Plato: The Republic

Book IV

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The following is an excerpt from Book 4 of the Republic, in which Plato/Socrates attempts to define the nature of justice. Prior to this point in the Dialogue, Plato/Socrates  has argued that any political community will need to perform four functions. It will have to: 1) make and exchange material goods; 2) produce food; 3) defend the community against aggression; and 4) adopt its laws and shape its institutions. Each of these functions requires its own form of specialized knowledge, and so will best be performed by it own category of specialist. The ideal community, therefore, will consist of four classes: 1) a class of craftsmen and merchants; 2) a class of farmers; 3) a class of soldiers; and 4) a class of legislators and political decision-makers, which Plato calls the "guardians." Justice is a specific relationship between the four classes of the ideal political order. As a matter of nature (physis) rather than custom  (nomos), it is absolute and unvarying, an object of genuine knowledge rather than mere opinion.

There is an underlying theme, though, which you should also keep in mind in reading this excerpt. In the Republic, Plato tries to establish the nature of a political community in which justice is done; but that means a community in which Socrates would have been acquitted by his jurors.  In that sense, the Republic takes up where the Apology leaves off.  - GZ

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SOCRATES

 I mean to begin with the assumption that our State, if rightly ordered, is perfect.

GLAUCON

That is most certain.

 

SOCRATES

And being perfect, is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just.

GLAUCON

That is likewise clear.

 

SOCRATES

And whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is not found will be the residue?

GLAUCON

Very good.

 

SOCRATES

If there were four things, and we were searching for one of them, wherever it might be, the one sought for might be known to us from the first, and there would be no further trouble; or we might know the other three first, and then the fourth would clearly be the one left.

GLAUCON

Very true, he said.

 

SOCRATES

And is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues, which are also four in number?

GLAUCON

Clearly.

 

SOCRATES

First among the virtues found in the State, wisdom comes into view, and in this I detect a certain peculiarity.

GLAUCON

What is that?

 

SOCRATES

The State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good in counsel?

GLAUCON

Very true.

 

SOCRATES

And good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge, for not by ignorance, but by knowledge, do men counsel well?

GLAUCON

Clearly.

 

SOCRATES

And the kinds of knowledge in a State are many and diverse?

GLAUCON

Of course.

 

SOCRATES

There is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of knowledge which gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel?

GLAUCON

Certainly not; that would only give a city the reputation of skill in carpentering.

 

SOCRATES

Then a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge which counsels for the best about wooden implements?

GLAUCON

Certainly not.

 

SOCRATES

Nor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen pots, he said, nor as possessing any other similar knowledge?

GLAUCON

Not by reason of any of them, he said.

 

SOCRATES

Nor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth; that would give the city the name of agricultural?

GLAUCON

Yes.

 

SOCRATES

Well, I said, and is there any knowledge in our recently founded State among any of the citizens which advises, not about any particular thing in the State, but about the whole, and considers how a State can best deal with itself and with other States?

GLAUCON

There certainly is.

 

SOCRATES

And what is this knowledge, and among whom is it found? I asked.

GLAUCON

It is the knowledge of the guardians, he replied, and is found among those whom we were just now describing as perfect guardians.

 

SOCRATES

And what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this sort of knowledge?

GLAUCON

The name of good in counsel and truly wise.

 

SOCRATES

And will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more smiths?

GLAUCON

The smiths, he replied, will be far more numerous.

 

SOCRATES

Will not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a name from the profession of some kind of knowledge?

GLAUCON

Much the smallest.

 

SOCRATES

And so by reason of the smallest part or class, and of the knowledge which resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself, the whole State, being thus constituted according to nature, will be wise; and this, which has the only knowledge worthy to be called wisdom, has been ordained by nature to be of all classes the least.

GLAUCON

Most true.

 

SOCRATES

Thus, then, I said, the nature and place in the State of one of the four virtues have somehow or other been discovered.

GLAUCON

And, in my humble opinion, very satisfactorily discovered, he replied.

 

SOCRATES

Again, I said, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of courage, and in what part that quality resides which gives the name of courageous to the State.

GLAUCON

How do you mean?

 

SOCRATES

Why, I said, everyone who calls any State courageous or cowardly, will be thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the State's behalf.

GLAUCON

No one, he replied, would ever think of any other.

 

SOCRATES

The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly, but their courage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of making the city either the one or the other.

GLAUCON

Certainly not.

 

SOCRATES

The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself which preserves under all circumstances that opinion about the nature of things to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator educated them; and this is what you term courage.

GLAUCON

I should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I do not think that I perfectly understand you.

 

SOCRATES

I mean that courage is a kind of salvation.

GLAUCON

Salvation of what?

 

SOCRATES

Of the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of what nature, which the law implants through education; and I mean by the words "under all circumstances" to intimate that in pleasure or in pain, or under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and does not lose this opinion. Shall I give you an illustration?

GLAUCON

If you please.

 

SOCRATES

You know, I said, that dyers, when they want to dye wool for making the true sea-purple, begin by selecting their white color first; this they prepare and dress with much care and pains, in order that the white ground may take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds; and whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast color, and no washing either with lyes or without them can take away the bloom. But, when the ground has not been duly prepared, you will have noticed how poor is the look either of purple or of any other color.

GLAUCON

Yes, he said; I know that they have a washed-out and ridiculous appearance.

 

SOCRATES

Then now, I said, you will understand what our object was in selecting our soldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastics; we were contriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in perfection, and the color of their opinion about dangers and of every other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training, not to be washed away by such potent lyes as pleasure-- mightier agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lye; or by sorrow, fear, and desire, the mightiest of all other solvents. And this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be courage, unless you disagree.

