Selections from Meditations (Rene Descartes)
MEDITATION I.
OF THE THINGS OF WHICH WE MAY DOUBT.
...
it may be said, perhaps, that, although the senses occasionally mislead
us respecting minute objects, and such as are so far removed from us as
to be beyond the reach of close observation, there are yet many other
of their informations (presentations), of the truth of which it is
manifestly impossible to doubt; as for example, that I am in this
place, seated by the fire, clothed in a winter dressing gown, that I
hold in my hands this piece of paper, with other intimations of the
same nature. But how could I deny that I possess these hands and this
body, and withal escape being classed with persons in a state of
insanity, whose brains are so disordered and clouded by dark bilious
vapors as to cause them pertinaciously to assert that they are monarchs
when they are in the greatest poverty; or clothed [in gold] and purple
when destitute of any covering; or that their head is made of clay,
their body of glass, or that they are gourds? I should certainly be not
less insane than they, were I to regulate my procedure according to
examples so extravagant.[L][F]
5.
Though this be true, I must nevertheless here consider that I am a man,
and that, consequently, I am in the habit of sleeping, and representing
to myself in dreams those same things, or even sometimes others less
probable, which the insane think are presented to them in their waking
moments. How often have I dreamt that I was in these familiar
circumstances, that I was dressed, and occupied this place by the fire,
when I was lying undressed in bed? At the present moment, however, I
certainly look upon this paper with eyes wide awake; the head which I
now move is not asleep; I extend this hand consciously and with express
purpose, and I perceive it; the occurrences in sleep are not so
distinct as all this. But I cannot forget that, at other times I have
been deceived in sleep by similar illusions; and, attentively
considering those cases, I perceive so clearly that there exist no
certain marks by which the state of waking can ever be distinguished
from sleep, that I feel greatly astonished; and in amazement I almost
persuade myself that I am now dreaming.[L][F]
6.
Let us suppose, then, that we are dreaming, and that all these
particulars--namely, the opening of the eyes, the motion of the head,
the forth- putting of the hands--are merely illusions; and even that we
really possess neither an entire body nor hands such as we see.
Nevertheless it must be admitted at least that the objects which appear
to us in sleep are, as it were, painted representations which could not
have been formed unless in the likeness of realities; and, therefore,
that those general objects, at all events, namely, eyes, a head, hands,
and an entire body, are not simply imaginary, but really existent. For,
in truth, painters themselves, even when they study to represent sirens
and satyrs by forms the most fantastic and extraordinary, cannot bestow
upon them natures absolutely new, but can only make a certain medley of
the members of different animals; or if they chance to imagine
something so novel that nothing at all similar has ever been seen
before, and such as is, therefore, purely fictitious and absolutely
false, it is at least certain that the colors of which this is composed
are real. And on the same principle, although these general objects,
viz. [a body], eyes, a head, hands, and the like, be imaginary, we are
nevertheless absolutely necessitated to admit the reality at least of
some other objects still more simple and universal than these, of
which, just as of certain real colors, all those images of things,
whether true and real, or false and fantastic, that are found in our
consciousness (cogitatio) are formed.[L][F]
7.
To this class of objects seem to belong corporeal nature in general and
its extension; the figure of extended things, their quantity or
magnitude, and their number, as also the place in, and the time during,
which they exist, and other things of the same sort.[L][F]
8.
We will not, therefore, perhaps reason illegitimately if we conclude
from this that Physics, Astronomy, Medicine, and all the other sciences
that have for their end the consideration of composite objects, are
indeed of a doubtful character; but that Arithmetic, Geometry, and the
other sciences of the same class, which regard merely the simplest and
most general objects, and scarcely inquire whether or not these are
really existent, contain somewhat that is certain and indubitable: for
whether I am awake or dreaming, it remains true that two and three make
five, and that a square has but four sides; nor does it seem possible
that truths so apparent can ever fall under a suspicion of falsity [or
incertitude].[L][F]
9.
Nevertheless, the belief that there is a God who is all powerful, and
who created me, such as I am, has, for a long time, obtained steady
possession of my mind. How, then, do I know that he has not arranged
that there should be neither earth, nor sky, nor any extended thing,
nor figure, nor magnitude, nor place, providing at the same time,
however, for [the rise in me of the perceptions of all these objects,
and] the persuasion that these do not exist otherwise than as I
perceive them ? And further, as I sometimes think that others are in
error respecting matters of which they believe themselves to possess a
perfect knowledge, how do I know that I am not also deceived each time
I add together two and three, or number the sides of a square, or form
some judgment still more simple, if more simple indeed can be imagined?
But perhaps Deity has not been willing that I should be thus deceived,
for he is said to be supremely good. If, however, it were repugnant to
the goodness of Deity to have created me subject to constant deception,
it would seem likewise to be contrary to his goodness to allow me to be
occasionally deceived; and yet it is clear that this is permitted.[L][F]
...
[After
proving that God exists and is not a deceiver in Meditations 3 and 5,
Descartes claims in Meditation 6 that there is indeed a distinction
between the dream world and real world, namely that of waking
sense-experience. -GZ]
Meditation 6
....
And
I ought to reject all the doubts of those bygone days, as hyperbolical
and ridiculous, especially the general uncertainty respecting sleep,
which I could not distinguish from the waking state: for I now find a
very marked difference between the two states, in respect that our
memory can never connect our dreams with each other and with the course
of life, in the way it is in the habit of doing with events that occur
when we are awake. And, in truth, if some one, when I am awake,
appeared to me all of a sudden and as suddenly disappeared, as do the
images I see in sleep, so that I could not observe either whence he
came or whither he went, I should not without reason esteem it either a
specter or phantom formed in my brain, rather than a real man. But when
I perceive objects with regard to which I can distinctly determine both
the place whence they come, and that in which they are, and the time at
which they appear to me, and when, without interruption, I can connect
the perception I have of them with the whole of the other parts of my
life, I am perfectly sure that what I thus perceive occurs while I am
awake and not during sleep. And I ought not in the least degree to
doubt of the truth of these presentations, if, after having called
together all my senses, my memory, and my understanding for the purpose
of examining them, no deliverance is given by any one of these
faculties which is repugnant to that of any other: for since God is no
deceiver, it necessarily follows that I am not herein deceived. But
because the necessities of action frequently oblige us to come to a
determination before we have had leisure for so careful an examination,
it must be confessed that the life of man is frequently obnoxious to
error with respect to individual objects; and we must, in conclusion,
ac. knowledge the weakness of our nature