Genetic Enhancement of a Child’s Memory:
A Search for a Private and Public Morality
William Soderberg
Montgomery College
soderber@marlowe.umd.edu
ABSTRACT:
Prospects of human genetic modification raise the question of genetic
enhancement of memory. A moral framework that takes into account the
tension between the roles of parent and citizen on the question of
genetically enhancing a child’s memory is presented. Weaknesses of both
moral liberalism and moral communitarianism are addressed: a tyranny of
a powerful minority of liberalism, while a tyranny of orthodoxy and a
tyranny of perfectionism plague different forms of communitarianism. A
position is advanced that draws on the strengths of both a Rawlsian
form of contractarianism and a moderate version of communitarianism. I
argue that genetic enhancements of memory in children pose such serious
wrongs and threats to general well-being that the practice should be
decided from behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. With the cards down,
as Ronald Green describes the veil of ignorance, a basic right to
nondiscrimination on the basis of genotype would be negotiated. With
this right in place, conflicts between the parental role and the role
of citizen would be managed by the negotiated prohibition of parental
decisions genetically to enhance the memory of children.
Let
me imagine myself some years from now as a citizen and a parent — who
also happens to be a philosophy teacher — facing the question of
whether I should choose various enhancements for my young child.
Orthodontics, music lessons, soccer leagues, and genetic enhancement of
an average memory are among the practices I am considering. I soon
discover an internal tension.
Ronald Green, in an article called
"The Rawls Game," (Teaching Philosophy, 1986, 9:1, 51-60) provides an
elegantly simple metaphor that helps partially to explain my tension.
He describes two moral perspectives with the image of a decision-making
game played with cards. The first perspective has decisions made with
the cards turned upward, so that I know my conception of the good life,
my talents, my social situation, and the like. The second perspective
has decisions made with the cards turned down. From this perspective, I
have some general knowledge about human society and motivation, but I
know none of the particulars of my own circumstances.
Moral Liberalism
The
first perspective, according to Green, is present in two forms of moral
liberalism — libertarianism and utilitarianism. As I consider
enhancements for my child, the cards-up approach of liberalism is
initially attractive. With the cards facing up, libertarians know their
own interests and seek to protect those interests. Genetic memory
enhancement in children seems to be a mere extension of other ways that
parents have given their children special advantages — through sports
leagues, music lessons, and braces on their teeth.
Green
recounts how this position can quickly lead to a tyranny of the
minority. In the libertarian version of the game, a unanimous vote for
policy decisions is required to protect each person’s liberty. If
everyone favors a policy, no one is forced to follow its dictates
against his or her will. The virtual impossibility of achieving a
unanimous vote, however, points to a major problem with libertarianism.
A few are likely to vote against proposals to redistribute resources
for the majority’s benefit when those few are disadvantaged by the
redistribution. Green describes this outcome as a tyranny of the
minority.
As I consider libertarian grounds for decisions on
enhancing my child’s life, I envision a host of problems. As parents
try to gain advantage for their children, a competition could set in
that would parallel a Hobbesian war of everyone against everyone.
Families that enjoy special access — by virtue of wealth or status —
could gain even further advantage if the memories of their children
were successfully enhanced. Finally, a floodgate of charges could be
opened by people who claim discrimination: those who were considered
above average and thus received no enhancement, those who claim they
were insufficiently enhanced, and those who although eligible received
no enhancement at all. When self-interest is held to be the main
motivation of parents, unanimous agreement on the issue of enhancing a
child’s abilities is clearly an impossibility.
These problems
with libertarianism lead me to turn to a utilitarian justification and
ask whether a policy of the greatest good of the greatest number would
work. Green describes utilitarian decision-making in the card game as a
majority vote cast with the cards up. Utilitarian decision makers are
motivated primarily by benevolence, but this too has its problems. The
greatest good of the greatest number can, under some circumstances,
produce a tyranny of the majority. The views of a minority that
conscientiously objects would not be heard, for example, if the
majority of parents favored genetic memory enhancements for their
children. This would raise a serious issue of fairness if the children
of the majority were to enjoy a social advantage due to their enhanced
memories.
