Table of Contents (Clicking on the links below will take you to those parts of this article)
1. Changing Modern Moral Philosophy: Anscombe, Williams and MacIntyre
a. Anscombe
In 1958 Elisabeth Anscombe published a paper titled "Modern
Moral Philosophy" that changed the way we think about normative
theories. She criticized modern moral
philosophy's pre-occupation with a law conception of ethics. A law
conception of ethics deals exclusively
with obligation and duty. Among the theories she
criticized for their reliance on universally applicable
principles were Mill's utilitarianism and
Kant's deontology. These theories rely on rules of morality that were claimed to be applicable to any
moral situation (i.e. Mill's Greatest
Happiness Principle and Kant's Categorical Imperative).
This approach to ethics relies on
universal principles and results in a rigid moral code. Further,
these rigid rules are based on a notion of obligation that is
meaningless in modern, secular society because they make no sense without assuming
the existence of a lawgiver--an assumption we no longer make.
In its place, Anscombe called for a return to a different way
of doing philosophy. Taking her inspiration from Aristotle, she
called for a return to concepts such as character, virtue and
flourishing. She also emphasized the importance of the emotions and
understanding moral psychology. With the exception of this emphasis on
moral psychology, Anscombe's recommendations that we place virtue more centrally in our
understanding of morality were taken up by a number of philosophers. The resulting
body of theories and ideas has come to be known as virtue ethics.
Anscombe's critical and confrontational set the scene for how virtue ethics
was to develop in its first few years. The philosophers who took up
Anscombe's call for a return to virtue saw their task as being to
define virtue ethics in terms of what it is not--i.e. how it differs
from and avoids the mistakes made by the other normative
theories. Before we go on to consider this in detail, we need to take a
brief look at two other philosophers, Bernard Williams and Alisdair
MacIntyre, whose call for theories of virtue was also instrumental in changing our understanding of moral philosophy.
b. Williams
Bernard Williams' philosophical work has always been
characterized by its ability to draw our attention to a previously
unnoticed but now impressively fruitful area for philosophical
discussion. Williams criticized how moral philosophy had developed. He drew a distinction between morality and ethics.
Morality is characterized mainly by the work of Kant and notions such as duty and obligation.
Crucially associated with the notion of obligation is the notion of
blame. Blame is appropriate because we are
obliged to behave in a certain way and if we are capable of conforming our conduct and fail to, we have violated our duty.
Williams was also concerned that such a
conception for morality rejects the possibility of luck. If morality is
about what we are obliged to do, then there is no
room for what is outside of our control. But sometimes attainment of the good life is dependant on things outside of our control.
In response, Williams takes a wider concept, ethics, and rejects the narrow and restricting concept
of morality. Ethics encompasses many emotions that are rejected by morality as irrelevant. Ethical
concerns are wider, encompassing friends, family and society and
make room for ideals such as social justice. This view of ethics is
compatible with the Ancient Greek interpretation of the good life as found in Aristotle and Plato.
c. MacIntyre
Finally, the ideas of Alistair MacIntyre
acted as a stimulus for the increased interest in virtue.
MacIntyre's project is as deeply critical of many of the
same notions, like ought, as Anscombe and Williams. However, he also
attempts to give an account of virtue. MacIntyre looks at a large
number of historical accounts of virtue that differ in their lists of
the virtues and have incompatible theories of the virtues. He concludes that these differences are attributable to different
practices that generate different conceptions of the virtues. Each
account of virtue requires a prior account
of social and moral features in order to be understood. Thus, in
order to understand Homeric virtue you need to look its social role
in Greek society. Virtues, then, are exercised within
practices that are coherent, social forms of activity and seek to
realize goods internal to the activity. The virtues enable us to
achieve these goods. There is an
end (or telos)
that transcends all particular practices and it constitutes the good of
a whole human life. That end is the virtue of integrity or
constancy.
These three writers have all, in their own way, argued for a
radical change in the way we think about morality. Whether they call
for a change of emphasis from obligation, a
return to a broad understanding of ethics, or a unifying tradition of
practices that generate virtues, their dissatisfaction with the state
of modern moral philosophy lay the foundation for change.
