Finally, I agree that in order to determine the concept of an individual substance it is good to consult the concept which I have of myself, just as the specific concept of the sphere must be consulted in order to determine its properties. Nevertheless, there is a great difference in the two cases for the concept of myself and of any other individual substance, is infinitely more extended and more difficult to understand than is a specific concept like that of a sphere which is only incomplete. It is not sufficient that I feel myself as a substance which thinks; I must also distinctly conceive whatever distinguishes me from all other spirits. But of this I have only a confused experience.

Therefore, although it is easy to determine that the number of feet in the diameter is not involved in the concept of the sphere in general, it is not so easy to decide if the journey which I intend to make is involved in my concept; otherwise, it would be as easy for us to become prophets as to be Geometers. I am uncertain whether I will make the journey but I am not uncertain that, whether I make it or no, I will always be myself. Such human previsions are not the same as distinct notions or distinct knowledge. They appear to us undetermined because the evidences or marks which are found in our substance are not recognizable by us. Very much as those who regard sensations merely, ridicule one who says that the slightest movement is communicated as far as matter extends, because experience alone could not demonstrate this to them. When, however, they consider the nature of motion and matter they are convinced of it. It is the same here when the confused experience, which one has of his individual concept in particular, is consulted. He does not take care to notice this inter-connection of events, but, when he considers general and distinct notions which enter into them, he finds the connection. In fact, when I consult the conception which I have of all true propositions, I find that every necessary or contingent predicate, every past, present, or future, predicate, is involved in the concept of the subject, and I ask no more.

I think, indeed, that this will open to us a means of reconciliation. For, I think, that M. Arnaud disliked to grant this proposition, only because he understood the connection which I held to, both as intrinsic and necessary at the same time, while I hold it indeed as intrinsic but not at all as necessary. I have now sufficiently explained that it is founded upon free decrees and free acts. I mean no other connection between the subject and the predicate than that which there is in the most contingent of true propositions. That is to say, I mean that there is always something to be conceived of in the subject which serves to give the reason why this predicate or event pertains to it or why a certain thing

has happened to it rather than not.

These reasons of contingent truths, however, bring about results without necessitation. It is therefore true that I am able not to make this journey, but it is certain that I will make it. This predicate or event is not connected certainly with my other predicates conceived of incompletely or sub ratione generalitatis; but it is certainly connected with a complete individual concept because I presuppose that this concept is constructed expressly in such a way that from it may be deduced all that happens to me. This concept is found doubtless a parte rei and is properly a concept of myself which I find under different conditions, since it is this concept alone that can include them all.

I have so much deference for M. Arnaud and such a good opinion of his judgment, that I easily give up my opinions or at least my expressions as soon as I see that he finds something objectionable in them. It is for this reason that I have carefully followed the difficulties which he put forward and now, after I have attempted to meet them in good faith, it seems to me that I am still not far from those very positions.

The proposition which we are discussing is of great importance and should be firmly established, since from it follows that every soul is a world by itself, independent of everything excepting God; that it is not only immortal, and, so to speak, permanent, but that it bears in its substance traces of everything that happens to it. From it can be deduced also in what the inter-activities of substances consist and particularly the union of soul and body. This inter-activity is not brought about according to the usual hypothesis of the physical influence of one substance upon another because every present state of a substance comes to it spontaneously and is only a sequence of its preceding state. No more is the inter-activity accounted for by the hypothesis of occasional causes as though God intervened differently for ordinary events than when he preserved every substance in its course; and as though God whenever something happened in the body aroused thoughts in the soul which would thus change the course that the soul would itself have taken without this intervention. The inter-activity is in accordance with the hypothesis of concomitants which, to me, appears demonstrative. That is to say, each substance expresses the whole sequence of the universe according to the view or relation that is appropriate to it. Whence it follows that substances agree perfectly and when we say that one acts upon another, we mean that the distinct expression of the one which is acted upon diminishes, but of the one which acts, augments, conformably to the sequence of thoughts which its concept involves. For, although each substance expresses everything, we are justified in attributing to it ordinarily only the expressions which are most evident in its particular relation.

Finally, I think after this, that the propositions contained in the abstract sent to M. Arnaud will appear not only more intelligible but, perhaps, better founded and more important than might have been thought at first.