Although both of these cards-up perspectives — the
libertarian and utilitarian — have initial plausibility, their
difficulties prompt me to consider the second moral perspective that
Green describes. This is the cards-down perspective and is identical
with the veil of ignorance described by John Rawls, Ronald Green’s
teacher. Both the tyranny of the minority and the tyranny of the
majority can be avoided if people can choose a policy unanimously with
the cards down. A right not to be enslaved and a right to religious
liberty, according to Rawls, can best be accounted for as products of
negotiation from behind the veil of ignorance. Slavery and religious
intolerance have been taken off the political agenda. The point of view
of the least well off is taken into account when the cards are turned
down.
The cards-down approach seems to be an improvement and to
provide what I am looking for. Good parenting takes one beyond mere
self-interest and even beyond mere benevolence. Humans may be viewed as
isolated atoms when self-interest or benevolence is regarded as their
primary motivation.
The story that parents — along with
teachers, clergy, and others — try to pass on to the young is received
at least in part from one’s predecessors. This story includes the
capacity of humans to turn the cards down and to work toward justice.
It is this capacity that binds humans together and transforms them into
something more than separate atoms. The energy to tell and re-tell the
story stems from a motive to be linked to the life of the next
generation. (I am indebted for this concept to Parker Palmer, who
attributes the motive to teachers, in The Courage to Teach, San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publ., 1998, 50.) Parents as well as teachers,
clergy, and others derive moral energy and moral authority from the
choice to serve as a link between past and future generations.
Upon
reading Green and Rawls, however, I become more cautious. It occurs to
me that the cards-down approach has deep historical precedents. From my
religious training, I am aware that religions often attempt to take
into account the perspective of society’s victims in proposing programs
of social betterment.
Rawls’ proposal curiously echoes a
religious view. I gradually realize that two forms of tyranny can arise
from turning the cards down — a tyranny of orthodoxy and a tyranny of
perfectionism.
Strict Moral Communitarianism
Some
communities adopt a form of elitism and hold that only the few leaders
can turn the cards down. This elitism points toward a form of extreme
or strict communitarianism. Only the few are regarded as capable of
fairly administering a society; the few may be said to adopt the
cards-down perspective for all matters concerning the common good.
Should the followers disagree with the conception of the good life
imposed by the leaders, however, a tyranny of orthodoxy can arise.
The
tyranny of orthodoxy can occur if only some people — whether they be
religious, scientific, or other authorities — are regarded as capable
of turning down the cards and administering a society. Claims of
unprecedented scientific techniques excite anticipation among potential
beneficiaries, but they also excite fear among members of various
groups who, for historical reasons, do not trust those who invent and
apply the techniques. The potential negative impact on medicine should
the medical profession engage in enhancements has already prompted the
suggestion that a new profession be formed to perform genetic
enhancements.
History has shown that the deification of some
humans is likely to be followed by their demonization. Deification can
occur when the few leaders are regarded as capable of actually turning
down the cards. The European clergy of the late middle ages lost the
trust of the people, and extensive social reform was the result. Some
would say that prior to the Reformation, some forms of Christianity in
Europe had collapsed into pseudo-religion. Already one war — World War
II — has been closely associated with a new "religion," scientific
eugenics. Should only some make the decisions with the cards down
concerning policies of genetic memory enhancement in children, the
tyranny of orthodoxy could emerge. In this case, the tyrants would not
be arbitrary religious authorities; they would be scientific or, some
might maintain, pseudo-scientific authorities.
John Rawls seems
to be well aware of the tyranny of orthodoxy, and he responds by
placing strict limits on the turning down of the cards. The contract
negotiated is to be viewed as a hypothetical, not an actual, contract.
The cards-down perspective is to be adopted, according to Rawls, only
to address serious wrongs and not to determine the common good.
Questions of basic rights and the well-being of the least well off are
decided with the cards down, but for other issues the cards remain up.
Moderate Moral Communitarianism
Is
there a way out of my tension or dilemma over whether decisions on
enhancing a child’s abilities should be made with the cards up or down?
The tyranny of orthodoxy may be avoided by allowing that everyone is
capable of fair-mindedness. The view that all are capable of turning
down the cards is compatible with a moderate form of moral
communitarianism. On this view, the cards remain up until the common
good is threatened. Even granting to everyone the capacity to turn down
the cards, however, does not clearly protect against the second form of
tyranny that can arise with the cards down — the tyranny of
perfectionism.
