and more difficult to understand than is a specific concept, such as a sphere, which is only incomplete and does not involve all the practically necessary circumstances to get at a particular sphere. It is not enough in order to understand what the me is that I am sensible of a subject which thinks, I must also conceive distinctly of all that which distinguishes me from other possible spirits and of this latter I have only a confused experience. Therefore, it is easy to determine that the number of feet in the diameter is not involved in the notion of the sphere in general, it is not so easy to determine certainly, although we can decide quite probably whether the voyage which I intend to make is involved in my concept; were it not so it would be as easy to be a prophet as to be a geometer. Nevertheless as experience is unable to make me recognize a great number of insensible things in the body in regard to which the general consideration of the nature of bodies and of movements might convince me; in the same way, although experience cannot make me feel all that is involved in my concept, I am able to recognize in general that everything which pertains to me is involved in it through the general consideration of an individual concept.