2. A Rival for Deontology and Utilitarianism
There are a number of different accounts
of virtue ethics. It is an emerging concept and was initially
defined by what it is not rather than what it is. The next
section examines claims virtue ethicists initially
made that set the theory up as a rival to deontology and
consequentialism.
a. How Should One Live?
Moral theories are concerned with right and wrong behavior. This subject area of
philosophy is unavoidably tied up with practical concerns about the
right behavior. However, virtue ethics changes the kind of question we
ask about ethics. Where deontology and consequentialism concern
themselves with the right action, virtue ethics is concerned with the
good life and what kinds of persons we should be. "What is the
right action?" is a significantly different question to ask from "How
should I live? What kind of person should I be?" Where the first type
of question deals with specific dilemmas,
the second is a question about an entire life. Instead
of asking what is the right act here and now, virtue ethics asks what
kind of person should I be in order to get it right all the time.
Whereas deontology and consequentialism are based on rules
that try to give us the right action, virtue ethics makes central use
of the concept of character. The answer to "How should
one live?" is that one should live virtuously, i.e. have a virtuous
character.
b. Character and Virtue
Modern virtue ethics takes its inspiration from the Aristotelian
understanding of character and virtue. Aristotelian character is,
importantly, about a state of being. It's about having the appropriate
inner states. For example, the virtue of kindness involves the right sort of
emotions and inner states with respect to our feelings towards others.
Character is also about doing. Aristotelian theory is a theory of
action, since having the virtuous inner dispositions will also involve
being moved to act in accordance with them. Realizing that kindness is
the appropriate response to a situation and feeling appropriately
kindly disposed will also lead to a corresponding attempt to act
kindly.
Another distinguishing feature of virtue ethics is that
character traits are stable, fixed, and reliable dispositions. If an
agent possesses the character trait of kindness, we would expect him or her to
act kindly in all sorts of situations, towards all kinds of people, and over a long period
of time, even when it is difficult to do
so. A person with a certain character can be relied upon to
act consistently over a time.
It is important to recognize that moral character develops over
a long period of time. People are born with all sorts of natural
tendencies. Some of these natural tendencies will be positive, such as
a placid and friendly nature, and some will be negative, such as an
irascible and jealous nature. These natural tendencies can be encouraged
and developed or discouraged and thwarted by the
influences one is exposed to when growing up. There are a number of
factors that may affect one's character development, such as one's
parents, teachers, peer group, role-models, the degree of encouragement
and attention one receives, and exposure to different situations. Our natural
tendencies, the raw material we are born with, are shaped and
developed through a long and gradual process of education and
habituation.
Moral education and development is a major part of virtue
ethics. Moral development, at least in its early stages, relies on the
availability of good role models. The virtuous agent acts as a role
model and the student of virtue emulates his or her example.
Initially this is a process of habituating oneself in right action.
Aristotle advises us to perform just acts because this way we become just.
The student of virtue must develop the right habits, so that he tends
to perform virtuous acts. Virtue is not itself a habit. Habituation is merely an aid to
the development of virtue, but true virtue requires choice,
understanding, and knowledge. The virtuous agent doesn't just act justly
out of an unreflective response, but has come to recognize the
value of virtue and why it is the appropriate response. Virtue is
chosen knowingly for its own sake.
The development of moral character may take a whole life-time. But once it is
firmly established, one will consistently, predictably, and appropriately in a variety of situations.
Aristotelian virtue is defined in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics
as a purposive disposition, lying in a mean and being determined by the
right reason.
As discussed above, Virtue is a settled disposition. It is also a purposive disposition.
A virtuous actor chooses virtuous action knowingly and for its own sake. It is not enough to act kindly by accident,
unthinkingly, or because everyone else is doing so; you must act kindly
because you recognize that this is the right way to behave. Note here
that although habituation is a tool for character development it is not
equivalent to virtue; virtue requires conscious choice and affirmation.
Virtue "lies in a mean" because the right response to each situation is neither too much nor too little.
Virtue is the appropriate response to different situations and different agents.