GLAUCON

But I agree, he replied; for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere uninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave--this, in your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains, and ought to have another name.

 

SOCRATES

Most certainly.

GLAUCON

Then I may infer courage to be such as you describe?

 

SOCRATES

Why, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words "of a citizen," you will not be far wrong--hereafter, if you like, we will carry the examination further, but at present we are seeking, not for courage, but justice; and for the purpose of our inquiry we have said enough.

GLAUCON

You are right, he replied.

 

SOCRATES

Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State--first, temperance, and then justice, which is the end of our search.

GLAUCON

Very true.

 

SOCRATES

Now, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance?

GLAUCON

I do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of; and therefore I wish that you would do me the favor of considering temperance first.

 

SOCRATES

Certainly, I replied, I should not be justified in refusing your request.

GLAUCON

Then consider, he said.

 

SOCRATES

Yes, I replied; I will; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the preceding.

GLAUCON

How so? he asked.

 

SOCRATES

Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of "a man being his own master;" and other traces of the same notion may be found in language.

GLAUCON

No doubt, he said.

 

SOCRATES

There is something ridiculous in the expression "master of himself;" for the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and in all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted.

GLAUCON

Certainly.

 

SOCRATES

The meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and also a worse principle; and when the better has the worse under control, then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise: but when, owing to evil education or association, the better principle, which is also the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse --in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled.

GLAUCON

Yes, there is reason in that.

 

SOCRATES

And now, I said, look at our newly created State, and there you will find one of these two conditions realized; for the State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the words "temperance" and "self-mastery" truly express the rule of the better part over the worse.

GLAUCON

Yes, he said, I see that what you say is true.

 

SOCRATES

Let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains are generally found in children and women and servants, and in the freemen so called who are of the lowest and more numerous class.

GLAUCON

Certainly, he said.

 

SOCRATES

Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a few, and those the best born and best educated.

GLAUCON

Very true.

 

SOCRATES

 These two, as you may perceive, have a place in our State; and the meaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few.

GLAUCON

That I perceive, he said.

 

SOCRATES

Then if there be any city which may be described as master of its own pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a designation?

GLAUCON

Certainly, he replied.

 

SOCRATES

It may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons?

GLAUCON

Yes.

 

SOCRATES

And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to the question who are to rule, that again will be our State?

GLAUCON

Undoubtedly.

 

SOCRATES

And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will temperance be found--in the rulers or in the subjects?

GLAUCON

In both, as I should imagine, he replied.

 

SOCRATES

Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance was a sort of harmony?

GLAUCON

Why so?

 

SOCRATES

Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other valiant; not so temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through all the notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom, or power, or numbers, or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then may we deem temperance to be the agreement of the naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to rule of either, both in States and individuals.

GLAUCON

I entirely agree with you.

 

SOCRATES

And so, I said, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been discovered in our State. The last of those qualities which make a State virtuous must be justice, if we only knew what that was.

GLAUCON

The inference is obvious.

 

SOCRATES

The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should surround the cover, and look sharp that justice does not steal away, and pass out of sight and escape us; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this country: watch therefore and strive to catch a sight of her, and if you see her first, let me know.

GLAUCON

Would that I could! but you should regard me rather as a follower who has just eyes enough to see what you show him--that is about as much as I am good for.

 

SOCRATES

Offer up a prayer with me and follow.

GLAUCON

I will, but you must show me the way.

 

Here is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing; still we must push on.

GLAUCON

Let us push on.

 

SOCRATES

Here I saw something: Halloo! I said, I begin to perceive a track, and I believe that the quarry will not escape.

GLAUCON

Good news, he said.

 

SOCRATES

Truly, I said, we are stupid fellows.

GLAUCON

Why so?

 

SOCRATES

Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our inquiry, ages ago, there was Justice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in their hands--that was the way with us--we looked not at what we were seeking, but at what was far off in the distance; and therefore, I suppose, we missed her.

GLAUCON

What do you mean?

 

SOCRATES

I mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of Justice, and have failed to recognize her.

GLAUCON

I grow impatient at the length of your exordium. Well, then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation of the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted; now justice is this principle or a part of it.

 

SOCRATES

Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.

Further, we affirmed that Justice was doing one's own business, and not being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said the same to us.

GLAUCON

Yes, we said so.

 

SOCRATES

Then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?

GLAUCON

I cannot, but I should like to be told.

 

SOCRATES

Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted; and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth, or remaining one.

GLAUCON

That follows of necessity.

 

SOCRATES

If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is found in children and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject--the quality, I mean, of everyone doing his own work, and not being a busybody, would claim the palm--the question is not so easily answered.

GLAUCON

Certainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which.

 

SOCRATES

Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own work appears to compete with the other political virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage.

GLAUCON

Yes, he said.

 

SOCRATES

And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?

GLAUCON

Exactly.

 

SOCRATES

Let us look at the question from another point of view: Are not the rulers in a State those to whom you would intrust the office of determining suits-at-law?

GLAUCON

Certainly.

 

SOCRATES

And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own?

GLAUCON

Yes; that is their principle.

 

SOCRATES

Which is a just principle?

GLAUCON

Yes.

 

SOCRATES

Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him?

GLAUCON

Very true.

 

SOCRATES

Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter; and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you think that any great harm would result to the State?

GLAUCON

Not much.

 

SOCRATES

But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State.

GLAUCON

Most true.

 

SOCRATES

Seeing, then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing?

GLAUCON

Precisely.

 

SOCRATES

And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice?

GLAUCON

Certainly.

 

SOCRATES

This, then, is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make the city just.

GLAUCON

I agree with you.

. . .