The tyranny of perfectionism is the arbitrary
treatment of persons based on the notion that some are higher than
others on a chain of being. The hierarchical order of the chain is
established by a standard of goodness or perfection. The doctrine can
lock people into particular classes since, in some versions, it has
stated that each should serve within his or her own station in life.
According to Alexander Pope’s version of perfectionism, it is part of
the very order of things that some people are greater than others —
wiser and richer. (Alexander Pope, Essay on Man, Epistle IV, 49-51.)
The
tyranny of perfectionism can arise from the unanimous vote of all
either for or against the genetic enhancement of memory in children. If
all were to agree to allow parents to seek enhancement of a child’s
average memory, a standard would in all likelihood be set for both the
low and high ends of permissible enhancement. Any such standard,
however, would serve to reinforce the notion of an ideal or perfect
type.
The unanimous vote might go the other way and prohibit the
genetic memory enhancement in children. The second form of the tyranny
of perfectionism could occur with the vote to prohibit the practice.
The problem with this vote would be that prohibiting the genetic
enhancement of a child’s memory would preserve the genetic status quo.
One finds in the status quo a natural lottery apparently rife with
inequality — the very sort of inequality justified in the doctrine of
the great chain of being.
Prohibitionists might reply as
follows. It may be true that the prohibitionist position accepts some
inequality in the natural distribution of memory abilities. A division
of roles in society can be destructive when one’s self-worth depends on
being more highly placed than another person on a social pyramid. By
contrast, however, a division of roles can be constructive when society
is viewed not as a pyramid but as a ship in which those aboard share
the common goal of trying to keep the ship afloat. Any serious threat
to the ship is a threat to all on board, so it is in the interest of
everyone to remain vigilant. Roles may be divided to achieve the common
goal of keeping the ship in operation. In this model, the individual is
not a mere atom. The fate of each is intertwined with the fate of every
other.
Both Rawlsian liberals and moderate communitarians may
accept a ship-of-state model, since both accept the cards-up as well as
the cards-down perspectives. Rather than face a permanent standoff, the
two groups may converse with each other. The issues of when to turn
down the cards and what practices to decide with the cards down become
matters of negotiation and not matters of irreconcilable difference
between liberals and communitarians.
Conclusion
With the
ship-of-state model of society in mind, I do not have to turn the cards
down for some of the decisions on enhancing my child’s life. Soccer and
music lessons, for example, pose no threat to the common good but
rather support it. I find that such sports as soccer can be ways to
help my child discover fair-mindedness and achieve fair play in the
midst of self-interest and benevolence, so I take her to soccer games.
Music, among its other merits, can instruct my child in the positive
benefits of discipline and repetition in the learning process. In each
of these instances, of course, I must be responsive to the child’s
abilities and interests in order to avoid coercion.
Orthodontics
is more problematic and points ahead to some of the difficulties with
genetic memory enhancement in a child. Should braces be necessary to
prevent illness or injury, I could approve. If orthodontics is used
strictly for aesthetic purposes, respect for the child’s autonomy could
be increased by waiting until the child is old enough to give more
fully informed consent to the procedure. Orthodontics for therapeutic
purposes does not require the cards to be turned down.
Decisions
on genetic memory enhancement in children may pose threats to the
common good as well as serious wrongs. For these decisions, the cards
are likely to be turned down to avoid the tyrannies of the majority,
the minority, and orthodoxy. I could agree with the cards-down
perspective in this case. When the cards are left up for some
practices, the ship of state can deteriorate into warfare. They were
left up too long on religious intolerance and slavery, and the result
in each case was civil war.
When in the past the cards have been
turned down following civil wars to address the serious wrongs of
slavery and religious intolerance, new definitions of what it means to
be a human person have been created. In a hypothetical, unanimous
agreement to prohibit genetic enhancement of a child’s memory I would
join a citizenry that exercises parental autonomy and — in the face of
a volatile new technology — defines a new way of understanding what it
means to be a human parent. My choice as a parent to serve as a link
between past and future human generations prompts me to pursue a
perspective of fairness in the application of this new technology — a
technology that incorporates self-interest and benevolence but makes
neither self-interest nor benevolence my primary motivation as a
parent. I could tell a coherent story to my child if I were able to
relate to that, with the cards down, people unanimously placed genetic
enhancement of a child’s average memory off the political agenda.