The virtues are associated with feelings. For example: courage is associated with fear,
modesty is associated with the feeling of shame, and friendliness associated with feelings about social
conduct. The virtue lies in a mean because it involves displaying
the mean amount of emotion, where mean stands for appropriate. (This
does not imply that the right amount is a modest amount. Sometimes
quite a lot may be the appropriate amount of emotion to display, as in
the case of righteous indignation). The mean amount
is neither too much nor too little and is sensitive to the
requirements of the person and the situation.
Finally, virtue is determined by the right reason. Virtue
requires the right desire and the right reason. To act from the wrong
reason is to act viciously.
On the other hand, the agent can try to act from the right reason, but
fail because he or she has the wrong desire. The virtuous agent acts effortlessly, perceives the right
reason, has the harmonious right desire, and has an inner state of
virtue that flows smoothly into action. The virtuous agent
can act as an exemplar of virtue to others.
It is important to recognize that this is a perfunctory
account of ideas that are developed in great detail in Aristotle.
They are related briefly here as they have been central to virtue
ethics' claim to put forward a unique and rival account to other
normative theories. Modern virtue ethicists have developed their
theories around a central role for character and virtue and claim that
this gives them a unique understanding of morality. The emphasis on
character development and the role of the emotions allows virtue ethics
to have a plausible account of moral psychology--which is lacking in
deontology and consequentialism. Virtue ethics can avoid the
problematic concepts of duty and obligation in favor of the rich
concept of virtue. Judgments of virtue are judgments of
a whole life rather than of one isolated action.
c. Anti-Theory and the Uncodifiability of Ethics
In the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle
warns us that the study of ethics is imprecise.
Virtue ethicists have challenged consequentialist and deontological
theories because they fail to accommodate this insight. Both
deontological and consequentialist type of theories rely on one rule or
principle that is expected to apply to all
situations. Because their principles are inflexible, they cannot accommodate the complexity of
all the moral situations that we are likely to encounter.
We are constantly faced with moral problems. For example: Should I tell my friend the truth about her lying boyfriend?
Should I cheat in my exams? Should I have an abortion? Should I save
the drowning baby? Should we separate the Siamese twins? Should I join
the fuel protests? All these problems are different and it seems unlikely that
we will find the solution to all of them by applying the
same rule. If the problems are varied,
we should not expect to find their solution in one rigid and inflexible
rule that does not admit exception. If the nature of the thing
we are studying is diverse and changing, then the answer cannot be any
good if it is inflexible and unyielding. The answer to "how should
I live?" cannot be found in one rule.
At best, for virtue ethics, there can be rules of thumb--rules that are true for the most part, but may not always be
the appropriate response.
The doctrine of the mean captures
exactly this idea. The virtuous response cannot be captured in a rule
or principle, which an agent can learn and then act virtuously. Knowing
virtue is a matter of experience, sensitivity, ability to perceive,
ability to reason practically, etc. and takes a long time to
develop. The idea that ethics cannot be captured in one rule or
principle is the "uncodifiability of ethics thesis."
Ethics is too diverse and imprecise to be captured in a rigid code, so
we must approach morality with a theory that is as flexible and
as situation-responsive as the subject matter itself. As a result some
virtue ethicists see themselves as anti-theorists, rejecting theories that systematically attempt to capture and organize all matters of practical or
ethical importance.
d. Conclusion
Virtue ethics initially emerged as a rival account to deontology
and consequentialism. It developed from dissatisfaction with the
notions of duty and obligation and their central roles in
understanding morality. It also grew out of an objection to the use of
rigid moral rules and principles and their application to diverse and
different moral situations. Characteristically, virtue ethics makes a
claim about the central role of virtue and character in its
understanding of moral life and uses it to answer the
questions "How should I live? What kind of person should I be?" Consequentialist theories are outcome-based and Kantian theories are
agent-based. Virtue ethics is character-based.
3. Virtue Ethical Theories
Raising objections to other normative theories and defining
itself in opposition to the claims of others, was the first stage in
the development of virtue ethics. Virtue ethicists then took up
the challenge of developing full fledged accounts of virtue that could stand on their own merits rather than simply
criticize consequentialism and deontology. These
accounts have been predominantly influenced by the Aristotelian
understanding of virtue. While some virtue ethics
take inspiration from Plato's, the Stoics', Aquinas', Hume's and
Nietzsche's accounts of virtue and ethics, Aristotelian conceptions of
virtue ethics still dominate the field. There are three main strands of development for virtue ethics: Eudaimonism, agent-based theories, and the ethics of care.
a. Eudaimonism
Eudaimonia is an Aristotelian term loosely (and
inadequately) translated as happiness. To understand its role in virtue
ethics we look to Aristotle's function argument.
Aristotle recognizes that actions are not pointless because they have an aim.
Every action aims at some good, For example: the doctor's vaccination
of the baby aims at the baby's health, Tim Henman works on his serve so
that he can win Wimbledon, and so on. Furthermore, some things are done
for their own sake (ends in themselves) and some things are done for
the sake of other things (means to other ends).
Aristotle claims that all the things that are ends in themselves also
contribute to a wider end, an end that is the greatest good of all. That good is eudaimonia.
Eudaimonia is happiness, contentment, and fulfillment; it s the name of the best kind of life, which is an end
in itself and a means to live and fare well.
Aristotle then observes that where a thing has a function the
good of the thing is when it performs its function well. For example,
the knife has a function, to cut, and it performs its function well
when it cuts well. This argument is applied to man: man has a function
and the good man is the man who performs his function well. Man's
function is what is peculiar to him and sets him aside from other
beings--reason. Therefore, the function of man is
reason and the life that is distinctive of humans is the life in
accordance with reason. If the function of man is reason, then the good
man is the man who reasons well. This is the life
of excellence or of eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is
the life of virtue--activity in accordance with reason,
man's highest function.
The importance of this point of eudaimonistic virtue ethics is that it reverses the relationship
between virtue and rightness. A utilitarian could accept the value of
the virtue of kindness, but only because someone with a kind
disposition is likely to bring about consequences that will maximize
utility. So the virtue is only justified because of the consequences it
brings about. In eudaimonist virtue ethics the virtues are justified
because they are constitutive elements of eudaimonia, i.e. human
flourishing and wellbeing, which is good in itself.
Rosalind Hursthouse developed one detailed
account of eudaimonist virtue ethics.
Hursthouse argues that the virtues make their possessor a
good human being. All living things can be evaluated qua
specimens of their natural kind. Like Aristotle, Hursthouse argues that
the characteristic way of human beings is the rational way: by their
very nature human beings act rationally, a characteristic that allows
us to make decisions and effect change in our character and allows
others to hold us responsible for those decisions. Acting virtuously,
i.e. acting in accordance with reason, is acting in the way
characteristic of the nature of human beings and this will lead to
eudaimonia. This means that the virtues benefit their possessor.
One might think that the demands of morality conflict with our
self-interest, as morality is other-regarding, but eudaimonist virtue
ethics presents a different picture. Human nature is such that virtue
is not exercised in opposition to self-interest, but rather is the quintessential component of human flourishing.
The good life for humans is the life of
virtue and therefore it is in our interest to be virtuous. It is not
just that the virtues lead to the good life (e.g. if you are good, you
will be rewarded), but rather a virtuous life is the good
life because the exercise of our rational capacities
and virtue is its own reward.
It is important to note, however, that there have been many
different ways of developing this idea of the good life and virtue
within virtue ethics. Philippa Foot, for example, grounds the virtues in what is
good for human beings. The virtues are beneficial to their possessor or
to the community (note that this is similar to MacIntyre's argument
that the virtues enable us to achieve goods within human practices). Rather than being constitutive of the good life, the virtues are
valuable because they contribute to it.
Another account is given by perfectionists such as Thomas
Hurka, who derive the virtues from the characteristics that most fully
develop our essential properties as human beings. Individuals are
judged against a standard of perfection that reflects very
rare or ideal levels of human achievement. The virtues realize our
capacity for rationality and therefore contribute to our well-being and
perfection in that sense.
b. Agent-Based Accounts of Virtue Ethics
Not all accounts of virtue ethics are eudaimonist. Michael
Slote has developed an account of virtue based on our common-sense
intuitions about which character traits are admirable. Slote makes a
distinction between agent-focused and agent-based theories.
Agent-focused theories understand the moral life in terms of what it is
to be a virtuous individual, where the virtues are inner dispositions.
Aristotelian theory is an example of an agent-focused theory. By
contrast, agent-based theories are more radical in that their evaluation
of actions is dependent on ethical judgments about the inner life of the agents who perform those
actions. There are a variety of human traits that we find admirable,
such as benevolence, kindness, compassion, etc. and we can identify
these by looking at the people we admire, our moral exemplars.
c. The Ethics of Care
Finally, the Ethics of Care is another influential version
of virtue ethics. Developed mainly by feminist writers, such as Annette
Baier, this account of virtue ethics is motivated by the thought
that men think in masculine terms such as justice
and autonomy, whereas woman think in feminine terms
such as caring. These theorists call for a change in how we view
morality and the virtues, shifting towards virtues exemplified by
women, such as taking care of others,
patience, the ability to nurture, self-sacrifice, etc. These virtues have been marginalized because society has not adequately valued the
contributions of women. Writings in this area do not always explicitly make a connection with
virtue ethics. There is much in their discussions, however, of specific
virtues and their relation to social practices and moral education, etc.,
which is central to virtue ethics.
d. Conclusion
There are many different accounts of virtue ethics. The three types discussed above are representative of the field.
There is a large field, however, of diverse writers developing other theories of virtue.
For example, Christine Swanton has developed a pluralist account of virtue ethics with connections to
Nietzsche. Nietzsche's theory emphasizes the inner self and provides a possible response to the call for a better understanding of moral psychology.
Swanton develops an account of self-love that allows her to distinguish true
virtue from closely related vices, e.g. self-confidence from vanity or
ostentation, virtuous and vicious forms of perfectionism, etc. She also
makes use of the Nietzschean ideas of creativity and expression to show
how different modes of acknowledgement are appropriate to the virtues.
Historically, accounts of virtue have varied widely. Homeric virtue
should be understood within the society within which it occurred. The
standard of excellence was determined from within the particular
society and accountability was determined by one's role within
society. Also, one's worth was comparative to others and competition was crucial in determining
one's worth.
Other accounts of virtue ethics are inspired from
Christian writers such as Aquinas and Augustine (see the
work of David Oderberg). Aquinas' account of the virtues is distinctive
because it allows a role for the will. One's will can be directed by
the virtues and we are subject to the natural law,
because we have the potential to grasp the truth of practical judgments.
To possess a virtue is to have the will to apply it and the
knowledge of how to do so. Humans are susceptible to evil and acknowledging this allows us to be receptive to the virtues of
faith, hope and charity--virtues of love that are significantly
different from Aristotle's virtues.
The three types of theories covered above developed over long
periods, answering many questions and often changed in response to criticisms. For
example, Michael Slote has moved away from agent-based virtue ethics to
a more Humean-inspired sentimentalist account of virtue ethics.
Humean accounts of virtue ethics rely on the motive of benevolence and
the idea that actions should be evaluated by the sentiments they express. Admirable sentiments are those that express a
concern for humanity. The interested reader must seek out the work of
these writers in the original to get a full appreciation of the depth
and detail of their theories.
4. Objections to Virtue Ethics
Much of what has been written on virtue ethics has been in
response to criticisms of the theory. The following section presents three objections and possible responses, based on bread ideas held in common by most accounts of virtue ethics.
a. Self-Centeredness
Morality is supposed to be about other people. It deals with our actions to the extent that they
affect other people. Moral praise and blame is attributed on the
grounds of an evaluation of our behavior towards others and the ways
in that we exhibit, or fail to exhibit, a concern for the well-being
of others. Virtue ethics, according to this objection, is
self-centered because its primary concern is with the agent's own character.
Virtue ethics seems to be essentially interested in the acquisition of the virtues
as part of the agent's own well-being and flourishing.
Morality requires us to consider others for
their own sake and not because they may benefit us. There seems to be
something wrong with aiming to behave compassionately, kindly, and
honestly because this will make me happier.
Related to this objection is a more general objection against
the idea that well-being is a master value and that all other things are
valuable only to the extent that they contribute to it. This line of
attack, exemplified in the writings of Tim Scanlon, objects
to the understanding of well-being as a moral notion and sees it more
like self-interest. Furthermore, well-being does not
admit to comparisons with other individuals. Thus, well-being cannot
play the role that eudaimonists would have it play.
This objection fails to appreciate the role of the
virtues within the theory. The virtues are other-regarding. Kindness, for example, is
about how we respond to the needs of others. The virtuous agent's
concern is with developing the right sort of character that will respond to the needs of others in an appropriate way. The
virtue of kindness is about being able to perceive situations where one
is required to be kind, have the disposition to respond kindly in a
reliable and stable manner, and be able to express one's kind character
in accordance with one's kind desires.
The eudaimonist account of virtue ethics claims that the good of the
agent and the good of others are not two
separate aims. Both rather result from the exercise of virtue. Rather than
being too self-centered, virtue ethics unifies what is
required by morality and what is required by self-interest.
b. Action-Guiding
Moral philosophy is concerned with practical issues.
Fundamentally it is about how we should act. Virtue ethics has criticized consequentialist and deontological
theories for being too rigid and inflexible because they rely on one
rule or principle. One reply to this is that these theories are action guiding. The existence of "rigid" rules is a strength, not a weakness
because they offer clear direction on what to do. As long as we know the principles, we can apply them to
practical situations and be guided by them. Virtue ethics, it is
objected, with its emphasis on the imprecise nature of ethics, fails to
give us any help with the practicalities of how we should behave. A
theory that fails to be action-guiding is no good as a moral theory.
The main response to this criticism is to stress the role of the virtuous agent as an
exemplar. Virtue ethics reflects the imprecise nature of ethics by
being flexible and situation-sensitive, but can also be action guiding
by observing the example of the virtuous agent. The virtuous
agent is the agent who has a fully developed moral character, who
possesses the virtues and acts in accordance with them, and we know what
to do by example. Further, virtue ethics places a lot of emphasis on the development of moral
judgment. Knowing what to do is not a matter of internalizing a
principle, but a life-long process of moral learning that will only
provide clear answers when one reaches moral maturity. Virtue ethics
cannot give us an easy, instant answer. This is because these
answers do not exist. Nonetheless, it can be action-guiding if we understand the
role of the virtuous agent and the importance of moral education and
development. If virtue consists of the right reason and the right
desire, virtue ethics will be action-guiding when we can perceive the
right reason and have successfully habituated our desires to affirm its
commands.
c. Moral Luck
Finally, there is a concern that virtue ethics leaves us hostage
to luck. Morality is about responsibility and the appropriateness of
praise and blame. However, we only praise and blame agents for actions taken under conscious choice.
The road to virtue is arduous and many things outside our control can
go wrong. Just as the right education, habits,
influences, examples, etc. can promote the development of virtue, the
wrong influencing factors can promote vice. Some people will be
lucky and receive the help and encouragement they
need to attain moral maturity, but others will not. If the development
of virtue (and vice) is subject to luck, is it fair to praise the
virtuous (and blame the vicious) for something that was outside of
their control? Further, some accounts of virtue are dependent
on the availability of external goods. Friendship with other virtuous
agents is so central to Aristotelian virtue that a life devoid
of virtuous friendship will be lacking in eudaimonia. However, we have
no control over the availability of the right friends. How can we then praise the
virtuous and blame the vicious if their development and respective
virtue and vice were not under their control?
Some moral theories try to eliminate the influence of luck on
morality (primarily deontology). Virtue ethics, however, answers this
objection by embracing moral luck. Rather than try to make morality immune to
matters that are outside of our control, virtue ethics recognizes the
fragility of the good life and makes it a feature of morality. It is
only because the good life is so vulnerable and fragile that it is so
precious. Many things can go wrong on the road to virtue, such that the
possibility that virtue is lost, but this vulnerability is an essential
feature of the human condition, which makes the attainment of the good
life all the more valuable.
5. Virtue in Deontology and Consequentialism
Virtue ethics offers a
radically different account to deontology and consequentialism. Virtue ethics, however, has influenced modern moral philosophy
to not only by developing a full-fledged account of virtue, but also has caused consequentialists
and deontologists to re-examine their own theories with view to
taking advantage of the insights of virtue.
For years Deontologists relied mainly on the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
for discussions of Kant's moral theory. The emergence of
virtue ethics caused many writers to re-examine
Kant's other works. Metaphysics of Morals, Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View and, to a lesser extent, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone,
have becomes sources of inspiration for the role of virtue in
deontology. Kantian virtue is in some respects similar to Aristotelian
virtue. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant stresses the importance of
education, habituation, and gradual development--all ideas that have
been used by modern deontologists to illustrate the common sense
plausibility of the theory. For Kantian, The main role of virtue and appropriate
character development is that a virtuous character will help one formulate appropriate maxims for testing.
In other respects, Kantian virtue remains rather dissimilar from other
conceptions of virtue. Differences are based on at least three
ideas: First, Kantian virtue is a struggle against emotions.
Whether one thinks the emotions should be subjugated or eliminated, for
Kant moral worth comes only from the duty of motive, a motive that
struggles against inclination. This is quite different from
the Aristotelian picture of harmony between reason and desire.
Second, for Kant there is no such thing as weakness of will,
understood in the Aristotelian sense of the distinction between
continence and incontinence. Kant concentrates on fortitude of will and
failure to do so is self-deception. Finally, Kantians need to give an
account of the relationship between virtue as occurring in the
empirical world and Kant's remarks about moral worth in the noumenal
world (remarks that can be interpreted as creating a contradiction
between ideas in the Groundwork and in other works).
Consequentialists have found a role for virtue as a disposition that
tends to promote good consequences. Virtue is not valuable
in itself, but rather valuable for the good consequences it tends to
bring about. We should cultivate virtuous dispositions because such
dispositions will tend to maximize utility. This is a radical departure
from the Aristotelian account of virtue for its own sake.
Some consequentialists, such as Driver, go even further and argue that
knowledge is not necessary for virtue.
Rival accounts have tried to incorporate the benefits of
virtue ethics and develop in ways that will allow them to respond to
the challenged raised by virtue ethics. This has led to very
fruitful and exciting work being done within this area of philosophy.
6. References and Further Reading
CHANGING MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY:
Anscombe G.E. M., "Modern Moral Philosophy", Philosophy, 33 (1958). The original call for a return to Aristotelian ethics.
MacIntyre A., After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1985). His first outline of his account of the virtues.
Murdoch I., The Sovereignty of Good (London: Ark, 1985)
Williams B., Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985). Especially Chapter 10 for the thoughts discussed in this paper.
OVERVIEWS OF VIRTUE ETHICS:
Oakley J., "Varieties of Virtue Ethics", Ratio, vol. 9 (1996)
Trianosky G.V. "What is Virtue Ethics All About?" in Statman D., Virtue Ethics (Cambridge: Edinburgh University Press, 1997)
VARIETIES OF VIRTUE ETHICS:
Adkins A.W.H., Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century (London: Chatto and Windus, 1972). An account of Homeric virtue.
Baier A., Postures of the Mind (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985)
Blum L.W., Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London: 1980)
Cottingham J., "Partiality and the Virtues", in Crisp R. and Slote M., How Should One Live? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)
Cottingham J., "Religion, Virtue and Ethical Culture", Philosophy, 69 (1994)
Cullity G., "Aretaic Cognitivism", American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 4, (1995a). Particularly good on the distinction between aretaic and deontic.
Cullity G., "Moral Character and the Iteration Problem", Utilitas, vol. 7, no. 2, (1995b)
Dent N.J.H., "The Value of Courage", Philosophy, vol. 56 (1981)
Dent N.J.H., "Virtues and Actions", The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 25 (1975)
Dent N.J.H., The Psychology of the Virtues (G.B.: Cambridge University Press, 1984)
Driver J., "Monkeying with Motives: Agent-based Virtue Ethics", Utilitas, vol. 7, no. 2 (1995). A critique of Slote's agent-based virtue ethics.
Foot P., Natural Goodness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001). Her more recent work, developing new themes in her account of virtue ethics.
Foot P., Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978). Her original work, setting out her version of virtue ethics.
Hursthouse R., "Virtue Theory and Abortion", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20, (1991)
Hursthouse R., On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 1999). A
book length account of eudaimonist virtue ethics, incorporating many of
the ideas from her previous work and fully developed new ideas and
responses to criticisms.
McDowell J., "Incontinence and Practical Wisdom in Aristotle", in Lovibond S and Williams S.G., Essays for David Wiggins, Aristotelian Society Series, Vol.16 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996)
McDowell J., "Virtue and Reason", The Monist, 62 (1979)
Roberts R.C., "Virtues and Rules", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LI, no. 2 (1991)
Scanlon T.M., What We Owe Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). A comprehensive criticism of well-being as the foundation of moral theories.
Slote M., From Morality to Virtue (New York: OUP, 1992). His original account of agent-based virtue ethics.
Slote M., Morals from Motives, (Oxford: OUP, 2001). A new version of sentimentalist virtue ethics.
Swanton C., Virtue Ethics (New York: OUP, 2003). A pluralist account of virtue ethics, inspired from Nietzschean ideas.
Walker A.D.M., "Virtue and Character", Philosophy, 64 (1989)
COLLECTIONS ON VIRTUE ETHICS:
Crisp R. and Slote M., How Should One Live? (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1996). A collection of more recent as well as critical
work on virtue ethics, including works by Kantian critics such as
O'Neill, consequentialist critics such as Hooker and Driver, an account
of Humean virtue by Wiggins, and others.
Crisp R. and Slote M., Virtue Ethics (New York: OUP, 1997). A collection of classic papers on virtue ethics, including Anscombe, MacIntyre, Williams, etc.
Engstrom S., and Whiting J., Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics
(USE: Cambridge University Press, 1996). A collection bringing together
elements from Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics on topics such as the
emotions, character, moral development, etc.
Hursthouse R., Lawrence G. and Quinn Warren, Virtues and Reasons
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). A collections of essays in honour of
Philippa Foot, including contributions by Blackburn, McDowell, Kenny,
Quinn, and others.
Rorty A.O., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (USA:
University of California Press, 1980). A seminal collection of papers
interpreting the ethics of Aristotle, including contributions by
Ackrill, McDowell and Nagel on eudaimonia, Burnyeat on moral
development, Urmson on the doctrine of the mean, Wiggins and Rorty on
weakness of will, and others.
Statman D., Virtue Ethics (Cambridge: Edinburgh
University Press, 1997). A collection of contemporary work on virtue
ethics, including a comprehensive introduction by Statman, an overview
by Trianosky, Louden and Solomon on objections to virtue ethics,
Hursthouse on abortion and virtue ethics, Swanton on value, and others.
VIRTUE AND MORAL LUCK:
Andree J., "Nagel, Williams and Moral Luck", Analysis 43 (1983). An Aristotelian response to the problem of moral luck.
Nussbaum M., Love's Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990)
Nussbaum M., The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986). Includes her original response to
the problem of luck as well as thoughts on rules as rules of thumb, the
role of the emotions, etc.
Statman D., Moral Luck (USA: State University of New
York Press, 1993). An excellent introduction by Statman as well as
almost every article written on moral luck, including Williams' and
Nagel’s original discussions (and a postscript by Williams).
VIRTUE IN DEONTOLOGY AND CONSEQUENTIALISM:
Baron M.W., Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology (USA:
Cornell University Press, 1995). A book length account of a neo-Kantian
theory that takes virtue and character into account.
Baron M.W., Pettit P. and Slote M., Three Methods of Ethics
(GB: Blackwell, 1997). Written by three authors adopting three
perspectives, deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics, this is
an excellent account of how the three normative theories relate to each
other.
Driver J., Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001). A book length account of a consequentialist
version of virtue ethics, incorporating many of her ideas from previous
pieces of work.
Herman B., The Practice of Moral Judgement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). Another neo-Kantian who has a lot to say on virtue and character.
Hooker B., Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2000). A modern version of rule-consequentialism, which is in
many respects sensitive to the insights of virtue.
O'Neill, "Kant’s Virtues", in Crisp R. and Slote M., How Should One Live? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). One of the first Kantian responses to virtue ethics.
Sherman N., The Fabric of Character (GB: Clarendon
Press, 1989). An extremely sympathetic account of Aristotelian and
Kantian ideas on the emotions, virtue and character.
Sherman N., Making a Necessity of Virtue (USA: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
